By its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, the Security Council requested me to establish a Commission of Experts to examine and analyse information gathered with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. On 26 October 1992 I appointed a five-member Commission, chaired by Professor Frits Kalshoven and, following the latter's resignation, by Professor Cherif Bassiouni. My report on the establishment of the Commission of Experts was submitted to the Council on 14 October 1992 (S/24657).

The Commission commenced its activities in November 1992 and concluded its work in April 1994. During this period it has held 12 sessions and conducted a series of studies and on-site investigations, using for that purpose offers of assistance from Governments and non-governmental organizations. The Commission also established a database designed to provide a comprehensive record of all reported grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. The two interim reports of the Commission, describing the status of its work and its preliminary conclusions were forwarded to the Security Council in my letters of 9 February 1993 (S/25274) and 5 October 1993 (S/26545).

The final report of the Commission includes a survey of the Commission's work since its inception, its mandate, structure and methods of work, its views on selected legal issues of particular significance in the context of the former Yugoslavia, a general study on the military structure of the "warring factions" and the strategies and tactics employed by them, and substantive findings on alleged crimes of "ethnic cleansing", genocide and other massive violations of elementary dictates of humanity, rape and sexual assault and destruction of cultural property committed in various parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On the basis of the information gathered, examined and analysed, the Commission has concluded that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law have been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on a large scale, and were particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. The practice of so-called "ethnic
cleansing" and rape and sexual assault, in particular, have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy, which may also be inferred from the consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their perpetrators.

The final report includes several annexes containing reports of investigations and studies, which as a whole constitute an integral part of the report. In his letter to me of 6 May 1994, the Chairman of the Commission requested that the annexes be published, although for cost purposes and given their volume (approximately 3,000 pages) it was suggested that they be published in English only and funded from the remaining surplus in the Trust Fund of the Commission of Experts.

I have examined the final report carefully, and I fully concur with the conclusions reached by the Commission. I, therefore, consider that the Commission has discharged its mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 780 (1992), and I am confident that the material collected and analysed by the Commission will greatly facilitate the task of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 in carrying out its mandate. Upon my instructions, the database and all of the information gathered by the Commission in the course of its work have been forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

In accordance with paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 780 (1992), I hereby transmit to the Council the final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992). The annexes will be forwarded to members of the Council as soon as they become available.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
Annex

FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

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I. MANDATE, STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF WORK

A. Mandate


2. Furthermore, in its resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, the Security Council requested the Commission, inter alia, to pursue actively its investigations on this matter, in particular the practice of "ethnic cleansing".

3. Having considered the recommendations in the interim report of the Commission of Experts (S/25274, annex I (hereinafter first interim report)), the Security Council decided in its resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. On 25 May 1993, the Council, by its resolution 827 (1993), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted the statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 contained in the report of the Secretary-General (S/25704, annex). To this effect, the Council requested the Commission, pending the appointment of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal, to continue on an urgent basis the collection of information relating to its mandate.

4. The Commission took note of references made to it by different organs and bodies of the United Nations system. Specifically, it took note of General Assembly resolution 47/147 of 18 December 1992, in which the Assembly reaffirmed that all persons who perpetrate or authorize crimes against humanity or other grave breaches of international humanitarian law are individually responsible for those breaches and that the international community would exert every effort to bring them to justice, and called upon all parties to provide all pertinent information to the Commission.

B. Composition

5. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 780 (1992), the Secretary-General submitted on 14 October 1992 a report to the Security Council (S/24657), in which he set out the manner in which he intended to implement the resolution. On 26 October 1992, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of the Chairman and four members of the Commission.

6. As of 26 October 1992, the Commission, whose members serve in their
personal capacity, consisted of Mr. Frits Kalshoven (Netherlands) as Chairman, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt), Mr. William J. Fenrick (Canada), Mr. Keba M'baye (Senegal) and Mr. Torkel Opsahl (Norway).

7. On 19 October 1993, owing to the resignation of Mr. Kalshoven for medical reasons and the untimely death of Mr. Opsahl, the Commission was reorganized. Subsequently, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Bassiouni as Chairman and Ms. Christine Cleiren (Netherlands) and Ms. Hanne Sophie Greve (Norway) as new members.

C. Internal working methods

8. Internal working methods of the Commission were defined in its rules of procedure adopted in January 1993 (S/25274, annex I, appendix).

9. The Commission has held 12 sessions, at which it discussed a number of substantive, methodological and organizational problems related to its mandate. 1/ At its final session, the Commission unanimously adopted the present report.

10. Pursuant to rule 10, paragraph 1, of its rules of procedure, the Commission appointed rapporteurs for several general and specific questions. Thus, Mr. Bassiouni was appointed Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of Facts; Mr. Fenrick, Rapporteur for On-site Investigations as well as Rapporteur on Issues of Law; and Ms. Greve, Rapporteur on the Prijedor Project. Mr. M'baye and Ms. Cleiren were assigned to study and report on the destruction of cultural property and on legal aspects of sexual assault, respectively.

11. Pursuant to rule 10, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure, the Commission submitted two interim reports to the Secretary-General, which were approved by the Commission at its third and seventh sessions respectively (S/25274, annex I, and S/26545, annex (hereinafter second interim report)).

D. Funding of the work of the Commission

12. The resources to finance the work of the Commission were provided in part from the regular budget of the United Nations (Office of Legal Affairs) and the Trust Fund for the Commission of Experts established on 26 March 1993 pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992).

13. While the Secretary-General had indicated that he would endeavour to meet the expenses of the Commission as far as possible through existing resources, the Commission was provided with additional funding for a period of 9 months, from 1 December 1992 to 31 August 1993. This funding covered the compensation and travel of the members, as well as the travel and subsistence of staff members assigned from the Office of Legal Affairs. The additional funding also provided for general temporary assistance and permitted the recruitment of two secretaries.

14. At the end of August 1993, after the expiration of the initial budget period, the Commission was informed that funds would be allocated to cover its
activities until 31 December 1993 from existing resources, namely, the budget of the Office of Legal Affairs.

15. At the beginning of 1994, the Commission was informed that there would be no allocation to cover the activities of the Commission from the regular budget and that only three Professional posts could be provided by the Office of Legal Affairs. All the other expenditures, including investigative missions and remuneration, travel and subsistence of the Secretariat staff, as well as remuneration of two secretaries and an administrative assistant, would be provided from the Trust Fund.

16. As stated above, the Secretary-General established on 26 March 1993 a Trust Fund to assist the Commission in its work. On 24 May 1993, he requested Governments to consider contributing to the Commission in terms of financial resources or personnel. The total amount of contributions to the Trust Fund was $1,320,631. The contributions to the Trust Fund, however, did not become effective before July/August 1993. Commission investigations were funded by the Trust Fund.

17. The Commission's database was financed exclusively through funds provided by DePaul University's International Human Rights Law Institute. That financing amounted to over $1 million as at 30 April 1994. 2/

E. Coordination and cooperation with other bodies and organizations

18. The Commission has endeavoured from the very beginning of its work to establish cooperation and coordination of its efforts with other United Nations bodies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned with the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It has noted in particular the call of the Commission on Human Rights, contained in its resolution 1992/S-2/1 of 1 December 1992, for the closest possible coordination with the Special Rapporteur of the Commission, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

F. Investigation methods employed by the Commission

19. The Commission employed three methods of investigation:

(a) Collection and analysis of information sent to or requested by the Commission;

(b) Undertaking of investigative missions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or in other countries in order to obtain additional information, take testimony and, as far as possible, verify facts;

(c) Information gathering on behalf of the Commission by certain Governments in different countries.
1. Collection and analysis of information

20. Pursuant to the requests contained in Security Council resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992) and through other sources, the Commission received over 65,000 pages of documentation, as well as printed and video information, containing allegations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (see annex I.A). In addition, the Commission has solicited documentation and supplemental information from various sources relating to the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The analysis of this large volume of allegations tends to confirm thereported large-scale victimization, although the Commission has not always been able to verify all the information contained in these reports.

21. From December 1992, the Commission set up a database designed to provide a comprehensive, consistent and manageable record of all reported alleged grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The in putting of information into the database was effected in the International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University (Chicago, United States of America) under the supervision of the Rapporteur for the Gathering and Analysis of Facts, who was also the President of the Institute and the Chairman of the Commission. The information was received from several Governments, which made official submissions, as well as from intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies. In addition, it included information received from United Nations bodies. The database also contained information from open sources and media reports.

22. The database has been transferred to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991.

2. Investigative missions

23. The other investigation method employed by the Commission was to conduct investigative missions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in other countries that had received refugees from the former Yugoslavia, in order to obtain additional information and to verify facts.

24. The Commission has undertaken 32 missions with the aim of either preparing for investigations or conducting them (see annex I.B). In all cases, missions were used to obtain additional information pertaining to the Commission's mandate.

3. Information gathering on behalf of the Commission by certain Governments

25. Several Governments assisted the Commission in gathering evidence, particularly in their respective countries. They are: Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States of America.
4. Confidentiality of information

26. The Commission received a number of confidential documents, especially testimonials of victims or of witnesses to grave breaches of international humanitarian law. In order to maintain the confidentiality of the information obtained, the Commission worked out a number of security procedures and took some practical measures to ensure them.

G. Plan of work of the Commission

27. The Commission, in its first interim report (S/25274, annex I, paras. 65 and 66), adopted a plan of work, which included:

(a) Updating of its database;
(b) Conducting selective in-depth investigations in the following areas:
(i) Mass killing and destruction of property;
(ii) Treatment of prisoners and detainees;
(iii) Systematic sexual assaults;
(iv) "Ethnic cleansing".

28. This plan of work was endorsed by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 9 February 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council (ibid.).

29. Subsequently, the Commission added to its specific projects a special case study on Prijedor.

30. Owing to personnel and time constraints, as well as limited financial resources, the Commission was compelled to adopt a selective approach in its work. It was not practicable to investigate exhaustively or otherwise attempt to verify every allegation of a violation of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In its choice and method of conducting research projects or investigations, the Commission endeavoured, at all times, to be both impartial and balanced.

H. Conclusion of the work of the Commission

31. In its resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council noted that pending the appointment of the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Commission should continue on an urgent basis the collection of information relating to its mandate. 3/

32. On 14 December 1993, the Commission was informed that in the light of the establishment of the International Tribunal and the appointment of its Prosecutor, the Commission should finalize its report and complete the transfer of its files, documents and database to the Tribunal by 30 April 1994.

33. As part of the conclusion of its work, the Commission has prepared for the transition with the Tribunal. By a letter dated 2 March 1994, the then
Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Office of Legal Affairs requested the Commission to transfer all information at its disposal to the Prosecutor's Office. The transfer of Commission documentation, files and equipment was completed by the time the present report was submitted to the Secretary-General.

I. Acknowledgements

34. The Commission wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the support it received from the following Governments: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Micronesia (Federated States of), Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

35. This support was in the nature of financial contributions to the Trust Fund, contributed personnel, officially submitted reports, assistance in taking testimony and general support of the Commission's investigations, particularly by the Governments of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

36. The Commission also wishes to acknowledge the logistical and administrative support of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

37. Lastly, the Commission gratefully acknowledges the contributions of many non-governmental organizations, not all of which can be specifically referred to in this report (see annex I.C for a complete list), but two deserve particular mention: Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch Helsinki.

J. Nature of the report

38. The Commission's mandate is unique in the history of the United Nations. It is also significantly broad.

39. The present report reflects only part of the extensive work and analysis done by the Commission under difficult and restrictive circumstances. The more complete record of its work and findings is contained in the annexes, which the Commission considers to be an integral part of the report.

40. The Commission expects that the Secretary-General will publish the annexes so that the present report will be complete.
II. APPLICABLE LAW

41. The Commission has chosen to comment on selected legal issues because of their particular significance for understanding the legal context related to violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Commission's mandate is to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of such violations and not to provide an analysis of the legal issues. It will be for the International Tribunal to make legal findings in connection with particular cases.

A. International/non-international character of the conflict

42. Classification of the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as international or non-international depends on important factual and legal issues. If a conflict is classified as international, then the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, 6/ including Additional Protocol I, 7/apply as well as violations of the laws and customs of war. The treaty and customary law applicable to international armed conflicts is well-established. The treaty law designed for internal armed conflicts is in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II of 1977, 8/ and article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 9/ These legal sources do not use the terms "grave breaches" or "war crimes". Further, the content of customary law applicable to internal armed conflict is debatable. As a result, in general, unless the parties to an internal armed conflict agree otherwise, the only offences committed in internal armed conflict for which universal jurisdiction exists are "crimes against humanity" and genocide, which apply irrespective of the conflicts' classification.

43. To date, the major conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia have occurred in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Determining when these conflicts are internal and when they are international is a difficult task because the legally relevant facts are not yet generally agreed upon. This task is one which must be performed by the International Tribunal.

44. However, as indicated in paragraph 45 of its first interim report, the Commission is of the opinion that the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among themselves, justifies the Commission's approach in applying the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

B. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols I and II

45. "Grave breaches" are specified major violations of international humanitarian law which may be punished by any State on the basis of universal jurisdiction. Grave breaches are listed in article 50 of the First Geneva Convention (wounded and sick), article 51 of the Second Geneva Convention (maritime), article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war), and
article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (civilians) of 1949. Grave breaches are also listed in articles 11, paragraph 4, and 85 of Additional Protocol I of 1977. The "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are only relevant during an international armed conflict. Common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II of 1977 are both applicable during internal armed conflicts, but neither of these documents makes any reference to grave breaches.

46. Under all four Conventions, grave breaches prohibit, inter alia, wilful killing, torture, rape or inhuman treatment of protected persons, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

47. In the case of prisoners of war, it is also a grave breach to compel a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile power or to deprive him of his rights to a fair and regular trial. In the case of civilians in the hands of the adverse party, it is also a grave breach to:

(a) Unlawfully deport or transfer a protected person;
(b) Unlawfully confine a protected person;
(c) Compel a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
(d) Wilfully deprive a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed;
(e) Take hostages.

48. Article 11 of Additional Protocol I makes a number of medical practices grave breaches of the Protocol.

49. Under article 85, paragraph 3, of Additional Protocol I, the following acts constitute grave breaches if committed wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of the Protocol, and causing death or serious injury to body or health:

"(a) Making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack;

"(b) Launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects ...;

"(c) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects ...;

"(d) Making non-defended localities and demilitarized zones the object of attack;
"(e) Making a person the object of attack in the knowledge that he is hors de combat;

"(f) The perfidious use ... of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other protective signs recognized by the Conventions or this Protocol."

50. Additional Protocol I also provides, in article 85, paragraph 4 that certain acts are grave breaches when committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions or Protocol, namely:

"(a) The transfer by an Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into occupied territory it occupies or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of that territory within or out of this territory ...;

"(b) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or civilians;

"(c) Practices of apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination;

"(d) Making the clearly-recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been given by special arrangement, ... the object of attack, causing as a result extensive destruction thereof, where there is no evidence of (prior use of such objects in support of the adverse party's military effort), and when such (places) are not located in the immediate proximity of military objectives;

"(e) Depriving any person protected by the Conventions (or the Protocol) of fair and regular trial."

51. It must be noted that the statute of the International Tribunal refers to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in article 2 and to violations of the laws or customs of war in article 3. It does not refer explicitly to grave breaches of Additional Protocol I. Many of the grave breaches of Additional Protocol I also constitute violations of the laws and customs of war.

C. Customary international law of armed conflict

52. It is necessary to distinguish between customary international law applicable to international armed conflict and to internal armed conflict. The treaty-based law applicable to internal armed conflicts is relatively recent and is contained in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol II, and article 19 of the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property. It is unlikely that there is any body of customary international law applicable to internal armed conflict which does not find its root in these treaty provisions. It is probable that common article 3 would be viewed as a statement of customary international law, but unlikely that the other instruments would be so viewed. In particular, there does not appear to be a customary international
law applicable to internal armed conflicts which includes the concept of war crimes.

53. The body of customary international law applicable to international armed conflicts includes the concept of war crimes, and a wide range of provisions also stated in Hague Convention IV of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and, to some extent, the provisions of Additional Protocol I.

54. It must be observed that the violations of the laws or customs of war referred to in article 3 of the statute of the International Tribunal are offences when committed in international, but not in internal armed conflicts.

D. Command responsibility

55. The Commission addressed the matter of command responsibility in paragraphs 51 through 53 of its first interim report as follows:

"51. A person who gives the order to commit a war crime or crime against humanity is equally guilty of the offence with the person actually committing it. This principle, expressed already in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, applies to both the military superiors, whether of regular or irregular armed forces, and to civilian authorities.

"52. Superiors are moreover individually responsible for a war crime or crime against humanity committed by a subordinate if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude, in the circumstances at the time, that the subordinate was committing or was going to commit such an act and they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the act.

"53. Military commanders are under a special obligation, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command or other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress such acts and to report them to competent authorities."

56. The Commission notes with satisfaction that article 7 of the statute of the International Tribunal uses an essentially similar formulation.

57. The doctrine of command responsibility is directed primarily at military commanders because such persons have a personal obligation to ensure the maintenance of discipline among troops under their command. Most legal cases in which the doctrine of command responsibility has been considered have involved military or paramilitary accused. Political leaders and public officials have also been held liable under this doctrine in certain circumstances.

58. It is the view of the Commission that the mental element necessary when the commander has not given the offending order is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal dereliction on the part of the commander as to constitute willful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive knowledge, that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have
known of the offences charged and acquiesced therein. To determine whether or not a commander must have known about the acts of his subordinates, one might consider a number of indices, including:

(a) The number of illegal acts;
(b) The type of illegal acts;
(c) The scope of illegal acts;
(d) The time during which the illegal acts occurred;
(e) The number and type of troops involved;
(f) The logistics involved, if any;
(g) The geographical location of the acts;
(h) The widespread occurrence of the acts;
(i) The tactical tempo of operations;
(j) The modus operandi of similar illegal acts;
(k) The officers and staff involved;
(l) The location of the commander at the time.

59. The military commander is not absolutely responsible for all offences committed by his subordinates. Isolated offences may be committed of which he has no knowledge or control whatsoever. As a fundamental aspect of command, however, a commander does have a duty to control his troops and to take all practicable measures to ensure that they comply with the law. The arguments that a commander has a weak personality or that the troops assigned to him are uncontrollable are invalid. In particular, a military commander who is assigned command and control over armed combatant groups who have engaged in war crimes in the past should refrain from employing such groups in combat, until they clearly demonstrate their intention and capability to comply with the law in the future. Thus, a commander has a duty to do everything reasonable and practicable to prevent violations of the law. Failure to carry out such a duty carries with it responsibility.

60. Lastly, a military commander has the duty to punish or discipline those under his command whom he knows or has reasonable grounds to know committed a violation.
E. Superior orders

61. In paragraph 54 of its first interim report, the Commission made the following statement:

"54. A subordinate who has carried out an order of a superior or acted under government instructions and thereby has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity, may raise the so-called defence of superior orders, claiming that he cannot be held criminally liable for an act he was ordered to commit. The Commission notes that the applicable treaties unfortunately are silent on the matter. The Commission's interpretation of the customary international law, particularly as stated in the Nuremberg principles, is that the fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact available to him."

62. The Commission notes with satisfaction that article 7, paragraph 4, of the statute of the International Tribunal adopts an essentially similar approach on this subject.

F. Reprisals

63. A reprisal must be distinguished from a simple act of retaliation or vengeance. An unlawful act committed under the guise of retaliation or vengeance remains unlawful, and the claim of retaliation or vengeance is no defence.

64. A reprisal is an otherwise illegal act resorted to after the adverse party has himself indulged in illegal acts and refused to desist therefrom after being called upon to do so. The purpose of a reprisal is to compel the adverse party to terminate its illegal activity. It must be proportionate to the original wrongdoing and must be terminated as soon as the original wrongdoer ceases his illegal actions. The proportionality is not strict, for if the reprisal is to be effective, it will often be greater than the original wrongdoing. Nevertheless, there must be a reasonable relationship between the original wrong and the reprisal measure.

65. However, reprisals against the following categories of persons and objects are specifically prohibited:

(a) The wounded, sick, personnel, buildings or equipment protected by the First Geneva Convention (art. 46);

(b) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons, the personnel, the vessels and equipment protected by the Second Geneva Convention (art. 47);

(c) Prisoners of war (Third Geneva Convention, art. 13 and Additional Protocol I, art. 44);
(d) Civilians in the hands of a party to the conflict of which they are not nationals, including inhabitants of occupied territory (Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 33 and Additional Protocol I, art. 73);

(e) Civilians (Additional Protocol I, art. 51, para. 6);

(f) Civilian objects (Additional Protocol I, art. 52, para. 1);

(g) Cultural objects and places of worship (Additional Protocol I, art. 53 (c));

(h) Objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population (Additional Protocol I, art. 54, para. 4);

(i) The natural environment (Additional Protocol I, art. 55, para. 2);

(j) Works and installations containing dangerous forces (Additional Protocol I, art. 56, para. 4).

66. There is no ban on reprisals contained in common article 3 and Additional Protocol II applicable to internal armed conflict. In international armed conflicts to which the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply, lawful reprisals as defined above must be directed exclusively against combatants or other military objectives subject to the limitations contained in the Geneva Conventions, Protocol I and customary international law of armed conflicts. In international armed conflicts where Additional Protocol I does not apply, reprisals may be directed against a much wider category of persons and objects, but subject to the limitations of customary international law of armed conflicts.

G. Interference with humanitarian aid convoys

67. Interference with humanitarian aid convoys is a practice which has been all too prevalent in the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

68. The Commission is of the view that, when and where the law relating to international armed conflicts applies, the provisions of article 54 of Additional Protocol I are also applicable. This article states in part:

"1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.

"2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away or for any other motive."
69. The use of starvation as a method of war, regardless of the modalities used, is also contrary to the customary law applicable in international armed conflicts.

70. The Commission also considers article 70, paragraphs 2 to 4, of Additional Protocol I to apply:

"2. The parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the adverse party.

"3. The parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow the passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:

"(a) Shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;

"(b) May make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;

"(c) Shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.

"4. The parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution."

71. The Commission deplores any acts taken to interfere with humanitarian aid convoys, as the safe and expeditious passage of these convoys is essential to the well-being of the civilian population.

H. Crimes against humanity

72. Article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal affirms the competence of the International Tribunal to prosecute persons committing "crimes against humanity", which are defined as specified acts "committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population," such as national, political, ethnic, racial or religious groups.

73. The definition of "crimes against humanity" in article 5 of the statute codifies accepted principles of international law applicable erga omnes. As ascertained by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, there are "elementary dictates of humanity" to be recognized under all circumstances. The General Assembly in its resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.
74. The Nuremberg application of "crimes against humanity" was a response to the shortcoming in international law that many crimes committed during the Second World War could not technically be regarded as war crimes stricto sensu on account of one or several elements, which were of a different nature. It was, therefore, conceived to redress crimes of an equally serious character and on a vast scale, organized and systematic, and most ruthlessly carried out.

1. Armed conflict

75. Crimes against humanity apply to all contexts. They are not, therefore, confined to situations of international armed conflict, but also apply to all armed conflicts including internal ones - civil wars and insurrection - and whatever casus mixtus may arise in between internal and international armed conflict. Thus, it includes all armed conflicts, whether they are of an international or non-international character. However, not every act committed by force of arms is an armed conflict; a genuine armed conflict has to be distinguished from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection. Crimes against humanity are also no longer dependent on their linkage to crimes against peace or war crimes.

76. Articles 2 and 3 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 address grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and violations of the laws and customs of war. Article 5, which concerns crimes against humanity, contains minimum provisions which must be respected, a fortiori, whether or not articles 2 or 3 are applicable to a specific conflict.

2. Protected persons

77. Article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal protects "any civilian population", which undoubtedly includes the whole of the populations of the area afflicted by the armed conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion. Refugees are not different from other civilians, and as such are protected within the meaning of "civilian population". "Civilian population" is used in this context in contradistinction to combatants or members of armed forces.

78. It seems obvious that article 5 applies first and foremost to civilians, meaning people who are not combatants. This, however, should not lead to any quick conclusions concerning people who at one particular point in time did bear arms. One practical example: in the former Yugoslavia, large-scale arbitrary killings were one of the hallmarks of attacks by a given group. Information about such arbitrary killings was then used by the same group to instill fear and demand total subjugation of the other group in other areas as well. Many of the most barbarous onslaughts on villages started with heavy artillery bombardments followed by the villages being stormed by infantry in tandem, while paramilitary groups sought the inhabitants in each and every house. A head of family who under such circumstances tries to protect his family gun-in-hand does not thereby lose his status as a civilian. Maybe the same is the case for the
sole policeman or local defence guard doing the same, even if they joined hands
to try to prevent the cataclysm. Information of the overall circumstances is
relevant for the interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its
purpose. Under such circumstances, the distinction between improvised
self-defence and actual military defence may be subtle, but none the less
important. This is no less so when the legitimate authorities in the area - as
part and parcel of an overall plan of destruction - had previously been given an
ultimatum to arm all the local defence guards.

79. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated the following
concerning crimes against humanity and the importance of the overall
circumstances:

"The defendant contends that stealing the personal property of Jews
and other concentration camp inmates is not a crime against humanity.
But under the circumstances which we have here related (emphasis added),
this plea is and must be rejected. What was done was done pursuant to a
government policy, and the thefts were part of a program of extermination
and were one of its objectives. It would be a strange doctrine indeed,
if, where part of the plan and one of the objectives of murder was to
obtain the property of the victim, even to the extent of using the hair
from his head and the gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took part in
disposing of the loot must be exonerated and held not guilty as a
participant in the murder plan. Without doubt all such acts are crimes
against humanity and he who participates or plays a consenting part
therein is guilty of a crime against humanity." 11/

80. It is significant to note that Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of
1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
addresses "fundamental guarantees" in article 4 and includes in the protected
group "all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take
part in hostilities".

3. Acts constituting crimes against humanity

81. The different acts constituting crimes against humanity are enumerated in
article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Such acts are:
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds and other inhumane
acts". "Other inhumane acts"covers serious crimes of a nature similar to the
other crimes cited. It is not equally obvious if the eiusdem generis principle
of interpretation will rule out a wider interpretation. It is necessary to
ascertain that the acts included in the concept of "crimes against humanity"
correspond to what is already considered part of international customary law.

82. In the context of crimes against humanity, it is relevant to observe that
the same kind of prohibited acts listed in common article 3 (relevant to
conflicts not of an international character) in the four Geneva Conventions of
1949, and in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions are mere codification of
elementary dictates of humanity. Article 3 prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituent court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples". Article 4 bans "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assaults; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; pillage; and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts". The former Yugoslavia signed Protocol II on 11 June 1979 and ratified it that same day, without reservations, declarations or objections.

83. Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations where there exists an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, which are preconditions for genocide. Crimes against humanity are, however, serious international violations directed against the protected persons, in contra distinction to a fate befalling them merely as a side-effect, for example, of a military operation dictated by military necessity.

4. Widespread and systematic nature of the acts

84. Isolated acts constituting offences, such as extra-judicial executions or other common crimes punishable under municipal law, do not qualify as crimes against humanity by themselves. The acts must be part of a policy of persecution or discrimination. In addition, the acts must be carried out in a systematic way or by means of a mass action. Thus, the number of victims and perpetrators are characteristically high. Because the perpetrators have a common plan containing the elements described above, they need not resort to the same means or acts against their victims. It is the systematic process of victimization against the protected group which is essential. For example, a number of interviewees reported that some persons had been crucified, but it is not necessary that all victims of the protected group be crucified or that this particular inhumane act be recognized in and of itself to be part of a crime against humanity. It is the overall context of large-scale victimization carried out as part of a common plan or design which goes to the element of systematicity.

85. It should be noted that the ensuing upsurge in crimes that follows a general breakdown of law and order does not qualify as crimes against humanity. However, a general breakdown in law and order may be a premeditated instrument, a situation carefully orchestrated to hide the true nature of the intended harm. Thus, it should not be accepted at face value that the perpetrators are merely uncontrolled elements, especially not if these elements target almost exclusively groups also otherwise discriminated against and persecuted. Unwillingness to manage, prosecute and punish uncontrolled elements may be
another indication that these elements are, in reality, but a useful tool for the implementation of a policy of crime against humanity.

86. Crimes against humanity may also amount to extermination of national, ethnical, racial, religious or other groups, whether or not the intent that makes such crimes punishable as genocide can be proven. They may also, through inhumane acts, amount to large-scale human degradation. The scale and nature of such crimes become of special significance and of concern to the international community because of the abhorrent character of the overall policy, the means employed to carry out the policy and the number of victims it produces.

I. Genocide

87. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that "genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world", and that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity". 12/

88. The Convention was manifestly adopted for humanitarian and civilizing purposes. Its objectives are to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and to affirm and emphasize the most elementary principles of humanity and morality. In view of the rights involved, the legal obligations to refrain from genocide are recognized as erga omnes.

89. When the Convention was drafted, it was already envisaged that it would apply not only to then existing forms of genocide, but also "to any method that might be evolved in the future with a view to destroying the physical existence of a group". 13/ As emphasized in the preamble to the Convention, genocide has marred all periods of history, and it is this very tragic recognition that gives the concept its historical evolutionary nature.

90. The Convention must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their context, and in the light of its object and purpose. Moreover, the text of the Convention should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every word. No word or provision may be disregarded or treated as superfluous, unless this is absolutely necessary to give effect to the terms read as a whole. 14/

91. Genocide is a crime under international law regardless of "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war" (art. I). Thus, irrespective of the context in which it occurs (for example, peace time, internal strife, international armed conflict or whatever the general overall situation) genocide is a punishable international crime.

92. The acts specified in the Convention must be "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" (art. II).
1. The extent of destruction of a group

93. Destruction of a group in whole or in part does not mean that the group in its entirety must be exterminated. The words "in whole or in part" were inserted in the text to make it clear that it is not necessary to aim at killing all the members of the group. 15/

94. If essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it could also amount to genocide. Such leadership includes political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders and others - the totality per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the group. If a group has its leadership exterminated, and at the same time or in the wake of that, has a relatively large number of the members of the group killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example deported on a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose. Similarly, the extermination of a group's law enforcement and military personnel may be a significant section of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless against other abuses of a similar or other nature, particularly if the leadership is being eliminated as well. Thus, the intent to destroy the fabric of a society through the extermination of its leadership, when accompanied by other acts of elimination of a segment of society, can also be deemed genocide.

2. The groups protected

95. National, ethnical, racial or religious groups are all protected. The different groups relevant to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia - the Serbs, the Croats, the Muslims, the Gypsies and others - all have status as ethnic groups, and may, at least in part, be characterized by religion, ethnicity and nationality. It is not a condition that the victim group be a minority, it might as well be a numerical majority.

96. If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The case being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to destroy in whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not belong to the national, ethnic, racial or religious group A. In a sense, group A has defined a pluralistic non-A group using national, ethnic, racial and religious criteria for the definition. It seems relevant to analyse the fate of the non-A group along similar lines as if the non-A group had been homogenous. This is important if, for example, group B and to a lesser degree group C have provided the non-A group with all its leaders. Group D, on the other hand, has a more marginal role in the non-A group community because of its small numbers or other reasons. Genocide, "an odious scourge" which the Convention intends "to liberate mankind from" (preamble), would as a legal concept be a weak or even useless instrument if the overall circumstances of mixed groups were not
covered. The core of this reasoning is that in one-against-everyone-else cases the question of a significant number or a significant section of the group must be answered with reference to all the target groups as a larger whole.

3. Intent

97. It is the element of intent to destroy a designated group in whole or in part, which makes crimes of mass murder and crimes against humanity qualify as genocide. To be genocide within the meaning of the Convention, the crimes against a number of individuals must be directed at their collectivity or at them in their collective character or capacity. This can be deduced from the words "as such" stated in article II of the Convention (see para. 92 above). In most countries, penal codes do not regard motives, rather only intent, as the subjective or mental constituent element of a crime. Motive and intent may be closely linked, but motive is not mentioned in the Convention. The necessary element of intent may be inferred from sufficient facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of actions or omissions of such a degree that the defendant may reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his or her conduct, which goes to the establishment of intent, but not necessarily motive.

4. Acts constituting the crime of genocide

98. The different acts constituting the crime of genocide are enumerated in article II of the Convention. Such acts are: "killing members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group". Each of these categories of acts can constitute the crime of genocide, as could any combination of these acts.

5. Punishable acts

99. Article III of the Convention lists the punishable acts as being: "genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct or public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide". This enumeration indicates how far the crime needs to have advanced before it becomes punishable. For example, an attempt will suffice. Secondly, it describes what kind of involvement in actual genocide may result in penal responsibility under the Convention. Thus, criminal responsibility extends to those involved in incitement, conspiracy and attempt, as well as individuals actually executing the specific acts prohibited by the Convention. Political masterminds or propaganda people are no less responsible than the individuals who perform the actual carnage. There are, therefore, several legal bases for criminal responsibility of individuals who engage in or are part of the various aspects of genocide.
6. Culpability

100. It is explicitly stated in the Convention that people who have committed genocide shall be punished whether they are "constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals" (art. IV). Public officials include both civilian and military personnel and everyone who holds (or held) a public office - be it legislative, administrative or judicial. To meet the aims of the Convention, people in the said categories must be treated equally irrespective of their de jure or de facto positions as decision-makers. As individuals, they are subject to prosecution like any other individual violator. They cannot hide behind any shield of immunity. The legal and moral responsibilities are the same and the need to prevent genocide no less clear because of the position of the violator.

7. The statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991

101. Article 4 of the statute of the International Tribunal affirms the competence of the International Tribunal to prosecute persons committing genocide. The definition of genocide in article 4 of the statute is identical to the provisions of the Genocide Convention.

J. Legal aspects of rape and other sexual assaults 16/

102. Rape constitutes a crime under international humanitarian law as well as under the criminal laws of the various republics which constituted the former Yugoslavia. It is also part of the substantive applicable law of the statute of the International Tribunal where it is referred to in several articles. 17/

103. Unlike most codified penal laws in the world, in international humanitarian law rape is not precisely defined. But on the basis of the contemporary criminal laws of the world's major criminal justice systems, the Commission considers rape to be a crime of violence of a sexual nature against the person. This characteristic of violence of a sexual nature also applies to other forms of sexual assault against women, men 18/ and children, 19/ when these activities are performed under coercion or threat of force and include sexual mutilation. 20/ It should be noted that irrespective of their definition, acts of sexual assault against women, men and children are prohibited by international humanitarian law through normative provisions prohibiting violence against the physical integrity and dignity of the person. Therefore, rape and other sexual assaults are covered in pari materia.

104. Even though sexual assaults imply the commission of the crime by a given perpetrator, persons who do not perform the act but are indirectly involved in the commission of this crime, like decision-makers and superiors, are also responsible under the Genocide Convention (art. III) and general norms of command responsibility (see paras. 55-60).
105. Violations of the laws and customs of war applicable to conflicts of an international character are contained in a number of international instruments. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land deals with the question of sexual assaults in article 46: "Family honour and rights, the lives of persons and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected." The Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits rape in article 27. The Commission deems that article 147 of the same Convention on "grave breaches" includes rape and other sexual assaults as constituting "torture or inhumane treatment" and that they are also prohibited because they are among those acts "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health". Furthermore, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions contains in article 76 an express prohibition of rape and other sexual assaults. In addition, such practices which are based on racial discrimination also constitute "grave breaches" under article 85, paragraph 4 of Protocol I, which holds that "inhuman and degrading practices involving outrage upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination" are prohibited. It is also considered that article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention constitutes part of customary international law, thus also establishing a basis for universal jurisdiction. Furthermore, it should be noted with respect to Protocol I, that the provisions of article 85, when violated on the basis of racial discrimination, also constitute a violation of customary international law. Under all of these provisions, a single act of rape or sexual assault constitutes a war crime. As a "grave breach", this type of violation falls under universal jurisdiction. The perpetrator, however, must be a person who is linked to one of the parties to the conflict and the victim must be linked to another party to the conflict or be a citizen of a neutral State. It is also held that article 76 of Protocol I is applicable to victims who are not protected by other provisions of the four Geneva Conventions.

106. With respect to provisions applicable to conflicts of a non-international character, common article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions applies, as does article 4, paragraph 2 of Protocol II. Both of these provisions include a prohibition against rape and other sexual assaults in so far as they constitute wilful injury to the person. A single act is enough to constitute such a violation when the perpetrator is linked to one of the parties to the conflict and the victim is linked to another party to the conflict or is a citizen of a neutral State. Under Protocol II, such prohibited acts constitute a violation when the conflict takes place "in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol" (art. 1, para. 1).

107. Two other sources of international humanitarian law apply to the prohibition of sexual assault and rape irrespective of the nature and characterization of the conflict. They are the conventional and customary law of "crimes against humanity" and the Genocide Convention. With respect to crimes against humanity, sexual assaults and rape fall within the meaning of other inhumane acts. However, the prohibited conduct must be part of an overall policy of persecution based on ethnic or religious grounds against a civilian population. Under the Genocide Convention, sexual assault and rape are included with in the meaning of article II of the Convention, provided that the prohibited
conduct is committed as part of an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group". Under both crimes against humanity and the Genocide Convention, such prohibited acts are subject to universal jurisdiction. It is also well-established that both of these sources of international humanitarian law are considered part of jus cogens and are, therefore, binding under customary international law.

108. The parties to this conflict are bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, both under State succession and by the parties' specific accession thereto. The parties are also bound by the Genocide Convention under State succession in so far as that convention has been ratified by the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The parties are bound by that Convention under jus cogens and customary international law. The parties are also bound under jus cogens and customary international law by the obligations arising under crimes against humanity, as developed in conventional and customary international law.

109. The Commission concludes that there is no doubt about the prohibition of rape and sexual assault in the Geneva Conventions and other applicable sources of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the Commission finds that the relevant provisions of the statute of the International Tribunal adequately and correctly state the applicable law to this crime.

III. GENERAL STUDIES

A. The military structure of the warring factions and the strategies and tactics they employ

110. The military conflicts in the former Yugoslavia must be examined on the basis of their evolution, which involved different parties at various times, operating in separate, though frequently interrelated, theatres of operation.

111. The first phase involved the conflict in Slovenia. The conflict began when that Republic declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. That conflict involved the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Slovenia Territorial Defence Forces — Slovenian troops who left JNA to join the newly created Slovenian Army — and local Slovenian Police. This phase lasted for only a few weeks, in June and July 1991.

112. The second phase of the conflict, involving Croatia, started before that Republic officially declared its independence on 25 July 1991. On one side, that conflict involved JNA, Serb militia in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia, special forces from Serbia (with the participation of Serb expatriates and mercenaries), local special forces, and Serb police and armed civilians from the same areas. On the other side, the newly formed Croatian Army consisted of Croatian troops who left JNA, the Croatian National Guard, local militia; special forces consisting of expatriate Croats and mercenaries, and local Croatian police and armed civilians. After November 1991, JNA formally withdrew from Croatia, but continued to support the newly formed, self-proclaimed "Serb Republic of Krajina" army. Meanwhile, the newly established Republic of Croatia had formed its army, the Croatian Army, which, along with Croatian special forces
and others, continued the armed conflict in what became the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) in Croatia.

113. The third phase of the conflict began in Bosnia and Herzegovina following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992. It simultaneously involved fighting between Croatian and Bosnian Government forces, Bosnian Government and Serbian forces, and Croatian and Serbian forces. The Croatian Defence Council forces in the Bosnian and Herzegovina are supported by the Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and "special forces" like the military wing of the Croatian Party of Rights (HOS) (named after the former Ustashe of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area). Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. At first, the Bosnian Government and JNA opposed each other. This lasted from April to June 1992, during which time the JNA troops from Serbia and Montenegro "officially" withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving behind JNA Serbian troops from Bosnia and their equipment. They were supplemented by "special forces" from Serbia which consisted of expatriate volunteers and mercenaries, Bosnian-Serb militia and police, and Serb volunteers.

114. At the early stages of the conflict, most of the combatants, including those in the regular army, did not wear distinctive uniforms, emblems or insignias of rank. As a result, officers freely moved from army to militia and from one unit to another. To further complicate matters, at the early stages of the conflict between: (a) Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other Serb forces within Croatia, and (b) between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina (in May 1992, JNA forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially withdrew from Bosnia), the "order of battle" of almost all army and militia units was not clearly established. The chain of command was significantly blurred, even to insiders. Consequently, the organizations' "command and control" structures were seriously eroded, which resulted in much confusion. The confusion was more pronounced in Bosnia among Serb combatants, but seems to have been purposely kept that way for essentially political reasons.

115. When each of the three Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively declared their independence, 21/ they did not have a separate army. Previously, the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA), also referred to as the Yugoslavian National Army, was a single unitary army for all members of the former Yugoslavia. The armies of the "warring factions" consisted mainly of military personnel and equipment of the former JNA.

116. Each of these republics had local territorial defence forces (TDF) 22/ which were part of the total defence systems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The republics also had local police forces consisting of personnel from their respective republics.

117. Upon the successive declarations of independence of these three republics, some of the military personnel of JNA (who had been located in each of these republics) left JNA and reconstituted themselves as part of the newly created national armies of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 23/ JNA "officially" withdrew from Croatia in November 1991 and from the Bosnia and Herzegovina between May and June 1992. Throughout this period, JNA was
reorganized several times by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As of May 1992, JNA - now called the Yugoslav Army- consisted essentially of troops from the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. These two Republics form the successor federal union to the former Yugoslavia.

118. In addition to the regular armies mentioned above, there are three additional armies: the Bosnian-Serb Army, which operates in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Serbian Army of Croatia, which operates in Croatia; and the Croatian Defence Council, which operates primarily outside the border of the Republic of Croatia, and mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first two were at one time and may still be armed and supported by JNA (now the Yugoslav Army) and the third may have been armed and supported by the Croatian Army.

119. The territorial defence forces (TDFs) are known as militia). In the case of Croatia, TDFs were known as the Croatian National Guard. The TDFs have a separate command structure from the regular army. Nevertheless, they join in the armed conflict, frequently operating with the regular army and under regular army officers' command. They also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually where most of the personnel in these units come from.

120. In addition, two other types of paramilitary groups and formations are also engaged in military operations. They consist of: (a) what are called "special forces", and (b) local police forces augmented by local armed civilians. All the warring factions make use of such forces among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of command and control are confusing, even to the combatants.

121. There are 45 reported special forces, which usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy, except when they are integrated into the regular army's plan of action. The special forces are supplied and often trained by the respective Governments that they serve. Many special forces answer only to senior political officials in the respective Governments. Such a relationship is frequently based on political allegiance and is not always publicly known. However, in time, information about the political sponsorship and support of these groups will become available. As these units usually operate independently and outside the apparent chain of command, their order of battle is not known. Notwithstanding the strong links between these units and the respective armies, the regular army failed to restrain them from the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. Among the most notorious of the special forces are Arkan's "Tigers" and Šešelj's "White Eagles" (also referred to as "Chetniks"). Lastly, many of these units operate throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian units operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and the Croatian units in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These special forces have committed some of the worst violations of international humanitarian law (see paras. 129-150, 236-237, and 216-231 below).

122. Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not to be confused with the special forces mentioned above. These local forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally, they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same opština (county) and
neighbouring areas. Their command and control is local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, though characteristically these groups, like the special forces, have an identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group is called by the leader's name. Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically significant name or the name of their town, village or area. The leadership is local, mostly consisting of political figures. These units, particularly among Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croats in Krajina, have, like the special forces, committed many violations of international humanitarian law (see paras. 129-150). The police, augmented by "volunteer" armed civilians, also participate in military activities. These forces operate within a given municipality. They are nominally under the overall control of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the respective ministries of interior also have national and regional police units, which usually operate outside the boundaries of local municipalities. The relationship between national, regional and local police is not always clear and varies in each country, and sometimes within the regions of each country. During the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the police, augmented by "volunteer" armed civilians, operated without apparent command and control from the army. Their leadership was local and included many political figures. These forces acted with almost complete autonomy in their respective areas. They also share responsibility with the special forces described above.

123. The situation consists of a multiplicity of combatant forces (for example, regular armies, militias, special forces, police and armed civilians) operating within different structures or outside any structure. These forces sometimes operate under no command and control. They may be without uniforms, emblems or insignias. Frequently, these forces merge or combine in connection with certain operations. Probably the only factor common to all of these forces is their receipt of military equipment, ammunition and supplies from their respective armies and other governmental sources.

124. The outcome of such a structure and the strategies and tactics employed help to blur the chain of command and conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability.

125. All parties to the conflict have specifically adhered to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II thereto. Furthermore, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a signatory to these Conventions, and all of the parties to the conflict concede that they are also bound by these obligations under the international law of State succession.

126. The Federal Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia embodied the international rules of armed conflict. JNA military personnel were instructed accordingly. Thus, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law are part of the applicable national laws of all warring factions.

127. All of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
128. The grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law occurring in this conflict are, in part, the product of the military structure that results in a lack of effective command and control. The violations are also the result of the strategies and tactics employed by the warring factions.

B. "Ethnic cleansing" 28/

129. In its first interim report (S/25274), the Commission stated:

"55. The expression 'ethnic cleansing' is relatively new. Considered in the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. 'Ethnic cleansing' is contrary to international law.

"56. Based on the many reports describing the policy and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, 'ethnic cleansing' has been carried out by means of murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian population, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property. Those practices constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, such acts could also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.

"57. The Commission is mindful of these considerations in the examination of reported allegations."

130. Upon examination of reported information, specific studies and investigations, the Commission confirms its earlier view that "ethnic cleansing" is a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas. To a large extent, it is carried out in the name of misguided nationalism, historic grievances and a powerful driving sense of revenge. This purpose appears to be the occupation of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups. This policy and the practices of warring factions are described separately in the following paragraphs.

131. With respect to the practices by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, "ethnic cleansing" is commonly used as a term to describe a policy conducted in furtherance of political doctrines relating to "Greater Serbia". The policy is put into practice by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and their supporters in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The political doctrine consists of a complex mixture of historical claims, grievances and fears and nationalistic aspirations and expectations, as well as religious and psychological elements. 29/ The doctrine is essentially based on ethnic and religious exclusivity and the dominance of Serbs over other groups in certain historically claimed areas. These views contrast with ethnic and religious
pluralism. This doctrine breeds intolerance and suspicion of other ethnic and religious groups and is conducive to violence when it is politically manipulated, as has been the case.

132. It should be emphasized that this policy and the manner in which it is carried out is supported only by some Serbs. In addition, the Commission emphasizes that responsibility for criminal conduct must be determined on an individual basis. 30/

133. The manner in which the policy of "ethnic cleansing" is carried out by Serbs in Bosnia is consistent throughout a certain geographic area represented by an arc ranging from northern Bosnia and covering areas in eastern and western Bosnia adjoining the Serb Krajina area in Croatia. 31/ The practice of "ethnic cleansing" is carried out in strategic areas linking Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas in Bosnia and Croatia. This strategic factor is significantly relevant to understanding why the policy has been carried out in certain areas and not in others. 32/

134. The coercive means used to remove the civilian population from the above-mentioned strategic areas include: mass murder, torture, rape and other forms of sexual assault; severe physical injury to civilians; mistreatment of civilian prisoners and prisoners of war; use of civilians as human shields; destruction of personal, public and cultural property; looting, theft and robbery of personal property; forced expropriation of real property; displacement of civilian population; and attacks on hospitals, medical personnel and locations marked with the Red Cross/Red Crescent emblem.

135. Many of these acts of violence are carried out with extreme brutality and savagery in a manner designed to instil terror in the civilian population, in order to cause them to flee and never to return. 33/ This is evidenced by the large number of purposeful and indiscriminate killings, rape and sexual assaults, and other forms of torture committed against civilians and prisoners of war, both inside and outside detention facilities. These acts are also highly publicized by the perpetrators in order to achieve a terror-inspiring effect on others and cause them to flee.

136. Other noteworthy practices are widespread destruction of villages by systematically burning them to the ground and blowing up all the houses and structures in a given area. This includes cultural and religious monuments and symbols. The purpose of this destruction is to eradicate cultural, social and religious traces that identify the ethnic and religious groups. In the cases where the practices described above do not occur, these groups are forced to leave under duress by reason of a well-founded fear for their personal security.

137. Another recurring practice is to force civilian inhabitants to sign over their property as a condition of their departure or removal to other areas. Mayors and public officials, including the police, are frequently involved in this practice. 34/

138. Two additional factors also indicate the existence of a policy of "ethnic cleansing": (a) the wholesale and surreptitious departure of the Serbian population living in certain areas, which are to be "ethnically cleansed",
before the acts described above take place; 35/ and (b) the practices reported occur under the supervision of a "crisis committee" (Krisni Stab), comprised of local political leaders, police and others, which made such decisions with the direct or indirect involvement and support of the Bosnian-Serb Army. 36/

139. Special forces (see paras. 121-122) frequently carry out "ethnic cleansing". These forces clearly seem to be supported, equipped and supplied by the Governments they serve and are allowed to operate without control by the authorities in charge. Two particular groups of special forces that have committed the largest number of reported violations are Arkan's Tigers and Šešelj's White Eagles (see para. 121).

140. The study of the Prijedor district described in paragraphs 151 to 182 below, reveals the extent of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" and the manner in which it was systematically carried out together with the local and regional authorities. 37/ The same patterns and practices described in the study on the district of Prijedor repeatedly occurred in many opštinas, such as Banja-Luka, Brčko, Foča and Zvornik, about which the Commission received significant information supporting the above conclusions. 38/

141. Three additional observations are noteworthy:

(a) JNA and the Army of the so-called "Bosnian Serb Republic" have been involved in carrying out and facilitating the policy and practices of "ethnic cleansing" in certain parts of the territory;

(b) The practices implementing the policy, particularly in certain parts of Bosnia, have been carried out to a large extent by the most marginal social elements of that society;

(c) The leaders of Bosnian Serbs influenced, encouraged, facilitated and condoned these social elements to carry out the crimes described above. The combination of these factors, stimulated by misguided nationalism, fanned by historical grievances and fuelled by reciprocal violence and revenge, has led to tragic consequences.

142. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the practices of "ethnic cleansing" were not coincidental, sporadic or carried out by disorganized groups or bands of civilians who could not be controlled by the Bosnian-Serb leadership. Indeed, the patterns of conduct, the manner in which these acts were carried out, the length of time over which they took place and the areas in which they occurred combine to reveal a purpose, systematicity and some planning and coordination from higher authorities. Furthermore, these practices are carried out by persons from all segments of the Serbian population in the areas described: members of the army, militias, special forces, the police and civilians. Lastly, the Commission notes that these unlawful acts are often heralded by the perpetrators as positive, patriotic accomplishments.

143. The above-mentioned factors and others indicate the existence of an element of superior direction. At the very least, they indicate a purposeful failure by superiors to prevent and punish the perpetrators once their crimes become known to the responsible commanders. 40/
144. Lastly, it should be noted that there was initially a link between local activities and activities of Serbs from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Krajina, Croatia, and also involvement by JNA. This linkage existed until 2 January 1992, the date of the cease-fire between Serbs in Krajina and JNA and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and is evident in many ways. In fact, these links are not denied by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is supported by the use of JNA in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina before the conversion of some of these forces into the army of the so-called "Serbian Republic of Bosnia". Furthermore, there is a strong political, diplomatic and military influence on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over a wide range of decisions of the "Bosnian Serb Republic" and the "Serb Republic of Krajina".

145. Similar policies and practices of "ethnic cleansing" have occurred in the Serb-Krajina area and in eastern and western Slavonia in Croatia by Serbs against Croats and also by Croats against Serbs, as discussed below. The patterns and practices of "ethnic cleansing" described above are the same in separate theatres of operation. This further substantiates the existence of a Serbian policy. One significant instance where this policy was carried out in Croatia is the destruction of the city of Vukovar in 1991.

146. Manifestations of "ethnic cleansing" have occurred throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and similar practices have been committed at certain times and places by Croatian warring factions, as discussed in paragraph 147.

147. "Ethnic cleansing" practices committed by Bosnian Croats with support from the Republic of Croatia against Bosnian Muslims in Herzegovina are politically related. Furthermore, Croatian forces also engage in these practices against Serbs in the Krajina area and in eastern and western Slavonia. The violence committed against Serbs in these areas appears, however, to have the more defined political aim of removing them from the areas. Croats have used the Croatian Defence Council, police, armed civilians and local special forces to carry out these acts in the areas mentioned above. They have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, including the destruction of Serbian villages and churches, killing of innocent civilians, torture and forceful removal of the civilian population. In the Krajina area and in eastern and western Slavonia, the cycle of violence between Serbs and Croats started in the early part of 1991, before the war formally began. The violence continued well beyond the end of that war. Similar practices were also, on occasion, carried out by Croats against Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, the Croatian authorities have publicly deplored these practices and sought to stop them, thereby indicating that it is not part of the Government's policy.

148. Bosnian Government forces have also committed the same type of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions against Serbs and Croats, but not as part of a policy of "ethnic cleansing". The number of these violations, as reported, is significantly less than the reported violations allegedly committed by the other warring factions.

149. The Commission is unable to determine the amount of harm and the exact number of violations committed by each of the warring factions. Nevertheless,
it is clear that there is no factual basis for arguing that there is a "moral equivalence" between the warring factions.

150. It should be noted in unequivocal terms, however, that reprisals, retribution and revenge do not constitute a valid legal justification or excuse for committing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law (see paras. 63-66). The Commission emphasizes that in addition to the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators who commit violations, military and political leaders who participate in the making, execution and carrying out of this policy are also susceptible to charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, in addition to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law.

IV. SUBSTANTIVE FINDINGS

A. The study of Opština Prijedor, a district in north-western Bosnia: alleged genocide and massive violations of the elementary dictates of humanity 477

1. General description

151. Opština Prijedor is a district located in north-western Bosnia in an area which is part of the Bosnian Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most (to the south), the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east). Except for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations before the armed conflicts started in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

152. According to the 1991 census, Opština Prijedor had a total population of 112,470 people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 percent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslavs" and 2.2 percent others (Ukrainians, Russians and Italians). In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately 120,000 people, augmented, inter alia, by an influx of people who had fled the destruction of their villages in areas to the west of Opština Prijedor.

153. Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count of June 1993, as published in Serbian-controlled media, gives the following overall picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>New arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>47,745</td>
<td>53,637</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>49,454</td>
<td>6,124</td>
<td>43,330</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>6,350</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the total number of killed and deported persons as of June 1993 is 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people missing). Since then, the
number of non-Serbs in the district have continued to decrease. The extreme persecution to which non-Serbs are subjected and their almost total lack of protection in the district is illustrated by the fact that ICRC and UNHCR asked permission from the Serbs, in March 1994, to evacuate all remaining non-Serbs from Opština Prijedor.

154. The following factual findings of the Commission are based on 300 to 400 statements by surviving victims of the events in Opština Prijedor currently living in different countries, local Serbian media reports of the events and research into the context of the events.

2. Serbs take power on 30 April 1992

155. According to Kozarski Vjesnik, a Serbian-controlled newspaper in Opština Prijedor, of 9 April 1993:

"The man (Simo Drljača), who the Serbian Democratic Party of the Opština Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police after half a year of illegal work, had done his job so well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well-armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the takeover of power (by the Serbs), which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The assembly of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, at the end of March last year (1992), appointed him Chief of the public security station (i.e., in charge of the secret police). He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence his new function in Bijelina on Monday."

156. More than six months prior to the power change in 1992, the Serbs started to build up their own administration parallel to the legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor - what they called the Serbian Opština Prijedor. This included, inter alia, a pure Serbian police force with secret service functions. The legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor had been lawfully elected, and the Prijedor Assembly reflected the ethnic composition of the district.

157. In early 1992, a very small Serbian paramilitary group took control of the television transmitter on the Kozara mountain in Opština Prijedor, and as a consequence the population in the district could not receive television programmes from Sarajevo or Zagreb any longer, only from Belgrade and later Banja Luka. The television programmes from Belgrade insinuated that non-Serbs wanted war and threatened the Serbs.

158. Prior to the power change on 30 April 1992, Serbs secretly armed other Serbs in the district. Many soldiers from the Yugoslav People's Army withdrew from Croatia to north-western Bosnia in early 1992. Instead of demobilizing those who returned to Opština Prijedor, the legitimate authorities were pressured to accept redeploying them to control all inroads to and exits from the district together with police and the territorial defence forces (TDFs). The pressure applied was an ultimatum. The legitimate authorities were invited
for a guided sightseeing tour of two Croatian villages just north of Bosanska Gradiška which had been destroyed and left uninhabited. The message was that if the ultimatum was not met, the fate of Prijedor would be the same as that of these villages. The ultimatum was accepted.

3. Immediate consequences of the Serbs taking power

159. An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opština Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel and the telephone system was no longer fully operational. A curfew was introduced in Prijedor town - the main town in the district - and travel permits were required in many areas even to move among local villages. Bus services were closed down.

160. In the wake of the power change, most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as police, public officials or even manual workers. In all key functions such as police and local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs.

161. Even before 30 April 1992, Serbs had started to visit the non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demand that they give their weapons up. This process was intensified after the takeover and combined with a campaign in which non-Serbian police and TDFs were instructed to hand over their weapons and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms.

162. Also, the local media, Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, joined in the anti-non-Serb propaganda. The media slandered former non-Serbian leaders by criticizing everything from their alleged lack of efficiency to their private lives. In addition, the media claimed that dangerous Muslim extremists were in the area, preparing genocide against the Serbs.

4. The major Serbian military operations in the district

163. Following an incident in which less than a handful of Serbian soldiers were shot dead under unclear circumstances, the village of Hambarine was given an ultimatum to hand over a policeman who lived where the shooting had occurred. As it was not met, Hambarine was subjected to several hours of artillery bombardment on 23 May 1992. The shells were fired from the aerodrome Urije just outside Prijedor town. When the bombardment stopped, the village was stormed by infantry, including paramilitary units, which sought out the inhabitants in every home. Hambarine had a population of 2,499 in 1991.

164. On 24 May 1992, a large-scale attack on the entire Kozarac area east of Prijedor town, under the Kozara Mountain, was carried out with intensive bombardment from all directions by artillery, tanks and small firearms. The bombardment lasted for more than 24 hours, before the infantry and paramilitary groups stormed Kozarac and nearby villages and searched for people in every building. The affected area had a total population of almost 27,000 people.
165. On 30 May 1992, a group of less than 150 armed non-Serbs had made their way to the old town in Prijedor to regain control over the town. They were defeated and the old town was razed. In the central parts of Prijedor town, all non-Serbs were forced to leave their houses as Serbian military, paramilitary, police and civilians advanced street by street with tanks and lighter arms. The non-Serbs had been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their homes to signal surrender.

166. Starting on 20 July 1992, a large area of predominantly non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the River Sava (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner to the Kozarac area. However, it was predominantly infantry and paramilitary groups that carried out the destruction. At the time of the attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages west of Opština Prijedor had been destroyed.

167. Today the former homes of almost 47,000 people in the Kozarac and Hambarine/Ljubija areas are empty and destroyed. Some were hit by artillery shells, while others were set ablaze in the initial attack. All the homes were later pillaged and a large number blown up, one at a time from inside, destroying especially the inside and the roofs. Most of the artillery used during these attacks had been moved into position some time before the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992.

5. Concentration camps and deportations

168. As non-Serbs were attacked in the villages and Prijedor town, hundreds, possibly thousands, were killed in their home areas, frequently after maltreatment. The survivors that temporarily managed to flee or hide were divided. Females, boys under the age of sixteen (sometimes the age limit may have been lower) and elderly men (older than 60 or 65) made up one group, while the other men comprised the second group.

169. The second group - the men - were taken to hastily opened concentration camps in a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm, next to Prijedor town and on the premises of the iron ore mine and processing plant at Omarska. Massacres, torture and appalling living conditions quickly depleted the number of detainees.

170. In an interview printed in Kozarski Vjesnik on 9 April 1993, Simo Drljača, present Deputy Minister of Interior of the "Serb Republic of Bosnia", stated that:

"In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm' and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjača' on the basis of solid documentation of active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republica Srpska ('Serb Republic of Bosnia'), and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjača."
As the "informative talks" or interrogations basically took place in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, it can be concluded that more than 6,000 adult males were taken to these concentration camps in the short period they existed (from the end of May to the beginning of August 1992). Since only 1,503 were moved on to Manja a camp according to Mr. Drljača, a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje camp and almost none released, it may be assumed that the death toll was extremely high. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. On at least one occasion this allegedly resulted in an entire busload of newly captured people being arbitrarily executed en masse. Some 37 women were detained in Omarska, while no women were kept over time in Keraterm.

171. The women were normally taken to the Trnopolje camp. In Trnopolje, the regime was far better than in Omarska and Keraterm. Nonetheless, harassment and malnutrition was a problem for all the inmates. Rapes, beatings and other kinds of torture, and even killings, were not rare. Some of these detained women were released after a few days, as there was a lack of space in the Trnopolje camp as well.

172. On their way to the concentration camps, some captives were detained for shorter periods at improvised detention facilities, such as sports halls in schools and stadiums (notably in the Prijedor suburb of Tukovi and in Ljubija).

173. As soon as the Serbs had captured the first groups of non-Serbs, the large-scale deportations of the women started. Some were deported straight from the improvised detention facilities, the majority from the Trnopolje camp. The majority of deportees were cramped into buses or onto military trucks and sent towards Travnik. These deportees had to walk almost 30 km from where the trucks and buses dumped them in a desolate area in the outskirts of the Vlašić Mountain to reach non-Serb held areas in central Bosnia. A few were deported the safer way to Bosanska Gradiška. Sizeable numbers were taken by rail – many in cattle wagons – to Travnik. Some women were let off the trains in Doboj from where they were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla. Some individuals perished during the transport owing to the mid-summer heat and to suffocating conditions both in cattle wagons and on closed military trucks, where the deportees were also deprived of food and water.

6. The strategy of destruction

174. The Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor on 30 April 1992, after more than six months of careful planning. After this, the non-Serbs had their homes and communities destroyed and their families split and were deprived of their employment. The majority of non-Serbs were soon captured, thousands incarcerated in concentration camps, and even larger numbers deported. This all happened after the Serbs had sealed off most exits from the area. The non-Serbs represented no real threat to the Serbs under these circumstances, as the district of Prijedor was enclosed at the time by Serbian controlled and dominated areas (the non-Serb majority population in the Sanski Most district was purged simultaneously in Prijedor).
175. Despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat, the main objective of the concentration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm, seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership. Political leaders, officials from the courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, key business people and artists – the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities – were removed, apparently with the intention that the removal be permanent. Similarly, law enforcement and military personnel were targeted for destruction. These people also constituted a significant element of the non-Serbian group in that its depletion rendered the group at large defenceless against abuses of any kind. Other important traces of Muslim and Croatian culture and religion, including mosques and Catholic churches, were destroyed.

7. The general lack of protection for non-Serbs

176. From the time when the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, non-Serbs, in reality, became outlaws. At times, non-Serbs were instructed to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Non-Serbs were subjected to crimes without the new Serbian leaders attempting to redress the problem. Rape, for example, became a serious problem for many women who were left alone because their husbands had been detained. The impression was allowed to spread among Serbs that they would be exonerated if they made life difficult for non-Serbs so that the latter would ask permission to leave the district. According to new Serbian regulations, those leaving the district had to sign over their property rights to Serbs and accept never to return, being told that their names would simultaneously be deleted from the census.

8. Responsibility

177. When the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, they immediately declared the existence of a Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor. Included in the membership of this crisis committee were the military commanders Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Zeljaja, and other district leaders, such as Major Slobodan Kuruzović; the Chief of Police, Simo Drljača; Mayor Milomir Stakić; the President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor, Mićo Kovačević; the President of the Serbian Democratic Party in Prijedor, Simo Mišković; and the President of the Red Cross in Prijedor, Srdjo Srdić.

178. The military destruction of the non-Serbian habitations in Opština Prijedor took place when the area was under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Zeljaja in close cooperation with military superiors, at least in the regional capital Banja Luka. Units stationed outside of Opština Prijedor assisted in the military destruction, as did paramilitary units whose attacks were timed to fit with the artillery attacks and the manoeuvres of the regular army units.

179. In the above-mentioned interview printed in Kozarski Vjesnik on 9 April 1993, Simo Drljača stated:
"(T)hey (the police force, including the secret services) carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB (the Public Security Centre) Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior.

...

"... the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups."

The secret police and the military police provided the concentration camps with interrogators and guards. For some of the most gruesome torture and killings of detainees, the assistance of paramilitary units and some locals was also called upon. Quasi-military intervention units were used to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership. The latter units killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manja a camp and arranged mass-killings of "deported" prisoners in the Vlašić Mountain area.

180. The other members of the crisis committee ran the community in which all these violations occurred. They participated in the administrative decision-making. The gains on different levels of the systematic looting of non-Serbian property were shared by many local Serbs.

181. The Commission of Experts possesses the names of hundreds of alleged perpetrators at different levels and in a variety of capacities.

9. Conclusions

182. It is unquestionable that the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualify as crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due process of law that these events constitute genocide.

B. The battle and siege of Sarajevo 48/

183. The battle and siege of Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992, the eve of European Community recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent State. On that date, thousands of people took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Parliament building and other buildings reportedly seized by Serb forces. Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the crowd. One protestor was confirmed dead. Since that date, the siege and relentless bombardment from the hills surrounding Sarajevo has taken a tremendous physical toll on the city and its inhabitants.
1. Structure and location of forces in and around the city

184. Since the beginning of the siege, the first Corps Sarajevo has served as the defensive force of the Bosnian Government in and around Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the first Corps Sarajevo as superior in infantry numbers as compared to the besieging forces, but clearly deficient in firepower. The first Corps Sarajevo headquarters is located at Sarajevo. The Croatian Defence Council and the first Corps forces fought together in defence of the city throughout much of the siege despite opposing one another in Mostar and in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, on 10 November 1993, the Croatian Defence Council Brigade was disbanded and part of its personnel joined a new Croatian brigade of the first Corps.

185. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the Bosnian-Serb force of the Bosnian-Serbian Army. The Corps has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. It is the successor of the unit of JNA that occupied the same positions until May 1992. The Romanija Corps headquarters are located overlooking the city at Lukavica. The command structure has for the most part remained the same throughout the siege. Three succeeding Generals have commanded that Corp since 1992.

186. Although the Serbian forces surrounding the city have superior firepower, it has been observed that it is unlikely that they could effectively take control of the city. This observation is based, in part, on the fact that the Bosnian forces have more combatants. In addition, controlling the city and its numerous buildings and streets could prove an overwhelming task for the Serb forces. The Serb forces have, therefore, concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hillsides. A possible explanation for the shifting of firing sites from the mountainous areas surrounding Sarajevo may be that artillery personnel move from one emplacement to the other. Another explanation for this phenomenon could be the pattern of delivery of munitions. There were, however, no apparent munitions shortages.

2. Location and nature of the artillery

187. Many reports in the chronology described shelling as generally coming from artillery, mortars and tanks located in the hills surrounding the city. Some reports described various Serb-held areas and deployment of forces. Reports of the besieging artillery and other heavy-to-medium weapons employed in the siege vary from 600 to 1,100 pieces, but no verified account is available. These estimates do not include tanks. Some of the weapons were in fixed emplacements such as bunkers in the wooded hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo and its suburbs. On account of the dense foliage, the emplacements were hard to detect from the air, particularly in the summer. Although the bunkers were difficult to see from the roads, the direction from which artillery and heavy mortar shells were fired revealed their emplacement. However, it was difficult to determine whether the bunkers also had snipers with rifles or personnel with small arms.
3. Frequency of shelling

188. UNPROFOR and city officials indicate that the daily shelling of the city ranges from 200 to 300 impacts on a quiet day to 800 to 1,000 shell impacts on an active day. The chronology confirms that the city has been relentlessly shelled. On the days where a total shelling count was documented, Sarajevo was hit by an average of 329 shell impacts per day. The range of shelling activity on these days varied from a low of two impacts on both 17 and 18 May 1993 to a high of 3,777 impacts on 22 July 1993.

4. Systematic shelling of specific targets

189. An examination of the range of destruction in Sarajevo reveals a pattern of specific targeting. The following targets were documented in the chronology as being among the most frequently targeted sites in the city: the Kosevo Hospital; the Sarajevo radio and television stations; the Oslobodenje Newspaper building, which is still in operation; the public transportation system; the Presidency and Parliament buildings; the main city brewery; the flour mill; the main bakery; the Olympic complex; the industrial area of Alipasin Most near the railway station and main television tower; the Jewish cemetery; the Lion Cemetery; the city airport; the tobacco factory; the Dobrinja apartment complex; the central district; Bascarsija (the old quarter of mosques); the Stari Grad Section; New Sarajevo; the main thoroughfare on Marshal Tito Street; and the shopping district at Vase Miskina.

190. The chronology confirms that certain areas of the city have also been systematically shelled throughout the course of the siege, particularly cultural and religious structures and public utilities. The city centre, the airport and southwestern suburbs had consistently been the most often targeted areas. The historic old town area had also been heavily shelled.

5. Patterns of random shelling

191. A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city. The shelling, which occurs at different times of the day without any apparent pattern or specific target, has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city and in such well-known non-military settings as schools, open streets, public parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city.

6. Link between shelling activity and political events

192. A review of the incidents in the chronology reveals a pattern of heavy shelling prior to and during the various peace conferences, and other negotiations, suggesting a political link to the attacks. 50/ There are also indications that shell fire has increased or decreased in reaction to statements by local and international political leaders and Governments. 51/
193. On 5 February 1994, at least 68 persons were killed and 200 others were wounded in the shelling of a market in the city centre. In reaction to that attack, NATO issued an ultimatum on 9 February which gave Bosnian Serb and Bosnian forces 10 days, starting on 11 February, to withdraw their heavy weapons from a designated exclusion zone or face heavy airstrikes. Very little progress was made with regard to the ultimatum until 17 February, when the Russian Federation announced that it was sending a contingent of 400 troops to the city, and persuaded Bosnian Serb forces to comply with the NATO ultimatum. On 20 February, NATO announced that there had been virtual compliance with the ultimatum and that there was no need for airstrikes "at this stage". Since that date, artillery fire has substantially decreased in Sarajevo.

194. The cumulative effect of the number of civilian casualties, the destruction of non-military structures, attacks upon and destruction of protected targets, such as hospitals, cultural property and other impermissible targets, evidence a consistent and repeated pattern of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. The length of time over which these violations took place and their recurrence clearly establish that, in at least a large number of incidents, those ordering and carrying out these actions committed such violations. Command responsibility also clearly exists.

C. Sarajevo investigation 52/

195. From 20 June to 9 July 1993, the Commission sent an investigative mission to Sarajevo, then under siege, to undertake a law-of-war study of a specific incident in the battle of Sarajevo and an analytical law-of-war survey of the battle of Sarajevo. The mission included a group of Canadian military lawyers and police investigators.

196. The mission participants met with a wide range of local officials, including the Bosnian State War Crimes Commission, city officials, medical officials and military officers.

197. The objective of the incident study was to analyse in depth a specific incident which occurred during the siege of Sarajevo, to identify specific violations of the law of war (particularly violations in which civilian casualties have occurred) to analyse the circumstances of the incident and to assess the feasibility of identifying and prosecuting alleged offenders (particularly the military commanders). The report is based on information that could be obtained in and around Sarajevo.

198. No incident was chosen prior to arrival in Sarajevo. Criteria to be considered in selecting an incident included: number of casualties, number of projectiles fired, sources and, to a lesser extent, time elapsed since the incident. It was hoped that it would be possible to get information from Bosnian, UNPROFOR and Serbian sources. The rationale for preferring an incident in which more than one projectile was fired was that multiple projectiles would give a stronger indication of intent to commit an offence.

199. Bosnian State War Crimes Commission authorities were requested to provide evidence concerning six incidents of their choice, on the understanding that
those incidents would be considered, but not necessarily chosen, for in-depth investigation. The evidence could not be compiled by the Commission within a short period of time and, as a result, an alternative approach was decided upon. Bosnian authorities suggested six incidents about which they believed a reasonable amount of information would be available. Two of these incidents, the shelling of a soccer game on 1 June 1993 and the shelling of a funeral in mid-June 1993, were selected for the possible in-depth investigation. Preliminary investigation indicated information on the shelling of the funeral would only be available from one source, as heavy rains the day after had washed away the evidence which UNPROFOR had intended to gather.

200. The incident finally selected for in-depth investigation was the mortar shelling of a soccer game in the Dobrinja suburb of Sarajevo on 1 June 1993. The investigators interviewed several witnesses on the Bosnian side, and also reviewed the crater analysis produced by UNPROFOR. Investigators were unable to interview witnesses on the Serbian side.

201. On the basis of the investigation it is reasonable to conclude that:

(a) Two mortar shells landed at the soccer tournament at approximately 10.30 a.m. on 1 June 1993;

(b) Thirteen persons were killed and 133 injured by the shells;

(c) The shells were fired from the Serbian side, approximately 300 m south of Lukavica barracks;

(d) The weather was clear and sunny with good visibility;

(e) The area where the shelling occurred was exclusively residential;

(f) The game site could not be seen from the Serbian side because it was surrounded by apartment buildings, but the cheering could be heard at the front line;

(g) No projectiles had landed in the area for several months.

202. On the basis of the above factors, it is reasonable to conclude that a prima facie case exists that persons on the Serbian side deliberately attacked civilians and, therefore, committed a war crime. With the information available, it is not possible to identify the probable offenders at present.

203. In connection with the analytical law-of-war survey and of the battle of Sarajevo, the study team visited several incident sites in Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping precluded an in-depth survey of property damage. The team, however, met with a wide range of officials of the Bosnian Government and UNPROFOR officers and obtained documentary material from them. The team was unable to meet with Serbian officials in Pale, even though it attempted to do so.

204. The report prepared by the investigation team is a non-exhaustive survey of law of armed conflict issues arising during the siege of Sarajevo. The team did
not have an opportunity to visit the Bosnian Serb Army forces during the investigation and received no allegations of Bosnian Government misconduct during the siege except for allegations from UNPROFOR sources concerning positioning of and firing by Bosnian Government forces. The report focuses on combat-related offences, unlawful targeting and the use of unlawful means and methods of warfare. It concluded that it is unlikely that weapons that are illegal per se were used during the siege, or that there was unauthorized use by personnel of the Bosnian Serb Army of vehicles carrying United Nations markings - which could be viewed as perfidious conduct. If persons were killed or wounded as a result of perfidious action, a grave breach of Protocol I would be established. Somewhat similarly, it would have to be established that named individuals attacked or authorized attacks on United Nations forces for these persons to be charged with violating the laws or customs of war, as set out in article 3 of the statute of the International Tribunal, in that they would be committing a grave breach of article 85, paragraph 3 (a), of Protocol I by making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack. In the Sarajevo context, United Nations peace-keepers are non-combatants and entitled to be treated as civilians. The tendency of both sides to control food, water and electricity for publicity purposes, the intermingling of military forces and the civilian population and the fact that no one appears to have died during the siege from starvation, dehydration or freezing, combine to make difficult the establishment of a solid case that starvation is being used as a method of warfare. The conduct of this matter has been deplorable, but its criminality is debatable.

205. Most of the war crimes committed in Sarajevo have involved attacks on civilian persons and objects and destruction of cultural property. An accurate list of persons killed and seriously injured during the siege of Sarajevo needs to be established. It will also have to be determined if, at the time of death, they were combatants or non-combatants and where, when and how they were killed or injured. Once this information is available, it will be possible to distinguish military and civilian casualties. It may also be possible to determine where the projectiles causing casualties came from in such a way that one can establish that they were caused by a particular unit. It will also be possible to determine how many of the civilian casualties were caused by some form of sniper fire. Irrespective of the rule of proportionality, it is reasonable to presume that civilian casualties caused by sniper fire are the result of deliberate attacks on civilians and not the result of indiscriminate attacks, as may be the case in shelling.

206. The compilation of a chronological and quantitative survey of damage to civilian objects in Sarajevo was not attempted by the study team. Its preliminary observations follow. It is obvious that damage has been caused to certain religious, cultural and medical buildings. There is a strong possibility that there has been a deliberate attempt to target certain types of objects. For example, a detailed study of the shelling of the Kosevo medical facility or of the National Library would probably indicate these objects had been deliberately targeted. There is also a strong possibility that a deliberate effort has been made to target religious facilities. The concealment of Bosnian Government forces among civilian property may have caused the attraction of fire from the Bosnian Serb Army which may have resulted in legitimate collateral damage. There is enough apparent damage to civilian
objects in Sarajevo to conclude that either civilian objects have been deliberately targeted or they have been indiscriminately attacked.

207. There have been incidents in the past where substantial civilian casualties have been caused and substantial military advantage gained by a particular military action. In those cases, one might attempt to quantify both military advantage and civilian losses and apply the somewhat subjective rule of proportionality. As a general statement, however, the rule of proportionality is not relevant to the sniping activities of the Bosnian Serb Army forces, and it is of questionable relevance to many of the artillery bombardments. The Bosnian Serb Army forces are deliberately targeting the civilian population of Sarajevo, either as a measure of retaliation or to weaken their political resolve. Attacking the civilian population is a war crime.

208. It will probably be very difficult to link particular individuals to specific incidents in which civilians or civilian objects have been deliberately attacked or subjected to indiscriminate attacks. However, it may be less difficult to identify specific units. It may be possible to localize incidents in such a way that it is clear that a certain unit under a particular commander was the cause of a number of incidents. Whether or not it is possible to develop a firm case against individual soldiers or unit commanding officers, it should be quite practicable to develop a prima facie case against the officer or officers responsible for the Bosnian Serb Army forces that have been surrounding Sarajevo from the beginning of the siege.

209. It is the view of the Commission that:

(a) The study of a specific incident in the battle of Sarajevo established with a reasonable degree of certainty that the civilian population had been deliberately targeted, but it was not practicable to identify the perpetrators;

(b) The general study on the law of armed conflict and the battle of Sarajevo assessed a range of information sources and, relying on the doctrine of command responsibility, provided support for the suggestion that it would be possible to develop a prima facie case against the commander of the Bosnian-Serb forces surrounding Sarajevo for deliberately attacking the civilian population (see annex VI.A).

D. Medak Pocket investigation 54/

210. On 9 September 1993, Croat forces attacked the Medak Pocket, a collection of small rural villages and hamlets forming a finger of Serb-controlled land in Sector South jutting into Croat territory. The Croats quickly killed or routed the few Serb defenders and overran the area. Within several days, however, Croatian authorities indicated a willingness to withdraw to their 8 September positions and to turn over the vacated territory to UNPROFOR. The withdrawal was completed by 17 September. As United Nations forces entered the Pocket, they found every building burning or demolished. There were hundreds of such buildings in the several villages and hamlets. None were habitable. Special sweep teams assessed and recorded damage, searched for survivors and collected bodies. The teams included UNPROFOR medical officers, civil police (CIVPOL)
monitors and soldiers. Very substantial reports were prepared on the Medak Pocket incident by UNPROFOR. To some extent, these reports duplicated one another but, considered together, they provided an excellent basis for a subsequent investigation focusing on legal and forensic issues.

211. The Commission sent a team consisting of Canadian military personnel and a forensic expert from Physicians for Human Rights to visit the area and the destroyed villages from 27 to 31 October 1993, and to review reports and photographs provided by UNPROFOR and "Serb Republic of Krajina" authorities.

212. Their investigations concluded that, although some of the dead probably were murdered, no individual could at the time be identified to be directly responsible. Furthermore, there was no strong unambiguous pattern of criminal killing sufficient at the time to affix responsibility upon the Croat commanders for deliberate killing of civilians.

213. At the same time, this investigation resulted in the following findings concerning wanton destruction:

(a) Unlike the evidence concerning the deaths arising from the Medak Pocket operation, there was a clear, obvious and overwhelming pattern of wanton destruction. Hundreds of homes were destroyed; hundreds of other buildings were destroyed; most animals were killed or taken; virtually all personal property was destroyed or taken; all vehicles and farm equipment were destroyed or taken; haystacks were set on fire; and many wells were polluted. Devastation was total;

(b) The timing of the destruction was inconsistent with any legitimate military conduct and not of military necessity. The bulk of this destruction occurred on 16 September, according to the many eyewitnesses. The sounds of the explosions, the rising of the smoke from fires and the fact that many buildings were still on fire as United Nations personnel entered the Pocket establish this;

(c) The destruction occurred well after all Serb resistance had ended. There was no Serb resistance in the areas from which the explosions were heard and the rising smoke seen. All effective Serb forces had fled the area at the time of the bulk of the destruction. The devastation was wrought in an unopposed withdrawal, not a contested advance or retreat. Even the Croatian liaison officer was forced to use an excuse not involving legitimate combat activity by the opposing forces. The scattered nature of the buildings, with the brief and desultory original Serb defence, does not explain this level of destruction;

(d) The widespread destruction by demolition and fire is also generally inconsistent with legitimate military operations. If buildings are contested, then demolition charges cannot usually be placed inside them. There was no other evidence to show how these buildings were destroyed other than by enemy forces being present in them;

(e) Various contradictory excuses given by the Croats for the destruction suggest the lack of any legitimate excuse for such widespread destruction.
214. It is the view of the Commission that the Medak Pocket investigation report provides exceptionally strong support for the suggestion that prima facie cases can be developed against named Croatian senior officers for the wanton destruction of civilian property.

215. The report prepared for the Commission and contained in annex VII as a result of the investigation includes suggestions for draft charges, synopses of evidence and trial plans for the possible prosecution of named Croatian senior officers.

E. Detention facilities 55/

216. Since the spring of 1992, the warring factions to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia operated a variety of detention facilities (camps) throughout the former Yugoslavia.

217. The Commission received information concerning a total of 715 camps, most of which are now closed. The Commission's information about the exact date of opening and closing of these camps and the number of prisoners is incomplete. 56/

218. Of the 715 camps: 237 were operated by Bosnian Serbs and the former Republic of Yugoslavia; 89 were operated by the Government and army of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 77 were operated by Bosnian Croats, the Government of Croatia, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council; 4 were operated jointly by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croats; and 308 camps for which it is not known with certainty under whose effective control they were.

219. The camps range in size from small detention centres that temporarily house a few prisoners to camps that house large numbers of prisoners. The duration of their operation varies from days to months. The purposes of the camps vary as well.

220. Owing to the nature of the several conflicts and the military structure of the warring factions (see paras. 110-128 and annex III), the control of camps varies. At different points in time, the same camp may be controlled by the army, the central Government, local and political authorities, the police, various military groups and local armed civilians.

221. The various groups identified above converted pre-existing structures, such as municipal buildings, administrative offices, schools, sports arenas within the occupied areas and larger facilities on the outskirts of those areas (factories, warehouses, quarries and mines), into camps. Using these pre-existing facilities allows for quick and easy control and displacement of the targeted population of a controlled or conquered geographic region by one of the warring factions. There is no particular distinction between facilities holding prisoners of war and non-combatant civilians.

222. The camps are frequently used to detain the civilian population that has been forcibly displaced from particular regions. Detention either precedes or follows armed engagements in these regions. Wholesale detention of persons from
another ethnic or religious group occur seven when there is nothing to suggest that internment of civilians is necessary for any valid legal purpose (see paras. 129-150 and annex III).

223. Camps are frequently the reported sites of mass executions, torture, rapes and other forms of sexual assault. They are the scene of the worst inhumane acts. These inhumane acts are committed by guards, police, special forces, and others who are allowed to come from the outside to perform such acts.

224. As the following discussion indicates, the number of camps and the number of reported violations in camps controlled by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its army are by far the lesser of the warring factions, irrespective of the ethnic or religious background of the detainees they hold.

The number of reported violations by the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army and the Croatian Defence Council is larger, particularly against Serbs in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia and against Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Herzegovina. The period of time during which those camps were operated in each of these contexts is relatively limited. The two warring factions identified above are however reported to have a much lesser number of violations than those committed by the Serb forces and those working on their behalf, whether in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. Camps operated by Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are by far the ones where the largest numbers of detainees have been held and where the cruellest and largest number of violations occurred.

225. The characteristics and patterns of violation in the camps differ widely depending on the controlling authority, the purpose of the camp and the camp commander.

226. Following is a summary description of camps divided by warring factions in control. 57/

1. **Bosnian Government camps**

227. Bosnian Government camps are reported to have been the site of cases of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. These allegations include killing and torture of Croatian and Serbian prisoners. The number of reports and allegations are, however, limited. The Commission has not been able to detect any particular pattern or policy of wrongdoing. The Commission has, however, ascertained that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina has expressed its opposition to these individual violations.

2. **Bosnian-Croat, Croatian Defence Council, Croatian Government and Croatian Army camps**

228. The Bosnian-Croat and Croatian Defence Council camps were in Herzegovina. The Croatian Government and Croatian Army operated camps were in the Krajina area, in eastern and western Slavonia and in other parts of Croatia. Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions have occurred in these facilities against Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, including killing, torture and rape. The Commission
has not been able to detect any particular pattern or policy in operating these camps. The Commission has information concerning the location and some information about the physical layout and command structure of some of these camps. The Commission also has information concerning the killings and torture inflicted on the interned population, as well as the names of some perpetrators and victims. The largest number of violations reported are in the Krajina and eastern and western Slavonia against Serbs and in Herzegovina by Bosnian Croats and the Croatian Defence Council against Bosnian Muslims. The Government of Croatia has, since late 1993, according to information received by the Commission, condemned these violations and sought to curb their occurrences.

3. "Bosnian Serb Republic" camps

229. The Commission has information that Bosnian Serbs are operating camps where grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, including killing, torture and rape reportedly occur on a large scale. These camps are mostly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and hold Bosnian Muslims for the most part, but also Bosnian Croats. The Bosnian Serbs use camps to facilitate territorial and political control of a geographic region and to expel and eliminate other ethnic and religious populations from that area. The Commission has detailed information concerning some of the locations and physical layouts of some of these camps, including descriptions of the various buildings where prisoners are detained, interrogated, tortured and killed. The Commission also has information about some camp commanders and military units in the areas and individual violators.

230. The following patterns have reportedly emerged from these camps:

(a) Camps are ultimately intended to achieve "ethnic cleansing" (see paras. 129-150 and 151-182 and annex V);

(b) Groups of camps are established and operated in clusters in various geographical areas and are frequently part of a network. Prisoners are frequently moved from one facility to another. Different facilities often have separate specific purposes like mass killing, torture, rape and exchange and holding of civilian prisoners;

(c) Detainees are sometimes transported from camps within a given region to camps in another region because of overcrowding, anticipated ICRC inspection, visits by the media, exchange of prisoners and as a result of triage for unlawful purposes;

(d) Purposeful humiliation and degradation of prisoners is a common feature in almost all camps;

(e) After a village, town or city is conquered, the local population is rounded up en masse and interned in different locations. During the rounding-up process, members of the population are frequently tortured, raped and killed. Local religious, political, civic, professional, business leaders and prominent personalities are singled out for the worst abuses. On the captors' side, local
civil servants, political leaders and particularly the police participate or are involved in the rounding-up process;

(f) Prisoners are forced to surrender their money and valuables to their captors and, if released, these valuables are not returned;

(g) In most instances, captors interrogate prisoners for information about military and strategic information, political affiliation and political belief. Captors also interrogate detainees concerning the personal wealth and family connections of other detainees. Most of the time, the questioning is unrelated to military or security matters. Almost always, interrogation is accompanied by brutality and humiliation and, in many cases, by torture and murder;

(h) The smaller camps house the population temporarily until the captors divide the prisoners into smaller groups and transport them to larger camps or to separate sections of large camps. When prisoners are transported to larger camps, they are often packed tightly into buses, lorries or freight and cattle trains and are subjected to physical and mental abuse. While being transported, prisoners are often killed at random and are denied food, water and access to toilet facilities. When the buses or freight cars reach their destinations, while the prisoners are unloaded, several prisoners are often killed. Sometimes prisoners are transported by car to camps by locals;

(i) Men between the ages of 16 (or younger) and 60, who are considered to be of military age, are usually separated from older men, women and children. These men are transferred to heavily guarded larger camps where killings and brutal torture are prevalent;

(j) At the larger camps, prisoners are subjected to random beatings. Many prisoners are beaten under the guise of being interrogated. Beatings, more severe torture and killings escalate when there has been a Bosnian-Serb military setback and when there are Serb casualties;

(k) Prisoners who are targeted for torture or death at the larger camps include prominent members of the community who are wealthy, educated or politically influential persons in the community. Guards usually have information identifying which prisoners fall into these categories. They obtain that information from their own local population, through coercion and violence from other prisoners or from other detention facilities that are used solely to interrogate displaced populations;

(l) In several instances, prisoners have been forced to inflict injury on each other, sometimes as entertainment for the guards. In other instances, prisoners are mass executed by machine-gun fire;

(m) In most camps (particularly during the second half of 1992 and the first half of 1993), prisoners are killed on a daily basis. Their bodies are sometimes left to rot on camp grounds, disposed of in mass graves abutting the camps and thrown into rivers, ravines, mine shafts and mining pits. The Commission has some information concerning the locations of many of these mass graves (see paras. 253-263 and annexes X, X.A and X.B);
(n) Women, children and men over 60 years of age are usually separated from others and taken to separate camps. These camps are guarded and surrounded by fences, but prisoners are usually allowed to walk from building to building within the camp compound. Although fewer killings occur at these camps, torture and particularly rape are commonplace;

(o) Rape is prevalent in the camps (see paras. 231-252 and annexes IX and IX.A). Captors have killed women who resisted being raped, often in front of other prisoners. Rapes were also committed in the presence of other prisoners. Women are frequently selected at random during the night. These rapes are done in a way that instills terror in the women prisoner population. The Commission has information indicating that girls as young as 7 years old and women as old as 65 have been raped while in captivity. The group most targeted for rape, however, is young women between the ages of 13 and 35. Mothers of young children are often raped in front of their children and are threatened with the death of their children if they do not submit to being raped. Sometimes young women are separated from older women and taken to separate camps where they are raped several times a day, for many days, often by more than one man. Many of these women disappear, or after they have been raped and brutalized to the point where they are traumatized, they are returned to the camps and are replaced by other young women. There have also been instances of sexual abuse of men as well as castration and mutilation of male sexual organs;

(p) Prisoners in all camps are subjected to mental abuse and humiliation, including barrages of ethnic slurs. Prisoners are detained in unsanitary environments where dysentery and lice epidemics are rampant. Prisoners are often denied the use of toilet facilities. Often, male prisoners of fighting age are packed so tightly in the prison facilities that they do not have room to lie down or sit, or sometimes even to breathe. In addition, prisoners are nearly starved to death and, at best, are given one meal a day consisting of meagre portions of thin soup and bread. In instances where food is delivered to a camp by the ICRC, the food is not distributed to prisoners as intended. Instead, food is retained for the Bosnian-Serb fighting forces or is consumed by the camp guards. Furthermore, medical attention is, for the most part, non-existent at the camps, and often sick and wounded prisoners are buried alive in mass graves along with the corpses of killed prisoners.

231. The Commission concludes that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law have been committed over a long period of time, on a large scale, and very frequently in the most brutal, inhuman and degrading manner. These violations are ordered by or known to the camp commanders, the local political leadership and police. Army units may or may not be involved. However, they do not intervene to stop these violations, thereby implying responsibility by omission.

F. Rape and other forms of sexual assault 59/

232. Throughout the various phases of the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, there have been numerous reports of widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault. The Commission, concerned about these
reported crimes, undertook several means of research and investigation to ascertain the facts.

233. The Commission sought particularly to examine the relationship between "ethnic cleansing" and rape and other forms of sexual assault.

234. Owing to the social stigma attached - even in times of peace - rape is among the least reported crimes. For this reason, it is very difficult to make any general assessment of actual numbers of rape victims. In the former Yugoslavia, there appears to have been very little, if any, difference between the ethnic groups in the reluctance to report rape. The overall reluctance to report rape is aggravated by war, especially if the perpetrators are soldiers and also where there is a general condition of chaos and a breakdown in law and order. The victims may have little confidence in finding justice. The strong fear of reprisal during wartime adds to the silencing of victims. 60/ The perpetrators have a strong belief that they can get away with their crimes.

235. Men are also subject to sexual assault. They are forced to rape women and to perform sex acts on guards or each other. They have also been subjected to castration, circumcision or other sexual mutilation.

1. Rape and sexual assaults study: the Commission's database 61/

236. The reports contained in the Commission's database identify close to 800 victims by name or number. 62/ An additional 1,673 victims are referred to, but not named in reports of victims who indicate that they have witnessed or know of other similar victims. Additionally, there are some 500 reported cases which refer to an unspecified number of victims. The victims' ages, as reported, range from 5 to 81 years old, with the majority of victims below 35 years old. The reported cases identify some 600 alleged perpetrators by name. In other cases, victims refer to a specific number of perpetrators, but do not identify them by name. In those cases of unidentified perpetrators, about 900 perpetrators are referred to. Of all the reports received, about 800 contain general information, identifying some perpetrators as soldiers, police, paramilitary, special forces, etc. The alleged perpetrators include military personnel, special forces, local police and civilians. About 80 per cent of the reported cases specify that they occurred in settings where the victims were held in custody.

237. The reported cases of rape and sexual assault contained in the database occurred between the fall of 1991 and the end of 1993. The majority of the rapes occurred from April to November 1992; fewer occurred in the following five months. In the same time period, the number of media reports increased from a few in March 1992 to a high of 535 news stories in January 1993 and 529 in February 1993. This correlation could indicate that the media attention caused the decline. In that case, it would indicate that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators if they wanted to. 63/ This could lead to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating the use of rape as a method of "ethnic cleansing", rather than a policy of omission, tolerating the widespread commission of rape.
2. Pilot study on rape

238. From 29 June to 9 July 1993, the Commission sent an investigative mission, consisting of Canadian military personnel, to Sarajevo to undertake a pilot study on the rape issue. The objective was to review available information and to develop a methodology for interviewing witnesses and victims in order to determine how relevant evidence could be obtained for use before a tribunal.

239. In Sarajevo, the investigative team obtained all the relevant information from the database of the War Crimes Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The database lists 126 victims, 113 incidents, 252 alleged perpetrators, 73 witnesses and 100 documents. Of these, there were 105 rape cases.

240. It is the view of the Commission of Experts that the pilot study of the rape issue was relatively generalized. Although the pilot study assessed various information sources, it was not practicable to gather precise information leading to possible prima facie cases.

3. Rape and other forms of sexual assault: interviewing victims and witnesses

241. A series of interviews was carried out by the Commission in Croatia and Slovenia in March 1994. Among the 146 victim-witnesses from Bosnia and Herzegovina who were interviewed, 31 were women victims of rape, and two were suspected by the interviewer to have been victims themselves but were unwilling to speak of their own experience. One of the men from Bosnia and Herzegovina interviewed was a victim of sexual assault. This occurred in a detention facility. Among the women, 18 were raped in their own homes, while 13 had been raped while in detention. Among the other men and women interviewed, there were 21 witnesses to additional cases of rape or sexual assaults. This involves a total number of 55 persons who were either the victims of or witnesses to rape or sexual assault.

242. Among the 77 victim-witnesses from Croatia who were interviewed, 11 were women victims of rape. Six of the men from Croatia who were interviewed were victims of sexual assault. In the case of the men, all but one of these violations occurred in a detention context. However, seven of the women had been raped in their own homes. These women were victims of multiple and/or gang rapes involving up to eight soldiers. Four women were raped while in detention, among them was a woman who was detained in her own home for six months and raped almost daily. Among the other men and women interviewed from Croatia, nine were witnesses to additional cases of rape or sexual assault. This involves a total number of 27 persons who were either the victims of or witnesses to rape or sexual assault.

243. All of the information gathered through the 223 interviews, that were conducted by the Commission has been made available to the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. There has been insufficient time between the end of the interview process (31 March 1994) and the finalization of the present report (30 April 1994) for a detailed analysis of the cases to be conducted by the Commission. However, the information gathered seems to support the analysis
carried out on the basis of the allegations included in the Commission's database. In the following paragraphs, the patterns of rape and sexual assault identified through the database are outlined, while illustrations are given which are drawn from among the interviews.

244. Five patterns emerge from the reported cases, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims (see also para. 229 for a description of rape practices in custodial settings).

245. The first pattern involves individuals or small groups committing sexual assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic group. This is before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in the region. Tensions in an area grow and members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours. Two or more men break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them and often rape the females. Some of the reported rapes are singular and some multiple. In either case, there is often a gang atmosphere where the abuses are part of the same event and all the attackers participate, even if they do not sexually assault the victims. One of the women interviewed was gang-raped by eight soldiers in front of her six-year-old sister and her five-month-old daughter. One of the men was forced at gunpoint to rape the victim, "as she was an Ustasha". When she reported the crimes to local authorities, they said they could do nothing as "she was a Croat".

246. The second pattern of rape involves individuals or small groups committing sexual assaults in conjunction with fighting in an area, often including the rape of women in public. When forces attack a town or village, the population is rounded up and divided by sex and age. Some women are raped in their homes as the attacking forces secure the area. Others are selected after the roundup and raped publicly. The population of the village is then transported to camps. One victim-witness interviewed saw an elderly woman and others raped in front of a group of 100 detained villagers. The witness was herself threatened with rape and she saw a number of men from the group having their throats cut.

247. The third pattern of rape involves individuals or groups sexually assaulting people in detention because they have access to the people. Once the population of a town or village has been rounded up, men are either executed or sent off to camps, while women are generally sent off to separate camps. Soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries and even civilians maybe allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them away, rape them and then either kill them or return them to the site. Reports frequently refer to gang rape, while beatings and torture accompany most of the reported rapes. Survivors report that some women are taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. Though this is the general pattern, there are also many allegations that women are raped in front of other internees, or that other internees are forced to sexually abuse each other. In camps where men are detained, they are also subjected to sexual abuse. During the Commission's interviewing process 15 people were interviewed whose major allegations related to the same detention camp. Some witnesses were men, and all of the women victims had been raped. The women were sometimes gang raped by, or in the presence of, the camp commander. Guards from the external ring of security around the camp (who apparently did not enter the camp in the course of their work) and soldiers who were strangers to the camp would be
allowed access to the camp for rape. One of the victim-witnesses interviewed saw a woman die after being in a coma for a week as a result of about 100 sadistic rapes by guards. Sexual assaults were also practised against men: one witness saw prisoners forced to bite another prisoner's genitals. In addition, 10 of those interviewed had witnessed deaths by torture and seven of the group had survived or witnessed mass executions (there or in other camps). Another incident related in an interview involved prisoners lined up naked while Serb women from outside undressed in front of the male prisoners. If any prisoner had an erection, his penis was cut off. The witness saw a named Serb woman thus castrate a prisoner. Another ex-detainee told of suffering electric shocks to the scrotum and of seeing a father and son who shared his cell forced by guards to perform sex acts with each other.

248. The fourth pattern of rape involves individuals or groups committing sexual assaults against women for the purpose of terrorizing and humiliating them often as part of the policy of "ethnic cleansing". Survivors of some camps report that they believe they were detained for the purpose of rape. In those camps, all of the women are raped quite frequently, often in front of other internees, and usually accompanied by beatings and torture. Some captors also state that they are trying to impregnate the women. Pregnant women are detained until it is too late for them to obtain an abortion. One woman was detained by her neighbour (who was a soldier) near her village for six months. She was raped almost daily by three or four soldiers. She was told that she would give birth to a chetnik boy who would kill Muslims when he grew up. They repeatedly said their President had ordered them to do this. One woman's home was taken by Serbian neighbours and used as a detention centre for interrogations over several months. She was raped almost daily and beaten for several months; two other women were raped there too. She saw several killings and torture.

249. The fifth pattern of rape involves detention of women in hotels or similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women. These women are reportedly more often killed than exchanged, unlike women in other camps. One woman interviewed was detained in a private house with a number of other women for six months. The witness was told that the women had to do this because the women in another camp (which the witness named and which has been documented by other information gatherers) were exhausted.

250. Common threads run through the cases reported whether within or outside of a detention context:

   (a) Rapes seem to occur in conjunction with efforts to displace the targeted ethnic group from the region. This may involve heightened shame and humiliation by raping victims in front of adult and minor family members, in front of other detainees or in public places, or by forcing family members to rape each other. Young women and virgins are targeted for rape, along with prominent members of the community and educated women;

   (b) Many reports state that perpetrators said they were ordered to rape, or that the aim was to ensure that the victims and their families would never want to return to the area. Perpetrators tell female victims that they will
bear children of the perpetrator's ethnicity, that they must become pregnant, and then hold them in custody until it is too late for the victims to get an abortion. Victims are threatened that if they ever tell anyone, or anyone discovers what has happened, the perpetrators will hunt them down and kill them;

(c) Large groups of perpetrators subject victims to multiple rapes and sexual assault. In detention, perpetrators go through the detention centres with flashlights at night selecting women and return them the next morning, while camp commanders often know about, and sometimes participate in, the sexual assaults;

(d) Victims may be sexually abused with foreign objects like broken glass bottles, guns and truncheons. Castrations are performed through crude means such as forcing other internees to bite off a prisoner's testicles.

251. Rape has been reported to have been committed by all sides to the conflict. However, the largest number of reported victims have been Bosnian Muslims, and the largest number of alleged perpetrators have been Bosnian Serbs. There are few reports of rape and sexual assault between members of the same ethnic group.

252. In Bosnia, some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases committed by Serbs, mostly against Muslims, are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more seem to be a part of an overall pattern whose characteristics include: similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other international humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements in the commission of rape, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim, but also the victim's community; and the timing of rapes. One factor in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of rapes which occurred in places of detention. These rapes in detention do not appear to be random, and they indicate at least a policy of encouraging rape supported by the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.

253. These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape policy existed in certain areas, but it remains to be proven whether such an overall policy existed which was to apply to all non-Serbs. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity was required to carry out many of the alleged rapes. Furthermore, rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context of the practice of "ethnic cleansing", which is discussed in paragraphs 129 to 150 and the practices in detention camps discussed in paragraph 230. When viewed in these contexts, it is clear that grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions occurred, as did other violations of international humanitarian law.
G. Mass graves

254. Owing to the large scale of victimization that has taken place over a substantial portion of the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1991, there is a significant number of persons who have been buried in many individual and mass graves.

255. The Commission addressed the question of mass graves in its second interim report of 6 October 1993 (S/26545, annex) and outlined its plans for the continuation of the database study and the exhumation at Ovčara (Sector East Croatia) (see paras. 265-276) and Packračka Poljana (Sector West Croatia) (see paras. 277-284).

256. As of 31 March 1994, the Commission received information leading to the identification of 187 mass grave sites throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Of the reported sites, 143 are located in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 44 are in Croatia.

257. The number of bodies in reported mass graves ranges from 3 persons to 5,000 persons. Of the mass grave sites, 65 are believed to contain at least some Muslims; 32 are believed to contain at least some Croats; and 19 are believed to contain at least some Serbs. Regarding the remainder of the grave sites, reports on approximately 81 do not contain information regarding ethnicity. Some grave sites are reported to contain bodies from more than one warring faction. However, these numbers do not reflect whether the grave sites contain bodies of civilians and other non-combatants or the bodies of soldiers killed in combat.

258. The number of bodies said to be contained in the reported grave sites are as follows: 25 grave sites contain less than 10 bodies; 16 grave sites contain at least 10 to 20 bodies; 29 grave sites contain at least 20 to 50 victims; 22 grave sites contain at least 50 to 100 bodies; 20 grave sites contain at least 100 to 500 bodies; and 13 grave sites contain 500 bodies or more. Sixty-two of the sites did not have a specific number of bodies.

259. Persons buried in 81 of the reported grave sites are alleged to have been killed by Serbs; 16 of the sites contain individuals reportedly killed by Croats; and 5 contain bodies reportedly killed by Muslims. The remainder of the reports on 87 mass graves do not identify the ethnicity of the perpetrator. Again, it should be noted that the individual or faction that was responsible for the killing may not have been responsible for the creation of the mass grave.

260. Many alleged mass graves are situated at or near the sites of identified detention facilities. In the Prijedor region alone, there are approximately 62 grave sites, some of which are said to contain the remains of prisoners killed at Omarska Camp, Keraterm Camp, and other camps located in the area. The Brčko area, where the Luka Camp was located, may contain between 5 and 10 mass grave sites. Grave sites are also clustered in Foča, Mostar, Kotor Varos, Pakračka Poljana (see paras. 277-284) and Marino Selo.
261. At least 99 of the alleged mass grave sites appear to contain victims of mass killings. In these instances, the source of information clearly detailed the circumstances of the killing or provided witness testimony. Thus, as more information becomes available, this number may change. In addition, the number of graves which allegedly contain at least 20 bodies, along with much of the source information regarding how many of the grave sites were created, suggests that this number will increase. This is particularly true at those sites which were at or near detention facilities. The data, including witness statements, indicate that many of those buried in mass graves were former prisoners in the various detention facilities throughout the territory.

262. It should be noted that, as indicated above, the existence of mass graves does not necessarily mean that persons were unlawfully killed. However, there are several provisions of the Geneva Conventions which outline the treatment and burial of those killed during wartime. In some instances, these provisions may have been violated by those burying the dead in collective graves without proper identification. Thus, a mass grave may be important not only as a potential repository of evidence of a mass killing, but the method and manner by which the grave is created may itself be a war crime.

263. The Commission believes that it is particularly significant to investigate mass graves in order to help resolve the problem of missing persons. This is of vital importance to their families. Investigations of mass graves will also help to discover evidence of criminality.

264. If the existence of the numerous mass graves situated at or near identified detention facilities were to be confirmed, such confirmation would be relevant to the inquiry into "ethnic cleansing" (see paras. 129-150).

H. Investigation of grave sites at Ovčara near Vukovar (UNPA, Sector East, Croatia) 79a/

265. As indicated in its first and second interim reports, the Commission had been intending for some time to conduct an investigation of the Ovčara grave site in Sector East, which was reported to contain the bodies of about 200 persons who were in the Vukovar Hospital in November 1991 when the city fell to Serb forces. The investigation would involve the exhumation of the bodies contained in the mass grave site, the collection of physical evidence at the grave site, the transport of the bodies to a morgue facility, the autopsy examination of the bodies to establish identification and the cause/manner of death and, in time, the collection of other types of evidence, including testimonial evidence, so that criminal responsibility for the killings related to the bodies in the grave could be determined.

266. The Commission faced some logistical difficulties in preparing for the Ovčara investigation. However, all of these difficulties were eventually overcome and the Commission obtained the assistance of an international team of investigators.
267. The only obstacle which the Commission could not overcome was political - obtaining viable assurances and permissions from the political authorities controlling the areas.

268. In an effort to obtain the necessary political assurances, the Commission made visits to Vukovar in March, July, October and November; to Belgrade in March and April; and to Knin in May, September and October. In addition, the Commission exchanged numerous pieces of correspondence with various authorities in these locations. The approach taken by the Commission was that, as a matter of balance, the Commission would attempt to excavate a second mass grave site in Sector West that was believed to contain Serb victims at essentially the same time as it conducted the Ovčara excavation. The Commission and the local authorities at various times also discussed issues, including the location for post-mortem examinations, the presence of observers during the investigation, and the concerns of "Serb Republic of Krajina" officials about the use of Sector West by Croatian authorities as a site for radioactive waste disposal.

269. Following a meeting at Knin with the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" on 5 September 1993, it was the view of the Commission that it had obtained the necessary approvals in writing to conduct the Ovčara excavation. As a matter of balance, while the bodies at Ovčara were being exhumed and an autopsy examination was being conducted to establish identification and the cause/manner of death, a preliminary site survey would be conducted at a presumed mass gravesite in the Pakračka Poljana/Marino Selo area in Sector West and a preliminary radiological survey would also be conducted in Sector West. On the basis of this understanding, the Commission decided to send an investigative mission to Zagreb in early October and to Sectors West and East during the week of 17 October.

270. On 14 and 15 October, the Commission met with the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" at Knin to obtain additional written authorization to proceed with the Ovčara excavation and to address newly raised concerns of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" about the location of the morgue facility. The authorities of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" insisted that post-mortem examinations could not be conducted in Croatia. Although the Commission had intended to have the post-mortem examinations conducted at Zagreb, the Commission agreed to endeavour to locate a place for these examinations which would be acceptable to the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina". The Commission also agreed to the presence of observers of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" at the sites during the investigations. On receipt of this assurance, the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" issued several documents providing cooperation and authorizing the Commission to proceed with the investigation.

271. The teams were deployed from Zagreb to Sector East on 19 October. On arrival in Sector East on the evening of 19 October, the on-site rapporteur was informed by UNPROFOR that a meeting with Sector East administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina", in particular Colonel Milanovic, was a condition precedent to commencement of the excavation. In the interim, and with the acquiescence of the UNPROFOR Sector Commander, the various teams went to the Ovčara site on 20 and 21 October to conduct a second site survey, which would not involve any excavation. The site had been secured by UNPROFOR since it was originally
identified in December 1992. During the site survey, the site was checked for unexploded ordinance by UNPROFOR; brush was cleared; the area was surveyed in detail with a range of equipment; and a certain amount of physical evidence, including spent cartridge cases and some cloth, was recovered.

272. On 22 October, the representatives of the Commission met with Colonel Milanovic in Erdut and was informed that, notwithstanding the various approvals received at Knin on 14 and 15 October, the Parliament of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" had taken a decision on 21 October requiring the Commission to postpone all activity at Ovčara until a political solution was found to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Following the meeting, all personnel were withdrawn from the Ovčara site to their accommodations at Klissa and Erdut. After consultation with UNPROFOR, it was decided that any attempt to continue the project after this decision by the "local administration" would expose the project personnel and UNPROFOR personnel to an excessive degree of risk.

273. Although efforts were made to rehabilitate the Ovčara project in the ensuing weeks, including a Commission meeting with Mr. Bjegovic, Prime Minister of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" at Knin on 30 October, none of these efforts were successful. No one affiliated with the Commission has returned to the site, which remains under UNPROFOR protection, since 22 October.

274. In order to make the most effective use of project personnel, once it became apparent by midday on 24 October that there would be no rapid change of position on the part of the local administration, project personnel were shifted over a period of time from Sector East to Sector West and elsewhere. The last person and the last piece of equipment was out of Sector East by 30 October. Sufficient material and personnel resources were, however, retained in Croatia until about 10 November so that the Ovčara excavation could be conducted if adequate political approval was obtained. After 10 November, the onset of cold weather made the project impracticable before the spring of 1994. Appropriate political approval was not obtained before 10 November.

275. On 17 November 1993, the representatives of the Commission met with Mr. Hadzic, President of the "Serb Republic of Krajina", at his initiative at Erdut. Also at the meeting were Mr. Niksic, "Vice-Chairman of the Regional Council", and Colonel Milanovic, Deputy Minister of Defence of the "Serb Republic of Krajina". Noteno. 1-234-93, dated 16 November, was presented to the on-site rapporteur, under the signature of Mr. Hadzic, stating that the following decisions had been reached:

(a) The authorities of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" agreed to cooperate in and give their approval for the excavations on the site of Ovčara, in the municipality of Vukovar;

(b) The excavation activities could start in March or April the following year, when the weather conditions improved;

(c) The authorities of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" would appoint one member to observe the activities of the Commission;
(d) The "President of the Republic", Mr. Hadžic, had approved the above-stated items and was willing to cooperate fully with the Commission.

276. Owing to weather conditions, the Commission had to postpone resumption of the investigation until the spring of 1994. In so far as the Commission's work was terminated as of 30 April, all relevant documents for this investigation have now been passed onto the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Tribunal. The site remains under UNPROFOR protection, but no criminal investigation related to this mass grave excavation has been conducted to date.

I. Investigation of grave sites near Pakračka Poljana

277. During the March 1993 reconnaissance mission, the Commission became aware of the need to conduct a second mass grave excavation at a site, which would probably contain Serb bodies, at essentially the same time as the Ovčara excavation, which would probably be found to contain Croatian bodies. At the same time, it was informed of a number of probable clandestine gravesites near Pakračka Poljana in Sector West, which were believed to contain a large number of Serb bodies. For reasons related to the security of the sites and of potential witnesses, the Commission avoided visiting the sites at that time.

278. In October 1993, when the Commission was in a position to conduct a mass grave excavation, it decided to have Physicians for Human Rights conduct a preliminary site survey at Pakračka Poljana to confirm the existence of a mass grave. At the time this decision was taken, it was considered that the Pakračka Poljana location was the location in the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) most likely to be the site of a mass grave containing Serb victims.

279. From 20 October to 9 November 1993, the Commission deployed teams to the area. The numbers of members of each group varied over time, as persons were shifted from the Ovčara site to Pakračka Poljana.

280. The Commission received a particularly high level of support from UNPROFOR during this investigation.

281. The forensic report on this preliminary site investigation reached the following conclusions:

(a) Nineteen individuals (16 males, 3 females) were buried in nine separate graves in a field south of Pakračka Poljana. The graves were shallow and appeared to have been dug by hand. Leaves found in the bottom of some graves and the clothing on several individuals, including heavy jackets and sweaters, suggests that burials took place in the autumn or early winter;

(b) The area around the graves was used as an execution site. Expended .22-calibre, .25-calibre, 9mm-calibre and 7.62 x 39mm-calibre cartridge cases were found adjacent to six of the graves. Expended rounds were also found near some of the bodies or recovered from clothing. Five of the bodies had their hands tied with rope. Other bodies had their hands together, sometimes in extremely awkward positions, but no rope was found during the excavations. It is
possible that the hands had been bound but that the binding was made of a natural fibre that disintegrated. Fifteen of the bodies exhibited gunshot wounds to the head, two had blunt head trauma, one had multiple gunshot wounds to the arm and leg and one had massive head trauma;

(c) The nine graves are clandestine burials. The isolated location of the graves suggests that the executioners intended to bury their victims secretly. The graves were within a short distance of a road that could be accessed by a truck or other vehicle. The graves were also adjacent to large, woody vegetation that screened the area from at least one direction;

(d) There was no indication that the graves had been disturbed since the time of internment.

282. Although the Pakračka Poljana site was believed to be the site of mass graves containing up to 1,700 bodies, the site was examined with considerable care. Seventy-one holes were dug at the site. The very firmly based conclusion was reached that this belief was erroneous.

283. On 9 November 1993, the 19 exhumed bodies were placed in body bags together with preservative chemicals and reburied at a site immediately adjacent to an UNPROFOR observation post. Before this step was taken, some consideration was given to the possibility of conducting an autopsy examination of the bodies to establish identification and the cause/manner of death and to the possibility of gathering some additional ante-mortem information by interviewing selected persons in the area. These activities were not undertaken owing to previously expressed "Serb Republic of Krajina" concerns that post-mortems not be done in Croatia on account of the difficulty of obtaining a suitable morgue facility. Also, time and personnel resources would not permit the intensive effort required to conduct a criminal investigation and to gather all available ante-mortem information.

284. Responsibility for obtaining additional information and for continuing this investigation has now been passed to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

J. Destruction of cultural property

285. In determining the extent of the destruction of cultural property in the former Yugoslavia, the Commission proceeded under its overall plan of work and made use more particularly of its database and reports by international organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other intergovernmental sources and non-governmental organizations.

286. The Commission has received extensive information on destruction of cultural property, but it was not in a position to investigate all these allegations. In particular, it could not verify allegations that all Catholic churches and mosques in Serb-occupied territories of Bosnia had been systematically destroyed or damaged. Since the Commission could not consider,
let alone investigate, all allegations of damage to cultural property, it has selected two examples which are typical of such breaches.

287. The two examples chosen by the Commission were the battle of Dubrovnik (see paras. 298-301) and the destruction of the Mostar Bridge.

288. In the autumn of 1991, the region of Dubrovnik was surrounded and besieged by the Yugoslav National Army. After a few weeks, Dubrovnik itself was cut off by land and sea by the forces of the former Yugoslavia. This situation continued up to the autumn of 1992, when the district of Dubrovnik was recognized as forming part of the Republic of Croatia. The military occupation of the district of Dubrovnik captured international attention because of the cultural and historical significance of the region and the town. Dubrovnik is now known as an old town which has suffered great damage as a result of the Serbian attacks. In 1979, the old town had been included in UNESCO's list of the world's cultural heritage.

289. The attacks on Dubrovnik started with the Serbian paramilitary forces, supported by Yugoslavia's regular army, in June and August 1991. On 1 October 1991 the Yugoslav Army invaded the district of Dubrovnik and laid siege to the town. It may be affirmed that there was virtually no defence of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area against the Yugoslav forces. Thus the destruction could on no account be justified as a military necessity.

290. The siege of Dubrovnik lasted from October until December. The first shelling began on 1 October and continued sporadically until 24 October 1991. After a short lull, the shelling started up again on 30 October and continued into December. The shelling on 6 December 1991 was especially intensive. The shelling was selective and deliberately aimed at the buildings in the old town and there is no doubt that the destruction of cultural property was intentional. However, the people doing the firing did not only hit the old town. The new town was also hit.

291. According to estimates, 55.9 per cent of the buildings of the old town were affected, either by fires or by damage to the structures and special elements or to the facades and roofs. Several palaces had their roofs either destroyed or burned, including the Festival Palace, whose archives were completely destroyed, and a number of monuments whose roofs caved in. Other examples are St. Blaise's Church, the Franciscan Cathedral and Convent, the Dominican Convent, St. Clair's Convent and the Fountain of Onofrio; and, of course, there was the destruction of the roofs of the old town. In this respect, the local authorities list 336 direct hits and 254 cases of partial destruction of roofs by shell fragments.

292. From the UNESCO experts' assessment, the total damaged roof areas can be estimated at 56,747 m². To this visible damage, the experts of the Commission have added damage resulting from vibrations, which may appear later, as well as the damage which simply could not be detected at the time the UNESCO experts were carrying out their work.

293. Thus, in respect of the statute of the International Tribunal, the offences in Dubrovnik can be said to concern extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and seizure or destruction and
damage to religious institutions dedicated to charity, education, the arts and sciences as well as historic monuments and artistic and scientific works.

294. The concept of military objective should also be considered in this connection in order to shed light on the crimes committed. Indeed, it seems quite clear that this destruction of cultural property did not in any way contribute to the military action and could in no way be considered necessary in terms of the military objectives pursued. Nor is there any way that the perpetrators of these crimes can claim to have been utilizing the monuments for military purposes. In the Commission's view, other concepts in addition to military objectives should be applied: the concepts of undefended place or object, of proportionality and of neutrality.

295. At 10.16 a.m. on 9 November 1993, Mostar Bridge was destroyed. In this connection, the Institute for the Protection of the Historic and Natural Cultural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina has accused the Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army in a letter to UNESCO dated 10 November 1993. This letter and other documents attached to the present report describe the history of the bridge, which was built between 1557 and 1566 according to the plans of the Turkish architect Aerudin. It is a monument which, unfortunately, did not appear in the UNESCO list. However, this bridge was well known to the population in the region, whether Serbian, Croatian or Muslim. Moreover, the bridge was a symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina which connected the gap between the Muslim and Croat communities. It embodied the links which united these peoples in spite of their religious differences and the circumstances of the present war. There can be no doubt, however, that it was of greater value to the Muslims.

296. Admittedly, before it was destroyed, the bridge had already suffered a certain amount of damage. Indeed, damage had already been done to its northern parapets. But, all things considered, the damage had been minor. The initial objective, it would seem, had been to discourage people from using it. Thus, prior to November 1993, the primary target had been the parapet, forcing anyone who might be tempted to cross the bridge to refrain from doing so. However, the shelling on 8 November 1993 clearly aimed at destroying the bridge. This destruction was carried out by tanks belonging apparently to the Croatian forces. On 9 November, the shelling continued. It was then that the supporting arch of the southern end of the bridge was hit and collapsed. It would seem that this incident was filmed by Folio Productions (a British production company).

297. The same criminal characterization which applies to the battle of Dubrovnik also applies to the destruction of Mostar Bridge, which was also devoid of any military significance. It would seem that the Croats were at the origin of the destruction of Mostar Bridge. A Mostar district military tribunal reportedly interrogated three Croatian Defence Council soldiers, who allegedly acted, according to a statement by the tribunal, "on their own initiative, without orders from their superiors". Clearly, these are questions of fact which have to be decided judicially to determine both individual responsibility and command responsibility.
K. Dubrovnik investigation 83/

298. The Commission sent an investigative team of Canadian and Norwegian military lawyers and a French art historian to Dubrovnik for the period 20 October to 4 November 1993. The objective of the investigation was to prepare a law of armed conflict study of the battle of Dubrovnik which would attempt, among other things:

(a) To determine whether and when indiscriminate attacks or deliberate attacks on civilian persons or civilian objects occurred;

(b) To quantify the loss of civilian life, injury to civilian persons, and damage to civilian property, including cultural property;

(c) To attribute responsibility for apparent violations of the law of armed conflict.

299. On the basis of this investigation, the Commission finds that at least 82, and possibly as many as 88, civilians were killed as a result of JNA military operations in the district of Dubrovnik during the period from September 1991 until December 1992, inclusive, and that most of these persons were killed in 1991. Thirteen civilians were killed during the St. Nicholas Day bombardment of 6 December 1991. The Institute for the Restoration of Dubrovnik has completed a study of damage to housing in the district of Dubrovnik which the Commission accepts. The Institute estimates that the cost of reconstructing housing alone will be DM 69,000,000, while the cost of complete reinstallation of families will be DM 480,000,000 (prices on 31 December 1990). Detailed reports on damage to cultural property have been prepared by UNESCO, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments and the Natural Environment of Dubrovnik and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which the Commission has accepted as a basis for their investigation. These reports indicate in particular that a substantial amount of damage was caused to cultural property in the old town of Dubrovnik, mostly during the St. Nicholas Day bombardment.

300. It is the finding of the Commission that the St. Nicholas Day bombardment of 6 December 1991 was a deliberate attack on civilian persons and on civilian objects, including cultural property. It is the finding of the Commission that it is possible to determine the precise identity and status of persons killed or injured during the bombardment and to confirm the extent of civilian property damaged during the bombardment, the unit responsible for the bombardment, the identity of the unit commander and the identity and position in the chain of command of more senior officers responsible for the bombardment.

301. It is the view of the Commission that it is possible to develop prima facie cases directed against one or more officers responsible for the St. Nicholas Day bombardment and that it may be possible to develop cases concerning other incidents in the district of Dubrovnik.
L. Radiological investigation (UNPA, Sector West) 84/

302. As the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" had expressed concern about the use of sites in Sector West for radioactive waste disposal, the Commission agreed to send a team of experts to conduct a preliminary radiological survey in the Sector. Information provided by the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" about the radioactive waste sites was extremely sparse. Two nuclear biological chemical specialists were deployed to Sector West with one (Netherlands) United Nations support detachment.

303. The specialists reached the following conclusions:

(a) The nuclear activity measured in Sector West proved not to be any higher than the normal background radiation. In addition, examination of five soil samples proved that the quantity of radioactive materials in the samples could be considered as normal. These radioactive materials contribute to the level of background radiation;

(b) There were no detectable signs of physical presence of any nuclear waste in the areas searched.

304. The investigation was as thorough as time would permit, and a wide range of possible dump sites were visited with uniform negative results.

305. However, in March and April 1994, the administration of the "Serb Republic of Krajina" provided new information on the location of possible waste dump sites. As the Commission was informed that it had to terminate its work by 30 April 1994, this additional information was passed to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

306. The disintegration of a federal State, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia, is often at first a civil conflict. However, as the respective States of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their independence, received international recognition and were admitted to membership in the United Nations, the conflict with respect to each of these States became an international conflict. 85/ The first interim report stated:

"45. The Commission is of the opinion, however, that the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

307. However, the precise time at which the different stages of this multi-party conflict became or ceased to be a conflict of an international character must be determined by a review of legally relevant facts. This determination must be made by the International Tribunal. In the event the Tribunal concludes that the conflict is of an international character, the "grave breaches" provisions
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 shall apply, as well as Additional Protocol I of 1977, as do other norms of international humanitarian law. With respect to other periods, common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol II apply, as do other norms of international humanitarian law.

308. The Commission emphasizes that the conventional and customary international law norms on crimes against humanity and genocide apply to the entirety of this conflict. This is the case irrespective of whether the conflict is determined to be of an international or non-international character.

309. The Commission also concurs with respect to the provisions of applicable law contained in the statute of the International Tribunal. Indeed, in its first interim report (paras. 36-46), the Commission had taken the position which the Security Council later adopted in resolution 827 (1993). The Commission recognizes, however, that Protocols I and II are also part of the applicable law.

310. Reports received and investigations conducted by the Commission indicate that the level of victimization in this conflict has been high. The crimes committed have been particularly brutal and ferocious in their execution. The Commission has not been able to verify each report; however, the magnitude of victimization is clearly enormous.

311. The Commission finds significant evidence of and information about the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law which have been communicated to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

312. Some of the conclusions relative to these violations are reflected in the present report, but for obvious reasons information and evidence of a prosecutorial nature are not described herein.

313. The practices of "ethnic cleansing" (see paras. 129-150), sexual assault and rape (see paras. 232-253 and 230) have been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they strongly appear to be the product of a policy. The consistent failure to prevent the commission of such crimes and the consistent failure to prosecute and punish the perpetrators of these crimes, clearly evidences the existence of a policy by omission. The consequence of this conclusion is that command responsibility can be established.

314. Knowledge of these grave breaches and violations of international humanitarian law can reasonably be inferred from consistent and repeated practices.

315. The domestic criminal laws of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the criminal codes of all the republics formerly comprising it contain prohibitions against the violations that have taken place. Therefore, there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that such acts as murder, torture, rape, robbery and theft constitute crimes.

316. The observations set forth in paragraphs 110 to 127 on the military structure of the warring factions and the strategies and tactics they employ may
reveal an initial state of confusion, reducing the effectiveness of command and control. This apparent confused state of affairs continued well beyond the initial stages of the respective conflicts. This leads to the conclusion that the existence of separate military structures and the multiplicity of units may well have been intended by some of the parties. The confusion may be intended to permit senior military and political leaders to argue lack of knowledge of what was happening and inability to control such unlawful conduct.

317. Notwithstanding the strong feelings of the warring factions concerning their victimization, both historical and contemporary arguments concerning reprisals (see paras. 63-66) and superior orders (see paras. 61 and 62) do not constitute a defence under the well-established law of international armed conflict and under the national laws of the parties to the conflict.

318. The type, range and duration of the violations described in the present report strongly imply command responsibility by commission and omission and also indicate that the absolute defence of obedience to superior orders is invalid and unfounded (ibid.). This is particularly evident in view of the loose command and control structure where unlawful orders could have been disobeyed without individuals risking personal harm. Indeed, some did. A moral choice usually existed. Individual cases, however, will have to be judged on their respective merits in accordance with the statute of the International Tribunal.

319. The Commission is shocked by the high level of victimization and the manner in which these crimes were committed, as are the populations of all the parties to the conflict. The difference is that each side sees only its own victimization, and not what their side has done to others.

320. It is particularly striking to note the victims' high expectations that this Commission will establish the truth and that the International Tribunal will provide justice. All sides expect this. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that peace in the future requires justice, and that justice starts with establishing the truth. 88/ The Commission would be remiss if it did not emphasize the high expectation of justice conveyed by the parties to the conflict, as well as by victims, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, the media and world public opinion. Consequently, the International Tribunal must be given the necessary resources and support to meet these expectations and accomplish its task. Furthermore, popular expectations of a new world order based on the international rule of law require no less than effective and permanent institutions of international justice. The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 must, therefore, be given the opportunity to produce the momentum for this future evolution.

321. The Commission requests the Secretary-General to publish this report and its annexes in their entirety and to give them the widest possible dissemination in order to inform Member States and the interested public.
Notes

1/ Sessions were held on the following dates:

   First session      -      4-5 November 1992
   Second session     -      14-16 December 1992
   Third session      -      25-26 January 1993
   Fourth session     -      1-3 March 1993
   Fifth session      -      24-25 May 1993
   Sixth session      -      13-14 July 1993
   Seventh session    -      30-31 August 1993
   Eighth session     -      27 October 1993
   Ninth session      -      14-15 December 1993
   Tenth session      -      11-12 January 1994
   Eleventh session   -      15-16 February 1994
   Twelfth session    -      11-15 April 1994

All the sessions, except the first one, which was convened in New York, have been held at Geneva.

2/ The funding for these contributed services was provided by DePaul University and grants to the University from the Open Society Fund and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.


4/ The contributions received were as follows:

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TOTAL                  | 1 320 631    |
5/ Because of the positive balance in the Trust Fund at the conclusion of the Commission's work, the Commission urges the Secretary-General to seek the Controller's authorization to use these funds for the publication of the annexes.


11/ U.S. v. von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 at 611 (1949) (the Green Series). See also International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, reported in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1949).

12/ General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of 9 December 1948, annex, second and third preambular paragraphs.

13/ From a statement made by Mr. Morozov, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 19 April 1948 during the debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (E/AC.25/SR.12).

Notes (continued)

15/ See Report on the question of prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6), para. 29, which states:

"'In part' would seem to imply a reasonable significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership...considerations of both proportionate scale and of total numbers are relevant".

16/ See annex II.

17/ S/25704, annex, art. 2 (Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; art. 3 (Violation of the law and customs of war); art. 4 (Crimes against humanity); and art. 5 (Genocide). It is to be noted that under article 4, rape is specifically listed even though the conventional and customary international law defining crimes against humanity does not list it specifically, but includes it as part of "other inhumane acts".

18/ Violent crimes of a homosexual nature are not explicitly mentioned in international humanitarian law, but protection against rape and other sexual assaults is also applicable to men on the basis of equality and non-discrimination.


20/ In his commentary on article 5 of the statute, the Secretary-General also seems to consider rape and other sexual assaults to be connected, as he states in the relevant part: "rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution" (S/25704, para. 48).


22/ The TDFs, however, existed in varying degrees of strength and readiness in the various republics. However, in most cases, they were poorly organized and staffed. Croatia organized a National Guard in April 1991 to replace the territorial defence force. The National Guard consisted mostly of former JNA military personnel from Croatia.

23/ It should be noted that the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina includes among its ranks Croatian and Serbian personnel. Also, Croatian Defence Council units have on occasion either been part of Bosnian Government operations or have fought along side the Bosnian Government Forces against the Bosnian Serb Army.
24/ Some of these special forces operate in localized areas, while others move freely to different theatres of operation, frequently going from one state to another within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Several of the special forces come from Serbia proper or have close links to Serbia, like Arkan's "Tigers", Šešelj's "White Eagles", Captain Dragan's forces, Serb Falcons (Sinisa Ucinic) and others. The Serbian People's Renewal Party also had a paramilitary organization which interrelated with the White Eagles. Serbian special forces from Krajina, like "Martic's Militia", operate predominantly in the UNPAs (Croatia). Other special forces from Croatia are tied to the Croatian Government's political and army figures. The HOS, which is reminiscent of the Second-World-War Ustachi, for example, have been substantially absorbed into the Croatian Defence Council. The mujahidin operate independently of the Bosnian Government. Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina formed paramilitary units in 1991. Two such Muslim groups are called Green Berets and the Patriotic League of the People. All special forces have expatriate volunteers and some use foreign mercenaries.

25/ Arkan's name is Zeljko Raznjatovic. Interpol has several outstanding warrants for his arrest. The warrants are for a variety of crimes, including bank robbery and investigations relating to political assassination in different European countries. He escaped from prison on bank robbery charges in the Netherlands and Sweden, where he is currently a wanted criminal. He is reputed to have been involved in murder for hire and to have connections with organized crime in Europe. His group has committed the entire range of crimes described above and in other parts of this report in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Tigers have used expatriates and mercenaries in the commission of these crimes. JNA seems to arm and support the Tigers. The crimes committed by this group started in 1991 in the war in Croatia. In 1992, Arkan was elected to the Kosovo "parliament" and ran in the 1994 parliamentary election of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. He has reportedly acquired substantial wealth in Sector East UNPA Croatia and in Belgrade which it is believed he derived from looting and contraband.

26/ Šešelj was a member of the parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and leader of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, which at one time held one third of the votes. Šešelj's group follows the pre-Second-World-War group called the "Chetniks" who were known for their ultra-right wing monarchial politics. The Second-World-War Chetniks wore the special monarchial emblems with the double headed eagle. The present forces wear the same emblem and also call themselves Chetniks. Like Arkan's Tigers, Šešelj's White Eagles committed the crimes referred to above and in other parts of this report. The group seems to have been armed and supported by JNA. Moreover, since mid-1993, the group is believed to have been under the direct control of JNA. The crimes committed by this group started in 1991 in the war in Croatia. During the 1994 elections in Belgrade, Šešelj and President Slobodan Milosevic publicly traded charges of war crimes and hinted at knowledge of war crimes. This was publicly reported in the media of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in October 1993. It was also reported that President Milosevic ordered some forty associates of Šešelj to be prosecuted for rape, and other war crimes. It should also be noted...
that there were several groups of Chetniks that were not under Šešelj's control. One such unit operated in the Krajina area in Croatia in 1991, and then in Bosnia in 1992, where the group took position around Sarajevo in the fall. The unit is under the command of Slavko Aleksic who operated under the command of the Bosnian Serb Army. (See annex III.A for more detail regarding special forces.)

27/ See annex IV.

29/ Serbian contemporary reality is particularly affected by history, which is vividly recalled, even when it goes as far back as the battle of Kosovo in 1389. But, more recent events arising out of the Second World War are even more significant in popular perception.

30/ Several reports indicate that individual Serbs acted with courage and generosity in helping persons of other ethnic or religious groups to flee to safety or shield such persons from certain harm. But, in almost all these reports, it is clear that those concerned persons did so surreptitiously, thus emphasizing the overall climate of fear and even terror inspired by those in control.

31/ The arc goes from Gorazde at the bottom of the arc in the East (southeast) near the Drina River, then following the Drina River, north through such cities as Zvornik, Brčko and in a northward direction to the areas of Bjelina, Derventa, Slavonski Brod, Banja Luka and Prijedor. The Drina River is the border between Bosnia and Serbia. The arc continues along the Sava and Korenika Rivers, which are the boundaries with the Serb Krajina area, and follows along eastern and western Slavonia, which are also Serb-inhabited areas in Croatia.

32/ This strategic factor is evident in the attack against Gorazde in April 1994 and in the reports of military preparation for action in the Brčko area.

33/ See, for example, E/CN.4/1994/20.

34/ However, even the involvement of public officials is frequently insufficient to ensure the safety of the forcefully removed civilian population. Some of those evicted were forced to walk across minefields, which resulted in many deaths and severe injuries. Additionally, troops along the confrontation lines opened fire on the civilians who were pushed across the lines.
35/ This is due to the fact that the Serb population is notified in advance of an attack. In some areas, this "ethnic cleansing" is done by "special forces" but frequently, it is the very civilian population which lives alongside the Bosnian Muslims in the areas described above who carry out or share in carrying out the criminal practices referred to elsewhere in this report, particularly the Prijedor study, paras. 151-182.

36/ For example, the Krisni Stab of Sanski Most (which is characteristic of other districts) consisted of the Mayor, the Chairman of the Serbian Democratic Party, the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party and the Commander of the Sixth Krajina Brigade.

37/ The evidence obtained in this study is the most specific and detailed of all the Commission's investigations. It was delivered to the Office of the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Tribunal along with other Commission material (see annex IV).

38/ See, for example, a special study undertaken by the Bolzmann Institute of Human Rights (Austria) for the Commission which evidences this conclusion. The study is incorporated in annex IV.

39/ Prior to the autumn of 1992, the Army of the "Bosnian Serb Republic" was referred to as the "Bosnian-Serb Army" (BSA).

40/ Command responsibility by commission and by omission exists (see paras. 55-60), even though the policy of "ethnic cleansing" is carried out in a way which tends to conceal the responsibility of superiors in the political and military hierarchy through a structural separation of army, militia, police and special forces (discussed in paras. 110-128). Considering, however, the extent of these violations, the vast areas over which they occurred and the length of time over which they took place, it is difficult to conceive how responsible commanders can claim ignorance of the violations that have occurred.

41/ This conversion kept local JNA military personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina, using substantially the same equipment of the former JNA, and thereafter receiving support from Serbia across the Drina River.

42/ Serbs have inhabited the Krajina area and eastern and western Slavonia since the late 1300s and have had a particular historic presence since 1578. But during the Second World War, the Ustachí regime killed a large number of Serbs, whose numbers ranged from a low of 200,000 to a high of 700,000 most of them from these regions. The memory of this tragedy looms large over the apprehensions of Serbs and is a factor in the spiral of violence that took place in the region.
43/ Most of Vukovar was razed to the ground. One incident, in particular, will forever symbolize this terrible battle. It is the mass grave at Ovčara, where some 200 plus Croats are believed to have been taken by Serbs from the Vukovar Hospital and summarily executed and then left in a shallow mass grave. The Commission conducted several reconnaissance missions to the areas, discovered the existence of a large number of bodies, collected some evidence and started to exhume the bodies in October 1993. Representatives of the "local Serbian administration" prevented the Commission from continuing its work. The Commission could not undertake the Ovčara and other mass graves investigations. However, before it was obliged to terminate its work, all of the relevant evidence was communicated to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. (For more detail see paras. 265-276 and annexes X, X.A and X.B.)

44/ They are related to the so-called "Herzeg-Bosna Republic". Under the February 1994 Washington Agreement between leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia and Croat leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina who are part of the so-called "Republic of Herzeg-Bosna", a federation is to be developed within Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was furthered by the Agreement reached between these two groups on 18 March 1994 and signals a positive transformation, hopefully leading to peace between the parties.

45/ Even though that conflict ended in January 1992, violence has continued since then. The evidence secured by the Commission, along with other evidence obtained from UNPROFOR concerning the destruction of the village of Medak in October 1993, was delivered to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal. On 19 March 1994, another agreement was reached between the Republic of Croatia and the so-called "Serb Republic of Krajina". (For the Medak study see annex VII.)

46/ This is evidenced by the Croatian Defence Council and Croatian police attacks on the villages of Ahmici-Vitez and StupniDo in 1993. These attacks would be characterized as representing a certain policy. The first was investigated by the European Community Monitoring Mission and Mr. Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. The second was investigated by UNPROFOR. All evidence was delivered to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

47/ See annex V.

48/ See annex VI. The study on the battle and siege of Sarajevo presents a daily chronology, documenting events in the city from 5 April 1992 to 28 February 1994. The chronology is based on incidents reported in the database, other source materials and media reports. It details, in so far as information is available: daily combat and shelling activity; specific identified targets hit; known damage to targets hit; sniping activity; and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities and local and international events relating to the battle and siege. The purpose of the chronology is to describe the events and consequences of the battle and siege of Sarajevo and to determine patterns of violations of humanitarian law.
49/ There are indications that early in the siege and until late May 1992, the Yugoslav Army (JNA) was involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. Bosnian officials frequently charged that JNA tanks joined Bosnian-Serb forces in barrages, and that the JNA provided the Bosnian-Serb forces with logistical support and protection. In April 1992, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested the withdrawal of all JNA forces from its soil. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia announced that it would withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina troops that were not residents of the Republic. Since most of the JNA troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Bosnian Serbs, the withdrawal of other troops had limited impact on the Serbian forces, as an estimated 80,000 Yugoslav soldiers were transferred with their equipment to the "Serb Republic of Bosnia".

50/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have often increased their artillery attacks on Bosnian Government-controlled areas of the city prior to and during international peace conferences or other negotiations. One explanation for this increased shelling activity is that the besieging forces are using the siege of Sarajevo presumably as a means to politically pressure the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree to terms which are important to the Bosnian-Serbs.

51/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have on many occasions increased shell fire in reaction to statements made by local political leaders. It has also been observed that the besieging forces seem to calculate events and the risks that they can take in relation to threats by third-party Governments and organizations. In this regard, when threats by third-party Governments or organizations are not perceived as immediate, the besieging forces increase or continue their shelling of the city. For example, Sarajevo was hit with a siege-high 3,777 shells on 22 July 1993 after the United States ruled out direct intervention to prevent the shelling of the city. The opposite behaviour was observed in August 1993, when President Clinton warned that the United States would consider bombing Serbian forces if the shelling of Sarajevo continued. When this threat appeared immediate, the attacks on Sarajevo diminished and Serbian troops were withdrawn from the surrounding mountains to the south-west. Likewise in reaction to the ultimatum by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 9 February 1994, which gave Bosnian Serb forces 10 days to withdraw their heavy weapons or face heavy airstrikes, the besieging forces substantially complied and curtailed their shelling of the city. This behaviour suggests that there is a centralized command and control of the besieging forces and that when there is pressure for the shelling to stop, it does.

52/ See annex VI.A.

53/ This research was conducted on the basis of information available in the database and reported in paras. 183-193. For a daily chronology, see annex VI.

54/ See annex VII.
55/ See annex VIII. See also reports of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Report of the Thompson CSCE mission to the detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see S/24583); Report of the mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia (composed of Mr. H. Corell, Mr. H. Tuerk and Ms. Gro Hillestad Thune) under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE (30 September-5 October 1992).

56/ ICRC information on this subject has not been made available to the Commission, as the ICRC deemed it to be confidential.

57/ Annex VIII contains details that support and amplify the ensuing summary.

58/ During a mission of the Commission to Tuzla, the medical personnel of the hospital reported a large number of rapes, with the victims ranging in age from 5 to 81 years old. The Commission has not been able, however, to verify these allegations.

59/ See annexes IX and IX.A.

60/ See E/CN.4/1993/50. The fears of victims are both real to them and weigh heavily on their decision to speak out about their traumatic victimization.

61/ See annex IX. The figures reported below are approximate because, notwithstanding careful scrutiny, some of the reported incidents may be repeated.

62/ In some reports, numbers are supplied instead of names to protect the identity of the victims. However, the submitting party has the true identity of the victim on file.

63/ Other factors perhaps contributing to the correlation may include: the fact that some mass movements of people involved in "ethnic cleansing" had already occurred; or that mass media attention and insensitive treatment of victims combined with "fatigue" among victims resulted in a decline in the number of reported rapes. Alternatively, the public simply became less interested in the issue, and journalists stopped pursuing the stories.

64/ The Commission met with a Sarajevo medical team concerned with the care of rape victims and spoke with two teen-age rape victims during its visit in April.
65/ This investigation of rape and other sexual assaults was conducted by the Commission with 11 teams of female lawyers (from Finland, the United States, Canada, Bangladesh and Ireland), who conducted interviews, and 8 female (and 2 male) mental health specialists (from the United States), who worked to support the process. The professional members of the teams volunteered their time to this investigation. This is the first time that such an investigation has been conducted in time of war by women seeking to determine the facts about rape and other forms of sexual assault (see annex IX.A). It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding the understandable fears and apprehensions of the victims and witnesses, 223 of them voluntarily agreed to speak to the Commission's team of interviewers. Every member of the team first approached interviewees with expressions of human solidarity and concern. Invariably to such traumatized victims, the mere fact that a United Nations body tangibly expressed its concern for them was comforting and uplifting. Almost all interviewees expressed their appreciation to the interviewers in the warmest ways. If nothing else, this unique investigation brought some human comfort and support to these victims. During the last few days of interviewing, the Commission's field officers received an average of 15 calls a day from victims and witnesses wanting to meet an interviewer. Unfortunately, the investigation had to be concluded on 31 March, because the Commission had to end its work on 30 April 1994. Phase I of the investigation took place in Croatia. Phase II took place in third countries, such as Slovenia and Austria. It was not possible to conduct an investigation in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the Commission had requested from that Government. Interviews which provided information about other violations of international humanitarian law are dealt with in other relevant chapters of the present report. Investigations were also conducted in Austria and Sweden for the Commission, but their results are not included in the present summary because of special confidentiality considerations.

66/ One victim reported an attempted rape in her home.

67/ This number does not include rapes witnessed by rape victims themselves.

68/ In addition to the cases of rape and sexual assault, the interviews gathered important information regarding mass executions and mass torture, particularly in the detention camp context.

69/ As stated in footnote 65 above, the Commission had the opportunity to pursue further interviews in Croatia. In addition, the Government of Turkey invited the Commission to conduct interviews in that country. However, the Commission could not do either, because it was required to conclude its work by 30 April 1994.
70/ The patterns have been identified for the purposes of analysis only and, to some extent, they overlap. Thus, some cases illustrate more than one pattern, while, on the other hand, not all cases fall within these five categories identified. The use of these interviews as illustrations is not a definitive characterization of the type of rape in question, as in some cases further investigation is needed.

71/ Out of the 514 allegations which are included in the database, 327 occurred in places of detention.

72/ It should be noted that several victims have reported acts of courage and generosity by Serbs who tried and at times succeeded in saving and sparing victims from death, torture and rape. Such acts should be acknowledged and recognized.

73/ See annex X.

74/ Multiple reports of graves containing different information regarding location or number of bodies, while possibly involving some duplication, have been included since there is no means of ascertaining whether the reports refer to the same grave or different ones.

75/ For example, there are at least nine reported grave sites in north-west Bosnia and Herzegovina which may contain both Muslim and Croat victims. These grave sites are located in Brisevo, Raljas, Stara Rijeka, Redak, Ljubija, Volaric, Jubovci, Biscani-Sredice and the Kurevo Forest.

76/ This would occur in an instance where two factions were fighting one another, civilians were killed, and their neighbours had no choice but to bury them in mass graves, owing to time, sanitary or safety considerations.

77/ Among these are: Ovčara, allegedly containing civilians and wounded Croatian soldiers taken from the Vukovar Hospital (see paras. 265-276); Pakračka Poljana, where the Commission found 19 bodies after conducting investigations in October and November of 1993 (see paras. 277-284) and Marino Selo, where the Commission has received information regarding a mass grave containing as many as 2,500 bodies (see paras. 277-284 and annexes X, X.A, X.B).

78/ First Geneva Convention, art. 17; Third Geneva Convention, art. 120; Fourth Geneva Convention, art. 129; Protocol I, art. 34.


79a/ See annex X.B.

80/ See annex X.B.
Notes (continued)

81/ Other information on destruction of cultural property is contained in annexes XI and XI.A. The battle and siege of Sarajevo (paras. 183-193) and particularly annex VI reveal significant and purposeful destruction of cultural and religious monuments in Sarajevo.

82/ Communiqué dated 22 September 1993 from the Zagreb Foreign Press Bureau. The Commission considers that the Croatian Army bears some responsibility in this matter.

83/ See annex XI.A.

84/ See annex XII.


86/ The sources of information are described in paras. 20-24.

87/ The territory over which most of the victimization occurred had a population base of an estimated 6 million persons, of whom 1.5 to 2 million are now refugees in more than 20 countries. Most of them were deported or forced to leave and are unable to return. The civilian and military casualties among all warring factions are reported to exceed 200,000. The number of reported mass graves, 150, discussed in paras. 254-264, tends to support the estimates of the number of casualties. Over 700 prison camps and detention facilities are reported to have existed (see paras. 216-231). The number of detainees and reports on mistreated prisoners, in for example, the Prijedor area alone exceeds 6,000 (see paras. 151-182). As stated in paragraph 153 concerning the Prijedor area, "the total number of killed and deported persons as of June 1993 is 52,811". The rape and sexual assault study and investigation discussed in paragraphs 232-253 suggests a very high number of rapes and sexual assaults in custodial and non-custodial settings (see also para. 229). Thus, the earlier projection of 20,000 rapes made by other sources are not unreasonable considering the number of actual reported cases.

88/ Establishing the truth is the best method of enhancing deterrence. In fact, early investigation of the facts, in any context of criminal activity, increases the effectiveness of future prosecution. The combination of investigation and prosecution makes deterrence more effective, thereby reducing possible violations in the future. Without effective investigations and prosecutions, the converse is true.
INTRODUCTION

1. The Annexes contained herein consist of reports derived from the database and other research and investigative efforts of the Commission. These reports constitute the factual basis of the Commission's findings and set out in detail certain aspects of the Commission's work.

2. The Commission deemed the Annexes to be an integral part of its Final Report. The Secretary-General concurred, as he stated in his transmittal Letter of the Commission's Final Report, dated 24 May 1994, to the President of the Security Council:

   I have examined the final report carefully, and I fully concur with the conclusions reached by the Commission....The annexes will be forwarded to members of the Council as soon as they become available (S/1994/674 at 2).

3. The Annexes are published by the Secretary-General at the request of the Commission. As stated in the Secretary-General's transmittal Letter, referred to above:

   The final report includes several annexes containing reports of investigations and studies, which as a whole constitute an integral part of the report. In his letter to me of 6 May 1994, the Chairman of the Commission requested that the annexes be published, although for cost purposes and given their volume (approximately 3,000 pages) it was suggested that they be published in English only and funded from the remaining surplus in the Trust Fund of the Commission of Experts (S/1994/674 at 2).

4. The Annexes have not each been approved by the entire Commission. However, each has been prepared by or under the direction of a member of the Commission and all have been reviewed and approved by the Chairman. The names of those who assisted in the preparation are mentioned on the title page of each Annex.

5. The Annexes are based on the data contained in some 65,000 pages of documents received by the Commission's database, established at DePaul University's International Human Rights Law Institute, Chicago, as well as on the investigations of the Commission and the research of its members and their staff.

6. With some exceptions, the information and allegations contained therein have not been verified. However, the cumulative nature of the information, as well as its corroboration from multiple sources evidences a degree of reliability, in the aggregate and in many individual cases. The recurrence of certain factual information from multiple or unrelated sources provides a basis for an inference of reliability and credibility. Viewed in its entirety, the combination of this information warrants the Commission's findings as to the general patterns and policies described in the Final Report and in the Annexes.

7. It must be noted that the information upon which these Annexes are based is limited in comparison to all that which could have been obtained had the Commission been appropriately funded and staffed, and had there been more time to conduct in-depth investigations. Despite these and other limitations and constraints described in the Final Report, what was achieved is nonetheless exceptional and revealing (S/1994/674 at ¶¶ 12-17).

8. As also indicated in the Final Report, the Commission was terminated on
30 April 1994. Thus, it ceased to receive information since then (S/1994/674 at ¶¶ 31-33). Furthermore, the database was transferred at that time to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague (ICTFY), and therefore, the data-entry work also had to be terminated. However, the work of the Commission, its database, and these Annexes did serve as bases for the Prosecutor's endeavors in the pursuit of justice.

9. Each Annex contains a brief description of the methodology followed and the basis upon which it is prepared. The format is in accordance with United Nations publications standards. The style is descriptive and reflects analysis which strives to be objective and impartial.

10. No other body has been established to pursue the tasks mandated to the Commission by the Security Council in its Resolution 780 (1992). Thus, the Final Report and these Annexes may well be the only relatively comprehensive, historic record likely to be compiled of the policies and practices as well as specific cases, evidencing grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. The work of the ICTFY will, however, complement this historic record.

11. It was not the Commission's intention or part of its responsibility to prepare cases for criminal prosecution or to pronounce upon the guilt of individual persons. These are tasks for prosecutors and judges, who will form their own views after thorough investigation and deliberation, in accordance with the "rule of law." They are not, therefore, bound by any of the opinions or conclusions expressed in the Annexes. It should also be emphasized that no allegation contained in the Annexes with respect to any individual is intended to constitute a finding on the guilt or innocence of that person. That will ultimately have to be determined by appropriate judicial bodies.

12. In order to avoid any possible prejudice to any potential prosecutions, certain names and references have been removed during the editing process. To obviate concerns for privacy or risk of detrimentally affecting eventual prosecutions, the names that are mentioned in the Annexes are those that have been reported by the media or are otherwise publicly known. Above all, the Commission is concerned with safeguarding the confidentiality of victims and witnesses.

13. The Commission developed effective working relations with the Prosecutor's office. Additionally, several members of the Commission, including the Chairman, have worked closely with Prosecutor Goldstone, even after the Commission officially concluded its work. In fact, a former member of the Commission is on the Prosecutor's staff, as are two former Assistants to the Commission.

14. Mindful of the Prosecutor's task and the exigencies of his work, the Chairman and the Prosecutor cooperated in reviewing these Annexes to make sure that they do not contain any information detrimental to the task of the Prosecutor. This is why many names, places and other relevant information has been deleted from the Annexes. But, this information is in the hands of the Prosecutor.

M. Cherif Bassiouni (Egypt), Chairman
Christine Cleiren (The Netherlands)
William J. Fenrick (Canada)
Hanne Sophie Greve (Norway)
Kéba M'Baye (Senegal)
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FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

Prepared by:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)
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ANNEX SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS

ANNEXES I - I.C

1. Annexes I through I.C describe administrative and organizational matters. They were prepared by the Commission's Secretariat and staff members of the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), DePaul University, under the supervision of Chairman Bassiouni. Annex I contains the Rules of Procedure of the Commission which were also attached to the (first) Interim Report as an appendix. The Rules of Procedure governed the activities of the Commission in the fulfillment of its mandate. Annex I.A includes an explanation of the workings of the IHRLI database and documentation centre and a description of the documents received by the Commission and catalogued in the documentarian's database. Annex I.B contains a list of the 34 missions undertaken by the Commission. Annex I.C contains a list of organizations which assisted or supported the work of the Commission to acknowledge their efforts.

ANNEX II - RAPE: A LEGAL STUDY

2. Commissioner Cleiren prepared Annex II, consisting of 18 pages of text, on the criteria for applying international humanitarian law to the crime of rape and other sexual assaults. The analysis addressed the legal issues of sexual assault against women, men, and children.

ANNEX III - MILITARY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE WARRING FACTIONS

3. This Annex was prepared by Chairman Bassiouni and consists of 37 pages. The analysis is based on a variety of sources describing the military structure, its evolution, and the strategies and tactics of the "warring factions" in the contextual evolution of this armed conflict. The historical, military, and political background of the military structure is described and analysed along with the particularities of the strategies and tactics of the parties. It is complemented by Annex III.A, which describes the role and activities of paramilitary organizations. The military characteristics described in Annexes III and III.A along with the historical background and policy of "ethnic cleansing" described in Annex IV are essential to an understanding of the facts that brought about the significant victimization and the violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in this conflict.

I. INTRODUCTION

4. The following report describes the basic military characteristics and features of the "warring factions" in the former Yugoslavia. The focus of this report is on the structures, strategies, and tactics of the regular military forces engaged in the conflict. These regular forces are those of the Yugoslav Army (JA) and its predecessor, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), also referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA); the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA); the Krajina Serb Army (SKA); the Croatian Army (HV); the Croatian Defence Council (HVO); and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Paramilitary and Special Forces units have performed an important role in this conflict, often coordinating their operations with those of conventional forces. These forces are discussed in detail in Annex III.A. Armed police and local volunteers have also been also active participants in military activities.
5 With the exception of the JNA, the military forces involved in the conflict have been organized only recently. In large measure, they emerged from the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and local Territorial Defence Forces (TDF).

6 The strategies of the "warring factions" in the current conflict, with their decentralized structures and reliance on partisan tactics, have much in common with the tactics employed by Yugoslav forces during the Second World War. Thus, the following discussion begins with a review of military operations that emerged to resist the Axis powers.

7 The facts discussed above are linked to the periods to which they relate. Obviously, command structure, "order of battle", forces, equipment, and troop disposition change. Thus, this report is not intended to be a specific chronology of such events. Rather, it is intended to reflect a general situation that needs to be understood in order to assess the military context of the events that led to large scale violations. It is not therefore a complete survey of all aspects of the military situation. The description which follows is based on information obtained up to March 1993.

II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

8 Unlike other conflicts, this one has peculiar characteristics which partake of conventional and unconventional war.

9 Political factors, both international and local, significantly affected the course of military operations.

10 Because the overall conflict evolved into three separate ones, the armies of some of the warring factions were newly constituted while the JNA was three times reconstituted. This situation produced complications and peculiarities with a direct bearing on the course of military activities, and the status of command and control.

11 The geographic spread of military industries, location of maintenance facilities, army depots and government supplies, also affected the course of military operations and the use of weapons because of the availability of munitions, spare parts and repair facilities.

12 Military operations in BiH and Croatia by the JNA, BSA, and SKA have essentially been a function of the political-military goal of securing territories that link Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas in BiH (along the Drina and Sava rivers) and Serb-inhabited areas in Croatia. The Serb goal was to achieve a territorial and defensible link between what is called "Greater Serbia". Thus, there has never been a unified or coherent battle line, but multiple theatres of operation between which forces shifted, depending on the status of each theatre. Strategic positions were related to each one of these theatres, but since these theatres were part of a political geographical arc linking Serbia with Serb-inhabited areas in BiH and Croatia, the theatres of military confrontation were readily identifiable. As the conflict progressed, the Serb side sought to solidify and enlarge its territorial gains in the areas of the projected "Greater Serbia", while BiH and Croatian forces sought to dislodge them. These theatres saw a constant ebb and flow of military activities.

13 Because these areas were of mixed ethnic and religious population and Serbs were usually a minority, particularly in BiH, Serbs felt that they had to dislodge the other groups. In 1992, Bosnian Serb forces were insufficient in number and disorganized. However, they were tasked by their political
leaders with massive population removal in a relatively short period of time without the open and direct participation of the JNA. The JNA, however, militarily supported the Bosnian Serb forces in many ways, including bombardment and shelling. They were also directly involved in several operations. This was in execution of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" which is described in Annex IV and more specifically in Annex V. The overriding political goal of depopulating these areas of non-Serbs determined the nature of the military activities. These areas were not military targets, but civilian areas with strategic importance derived from the fact that they linked Serbia with Serbs in BiH and Croatia. Personnel, arms and supplies crossed the Drina River from Serbia to Serbs in BiH and through Bosnian Serb areas to certain parts of the Krajinas, which are surrounded by Croats. Military operations in these areas must therefore be seen in this light in order to be understood.

14 Confrontation lines are therefore in and around cities and villages, and access roads to them. But they are not part of a continuous line. Consequently, there are seven areas in BiH controlled by the Bosnian government which are geographically unconnected. This also means that areas under Serb control are not contiguous. The same is true with respect to Bosnian and Croatian forces in Herzegovina and also in the Krajinas where the Serbs are in four unconnected sectors. This checkered military map meant the forces from different warring factions were interspersed. In many areas, the party in control is surrounded entirely by another party, or only partly by that party and partly by yet another party.

15 The result of this checkered and totally uneven field situation is that each one of these theatres of military confrontation had different characteristics. More particularly, they also had different dynamics and the relations between opposing groups varied significantly.

16 One way by which this is evident is in the level of the black market and trade that goes on in these areas between the warring factions or through their lines. Thus, for example, the Tuzla area, which has over one million inhabitants, including some 20,000 Serbs and 30,000 Croats, has suffered little bombardment from the Serb forces which surround it entirely. That city has a flourishing black market to which goods arrive from Serbia through Serbian lines. Another example is the Bihać pocket which, until summer 1994, was ruled by Fikret Abdić who broke with the Sarajevo government. He operated a private company that brought goods from Croatia (which borders Bihać on one side) into the pocket, and also traded with the Serb forces which encircled the pocket from three directions. This cozy relationship resulted in Abdić's signing in Belgrade in April 1993 a separate peace with the Bosnian Serb Republic. This situation that changed when the Fifth Army Corps of BiH recaptured the area in August 1994. Since then, the area has been the scene of intense fighting between BiH forces and the BSA, which also has support from the SKA in nearby Croatia. These are only illustrations of the peculiarities of this conflict.

17 The military structure, strategies and tactics of the "warring factions" are a consequence of the following factors:

(a) World War II antecedents, as well as experiences in that partisan war which led to the doctrine of Total National Defence (TND). TND includes the placing of weapon caches with local territorial defence units, decentralization of forces and command control, reliance on local forces, and other characterizations, which partake of a combination of guerilla and conventional warfare;

(b) Political factors leading to the different stages of the JNA; and,
(c) The gradual evolution of the conflict which took place between multiple parties, at different times, and in separate, though frequently related, theatres of operation.

18 The TND was part of Yugoslav political-military doctrine. Thus, TND and the type of Army and Party structures that existed in Communist Yugoslavia constitute a political-military context which has had significant impact on the goals, strategies and tactics employed by the JNA and the forces that emerged out of the JNA in Serb Bosnia and Krajina. This context and, in particular, the political factors that led to the conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH, are crucial to an understanding of what occurred.

19 When the three Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH declared their independence, they did not have separate armies. Before 1991, the JNA was a single army for all members of the former Yugoslavia, though its military centrality changed since 1974. Upon the successive declarations of independence of these three republics, some of the military personnel, who had been located in each of these republics, left the JNA and reconstituted themselves as part of the newly created national armies of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH. In addition, each of the "warring factions" used paramilitary and special forces as described in Annex III.A. The armies of the "warring factions" consisted mainly of military personnel and equipment of the former JNA. But each of these Republics had local TDF which were part of the TND of Yugoslavia, and local police forces consisting of personnel from their respective Republics. These forces and armed civilians supplemented the armies of the "warring factions".

20 The role performed by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was critical to the evolution of this conflict, as stated by James Gow, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London:

"[t]he role played by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was central: it made the difference between widespread unrest and war. By September 1991 the military had decided to create a new Yugoslav state from parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be "cleansed" of "unreliable" and potentially hostile inhabitants. At that stage, as the Belgrade military intensified its activity in Croatia, it also appears to have begun preparations for a war to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. That war was launched in the period preceding international recognition of the Bosnian state, with a series of attacks at crucial points in the country. In the face of international pressure, the Yugoslav military divided, with half of its capability remaining in Bosnia as the Bosnian Serb army. This force proceeded to occupy and "cleansing" large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

21 Since the conflict began, however, there has been considerable continuity in the structure, strategy, and tactics of the military forces in the former Yugoslavia. The distinctive changes since 1993 are that the "warring factions" increased centralized command of their respective army structures; established control over paramilitary and special forces by integrating them into the army or disbanding them; and enhanced military professionalism. The result, as of middle-to-late 1993, is that more combatants are in uniform, who operate as part of regular army units, and under the command of superior officers. It is therefore important to distinguish between the situation that existed between approximately June 1991 and late 1993, and the ensuing period, bearing in mind that the process of transformation has been gradual.
22 The earlier part of the conflict was characterized by a multiplicity of combatant forces (for example, regular armies, militias, special forces, police and armed civilians) operating within different structures or outside any structure, sometimes operating under no established command and control. Some of these forces operated without uniforms, emblems or insignias. Frequently, these forces merged or combined in connection with certain operations. Probably the only factor common to all of these forces is their receipt of military equipment, ammunition and supplies from their respective armies and governments, and in the case of Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, their reliance on the JNA and the FRY.

23 The military structure and the strategies and tactics employed blur the chain of command and conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability to the military and political leaders. But it could also have been the result of a chaotic situation which regular armies in the process of constituting or reconstituting themselves could not control until they had reached a sufficient level of organization. This occurred later in the conflict, but after most of the violations had occurred.

24 These factors, however, contributed to the manner in which the policy of "ethnic cleansing" was implemented, particularly by Serb forces, who were unrestrained by the JNA, from which they received support. 2

25 The overall conflict in the former Yugoslavia evolved through three distinct phases. The military structure must be examined in the contexts of the three succeeding and sometimes overlapping conflicts which took place during these three phases, as described below.

26 The first phase involved the conflict in Slovenia. It began when that Republic declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. That conflict involved the JNA, Slovenia's TDF, Slovenian troops who left the JNA to join the newly created Slovenian Army, and local Slovenian Police. This phase lasted for only 10 days in June and July 1991, and resulted in limited human and property harm. 10

27 The second phase of the conflict involved Croatia. It started before that Republic officially declared its independence on 25 July 1991. On one side, that conflict involved the JNA, Serb militia in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia, special forces from Serbia (with the participation of Serb expatriates and some mercenaries), local special forces, and Serb police and armed civilians from the same areas. On the other side, the newly-formed Croatian Army consisted of Croatian troops who left the JNA, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), local militia, special forces (with the participation of expatriate Croats and some mercenaries), and local Croatian police and armed civilians. After November 1991, the JNA formally withdrew from Croatia, but continued to support the army of the newly-formed, self-proclaimed "Serb Republic of Krajina". Meanwhile, the newly-established Republic of Croatia had formed its army, the Croatian Army (HV), which, along with Croatian special forces and others, continued the armed conflict in what became the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. 11

28 The third phase of the conflict began in BiH, following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992. It involved simultaneous fighting between Croatians and Bosnian government forces, Bosnian government forces and Serbian forces, and Croatian and Serbian forces. The Croatian Defence Council forces in BiH (HVO) were supported by the Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and special forces like the HOS, the military wing of the Croatian party of Rights (named after the former Ustaše of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area). The HOS was
later partially incorporated in the HVO and disbanded. Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. At first, the Bosnian government and JNA opposed each other. This lasted from April to June 1992, during which time the JNA troops from Serbia and Montenegro "officially" withdrew from BiH, leaving behind Serbian JNA troops from BiH and their equipment. They were supplemented by special forces from Serbia which consisted of Serbs, expatriate volunteers and mercenaries, Bosnian Serb militia and police, and local Serb volunteers. 12/

29 As described above, in addition to the regular armies of JNA, Croatia and BiH, there are three additional armies: the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which operates in Croatia; and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which operates outside the border of the Republic of Croatia, in BiH. The first two are armed and supported by the JNA (the Yugoslav Army or JA) and the third is armed and supported by the Croatian Army (HV).

30 In addition to these armies, the TDF were militarily active. In Croatia, TDFs were known as the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). The TDFs had a separate command structure from the regular army. Nevertheless, they joined in the armed conflict, frequently operating with their respective regular army and under regular army officers' command. They also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually the areas from which most of the personnel in these units came.

31 Two other types of paramilitary groups and formations are also engaged in military operations. They consist of the so-called special forces, and local police forces augmented by local armed civilians. All the warring factions make use of such forces among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of command and control are confusing, even to the combatants. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces).

32 There are several reported paramilitary and special forces, (see Annex III.A), which usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy, except when they are integrated into the regular army's plan of action. 13/ These forces are supplied and often trained by the governments that they serve. Many special forces answer only to senior political officials in the respective governments. Such relationships are frequently based on personal political allegiance and are not always publicly known. However, in time, information about the political sponsorship and support of these groups became more readily available though still nebulous. As these units usually operate independently and outside the apparent military chain of command, their order of battle is not known. Notwithstanding the strong links between these units and the respective armies, the regular armies failed to restrain them from the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. Among the most notorious of the special forces are Arkan's "Tigers" and Šešelj's "White Eagles" (also referred to as "Četniks"). Many of these units operate throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian units operate in BiH and Croatia, and the Croatian units in BiH. These special forces have committed some of the worst violations of international humanitarian law. They are described in Annex IIIA.

33 Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not to be confused with the special forces mentioned above. These local forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally, they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same opština (county) and neighbouring areas. Their command and control is local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, though these groups, like the special forces, typically have an identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group is
called by the leader's name. Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically
significant name or the name of their town, village or area. The leadership
of these groups is local, mostly consisting of political figures. These
units, particularly among Serbs in BiH and Krajina and Croats in Krajina and
BiH, have, like the special forces, committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

34 The police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, also participate in
military activities. These forces operate within a given municipality. They
are nominally under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the
respective Ministries of Interior also have national and regional police
units, which usually operate outside the boundaries of local municipalities.
The relationship between national, regional and local police is not always
clear and varies in each country, and sometimes within the regions of each
country. During the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and in BiH, the
crime, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, operated without apparent
command and control from the army. Their leadership was local and included
many political figures. These forces acted with apparent autonomy in their
respective areas, except when engaged in operations with their respective
regular army.

35 During the early stages of the conflict, most of the combatants,
including in many cases those in the regular army, did not wear distinctive
uniforms, emblems or insignias of rank. As a result, officers freely moved
from army to militia and from one unit to another. To further complicate
matters, in the early stages of the conflict between Croatia and the FRY and
other Serb forces within Croatia, and between BiH and the FRY and other forces
within BiH (in May 1992, JNA forces from the FRY officially withdrew from
Bosnia), the order of battle of many army and militia units was not clearly
established. The chain of command was significantly blurred, even to
insiders. Consequently, the organizations' command and control structures
were seriously eroded, which resulted in much confusion. The confusion was
more pronounced in BiH among Serb combatants until late 1992. It seems to
have been purposely kept that way for essentially political reasons. This
makes it difficult to ascertain units in a specific area and to establish
command responsibility. The situation changed as the three regular armies
managed or decided to control these combatants as of 1993. But that process
was slow.

36 The outcome of such a structure and the strategies and tactics employed
blur the chain of command and help conceal responsibility. This concealment
may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible
deniability. But, it could also be due to other factors existing at the early
stages of the conflict, as stated by one expert:

"[t]here is a great deal of genuine confusion in the West as who
actually controls the Serbian forces in BiH. To make the situation even
more complicated, the regime in Belgrade consistently tries to do its
best to muddle the issue by denying its own responsibility for war in
the neighbouring republic. For example, the President of the self-
proclaimed FRY, Mr. Dobrica Cosic (who is also Supreme Commander of the
Federal Army) falsely asserted on 15 July that the army does not provide
any weapons and military equipment to the former 'territorial Defense
Forces of the Serbian Republic of BiH, except for some limited
humanitarian aid'. Moreover, it does not command and control these
forces. But the reality is quite different. The operational chain of
command in the federal army runs from the Supreme Defense Council
(composed of the president of the FRY and presidents of the Republics of
Serbia and Montenegro through the General Staff in Belgrade to the
commanders of 1st MD (Belgrade), 4th MD (Podgorica), the Army of the
Special forces are apparently accountable only to senior political officials of the governments which they serve. Little is known about their order of battle except that restraint of these units by the regular army is conspicuously absent. Command and control, in effect, have been established through a policy of omission. The JNA, in particular, has at least tacitly permitted paramilitary units and special forces to engage in conduct that has resulted in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. In many instances, the JNA was on the scene and militarily supported these activities and these violations. A purposeful failure to act was therefore evident in many cases.

As stated earlier, paramilitary units and special forces have performed an important role in the conflict. In the early stages of the war in BiH, for example, paramilitary units coordinated their operations with the JNA. This was apparent in the attacks on Prijedor, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, as well as in other attacks in cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. The role that paramilitary and special forces have played in the conflict is explored in greater detail in Annex III.A.

A large number of Serbian and Croatian expatriates have joined in the fighting, mostly with paramilitary and special forces. There are also a smaller number of non-nationals, volunteers, and a few that could be called mercenaries also joining in the fighting. In contrast, a much smaller number of expatriates and non-nationals joined on the BiH side. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces)

All of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law for which military and, in some cases, civilian commanders are responsible under the principle of command responsibility. The largest number of these violations were clearly perpetrated by Serb combatants, and the largest number of victims have been from BiH.

The absence of command and control and the conditions created, particularly on the Serb side, were conducive to large scale and repeated violations. Persons who engaged in this conduct were encouraged by propagandistic rhetoric and comforted by the belief that they would have impunity. The absence of preventive action by military commanders and other purposeful omissions, such as the failure to punish known perpetrators, constitutes a clear basis for command responsibility.

The history of war clearly reveals that professional armies that are under effective command and control commit fewer violations than fighting units that are not properly trained in the law of armed conflict and are not under the effective command and control of superior officers. But when military commanders order violations, permit them to happen, fail to take measures to prevent them, and fail to discipline, prosecute and punish violators, then the worst can be expected. Unfortunately, in this conflict, the worst did occur. This is a sad commentary on those who committed these crimes, but it is an even sadder one concerning the military and political leaders who ordered these acts or made them possible. War is sufficiently inhuman without having it carried out in the most inhuman ways. Tragically, in this case, these inhuman ways were designed to serve a political purpose. See the Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Annex IV.

The grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law occurring in this conflict are, in part, the
product of the military structure that resulted in a lack of effective command and control. The violations are also the result of the strategies and tactics employed by the "warring factions", and the failure of military commanders to prevent and repress these violations.

44 The parties to this conflict are bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, both under State succession and by the parties' specific accession thereto. The parties are also bound by the Genocide Convention under State succession, in so far as that convention has been ratified by the former FRY. The parties are also bound by jus cogens and customary international law. The parties are also bound under jus cogens and customary international law by the obligations arising under "crimes against humanity", as developed in conventional and customary international law.

45 The Federal Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia embodied the international rules of armed conflict. JNA military personnel were instructed accordingly. Thus, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law are also part of the applicable national laws of all warring factions.

46 Furthermore, the ordinary criminal laws which existed in the criminal codes of all the former Republics of Yugoslavia also prohibited those acts (which are grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of international humanitarian law) as common crimes.

47 Lastly, the defence of "obedience to superior orders", finds no application in the cases of violations which occurred in this conflict.

48 The doctrine of "Command Responsibility" and the defence of "obedience of superior orders" are discussed in the Final Report, ¶ 55-62.

ANNEX III.A - SPECIAL FORCES

49 Annex III.A was prepared by staff members of IHRIL, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 251 pages of text.

I. INTRODUCTION

50 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has seen the widespread use of paramilitary organizations within the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia, and to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The use of paramilitary organizations by all "warring factions" must be viewed in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the structure of the military before the breakup. In the period of 1989-1991, political ferment indicated that a breakup of Yugoslavia was likely, however, there were no indications on how the country would be divided. The rise of nationalism and ethnic tension caused Yugoslavs to become concerned for their own safety. This concern over their own self-defence, combined with the rhetoric of nationalist politicians, led many Yugoslavs to arm themselves. Furthermore, uncertainty of the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) role in post-Communist Yugoslavia led many to conclude that paramilitary organizations were a necessity.

51 The creation of paramilitary groups was further fueled by the wide circulation of stories of atrocities committed by all sides. Serbs, for example, were shown pictures allegedly depicting the Mujahedin forces holding the severed heads of Serb soldiers. All sides viewed themselves as victims,
not as perpetrators, thereby creating a desire for revenge and providing justification for their own deeds.

52 Paramilitary organizations exist in several forms. Some are highly-organized groups and operate in several theatres in conjunction with regular military formations. Others are loosely organized and act alone in a single village or on an ad hoc basis. Some of the groups preceded the conflict, others followed it. Still others were formed as the need arose during the conflict. These groups have been organized by the governments or militaries of the warring factions, by political parties, as well as by local police, political, military or community leaders. The members of these paramilitary organizations have been drawn from the regular army, Territorial Defence forces, local militia and police, local civilians, expatriots, and foreign nationals. According to some reports, the paramilitary organizations also include criminals released from prison solely for the purpose of forming these units.

53 For purposes of this report, the paramilitary forces operating in the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be classified into four categories: Special Forces, "Militias", "Paramilitary units", and "police augmented by armed civilians". Special Forces usually operate with substantial autonomy under the command of an identified leader. They operate in several theatres, and sometimes engage in joint operations with the regular militaries. These groups are supplied, and often trained, by the governments they serve. Many of these Special Forces report solely to senior political officials. "Militias" consist of members of the former Territorial Defence Forces. They frequently operate jointly, in the geographic area from which they originate under the command of the regular army. "Paramilitary units" are forces under the command of a local leader. Their area of operation is often confined to the town or village from which the members were drawn, although they may occasionally operate alongside similar groups in other towns or villages. The "police augmented by armed civilians" are forces that operate within a given county under local, sometimes political, leadership. These forces frequently act with autonomy, although they are reported to be under the control of the Ministry of Interior or other political organizations. For purposes of this report, groups from these categories will be referred to generically as paramilitary groups, unless otherwise indicated.

54 This report attempts to identify the paramilitary organizations working in support of all three warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. It also discusses how these groups operate in relation to the regular military command of the respective factions. Furthermore, this report discusses the reported activity of these groups.

55 This report begins with a discussion of the research methodology, and is followed by a brief discussion of the pre-conflict military defence doctrine of the former Yugoslavia. This doctrine, with its reliance on a decentralized command structure and locally-based weapons caches, provided fertile ground for the creation of paramilitary groups. This discussion is followed by a summary analysis of the data. Section II discusses the activity of six of the most prolific paramilitary organizations: the Green Berets and Mujahedin, working in support of the government of BiH; the HOS and troops under the command of Jusuf Prazina, working in support of the Croatian government; and those groups under the command of Vojislav Šešelj and Željko Ražnatović (nom de guerre Arkan), working in support of the government of Serbia and the self-declared Serb Republics. Section III is a listing of the other identified paramilitary organizations containing all reported vital statistics, and Section IV discusses paramilitary activity by geographic location.
A. Methodology

56 This report is based on information contained in documents and audio and video tapes received by the Commission of Experts and the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), as well as on information gathered from searches of the NEXIS and FBIS media databases. All of the organizations referred to in paragraph 4 operated in substitution for, or supplementing, a regular military force. All documents and media reports in the possession of IHRLI were reviewed, and those containing allegations of paramilitary activity were analysed. A large number of these reports referred to paramilitary groups generically (i.e., Serbian paramilitaries or irregular forces). Although these reports were consulted, only those reports referring to a paramilitary organization by name (i.e., Tigers, Yellow Ants), or by specific leaders or group members (i.e., paramilitary forces under Dragan Ikanović), are included in the statistical data below.

57 Information sheets were created for each identified paramilitary organization containing the following information: name of unit, ethnicity, uniform, number of troops, place of origin, area(s) of operation, political affiliation, leader(s), alleged members, source of information, and the alleged activity. These information sheets were then used to compare information on the paramilitary groups in a standardized format.

58 This report is limited by the quality and quantity of the documents received by the Commission. In addition, the Commission was not able to verify much of the information that it received. Consequently, this report should not be considered all inclusive, though it is comprehensive. Subsequent investigation may identify additional paramilitary groups and facts that have not yet been discovered that may bear upon the information contained in this report.

B. Brief military history

59 Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform led to fears of a Soviet invasion. These fears resulted in the development of a new military defence doctrine in the former Yugoslavia called "Total National Defence". This doctrine was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion by mobilizing all of the nation's cultural, societal, and military resources. The Communist party apparatus was tightly integrated into the military scheme, with the military structures accommodating a "shadow" chain of command responsible to the Communist party.

60 Yugoslav military strategists realized national command, control, and communications facilities were vulnerable. Therefore, they decentralized the system of command and control. The governments of the various republics would participate with the federal government for regional defence.

61 This strategy required universal military service and coordinated training in guerrilla warfare. This ensured that cadres of soldiers, trained in guerrilla warfare, would be available nationwide and capable of operating in a decentralized command fashion. Training facilities, weapons caches, and supply stores were placed throughout the country. The military also organized reserve units (Territorial Defence Forces) around workplaces to ensure the wide distribution of weapons.

62 Thus, with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, trained soldiers were available for mobilization, and weapons and ammunition were also available for distribution to national and local political or military leaders and their followers. These leaders sometimes used these resources to further their own
political, military, or personal goals. This, along with the other factors, led to the proliferation of paramilitaries throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

C. Summary analysis

This study found that:

(a) There are at least 83 identified paramilitary groups operating in the territories of the former Yugoslavia: 56 are working in support of FRY and the self-declared Serbian Republics; 13 are working in support of the Republic of Croatia; and 14 are working in support of BiH;

(b) The number of paramilitary groups, and the size of each group, has varied throughout the course of the conflict. The number and size of the groups rise, for example, when the conflict intensifies. The reports received indicate only a rough approximation of paramilitary troop strength. The number of persons in paramilitary groups fighting in support of BiH range from 4,000 to 6,000; between 12,000 and 20,000 have supported the Republic of Croatia; and between 20,000 and 40,000 paramilitaries have fought on behalf of the self-declared Serb Republics;

(c) In addition to the 83 paramilitary groups, there are groups which consist of persons who have been drawn essentially from outside the former Yugoslavia. Three groups specifically mentioned are the Mujahedin (operating with the BiH Army), the Garibaldi Unit (an Italian unit operating alongside the Croats), and Russian Mercenaries (operating in conjunction with the Serbs). There are also general reports of the presence of mercenaries from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States;

(d) Paramilitary activity has been reported in 72 separate counties, but the vast majority has occurred in BiH.

The first report of paramilitary activity occurred in April of 1991. However, Arkan and Vojislav Šešelj began forming paramilitary organizations as early as 1990. The first reported paramilitary operation involved Šešelj's troops in Vukovar County, Croatia. The most active period for Serb paramilitary activity in Croatia was in October of 1991. Those areas reporting the greatest amount of paramilitary activity in Croatia were Knin, Podravska Slatina, and Vukovar.

There were no reports of paramilitary activity in BiH until early 1992. The first reports concerned paramilitary groups supported by Arkan and Šešelj. The activity in BiH was strongest in May and June of 1992 in the areas of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboj, Poča, Konjic, Modriča, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Višegrad, and Zvornik.

Paramilitary groups working in support of FRY, or the self-proclaimed Serbian Republics, have operated in the territories of BiH, Croatia, and FRY. Those groups working in support of Croatia were reported to have operated in both BiH and Croatia, while those supporting BiH have not been involved in operations outside BiH territory.

The vast majority of the paramilitaries acted locally, with their operations confined to a single county, or opština. They operated under the command of a local leader with local command and control. These groups would often coordinate their operations with regular forces or other paramilitaries. The local groups would then take control of the area after it had been secured.
68. The most active paramilitary groups operating throughout the area of conflict were the Serb groups under the command of Arkan and Šešelj. 31/

69. Reliance on, or tolerance of, paramilitary and special forces served several purposes for the military and political leaders of the respective republics. It clouded the issue of command and control, reduced the chances of being identified, and therefore permitted the greater use of illegal violence. Many of these groups, for example, did not wear uniforms or other conventional military badges or symbols.

70. Involvement of paramilitary groups in the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law is alleged in the vast majority of the reports in which paramilitary groups are mentioned. The most frequently reported violations are the killing of civilians, torture, rape, destruction of property, and looting. 32/ There is also a strong correlation between reports of paramilitary activity and reports of rape and sexual assault, detention facilities, and mass graves. These types of activities (i.e., paramilitary activity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) tended to occur in the same counties 33/ and evidence the localized nature of the activity.

71. FRY, Croatia, and BiH used paramilitary forces. However, the disproportionate number of paramilitary and special forces of Serbian ethnicity indicates that the Serbs more heavily relied on the use of special forces to accomplish their military and strategic goals. Of 39 counties where Serb paramilitary activity was reported, Serb paramilitary units were operating in conjunction with the JNA in 24 of them. In comparison there were reports for five counties of joint operations between forces operating in support of Croatia, the Croatian Army (HV), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), 34/ and reports for only two counties of joint operations between the Army of BiH and forces operating in support of the Government of BiH.

72. The JNA was operating with the highest paramilitary activity in eight counties simultaneously: Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboj, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Višegrad, and Zvornik. Excluding Sarajevo, these counties are within the strategic arc the Serbs need to link all Serbian populations from BiH and Croatia within a contiguous Serbian state.

73. There is substantial evidence that Serbian government or military officials have coordinated, or at least have been aware of, the activities of the Serbian paramilitary or special forces:

(a) Serbian paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps; 35/

(b) There are reports of Serbian paramilitary groups or special forces entering a county at the invitation of local political leaders. In Prijedor, a Bosnian Serb government spokesman explained their use of Arkan: "He is very expensive, but also very efficient";

(c) In 36 of the 67 counties in which there were reports of Serbian paramilitary activity, there was a coordination of operations between two or more groups. In comparison, only six of the 17 counties had reported paramilitary activity in support of Croatia and five of the 11 counties had reported paramilitary activity in support of BiH;

(d) Fifteen of the 55 identified groups operated in more than one county, again suggesting a coordination of activity, compared to five Croatian and four working in support of BiH in more than one county.
D. General observations

74. While paramilitary groups have links to their respective governments, the nature of these links vary according to which agency furnishes funds, supplies, and military equipment to the group. Thus, Arkan is said to have strong links to Serbia's Ministry of Interior. The HOS in Croatia have links to political figures in that country, and the Green Berets have links to the Presidency of BiH. Control of the paramilitary groups is largely a function of the internal politics of the warring factions.

75. Members of ethnic and religious groups, such as Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims residing outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, have participated in the conflict as mercenaries. Some members of these groups, as well as persons of other nationalities, have been paid by the "warring faction" which they supported. 36/

76. In most cases, paramilitary groups have coordinated their activities with the armies of the "warring factions". The groups that have operated with the most independence are the HOS in Croatia and the Mujahedin in BiH. The smaller the group, the greater the tendency to operate outside of the army's control.

77. In many counties, Serbian special forces supported the work of local "crisis committees" when local militia or local police were unavailable. This further evidences the localized nature of most paramilitary activity. In some respects, it also reflects the doctrines of guerilla warfare inspired by Tito's World War II experience.

78. In BiH, Serb paramilitary activity was at its greatest level in the second half of 1992. During this period, immediately after the JNA was officially withdrawn, there was disorganization and confusion within the regular armed forces of the Bosnian Serb Army. This led to a lack of command and control, and it was during this period that the greatest number of violations by Serb paramilitary groups occurred.

79. Serb paramilitary members have been recruited largely from the population of persons between the ages of 18 to 30. This population of young persons is more capable of violence and less susceptible to control than older age cohorts. Paramilitary members have also been recruited from prisons. It has been reported that persons convicted of violent offences were released to fight in BiH. The Army apparently had the first pick from among these offenders. The others served in paramilitary units.

80. Most of the paramilitary units sustained themselves through lootings, thefts, ransoms and trafficking in contraband. This is especially true of the groups associated with Arkan, as discussed below.

81. The largest number of violations were committed by Serb paramilitary groups fighting in BiH in support of the breakaway Serb Republic. This can be explained, in part, by the following: There are more Serb paramilitary groups than those fighting on behalf of the other warring factions; Serb paramilitary groups have more members than the other groups; Serb paramilitary groups have operated over a wider range of territory, thus they have been in contact with a larger number of potential victims; and the Serbs have pushed a policy of "ethnic cleansing" on a wider scale than the other groups.
ANNEX IV - THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING

82. Annex IV was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 88 pages of text.

I. INTRODUCTION

83. Part I of the following Annex briefly describes the historical antecedents to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Part II describes the development of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" and the early stages of its implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Part III focuses upon one "ethnic cleansing" campaign in the Bosnian city of Zvornik and describes the military attack on and expulsion of the Muslim population of the city.

84. As used in this report, "ethnic cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic or religious group.

85. All parties involved in the conflict have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. These violations include the killing of civilians, rape, torture, and the deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there are significant qualitative differences. Most of the violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. The second largest group of victims were Croats, whose perpetrators have been Serbs from Serbia, BiH, and the Krajinas. Both Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats have also victimized Serbs in BiH and Croatia, but in lesser number. The policy of "ethnic cleansing", however, has been systematically carried out by Serbs in BiH and Croatia against their opponents, though Croats have also carried out similar policies, but on a more restricted scale, against Serbs in Croatia and Muslims in Herzegovina. Forceful population removal by BiH of Serbs has also occurred in some limited areas, but not as a policy. In fact, BiH occupied areas contain both Croats and Serbs, while Bosnian Serb areas have been cleansed of all but Serbs. The Krajinas in Croatia also have been cleansed of Croats, while eastern and western Slavonia (Croatia) have been cleansed of Serbs.

86. Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and BiH have engaged in "ethnic cleansing" practices against Serbs and Muslims. Croats, for example, have conducted "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and in parts of the Krajina region, as well as against Muslims in the Mostar area. While Bosnian Muslim forces have engaged in practices that constitute "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, they have not engaged in "ethnic cleansing" operations. The vast majority of reports alleging "ethnic cleansing" operations involved Serbian forces who have used means, such as the mass killing of civilians, torture, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, and other practices to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb-claimed territory.

87. "Ethnic cleansing" by Serb forces has been systematic and apparently well-planned. As early as mid-1990, the Yugoslav Army (JNA) began to arm and supply local Serb forces in BiH. The "ethnic cleansing" campaigns in the early stages of the conflict involved coordinated attacks by JNA and paramilitary forces that sometimes operated from the Republic of Serbia. As the war and "ethnic cleansing" continued, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) persisted in supplying logistical support, arms, fuel, and other supplies to Serb forces in Croatia and BiH. "Ethnic cleansing" has involved
means, such as the mass killing of civilians, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, the confiscation of property and similar measures to eliminate, or dramatically reduce, Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb held territory.

88. According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, by late 1993, over 2.1 million people had been displaced from their homes since the conflict in the BiH region. 37/ 

II. EARLY HISTORY

89. The Slavic people migrated from the caucuses to the Balkan peninsula between the Sixth and the Eighth Century. Between the Ninth and Twelfth Centuries, Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs developed distinct historical and cultural identities.

90. The division of the Christian Church in 1054 reinforced the fault line that earlier divided the Roman Empire. 38/ On the eastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greek world, the Eastern Orthodox Church and users of the Cyrillic script. On the western side lie the Roman Catholic Church.

91. In the 17th Century the Ottoman Turks encroached on the Balkan peninsula and defeated Serb, Bosnian, and Albanian forces at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) in June 1389. The event was to become of particular historical significance to the Serbs and is commemorated as the symbolic end to the independent Serbian medieval kingdom. 39/ 

92. Members of the Bosnian Church, which was distinct from the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, converted to Islam during this period. These conversions were in part due to the promise of better conditions by Turkish rulers.

93. In the 17th Century, the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires clashed and the Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottoman lands to Christian powers in 1699. The entry of the European powers into the region further accentuated the divisions that had occurred earlier. Croats and Slovenes were firmly part of the west, embracing Catholicism and looking towards the western powers for leadership. The Serbs and Bosnians remained within the Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs, Russia became a growing influence, and as Ottoman power in the region waned Russia assumed the rule of protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.

94. Independence movements appeared in Serbia in the early 19th Century and by 1830, Serbia had achieved autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Strong nationalist sentiments continued to grow throughout the 19th Century. Serbs increasingly viewed their mission as one of liberating and unifying the lands in which Serbs lived. It was during this period that the idea of a "Greater Serbia" first emerged.

III. THE BALKAN WARS AND THE WORLD WARS

95. Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finally freeing the peninsula from Ottoman control. 40/ Serbia made territorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia. However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting with Serbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina. 41/ The two Balkan wars experienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worst
atrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite the peninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an International Commission found:

"[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind—such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions." 42

96. Serb nationalists, incensed by the Hapsburg annexations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The event, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, sparked the first World War.

97. Following the First World War, unity was finally achieved when King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued by ethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbian domination, sought greater self-government within a looser confederation. It was during this period that the Croatian Ustaša (Uprising) movement was born. Its goal was Croatian independence, through violence if necessary.

98. Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leading to German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, the Germans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedić. During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaign of annihilation against its Serbian population. Some Muslims joined the Croats' efforts against the Serbs, though many have fought alongside the Ustaše regime and against the Germans and the Italians. Pavelić sought to create an ethnically and religiously homogenous state. The Serbs of Croatia were faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. Serb officials maintain that a system of death camps, covering 210 square miles, ran along the Sava River. It has been estimated that between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs were killed during this period.

99. In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance, took Belgrade and a communist regime was established. A federal system was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a high concentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ethnic tensions persisted in the post war years. Tito, however, effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements, such as the Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s.

IV. PRELUDE TO THE BREAKUP

100. After Tito's death in 1980, a resurgent Serbian nationalism was led by Slobodan Milošević. To achieve, and later to consolidate his power, Milošević organized massive demonstrations in support of Serbs living in the province of Kosovo, which had a predominantly ethnic Albanian population. When disturbances broke out in Kosovo in 1989, Milošević imposed martial law.

101. Within the Republic of Serbia, the tenor of political life became increasingly strident. Faced with a disintegrating nation-state, Milošević denounced his domestic political opponents as "enemies of Serbia". 43/ His opponents in the other Republics were compared to vampires and fascists. 44/

102. In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amended its
constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with the use of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the other Republics. The resulting tension between the six Republics led to the breakup of the League of Communists in early 1990. In January of that year Slovenian delegates to the Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists demanded an end to the Communist party's "leading role" and the establishment of a multi-party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenians walked out of the Congress.

V. THE CURRENT CONFLICT

103. The present conflict emerged in early 1990 when Serbia and three of the other five republics failed to reach an agreement concerning the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) sought a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. This conflict resulted in efforts by Croatia, Slovenia, and later BiH and Macedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.

104. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991. Two days later, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) attacked the provisional militia. The war in Slovenia lasted only 10 days, but it soon spread to Croatia, where the conflict would be more protracted and bloodier.

105. In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbs living in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian National Council and scheduled an August referendum on their secession from Croatia. Breakaway republics were also established by the Serbs in BiH. These breakaway republics received small arms, artillery, missile launching systems and other support from their supporters in Serbia. In addition, Croats living in BiH established the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and they received arms and other assistance from supporters in Croatia. 45/

106. The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in the conflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs of Croatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was a massive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serb paramilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx of supplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large number of sophisticated weapons and vehicles. 46/

107. Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces was apparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass grave found at Ovca is thought to contain the remains of at least 200 Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarily executed, and buried in a shallow grave.

108. In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNA had approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May, General Ratko Mladić was appointed JNA commander. Under pressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, the FRY announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However, Yugoslav officials said that JNA personnel from BiH could remain there and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs (see Annex III, Military Structure).

109. In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the European Community, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian towns such as Prijedor and other villages in the Kozarac region of north-east BiH, and Zvornik in north-west BiH. Similar attacks have occurred in many cities and villages along the
Drina and Sava Rivers. These areas of BiH have high concentrations of Bosnian Serbs. The purpose of the attacks seems clear: Serb forces have sought to consolidate their control over these territories and link them with each other, as well as with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia.

VI. THE "ETHNIC CLEANSING" CAMPAIGN IN BiH

110. Although "ethnic cleansing" occurred to some extent in the conflict in Croatia, it was in BiH that a distinct pattern of "ethnic cleansing" could be discerned. First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the area. In many cases, Serbian residents are told to leave the area before the violence begins. The homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural and religious monuments, especially churches and mosques, are destroyed. Second, the area falls under the control of paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents with random killings, rapes and looting. Third, the seized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction with paramilitary groups. During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten and sometimes transferred to prison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, have occurred. Non-Serb residents are often fired from their jobs and their property is confiscated. Many have been forced to sign documents relinquishing their rights to their homes before being deported to other areas of the country.

111. According to one military expert of Jane's Information Group:

"[the Commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces] has a clear military aim: the consolidation of Serb-held territory of Bosnia; the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them, such as Goražde, and the severance of any possible military link between Muslims in Bosnia and those in the Sanzak area of Serbia." 47/

112. The policy of "ethnic cleansing" has been implemented consistently throughout an area incorporating an arc that ranges from north-eastern BiH through the regions of eastern and western BiH, adjacent to the Serb Krajina area of Croatia.

113. The Serbs "ethnic cleansing" campaign was shaped by several factors. First, the demographics of the region ensured that any attempt to establish "ethnically pure" areas would entail tremendous dislocations. In BiH, the pre-war population was approximately 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb, and 18 per cent Croat. 48/ The areas of Serb preponderance are primarily located in the north-east, south-east and north-west portions of the country. However, these areas are neither homogenous nor contiguous. The areas in which Serbs are numerically dominant include substantial populations of Muslims and Croats.

114. Populations can be removed, even forcibly removed, without extreme bloodshed. Ethnic minorities could have been ejected from their homes, gathered at a central locations, and transported to another region. This, however, would have required a strong and well-organized regular army. The Bosnian Serb Army was neither numerically strong enough, nor sufficiently well-organized, especially in the first stages of the conflict in BiH, to accomplish this task. Thus, Serb officials relied on the use of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, rapes, and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbs had to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would flee the area and never return.

115. The character of "ethnic cleansing" was partly determined by its reliance on local officials and paramilitary leadership. Local officials
relied on police and militia to help expel non-Serbs from Serb-controlled land, and these forces were often ill-equipped and untrained. The use of terror was their most efficient weapon. Police and local militia were frequently supplemented by paramilitaries. These groups often operated outside any discernable centralized command and control structure. Paramilitaries were often recruited from a population of rural, uneducated youth. Sometimes a deliberate effort was made to recruit those with criminal backgrounds. The apparent lack of control over paramilitaries conveyed the message that the most brutal acts would be permitted, or at least they would go unpunished.

116. The fragmentation of authority has provided FRY and Bosnian Serb officials with "plausible deniability". If ties between paramilitaries and officials are obscured, government officials might be able to evade responsibility for "ethnic cleansing". Thus, even after the JNA became better organized and able to assert greater control in 1993, it did not establish effective command and control over the paramilitaries.

117. While regular military units, militia, police and local citizens have all participated in "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of "ethnic cleansing." Two of the units that have played a major role in the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in BiH, the "Četniks" associated with Vojislav Šešelj and the "Tigers" associated with Željko Ražnatović (Arkan), have been active in the Republic of Serbia as well. Šešelj's followers have reportedly waged "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against ethnic minorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Arkan's "Tigers" have staged military training exercises allegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.

118. These paramilitary units have launched operations from within the Republic of Serbia. In addition, paramilitary training camps are located within the Republic of Serbia.

VII. THE ATTACK ON ZVORNIK 49/

119. The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals a similar pattern of events that was repeated throughout much of the area. In the weeks prior to the attack (which occurred on 8 April 1992), tensions between ethnic groups in the city had increased. Members of each ethnic group had obtained weapons for their personal use. Muslims were warned by their Serb friends that they should leave the area. Prior to 8 April, many Serbs left Zvornik, apparently having been forewarned of the impending attack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbs constructed a barricade, preventing many Muslims from reaching their work site or school. In retaliation, Muslims also erected a barricade at the same location. It was protected by Muslim police officers and armed volunteers.

120. On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into the region. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that the JNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack by Muslim extremists.

121. On 8 April, Serb representatives of SDS, as well as the paramilitary leader known as "Arkan," called for the Muslims to peacefully surrender the city. Negotiations proceeded in which the division of the city into Muslim and Serb enclaves was discussed. The negotiations broke down, however, apparently because Arkan was dissatisfied with the result.

122. After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on the town began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units, was joined by Arkan's
paramilitary troops, sometimes known as "Arkanovci." There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections of the city.

123. The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary units known as "Šešeljovci" and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), entered the city. Serb territorial defence units (TOs) also participated. It was reported that these troops committed random executions and rapes after entering Zvornik.

124. The next day, a provisional government was established that was headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfew was imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit to travel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the police station to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deported to an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnel such as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented from working. During the following days, paramilitary units continued to patrol the streets, and there were many reports of looting, rape and other acts of brutality.

125. In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return to the area from which they had fled. Many returned because they feared losing their property. On arriving in Zvornik, Muslims were told that they must register their property. An "agency for the exchange of houses" was established. In exchange for relinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homes of Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible on the condition that their property was turned over to Serb authorities. From late May to early June 1992, the entire Muslim populations of villages in the surrounding area were deported. The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personal possessions with them. Even these items were often stolen at Serb checkpoints on the roads leaving the area.

126. According to an account in Vreme, the "cleansing" was followed by organized looting. "Some stole gold, hard currencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbed department stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the walls and children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroom suites could be seen floating down the river". 50/

ANNEX V - PRIJEDOR

127. Commissioner Greve prepared Annex V with the assistance of Morten Bergsmo, Assistant to the Commission of Experts. Annex V is an extensive report, consisting of 128 pages of text, on the genocide and "ethnic cleansing" which occurred in Opšćina Prijedor.

128. Commissioner Greve and Mr. Bergsmo collected approximately 400 statements from victims and witnesses of the events in Opšćina Prijedor which were the main resource for the report. In addition, Commissioner Greve relied on local Serbian media reports of the events and her own research.

129. For security reasons, the information gathered from victims and witnesses is kept confidential. These statements are contained in four separate volumes (a total of 911 pages) and are provided exclusively to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY).

I. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

130. Opšćina Prijedor is a district located in north-western Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in an area which is part of Bosnian Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most (to the south), the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and
the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east). Except for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations before the armed conflicts started in BiH.

131. According to the 1991 census, Opština Prijedor had a total population of 112,470 people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslavs" and 2.2 per cent others (Ukrainians, Russians and Italians). In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately 120,000 people, augmented, inter alia, by an influx of people who had fled the destruction of their villages in areas to the west of Opština Prijedor.

132. Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count of June 1993, as published in Serbian-controlled media, gives the following overall picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>New arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>47,745</td>
<td>53,637</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>49,454</td>
<td>6,124</td>
<td>43,330</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>6,350</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the total number of killed and deported persons as of June 1993 is 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people missing). Since then, the number of non-Serbs in the district has continued to decrease. The extreme persecution to which non-Serbs are subjected and their almost total lack of protection in the district is illustrated by the fact that the ICRC and the UNHCR asked permission from the Serbs, ultimo March 1994, to evacuate all remaining non-Serbs from Opština Prijedor.

II. SERBS TAKE POWER ON 30 APRIL 1992

133. According to Kozarski Vjesnik, a Serbian-controlled newspaper in Opština Prijedor:

"The man [Simo Drljača], who the Serbian Democratic Party of the Opština Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police after half a year of illegal work, had done his job so well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the takeover of power [by the Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The assembly of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him Chief of the public security station [i.e. in charge of the secret police]. He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence his new function in Bijelina on Monday." 51/

134. More than six months prior to the power change in 1992, the Serbs started to build up their own administration parallel to the legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor, what they called the Serbian Opština Prijedor. This included, inter alia, a pure Serbian police force with secret service functions. The legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor had been lawfully elected and the Prijedor Assembly reflected the ethnic composition of
135. In early 1992, a very small Serbian paramilitary group took control of the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain in Opština Prijedor. As a consequence, the population in the district could not receive television programmes from Sarajevo or Zagreb any longer, only from Belgrade and later Banja Luka. The television programmes from Belgrade insinuated that non-Serbs wanted war and threatened the Serbs.

136. Prior to the power change on 30 April 1992, Serbs secretly armed other Serbs in the district. Many soldiers from the JNA withdrew from Croatia to north-western BiH in early 1992. Instead of demobilizing those who returned to Opština Prijedor, the legitimate authorities were pressured to accept redeploying them to control all inroads to and exits from the district together with police and the TO. The pressure applied was an ultimatum. The legitimate authorities were invited for a guided sightseeing tour of two Croatian villages just north of Bosanska Gradiška which had been destroyed and left uninhabited. The message was that if the ultimatum was not met, the fate of Prijedor would be the same as that of these villages. The ultimatum was accepted.

III. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SERBS TAKING POWER

137. An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opština Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel and the telephone system was no longer fully operational. A curfew was introduced in Prijedor town - the main town in the district - and travel permits were required in many areas even to move among local villages. Bus services were closed down.

138. In the wake of the power change, most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as police, public officials or even manual workers. In all key functions such as police and local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs.

139. Already before 30 April 1992, Serbs had started to visit the non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demand that they give their weapons up. This process was intensified after the takeover, and combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana or TOs) were instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms.

140. Also, the local media, Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, joined in the anti non-Serb propaganda. The media slandered former non-Serbian leaders by criticizing everything from their alleged lack of efficiency to their private lives. In addition, the media claimed that many dangerous - in particular Muslim - extremists were in the area, preparing genocide against the Serbs.

IV. THE MAJOR SERBIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT

141. Following an incident in which less than a handful Serbian soldiers were shot dead under unclear circumstances, the village of Hambarine was given an ultimatum to hand over a policeman who lived nearby where the shooting had occurred. As it was not met, Hambarine was subjected to several hours of artillery bombardment on 23 May 1992. The shells were fired from the aerodrome Urije just outside Prijedor town. When the bombardment stopped, the village was stormed by infantry, including paramilitary units, which sought
out the inhabitants in every home. Hambarine had a population of 2,499 in 1991.

142. On 24 May 1992, a large-scale attack on the entire Kozarac area east of Prijedor town, under the Kozara Mountain, was carried out with intensive bombardment from all directions by artillery, tanks, and small firearms. The bombardment lasted for more than 24 hours, before infantry and paramilitary groups stormed Kozarac and nearby villages and searched for people in every building. The affected area had a total population of almost 27,000 non-Serbian people.

143. On 30 May 1992, a group of probably less than 150 armed non-Serbs had made their way to the Old Town in Prijedor to regain control over the town. They were defeated, and the Old Town was razed. In the central parts of Prijedor town, all non-Serbs were forced to leave their houses as Serbian military, paramilitary, police and civilians advanced street by street with tanks and lighter arms. The non-Serbs had been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their homes to signal surrender.

144. Starting on 20 July 1992, a large area of predominantly non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner to the Kozarac area. However, it was predominantly infantry and paramilitary groups that carried out the destruction. At the time of the attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages west of Opština Prijedor had been destroyed.

145. Today, the former homes of almost 47,000 people in the Kozarac and Hambarine/Ljubija areas are empty and destroyed. Some were hit by artillery shells, while others were set ablaze in the initial attack. All the homes were pillaged and a large number blown up, one at a time from inside, destroying especially the inside and the roofs. Most of the artillery used during these attacks had been moved into position some time before the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992.

V. CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND DEPORTATIONS

146. As non-Serbs were attacked in the villages and Prijedor town, hundreds, possibly thousands, were killed in their home areas, frequently after maltreatment. The survivors who temporarily managed to flee or hide were divided. Females, boys under the age of sixteen (sometimes the age limit may have been lower) and elderly men (older than 60 or 65) made up one group, while the other men comprised the second group.

147. The second group - the men - were taken to hastily opened concentration camps in a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm, next to Prijedor town and on the premises of the iron ore mine and processing plant at Omarska. Massacres, torture, and appalling living conditions quickly depleted the number of detainees.

148. In an interview of Simo Drljača (Chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor), he stated that:

"In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm', and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjača', on the basis of solid documentation of active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republica Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get
their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjača." 52/

149. As the "informative talks" or interrogations basically took place in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, it can be concluded that more than 6,000 adult males were taken to these concentration camps in the short period they existed (from the end of May to the beginning of August 1992). Since only 1,503 were moved on to Manjača camp according to Mr. Drljača, a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje camp, and almost none released, it may be assumed that the death toll was extremely high, even by Serbian accounts. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. On at least one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of newly captured people being arbitrarily executed en masse. Some 37 women were detained in Omarska, whilst no women were kept over time in Keraterm.

150. The women's groups (almost all the females, the boys under the age of sixteen and the elderly men) were normally taken to the Trnopolje camp. Here the regime was far better than in Omarska and Keraterm; none the less harassment and malnutrition was a problem for all the inmates. Rapes, beatings and other kinds of torture and even killings were not rare. Some of these detained women were released after a few days as there was a lack of space in the Trnopolje camp as well.

151. On their way to the concentration camps, some captives were detained for shorter periods at improvised detention facilities such as sports halls in schools and stadiums (notably in the Prijedor suburb of Tukovi, and in Ljubija).

152. As soon as the Serbs had captured the first groups of non-Serbs, the large-scale deportations of the women's group started. Some were deported straight from the improvised detention facilities, the majority from the Trnopolje camp. The majority of deportees were cramped into buses or onto military trucks and sent towards Travnik. These deportees had to walk almost 30 kilometres from where the trucks and buses dumped them in a desolate area on the outskirts of the Vlašić Mountain, to reach non-Serbian-held areas in central BiH. A few were deported the safer way to Bosanska Gradiška. Sizable numbers were taken by rail - many in cattle wagons - to Travnik, some were let off the trains in Doboj from where they were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla. Some individuals perished during the transport due to the mid-summer heat and next to suffocating conditions both in cattle wagons and on closed military trucks where the deportees were also deprived of food and water.

VI. THE STRATEGY OF DESTRUCTION

153. The Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor on 30 April 1992, after more than six months of careful planning. After this, the non-Serbs had their homes and communities destroyed, their families split, and their employment denied. The majority of the non-Serbs were soon captured, thousands incarcerated in concentration camps, and even larger numbers deported. This all happened after the Serbs had sealed off most exits from the area. The non-Serbs presented no real threat to the Serbs under these circumstances, the district of Prijedor being surrounded at the time by areas controlled and dominated by the Serbs (the non-Serb majority population in the Sanski Most district was purged simultaneously as in Prijedor).

154. Despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat, the main objective of
the concentration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm, seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership. Political leaders, officials from the courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, key business people and artists – the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities – were removed, apparently with the intention that the removal be permanent. Similarly, law-enforcement and military personnel were targeted for destruction. These people also constituted a significant element of the non-Serbian group in that its depletion rendered the group at large defenceless against abuses of any kind. Other important traces of Muslim and Croatian culture and religion – mosques and Catholic churches included – were destroyed.

VII. THE GENERAL LACK OF PROTECTION FOR NON-SERBS

155. From the time when the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, non-Serbs in reality became outlaws. At times, non-Serbs were instructed to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Non-Serbs were subjected to crimes without the new Serbian leaders attempting to redress the problem. For example, rape became a serious problem for many women who were left alone as their husbands had been detained. The impression was allowed to spread among Serbs that they would be exonerated if they made life difficult for non-Serbs so that the latter would ask permission to leave the district. According to new Serbian regulations, those leaving the district had to sign over their property rights to Serbs and accept never to return, being told that their names simultaneously would be deleted from the census.

VIII. RESPONSIBILITY

156. When the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, they immediately declared the existence of a Crisis Committee of the Serbian district of Prijedor (Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor). Some of the members of this crisis committee were the military commanders Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Zeljaja, and other district leaders, such as Major Slobodan Kuruzović; the Chief of Police, Simo Drljača; Mayor Milomir Stakić; the President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor, Mićo Kovačević; the President of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) in Prijedor, Simo Mišković; and the President of the Red Cross in Prijedor, Srdjo Srdić.

157. The military destruction of the non-Serbian habitations in Opština Prijedor took place when the area was under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Zeljaja in close cooperation with military superiors, at least in the regional capital Banja Luka. Units stationed outside of Opština Prijedor assisted in the military destruction, as did paramilitary units whose attacks were timed to fit with the artillery attacks and the manoeuvres of the regular army units.

158. In the above-mentioned interview, Simo Drljača stated that:

"[T]hey [the police force (including the secret services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior. ...

... the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups." 53/
159. The secret police and the military police provided the concentration camps with interrogators and guards. For some of the most gruesome torture and killings of detainees, the assistance of paramilitary units and some locals was also called upon. The joint police and military intervention units were used to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership. The latter units killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manjača camp and arranged mass killings of "deported" prisoners in the Vlašić Mountain area.

160. The other members of the 

Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor ran the community in which all these violations occurred. They participated in the administrative decision-making. The gains of the systematic looting of non-Serbian property were shared by many Serbs on different levels.

161. The Commission of Experts possesses the names of hundreds of alleged perpetrators at different levels and in a variety of capacities.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

162. It is unquestionable that the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualifies as crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due process of law that these events constitute genocide.

ANNEX VI - THE BATTLE AND SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

163. Annex VI was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. It consists of 1,300 pages of text. Section 1 is the summary, which follows. Section 2 is the chronology which details daily combat and shelling activity, targets hit and damage to those targets, sniping activity, and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities as well as narratives of local and international events relating to the battle and siege. Each section is followed by detailed appendices, illustrating the information contained in the report.

I. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A. Methodology

164. The Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo presents a daily chronology documenting events in the city from 5 April 1992 to 28 February 1994. The chronology is based on incidents reported in the database, source materials and media reports. It details, in so far as information is available: daily combat and shelling activity; specific identified targets hit; known damage to targets; sniping activity; and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities and narratives of local and international events relating to the battle and siege. The purpose of the chronology is to describe the events and consequences of the battle and siege of Sarajevo and to evaluate apparent patterns of violations of humanitarian law. Where facts, figures or accounts of events have differed in the reports reviewed, all the conflicting versions are recorded in the chronology.

165. To present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during the siege, a number of sources were utilized to prepare the chronology. Daily, weekly and monthly UNPROFOR reports were incorporated where available, to record the number of shells fired into the city, as well as to develop a
greater understanding of the events as witnessed by the military observers on the ground. UNPROFOR orders of battle were also reviewed and included to identify the command structure of the forces in and around the city. In many instances, information was obtained through specialized UNPROFOR and other UN reports, containing details on the numbers of relief flights into the city, the status of utilities and attempted utility repairs, specific crater analyses after serious shelling incidents, and other significant events. In addition to UNPROFOR reports, valuable information was gathered from local sources and incorporated into the chronology. In particular, cumulative statistical reports and reports on daily, weekly and monthly casualties in the city were obtained from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Institute of Public Health Bulletins. Other valuable information was submitted by the BiH government and was incorporated into the chronology. This information included reports on property destruction in the city and photographs of destroyed structures submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission in Sarajevo. Photographs and videotapes obtained independently by the United Nations Commission of Experts were also utilized. These materials confirmed the widespread structural and property damage in the city.

166. To supplement the above information, an on-line international media search was conducted to locate relevant press accounts pertaining to the events in Sarajevo. This search resulted in nearly twelve thousand pages of information which was put into source files and incorporated into the chronology. These media sources were cross-checked and verified against one another. Where accounts differed, both sides were recorded. Local media sources such as the Belgrade based Tanjug news agency and Vreme, as well as Sarajevo Television and Radio were consulted. This media-based information played an especially important part in the chronology, particularly during the first few months of the siege when UNPROFOR and other sources of information had not yet begun their efforts to record relevant data in the city. Additional information was also gathered pertaining to relevant negotiations and political events. In particular, the staff of IHRLI prepared a separate chronology of the negotiations which was incorporated into the chronology on the battle and siege of Sarajevo. The chronology of the negotiations drew much of its information from reports of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a Carnegie Endowment Special Publication prepared on the negotiations, and press reports.

167. In conjunction with the preparation of the chronology, many hours of video footage were viewed. This film was gathered and archived by IHRLI, with the assistance of Linden Productions. The footage viewed ranged from local home video to western media reports providing details on the many events and venues featured in the chronology. To accurately identify and locate targets in the city and to verify reports in the chronology, a number of informal interviews were also held with individuals who had been in Sarajevo during the siege. This provided an excellent opportunity to hear detailed first-hand accounts of the siege. Since the individuals interviewed were native Sarajevans, the meetings also served to identify specific targets in the city, as well as many of the sites pictured in photos received.

168. Once a draft of the chronology was completed, a team of analysts was assembled to examine the information contained therein. One analyst, for example, was assigned the task of collecting all of the information in the chronology pertaining to specific targets shelled in the city. Working with this information he prepared a map identifying the specific locations of shelled targets reported in the chronology. Other analysts also:

(a) prepared a list of the most frequently hit targets in the city;
(b) prepared a table of frequency of shelling, by dividing the city into designated areas and determining the most frequently shelled areas; and

(c) accumulated and identified photographs picturing targets shelled in the city."

169. Statistical analysts then examined the numerical data contained in the chronology. As part of their effort, statistical charts were prepared recording:

(a) total daily shelling activity in the city;
(b) daily numbers of persons killed;
(c) daily numbers of persons wounded; and
(d) combined reported shelling activity and casualties by day and by week."

In preparing this statistical information, only reports in the chronology with daily totals (e.g. total number of persons killed on a given day, or total number of shells fired) were included. This methodology was utilized to prevent incomplete data from being factored into the daily averages computed.

170. After an initial review of the statistics and the other data in the chronology, it became apparent that a possible connection existed between the increase and decrease in shelling activity and related political events such as negotiations, meetings, preparations for negotiations, the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local leaders, and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. The relevance of this connection is that it establishes a possible link between military and political activities or objectives. With this fact in mind, a graph was created to track significant local and international events contained in the chronology with the level of shelling in Sarajevo. The political events included in this graph are as follows:

(a) international peace conferences involving the former Yugoslavia;
(b) statements by parties to the conflict; and
(c) statements made by other countries or international organizations relating to the former Yugoslavia.

B. Brief description and history of the city

171. Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, is located in central BiH in the Miljacka River valley. It is a long and narrow city (occupying 2,049 sq.km.) surrounded by hills and mountains. The 1991 census indicates that before the siege the city and its surrounding areas had a population of 525,980. There are estimates that prior to the siege the population in the city proper was 435,000. The current estimates of the number of persons living in Sarajevo range between 300,000 and 380,000 residents.

172. The history of Sarajevo dates back to the Roman conquest of the area. Slavs later colonized the area and erected a castle in the south-east of the city. The city's name is derived from the Turkish word 'Seraglio' (palace in the fields). This name was given to the region by the Turks in the early 15th Century after the capture of the castle that the Slavs had erected. The city has been a cultural, religious and commercial centre since the 15th Century.
In 1878 Sarajevo was assigned to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin. On 28 June 1914, a student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife on what now is the site of the Princip Bridge. The assassination set into motion the events leading to World War I.

173. Sarajevo contains an architectural blend of three major influences: the old Oriental heart of the city, the turn of the century Viennese city around it, and the contemporary high-rise apartment buildings and industrial facilities through its outskirts. The Old Town was built by the Turks and contains ancient structures and objects of cultural importance. Its centre, the medieval square known as Baščaršija (Market Square) serves as its marketplace. The city also has a very comprehensive modern tram and mass transit system. In addition to its many orthodox churches, Sarajevo has numerous mosques.

174. Sarajevo became the focus of world attention as host of the 1984 Olympic Games. Prior to the siege, it was a cosmopolitan city where persons of different religions lived and worked together. Inter-marriages between the ethnic groups were not uncommon. According to the 1991 census, the city's multi-ethnic population distribution prior to the siege was as follows: Muslims 49.3 per cent; Serbs 29.9 per cent; Croats 6.6 per cent; Yugoslav 10.7 per cent. Jews and other groups made up the remaining 3.5 per cent of the population. Observers have noted that in the beginning of the siege many of Sarajevo's Serbs fled the city. According to reports, some joined the Bosnian Serb army. Others relocated to Serb-held areas in the outlying districts. There are estimates that 40,000 Serbs remain in government-held parts of the city. According to reports, the city's 400-year-old Jewish community numbered 14,000 before World War II and 1,400 before the current conflict. It has been reported that as a result of evacuations and casualties, only a few hundred Jews remain.

C. Summary of the battle and siege

175. The battle and siege of Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992, the eve of European Community recognition of BiH as an independent state. On that date, thousands of persons took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Parliament building and other buildings reportedly seized by Serb forces. Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the crowd. One protestor was confirmed dead. Since that date, the siege and relentless bombardment from the hills surrounding Sarajevo has taken a tremendous physical toll on the city and its inhabitants.

176. Since the beginning of the siege it is estimated that nearly 10,000 persons have been killed or are missing in the city. This total includes over 1,500 children. An additional 56,000 persons have been wounded, including nearly 15,000 children. It has been estimated that over the course of the siege the city has hit been hit by an average of approximately 329 shell impacts per day, with a high of 3,777 shell impacts on 22 July 1993. This shellfire has caused extensive damage to the city's structures, including civilian and cultural property. The BiH Government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent were reported seriously damaged, 64 per cent partially damaged and 10 per cent slightly damaged. The Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education concluded that most of the buildings in the city had been damaged to a greater or lesser degree and that 35,000 dwellings had been destroyed through September 1993.

D. Civilian casualties
177. The chronology contains cumulative casualty reports submitted by the BiH Institute for Public Health. It also contains casualty reports from UNPROFOR and other sources. According to the BiH Institute reports, as of 15 November 1993, 9,539 persons had either been killed, died of malnutrition or from the cold, or were missing in the city. This total included 1,525 children. Additionally, 55,801 persons had been wounded, including 14,538 children.

178. Based on the chronology's sources of information, a large number of Sarajevans have been killed and wounded with regularity throughout the siege.

(a) The chronology contains reports on 315 days where the total numbers of persons killed was documented. On those days a total of 2,474 persons were reported killed, totaling an average of approximately eight killed in the city per day.

(b) The chronology also contains reports on 306 days on which the total number of persons wounded was documented. On those days, a total of 13,472 persons were reported wounded, totaling an average of approximately 44 wounded per day.

It should be noted that actual daily casualty numbers in Sarajevo are probably higher than those reported in the chronology. This is because the varied centralized city casualty counts relied upon may not include many victims who are taken to district morgues and clinics.

179. The siege has not spared any sector of Sarajevo's population. UNICEF reported that of the estimated 65,000 to 80,000 children in the city: at least 40 per cent had been directly shot at by snipers; 51 per cent had seen someone killed; 39 per cent had seen one or more family members killed; 19 per cent had witnessed a massacre; 48 per cent had their home occupied by someone else; 73 per cent have had their home attacked or shelled; and 89 per cent had lived in underground shelters. It is probable that the psychological trauma suffered during the siege will bear heavily on the lives of these children in the years to come.

180. As a result of the high number of casualties and the wartime conditions present, makeshift cemeteries appear throughout Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. Parks, athletic fields, and other open spaces have been utilized as graveyards. One such site is the sports complex built for the 1984 Winter Olympics.

181. The siege has also had a profound effect on the psyche and future of the city's population. The BiH Government has reported a soaring suicide rate by Sarajevans, a near doubling of abortions and a 50 per cent drop in births since the siege began.

E. Structural and property damage and destruction

182. The structural and property damage in Sarajevo as a result of the siege includes specifically protected targets such as hospitals and medical complexes, medical facilities (including ambulances) and medical personnel, as well as cultural property. Furthermore, there have been attacks upon civilian property which are not justified by military necessity and are equally prohibited. The BiH government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent have been reported as seriously damaged, 64 per cent as
In its report, the Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education commented on the structural damage in the city. The Committee stated:

"... [I]t is plain that Sarajevo has suffered badly at the hands of its attackers. Apart from the obvious human cost in the continued suffering and difficulties of day to day living, there has been serious damage to the urban fabric. The infrastructure (drainage, electricity, telephone services, etc.) is badly damaged. Most buildings are damaged significantly and probably all buildings are damaged to a greater or lesser degree (broken glass etc.). Some buildings have been completely destroyed including ancient monuments (such as the Library) and including a number of modern steel framed buildings (such as the Unis Building) which in some cases have simply collapsed. 35,000 dwellings are also assessed to have been destroyed during the past year."

183. The chronology documents the widespread structural and property damage and destruction of the city.” The following list is only illustrative and does not distinguish on a legal basis between specifically protected targets and others. The targets shelled and documented in the chronology include:

(a) hospitals and medical complexes: the Koševo Hospital; the Military Hospital (a.k.a. French Hospital); the Jezero Hospital; and the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation.

(b) media and communication centres: the Oslobodjenje buildings; the radio and television administration buildings; the main post office; the television tower; and the PTT building.

(c) civilian and industrial targets: the electric tram depot; the town hall; the Hotel Bristol; the tobacco factory; the public transportation network; university buildings; the market place/bazaar area (the Old Town/Baščaršija); the Hotel Europa; the Lion, Jewish, and other cemeteries in and around the city; Olympic sites; the Bosna Hotel; the Islamic Theological School; the main library; the Gazi Husref Begova Mosque; the Olympic Museum; the Klas Šarko and Velepekaara Building (flour mill, main bakery); the Holiday Inn Hotel; the National Museum; the candy factory; the People’s Bank; the Veterinary College; Morića Han; the Tvornica Armatura (factory); the Elektroprivreda building; and Skenderija.

(d) Government buildings: the Presidency building; the Parliament; and the Sarajevo Courthouse.

(e) military and United Nations centres: the airport; UNHCR facilities; the Lukavica Barracks; UNPROFOR headquarters; the Halilovici Barracks (a.k.a. UNPROFOR "Camp Beaver"); the Bistrik Camp (UNPROFOR); and the former Maršal Tito Barracks.

184. Shelled quarters of the city and suburban areas documented in the chronology include: Oteš; Azići; Stup; Ilidža; Butmir; Nedžarići; Dobrinja; Mojmilo; Novi Grad; Buća Potok; Hrasno; Grbavica; Novo Sarajevo; Baščaršija; Bistrik; Stari Grad; Iğman, Trebević and Žuč Mountains; Čengić Vila; Pofalići; Vasin Han; Rajlovac; Vraca; Marijin Dvor; Doglodi; Bjelave; Vratnik; Velesići; Dolac Malta; Stupsko Brdo; Katorac (upper); Katorac (lower); Kasindol Street; Pero Kosorić Square; Darovalaca Krvi Street; Vase Miškina Street; Vojničko Polje; Alipašino Polje.
F. Structure and location of forces in and around the city

1. The defensive forces

185. Since the beginning of the siege, the First Corps Sarajevo has served as the BiH defensive force in and around Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the First Corps Sarajevo as superior to the besieging forces in infantry numbers, but clearly deficient in its firepower. It has been estimated that there are as many as 70,000 soldiers in the BiH forces committed to the defence of the city. More conservative estimates range in the area of 25,000 to 30,000. The First Corps Sarajevo headquarters is located in Sarajevo and was originally commanded by Mustafa Hajrulahović. The most recent commander was Vahid Karavelić. Observers have noted that a recent reorganization of the First Corps has lead to better command and control of the forces.

186. At the beginning of the siege, a score of men with criminal backgrounds formed groups to defend the city. Among these men were Musan Topalović (a.k.a. Çaço) and Ramiz Delalić (a.k.a. Čelo). Çaço, a 29-year-old former musician ultimately commanded the BiH army's Tenth Mountain Brigade. Čelo commanded the Ninth Brigade. Both men reportedly controlled gangs operating on the Bosnian Serb siege line, bringing truckloads of contraband over the bridges across the Miljacka river separating Grbavica from the city centre. On 26 October 1993, the BiH government initiated a crackdown against these commanders, surrounding their headquarters in separate stand-offs. Çaço was killed during the course of his capture and Čelo was reported to have given himself up.

187. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the First Corps forces fought together in defence of the city throughout much of the siege despite opposing one another in Mostar and in other parts of BiH. The HVO had an estimated 2,000 soldiers deployed in Sarajevo, in an area on the Miljacka River facing the Serbian-held districts of Kovačićevo, Grbavica and Hrasno which had reportedly not seen as much heavy fighting as other fronts. In late September 1993 there were reports that Bosnian Serb forces held their fire along these sections of the front defended by the HVO and that the forces traded cigarettes and food across the Miljacka. On 10 November 1993, several groups of HVO troops were marched under BiH army guard and the HVO barracks were occupied by BiH army troops. The HVO commander, Slavko Zelić, was subsequently arrested. The BiH army thereafter announced that it was disbanding the HVO in Sarajevo and accused some of its members of "actively cooperating" with BSA forces around the city, jeopardizing its defences. The BiH army then invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the First Corps.

2. The besieging forces

188. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the Bosnian Serb force of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) which has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. It is the successor of the same unit of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which occupied the same position until May 1992. There are indications that early in the siege the JNA was involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. Bosnian officials frequently charged that JNA tanks joined Bosnian Serb forces in barrages, and that the JNA provided the Bosnian Serb forces with logistical support and protection. In late April 1992, the BiH government ordered the withdrawal of all JNA forces from its soil. The Belgrade government announced that it would withdraw from BiH, troops who were not residents of the Republic. Since most of the JNA troops in BiH were Serbs of Bosnian nationality, this withdrawal policy reportedly had little effect. Some 80,000 Yugoslav soldiers were thereafter transferred with their equipment to the Territorial Defence Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH).
189. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters are located in the hills overlooking the city at Lukavica. The Corps was originally commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipić and was most recently commanded by Major General Stanislav Galić. The command structure has for the most part remained the same throughout the siege. While the defensive forces seem to have numerical superiority in their infantry troops, the besieging forces have firepower superiority. Reports estimate that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps numbers some 13,000 troops which are formed into eight brigades directly surrounding the city. A possible explanation for the shifting of firing sites from the mountainous areas surrounding Sarajevo may be that artillery personnel move from one emplacement to the other. Another explanation for this phenomenon could be the pattern of delivery of munitions. There are, however, no apparent munitions shortages.

190. Although the BSA forces surrounding the city have superior firepower, it has been observed that it is unlikely that they could effectively take control of the city. This observation is based, in part, on the fact that the BiH forces have more fighters. In addition, controlling the city and its numerous buildings and streets could prove an overwhelming task for the BSA forces. The BSA forces have therefore concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hills.

G. Location and nature of artillery of the besieging forces

191. Many reports in the chronology generally describe shelling as coming from gunners in the hills surrounding the city. Far fewer pinpoint specific areas from which the shelling has originated. Reports of the besieging artillery and other heavy-to-medium weapons employed in the attacks vary from 600 to 1,100 pieces, but no verified account is available. These estimates do not include a large number of tanks. Some of the weapons are in fixed emplacements such as bunkers in the wooded hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo and its suburbs. Because of the dense foliage, the emplacements are hard to detect from the air, particularly in the summer. Although the bunkers are difficult to see from the roads above or below the emplacements, it is possible to detect some of them. It is, however, very difficult to determine whether the bunkers contain artillery pieces, mortars or machine-guns, or have only snipers with small arms. From their hillside vantage points the besieging forces have a commanding view of the city. It is thus likely that they know which targets they are hitting with their artillery fire.

H. Nature and frequency of shelling by the besieging forces

192. The nature of the shelling observed in Sarajevo takes several forms: 1) specific targeting; 2) indiscriminate shelling; and 3) random shelling. With respect to specific targeting, a question arises as to whether or not a target is a protected target which makes the shelling a war crime. Indiscriminate shelling does not target a specific object, but by virtue of not discriminating or distinguishing between targets, it constitutes a war crime if within the area selected for shelling there are protected targets. Lastly, random shelling may include indiscriminate shelling as well as specific targeting, but the manner in which it is executed is not selective. Random shelling, can be methodical and systematic. If it includes protected targets it is a war crime.

193. Protected targets, whether objects or persons, are specifically identified in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. They are also established in the customary law of armed conflict and in the 1907 Hague Convention on the Regulation of
In addition, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of War also applies. Both the conventional and customary law of armed conflict provide for specific prohibitions but also for what may be termed as circumstances exonerating from war crimes responsibility (but only with respect to certain types of violations). These exonerating conditions are: proportionality in responding to enemy fire; military necessity; and reprisals. Since this study does not go into the question of individual criminal responsibility with respect to specific incidents, the analysis shall not cover the legal questions raised above. However, from a macro-analysis perspective, it is clear that, irrespective of whether a given instance establishes or not the individual responsibility of those who performed the act, the totality of the circumstances described in this report evidence command responsibility.

194. UNPROFOR and city officials have indicated that shelling of the city ranges from about 200 to 300 impacts on what they refer to as a quiet day to 800 to 1,000 shell impacts on an active day. The chronology confirms that the city has been relentlessly shelled over the course of the siege.

(a) On the 196 days in the chronology where a total shelling count was available, Sarajevo was hit by 64,490 shells, totaling an average of approximately 329 shell impacts on the city per day. The range of shelling activity on these days varied from a low of two shell impacts on 17 and 18 May 1993 and 24 August 1993, to a high of 3,777 shell impacts on 22 July 1993.

195. Observers have noted that UNPROFOR shelling reports in many cases record only a fraction of actual shelling activity. This is due in part to the logistical difficulties encountered by the UNPROFOR contingent during the siege. Therefore, it should be assumed that Sarajevo has been hit by a greater number of shells than that which has been recorded by observers.

1. Systematic shelling of specific targets by the besieging forces

196. The majority of shells counted on most days are usually directed towards BiH-controlled areas of the city suggesting a strategy to hit those areas. An examination of the range of destruction reveals a system of specific targeting as evidenced by the severe damage to almost all mosques, Catholic churches and major commercial buildings and facilities in the centre of the city.

197. The following targets have been documented in the chronology as being among the most frequently targeted sites in the city: the Sarajevo radio and television stations; the Oslobodjenje Newspaper building which is still in operation; the public transportation system; the Holiday Inn Hotel (which is the base of many foreign journalists); the Presidency and Parliament buildings; the main city brewery; the flour mill; the main bakery; the Olympic complex; the Post Telegraph and Telephone building; the industrial area of Alipašin Most near the railway station and main television tower; the Jewish cemetery; the Lion cemetery; the city airport; the tobacco factory; the Dobrinja apartment complex; the central district; Baščaršija (the old quarter of mosques); the Stari Grad section; New Sarajevo; the main thoroughfare on Maršal Tito Street; and the shopping district at Vase Miškina.

198. The chronology confirms that certain areas of the city have been systematically shelled throughout the course of the siege. For example, the city centre has consistently been the most often targeted area, with shelling attacks reported in that particular area of the city on 240 days. Also heavily shelled were the airport area and south-western suburbs (shelling attacks reported on 158 days) and the Old Town area (shelling attacks reported on 113 days).
199. Systematic targeting can be inferred from the shelling of hospitals and in particular the Sarajevo University Clinical Centre Koševо which has constantly been under shell and sniper fire." The Koševо complex has reportedly been shelled at least 264 times since the siege began, killing staff and patients alike." An examination of the sheer number of shells and the high percentage of direct hits on the complex indicates an intent by the besieging forces to hit this civilian target. Moreover, much of the shelling from the surrounding hillsides has taken place at midday, the time when the hospital is busiest with visitors. It is therefore obvious that the besieging forces have knowledge of the patterns of operation of this facility." Despite extensive damage, a shortage of electricity, water and necessary equipment, the Koševо Hospital is by necessity still in operation.

2. Patterns of random shelling by the besieging forces

200. A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city. The shelling which occurs at different times of the day without any particular pattern or target has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city and in such presumably well-known civilian settings as schools, markets, streets, parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city.

201. It is noteworthy that shell fire increases at night and often continues into the early morning hours. This may be attributable to the fact that many of those engaged in the shelling and sniping are working in the fields and at other jobs during the daytime hours. Observers have also noted that the shelling by the besiegers is generally lower during the week than on weekends. At times, night shellings are observed to follow a systematic directional pattern as if the same artillery pieces are simply changing their range. At other times, the shelling comes from different locations. A pattern of heavy shelling into the city has been observed to have occurred after reports of early morning small-arms fire. This suggests that the besieging forces have used heavy shelling of the city as a means to respond to efforts by the defending forces to break the siege."

202. Most of the besieging forces firing from the hills surrounding Sarajevo are drawn from people who once lived in the city or who still live in the surrounding areas. There could, therefore, be a connection between the targeting of sites and the patterns of city life known to the besiegers. There have also been indications that "informants" within the city notify gunners in the hills of potential targets on certain days. For example, a child was killed in November 1992 after a mortar shell exploded as people were leaving a show in the city. Subsequent notifications of performances and exhibitions in the city have been more discreet in order to avoid the attention of the BSA artillery.

I. Sniping attacks by the besieging forces

203. Unlike artillery, mortar and tank shellings where accuracy may or may not be precise, and where the shelling may or may not be deliberate targeting, sniping is both deliberate and precise. It is a war crime when sniping is purposefully directed towards civilian targets. Sniping attacks by the forces in and around the city display an intent to hit civilian and non-combatant targets. These shootings appear to lack military purpose or justification. Skilled marksmen often kill their targets with a single shot to the head or heart, and it is clear that they have exercised the specific intent to hit
obvious civilian targets with no other purpose than to cause death or serious bodily injury. In many cases snipers with a clear view from high rise buildings and the surrounding hillsides have targeted the most vulnerable of civilians, including: children (even infants); persons carrying heavy plastic containers filled with water; persons in queues; pedestrians at intersections; and rescuers attempting to come to the aid of sniping and shelling victims.

204. Snipers have been reported in positions throughout the city and have been known to travel in teams. In numerous incidents documented in the chronology, sniper fire has been directed towards ambulance drivers, fire fighters, relief workers and others attempting to secure those wounded in attacks. There have also been numerous sniping attacks on UN and UNPROFOR personnel and facilities near the airport, observation posts and barracks.

J. Link between shelling activity by the besieging forces and political events

205. Heavy shelling of the city has occurred on numerous occasions prior to and during the various peace conferences, suggesting a political objective or link to the attacks. There is an apparent correlation between the increase and decrease of shell fire in connection with political events such as: negotiations; meetings; the preparation for negotiations; the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local political leaders; and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. The relevance of this is that it establishes a link between military and political activities or objectives. This fact also has a bearing on the interpretation of the rules of armed conflict with respect to proportionality and military necessity as mentioned above. It is also relevant to the establishment of senior command responsibility as well as the responsibility of political leaders who may have been involved in the decision making process related to the shelling activity.

206. The following are examples of reports appearing in the chronology which indicate a possible link between the shelling attacks in Sarajevo and political events:

(a) On 23 August 1992, mortar shells hit Sarajevo for the fourth day with both sides accusing each other of trying to seize the initiative ahead of the coming peace talks in London. Twenty-two persons were reported killed and 100 injured on this day.

(b) On 14 September 1992, the BiH Presidency announced that it would not go to the following Friday's peace talks in Geneva. The announcement, reported on Sarajevo Radio, was met by a sharp upsurge of mid-morning shelling which shattered a two-day lull in the city. At least 20 people were reported killed and wounded in the first two hours of the attacks which began at 10:00 a.m.

(c) On 17 September 1992, fierce fighting was reported in Sarajevo on the eve of new peace talks as BSA gunners reportedly shelled the city with heavy weapon-fire. An artillery duel took place in the downtown area as the BiH delegation left for renewed peace talks in Geneva. Shelling and street fighting in the city lasted until about midnight in what Sarajevo radio called Sarajevo's "worst day of hell." More than 400 shells were fired by 4:00 p.m., mostly on BiH positions.

(d) On 29 October 1992, the day after the new constitutional proposals for BiH were released (the Vance-Owen Plan), Sarajevo was hit with what was described as the worst shelling in two weeks with dozens of shells hitting the
Old Town area. Heavy shellfire and high numbers of casualties were reported in the days to follow, including 749 shells, 31 people reported killed and 118 wounded in the 24 hour period ending at 5:00 p.m. on 31 October 1992.

(e) On 11 January 1993, 1300 incoming shells hit the city on the day of the resumption of the Geneva Peace talks. On 27 January, 1,500 shells hit the city during the peace talks.

(f) On 17-22 March 1993, a high level of shelling activity was reported during the peace negotiations. On 17 March, the city was hit with 962 shells (mostly around the Presidency) as the peace conference resumed in New York. During peace negotiations on 18 March, BSA forces reportedly launched the heaviest barrage in months against the city. However, no shelling numbers were reported. Thereafter, BiH President Izetbegović temporarily pulled out of the peace talks, stating that he could not be involved as long as BSA forces continued their attacks. On 19 March, artillery and mortar fire resulted in one of the heaviest tolls in a year, killing 25 and wounding 76. A high level of shelling continued and intensified fighting was reported on 21 March as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić warned that if the UN Security Council authorized the use of military means to enforce a no-fly zone over BiH, his delegation could pull out of peace talks. Observers in the city counted 2,398 shells hitting the city on that day. On 22 March, UNPROFOR Commander Colonel Marcel Valentin called on the BSA forces to account for the shelling of civilian targets. He said that it was "quite obvious" that the Bosnian Serbs were trying to gain territory before signing a peace agreement being negotiated in New York.

(g) On 13 April 1993, one person was killed and 35 people were injured in an hour-long artillery assault after planned peace talks with BiH army commanders collapsed.

(h) On 2 May 1993, following news from Athens that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had signed a peace plan, the first shells were fired into the city from surrounding mountainsides at 7:45 p.m. According to hospital sources, five people were killed.

(i) On 22 May 1993, the day marking BiH's first anniversary of admission to the United Nations, BSA forces reportedly hit the city with artillery fire, killing at least nine persons and wounding more than 100 others. BSA and BiH forces blamed each other for beginning the artillery duel shortly before noon. A hospital official characterized the day as the worst in many weeks.

(j) On 17 July 1993 the BiH Presidency announced that it had agreed in principle to take part in the next round of peace talks in Geneva scheduled for the following week. BiH troop movements continued and it was reported that BSA forces launched a major offensive in the region of the Igman mountains with 2,000 shells hitting BiH positions outside the city.

(k) On 18 July 1993, BiH President Izetbegović ruled out attending renewed peace talks in Geneva unless BSA forces stopped offensives. On 21 July 1993, Sarajevo suffered what was described as "the heaviest shelling in weeks." However, no shelling numbers were reported. On that day United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher ruled out US military action or other direct intervention to prevent BSA forces from capturing Sarajevo. Commentators noted that those remarks may have removed any fears that Bosnian Serb leaders may have had about whether taking Sarajevo or other UN declared "safe areas" would draw military retaliation from the United States. On 22 July 1993, UNPROFOR recorded a siege-high 3,777 BSA fired shells in a 16 hour period. BiH President Izetbegović reiterated his earlier position that he
would not attend the peace talks while fighting continued.

(l) On 24 July 1993, UNPROFOR reported that the BiH-controlled area of Žuč was hit by over 3,000 shells in a renewed Serbian offensive apparently seeking a breakthrough that could bring parts of the city under BSA control. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that BiH President Izetbegović must accept the partition of BiH into three ethnic states or BSA forces would settle the question on the battlefield. Karadžić said that peace talks should be postponed for months because negotiating would be pointless.

(m) On 27 July 1993 all three of the factions held a rare joint meeting. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that "[t]his is the last chance for an honest peace." Sarajevo was reported to have been hit by 2,390 shells on this day. On 28 July, shelling in the Žuč area reportedly eased as the peace talks in Geneva took a positive turn when leaders of the three factions met without mediators for the first time.

(n) On 29 September 1993, four to five mortar shells hit downtown Sarajevo in the afternoon just minutes after the radio announced rejection by parliament of the latest Geneva peace plan. This was reported to be the first mortaring of the city centre by BSA forces in several weeks. There had been reports in the days preceding the vote rejecting the peace plan that BSA commanders warned that they would respond to a rejection of the plan by "flattening" Sarajevo and by renewing offensives elsewhere.

(o) On 7 October 1993, shelling and sniping activity reportedly increased after BiH President Izetbegović stated that he could never accept the latest peace plan that would have divided BiH into three ethnic mini-states. Sarajevo which had reportedly enjoyed relative quiet in recent days, experienced increased shelling and sniping activity. The UN described the situation in the city as "unstable," with shelling around the airport and small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire in the city. No shelling totals were reported on this day.

(p) On 28 November 1993, BSA shellfire reportedly killed five people in the city on the eve of a new round of peace talks. An artillery barrage on the city reportedly came as BiH President Izetbegović left for Geneva. Moments earlier, Izetbegović told reporters, "If the Serb side does not return territories, sanctions should be tightened and not lifted."

(q) On 21 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1500 artillery shells. This shelling attack occurred as BiH officials in Geneva considered whether to accept a new Serb-Croat map for BiH. In the evening, a BiH spokesman said that the new map was "totally unacceptable."

(s) On 22 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1744 shells. This shelling occurred as the warring factions met in Brussels and agreed to a cease-fire in time for Christmas.

(t) On 23 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1309 artillery shells. This shelling activity occurred as peace talks in Brussels ended without a settlement, with the parties agreeing to meet again on 15 January.

(u) On 4 January 1994, the city was reportedly hit by a total of 868 shells. This shelling occurred as BiH and Croatian leaders held talks in Vienna.

(v) On 5 January 1994, the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1,409 shells. This shelling occurred as BiH and Croatian leaders held a second day
of talks in Vienna. On 6 January 1994, Sarajevo was reportedly hit by a total of 732 shells as BiH President Izetbegović demanded that the UN Security Council stop the shelling of the city. On 7 January the city was reportedly hit by a total of 906 shells. This continued bombardment prompted the UN Security Council to condemn the bombardment of the city.

K. The blockade of humanitarian aid

207. The blockade of humanitarian aid has been used as an important tool in the siege. Such interference with humanitarian aid which endangers the lives and well being of civilians is a war crime. Four hundred and 30 thousand people are estimated to be dependent on food aid in Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. Not only has the blockade of aid contributed to the demoralization of the civilian population, but it has adversely affected its physical health. A shortage of food has led to a malnutrition rate described by UNHCR as being on par with that of the poorer developing nations. A shortage of fuel has resulted in the shutdown of the city's bakery, the water pumping station and other essential services. In addition, hospitals have been without power and have had to function without lights, x-ray machines, monitors, or proper anesthetics.

208. Unlike other enclaves in BiH which depend on overland convoys, the international humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo's United Nations controlled airport has helped to bring most supplies into the city. On 12 October 1994, the UNHCR announced that the Sarajevo airlift was in its 467th day, overtaking the 462 days of the Berlin airlift between June 1948 and September 1949. On 18 January 1994, UN officials reported that 7,272 flights had brought in 81,948 tons of aid into Sarajevo via the humanitarian airlift. However, due to airport closings and airlift suspensions caused by shelling and sniping attacks in the area, this effort is often suspended.

209. The chronology documents the fact that the airport area has been one of the most often shelled areas of the city. This activity suggests a possible correlation between the high level of shelling in the airport area and an intent to blockade humanitarian aid. It can be argued that while the besieging forces are blockading overland humanitarian aid throughout BiH, they are accomplishing the same result in Sarajevo by shelling the airport area, forcing the suspension of the humanitarian airlift.

L. The use of utilities as a weapon of war

211. Throughout the siege, the destruction of electric, gas, phone line and water facilities has been used as a weapon against the inhabitants of the city. Both the defenders and the besiegers have often accused each other of using these utilities as weapons of war. UN and local attempts to repair damaged lines and pumping stations have often been rebuffed with shell and sniper fire, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. For example, it had been reported that by March 1993, 18 of the city's water repair technicians
had been killed while trying to repair damaged pipes.

212. The city's drinking water depends on power to the main pumping station. Power lines have frequently been cut by fighting or by forces using the utilities as weapons against civilians. The besieging forces have on several occasions reportedly turned off the city's main water supply and have refused to permit work crews to repair and replenish necessary water purification systems. The water cut-off has led to long queues outside water sources in the city. These long lines have attracted sniper and shellfire from the besieging forces on several occasions and have resulted in the deaths of many civilians. Civilians are also vulnerable to sniper fire as they are forced to carry containers filled with water obtained from the few remaining water sources. These heavy containers are frequently carried for miles by hand, or carted on bicycles, baby carriages and shopping carts.

213. Winter conditions put the city's residents in danger of starving or freezing to death. Because of a shortage of heating fuel, many of the city's trees have been cut down and used as firewood. Residents have also been forced to burn books, furniture and any other materials gathered burn to provide themselves with heat.

M. Concluding observations

214. On 5 February 1994, at least 68 persons were killed and 200 others were wounded in the shelling of a market in the Sarajevo city centre. In reaction to that attack, NATO issued an ultimatum on 9 February giving BSA forces 10 days, beginning on 11 February, to withdraw their heavy weapons from a designated exclusion zone or face heavy airstrikes. Very little progress was made until 17 February when Russia announced that it was sending a contingent of 400 troops to the city and persuaded BSA forces to comply with the NATO ultimatum. On 20 February, NATO declared that there had been virtual compliance with its ultimatum and that there was no need for airstrikes at that stage. Since that date, artillery fire has substantially decreased in Sarajevo.

215. Based on the events reported over the course of the siege, any military personnel who has engaged in unlawful sniping or shelling activity is individually responsible if he knew that such acts would cause the death or injury of innocent civilians, the destruction of protected targets, or the destruction of public and civilian property which had no apparent military purpose and for which there was no valid military necessity.

216. On the basis of the conduct observed from April 1992 to February 1994, it is apparent that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the BSA and its commanders are responsible for a great deal of the widespread destruction in Sarajevo. It is also apparent that the command structure knew, or should have known, that they were attacking civilian targets. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the BSA has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. Given the magnitude of the shelling over the course of the siege, the logistics required to re-arm the besieging forces, and the continuous attacks on civilian targets, the commanders of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps should be held accountable for the extensive destruction to private and public property, and for the resulting loss of civilian lives.
ANNEX VI.A - INCIDENT STUDY REPORT REGARDING MORTAR SHELLING DOBRINJA, SARAJEVO ON 1 JUNE 1993: INVESTIGATION

217. Annex VI.A also concerns Sarajevo. It is a six page report prepared by Commissioner Fenrick and a team of Canadian military lawyers. The Commission decided to conduct an investigation of a specific incident in the siege of Sarajevo to determine the feasibility of identifying and prosecuting alleged perpetrators. The Commission asked Commissioner Fenrick, the Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations, and a team of Canadian military lawyers to conduct the investigation. They chose to investigate the mortar shelling of a soccer game in Dobrinja, a suburb of Sarajevo, which occurred on 1 June 1993. The investigation team interviewed many Bosnian witnesses, but was unable to interview Serbian witnesses. Additionally, the team reviewed an analysis, prepared by UNPROFOR, of the mortar craters resulting from the shells. Based upon the information gathered, the team wrote an eight page report.

ANNEX VI.B - THE BATTLE OF SARAJEVO AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

218. Annex VI.B is a 37 page study of the battle of Sarajevo and the law of armed conflict. The study was prepared by Commissioner Fenrick and a Canadian military lawyer from the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team. The study addresses the issues of armed conflict and misconduct on the part of the military during the siege of Sarajevo. The objective of the study was to impute command responsibility for violations of the laws of war by preparing an analytical survey of the battle and all violations committed.

ANNEX VII - THE MEDAK INVESTIGATION

219. Annex VII is a 16 page report on the Medak Pocket Operation which occurred in early September 1993. Croatian forces entered and attacked the area of small, rural villages known as the Medak Pocket. However, when the forces agreed to relinquish the territory, they allegedly destroyed and burned everything before they left. UNPROFOR troops arrived at the end of the retreat and were able to collect a significant amount of evidence. Based on several witness interviews conducted by the investigation team and the UNPROFOR reports, the team produced the Annex.

ANNEX VIII - PRISON CAMPS

220. Annex VIII was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni and consists of 880 pages of text.

I. INTRODUCTION

221. This report on detention facilities, attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning all alleged detention facilities (camps) within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify detention sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but is intended to provide a description and analysis of the detention facilities reported to have existed.

222. The report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary and analysis. The summary and analysis discusses the methodology of the report and provides the total number of reported detention facilities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The total number of detention facilities is also broken down by geographic region. In addition, the summary
and analysis discusses patterns, trends and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of detention facilities.

223. The analysis by geographic location in Section II, divides detention facilities by their location, i.e. whether they were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), or Slovenia. Within those locations, it further breaks down reported facilities by the county or region in which they were located. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution figures are also provided for each county or region, as well as other background information.

II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A. Methodology

224. To analyse the contents of the database for this report, all documents in IHRLI documentation centre were first reviewed to identify those reports containing allegations of detention facilities within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. After initial review, the documents were organized geographically by county or region and then analysed. Relevant information pertaining to alleged detention facilities was then gleaned, and individual geographic reports were thereafter prepared, containing information, wherever available, identifying: 1) the name, location, dates of operation, and physical description of alleged detention facilities; 2) information concerning command and control, including the identities and ethnicity of commanders and guards, and any other groups or individuals reported to be involved in the camp operation; 3) information pertaining to prisoners, including their ethnicity, civilian or military status, subsequent transfers, and total reported prisoner population; 4) the treatment of prisoners, including maltreatment or good treatment, food, hygiene, toilet and medical facilities, sleeping accommodations, and other conditions.

225. The main criterion for determining whether a site would be deemed a detention facility for purposes of this report, depended mainly upon whether persons were alleged to have been held against their will, and whether the detention site appeared to have been established as a result of the armed conflict between the warring factions identified.

226. In some instances, the existence of certain detention facilities were well documented and independent sources corroborated reports of those alleged facilities. In other instances, only uncorroborated claims or corroborated reports by non-neutral sources were received. Those claims were included in the report and are indicated as such.

227. It is significant to note that a wide variety of sources were utilized in this report. It should also be noted that the Commission had no basis to confirm the information contained in that source material. To make a qualitative assessment of the information contained in this report, efforts were therefore made to confirm or corroborate allegations of camps wherever possible. To this effect, it is indicated in each camp report whether: 1) the existence of the detention facility was corroborated by multiple neutral sources; 2) the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by a neutral source; 3) whether the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by multiple sources, none of which were neutral; or 4) whether the existence of the detention facility had not been corroborated by multiple sources.
B. Observations

228. Since the armed conflict in Slovenia in June 1991, the warring factions have operated a variety of detention facilities (camps). It appears that as the situation in the former Yugoslavia disintegrated and war erupted, detention facilities came into existence in increasing numbers. A large number of camps came into existence in Croatia after the beginning of hostilities in September 1991. The greatest number of camps came into existence in BiH in the period after April 1992. It appears that many of the camps appearing in this report are now closed.

229. The reports reviewed allege a total of 960 reported places of detention in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Of those 960 alleged places of detention, 466 (48.5 per cent) were reportedly operated by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; 121 (12.6 per cent) by Bosnian Croats or the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Army; 84 (8.8 per cent) by the Government and Army of BiH or Bosnian Muslims; 32 (3.3 per cent) jointly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats; 9 (.9 per cent) as private prisons, individuals or groups; 4 (.4 per cent) by the Government or armed forces of Slovenia; and 244 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.

230. As the above statistics and following discussion indicate, the number of camps and reported violations in camps controlled by the Government of BiH and its army are the fewest among the warring factions, irrespective of the ethnic or religious background of the detainees held. The number of reported violations by the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army, and the Croatian Defence Council is larger, particularly against Serbs in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia and against Muslims from BiH in Herzegovina. The period of time during which those camps were operated in each of these contexts is relatively limited. The two warring factions identified above are, however, reported to have committed far fewer numbers of violations than those committed by the Serb forces and those working on their behalf, whether in Croatia or BiH. Camps operated by Serbs in BiH are by far where the largest numbers of detainees have been held and where the harshest and largest number of violations occurred.

231. The information concerning the number of prisoners includes a wide range of estimates. It appears that none of the detaining powers involved in the conflict made a concerted effort to identify and maintain records of the number of individuals they detained. If they have done so, such information was not made available.

232. The camps reported range in size from small detention and screening centres that temporarily housed a few prisoners, to camps that housed large numbers of prisoners. The duration of their operation varied from days to months. The vast majority of places used to detain prisoners were pre-existing structures, such as penitentiaries, municipal buildings, administrative offices, schools, sports arenas, factories, warehouses, mines, farms and private homes, hotels, restaurants, and apartments. In a very few examples, camps were reported to have been newly constructed for the purpose of detaining prisoners.

233. Due to a lack of information, it was generally very difficult to determine the command and control in the camps. The information, when available, was usually limited to individual camps at a very immediate and local level. The extent to which superior or central authorities had control in the operation of camps was usually unknown.

234. Some reports describe a situation whereby camps were maintained and operated by a mix of military personnel, former army officers and soldiers,
various paramilitaries, local volunteers, members of civilian police forces, or politicians. There were also many reports of situations where there was movement in and out of camps by visitors, including local civilians, paramilitary forces, and the army, who perpetrated abuses upon the prison population.

235. Most detainees appeared not to be prisoners of war, but, rather, civilians. POWs and civilian prisoners were detained together, and prisoners from the conflict were sometimes mixed in with the common criminal population of a penitentiary. Often, civilians were arrested and detained for the purpose of collecting prisoners for exchange.

236. There is little to suggest a legitimate purpose for the internment of so many non-combatant civilians by the various authorities and forces concerned. There is much to suggest that such internment was wholly illegitimate and intended to serve the geopolitical and military objectives of the detaining powers.

237. The parties to the conflict acknowledged and agreed on a number of occasions to the valid effect of those aspects of international humanitarian law relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, civilians and others detained by the parties to the conflict.

238. Under the law of armed conflict, prisoners of war are considered to be in the hands of the detaining power. The detaining power, therefore, is responsible for the treatment given prisoners of war irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist. The same holds true for the treatment of civilians detained.

239. It appears that little or no effort was made by any of the detaining powers to provide the judicial or administrative bodies required by law to identify, record, and determine the status of prisoners of war and internees.

240. Parties to the conflict appear to have considered the detention of those thought to be potentially capable of fighting as a legitimate activity. There are many instances of detention apparently based upon the suspicion of hostile activity against the detaining power.

241. Prisoners were commonly subjected to the most inhumane treatment imaginable. Mass executions, torture, rape, and other sexual assaults were frequently reported. Those in control of the apprehension and detention of prisoners were often reported to have stolen prisoner belongings. Guards and soldiers frequently humiliated those detained. Sometimes prisoners were placed in dangerous situations and used in military operations, such as mine clearing. There were also reports of reprisal killings carried out upon innocents detained in a number of camps.

242. The ethno-religious aspects of the conflict appear to have translated directly into prisoners suffering actively adverse distinctions based on nationality, religious belief, and political opinions.

243. The patterns and violations in the camps appear to differ to some extent, depending on the controlling authority, the purpose of the camp, and the camp commander.

244. The conditions in most camps were generally described as very poor. The camps commonly lacked sufficient heat, light, food, and water. Lack of hygiene was pervasive. Little or no medical attention was prevalent and a total lack of security for the prisoners was apparent. In fact, it was reported that those in control of camps often allowed drunk soldiers and
others access to abuse the prison population.

245. Wounded and sick prisoners were often maltreated and/or left to suffer, although many wounded and sick prisoners were treated to some extent.

246. The following section of this summary and analysis is divided by location, and contains various observations relating to certain patterns and commonalities in the detention facilities reported. For a more detailed breakdown of individual regions and camps, see Section II below, which contains a geographical listing and full analyses of the individual detention facilities reported.

C. Camps reported in BiH

247. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 677 camps within BiH. Among those camps, 333 (49.2 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 83 (12.2 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 51 (7.5 per cent), by Croats; 31 (4.6 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 5 (.7 per cent), by private parties; and 174 (25.7 per cent) by unidentified forces.

1. Bosnian Serb controlled camps

248. The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs operated numerous camps where grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, including killing, torture, and rape occurred on a large scale. Those camps were mostly in BiH and predominantly held Bosnian Muslims, but also Bosnian Croats and a small number of Serbs.

249. The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs used camps in BiH to facilitate territorial and political control of geographic regions and to expel and eliminate other ethnic and religious populations from that area. In essence, the Bosnian Serb forces, including former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) officers and soldiers, paramilitary units, police forces, civilians, and the political leadership of the Serbs of BiH, apparently with a significant degree of participation by and cooperation with the Serbs and Montenegrins of FRY, incorporated and exploited the detention of civilians as an integral aspect of their campaign of "ethnic cleansing". While armed, uniformed soldiers of the forces opposed to the Serbs were incarcerated in significant numbers, the vast majority of those imprisoned by Serbs in BiH appear to have been civilians.

250. Groups of camps appear to have been established and operated in clusters in various geographical areas and were frequently part of a network. Prisoners were frequently moved from one facility to another. Different facilities often appeared to have separate purposes, such as mass killing, torture, rape, and exchange of and detention of civilian prisoners.

251. The Bosnian Serb implementation of practically identical strategies and tactics for the conquest of territories and subsequent detention of non-Serb populations suggest an overall plan devised prior to the conflict and carried out locally. There seems to be a similarity in the structure of camps which might suggest a degree of pre-planning before the war was started. The notion of clusters of camps, triage camps, distribution camps, older persons and women and children held in established minimum security facilities, and men of fighting age held in established maximum security facilities, suggests such a plan. The similarities of the allegations of camp usage also strongly suggests that a plan did exist and was carried out across the board geographically. Reports suggest a common method of initial apprehension and identification of those non-Serbs detained for ultimate disposition (either
long-term detention, deportation, or execution). A common plan is also suggested by the implementation of a system whereby prisoners were detained, classified, and subjected to similar types of abuse (e.g., it was often reported that intellectuals, politicians, police, and the wealthy were regularly tortured and killed in certain camps). There is also a similarity in the command and control of the camps, whereby there was a mix of civilian, political, JNA, paramilitary, and local Serb reservists and civilians involved in camp operations. With regard to practical aspects of camp operation, large suitable facilities appear to have been selected and prepared, to some extent, in advance. Whether a plan was established by the military, police, or politicians, is something that could not be ascertained.

252. The method by which the campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was carried out ensured that, comparatively, the most brutal and inhumane treatment of those detained occurred within the geographic arc following the Sava and Drina Rivers of the former Yugoslavia. See examples, camps in Prijedor, Višegrad, Zvornik, Brčko and Foča, and Bijeljina. For, it is within this region of BiH that the Serbs required absolute control in order to establish a separate nation with contiguous borders and an uncompromised geographic link with Serbia and Montenegro. That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance of the non-Serb populations of the area. In large part, that subjugation and elimination was accomplished by wholesale detention of those populations in various places of detention.

253. Commonly, Serb forces reduced the opposition of a county area and upon conquest of the territory of that BiH county (opština) immediately began to round up the non-Serb population. It sometimes occurred that the entire population of a town or village was gathered together so that the Serb and non-Serb populations could be separated and dealt with accordingly. During the rounding-up process, members of the population were frequently tortured, raped, and killed. Sometimes, the local population would be interned in different locations. Other times, after an initial round of apprehension, non-Serbs would be released and weeks later re-apprehended and placed in various camps to be either killed or moved out of the area.

254. Frequently, the religious, political, civic, professional, and business leaders of the non-Serb population were immediately identified for detention and for the worst abuses. Often on the captors' side, local civil servants, political leaders, and particularly the police, participated or were involved in the rounding-up process. Prisoners were also often forced to surrender their money and valuables to their captors.

255. It was often reported that men between the ages of 18 and 60 were separated from women, children, and elderly men. Apparently, men between the ages of 18 (or younger) and 60 were considered to be of fighting age, constituting a class of quasi-prisoners of war or perhaps legitimate internees because of their potential for hostility. However, rarely did reports include any information to suggest that those considered capable of fighting had ever actually committed hostile acts or had organized to do so. In fact, many Muslim villagers simply surrendered the weapons they had upon an initial demand by the Serb forces in the region. After that surrender, the villagers were in many cases detained. The reports indicate that in many instances, men between the ages of 18 and 60, were ultimately transferred to heavily guarded larger camps where killings or torture were prevalent.

256. A large number of Bosnian Serb places of detention appear to have been used as short term detention facilities before transfer or transport of prisoners out of the area.

257. Smaller camps, in many cases, housed prisoners temporarily until the
captors divided the prisoners into groups and transported them to the larger camps. The prisoners were often packed into buses, trains, and lorries, and were subjected to physical and mental abuse. During transport, and upon arrival at their new camps, prisoners were also reported to have been killed at random and denied food, water, and access to toilet facilities. The prisoners were on occasion transported by automobile to camps by locals, or were marched under armed guard.

258. Detainees were sometimes transported from camps within a given region to camps in another region because of overcrowding, anticipated International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections, visits by the media, exchange of prisoners, and as a result of triage for unlawful purposes.

259. Very few camps appear to have been actually constructed for the purpose of detaining captured prisoners or interning the civilian population. The vast majority of the sites used for detention were pre-existing facilities. Some of those facilities were modified in order to create more secure camps. For example, electric and barbed-wire fences were sometimes reported to have been installed around a number of buildings.

260. Bosnian Serbs were also reported to have maintained Muslim "ghettos" in certain towns and sometimes used villages as camps to detain a large group of captives. See examples, Trnopolje camp in Prijedor, Es Naselje in Brčko, and Brezovo Polje in Brčko.

261. There is little to suggest that captured uniformed combatants were treated with the respect required by the law of armed conflict. Those prisoners who had in fact committed hostile acts against the Serbs were frequently punished. The punishments included severe mental and physical abuse and often execution.

262. Those women and children detained were also subjected to the worst kinds of abuse, including rape and other sexual assaults. There are reports of many detention facilities in existence for the sole purpose of holding women and girls for rape and sexual entertainment. There are also numerous allegations of rape at camps wherever women and girls were held. Captors reportedly raped female prisoners in front of other prisoners. Those who resisted, were often reportedly killed or otherwise brutalized, often in the presence of others. There were also reports of the sexual abuse of men, as well as castration and mutilation of sex organs.

263. Elderly persons detained often suffered the same level of abuse as the others. This indicates that the captors spared no group from detention and maltreatment.

264. There were reports that certain individuals were spared detention and abuse, because of the intervention of influential Serbs in the area or because they were somehow able to bribe their way out of detention. There were also instances of local Serbs risking their own lives to help Muslims and Croats escape detention in various Serb camps in BiH.

265. There were also reports of Serbs who were detained in Serb-controlled facilities. In those cases, the prisoners had usually refused to participate in the conquest of a region or in the activities of "ethnic cleansing". Those imprisoned Serbs were treated as poorly as the other prisoners.

266. A large number of the Bosnian Serb-controlled camps appear to have served as screening stations for the purposes of interrogation and decisions as to how individual prisoners would be disposed of. Interrogation almost always consisted of questions relating to military and strategic information
(including the location and possession of weapons), political affiliation, and political belief. Captors also interrogated detainees concerning the personal wealth and family connections of other detainees. Interrogations were commonly accompanied by brutal conduct and humiliation and, in some cases, by torture and killing. Confessions were often forcibly extracted from prisoners and used as a reason for their detention and treatment. The forced confessions on many occasions described some sort of offence or hostile act.

267. Reports indicate that upon arrival at the larger camps, prisoners were regularly subjected to random beatings. Reprisals appear to have been carried out against the prisoner population for Bosnian Serb setbacks in battle. Such reprisal activities included beatings, severe torture and killings. Apparently, one motivation for the punishment of inmates was retribution for supposed Serb casualties suffered in battle.

268. The type and amount of torture, abuse and maltreatment visited upon the prisoners detained in Bosnian Serb camps was of a great magnitude. Not only were prisoners physically abused, but they were also commonly humiliated, degraded, and forced to abuse one another. In several instances, prisoners were reported to have been forced to inflict injury upon each other, sometimes as entertainment for the guards. Humiliation often involved behaviour contradictory to the prisoners' religious background. Prisoners were also subjected to mental abuse and humiliation, including barrages of ethnic slurs.

269. Several Bosnian Serb controlled camps served as places of mass and continuous killing and execution by various means. Such camps also maintained large populations of prisoners for considerable periods of time. Other camps housed large numbers of prisoners but were not the site of a great number of killings.

270. At the larger camps, prisoners were reported to have been killed on a daily basis. In some cases, their bodies were left to rot on the camp grounds, or were loaded by prisoners and hauled away by truck to various destinations. The bodies were also reportedly disposed of in mass graves abutting the camps and thrown into rivers, lakes, ravines, mine shafts and mining pits, and other local venues. Bodies were also reported to have been incinerated or dismembered.

271. Prisoners who were targeted for torture or death at the larger camps often included prominent members of the community who were wealthy, educated or politically influential. Guards often were reported to have information identifying which prisoners fell into those categories.

272. The conditions in the places of detention were almost uniformly harsh. There was consistently a lack of food, insufficient access to toilets and beatings accompanying toilet-use, little drinkable water supply, an absence of soap and infrequent opportunities to bathe or change clothes, inadequate bedding, and often little protection from the natural elements.

273. Prisoners in some camps were reported to have suffered from dysentery and lice epidemics. Medical attention was, for the most part, non-existent at the camps. In some instances, inmates with medical training, treated fellow prisoners. However, due to an absence of supplies and facilities, such treatment was very primitive.

274. In the larger camps, male prisoners were often reported to be packed tightly into the detention facilities, so that they had no room to lie down or sit, or sometimes even to breathe. The prisoners were in many cases forced to urinate and defecate in containers and on the floors of the rooms in which they were accommodated.
275. Prisoners were often reported to have been subjected to abuse during meals, and, at best, were given one meal per day consisting of small portions of soup or bread. In some reported instances where food was delivered to a camp by the ICRC, the food was not distributed to prisoners, but was instead diverted to Bosnian Serb guards or forces.

276. There appears to have existed a certain degree of acknowledgement by Bosnian Serb authorities that camps were maintained. The camps appear to have been maintained and operated by a mix of former JNA officers and soldiers, Bosnian Serb Army personnel, various Serb paramilitaries, local volunteer Serbs, local impressed Serbs, members of the various Serb police forces and at least some Montenegrins. There also exists information that civilian Serb politicians were intimately involved with the operation of such places of detention.

277. Bosnian Serb authorities often expressed the belief that the above-described detention facilities were legitimate. The reasons stated included the necessity of protecting civilians from the dangers of combat, interning those who threatened the security of the detaining forces and detaining those responsible for criminal activity.

278. It is interesting to note that in at least one Serb-run camp, Batković, Bijeljina, the local Serb population was reported to have become aware of the situation inside the camp and demanded that the prisoners there be treated better. Conditions for the prisoners were reported to have subsequently improved.

2. BiH and Croat controlled camps

279. The BiH Government and Muslim forces and Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have detained thousands of soldiers and civilians in BiH. At one point, because of an alliance between the two parties, they both imprisoned Serbs. A significant number of camps were reported to have been operated jointly by Croat and BiH forces. After that alliance disintegrated, both sides were reported to have imprisoned each others' soldiers captured in battle, and large numbers of civilians of their opponents' ethnicity.

280. There are indications that BiH forces and Bosnian Croats to some extent reacted to the method of warfare and "ethnic cleansing" initiated by Bosnian Serbs by taking up similar methods of warfare. This included the indiscriminate detention of civilians, rather than maintaining methods of behaviour required by the international law of armed conflict. There seemed to be elements of revenge for past imprisonment of Muslim and Croat civilians. Also, the idea existed, perhaps, that if one held a significant number of the "enemy" prisoner, the "enemy" would be more likely to treat its own prisoners well so as to avoid the impulse for reprisals by the other side.

281. Both BiH forces and Bosnian Croats are reported to have interned civilians for the purpose of exchange for members of their own forces and populations held by the other two parties to the conflict. There also seems to be rather isolated attempts at smaller scale "ethnic cleansing".

282. The BiH and Muslim forces were reported to have imprisoned a number of individuals who resisted military service. Some of those persons were tried and convicted of criminal offences, and others were sent to the front to dig trenches. The BiH authorities also arrested people for possession of weapons. In Kladanj, Serbs were said to be imprisoned for the purpose of protecting them against retaliation by the local Muslim population. In Zenica, the BiH captors reportedly established a tribunal to determine the status of those
imprisoned as either military or civilian.

283. The treatment of prisoners in Bosnian Muslim run camps was in some cases reported to be brutal and degrading. That treatment was often reported to include violent interrogations and beatings. Reports of forced same-sex sexual acts between prisoners also exist. Drunk guards were reported to have abused detainees, and civilians were allowed access into camps to beat and harass prisoners. Personal vendettas were also allowed to be consummated against prisoners of war. The killing of prisoners was not uncommon. There were also reports the Bosnian Muslim forces used prisoners as human shields.

284. There were reports of Bosnian Muslim-run brothels and rape camps. A number of reports also alleged the operation of private prisons controlled by various Bosnian Muslim forces or individuals. The BiH Government, in fact, acknowledged the existence of such Muslim private prisons and officially deplored them.

285. Reported conditions at most BiH and Muslim camps, were generally described as being no better than the vast majority of other places of detention in the former Yugoslavia.

286. In Bihac, BiH forces were reported to have imprisoned captured soldiers and supporters of leader Fikret Abdić. Likewise, the forces of Fikret Abdić reportedly maintained a camp to hold captured BiH forces and civilians deemed in opposition to Abdić's authority.

287. Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have maintained camps in areas under their control imprisoning both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. While there is at least one report of a "death camp" run by Bosnian Croats in Orašje, killing of prisoners, though not uncommon, was on a scale much lower than that apparently perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs.

288. The Bosnian Croat camps were reported to have been maintained by both military and paramilitary forces. The forces of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnian Croat forces apparently cooperated in the detention and transfer of prisoners.

289. The Bosnian Croats were said to have apprehended a significant numbers of individuals to hold for the purpose of prisoner exchanges. Other prisoners were supposedly held to protect them from the dangers of combat. Men were also imprisoned who were considered to be of fighting age. In addition, there appeared to be some attempts to expel non-Croat populations from some areas, such as in Vitez. Some persons there were arrested for so-called security reasons and for possession of weapons.

290. In at least one site, the Central Mostar Prison, it was reported that Croats divided their prisoners into five categories: Serb combatants; enemy collaborators; prisoners held for purposes of exchange; civilians accused of common crimes; and Croatian soldiers serving time for disciplinary infractions.

291. Bosnian Croat captors reportedly maltreated a significant portion of those detained. Allegations of beatings, rape, and theft of prisoners' personal belongings were rather common. The prisoners were also reported to have been used as human shields. The litany of abuses perpetrated in those camps was much like the abuses perpetrated in the other camps in the former Yugoslavia.
3. Reported camps by location

292. Of the reports of 677 camps alleged in BiH, 381 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 296 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in BiH:

293. **Banja Luka**: Total camps: 9
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 2

294. **Bihać**: Total camps: 14
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
   Muslims: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:

295. **Bijeljina**: Total camps: 12
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 1
   Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated:

296. **Bileća**: Total camps: 9
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 6 Uncorroborated: 2
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

297. **Bosanska Dubica**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 4

298. **Bosanska Gradiška**: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

299. **Bosanska Krupa**: Total camps: 7
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 5
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

300. **Bosanski Brod**: Total camps: 8
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
   Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

301. **Bosanski Novi**: Total camps: 7
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated: 1
   Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

302. **Bosanski Petrovac**: Total camps: 1
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
303. **Bosanski Šamac**: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

304. **Bratunac**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

305. **Brčko**: Total camps: 34
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 26 Uncorroborated: 4
           Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

306. **Breza**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 

307. **Bugojno**: Total camps: 12
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
           Croats/Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
           Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 3

308. **Busovača**: Total camps: 1
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

309. **Čajniče**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

310. **Čapljina**: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

311. **Cazin**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 
           Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 

312. **Čelinac**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

313. **Čitluk**: Total camps: 2
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

314. **Derventa**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
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329. **Kalesija**: Total camps: 5  
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Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

330. **Kalinovik**: Total camps: 5  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2  
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

331. **Kiseljak**: Total camps: 7  
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 4

332. **Kladanj**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Croats/ Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

333. **Ključ**: Total camps: 4  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

334. **Konjic**: Total camps: 29  
Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 5  
Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 12  
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

335. **Kotor Varoš**: Total camps: 9  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 7

336. **Kreševo**: Total camps: 3  
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:

337. **Kupres**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:

338. **Laktaši**: Total camps: 2  
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339. **Lištica**: Total camps: 1  
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354. **Prijedor**: Total Camps: 36
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 28 Uncorroborated: 8

355. **Prnjavor**: Total Camps: 1
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

356. **Prozor**: Total Camps: 7
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 3
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

357. **Rogatica**: Total Camps: 12
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           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

358. **Rudo**: Total Camps: 3
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
           Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

359. **Sansi Most**: Total Camps: 10
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 8 Uncorroborated: 2

360. **Sarajevo**: Total Camps: 91
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 20
           Muslims: Corroborated: 11 Uncorroborated: 18
           Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
           Croats/ Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 7
           Unknown: Corroborated: 11 Uncorroborated: 13
           Private: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

361. **Šekovići**: Total Camps: 4
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D. Camps reported in Croatia

384. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 201 camps within Croatia. Among those camps, 77 (38.3 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 70 (34.8 per cent) by Croats; 1 (.5 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by Slovenians; 51 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.

385. As armed conflict erupted between Croatians and Serbs in Croatia, the detention of combatants and civilians reached a large scale. Ultimately, at least several thousand Croatians and Serbs had been imprisoned in Croatia from
the end of 1991 to the present.

386. Most of the places of detention in Croatia were maintained by Croatians or Serbs. There are, however, a significant number of reported detention facilities where it was unclear who maintained control.

1. **Croat controlled camps**

387. The reports indicate that Croatian forces captured and detained both Serb combatants and Serb civilians. As the conflict progressed, it appears that the Croatians began to capture and detain Serb civilians for the purpose of later exchanging them for Croats held prisoner.

388. Some cooperation appeared evident between the Croats of the Republic of Croatia and the Croats of the Republic of BiH. At one point, at least, Bosnian Croat forces were apparently able to transfer prisoners from the Bosanski Brod and Odžak areas of BiH to Slavonski Brod in Croatia. Some of those prisoners were later transferred back to places of detention in the territory of BiH. Others were apparently transferred to places of detention elsewhere in Croatia.

389. The Croats appear to have used numerous sites to detain and interrogate Serbs for short periods of time and maintained only a few places for long term detention.

390. It was reported that the Croatian camps were often divided into three blocks. The first block consisted of former JNA members who surrendered without a struggle. The second block consisted of elderly persons and the third block was reported to have consisted of military police, volunteers, and individuals identified by the Croats as "Četniks".

391. In Pakrac, Croats were alleged to have maintained two "death camps" for the elimination of captured Serbs. This was the only allegation of Croat operating a place of detention for the purpose of large-scale execution. However, there were numerous allegations of Croatian mistreatment of prisoners in other places of detention, as well as numerous allegations of killings.

392. The reported maltreatment inflicted upon prisoners in Croat-controlled detention facilities consisted mainly of indiscriminate beatings, some rapes, public humiliation, and forced appearance on television. Electric shock and forced same-sex sexual acts were also alleged as common methods of torture and abuse.

393. Those who were reported to have controlled and maintained the Croatian places of detention were the Croatian armed forces, local police forces and some paramilitary groups.

394. Camp conditions were generally poor. However, in at least one instance at Gospić Prison, it was reported that Croatian captors attempted to improve conditions when notified of an ICRC visit.

2. **Serb controlled camps**

395. There were also Serb controlled places of detention in Croatia which were reported to have consisted mainly of pre-existing facilities. However, the Serbs apparently found it necessary to erect a few camps in order to effectively detain their captives. The Serb camps in Croatia held both civilians and prisoners of war.
396. Prior to the war in BiH, Serb captors in Croatia transferred some prisoners to the Manjača camp in Banja Luka, Bosnia. Later, after fighting started in BiH, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were reported to have been held at Serb camps in Croatia.

397. Those reportedly responsible for the operation and maintenance of Serb-controlled camps in Croatia were a mixture of JNA officers and soldiers, SAO Krajina police forces, Serb Territorial Defence units and various paramilitary forces.

398. Maltreatment of prisoners was commonly attributed to the Serb controlled camps in Croatia. Camp commanders appear to have been well aware of the abuse that took place and often allowed Serb civilians and paramilitaries access to the prisoners in order to abuse them. In at least one case, Bosnian Serbs reportedly travelled to Knin, Croatia to participate in the abuse of Bosnian Croats and Muslims held there.

399. There are a number of reports that the guards in Serb camps consumed drugs and alcohol and in an intoxicated state subjected prisoners to different types of maltreatment.

400. As with other detaining powers, the Serbs in Croatia were reported to have attempted at times to deceive visitors interested in the condition of camps. For example, places of detention and the prisoners themselves were cleaned up before a visit and prisoners who appeared to be in satisfactory condition were shown off, whereas those who showed physical signs of maltreatment were hidden.

401. There were also reports of prisoners coerced to appear on Belgrade television to describe their supposed offences against Serbs.

3. Reported camps by location

402. Of the reports of 201 camps alleged in Croatia, 100 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 101 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Croatia:

403. Beli Manastir: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1

404. Benkovac: Total camps: 5
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 5

405. Bjelovar: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated:

406. Daruvar: Total camps: 8
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2
           Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 4
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
407. **Djakovo**: Total camps: 2  
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

408. **Drniš**: Total camps: 2  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

409. **Dubrovnik**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

410. **Dvor**: Total camps: 4  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2  
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

411. **Glina**: Total camps: 3  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

412. **Gospić**: Total camps: 5  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1  
Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

413. **Gračac**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

414. **Grubišno Polje**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

415. **Imotski**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

416. **Ivanec**: Total camps: 1  
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

417. **Karlovac**: Total camps: 2  
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

418. **Knin**: Total camps: 7  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 3

419. **Korenica**: Total camps: 3  
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
420. **Kostajnica:** Total camps: 2
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
421. **Kutina:** Total camps: 1
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
422. **Metković:** Total camps: 4
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
          Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
423. **Našice:** Total camps: 1
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
424. **Nova Gradiška:** Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
          Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
          Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
425. **Nvoska:** Total camps: 1
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
426. **Ogulin:** Total camps: 3
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2
          Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
427. **Osijek:** Total camps: 14
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 4
          Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 3
          Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:
428. **Otočac:** Total camps: 1
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
429. **Pakrac:** Total camps: 7
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
          Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
          Slovenians: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
430. **Petricina:** Total camps: 2
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
431. **Podravska Slatina:** Total camps: 2
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
          Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
432. **Pula**: Total camps: 1
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

433. **Rijeka**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

434. **Šibenik**: Total camps: 7
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

435. **Sinj**: Total camps: 1
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

436. **Sisak**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:

437. **Slavonska Požega**: Total camps: 5
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

438. **Slavonski Brod**: Total camps: 7
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
   Croats/Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:

439. **Slunj**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

440. **Split**: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:

441. **Vinkovci**: Total camps: 2
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

442. **Varaždin**: Total camps: 1
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

443. **Vojnić**: Total camps: 3
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated:
444. Vrbovec: Total camps: 1
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

445. Vrginmost: Total camps: 1
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

446. Vukovar: Total camps: 44
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 27
Croats: Corroborated: 9
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

447. Zadar: Total camps: 7
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:

448. Zagreb: Total camps: 8
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:

E. Camps reported in FRY

449. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 71 camps within FRY. Among those camps, 56 (78.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; and 15 (21.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.

1. Serb/FRY controlled camps

450. A combination of JNA personnel, police forces and Serb paramilitaries, reportedly operated and maintained the camps in FRY.

451. A significant number of Croats, probably at least several thousand, were reported to have been captured by Serb forces in Croatia and transferred to what is now known as FRY. The majority of those imprisoned in various prisons and camps in FRY were apparently captured at the battle of Vukovar in approximately November 1991.

452. Those captured were a mix of soldiers and civilians. Apparently, the Serbs first regarded their Croat prisoners as insurgents and rebels and later, as the independence of Croatia was recognized, to a certain extent regarded their captives as prisoners of war. It was also reported that when the Republic of Croatia was internationally recognized, Croat prisoners in FRY were severely beaten as a result.

453. It was reported that Serb authorities tried and convicted a number of Croat prisoners for various offences. Those prisoners were often transferred to other detention facilities. Serbs also commonly transferred other prisoners between detention centres.

454. Treatment of prisoners at the FRY camps was commonly reported as very poor. Violent interrogation, and reports of beatings and sadistic treatment of prisoners were common. For example, it was reported that prisoners were forced to participate in various "games", the rules of which inevitably led to the abuse of the participants. It appeared that Serb authorities in FRY
transported local Vukovar Serbs to FRY in order to identify certain prisoners and participate in their maltreatment. Personal vendettas were allowed to occur. Drunk guards were also reported to have inflicted great harm upon those imprisoned. There were also reports of women who were held and exploited for sexual purposes.

455. Living conditions for the prisoners were also reported as very poor. Common complaints included a lack of food, insufficient access to toilet facilities, and an inadequate opportunity to bathe and change clothes. Facilities were often cold and damp, and inmates were often left without sufficient bedding. The wounded and sick often suffered without adequate medical care.

456. It appears that the majority of Croat prisoners in FRY were exchanged by late summer of 1992.

457. It was also reported that prisoners captured in BiH were transported to camps in FRY. A number of the Bosnian Muslims held in such camps were reportedly captured around Višegrad and Bosanski Šamac.

458. A number of Bosnian refugees in Montenegro, from Foća, were reportedly arrested by FRY police forces, held in various prisons, and later turned over to Serbs maintaining camps in Foća where they were then imprisoned. It was also reported that a significant number of Muslim prisoners held in Bileca, were transferred to a camp in Subotica.

459. Upon investigation by third party teams, certain alleged concentration camps for Muslims in FRY were found to be refugee centres where living conditions were poor.

2. Reported camps by location

460. Of the reports of the 71 camps alleged in FRY, 42 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources), and 29 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in FRY:

461. Kosovo: Total camps: 1
Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 0

462. Montenegro: Total camps: 9
Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2

463. Serbia: Total camps: 27
Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 13 Uncorroborated: 13
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 0

464. Vojvodina: Total camps: 25
Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 10 Uncorroborated: 13
Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 0
465. **Unidentified Locations in FRY:**

Total camps: 9

Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 9 Uncorroborated:

D. Camps reported in Slovenia

466. The reports reviewed alleged a total of seven camps within Slovenia. Among those camps, three (42.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Slovenian forces and four (57.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.

467. As the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia erupted and unfolded, detention of soldiers and civilians reportedly became commonplace. In June and July 1991, Slovenian forces reportedly captured and imprisoned a few hundred soldiers of the JNA and some civilian personnel of SFRY, including internal police, for a short period of time after Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991.

468. The Slovenes reportedly held the prisoners in various places including mining facilities and a penitentiary. The captors allegedly subjected the prisoners to beatings, verbal humiliations, and threats. Since the prisoners' release and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and BiH, there were no reports concerning detention in Slovenia.

469. Of the reports of the seven camps alleged in Slovenia, six were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and one was uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Slovenia:

1. **Reported camps in Slovenia**

470. **Slovenia:** Total camps: 7

Run by: Slovenians: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated:

ANNEX IX – RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

471. Annex IX, consisting of 124 pages, was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni.

I. **INTRODUCTION**

472. The Commission investigated rape and sexual assault in three ways. The first method was through a study of the documentary evidence contained in the database at IHRLI. This study is discussed in paragraphs 28 through 294. The second method was through a field investigation. This investigation is discussed at Annex IXA, in paragraphs 1 through 190. The field investigators conducted 223 interviews in Croatia. The final method was through the analysis of investigations and interviews conducted by governments and submitted to the Commission, but not included in the database. For example, the government of Austria recently interviewed 18 refugees, several of whom were victims or witnesses of incidents of rape and sexual assault. Sweden conducted interviews of 35 refugees, most of whom were victims or witnesses of
rape and sexual assault. These investigations and their findings have been sent by the Commission to the office of the Prosecutor for the ICTFY. A great number of fact-finding missions have been carried out to try to assess the incidence and extent of the use of rape and sexual assault as a weapon of war in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

473. The question of the credibility of victims and witnesses and the reliability of the information provided has been foremost in the consideration of this analysis. Indeed, some of the information provided, as described below, is general, generic, or insufficient. But such information may none the less be credible because of some particular details it may contain and because of other corroborating facts. Furthermore, interviews, whether conducted by the Commission or by certain governments, of victims and witnesses in sufficient numbers confirm certain accounts. Such interviews also provide a first hand account and description of certain facts, which are also found in the documentation available in the database. Thus, it is the cumulative nature of the information which tends to corroborate the facts about incidents in the locations described, as well as patterns of behaviour. Consequently, it is this cumulative effect which gives the information credibility and reliability. This is also the basis which provides a sufficient numerical basis to develop a statistical analysis from which to derive the conclusions described below. Thus, for example, of the 1,100 cases examined, it is possible to identify with some degree of accuracy the patterns described in paragraphs 8 through 25. The macroanalysis aspect of this report is therefore well founded on the facts. Obviously, individual cases and their level of readiness for prosecution will vary and, without speculating on any ultimate prosecutorial outcome, it could easily be surmised that no less than 10 percent of these reports are very likely cases for prosecution. Finally, the analysis of allegations by geographical location has been written in a way to conceal the identities of victims, witnesses, and alleged perpetrators, for confidentiality and security reasons. The vagueness present should not be taken for a lack of information. Names have been provided when they are taken from widely published sources like the news media.

474. The relevance of the study is therefore threefold: 1) it identifies specific individual cases, patterns and policies; 2) it establishes foundations in fact for allegations of rape and sexual assault in this conflict, and more particularly their use as an instrument of war; and 3) it serves as a basis for the eventual prosecution by the ICTFY of rape and sexual assault cases, particularly with respect to the prosecution of commanders and other decision makers who may have been responsible for individual conduct and formulating policy. A most significant corollary of the study is that it has identified a number of cases ready for the final investigatory stages leading to prosecution.

A. Summary of statistical information from all sources

475. This is a study by IHRLI of allegations of systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. The information for the study comes from the sources stated in paragraph 1. The database contains tens of thousands of allegations of rape and sexual assault. Rape is defined for the purposes of the study as non-consensual sexual penetration, while sexual assault encompasses rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts. It also includes sexual mutilations for purposes of this study. When duplicated information is eliminated and the most general allegations discarded, the following statistics are revealed:

(a) There are approximately 1,100 reported cases of rape and sexual assault;


(b) About 800 victims are named, or the submitting source appears to know the identity of the victim, but does not disclose it;

(c) About 1,800 victims are specifically referred to but are not named or identified sufficiently by the witness reporting the incident;

(d) Witness reports also refer to additional numbers of victims through approximations. These reports suggest there may be about 10,000 additional victims the reports could eventually lead to;

(e) About 550 of the reported cases refer to victims of rape and sexual assault but are unspecific and do not give any identifying information;

(f) About 700 alleged perpetrators are named, or the submitting sources appear to have the name of the person they call the perpetrator but chose not to disclose it;

(g) About 750 perpetrators are specifically identified, but the witnesses do not know the name to make the identification complete;

(h) The cases contain references to about 300 perpetrators only approximately, with no specifics as to name or the specific number present;

(i) About 900 cases refer generally to classes of perpetrators but do not approximate their numbers.

476. There are about 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where people were detained and sexually assaulted:

(a) 88 of those are reportedly run by Serbs;

(b) 35 are run by unknown forces;

(c) 17 are allegedly run by Croats;

(d) 14 are allegedly run by Muslim and Croat forces together;

(e) 8 are reportedly run by Muslims.

477. This statistical information may not represent the true extent of what has occurred in the former Yugoslavia. This shortfall may be due to a variety of reasons:

(a) The chief reason is that victims are reluctant to report the assaults;

(b) Victims fear reprisals by their attackers, both for themselves and family members remaining in occupied areas;

(c) Some victims feel shame and embarrassment and fear ostracization by their communities--this is especially true in Muslim society, though many female victims have banded together for support, unlike most victims of rape and sexual assault in peacetime;

(d) A great deal of time has passed since the crimes were committed. Now, victims and witnesses have relocated to over 20 different countries. With the passage of time and migration, there is an increasing reticence to report incidents of rape and sexual assault at an international
level. Victims and witnesses wish to get on with their lives and not to relive the shame and embarrassment of their experiences;

(e) Many do not have a place to report the assault or feel that reporting would be useless;

(f) Refugees have a certain level of skepticism about the international community. Support groups and therapists contribute to this skepticism due to their concern over the traumatic effect of reliving the trauma through constant questioning.

478. These concerns are evidenced in many of the reports used in this study. Submitting sources often withhold the names of victims, witnesses or perpetrators to protect them. Additionally, many of the witnesses who gave testimony stated that they were afraid to allow their identity to be revealed because of retaliation by the alleged perpetrators or rejection by their own community. Some of the victims report that the people who assaulted them said never to tell what had happened or they would hunt down the victims and kill them.

B. Methodology

479. To analyse the contents of the database, all of the allegations of rape and sexual assault were gathered. Summary sheets were created for each allegation. These worksheets separated out some of the vital information, such as the identity of the witness who reported the incident, the identity of the victims and perpetrators, the date and location of the incident, the source of the report, and the method of recording the information. The worksheets also contained a comprehensive summary of the incident of rape and sexual assault. These summary sheets were then used as analytical tools to compare the information in a standardized format. They were organized geographically, divided by the setting in which they allegedly occurred, and arranged chronologically within that subheading. The analysis which follows is also organized geographically by county in alphabetical order. This particular form was chosen because of the number of "warring factions", and the generally confusing nature of the conflict.

480. The setting was defined as either custodial or non-custodial, and those reports which did not specify the setting were assumed not to have occurred in custody. This classification was used for several reasons, primarily because some level of organization and coordination is required to hold people in custody. The greater the number of rapes and sexual assaults in custody, the greater the likelihood of higher-level control over, or acquiescence to the practice. About 600 reported cases specify that they occurred in settings where the victims were held in custody.

C. Summary analysis

481. Rape and sexual assault have been reported to have been committed by all of the "warring factions". Additionally, many ethnic groups were reportedly victims of rape and sexual assault: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Croatians, Croatian Serbs, Croatian Muslims, Albanians, Czechs and others. However, it is important to avoid moral equivalency in the analysis. The vast majority of victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60 percent of the nearly 150 detention sites where men and women were allegedly raped and sexually assaulted. Finally, for purposes of prosecution, it is important to distinguish between "opportunistic" crimes and the use of
rape and sexual assault as a method of "ethnic cleansing". Rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context of the practice of "ethnic cleansing"; discussed in Annex IV, and the practices in concentration camps, discussed in Annexes V and VIII. Most of the reported cases occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and none were reported to have occurred in Slovenia.

482. Several patterns of conduct are revealed in the reported cases, regardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims. These patterns are:

(a) Individuals or small groups commit rape and sexual assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic group before generalized fighting breaks out in an area;

(b) Individuals or groups commit rape and sexual assault in conjunction with fighting in an area, often raping women in public;

(c) Individuals or groups commit rapes and sexual assaults of detainees;

(d) Individuals or groups commit rape and sexual assault against women held for the purpose of being raped and sexually assaulted and for the purpose of harming the women;

(e) Detention sites are established solely for the rape and sexual abuse of women for the perpetrator's gratification.

483. The first pattern occurs before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in a region. This type of rape and sexual assault is accompanied by looting, intimidation, and beatings. Tensions in an area grow, and members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours by intimidation, looting and beatings. Two or more men reportedly break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them, and often rape and sexually assault female residents. Some of the reported rapes and sexual assaults are singular and some are multiple. In either case, there is often a gang atmosphere where all the abuses are part of the same event, and all the attackers participate in the event, even if they do not sexually assault the victims. A distinct pattern of rape and sexual assault within this general type is peculiar to one area of BiH and Croatia. Paramilitary groups roam the countryside, abducting primarily Bosnian Serb women from their homes. The women are taken to a specific location, raped and sexually assaulted repeatedly, and then abandoned. The size of the groups of men range from four to 15. The victims are usually assaulted by each of the men in the group.

484. The second pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in conjunction with widespread or generalized fighting. When forces attack a town or village, the population is gathered and divided by sex and age. Some women are raped and sexually assaulted in their homes as the attacking forces secure the area. Others are selected after the roundup and are then raped and sexually assaulted publicly. The population of the village is then transported to camps.

485. The third pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in sites of detention or other "collection centres" for refugees. After the population is rounded up in a town or village, men and women are separated. Men are executed or sent off to camps, and women are generally sent off to separate camps. In these custodial situations, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries, and even civilians are allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them
away, rape and sexually assault them, and then either kill them or return them
to the site. There is a significant amount of gang-rape and sexual assault
reported in this context, and beatings and torture accompany most of the
reported rapes and sexual assaults. Survivors report that some women are
taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. The women who are not
killed are eventually exchanged. Though this is the general pattern, there
are also many allegations that women are raped and sexually assaulted in front
of other detainees, or that other detainees are forced to rape and sexually
assault each other. The sexual assault of men in these camps is generally
public, and the men are not usually removed from the camp. In these camps,
other forms of humanitarian law violations, such as torture, occur
simultaneously. In camps with only male populations and in camps with mixed
populations, men are also subjected to sexual assault. Examples of this type
of camp include Serb-run Trnopolje in Prijedor,\textsuperscript{136} Croatian-run Odžak camp in
Odžak,\textsuperscript{137} and the Muslim-run camp in Goražde.\textsuperscript{138}

486. The fourth pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in specific types
of sites of detention. Survivors of some camps report that they believe that
they were detained for the purpose of rape and sexual assault. In these
sites, all of the women are raped and sexually assaulted, the raping is quite
frequent, and it is often committed in front of other internees. In this
context as well, beating and torture accompany rape and sexual assault.
Often, the captors state that they are trying to impregnate the women,
pregnant women are treated better than their non-pregnant counterparts, and
pregnant women are detained until it is too late in the pregnancy to obtain an
abortion.\textsuperscript{139} Examples of this type of camp include the Serb-run Usara High
School camp in Doboj,\textsuperscript{140} Muslim-run Čelebići camp in Konjic,\textsuperscript{141} and Croatian-run
Dretelj camp in Čapljina.\textsuperscript{142}

487. The last pattern of rape and sexual assault is detention for the purpose
of providing sex. Women are collected from their homes and from camps and
taken to hotels or similar facilities where they serve to provide sexual
gratification for the armed forces.\textsuperscript{143} The women kept in these sites are
reportedly killed more often than they are exchanged, unlike the female
population in most camps. Additionally, unlike camp detention, the motive for
detention of these women seems not to be to cause some reaction in the women
detained, but instead to provide sexual services to men. The Yugoslav Mission
submitted a list of such sites run by Croats and Muslims in BiH and the
women's group Trešnjevka submitted a list of such sites run by Serbs in BiH.

488. In both custodial and non-custodial settings, many victims report that
the alleged perpetrators state that they were ordered to rape and sexually
assault the victims, or that they were doing it so that the victims and their
families would never want to return to the area. Also, every reported case
occurred in conjunction with an effort to displace the civilian population of
a targeted ethnic group from a given region. Reports of rape and sexual
assault between members of the same ethnic group are few and have some ethnic
component, such as sheltering members of the target ethnic group or marriage
to a member of the targeted ethnic group. Very few reports fail to display
some ethnic motivation.

489. Some characteristics of the rapes and sexual assaults include:

(a) Rapes and sexual assaults are conducted in ways that emphasize the
shame and humiliation of the assault—such as forcing family members to rape
each other, raping the victims in front of family members, including children,
and raping persons in public places or in front of other internees;

(b) Large groups of perpetrators subject victims to multiple rapes and
sexual assaults;
(c) Young women and virgins are targeted for rape and sexual assault, along with prominent members of the community and educated women;

(d) In custodial settings, perpetrators go through the detention centres with flashlights at night and choose victims randomly, returning them the next morning, thereby terrorizing the entire population of the camp;

(e) Perpetrators tell female victims that they will bear children of the perpetrator's ethnicity, that the perpetrators were ordered to rape and sexually assault them, or that, if the victims ever tell anyone or anyone discovers what has happened, the perpetrators will hunt them down and kill them;

(f) Victims are sexually assaulted with foreign objects like broken glass bottles, guns, and truncheons;

(g) Castrations are performed through crude means such as, forcing one internee to bite off another's testicles, and tying one end of a wire to the testicles and the other end to a motorcycle, then using the motorcycle to yank off the testicles;

(h) Perpetrators tell victims that they must become pregnant and hold them in custody until it is too late for the victims to get an abortion;

(i) Camp commanders often know about, and sometimes participate in, the rape and sexual assault of internees and former internees.

490. There also are many cases where female victims are protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attackers. Men take women out of the camps to protect them from rape and sexual assault, tell other guards or soldiers that the women are "taken", or help them escape. Women hide other women or bring them contraceptives. There is insufficient information on the sexual assault of men to determine a similar pattern.

491. Men are also subject to sexual assault. They are forced to rape and sexually assault women, they are forced to perform fellatio on guards and on each other, they are forced to perform other sex acts on each other, and they suffer castrations, circumcisions, and other sexual mutilations.

492. Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor, in particular, that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Out of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.

493. Other factors to consider in discerning a possible pattern include: similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and
humiliation to not only the victim but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults.

494. The reported cases of rape and sexual assault contained in the database occurred between 1991 and 1993. The majority of the rapes and sexual assaults occurred during April to November 1992 and very few occurred before or after that. In the same time period, the number of media reports increased from a low of none in March of 1992 and of 13 in April 1992 to a high of 535 in January 1993 and 529 in February 1993. This correlation could reflect the lag in the ability of the media to cover the information, waning media interest in the subject, that media attention caused the decline, or that the purposes for which the alleged rape and sexual assault was carried out had been served by the publicity. The last two possible explanations would indicate that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators, leading to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of ethnic cleansing.

495. The numbers of alleged rapes and sexual assaults and the patterns present are different among the different countries. Most of the alleged assaults occurred in BiH in the latter two-thirds of 1992. All of the patterns described above were present. A smaller number of alleged rapes and sexual assaults occurred in Croatia, mostly in late 1991. There were only a few sites of detention, run by both Serbs and Croats, and most of the reported rape and sexual assault occurred when tensions were high in an area or in conjunction with the fighting. Nearly all the rapes and sexual assaults reported to have occurred in the FRY were committed while the victims were in custody. Most occurred in late 1991 in Begejci, Stajićevo, and Livade camps near Zrenjanin, Vojvodina.

D. Conclusions

496. Rape and other forms of sexual assault harm not only the body of the victim. The more significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate and personal decisions and bodily functions. This loss of control infringes on the victim's human dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective means of 'ethnic cleansing'..

497. Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct, without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. Factors to consider in discerning a pattern include: similarities among practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim, but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. The presence of these factors strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Out of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.

498. Some of the allegations of rape and sexual assault are clearly instances
of a policy of commission. In some cases, military commanders and camp commanders are reported to have ordered their subordinates to rape and sexually assault people who were not members of the subordinates' ethnic or religious group. Other cases point to a policy of omission, where military and camp commanders failed to prevent such conduct and failed to punish their subordinates for such criminal behaviour when it was discovered. There is evidence that rape and sexual assault have been used by all parties of the conflict to displace targeted ethnic groups, though not necessarily as part of an overall policy of "ethnic cleansing". However, the vast majority of victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60 percent of the 162 detention sites where detainees are allegedly raped and sexually assaulted. Finally, for purposes of prosecution, it is important to distinguish between "opportunistic" crimes and the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of "ethnic cleansing."

ANNEX IX.A - SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATION

499. Annex IX.A is a 62 page report of the sexual assault investigation conducted by the Commission in February and March of 1994, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni. The Annex contains two parts. Part one is the report of the interview coordinator which contains the following: 1.) a discussion of the methodology used to conduct the interviews and choose the victims and witnesses to be interviewed; 2.) comments regarding the substance; 3.) recommendations for further investigation; and 4.) the plan of action for the interview process. Part two is the report of the mental health team which discusses the activities and role of the experts as well as the psychological effects of giving testimony and the psychological and physical status of those interviewed.

ANNEX IX.B - PILOT RAPE STUDY

500. Annex IX.B is eight page report of the results of a pilot rape study conducted in Sarajevo, under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick. The investigation team consisted of two Canadian military police investigators and a Canadian military lawyer. Sarajevo was the chosen site because the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of BiH and the League for the Help of Victims of Genocide are located in Sarajevo. Both organizations previously indicated that they had collected extensive information regarding rape. The objective of the study was to assess the feasibility of prosecuting alleged perpetrators and their superiors in certain cases of rape.

ANNEX X - MASS GRAVES

501. Annex X, a 104 page report, was prepared by staff members of IHRLI, under the direction of Chairman Bassiouni.

I. INTRODUCTION

502. Because of the large scale of victimization in the Yugoslav conflict, many persons are buried in individual and mass graves. The mass graves report attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning any and all alleged mass graves in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but to provide a factual description, and whenever possible, some analysis of the mass graves reported to be in existence as of 30 April 1994. It should be
noted that the reporting or existence of a mass grave does not necessarily imply that a war crime has been committed.

503. It is significant to note that further study of mass graves should be made for three reasons:

(a) A mass gravesite is a potential repository of evidence of mass killings of civilians and POWs. Such sites can yield forensic information which can provide evidence or insight into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of those buried there.

(b) The manner and method by which a mass grave is created may itself be a breach of the Geneva Conventions, as well as a violation of the customary regulations of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions require parties to a conflict to search for the dead and to prevent their bodies and remains from being despoiled. For every deceased person who falls into the hands of the adverse party, the adverse party must record, prepare, and forward all identification information, death certificates and personal effects to the appropriate parties. Parties to a conflict must also ensure that deceased persons are autopsied and buried in individual graves, as far apart as circumstances permit. Bodies should not be cremated except for hygiene reasons or for the religious reasons of the deceased. Interment should be carried out in an honourable fashion, according to the religious rites of the deceased. Victims should be grouped by nationality and their graves maintained and marked so that they can be easily found.

(c) The identification of mass graves can serve a reconciliatory purpose between the "warring factions", so that the families of those killed during the conflict can learn the whereabouts of their loved ones.

504. This report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary analysis and the second section consists of factual descriptions of all reported gravesites and analysis by geographic location. The Summary Analysis, in Section II below, discusses the methodology of the report, defines relevant terms, and tracks the following information: total number of graves; number of graves in each geographic region; number of graves by ethnicity of victim and of perpetrator; number of graves containing a given range of bodies; number of graves where information suggests the bodies were victims of mass killings; number of graves near detention facilities, and so forth. In addition, this section will discuss patterns, trends, and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of mass grave sites.

505. The Analysis By Geographic Location, in Section II(B), describes gravesites by county and is organized alphabetically. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution information is provided for each county, as well as a brief summary of military activity in the region, if available. Many of the counties reported multiple mass graves. The section also contains the following:

(a) All identified gravesites in that county are then discussed in detail. A full description of the location of the grave is given, along with all known relevant events leading up to the creation of the gravesite. Ethnicities of victims and perpetrators are identified; however, names of victims have been redacted to protect their identities as well as those of their families. The names of some perpetrators reportedly involved in the events surrounding the mass grave are known, but not disclosed.

(b) Other information includes the number of bodies buried in the
grave, how the grave was created, and any investigations, visual sightings or forensic explorations of the grave and data gained therefrom.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary analysis

506. For the purposes of this report, "grave" is defined as any site which: 1) is intended as a place of permanent interment and 2) has physical characteristics which prevent the bodies from being moved by the natural elements. Accordingly, rivers do not fall within the definition of mass graves for this report, nor do groups of bodies left to decompose on forest floors. "Mass" is defined as any group of two or more persons sharing the common place of interment. "County" is defined as a region known as an "opština". An opština is larger than a municipality or town, and includes smaller villages and hamlets which surround the larger cities. "Ethnicity of perpetrator" is defined as the ethnicity or religious affiliation of the party responsible for the deaths that led to the creation of a mass grave. In many instances, the party responsible for the killing is not the party directly involved in creating the mass grave. This would occur in a situation where civilians were killed and their neighbours had no choice but to bury them in mass graves, due to time, sanitary, or safety considerations.

507. Reports of mass graves are entered into the IHRLI database. The database generates a separate screen for each reported mass grave and tracks all relevant information available about each site.

508. When a report of a mass grave is received by the database, it is cross-checked against any factual information already on hand to avoid duplication. If the report contains data on a gravesite previously identified in the database, any new data is incorporated into the active file in the database. If the report concerns a new mass grave, a file is opened for that grave. The purpose of the files is to develop and organize information for analysis and track corroborative accounts of mass graves.

509. This report is based on over 10,000 pages of source information received and database incidents developed by IHRLI. This information is submitted by a variety of sources, including U.N. organizations, member states, governments of the warring factions, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The substance of the information received varies from general reports of patterns of activity in the former Yugoslavia to detailed witness accounts, which describe specific incidents at length.

510. Based on the available information, there are four general types of mass graves which exist in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The first type is a gravesite where the bodies were victims of a mass killing but the method and manner of burial were proper. The second type is a gravesite where the bodies were those of civilian casualties or soldiers killed in combat, and therefore not unlawful killings, but the method and manner of burial were improper. The third type includes gravesites where the bodies were victims of a mass killing and the method and manner of burial were improper. Finally, the fourth type includes gravesites where neither the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the victims nor the manner and method of burial were improper.

511. The number of mass graves reported to exist is as follows:

(a) 38 counties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia contain a total of 187 alleged mass grave sites, with 143 in BiH and 44 in
Croatia;

(b) Over half of the sites in Croatia (27) are located in the eastern region of the republic, comprising the counties of Vukovar, Osijek, and Vinkovci; and

(c) Over half the sites (79) in BiH are located in the north-western quarter of the republic, comprising the counties of Prijedor, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Sanski Most, and others.

512. The number of bodies said to be contained in the graves are as follows:

(a) 25 contain at least 10 bodies;
(b) 16 contain at least 10-20 bodies;
(c) 29 sites contain at least 20-50 bodies;
(d) 22 contain at least 50-100 bodies;
(e) 20 contain at least 100-500 bodies;
(f) 13 contain at least 500 bodies;

(f) Reports on 62 of the gravesites did not specify the number of bodies buried at the site. For more accurate analysis, reports which contained allegations that "thousands" of individuals are buried at a certain site, without a more concrete number, were classified as "unspecified". Likewise, those reports which claimed that a given number of people were killed in a location, but did not refer to that number in discussing the subsequent burial, are classified as "unspecified"; and

(g) Many persons tend to report large numbers of persons buried in mass graves on the basis of numbers of missing persons, rather than numbers of those killed. This was the case in Sector West, in Pakračka Poljana, where 1,700 bodies were alleged to have been buried. In all, 19 bodies were found by the Commission, at which point the Krajina authorities suggested that 2,500 bodies were actually buried in Marino Selo, a few kilometres away.35

513. The ethnicity of the victims buried in reported mass graves are as follows:

(a) 65 are said to contain at least some Muslims;
(b) 32 are said to contain at least some Croatians;
(c) 19 are said to contain at least some Serbs; and
(d) 81 sites did not have the ethnicity of the victims specified. It should be noted that many of the gravesites are said to contain victims from more than one ethnic group, usually Muslims and Croatians. Where a mass grave is alleged to have victims of multiple ethnicities, the site is counted twice, once for each ethnicity reported.

514. The ethnicity of perpetrators responsible for killing persons buried in mass graves are as follows:

(a) Persons buried in 81 of the reported gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Serbs;
(b) Persons buried in 16 of the gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Croats;

(c) Persons buried in five of the gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Muslims; and

(d) Of the reports, 87 of the reports did not identify a perpetrator. Where the ethnicity of the perpetrator was not clearly established from the data, sites are classified as having an unspecified perpetrator, despite one ethnic group's clear military control of the region."

515. Of the reported sites, 54 of the reported sites are at or near detention facilities. This comports with the data that suggests many of the victims buried in mass graves were prisoners who died or were killed at detention facilities run by an adversarial ethnic group.

516. Over half (99) of the alleged gravesites appear to contain victims of mass killings. In these instances, the source information clearly detailed the circumstances of the killing, or provided witness testimony about the deaths of the victims.

517. There are several trends which appear throughout the report of mass graves in both BiH and Croatia, including Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, such as Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia. The first is the coexistence of mass graves and detention facilities. Mass graves are frequently reported in areas where numerous identified detention facilities were located and where many individuals were reportedly killed. This coexistence suggests that mass graves were and are deliberately being used as a means of secretly disposing of the bodies of those persons unlawfully killed. Some of these persons may have been killed in detention, while others were killed in the course of "ethnic cleansing". This is particularly true in the counties of Brčko, Foča, Pakrac, and Prijedor.

518. A second trend concerns the manner in which the graves are created. After a mass killing, the occupying troops or detention camp guards will often select a handful of civilians or prisoners to assist with loading dead bodies onto trucks to transport them to a burial site. Other prisoners are forced to actually dig the grave in which the dead are to be buried, usually with their bare hands or shovels. After the transport or excavation is completed, the prisoners or civilians are also killed and thrown into the grave with the dead bodies, presumably to eliminate any potential witnesses to the killings and subsequent burials. Lack of available witnesses also accounts for the poor quality of information about many of the gravesites.

519. A third trend appearing from the data concerns a blatant disregard for the rites of a proper burial. Most of the dead in mass graves are neither placed in coffins nor wrapped in any sort of protective material. In many cases, the victims are not identified by name, or registered as dead before burial. These actions deny the dead a dignified burial and effectively prevent the families of those killed in the conflict from ever tracing their whereabouts.

520. A fourth trend suggested by the data concerns the burial site itself. There is a pattern whereby perpetrators dispose of bodies in pre-existing but non-traditional sites, which provide a ready-made place for body disposal without the use of mechanical diggers or excavators. Dead bodies are frequently thrown in mine-shafts, canals, quarries, landfills, caves and the like. In addition, these are the types of sites where bodies are said to be buried in large numbers as opposed to small numbers, possibly because it is easier to effectuate the burial of many people if the need for actual
excavation is eliminated.

521. A fifth pattern appearing from the data is the delay or denial of burial by the occupying forces. In many instances, dead bodies will be left on streets, lawns or forests for days or weeks, forcing the surviving civilian population to view the devastation. When villagers attempt to bury the bodies themselves, they are often prevented by the opposing faction or must risk their own lives to do so.

522. A sixth trend is the circumvention of interment altogether. Victims' bodies have been disposed of in a variety of ways which do not embrace actual interment in a grave, be it real or makeshift. The most common non-burial method of disposition is the dumping of bodies into rivers. The Danube, Sava, Sana, and Drina Rivers have all been reported to contain the bodies of killed persons. Some victims have allegedly had their stomachs slit and filled with sand so the bodies remain submerged once in the river. Also, many persons were reportedly burned in ovens or gathered into homes and set ablaze.

523. Many of the methods of burial or disposal of bodies are designed to instil fear and intimidate the civilian population still living in contested areas. This is particularly true in the case of bodies dumped in rivers, where the population downstream is forced to witness masses of bodies floating in the water. When bodies are buried, they are often placed in very shallow graves or merely covered with a layer of dirt, so that body parts often surface during inclement weather. Another example of a burial designed to provoke fear is in Blagaj, located in Prijedor county, where bodies were buried only from the waist down, so that passers-by were forced to view a line of decomposing persons.

524. Many of the attacks which led to the creation of mass graves in BiH occurred in late April, May and June of 1992. This is particularly true in the south-east quarter of BiH, which includes Foća, Gacko, Rogatica and Vlasenica; the north-east quarter of BiH, including Brčko and Zvornik; and the north-west quarter of BiH, which includes Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kotor Varoš.

525. Mass graves in many regions appear to be the final phase in an "ethnic cleansing" process. Mass graves are usually found in sectors where forces have followed a distinct pattern of expulsion: the county is attacked by artillery; infantry troops enter the villages and force villagers from their homes, during which time many are killed. Once the houses are emptied, they are looted and burned. Those villagers who are still alive are rounded up and the men are separated from the women, children and elderly. These villagers are either killed, deported or detained; in any event, they rarely return to the village from which they came. The bodies of those killed during the initial expulsion, subsequent detention, or expulsion after release are often deposited in mass graves in and around the area where they were killed or died from torture or other wise.

ANNEX X.A - MASS GRAVES: OVČARA NEAR VUKOVAR, UNPA SECTOR EAST

526. Annex X.A is report of the mass grave investigation conducted in Ovčara, near Vukovar in UNPA Sector East, Croatia. The 14 page report was prepared by Commissioner Fenrick, members of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team and the Royal Netherlands Army, and Physicians for Human Rights. The Annex contains two parts - the report of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team and the report of the forensic team. The Canadian team's report contains an account of the team's efforts to obtain the necessary permission from local Serbian authorities to conduct the investigation and all events leading up to
securing the area. The forensic team, Physicians for Human Rights, prepared a
report containing an extensive explanation of the technical equipment and
procedures that were employed and followed during a mass grave exhumation.

ANNEX X.B - MASS GRAVES: PAKRAČKA
POLJANA, UNPA SECTOR WEST, CROATIA

527. Annex X.B concerns the mass grave exhumation at Pakračka Poljana, UNPA Sector West, Croatia. The report was prepared by Commissioner Fenrick, members of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team and the Royal Netherlands Army, and Physicians for Human Rights. It is substantially similar to Annex X.A, but is lengthier and more detailed because the full mass grave exhumation actually took place in Pakračka Poljana. The 47 page report contains two parts. Part one consists of an interim report and an investigation report prepared by the WCIT. Part two is the forensic report of the Physicians for Human Rights team which contains a description of the methods employed to exhume the bodies and catalogue physical evidence as well as the findings on how the victims were killed.

ANNEX XI - DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

528. Annex XI is a 12 page study of the destruction of cultural property prepared by Commissioner M'Baye. The study does not attempt to cite every violation of the laws of war concerning the destruction of cultural property. Rather, Commissioner M'Baye focussed on two incidents: the battle of Dubrovnik which occurred in October to December 1991 and the destruction of the Mostar Bridge which occurred on 9 November 1993. The analysis of the incidents and the application of the laws of war are to serve as examples for the Office of the Prosecutor to follow in its investigation of the deliberate destruction of cultural property.

ANNEX XI.A - THE BATTLE OF DUBROVNIK
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

529. Annex XI.A is a 33 page study of the Battle of Dubrovnik and the law of armed conflict. The Annex was prepared by members of the Canadian and Norwegian Armed Forces, under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick. A team of experts on the law of armed conflict and an art historian were sent to Dubrovnik to investigate the alleged damage to cultural property and civilians. The objective of the study was to prepare a study which focussed on injury to civilians and cultural property in order to 1.) determine whether and when indiscriminate or deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects had occurred; 2.) quantify the loss of civilian life, injuries, and damage to civilian property, especially cultural property; and 3.) impute responsibility for violations of the law of armed conflict. In the preparation of the study, the team relied on the following evidence: oral and written statements of eye-witnesses; hearsay statements; photographs and videotapes; unexploded ordnance; reports from other investigations conducted by national bodies, such as the civilian police, or other United Nations bodies, such as UNESCO; and a local criminal court judgment. In addition, the team sought out secondary sources of information to supplement its evidence.

ANNEX XII - RADIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION
(UNPA SECTOR WEST, CROATIA) OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1993

530. Annex XII, which was prepared by members of the Royal Netherlands Army under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick, concerns the radiological
investigation conducted in October 1993 in UNPA Sector West, Croatia. The seven report contains the findings of the two nuclear, biological and chemical experts sent to investigate allegations of nuclear waste dumping in the sector. The team took several soil samples throughout the area with negative results.
Notes

1/ At the time, the Commission's Secretariat consisted of: Vladimir Kotliar, Secretary; Bruna Molina-Abrams, Deputy Secretary; and Julio Baez, Assistant Secretary. The Commission's first Secretary was Jacqueline Dauchy.


3/ Some missions were for reconnaissance purposes in order to decide whether an investigation should be conducted or in order to prepare for the actual investigation. For example, in May 1993, a team travelled to Dubrovnik to assess the situation and determine the facts related to the destruction of cultural property and attacks on civilians. The Commission conducted other missions to interview victims and witnesses or to gather information from NGOs or governments. For example, during a trip to Austria, the Commission obtained information on the order of battle and chain of command of the forces involved in the conflict.

4/ International humanitarian law does not specifically address violent sexual crimes against men. However, men are protected because to exclude them would amount to discrimination on the basis of sex. Additionally, children are protected by several international conventions. See, e.g., The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25 (20 November 1989), entered into force 2 September 1990.


7/ Id. at 30, ¶ 117.

8/ James Gow, "One Year of War in Bosnia Herzegovina", 2 Jane's Intelligence Review 1 (4 June 1993).


10/ See James Gow, "Slovenia Territorial Defence A Year on", Jane's Intelligence Review 305 et. seq. (July 1992).


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<th>Geneva Conventions</th>
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17/ For a more detailed historical discussion of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, see Annex IV, and for a more detailed discussion of the military structure, see Annex III.

18/ Some of the reports received by IHRLI do not contain sufficient information to categorize all identified groups within these four categories. Therefore, further investigation is needed to separate these groups by some organizational or other criteria as well as to determine the internal and external chains of command.

19/ For the purpose of this report, county is used to refer to a region known as an "opština". An opština is larger than a municipality or town, and includes smaller villages and hamlets which surround the larger cities.

20/ This is a well-established definition for "Paramilitary" organizations or groups. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition (1967).

21/ For a more detailed discussion of the military history and command structure of the armies of the former Yugoslavia, see Annex III, Military Structure.

22/ This was later known as "People's Total Defence".

23/ This figure counts the White Eagles as one group, even though there may be several separate groups operating under this name. For a more detailed discussion, see the section on White Eagles below.

24/ These numbers are estimates based on a review of the reports submitted to the Commission of Experts and have not been verified. Those same characteristics that make the use of organizations desirable, i.e., lack of uniforms and lack of an identifiable chain of command, also make it difficult to accurately state the number of paramilitary troops.

26/ In addition to the 72 counties, there were reports of paramilitary activity in eight villages (four in BiH and four in Croatia) in undetermined counties. For purposes of statistical analysis, these villages will be counted as counties.

27/ Paramilitary activity was reported in 45 counties in BiH, 21 counties in Croatia, and six in FRY.

28/ There were reports that Serbian paramilitary groups were operating in 39 counties in BiH, 22 in Croatia, and six in FRY. Croatian paramilitaries were reported to be operating in 11 counties in BiH and six in Croatia. There were reports that the groups supporting BiH were operating in 11 counties throughout BiH.

29/ Ten of the 14 groups working in support of BiH, eight of the 13 groups supporting Croatia, and 41 of the 56 Serbian paramilitary forces were reported to have operated locally.

30/ Paramilitary units working in support of BiH were reported to be conducting joint operations in five counties, those supporting Croatia in six counties, and those supporting FRY or the self-declared Serbian republics in 36 counties.

31/ Arkan's troops were reported in 28 counties and Šešelj's troops were reported in 34.

32/ Allegedly 55 paramilitary groups killed civilians, 26 allegedly destroyed property, 25 looted, 14 tortured, and 10 forcibly evicted.

33/ Of the 72 counties where paramilitary activity was reported, rape and sexual assault were reported in 32, prison camps in 46, and mass graves in 24. See Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault; Annex X, Mass Graves; Annex VIII, Prison Camps.

34/ In fact, until August of 1992 the most notorious Croatian paramilitary, the HOS, and the regular Croatian Army often had conflicting military objectives.


Wars).


40/ The First Balkan War was largely an effort by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. Montenegrin, Ottoman and Rumanian troops joined the conflict to oppose Bulgaria. The two Balkan Wars ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans, except for a part of Thrace and Constantinople. Id. at 99.


44/ Id.

45/ James Gow, "One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina", RFE/RL Research Report 11 (4 June 1994). Gow states that as early as mid-August 1991 "... the activities of the Yugoslav Army units stationed there [in BiH] were, in fact, aimed at linking most of the Republic with Serbia. According to Gow, the JNA expected a major influence on events in BiH from 1990 onward, including providing arms to the Serb population and encouraging local unrest.


49/ The attack on Zvornik is one of two case studies on "ethnic cleansing". For the other study related to the Prijedor region, see Annex V.


51/ Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993.

52/ Siniša Vujaković's Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

53/ Id.

54/ See Appendix 3, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the

56. Linden Productions has provided IHRLI and the Commission of Experts with volunteer services in creating a computerized videotape database archive, allowing all video footage to be stored in a digital format on CD-ROM.

57. This analysis is contained in the Appendices.

58. See Appendix 1, Sarajevo Targets of Shelling with Accompanying Key.

59. See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling Recorded in the Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

60. See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas. This table provides a monthly breakdown of the shelling activity in each of the areas designated in the city and is based upon reports contained in the chronology.

61. See Appendix 6, Photographs Picturing Targets Shelled in Sarajevo. These photographs were submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission and other sources. In addition to including photographs of shelled targets, this Appendix contains listings of reported shelling dates for the targets which frequently appear in the chronology. Background summary descriptions are also provided for some of the targets pictured.

62. A team of statisticians from the DePaul University Department of Mathematical Sciences, under the supervision of Dr. Effat Moussa, Director of Graduate Program Applied Mathematics, and graduate student Diane Horstman, helped analyse the statistical information in the chronology.

63. See Appendix 2, Table of Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

64. See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed. This table includes only those reports in the chronology which document the daily total number of persons killed. Numbers of reported killed in individual incidents are not included.

65. See Appendix 3, Table of Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number of Wounded. This table includes only reports in the chronology which document the total number of persons wounded. Numbers of reported wounded from individual incidents are not included.

66. See Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day. This graph presents the information contained in Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported, Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, and Appendix 3, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded. By
combining the daily shelling and casualty reports in a graph form, it is meant to present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during the siege. See also, Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week. This graph is a weekly breakdown of Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day.

67. See Appendix 2, Graph of Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events. This graph contains the same information as Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day, but also charts significant political events contained in the chronology.

68. See Appendix 1 for maps of Sarajevo. The first map is a detailed city plan. The second and third maps illustrate the Sarajevo's topography and the areas surrounding the city.

69. Sarajevo was a cosmopolitan city sharing many characteristics with other major European cities. The surrounding areas are, however, generally inhabited by a rugged, mountain-rural population. There are, therefore, significant social differences between the city's defenders and the besiegers.

70. See Appendix 2, Weekly Casualties Source: BiH Institute for Public Health. The casualty reports contained in this table are based on Institute for Public Health Bulletins beginning on 26 June 1992 and ending on 27 September 1993. Any inconsistencies which appear in the data reported by the Institute for Public Health are noted. For example the Bulletins reviewed initially reported victims as "killed", but subsequently listed victims under a broader category: "killed, died of undernourishment, cold and missing." As a result, the table lists this category as "killed or missing" and the sudden increase in numbers from 2,349 to 7,468 on 9 November 1992, reflects the change in the Institute for Public Health's methodology. Similarly, on 16 August 1992, there is a sudden increase in the total number of wounded from 9,446 to 22,677. This increase is due to the fact that the Institute for Public Health then began reporting both severely and lightly wounded persons. The total of 22,677 represents the combined number of persons wounded and thereafter remains consistent. Further, on 9 November 1992, there is a decline in the number of heavily wounded from 13,605 to 12,000. This sudden decline remains unexplained.

71. It is not clear exactly what percentage of these casualties involve civilians and non-combatants. However, the following indicates that a high percentage of the city's victims have been civilians: the 2 August and 10 August 1992 Bulletins estimated that 70 per cent of the casualties were civilian; the 19 August 1992 Bulletin estimated that 75 per cent of the casualties were civilian; and the 27 September 1992 Bulletin estimated that 80 per cent of those killed and 75 per cent of the wounded were civilians. Information obtained by the Canadian War Crimes Investigative Team from Dr. Arif Smajkic of the Health Institute indicated that about 85 per cent of the casualties in Sarajevo itself were non-combatants. See Annex VI.A, Sarajevo Investigation.

72. See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total number of persons reported killed is documented.

73. See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total number of persons reported wounded is documented.
74. The city's residents have attempted to maintain relative normality in the lives of their children. Makeshift elementary schools have been established throughout the city in positions away from snipers and shellfire. These schools move from building to building, partly because the classrooms have been destroyed, but also because groups of children have become targets of shelling attacks. Despite these efforts, the schools are still attacked. For example, on 9 November 1993, a Sarajevo schoolhouse was hit by shellfire, killing at least three children and their teacher, and wounding dozens of others. More recently on 3 January 1994, two shells exploded near a crowd of children as they left a kindergarten, killing at least one and wounding several others.

75. See Appendix 6, which includes several photographs of the makeshift cemeteries which have appeared throughout the city.

76. Structural and property damage in this report refers to the infrastructure, as well as to publicly and privately owned property. For a specific treatment of the destruction of utilities, see Annex VI.

77. See materials submitted by the BiH Government, IHRLI Doc. No. 027259-60.

78. See Council of Europe, Third Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education, 20 September 1993, Doc. 6904, IHRLI Doc. No. 39833.

79. See Appendices to Annex VI.

80. For a comprehensive breakdown of the forces around the city, see Appendix 8, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle).

81. Reports indicate that Hajrulahovic served as the 1st Corps commander through at least 9 May 1993.


84. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907.


86. UNPROFOR has reported that BiH forces have been scattered in different parts of the city and that they have set up mortars and artillery beside
hospitals and schools. The location of military forces and weapons too close to civilian or other protected targets may either justify return fire or provide a basis for "military necessity". However, clearly, this does not apply to intentional attacks upon civilian targets and intentional targeting of civilian targets and sniping against civilians. In addition, there may be questionable situations such as the area near the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport. This area constitutes a corridor between the inner-perimeter defenders and the outer-perimeter defenders. Although neither side is permitted in this enclave, it is, however, used on a regular basis by the defenders to bring supplies and munitions from the inner-perimeter to the outer-perimeter defenders.

87. See Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

88. The chronology contains shelling counts provided in available UNPROFOR daily, weekly and monthly reports, as well as in media, wire reports and other sources. UNPROFOR did not officially begin counting shelling activity in Sarajevo until October 1992. Additionally, UNPROFOR reports contain daily shelling counts for only a fraction of the siege.

89. See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets with Dates of Shelling Recorded in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

90. Because of the sniping and shelling in the city, journalists at Oslobodjenje are required to remain in the building to work in seven day shifts. According to reports, five of Oslobodjenje's staff have been killed and 20 wounded, including its editor Kemal Kuršpahić. But despite near total destruction of its building, restricted electricity and a shortage of paper, the newspaper has been published every day. For many of Sarajevo's residents, Oslobodjenje has been the only source of information since a lack of power and a shortage of batteries renders radios and televisions useless. See Askold Krushelnycky, "Voice of the People that Refused to be Killed by War," The European, 9-12 September 1993.

91. See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas; and Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling.

92. See Appendix 9.


94. It is interesting to note that before the siege, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić served for many years as a clinical psychiatrist at the Koševo Hospital.

95. It has been observed that following infantry attacks by the defensive forces and other efforts to break the siege, the besieging forces have often retaliated with intensive shelling into the city centre causing extensive damage and a high number of casualties. UNPROFOR has observed that the besieging forces have inferior infantry to mount counter-attacks and therefore use mortar and tank fire to shell the city. This fire is usually directed towards civilian areas.

96. The chronology contains reports of sniping attacks by both BSA and BiH
forces.

97. The siege has proven particularly dangerous to the city's rescue workers. For example, the Sarajevo Fire Department reported that its casualty rate was 10 per cent higher than that of the BiH army.

98. It has been observed that the besieging forces have often increased their artillery attacks on the city prior to and during the international peace conferences. See Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events, and the examples below. One explanation for this increased shelling activity is that the besieging forces are using the siege as a means to politically pressure the BiH government to agree to peace terms favourable to the Bosnian Serbs.

99. It has been observed that the besieging forces have on many occasions increased shell fire in reaction to statements made by local political leaders. It has also been observed that the besieging forces seem to calculate events and the risks that they can take in relation to threats by third-party governments and organizations. In this regard, when threats by third-party governments or organizations are not perceived as immediate, the besieging forces increase or continue their shelling of the city. For example, Sarajevo was hit with a siege-high 3,777 shells on 22 July 1993 after the US ruled out direct intervention to prevent the shelling of the city. The opposite behaviour was observed in August 1993, when President Clinton warned that the US would consider bombing Serbian forces if the shelling of Sarajevo continued. When this threat appeared immediate, the attacks on Sarajevo diminished and Serbian troops were withdrawn from the surrounding mountains to the south-west. Likewise, in reaction to NATO's ultimatum on 9 February 1994 which gave Bosnian Serb forces 10 days to withdraw their heavy weaponry or face airstrikes, the besieging forces substantially complied and curtailed their shelling of the city. This behaviour by the besieging forces suggests that there is a centralized command and control of the besieging forces and that when there is pressure for the shelling to stop, it does.

100. See also II below (Chronology); Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events.

101. This shell count does not appear in the statistical data since there is no report on the total number of shells fired for the day.


103. It has been estimated by the United Nations that the average adult in the city has lost approximately 25 pounds.

104. Berlin had received more than two million tons of food and coal on 277,000 flights, while Sarajevo had received 63,000 tons of aid on 5,800 flights.

105. Most recently on 4 May 1994, a German plan carrying UN relief supplies and Germany's new ambassador to BiH was hit by three bullets at the Sarajevo
airport. Soon afterward, an Ilyushin-76 plane, flying for the American Soros foundation was hit once by small arms fire. The airlift was suspended thereafter. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.

106. See Appendices 3 and 4.

107. The reports reviewed demonstrate that on occasions, even a single shot fired in the direction of a relief aircraft has suspended the humanitarian airlift. The forces therefore know that any shelling or combat between them in the airport area will inevitably suspend the airlift.

108. One consequence of cutting down these trees is that the city has become more vulnerable in that snipers and gunners have a better view of their targets.

109. A UN investigation of the market shelling was inconclusive. A five-member investigative team found that the market blast was caused by a single high-explosive bomb from a conventional, factory made 120 millimetre mortar. The precise location of the weapon that fired the round could not be established. See UN Background Paper, "Sarajevo Market Explosion of 5 February 1994, A Background Summary of UNPROFOR's Investigative Report," 16 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63707.

110. According to UNPROFOR reports, a total of 296 heavy BSA weapons were either turned in or were being monitored. A total of 46 BiH weapons were accounted for. See UNPROFOR list of weapons collected in the Sarajevo area, IHRLI Doc. No. 63775.

111. There are, however, reports as recent as 4 May 1994, that while the two month truce has generally held in the city, UNPROFOR has noted a recent increase in violations of the NATO ultimatum. A UN spokesman, Major Dacre Holloway, said that at least two or three explosions heard in the city on 4 May, were probably tank cannons. Holloway also said that a BSA tank was spotted earlier in the day in Krupac, just south of BSA-held Lukavica. Both suburbs are inside the arms exclusion zone. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.

112. The team did not choose the incident prior to arriving in Sarajevo. Certain criteria, such as the number of casualties and sources of information, were used to determine which incident to investigate.

113. They visited Sarajevo from 24 June to 8 July 1993 during which time they met with Bosnian officials and military personnel and visited several buildings and areas that were shelled during the siege.

114. Annex VII was prepared under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick. Major J.C. Holland, Canadian Armed Forces, was the principal legal analyst.

115. The Medak Pocket was under Serb control at the time of the attack. The Pocket is a small territory which is partially in Croatia.

116. See also Annex IX for a specific analysis on rape and sexual assault in the camps.
117. For information on mass graves, see Annex X.

118. These interviews reflect the best efforts of the Commission with the limited time and resources available. When the Commission's mandate ended, it was receiving an average of 15 witness calls per day. Because the mandate ended, these people were unable to give statements. Further, the field investigation itself is not complete. The Commission would have worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had there been time and resources. Additionally, the investigation would have covered those countries with concentrations of refugees. In fact, the government of Turkey had invited the Commission to interview refugees there. There are about 18,000 refugees in Turkey. Thus, this report does not have the full picture and can not purport to describe the full extent of sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia. For more information on the Commission's field investigation, see Annex IX.A.

119. The cases from Sweden and Austria were not entered into the database nor were they considered as part of the database study based on concerns for confidentiality.


Several groups have also submitted recommendations for assisting the victims of rape and sexual assault and ensuring accountability for perpetrators. See e.g., "The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy", Meeting the Health Needs of Women Survivors of the Balkan Conflict (1993); "International Human Rights Law Group", No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia (June 1993).

121. Examples of this type of allegation are, "20,000 women have been raped". These allegations are so general that they provide no useful information for analysis. This particular allegation comes from the European Community Delegation, headed by Dame Anne Warburton, and including Madame Simone Veil among others. This mission investigated only Muslim allegations of rape and sexual assault. The investigators spoke to few direct witnesses or victims, but concluded that the most reasoned estimate of the number of Bosnian Muslim victims of rape was 20,000. The investigators gave no reasons for their arrival at this figure and offered no evidence for its accuracy. Danish Mission, "Annex I: European Community Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former Yugoslavia", Submission to the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25240 (3 February 1993).

Within the United Nations a mission was carried out in January 1993 by medical experts working under the mandate of the Commission on Human Right's Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the former Yugoslavia.
The team of experts discovered 119 documented cases of pregnancy resulting from rape. They stated that medical studies suggest that one in every 100 incidents of rape results in pregnancy. Thus, the 119 cases were likely to represent about 12,000 cases of rape. This number is not exact, however, given the number of victims who reported that they experienced multiple rapes, and was put forward only as a guide to the general scale of the problem. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Team of Experts on Their Mission to Investigate Allegations of Rape in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (10 February 1993).

122. Many victims are referred to using a code number created by the submitting source, initials, or a pseudonym.

123. Some of these victims are referred to either by first name, description, or some other way such as, "there were six other women in the room".

124. These reports identified generically that women were raped in a particular location. Though such allegations are very general, they provide enough information that they corroborate other accounts. Thus they were worthy of being included in the study.

125. These reports referred to the class of perpetrators by military affiliation, ethnic affiliation, or as "they". Some of the reports did not mention the perpetrators at all but stated "x was raped" in a certain location on a certain date.

126. Many fear that expatriate fighters, members of Special Forces and mercenaries may reach them in states where the victims have taken refuge. For a detailed discussion of military formations, see Annex III. For a detailed analysis of paramilitary formations, see Annex III.A.

127. Additionally, many women have received support from victim's organizations, women's organizations, and "Home Clubs". In fact, for really the first time, there is a sort of women's solidarity movement, worldwide, but especially in the former Yugoslavia and states housing refugees. This solidarity movement brings a great deal of support for victims of rape and sexual assault.

128. Most rapes and sexual assault allegedly occurred in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Croatia in the later part of 1991. In BiH, most alleged rapes and sexual assaults occurred in the middle to late part of 1992.

129. Though some level of custody of the victim is required to commit rape and sexual assault, the definition of custody used by the study was more technical. Much like the American definition of kidnapping, custody for the purposes of the study required some control over the victim for a period of time and to an extent greater than that involved in committing the offence. Therefore, a victim who was kidnapped, taken to a site, raped and sexually assaulted for a period of hours and then released or abandoned was not raped and sexually assaulted in a custodial setting. If the victim was taken from a detention centre, or kept for a period of days or longer, the rape and sexual assault would have occurred in a custodial setting.

130. In the context of this conflict, the different ethnic groups have
different religions, therefore ethnicity in this case has a religious component. Thus, the term "ethnic cleansing" means the attempt to remove an ethnic or religious group from a given area.

131. There are alternative spellings for BiH. Submitting sources use both spellings, so, in citations, the country is spelled as the submitter spelled it. To avoid the inconsistency in the text, BiH is used.

132. With this pattern there is evidence that the key motivation for the alleged perpetrators is access to the victims, rather than a direct order to commit the rapes and sexual assaults. That is not to say that the pattern is inconsistent with such an order, rather, the evidence suggests access was the key.

133. There is little evidence that men were held for the purpose of sexual assault.

134. These are often called "bordellos", and there is no evidence that men were held for the same purposes. These differ from the previous category because they seem to be organized for the purposes of supplying sexual gratification for men, rather than for the purpose of punishing the detainees.


136. See paragraphs 172-189 on Prijedor for more information. See also Annex V on the Prijedor area.

137. See paragraphs 47-60 on Bosanski Brod and Odžak for more information.

138. See paragraphs 128-129 on Goražde for more information.

139. For a discussion of forced impregnation as a war crime separate from rape, see Anne Tierney Goldstein, The Center For Reproductive Law and Policy, Recognizing Forced Impregnation as a War Crime Under International Law (1993). These pregnancy-oriented components were not always present. Sometimes other factors that heightened the humiliation were present. An example of this is the camp at Veljko Vlahović in Rogatica, where girls were repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted in front of each other, forced to drink alcohol, sit on mines, jump out of windows, etc. See paragraphs 190-199 on Rogatica for more information.

140. See paragraphs 90-100 on Doboj for more information.

141. See paragraphs 144-147 on Konjic for more information.

142. See paragraphs 155-167 on Mostar and Čapljina for more information.

143. Civilians also frequented these sites and used and abused the women held there.

144. These feelings were described by many of the victims whose accounts were included in this study.
145. The next greatest percentage of alleged perpetrators is "unknown". See paragraph 3 for the ethnic breakdown of detention sites.

146. Rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context of the practice of ethnic cleansing discussed in Annex IV and the practices in concentration camps discussed in Annexes V and VIII.

147. Annex IX.A was prepared under the direction of the Chairman. Karen Kenny, Consultant to the Commission of Experts and Interviews Coordinator for the Investigation, was the principal legal analyst. Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh, Consultant to the Commission, was the principal medical analyst.

148. As simple breaches, burials in violation of these provisions carry only disciplinary penalties.

149. Chapter II, Article 19 of the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907 provides that "the same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates as well as for the burial of prisoners of war, due regard being paid to their grade and rank".

150. See also Protocols I and II for clarification of these provisions. Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts and Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts.

151. This duty is explained in Article 15, First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), and Article 18, Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949). Both articles provide substantially similar information.

152. Article 16, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949); Article 19, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949); Article 120, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949), Article 129, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War (1949).

153. If cremation takes place, the circumstances of the cremation and the reasons for doing so must be detailed on the decedent's death certificate.

154. Article 17, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949); Article 18, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949); Article 120, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); Article 130, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War (1949).

155. Non-governmental organizations which have cooperated with the Commission are listed in Annex I.B, List of Missions Undertaken by the Commission.

156. An example of this type of grave would be where a group of civilians was executed by machine-gun fire, and their fellow villagers conducted a proper burial in the local cemetery according to the appropriate religious rites.

157. The following counties contain at least one reported mass gravesite and are addressed in the report: Bijeljina, Bosanski Brod, Bosanska Dubica,
Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Brčko, Doboj, Foca, Gacko, Gospić, Ključ, Konjic, Kotor Varoš, Kupres, Modriča, Mostar, Nova Gradiška, Ožak, Ogrin, Osijek, Pakrac, Petrinja, Podravska Slatina, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sarajevo, Slavonska Požega, Sokolac, Srebrenica, Titova Korenica, Tomislavgrad, Travnik, Vinkovci, Vlasenica, Vukovar, Zenica and Zvornik. Mass graves have also been reported to exist in the county of Bratunac, which was the subject of a previous report and is not covered here.

158. This number will fluctuate as additional information is received by IHRLI.

159. For a discussion of the mass grave investigation at Pakracka Poljana, see Annex X.B, Mass Graves – Pakraćka Poljana, UNPA Sector West, Croatia.

160. For example, in the Brčko county, many of those buried in mass graves were prisoners of the Serb-run Luka camp. Most of the graves, however, only specified that the people were Luka prisoners, not that the identified perpetrators were Serbs.

161. For example, if a report noted that 20 civilians were lined up against a wall and killed by automatic weapons fire, the victims would be classified as victims of a mass killing.

162. An example of a grave which was deliberately concealed is Ovčara, an agricultural complex a few kilometres south of Vukovar. The gravesite at Ovčara is in a field near a dumpster, where the burial grounds are difficult to discover. For a discussion of the site explorations at Ovčara, see Annex X.A, Mass Graves – Ovčara Near Vukovar, UNPA Sector East.


164. Some of the gravesites in Vukovar county may be an exception to this trend. Croatian civilians, as well as JNA forces, were reported to have registered many victims of the fighting in Vukovar. JNA forces were also said to have dug up bodies previously interred and taken them to for proper autopsy and burial. See the section on Vukovar for a more detailed discussion of these procedures.

165. For a more detailed discussion of the gravesites in Blagaj, see below.


167. Id.; see also Annex VIII, Prison Camps.

168. In 1979, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) placed Dubrovnik on the World Heritage List. In 1991, the JNA attacked the town and caused an extensive amount of damage to historical, cultural and religious property. The damage was allegedly out of proportion to what was reasonably expected, given the number and location of valid military objectives within the district. Therefore, the Battle of Dubrovnik was chosen for a study of the laws of war as applied to destruction of cultural property. Annex XI.A was prepared under the direction of Commissioner Fenrick by Lieutenant-Colonel Dominic McAlea, Canadian Armed
Forces, Colin Kaiser, Consultant to the Commission of Experts, Major Terje Lund, Norwegian Armed Forces, and Major Oyvind Hoel, Norwegian Armed Forces.
Security Council

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FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX I
RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
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RULES OF PROCEDURE
OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

1. Mandate

The Commission shall examine and analyse the information submitted by States, international humanitarian organizations, or other persons or bodies pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992), as well as such further information as the Commission may obtain through its own investigations or efforts, with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

2. Meetings and quorum

1. The Commission shall hold its meetings in private but may open them to the public as, and when, it deems it necessary for the enhancement of the effectiveness of its work.

2. The Commission shall meet at such times as it may designate; meetings may otherwise be called by the Chairman, as a rule with at least one week's notice.

3. The Chairman may declare a meeting open when at least a majority of the members of the Commission are present. The presence of a majority of the members shall be required for any decision to be taken.

3. Restraint in the disclosure of information

Members of the Commission shall exercise restraint in disclosing information. They shall refrain from taking a stand in public on any confidential question under discussion in the Commission. The Chairman will make information on the work of the Commission available to the extent he deems it appropriate.

4. Powers of the Chairman

The Chairman shall declare the opening and closing of each meeting of the Commission and, at such meetings, shall direct the discussions, accord the right to speak, put questions to the vote, announce decisions, rules on points of order, and have complete control of the proceedings.

5. Secretariat

The Secretary of the Commission shall be responsible for making all arrangements connected with the work of the Commission, including arrangements for the meetings of the Commission. He or she shall distribute documents and materials to the members of the Commission as requested by the Commission, its Chairman, or any member thereof, and shall be responsible for the preparation of the records of the meetings of the Commission.
6. Records

1. The Commission will be provided with records of its meetings in both English and French.

2. The Commission will arrange for the safe keeping and conservation of its records and files. After the conclusion of its work, the Commission will transmit its record and files to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

7. Participation of States, international humanitarian organizations, or other persons or bodies

The Commission may invite States, international humanitarian organizations, or other persons or bodies to participate in its discussions, when the Commission deems it necessary for the enhancement of the effectiveness of its work.

8. Investigations

1. The Commission may hear witnesses or experts, on its own initiative or upon proposal by States, international humanitarian organizations, or other persons or bodies. In such cases, the Commission shall determine the modalities for summoning witnesses and experts. States, whose nationals have been summoned to appear before the Commission as witnesses or experts, may be invited to be present when their nationals are heard.

2. The Commission may decide to request States to hear witnesses or experts.

3. The Commission may decide to visit the territory of one or more of the States that formed part of the former Yugoslavia, or any other State, upon invitation or on its own initiative with the consent of any such State. Visits may be carried out by the Commission in its entirety, by one or more of its members, or by staff of the Commission, as decided by the Commission.

9. Decisions

The Commission will make every effort to take its decisions by consensus. In the absence of consensus, decisions of the Commissions will be taken by a majority of the members present and voting.

10. Reports

1. The Commission may designate a rapporteur for any question of a general or specific nature.


3. Members of the Commission who wish to make a separate statement may have such a statement appended to the report.
11. **Other procedural matters**

Any procedural matters arising at a meeting which are not covered by these rules shall be dealt with by the Chairman in light of the rules of procedure applicable to Committees of the General Assembly.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX I.A
THE DATABASE AND DOCUMENTS RECEIVED

Under the Direction of:

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Monica Witczak, IHRLI Volunteer Analyst

and

The Staff of the International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report describes the document handling, database entry and security procedures implemented by the Commission's Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts at the DePaul University International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI). In December 1992, the Rapporteur on the Gathering and Analysis of the Facts established the database and documentation centre at IHRLI. As of 30 April 1994, over 65,000 pages of documents were received from governments, United Nations bodies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other sources, as detailed below. Over 5,600 cases have been logged into the database. In addition to the above materials, the documentation centre has a collection of videotapes, maps, and photographs.

2. In March 1993, the Commission and IHRLI agreed that data gathering, the creation of a database, and data analysis would be done by IHRLI under the direction of Rapporteur Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni. IHRLI did not receive remuneration or reimbursement from the United Nations or the Commission for this work. All costs, including personnel costs, were met by grants and in-kind contributions to IHRLI.

3. The costs of the database operations from December 1992 to April 1994 exceeded $1,100,000. IHRLI received over $850,000 in grants from the Soros Foundation and the Open Society Fund, and a $300,000 grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Through April 1994, IHRLI received approximately $250,000 of in-kind contributions from DePaul University for space and indirect costs.

4. IHRLI also benefited from the contributions of volunteer attorneys and students. Attorneys from Chicago, New York, Minnesota, and Washington, D.C. contributed pro bono services to IHRLI over the life of the database project. As part of their efforts, a number of attorneys relocated to Chicago to work on the project. A large number of law students, graduate students and post-graduate students also served as volunteers.

5. IHRLI transmitted all original documents and complete copies of the database software and the information contained therein to the Prosecutor's Office of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY).

II. SOURCES OF DOCUMENTS

6. The documentation centre received documents from governments, United Nations bodies, IGOs, NGOs, and other sources. Many of these documents were obtained through the Commission, but over half were obtained independently by IHRLI. A large number of the documents obtained by the Commission and IHRLI are now in the public domain. Some Commission documents were not forwarded to IHRLI for confidentiality reasons.

7. IHRLI received many documents in languages other than English, particularly in Serbo-Croatian. IHRLI relied on volunteer translators to translate these documents into English for entry into the database and for analysis by IHRLI attorney-analysts.

A. Submissions by governments

8. The following Governments submitted reports and materials to the Commission pertaining to the large-scale victimization that has occurred in
the former Yugoslavia: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Republic of Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Venezuela.

9. A number of reports received from governments provided data relating to specific occurrences which, if supported by evidence, would constitute "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. The Governments of Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America were among the Governments which provided information that proved useful to the work of the Commission and ultimately will prove useful to the Prosecutor of the ICTFY. Several of the afore-mentioned Governments made multiple submissions.

10. Other submissions by governments ranged from general letters expressing support for initiatives taken by the United Nations, to re-publications of media reports, and to investigative studies and reports alleging or documenting "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. Some of this documentation consisted of general background information.

11. Of the submissions described above, some were incorporated into formally submitted UN documents and are therefore in the public domain; other documents were submitted directly to the Commission only, and are therefore not in the public domain.

B. Submissions by the "warring parties" not recognized as states

12. The following parties also submitted relevant information through multiple submissions: Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg-Bosne (Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosnia), Republika Srpske Krajine (Republic of Serbian Krajina), and Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic).

C. Information received from United Nations bodies

13. The following UN bodies were a source of information to the Commission: United Nations Centre for Human Rights; Committee on the Rights of the Child; Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Arrest and Detention; Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia; United Nations Commission on Human Rights; United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Human Rights Committee; United Nations Program for Development; United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR); United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; United Nations Department of Public Information; and World Health Organization (WHO).

D. Submissions by IGOs

14. The following IGOs have submitted reports or provided information to the Commission, or published material which the Commission consulted: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Council of Europe, European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), European Parliament, International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

15. Some IGOs, because of their limited mandates and missions, did not provide all of the information to which they had access. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for instance, did a great deal of work in the prison camps, but only provided information which it published and which is in the public domain.

E. Submissions by NGOs

16. The reports received from a number of non-governmental and humanitarian organizations proved to be very useful in enabling the Commission to gather pertinent, substantiated data. The extent of the investigations giving rise to these reports, and the level of their analysis, demonstrated an effort and commitment on the part of many NGOs to produce verifiable facts. The accounts published in the reports of some NGOs, particularly those received from Human Rights Watch Helsinki, were detailed and most closely resembled the type of data the Commission needed to assess responsibility for "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. NGOs from which the Commission or IHRLI received information are listed in Annex I.C below.

17. NGOs did not, however, provide the Commission with their supporting documentation, usually for fear of breaching confidentiality agreements or endangering the lives of their sources of information.

F. Other sources

18. While governments, UN bodies, IGOs, and NGOs provided most of the documentation to the Commission, other sources yielded some useful information. Private individuals submitted personal accounts of victimization, videotapes, photographs, and other relevant information. IHRLI also gathered valuable information from print and electronic media, including reports based on searches of the LEXIS/NEXIS and Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) databases. 1/

III. ASSESSMENT OF REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE IHRLI DOCUMENTATION CENTRE

19. The Commission and the Rapporteur experienced mixed results in their efforts to gather data and evidence of alleged violations of international humanitarian law. Many of the reports prepared by governments, UN bodies, IGOs, and NGOs consisted of general allegations which did not contain evidence. However, these sources were complemented by information provided by the warring parties' state war crimes commissions, other national organizations, media sources, and private individuals.

20. The reports received establish the large scale victimization that has taken place in the former Yugoslavia, but frequently did not contain the legal "evidence" necessary to bring criminal charges under international criminal law or under the domestic criminal law of states in whose territory those acts were committed. Some reports, however, contained specific information supported by evidence, such as affidavits, witness statements, photographs, maps, etc.

21. Since the submitting sources did not always provide sufficient
information to support their allegations, the incidents reported and entered into the database frequently lacked necessary information. Difficulties in data entry and analysis occurred because of the following common problems of the reports received:

1. sources upon which reports were based were usually not verifiable because many reports did not disclose original sources;
2. spellings of names and locations were often inconsistent, due to translation into the reporting language;
3. locations were difficult to pinpoint, due to a lack of specific geographical information;
4. reports of the same incident sometimes varied significantly in important details;
5. property damage reports rarely included more than the type of property affected, and often lacked specific locations;
6. numbers of victims or other variables were often reported within large ranges;
7. names of victims, witnesses and perpetrators were often intentionally omitted from the reports;
8. reports often failed to identify the specific military units involved in alleged incidents; and
9. important details, which may not have seemed relevant to the reporter, were often omitted.

22. The Commission was not able to verify all of the reports received. In compiling reports, however, the IHRLI team of attorney-analysts were able to corroborate and check many of the allegations contained in the submitted reports by cross-referencing multiple reports of similar facts.

IV. THE IHRLI/LINDEN PRODUCTIONS VIDEOTAPE ARCHIVE PROJECT

23. IHRLI compiled a videotape archive containing media footage relating to alleged violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. In total, IHRLI received more than 300 videotapes. Of these, 36 videotapes were received from Commission sources, and the remainder were obtained by IHRLI independently.

24. All videotapes received at IHRLI were catalogued by a video documentarian. The documentarian labelled each videotape with the date received, the submitter, the title and a unique identification number. The video documentarian then screened each video, and prepared a brief summary for the video master index, which included a description of the tape's contents, running time, source of the tape, and broadcast date, if any. The tapes were then stored in a secure location.

25. Copies of all videotapes were then sent to Linden Productions in Los Angeles, which received a grant from IHRLI of $80,000, funded by the Soros Foundation, to cover the costs of video archiving. The tapes sent to Linden Productions were incorporated into a computerized video database, utilizing QuickTime software to display videotape on MacIntosh computers. Although the IHRLI database utilized a Foxpro-based program, the Linden video archive and the IHRLI database could be converted to compatible formats.

26. All videotape footage was categorized by Linden Productions into major subject categories, including rape, torture, deportation, prison camps, paramilitary action, destruction of cultural property, etc. The footage was then further processed in a database "shot list" and each shot was fully described and time-coded. The information was also catalogued to include incidents, locations, dates, witnesses, perpetrators, etc.

27. The fields of the video database at Linden Productions and the database fields at IHRLI are compatible. The contents of the video database can also be printed for easy reference. On the print-out format that Linden Productions designed, the video images appear along with transcriptions of the accompanying dialogue and the subject-matter categories described above. Requests for footage pertaining to a particular subject can be collected and
downloaded from the database to standard VHS videocassette format. The computerized archive facilitates the customized design of videotape presentations from available footage. The videotapes were used by the IHRLI attorney-analysts to compile their reports to the Commission.

28. All videotapes are stored at Linden Productions in special humidity and dust-free vaults, protected by security systems, and available only to restricted personnel.

29. Videotapes from the following sources were placed in the video archive:

(a) United Nations sources of videotapes: Commission of Experts, UNPROFOR, UNESCO;

(b) Government-owned or government-controlled sources of videotapes: SAGA (BiH), TV BiH (BiH), State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Croatian Information Centre (Croatia), Croatian Monitor (Croatia), RTV Belgrade (FRY), ARTE (France), Consell Superieur de l'Audiovisuel (France), France 2, France 3, TFI (France), Auslandsreport (Germany), Teleskop (Germany), Dublin 4 (Ireland), RAI (Italy), BBC (UK), Channel 4 TV (U.K), Center for Defense Information (US Department of Defense), and Worldnet Productions (US Information Agency);


V. THE IHRLI MAP COLLECTION

30. IHRLI compiled a collection of maps to assist in the analysis of events in the former Yugoslavia. In addition to maps from commercial sources, maps were received from the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, from the United Nations, and from IGOs and NGOs. These maps cover a wide spectrum of scale and detail, ranging from maps of single cities and counties to maps of the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. Topical maps in the collection display the distribution of ethnic populations, the dispositions of warring factions, and the presence of detention sites.

31. IHRLI received digitized maps from the Defense Mapping Agency of the United States Government. The maps, on compact disc, cover the entire area of the former Yugoslavia and permit viewing on a computer monitor at various levels of detail.

32. Maps received from United Nations sources include the following: dispositions of warring factions in Sarajevo, dispositions of warring factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina at various dates, dispositions of United Nations forces at various dates, population distribution maps, and province boundary maps.

33. IHRLI added a cartographer to its staff to assist its attorney-analysts in the best use of the map collection and to create maps based upon the analysis done at IHRLI. The IHRLI cartographer worked with the IHRLI attorney-analysts to develop maps of detention sites, rape sites, ethnic distributions, and the targets of shelling in Sarajevo.
VI. THE IHRLI DOCUMENTATION SYSTEM

34. The IHRLI documentation system was developed to meet the following goals: 1.) preserving the integrity of the documents received; 2.) facilitating the retrieval of documents; and 3.) verifying that the documents are analyzed and correlated. The system was predicated on the sequential numbering of all documents received. Relevant source information for each document was entered into a separate source database that interfaced with the main database. This system was developed after consulting with attorneys experienced in complex and multi-party litigation.

35. Documents received by IHRLI from all sources were submitted directly to a documentarian, who monitored the flow of all documents pertaining to IHRLI's work on the Commission project. All documents were reviewed initially to determine whether they should be filed by document number in a master file or solely in an administrative file (see explanation below).

36. The documentation system follows a two-step process which was the responsibility of the IHRLI documentarian. First, all original documents pertinent to the work of the Commission were stamped with a sequential document number and stored in the master file. Second, source information pertaining to each document was entered into a database. This information created a computerized index which enabled the Rapporteur to locate any document that was received, and permitted access to source information during the data entry process (described below) so that source information in the main database was consistent and accurate.

37. All documents in the master file were then reviewed by an attorney analyst to determine whether they were database relevant. Database relevant documents were photocopied for assignment to data-entry analysts. Data cover sheets were then attached to each of these documents. The cover sheets accompanied the documents through the entire data entry process, and contained space to record analyst names, database incident numbers based on the document, and quality control information.

A. The administrative file

38. Documents placed in the administrative file were organized by subject matter rather than by document number. As of 30 April 1994, the administrative file contained approximately 30,000 pages of documents. The administrative file contained four primary types of documents: 1.) all documents relating to the function of the IHRLI Commission project, such as correspondence, resumes and confidentiality agreements; 2.) background material relevant to the Commission project, such as academic articles, media clippings, UN resolutions, and information regarding NGOs or individuals who assisted the project; 3.) all reports and work product of IHRLI, which were filed in chronological order; 4.) subject-matter files, which were used to collect documents relating to topics such as military command structures or specific incidents. The documents in these subject-matter files were often duplicates of the originals in the master file, and therefore accessible either by document number or by subject matter.

B. The master file

39. The master file contained all substantive reports received by IHRLI relating to breaches of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. As of 30 April 1994, the Rapporteur received 65,000 pages of documents which were filed in the master file. The master file was organized by sequential
numbering. All incoming documents were stamped with a unique document number as they were received and filed in numerical order, regardless of subject matter or document date. All information entered in the documentarian database and incident database (described below) was cross-referenced to these document numbers. Therefore, an analyst working with information retrieved from the database could directly consult the source documents.

40. While most of the documents which were numbered and placed in the master file contained information relevant to the incident database, some general source documents were also catalogued in the master file so that they were readily accessible to IHRLI analysts.

41. Access to documents in the master file was strictly controlled by the documentarian. If any photocopying was done, the documentarian inventoried these documents and verified that they were all returned.

C. The submitter/source file

42. The entire master file was duplicated in the submitter/source file. Photocopies of all original documents were filed according to the submitting group or individual and cross-referenced according to the primary source of each report.

D. Security and data protection

43. The documentation centre and other offices of the Rapporteur and his staff were protected by an electronic security system monitored by DePaul University security personnel. On-site original and photocopied documents were kept in locked file cabinets. Additional copies of all documents were stored in a secure off-site facility. The data in the IHRLI database was backed up daily, and backup disks were stored off-site.

44. All IHRLI staff were required to sign a confidentiality agreement prohibiting the disclosure of any information from the IHRLI documentation to outside parties.

VII. DOCUMENTARIAN DATABASE

45. The documentarian database contains numerous fields to fulfill its function as an index of the master file. By dividing the information in each document into separate database fields, the documentarian can generate reports which sort the entire database by several categories. For example, the documentarian database can be sorted by document number, or alphabetically by source or submitter name.

A. Document short title

46. A short source name was assigned to each document, typically based on the topic or submitting group and the date of the document. In addition to being entered in the documentarian database, the document short title was attached to each document which was assigned for data-entry. When this short source name was entered into the database, each data entry analyst was provided with full and uniform source information.
B. **Submitter category**

47. Each document was categorized according to the type of submitter from which IHRLI received the document. Thus, the documentarian characterized each submitter as a government, IGO, NGO, private organization, or private individual.

C. **Submitter Name**

48. The submitter name referred to the specific government, NGO, individual, etc., that sent a particular report to the Commission. It may have differed from the organization which prepared the document. If a Helsinki Watch report, for example, was sent to the Commission by the US Government, the submitter recorded in the documentarian database was the US Government and not Helsinki Watch. However, cross-referencing permitted the identification of the primary and secondary sources, as described below.

D. **Primary source**

49. The primary source of a report was the source upon which the submitter relied in preparing the document or report it sent to the Commission or IHRLI. If an organization submitted a report that it prepared and the report was not based on any other source or publication, then the organization was both the submitter and primary source.

E. **Secondary source**

50. Secondary sources were any sources cited by the primary source which related to a particular incident. Secondary sources were usually entered by the data-entry analysts, rather than by the documentarian.

F. **Citation**

51. The citation field provided standard bibliographic information for each document, including titles, organizations, authors, page numbers, etc. Where appropriate, descriptive information about documents was provided as well, to assist analysts in referring to the documentarian database.

52. Known duplicates within the master file were cross-referenced by document number in the citation field. In this way, the documentarian tracked duplicate reports submitted by different governments, organizations, or individuals.

G. **Document number**

53. The document number range of each document was recorded in a separate field. All records in the documentarian database could thus be sorted sequentially, reflecting the order of the physical master file. A separate field was provided for the specific document number within the range of the entire document that corresponded to a specific incident. This field was used by the data-entry analysts.

H. **Date**
54. If known, the date of a document was recorded in this field. If the document contained several dates, the earliest was used.

I. Notes

55. Finally, a notes field was available for the documentarian to enter any information which appeared important but did not fit into any of the above categories. Sometimes the notes field was used to indicate questions or uncertainties which would be resolved later.

VIII. THE IHRLI DATABASE

56. The database provides a comprehensive record of alleged violations. The database, developed with Foxpro database software, operates on several levels and manages multiple categories and sub-categories of information. The database categories capture information pertaining to locations, victims, perpetrators, witnesses, sources, evidence, etc. Over 5,600 incidents were entered into the database as of 30 April 1994. Specialized topical databases were also developed to facilitate the work of IHRLI attorney-analysts on the following specific research projects: the battle and siege of Sarajevo, rape and sexual assault, mass graves, detention facilities, and the military structure and order of battle of the warring factions.

57. The database is capable of generating reports and searches based on categories of information. These reports can be statistical in nature (e.g., calculating the number of times a particular type of violation has occurred) or may contain significant amounts of information related to a particular category in the database. For example, a search may be generated to contain the names of victims, witnesses, and perpetrators associated with a particular location. The database can also be searched using context-sensitive queries. Search terms can include the name of a particular victim, witness, perpetrator, location, etc. As a result, when a search term is entered, the computer will search categories in each file and produce a list of every case number where that term appears.

58. Database entries (or "cases") typically concerned multiple events that may or may not have constituted several independent violations of international humanitarian law. Given time constraints, it would be practically impossible to segregate every possible violation and create a separate incident file. If a report contained roughly the same set of facts concerning victims, witnesses, perpetrators, and locations, it was consolidated into a single incident.

59. At the data-entry stage, reports were not distinguished on the basis of credibility or possible bias, and no reports were omitted from the database based on such criteria. The cumulative nature of the vast amount of information in the database allowed for subsequent credibility assessments, although verification is needed for prosecutorial purposes.

A. Database categories

60. The database is organized by multiple categories, including the date, location, and type of reported violation. The information in the database can be sorted and retrieved by any of these categories.
1. **Date and time**

61. The date and time of the incident were entered into separate fields of the database. If an incident involved multiple dates, the earliest date was used.

2. **Summary description**

62. A narrative description summarized each incident in the database. It provided the relevant locations, existence and location of evidence, types of violations alleged, and the names of victims, witnesses and perpetrators, etc. The summary description was intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the incident. It included information which was also categorized in the specific database fields described below.

3. **Location information**

63. The location category of the database provided numerous sub-categories to record all of the information relevant to the location of incidents. In addition to fields for the country, municipality, and city where an incident occurred, the data analyst can categorize the location as a private house, public building, police station, concentration camp, mass grave, etc. Within the location field, memo fields were also available to enter relevant addresses, landmarks or site descriptions.

64. The database contains a location list containing the specific map coordinates of all locations entered into the database. Analysts could use a preexisting location record or create a new location record.

4. **Source information**

65. As mentioned above, the source records from the documentarian database were used to build the source records in the main database. When an analyst entered the document short title into the source field, the source information was retrieved automatically from the documentarian database. The analyst then entered the specific document numbers pertaining to the incident and added incident-specific source information.

5. **Property damage**

66. The property damage field provided a memo field for a narrative description of reported property damage, including the location and owner of property, the manner and extent of damage, and the perpetrator. Fields were also available to enter the value of affected property, if known, and to indicate whether the incident involved damage to religious or cultural property.

6. **Violations/victim counts**

67. The violations/victim counts field of the database enabled analysts to indicate the particular type of violation and to enter numbers of victims, if known. All categories that pertained to a particular incident were selected by the analyst. The following violation categories are available in this field: mass killing, killed after torture, killed after rape, killed after imprisonment, killed after forced eviction, killed in flight, killed in
combat, killed - other, battery, torture, mutilation, wounded, rape, kidnapping/hostage taking, forced eviction, missing, imprisonment. If the violation contained in a particular report is not part of the available list, a memo field is available to describe the type of violation that occurred.

7. Victims/witnesses/perpetrators

68. All information regarding victims, witnesses and perpetrators was entered in a uniform format, with the same fields available for data entry in each category. In addition to the memo fields used to enter information regarding those involved in an incident, category fields are available to identify characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, and military status. The following types of information are entered into the victim/witnesses/perpetrators field: Name, Sex, Age, Date of Birth, Address, Ethnicity, Religion, Parents' Names, Occupation, Military Status, Physical Characteristics, Antemortem Data.

69. Many of these fields contain sub-categories to enable the entry of more detailed information. For instance, the military status field provides space to enter information pertaining to service, rank, commanding officer, insignia, etc.

8. Evidence

70. The evidence field provides space for a narrative description of the type and location of any supporting evidence of the incident, such as audio tapes, videotapes, affidavits, etc.

B. Data entry

71. Data entry proceeded on a small, independent computer network consisting of six computer workstations. Data was entered simultaneously from each workstation.

72. Assignments for database entry were distributed by a staff attorney who monitored the progress of each document through the data entry system. Information was entered into the database by analysts with a legal and/or human rights background. The information was entered into the appropriate categories of the database according to guidelines established by the legal staff. A narrative description of each report was also entered for each incident.

73. All documents assigned to data entry personnel were accompanied by a data cover sheet, on which the analysts recorded the database incident numbers associated with the document. This form accompanied the document throughout the data entry and quality control process and contained the following information: 1.) document numbers; 2.) document short title; 3.) name of the data entry person; 4.) date of assignment; 5.) incident numbers generated by the computer; 6.) dates of data entry; and 7.) results of the quality control process.

74. Data was entered into the database from December 1992 until April 1994. Four to five computers were utilized for data entry for an average of twelve hours per day, Monday through Friday. On Saturdays and Sundays, three to four computers were used approximately seven hours per day. The sixth computer was used by the documentarian to enter document source information. This data entry was a very labour-intensive and often tedious process, which required a
significant amount of training. Because IHRLI had to rely largely on graduate and post-graduate student volunteers who had limited time to commit to the project, there was frequent turnover in the data entry staff. This slowed the data entry procedure, as new volunteers were continuously recruited and trained.

C. Quality control

75. The quality control process was an on-going effort to ensure the completeness, accuracy, and uniformity of the database. Every time a new incident was opened, the computer incident number was entered on the data cover sheet. After completing data entry for a document, the data entry analyst printed and edited a hard copy of all of the incidents completed. These printouts were then given to a supervising attorney, along with the document and the data cover sheet. The attorney verified the completeness and accuracy of the work. Documents which satisfied this quality control check were returned to the documentarian. Documents which need additional work were returned to the analyst.
Notes

1/ Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, an NGO based in Minneapolis, Minnesota, assisted IHRLI with the collection and analysis of media reports from LEXIS/NEXIS and other sources. IHRLI also had access to the FBIS database through the efforts of attorney Thomas S. Warrick of Washington, D.C.

2/ Linden Productions of Los Angeles, California, through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Pippa Scott, provided IHRLI and the Commission of Experts with volunteer services in creating a computerized videotape database archive, allowing all videotape footage to be stored in a digital format.

3/ The database software was developed for IHRLI by computer consultant Jack Endicott in consultation with the Rapporteur, his legal staff, and others experienced in the fields of computer science, information management and complex litigation.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX I.B
LIST OF MISSIONS UNDERTAKEN
BY THE COMMISSION

Prepared by:
Secretariat, Commission of Experts
LIST OF MISSIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE COMMISSION

1. Mission to Ovčara (Vukovar) (UNPA Sector East, Croatia) (preliminary mass grave investigation) December 1992

2. Reconnaissance mission to Vukovar (preparation for the mass grave investigation at Ovčara) March 1993

3. Mission to Zagreb (Croatia), Belgrade (FRY), Sarajevo (BiH), Ljubljana (Slovenia) (to establish contacts with authorities and to obtain information) April 1993

4. Mission to Knin (UNPA Sector South, Croatia) (preparation for the mass grave investigation at Pakračka Poljana, UNPA Sector West) May 1993

5. Reconnaissance mission to Dubrovnik (Croatia) (destruction of cultural property) May 1993

6. Mission to Sarajevo (BiH) (killings of civilian population and destruction of cultural property) June/July 1993

7. Mission to Zagreb (Croatia) (interviews with alleged war criminals) August 1993

8. Mission to London (UK) (to obtain information from Amnesty International) August 1993

9. Mission to Vienna (Austria) (to obtain information on order of battle/chain of command and video tapes) August 1993

10. Mission to Sarajevo and Zenica (BiH) (killings of civilian population and destruction of cultural property) September 1993
11. Mission to Knin (UNPA Sector South, Croatia) (preparation for mass grave investigation) September 1993

12. Mission to Paris (France) (to establish contacts with UNESCO and obtain information on the destruction of cultural property) September 1993

13. Mission to Vukovar, UNPA Sector East, Croatia (mass grave investigation at Ovčara) October 1993

14. Mission to Marino Selo/ Pakračka Poljana, UNPA Sector West, Croatia (mass grave investigation) October-November 1993

15. Radiological investigation in Western Slavonia, UNPA Sector West, Croatia November 1993

16. Mission to Dubrovnik (Croatia) (destruction of cultural property and battle of Dubrovnik) November 1993

17. Mission to Erdut, UNPA Sector East, Croatia (preparation for mass grave investigation of Ovčara) November 1993

18. Mission to Stockholm (Sweden) (to obtain testimonies) November 1993

19. Mission to Berlin (Germany) (to prepare for gathering testimonies) December 1993

20. Mission to Bonn (Germany) (to prepare for gathering testimonies) December 1993

21. Mission to Paris (France) (to continue cooperation with UNESCO and to obtain further information on destruction of cultural property) January 1994

22. Mission to The Hague (The Netherlands) (to obtain testimonies) January 1994
23. Mission to Munich (Germany) (to obtain information for Prijedor investigation) January 1994

24. Mission to Oslo (Norway) (to obtain information for Prijedor investigation) January 1994

25. Mission to Zagreb (Croatia) (preparation for sexual assault investigation of victims from Croatia, refugees from BH and Serbs in Croatia) February 1994

26. Mission to Vienna (Austria) (to obtain information for order of battle study and for sexual assault investigation) February 1994

27. Mission to Zagreb (Croatia) (to obtain information for Prijedor investigation) February 1994

28. Mission to Zagreb (Croatia) and other places in Croatia (sexual assault investigation of victims from Croatia, refugees from BH and Serbs in Croatia) February-March 1994

29. Mission to Belgrade (FRY) (to discuss conduct of sexual assault investigation) March 1994

30. Mission to Bonn (Germany) (to obtain information for Prijedor investigation) March 1994

31. Mission to Berlin (Germany) (to obtain information for Prijedor investigation) March 1994

32. Mission to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Vitez, Kiseljak (BiH) (to obtain information and gather testimonies) March 1994

33. Mission to Bergen (Norway) (to finalize Prijedor investigation) April-May 1994
34. Mission to The Hague
(The Netherlands) (in connection with Prijedor investigation) May 1994
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX I.C
LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS WHICH ASSISTED OR
SUPPORTED THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

Prepared by:
Secretariat, Commission of Experts
The following is a list of the non-governmental, private, charitable, and religious organizations from the territory of the former Yugoslavia and other countries which have assisted or collaborated with the Commission, or published material which the Commission consulted:

- Action international contre la faim (AICF)
- Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA)
- Algerian Medical Union
- American Croatian Information & Research Agency (ACIRS)
- American Refugee Committee (ARC)
- Amnesty International
- ARIADNA
- Association for Humanitarian Projects in The Netherlands
- Association of Citizens of Mostar & Friends of Mostar
- Association of Expelled Serbs from the Municipality of Metković in Belgrade
- Association of Preventive and Voluntary Work
- Association of Serbs from Croatia
- Bosnia Action Committee
- BiH Red Cross
- BEDEM LJUBAVI
- BiH Information Centre
- BISER
- Blessed are the Peace Makers
- Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights
- Canadian Croatian Information Congress
- Canadian Voice of Women for Peace
- CARITAS
- CAUSE COMMUNE
- Centre for Antiwar Action
- Centre for Constitutional Rights
- Centre for Culture and Communication
- Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights
- Centre for Reproductive Law and Policy
- Centre for Victims of Torture
- Centre for Women - War Victims
- Centre for Croat Unions
- Christlicher Friedensdienst
- Citizens Forum and International Peace Centre
- Citizens of Janja
- Committee for Human Rights
- Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà
- Council for Human Rights
- Crisis Centre Movement in Norway
- Croatian Medical Association
- Croatian Society for Protection of Rights of Children, Families, Foster and Adopted Families
- Croatian Society of Psychiatrists
- Croatian Information Office (Split)
- Croatian Information Centre
- Croatian Helsinki Committee
- Croatian Red Cross
- Cultural Centre of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Dalmatinski Odbor Solidarnosti
- Danish Helsinki Committee
- Deutsch Humanitare Hilfe (DHH)
- Dutch Section of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
- Ecumenical Women's Team
- Equality Now
- European Peace Movement
- Evangelische Frauenarbeit
- For the Dignity of Women and Children
- Fundamental Freedoms
- German Caritas
- Handicap International
- HELALA AHMAR
- Help the Children in Croatia
- Human Rights Watch - Helsinki Watch
- Humanitaire Action Passerelle vers l'Espoir
- Humanitarian Law Fund
- Hrvatski Caritas
- INFOTEKA
- Initiative Gegen den Krieg in Kroatien und BiH
- Institute for the Protection and Usage of Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage, Sarajevo
- Institute for War and Peace Reporting
- Integration Groups of Women from the former Yugoslavia and Austria
- International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)
- International League for Human Rights
- International Mennonite Organization
- International Medical Group
- International Rescue Committee
- International Human Rights Law Group
- International Society for Human Rights, British Section
- Internationale Gesellschaft fur Menschenrechte e.v.
- Islamic Relief Agency (IGASE)
- Italian Cooperation in Solidarity (ICS)
- Italian Cooperation
- KARETA
- Kuwait General Committee
- Lazarus Hilfswerk
- Lexicographic Institute
- Ljiljan BiH
- Marie Stopes International
- Médecins sans frontières
- Medical Centre for Human Rights
- Meliha iliinković
- MERHAMET
- Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights
- Moji Blijnji
- Mothers for Peace
- Museum Documentation Centre
- NEMANJA (Women's Group)
- NONA (Mostar Women's Group)
- Nordrein Westfahlen
- Norwegian Institute for Human Rights
- Norwegian People's Aid
- NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
- Open Door
- Operation Second Choice
- Peace Movement Europe
- Peace Movement Rijeka (Pokret za mir Rijeka)
- Pharmaciens sans frontières (PSF)
- Physicians for Human Rights
- Progetto Sviluppo Ogil
- Red Crescent Society
- Red Barnet
- Refugee Council/Commission for Refugee Status
- Reporters sans frontières
- Rijasat of Islamic Conference
- Rominke Krisesenter
- Save the Children Federation
- Scottish European Aid
- Serbian-American Affairs Office
- Serbian-American Media Centre
- Serbian Bar Association (Chicago)
- Serbian Council Information Center
- Serbs of Foća
- Sisterhood is Global Institute
- Slovenian Red Cross
- Slovenian Council of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
- Society of Croatian Women Intellectuals (HDI)
- Society for Threatened Peoples
- Solidarites
- SOS Balkanes
- Süd Ost Europa Kultur e.v.
- SUNCOKRET
- Swiss Coordination of Women for the former Yugoslavia
- The Coordination of Women's Advocacy Groups for Liaison with the International War Crimes Tribunal
- Union Médical Algérienne (U.M.A.)
- Union for Peace and Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina
- United Methodist Committee of Relief
- United States Committee for Refugees
- Vukovarske Majke
- War Victims: Raped Women
- Well-Being
- Women and Children First
- Women in Black against War
- Women of BiH
- Women's Commission of the International P.E.N.
- Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
- Women's Group "Trešnjevka"
- Women War Victims
- World Campaign "Save Humanity"
- World Humanity Fund
- World Council of Churches
- Yugoslavian Red Cross
- Zenica Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on Muslims
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX II
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A LEGAL STUDY

Under the Direction of:

Christine P.M. Cleiren
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Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (ICTFY) grants jurisdiction to the International Tribunal on four grounds: "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2), violations of the law and customs of war (article 3), "crimes against humanity" (article 4) and genocide (article 5). In the Statute, "rape" is listed as a crime against humanity.

2. Unlike the majority of codified penal law, "rape" is not precisely defined in international humanitarian law. As a consequence, there is, at present, every reason to interpret this concept broadly as encompassing other sexual assaults. In his commentary on article 5 of the Statute, the Secretary-General also seems to consider rape and other sexual assaults to be connected, as he states in relevant part: "... rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution". Rape is considered in this report to be a crime of violence of a sexual nature. This also applies to other sexual assaults, such as enforced prostitution and painful circumcision. Today these crimes are considered by medical doctors, psychiatrists, and psychologists to be very serious violent crimes of a sexual nature having a wide range of severe effects on the victim and her domestic environment. This study will therefore also encompass other sexual assaults. In the majority of the cases reported, women were the victims of the alleged rapes and other sexual assaults. However, men and children, when victims of rape or other sexual assaults, are also to be protected by international humanitarian law.

3. This paper considers the criteria for applying certain international humanitarian law instruments in this context. It deals, on the one hand, with the possibilities, and on the other, with the limitations of the law as applied to these specific crimes. The terminology used is "possibilities for application" and "conditions/limitations", respectively.

A. Universal jurisdiction and the "nulla poena . . ." principle

4. At present, international humanitarian law is in a process of development. As a result, it is flexible. However, the following discussion is restricted to an arrangement and study of generally accepted customary international law (nullum crimen sine lege).

5. Rape and other sexual assaults are prohibited in the penal law of all civilized nations. This applies in any case to the former Yugoslavia, which was a party to the conventions which are discussed here. Perpetrators of these crimes must have been aware of the fact that they committed an international crime for which they could be prosecuted. Moreover, the applicable law for the most part provides for universal jurisdiction. According to article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the "grave breaches" listed in article 147 and mentioned in article 85 of Additional Protocol I, constitute universal jurisdiction. If the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is considered applicable, universal jurisdiction is provided for in article VI. "Crimes against humanity" constitute universal jurisdiction on the grounds of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment, which is reaffirmed in, e.g., the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. If articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, not constituting "grave breaches", and Additional Protocols II are accepted as customary international law, they might also provide for universal jurisdiction. As will be shown below, the crimes of rape and other sexual assaults are of such a nature that governments are obliged to
prevent the commission of international crimes and prosecute the perpetrators. When this is not done, the international community has a right to interfere with the sovereignty of a state and take responsibility for prosecution. This is another factor in favour of the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICTFY, apart from the fact that this is bestowed upon the ICTFY by its Statute, in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 808 (1993).

B. Some observations on criminal responsibility

6. As rape is a very personal crime, it is hardly possible to commit rape by mere instigation or omission. However, persons other than the physical perpetrators have personal criminal responsibility, as stated in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute. In the case of the other sexual assaults, persons other than the actual perpetrators can be said to have committed these assaults, but their responsibility should be determined first with reference to the other possibilities provided for in the above-mentioned article. 9/7

7. With regard to the "responsibility of omission", the Statute states, in article 7, paragraph 3:

"The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."

In general, the principle of criminal responsibility for failing to act cannot be denied when a person in authority (a) knew or should have known that the crimes were regularly being committed; (b) had the power to interfere with the criminal practices; and (c) had special responsibility for the field in question. 10/

8. However, due to the chaos in the former Yugoslavia including many activities carried out by paramilitaries, it might be difficult to expose lines of command. In consequence, the responsibility of the Governments for the prevention and punishment of crimes will play a crucial part in the proceedings before the ICTFY. 11/

9. By applying this criterion of responsibility, the authorities can be held responsible for the climate which made it possible for these crimes to be committed. 12/ With regard to the war crimes constituting "grave breaches", this responsibility is elaborated in article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 13/ and in article 86 (headed "Failure to act"), paragraph 1, of Additional Protocol I 14/ by making it an "active duty" on the government not only with regard to "grave breaches", but also to "all other acts contrary to the provisions of this Convention" 15/ and "all other breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol", 16/ respectively. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 17/ provides for an active obligation on the part of the State parties. 18/ With regard to "crimes against humanity", an active obligation on the part of the Government is provided for in the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 19/

C. The interpretation of what constitutes rape and other sexual assaults

10. Under international humanitarian law, rape and other sexual assaults are in most cases either expressly prohibited as such or can be categorized as
11. That rape and other sexual assaults may be considered to constitute these crimes can be deduced, *inter alia*, from the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which defines "torture" in article 1 as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him for an act that he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind . . . ." 21/

12. According to Amnesty International, rape and sexual abuse are forms of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 22/ An International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) *aide-mémoire* of 3 December 1992 stated that "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health obviously covers rape." 23/

**D. The present discussion**

13. The ways in which the Statute provides scope for the prosecution of persons involved in the crime of rape or other sexual assaults will be considered below. For the purpose of this discussion, the victims are assumed to be civilians, i.e., persons protected by the Geneva Convention related to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the corresponding sections of the Additional Protocols. 24/ The applicable law will be dealt with as per the Statute. For an evaluation of the scope, reference is made to the conclusion.

**II. RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL ASSAULTS CONSIDERED "GRAVE BREACHES" OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949**

14. In the case of rape and other sexual assaults, the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable.

15. Rape and other sexual assaults constitute "grave breaches" as they can be considered to be a form of torture or inhuman treatment and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body and health; 25/ these crimes, listed in article 147, constitute "grave breaches". Support for this argument can also be found in the fact that "inhuman treatment" is treatment contrary to article 27, which, *inter alia*, expressly prohibits rape and other sexual assaults. 26/ Also, the enumeration of the "grave breaches" should be considered exhaustive in form only, not in substance. The commentary to article 146, paragraph 3, states in relevant part: "article 147 defines grave breaches of this convention. However, under the terms of this paragraph, the contracting parties must also suppress all other acts contrary to the provisions of this convention . . . . Other grave breaches of the same character as those listed in article 147 can be easily imagined. This was well understood when the Yugoslav Penal Code (article 125) was adopted, since the crime of forced prostitution was added to the list . . . ." 27/ The fact that at the Tokyo Trials rape was considered a violation of "the laws and customs of war" constitutes a very important argument. Although the Geneva Conventions were not yet existent, the charge indicates that rape is seen as a crime as serious as torture and killing. Today, such a crime would be considered a "grave breach". 28/

16. The possibilities of application are that a single act is sufficient to constitute a war crime 29/ and that it need not be policy instigated or
tolerated by the State, or politically, ethnically, racially, or religiously motivated.

17. However, it must be clear that the perpetrators are linked to one side of the armed conflict, acting against neutral citizens or citizens of a belligerent party. From war trials, such as the Essen Lynch Case, we can deduce that these links are so obvious that this is easily taken for granted, unless both parties to the conflict are of the same nationality or from countries which are on the same side of the conflict. 30/ Article 85 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also defines "grave breaches" and will be discussed in Section III, below.

III. RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL ASSAULTS CONSIDERED VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR

18. Although article 3 of the Statute refers only to The Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto (Convention No. IV), the following principles and instruments of humanitarian law form part of international customary law as well. The Statute does not consider the Additional Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions to be customary international law. However, they are treated as such here, because they fall within the jurisdiction of the ICTFY in so far as they constitute customary international law. This will be the case in the parts relevant to the topic of rape and other sexual assaults, as they constitute fundamental principles of international law. 31/ The condition/limitation of application will consist of proving that the relevant parts of these Protocols constitute customary international law.

19. The principle of customary law distinguishing between civilians and combatants and limiting attacks of military necessity, 32/ was violated during the war in the former Yugoslavia.

20. The applicable law can be found in several treaties. In the Trial of Admiral Toyoda, rape was considered a violation of the laws and customs of war. Although at the time the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 had not come into existence, the charge suggests that rape is regarded a crime as severe as torture and killing and would thus nowadays constitute a grave breach. However, if this argument will not be accepted, the conclusion ought to be that rape constitutes one of the other war crimes, constituting customary international law and creating universal jurisdiction. 33/

21. Rules applicable to armed conflicts of both an international and a non-international 34/ character can be found in article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, 35/ which provides a list of fundamental rules. Although this article states that it applies to a non-international armed conflict, these fundamental rules are also applicable in case of an international armed conflict. The International Court of Justice ruled, in the case Nicaragua v. United States of America, that these principles constitute "elementary considerations of humanity' and cannot be breached in an armed conflict, regardless of whether it is international or national in character". 36/ Relevant here is paragraph 1, which prohibits, inter alia, "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment". 37/ Applicable rules can also be found in paragraph 1 of article 76 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which expressly prohibits "rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault". This rule "applies both to women affected by armed conflict, and to others". 38/
22. Rules applicable in international armed conflict, are codified in the Fourth Geneva Convention. This can be derived, for instance, from the Nicaragua v. United States of America Case (Judgment of the International Court of Justice, 27 June 1980), wherein the Court rules that "the obligation to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions does not only derive from the Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific expression".

Another argument for the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 can be concluded from the fact that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) felt itself bound by the Geneva Conventions. The Republics following SFRY are probably bound by the general treaty obligations undertaken by SFRY. In any case, "in most part . . . the Fourth Geneva Convention concerns customary law, and, in many respects, even peremptory norms that cannot be excluded by agreements". Rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault are expressly prohibited in article 27, which is considered the core of the protection offered in the Fourth Geneva Convention, and can in particular be considered to codify customary international law. This can be concluded from the Commentary to the article which states in relevant part: "The Statement of these principles in an international convention gives them the character of legal obligations and marks an essential stage in the history of international law, in particular international humanitarian law . . . it codifies notions which date back to ancient times . . . ." The 1907 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land provides protection for family honour and rights in article 46. This article will not have to be considered as article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention now offers a more specialized protection. The general rule provides that "specialis" has preference over "generalis". (However, if article 27 cannot be accepted as constituting customary international law creating universal jurisdiction, the Hague Convention will have to be invoked and then the criteria for war crimes will apply). Article 85, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions states, inter alia, that "inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination" constitute a "grave breach" when "committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions and of this Protocol".

23. Conditions/limitations with regard to Protocol I are that it has to be proven that the crimes were based on racial discrimination and that they were "committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions and of this Protocol".

24. Rules applicable in a non-international armed conflict can be found in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, where prohibition of rape, enforced prostitution and other sexual assaults is found in paragraph 2 of article 4, headed "Fundamental guarantees".

25. A condition/limitation of prosecution, based on the article mentioned in paragraph 24, might be that this Protocol can only be evoked when the armed conflict takes "place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol".

26. Rules applicable when the area is considered to be occupied territory are stated in article 47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits protected persons in occupied territory in any case or in any matter whatsoever from being deprived of the benefits of the Convention.
27. For a further discussion on possibilities of application and conditions/limitations with regard to the application of this type of law, except for the special items already dealt with in this section, see Section II. 45/

IV. RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL ASSAULTS CONSIDERED "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY"

28. In article 5 of the Statute "crimes against humanity" are described as "the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or national in character, and directed against any civilian population . . . (g) rape".

29. There are several reasons why rape and other sexual assaults can constitute a "crime against humanity". Rape is listed among the "crimes against humanity" in article 5 of the Statute. 46/ The possibility that rape and other sexual assaults already constituted "crimes against humanity" under the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 1945. Rape and other sexual assaults are not explicitly mentioned in the Nuremburg Charter under article 6, paragraph C, which defines the "crimes against humanity". However, rape and other sexual assaults are considered to come within the scope of this paragraph, as this was compassed in the words "... and other inhumane acts". "The wide scope of this term indicates that the enumeration . . . is exhaustive in form only, not in substance". Apart from this, Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany defined rape as a "crime against humanity". Although it can be discussed whether this Law constitutes customary international law, it does make clear that the Four Powers considered rape a "crime against humanity". 47/ The scope of this term has only been widened since the Second World War cannot be excluded. 48/ Apart from this, "crimes against humanity" are to be considered violations of fundamental human rights, 49/ in this case: the prohibition of "torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" 50/ and the prohibition of "enslavement". 51/

30. The possibilities of application are that "crimes against humanity" are applicable in times of peace as well as in times of armed conflict, whether national or international, 52/ and that they can be committed by anybody. 53/

31. Conditions/limitations might occur insofar as it is necessary to prove that the alleged rapes and other sexual assaults are "directed against any civilian population", i.e., "single or isolated acts" fall outside the scope 54/ because it has to be proven that these crimes have been committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the population. 32. "Widespread" refers to the large scale on which the crimes are committed 55/ or to a pattern of abuse. 56/ This pattern might be apparent from the cases reported which show that the rapes are often perpetrated in the same manner, e.g., it starts when an area is conquered, the women are taken away and detained, or raped in front of the family. "Systematic" refers to a pattern of abuses of which rape is an element; here rape is used as one of the tools of war, which is possible due to the severe (mental) effects on the victim and her environment. Reports tend to show a pattern of abuse, e.g., it starts when an area is conquered and occurs concurrently with torture and murder. It occurs predominantly around the camps, after which the population flees before the area is occupied.

33. It also has to be proven that the crimes are based 57/ on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds and that the state is involved.
This can be concluded from state tolerance. 58/

V. RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL ASSAULTS CONSIDERED TO BE GENOCIDE

34. Article 4 of the Statute refers to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which defines genocide in article II as:

"any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such . . . (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 59/ (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 60/ (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group". 61/

35. The possibilities of application are that genocide is a crime under international law, in times of peace and in times of armed conflict, whether this is deemed international or non-international, 62/ and that only one of the acts enumerated in article II of the Convention has to be proven. The fact that there is no need to demonstrate that the perpetrator was acting on behalf of the state is also very important. 63/

36. A condition/limitation of this Convention will be the requirement of proving that the acts described above were "committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group".

VI. CONCLUSION

A. Applicable whether the conflict is deemed international or non-international

37. Violations of the laws and customs of war: applicable rules can be found in article 3 common to the Four Geneva Conventions, which provides a list of fundamental rules, and article 76 of Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions, which expressly prohibits rape and other sexual assaults.

38. A single act suffices to constitute a war crime; 65/ the conditions/limitations will be that it has to be proven that the perpetrators are linked to one side of the conflict, acting against neutral citizens or citizens of a belligerent State. With regard to Protocol I and, to a lesser extent, common article 3, it also has to be proven that these articles constitute customary international law giving rise to universal jurisdiction.

39. "crimes against humanity" can be committed by anybody and come with universal jurisdiction; the conditions/limitations arising are that it has to be proved that there is evidence of State involvement, at least in terms of tolerance, that the alleged facts form a part of a widespread 66/ or systematic attack against any civilian population, and that the crimes are based on national, political, ethnic or religious grounds.

40. Genocide: rape and other sexual assaults may come under the definition contained in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, 68/ that it is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator was acting on behalf of the State and that genocide comes under universal jurisdiction. However, it is necessary to prove that the acts were committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.

B. Applicable when the conflict is deemed international

41. "Grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention (enumerated in article 147), rape, and other sexual assaults constitute "torture or inhuman treatment" and/or "wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health".

42. Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits rape.

43. "Grave breaches" of Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions, article 85, paragraph 4, prohibits "inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination".

44. The possibilities of application are that a single act suffices to constitute a war crime and that the "grave breaches" come under universal jurisdiction. The conditions/limitations will be that it has to be proven that the perpetrators are linked to one side of the conflict, acting against neutral citizens or citizens of a belligerent state. With regard to Protocol I and, to a lesser extent, article 27, it also has to be proven that these articles constitute customary international law coming under universal jurisdiction and, also with regard to Protocol I, that the crimes were based on racial discrimination and were "committed wilfully and in violation of the Conventions and of this Protocol".

C. Applicable when the conflict is deemed non-international

45. A prohibition of rape, forced prostitution, and other sexual assaults is found in article 4, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol II to the Four Geneva Conventions. A single act suffices to constitute a war crime, provided it is proved that the armed conflict takes place

"place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol", 69/

and that it constitutes a breach of customary international law, coming under universal jurisdiction.

D. Applicable when no armed conflict takes place

46. Both "crimes against humanity" and genocide are applicable outside of armed conflict. 70/ In criminal law each case has to be considered on its own merits; for the prosecution of rape and other sexual assaults, this also means that in each case it has to be decided which of the above-mentioned fields of law is applicable, depending on the conditions and circumstances of the case and the facts that can be proven.
Notes

1/ Many thanks to Mr. R. van Elst, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.


4/ Violent crimes of a homosexual nature are not explicitly mentioned in international humanitarian law. However, this is understandable as the topic of homosexuality, even today, is not discussed freely. That international humanitarian law, insofar as it provides protection against rape and other sexual assaults, is applicable to men as well is beyond any doubt as the international human right not to be discriminated against (in this case on the basis of sex) does not allow derogation.


6/ The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was party to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It was also a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. FRY was also party to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. The former Republics of FRY are probably bound by the general treaty obligations undertaken by FRY itself.

7/ See Section V.

8/ In countries where the principle of expediency is a part of penal law, the State is obliged to prosecute when social obligations necessitate.


10/ The responsibility for omission, as applied at the trials after the Second World War (e.g., the Yamashita Case, the Hostage Case, the Pohl Trial, and the Einsatztruppen Trial), was, like the other principles of individual criminal responsibility, reaffirmed in, e.g., the General Assembly Resolution 95 (I) of 1946, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.

Notes (continued)

11/ Even if a resistance movement or a guerilla organization cannot be considered an independent party to the armed conflict, the combatants of these groups can be bound by the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Conventions if their organization is related to a State. Third Geneva Convention, article 4, paragraph 2.

12/ Bernard V.A. Röling, "Aspects of the Criminal Proceedings for Violations of the Laws of War", in The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 199, 204, 219 (A. Cassese ed., 1979). Röling considers this climate to be mainly the "climate of opinion", responsible for mass-scale "system criminality", which he considers to be "criminality which has been officially promoted or tolerated, or which is an expression of the prevailing spiritual climate".

13/ See Section II.

14/ See Section III.

15/ "The obligation on the High Contracting Parties to search for persons accused to have committed grave breaches imposes an active duty on them. As soon as a Contracting Party realizes that there is on its territory a person who has committed such a breach, its duty is to ensure that the person concerned is arrested and prosecuted with all speed. The necessary police action should be taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in pursuance of a request from another state". IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War, Commentary, International Committee of the Red Cross 593-94 (J.S. Picet ed., 1958).

16/ This paragraph states: "The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all other breaches, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act under a duty to do so".

17/ See Section V.

18/ Article I of the Convention declares in relevant part: "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide . . . is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish". Article V states: "The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article III". Article VI states: "Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction".

19/ Article 22 of this draft Code states that "systematic or mass violations of human rights" are Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind. The article states in relevant part: "An individual who commits or orders the commission of any of the following violations of human rights . . . torture, establishing or maintaining over persons a status of slavery, servitude or forced labour . . . . in a systematic manner or on a mass scale . . . ." Article 5, headed "responsibility of states", states: "prosecution of
Notes (continued)

an individual for a Crime against the Peace and Security of Mankind does not relieve a state of any responsibility under international law for an act or omission attributable to it". Paragraph 1 of article 6 states: "A state in whose territory an individual alleged to have committed a Crime against the Peace and Security of Mankind is present shall either try or extradite him".

20/ Older documents refer to "family honour", "honour of women", etc. Seen in the context of that time, rape and other sexual assaults would surely violate such "honour".

21/ There is no doubt that rape and other sexual assaults inflict severe pain and suffering on the victim, which can be inflicted for several reasons. For example, in the majority of the cases reported, the alleged perpetrators were of a different ethnic origin from the victims, which points to discrimination.

22/ Amnesty International, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuses by Armed Forces (January 1993).


24/ For a definition, see articles 4 and 13 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. If the victims of rape and other sexual assaults are considered to have prisoner of war status, reference can be made to the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, articles 13, 16, 45, 87, paragraph 3, 130 and common article 3, paragraph 1 and the relative articles of additional Protocol II.

25/ See the discussion on interpretation under Section I, paragraph 2.

26/ For the interpretation of "inhuman treatment" the commentary to article 147 refers to article 27, which, inter alia, expressly prohibits rape and other sexual assaults. It also states: "That leads to the conclusion that by 'inhuman treatment' the Convention does not mean only physical injury or injury to health". IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian persons in Time of War, Commentary, International Committee of the Red Cross, 598 (J.S. Pictet ed., 1958).


28/ In the Trial of Admiral Toyoda, specification 1 of the charge states as follows: "wilfully and unlawfully disregarding and failing to discharge his duties by ordering, directing, inciting, causing, permitting, ratifying and failing to prevent Japanese naval personnel of units and organizations under his command, control and supervision from abusing, mistreating, torturing, raping, killing and committing other atrocities." W.H. Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes", 1 Military Law Review 69, 69-70 (1993).

Notes (continued)

30/ It can be argued that perpetrators are supposed to be "acting as organs of state". See E.A. Daes, New Types of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law 55-78. However, "the Nuremburg jurisprudence makes clear" that the perpetrator "need not necessarily be a soldier". Theodor Meron, "Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law", 3 American Journal of International Law 424, 426 (1993).

31/ The fact that SFRY ratified these Protocols is also important. N. Keijzer, "Internationale berechting van oorlogsmisdrijven, begaan in het voormalige Joegoslavië," 10 Militair Rechterlijk Tijdschrift 66, 66-68 (1993). Protection from rape and other sexual assaults as a topic under customary international law applicable in armed conflict can be deduced from the history of international law, e.g.: Lieber Code ("rape"), Oxford Manuel ("female honour"), The Declaration of Brussels ("honour and rights of the family"), and the above-mentioned 1907 Hague Convention.

32/ The Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 already states "that the only legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. This rule . . . constitutes one of the foundations of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict". International Committee of the Red Cross, Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Commentary 53 (1973). Since then, these principles have been reaffirmed in many legal instruments, e.g.: Resolution XXVIII, adopted at the XXnd International Conference of the Red Cross held in 1965 in Vienna, the GA Resolution 2444 (XXIII). Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War 22 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2nd ed. 1991) and Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions (article 48 and article 85, paragraph 3, sub A, declaring violation a "grave breach").

33/ See note 25.

34/ Rules for non-international armed conflicts are "not applicable to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolate and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature, as not being armed conflict". Additional Protocol I, article 1, paragraph 2.

35/ Apart from the fact that this article constitutes customary international law, an extra argument for application can be found in the fact that Representatives of the Republic of Croatia, the SFRY and the Republic of Serbia entered into a Memorandum of Understanding on 27 November 1991, pursuant to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Two agreements have also been concluded between representatives of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, The Party of Democratic Action, and the Croatian Democratic Community pursuant to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.


37/ See Section I.C.
Notes (continued)

38/ C. Pilloud et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 892 (Y. Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). As article 75 offers a general protection for persons not protected by any other provisions of the Four Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I, it is sometimes stated that this also applies to article 76.


42/ For the interpretation of these terms I refer to the discussion under Section I.C, above. Support for the argument that rape constitutes a "grave breach" under this protocol can also be found in a discussion among the drafters of the Protocol in 1976. Universal jurisdiction was "restricted to 'grave breaches' in order to enhance the probability of the observance of the law". In addition, it was felt that a precise standard was needed to avoid the risk that any soldier, without intending violation of the protocol, would run the risk of being charged with a war crime. Y. van Dongen, The Protection of the Civilian Population in Time of Armed Conflict 12 (1991). It might be concluded that the "spirit" of the crime is the criterion for determining whether a "grave breach" has occurred. For the argument that rape and other sexual assaults have all the characteristics of a "grave breach", see the discussion under Section I, Introduction, above. This protocol can be said to fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, in so far as it constitutes customary international law; the "fundamental guarantees" stated in Chapter II, Article 4, ought to be regarded as such.

43/ Article 1, paragraph 1.

44/ Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that the laws of the occupied area shall remain in force and that the tribunals shall continue. A logical consequence seems to be that perpetrators of rape and other sexual assaults should be prosecuted, also in occupied territory. Articles 76, paragraph 4, and 126 contain specific rules on the treatment of female detainees in occupied territory.

45/ Violations of the "grave breaches" and violations of international customary law applicable in armed conflict both constitute war crimes.

46/ Reference can be made to the relevant part of the ruling of the International Military Tribunal in the Justice Case: "The Charter makes . . . a crime; and it is, therefore, not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent . . . was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement" (cited in Y. Khushalani, Dignity and Honour of Women as Basic and Fundamental Rights 25 (1982)).

47/ E. Schwelb, "Crimes against Humanity", 23 BYIL 178, 191 (1946). That "crimes against humanity" were interpreted broadly during the Nuremberg Trials can also be deduced from the opinion of F. de Menthon, the French prosecutor at Nuremberg who regarded "crimes against humanity" as "crimes
against the human status", which he defined in relevant part as "all those faculties, the exercising and developing of which rightly constitute the meaning of human life" (cited in S. Goldenberg, "Crimes against Humanity, A Study in the Making and Unmaking of International Criminal Law", U.W.O. Law Review 1, 14).

48/ At the International Conference on Human Rights in 1968 apartheid was condemned as a "crime against humanity". S. Goldenberg, "Crimes against Humanity, A Study in the Making and Unmaking of International Criminal Law", U.W.O. Law Review 1, 47.

49/ D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law 122 (3rd ed. 1983). For the United Nations, the protection of human rights seems to be the main point of interest with respect to armed conflicts. Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War 20 (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2nd ed. 1991).

50/ See Section I.C, above.

51/ In the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind slavery and servitude, when committed in a systematic manner or on a mass scale, are considered systematic or mass violations of human rights, constituting Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, (article 22). In 1949, the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others replaced for the contracting parties all foregoing conventions on Slavery. ECOSOC resolution 731 E, 1959, in: R.J. Taubenfeld & H.J. Taubenfeld, Sex-based Discrimination, Binder 2, at 16 (1979). In article 1 it is stated that the parties agree to punish: "any person who, to gratify the passions of another (1) procures, entices or leads away, for purposes of prostitution, another person, even with the consent of that person, (2) exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person". It can be concluded that enforced prostitution constitutes enslavement, and that it is irrelevant whether the victim is male or female.

52/ Although article 5 of the Statute states that "crimes against humanity" must be committed in armed conflict, due to legal developments since the Charter of the IMT, it might be considered as "crimes against humanity" can also be committed in time of peace. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Law 248 (1992). This has been formulated, e.g., in the Draft Code of Offenses against Peace and Security of Mankind (first version reported to the U.N. G.A. in 1954). Y. Khushalani, Dignity and Honour of Women as Basic and Fundamental Rights 32 (1982). C.F. Rüter, Enkele Aspecten van de Strafrechtelijke Reactie op Oorlogsmisdrijven en Misdrijven Tegen de Menselijkheid (1973).


Notes (continued)


57/ Here there is no need to prove intent, as is the case with the crime of genocide. See Section V. As a consequence, it will be easier to meet this requirement.

58/ For the constitution of a "crime against humanity", it is necessary for the government, which is responsible for prevention and repression, to have instigated or, at least, tolerated the crimes. C.F. Rüter, Enkele Aspecten van de Strafrechtelijke Reactie op Oorlogsmisdrijven en Misdrijven tegen de Menselijkheid 37-38 (1973).

59/ See Section I.C.

60/ Not only does rape have a serious effect on the victim, bodily as well as mentally, it also has a serious effect on her family environment. Families are reported to have fled their communities for fear of rape. Probably rape and other sexual assaults have even more severe effects in Muslim communities as victims are allegedly regarded as dishonoured.

61/ This can be effected in several ways, e.g.: it is reported that women are raped in captivity by men of another ethnic group and only released when pregnancy was well advanced; at this point, it is not possible to bear children of the same ethnic origin as the women. The alleged mutilation of men's genitals prevents these men from procreating. In the above-mentioned examples, ethnic procreation will be achieved by the alleged perpetrators.

62/ Article I of the Convention states in relevant part: "The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law . . . ."

63/ Theodore Meron, "The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia", Foreign Affairs Summer 1993, at 130-131. Article IV of the Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals".

64/ Jurisprudence and literature have not yet defined the proof (in substance and amount) necessary to satisfy this requirement.

65/ A possibility of application with respect to article 76 of Protocol I might be that it is sometimes stated that this article applies when the victims are not protected by other articles of the Four Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol I.

66/ "Widespread" refers to a large scale or a pattern of abuse.

67/ "Systemic" refers to rape being used as one of the tools of war in a pattern of abuses.

68/ Several of the acts, each constituting the crime of genocide, might be applicable here. See article 2 of the Genocide Convention.
Notes (continued)

69/ Article 1, paragraph 1.

70/ A discussion on the possibilities of application and the conditions/limitations can be found above.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX III
THE MILITARY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY
AND TACTICS OF THE WARRING FACTIONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The following report describes the basic military characteristics and features of the "warring factions" in the former Yugoslavia. The focus of this report is on the structures, strategies, and tactics of the regular military forces engaged in the conflict. These regular forces are those of the Yugoslav Army (JA) and its predecessor, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), also referred to as the Yugoslav National Army (JNA); the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA); the Krajina Serb Army (SKA); the Croatian Army (HV); the Croatian Defence Council (HVO); and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Paramilitary and Special Forces units have performed an important role in this conflict, often coordinating their operations with those of conventional forces. These forces are discussed in detail in Annex III.A. Armed police and local volunteers have also been active participants in military activities.

2. With the exception of the JNA, the military forces involved in the conflict have been organized only recently. In large measure, they emerged from the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and local Territorial Defence Forces (TDF).

3. The strategies of the "warring factions" in the current conflict, with their decentralized structures and reliance on partisan tactics, have much in common with the tactics employed by Yugoslav forces during the Second World War. Thus, the following discussion begins with a review of military operations that emerged to resist the Axis powers.

4. The facts discussed below are linked to the periods to which they relate. Obviously, command structure, "order of battle", forces, equipment, and troop disposition change. Thus, this report is not intended to be a specific chronology of such events. Rather, it is intended to reflect a general situation that needs to be understood in order to assess the military context of the events that led to large scale violations. It is not therefore a complete survey of all aspects of the military situation. The description which follows is based on information obtained up to March 1993.

II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

5. Unlike other conflicts, this one has peculiar characteristics which partake of conventional and unconventional war.

6. Political factors, both international and local, significantly affected the course of military operations.

7. Because the overall conflict evolved into three separate ones, the armies of some of the warring factions were newly constituted while the JNA was three times reconstituted. This situation produced complications and peculiarities with a direct bearing on the course of military activities, and the status of command and control.

8. The geographic spread of military industries, and the location of maintenance facilities, army depots and government supplies, also affected the course of military operations and the use of weapons because of the availability of munitions, spare parts and repair facilities.

9. Military operations in BiH and Croatia by the JNA, BSA, and SKA have essentially been a function of the political-military goal of securing territories that link Serbia proper with Serb-inhabited areas in BiH (along the Drina and Sava rivers) and Serb-inhabited areas in Croatia. The Serb goal was to achieve a territorial and defensible link between areas constituting a
"Greater Serbia". Thus, there has never been a unified or coherent battle line, but multiple theatres of operation between which forces shifted, depending on the status of each theatre. Strategic positions were related to each one of these theatres, but since these theatres were part of a political-geographical arc linking Serbia with Serb-inhabited areas in BiH and Croatia, the theatres of military confrontation were readily identifiable. As the conflict progressed, the Serb side sought to solidify and enlarge its territorial gains in the areas of the projected "Greater Serbia", while BiH and Croatian forces sought to dislodge them. These theatres saw a constant ebb and flow of military activities.

10. Because these areas were of mixed ethnic and religious population and Serbs were usually a minority, particularly in BiH, Serbs felt that they had to dislodge the other groups. In 1992, Bosnian Serb forces were insufficient in number and disorganized. However, they were tasked by their political leaders with massive population removal in a relatively short period of time without the open and direct participation of the JNA. The JNA, however, militarily supported the Bosnian Serb forces in many ways, including bombardment and shelling. They were also directly involved in several operations. This was in execution of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" which is described in Annex IV and more specifically in Annex V. The overriding political goal of depopulating these areas of non-Serbs determined the nature of the military activities. These areas were not military targets, but civilian areas with strategic importance derived from the fact that they linked Serbia with Serbs in BiH and Croatia. Personnel, arms and supplies crossed the Drina River from Serbia to Serbs in BiH and through Bosnian Serb areas to certain parts of the Krajinas, which are surrounded by Croats. Military operations in these areas must therefore be seen in this light in order to be understood.

11. Confrontation lines are therefore in and around cities and villages, and access roads to them. But they are not part of a continuous line. Consequently, there are seven areas in BiH controlled by the Bosnian government which are geographically unconnected. This also means that areas under Serb control are not contiguous. The same is true with respect to Bosnian and Croatian forces in Herzegovina and also in the Krajinas where the Serbs are in four unconnected sectors. This checkered military map meant the forces from different warring factions were interspersed. In many areas, the party in control is surrounded entirely by another party, or only partly by that party and partly by yet another party.

12. The result of this checkered and totally uneven field situation is that each one of these theatres of military confrontation had different characteristics. More particularly, they also had different dynamics and the relations between opposing groups varied significantly.

13. One way by which this is evident is in the level of the black market and trade that goes on in these areas between the warring factions or through their lines. Thus, for example, the Tuzla area, which has over one million inhabitants, including some 20,000 Serbs and 30,000 Croats, has suffered little bombardment from the Serb forces which surround it entirely. That city has a flourishing black market to which goods arrive from Serbia through Serbian lines. Another example is the Bihać pocket which, until summer 1994, was ruled by Fikret Abdić who broke with the Sarajevo government. He operated a private company that brought goods from Croatia (which borders Bihać on one side) into the pocket, and also traded with the Serb forces which encircled the pocket from three directions. This cozy relationship resulted in Abdić's signing in Belgrade in April 1993 a separate peace with the Bosnian Serb Republic. This situation changed when the Fifth Army Corps of BiH recaptured the area in August 1994. Since then, the area has been the scene of intense
fighting between BiH forces and the BSA, which also has support from the SKA in nearby Croatia. These are only illustrations of the peculiarities of this conflict.

14. The military structure, strategies and tactics of the "warring factions" are a consequence of the following factors:

(a) World War II antecedents, as well as experiences in that partisan war which led to the doctrine of Total National Defence (TND). TND includes the placing of weapon caches with local territorial defence units, decentralization of forces and command control, reliance on local forces, and other characterizations, which partake of a combination of guerilla and conventional warfare;

(b) Political factors leading to the different stages of the JNA; and,

(c) The gradual evolution of the conflict which took place between multiple parties, at different times, and in separate, though frequently related, theatres of operation.

15. The TND was part of Yugoslav political-military doctrine. Thus, TND and the type of Army and Party structures that existed in Communist Yugoslavia constitute a political-military context which has had significant impact on the goals, strategies and tactics employed by the JNA and the forces that emerged out of the JNA in Serb Bosnia and Krajina. This context and, in particular, the political factors that led to the conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH, are crucial to an understanding of what occurred.

16. When the three Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH declared their independence, they did not have separate armies. Before 1991, the JNA was a single army for all members of the former Yugoslavia, though its military centrality changed since 1974. Upon the successive declarations of independence of these three republics, some of the military personnel, who had been located in each of these Republics, left the JNA and reconstituted themselves as part of the newly created national armies of Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH. In addition, each of the "warring factions" used paramilitary and special forces as described in Annex III.A. The armies of the "warring factions" consisted mainly of military personnel and equipment of the former JNA. But each of these Republics had local TDF which were part of the TND of Yugoslavia, and local police forces consisting of personnel from their respective Republics. These forces and armed civilians supplemented the armies of the "warring factions".

17. The role performed by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was critical to the evolution of this conflict, as stated by James Gow, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London:

"[t]he role played by the military in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia was central: it made the difference between widespread unrest and war. By September 1991 the military had decided to create a new Yugoslav state from parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be "cleansed" of "unreliable" and potentially hostile inhabitants. At that stage, as the Belgrade military intensified its activity in Croatia, it also appears to have begun preparations for a war to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. That war was launched in the period preceding international recognition of the Bosnian state, with a series of attacks at crucial points in the country. In the face of international pressure, the Yugoslav military divided, with half of its capability remaining in Bosnia as the Bosnian Serb army. This force
proceeded to occupy and "cleanse" large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 4/

18. Since the conflict began, however, there has been considerable continuity in the structure, strategy, and tactics of the military forces in the former Yugoslavia. The distinctive changes since 1993 are that the "warring factions" increased centralized command of their respective army structures; established control over paramilitary and special forces by integrating them into the army or disbanding them; and enhanced military professionalism. The result, as of middle-to-late 1993, is that more combatants are in uniform, who operate as part of regular army units, and under the command of superior officers. It is therefore important to distinguish between the situation that existed between approximately June 1991 and late 1993, and the ensuing period, bearing in mind that the process of transformation has been gradual.

19. The earlier part of the conflict was characterized by a multiplicity of combatant forces (for example, regular armies, militias, special forces, police and armed civilians) operating within different structures or outside any structure, sometimes operating under no established command and control. Some of these forces operated without uniforms, emblems or insignias. Frequently, these forces merged or combined in connection with certain operations. Probably the only factor common to all of these forces is their receipt of military equipment, ammunition and supplies from their respective armies and governments, and in the case of Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, their reliance on the JNA and the FRY.

20. The military structure and the strategies and tactics employed blur the chain of command and conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability to the military and political leaders. But it could also have been the result of a chaotic situation which regular armies in the process of constituting or reconstituting themselves could not control until they had reached a sufficient level of organization. This occurred later in the conflict, but after most of the violations had occurred.

21. These factors, however, contributed to the manner in which the policy of "ethnic cleansing" was implemented, particularly by Serb forces, who were unrestrained by the JNA, from which they received support.5/

22. The overall conflict in the former Yugoslavia evolved through three distinct phases. The military structure must be examined in the contexts of the three succeeding and sometimes overlapping conflicts which took place during these three phases, as described below.

23. The first phase involved the conflict in Slovenia. It began when that Republic declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. That conflict involved the JNA, Slovenia's TDF, Slovenian troops who left the JNA to join the newly created Slovenian Army, and local Slovenian Police. This phase lasted for only 10 days in June and July 1991, and resulted in limited human and property harm. 6/

24. The second phase of the conflict involved Croatia. It started before that Republic officially declared its independence on 25 July 1991. On one side, that conflict involved the JNA, Serb militia in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia, special forces from Serbia (with the participation of Serb expatriates and some mercenaries), local special forces, and Serb police and armed civilians from the same areas. On the other side, the newly-formed Croatian Army consisted of Croatian troops who left the JNA, the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), local militia, special forces (with the participation of
expatriate Croats and some mercenaries), and local Croatian police and armed civilians. After November 1991, the JNA formally withdrew from Croatia, but continued to support the army of the newly-formed, self-proclaimed "Serb Republic of Krajina". Meanwhile, the newly-established Republic of Croatia had formed its army, the Croatian Army (HV), which, along with Croatian special forces and others, continued the armed conflict in what became the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. 7

25. The third phase of the conflict began in BiH, following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992. It involved simultaneous fighting between Croats and Bosnian government forces, Bosnian government forces and Serbian forces, and Croatian and Serbian forces. The Croatian Defence Council forces in BiH (HVO) were supported by the Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and special forces like the HOS, the military wing of the Croatian party of Rights (named after the former Ustaše of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area). The HOS was later partially incorporated into the HVO and disbanded. Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. At first, the Bosnian government and JNA opposed each other. This lasted from April to June 1992, during which time the JNA troops from Serbia and Montenegro "officially" withdrew from BiH, leaving behind Serbian JNA troops from BiH and their equipment. They were supplemented by special forces from Serbia which consisted of Serbs, expatriate volunteers and mercenaries, Bosnian Serb militia and police, and local Serb volunteers. 8

26. As described above, in addition to the regular armies of JNA, Croatia and BiH, there are three additional armies: the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which operates in Bosnia; the Krajina Serb Army (SKA), which operates in Croatia; and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which operates outside the border of the Republic of Croatia, in BiH. The first two are armed and supported by the JNA (the Yugoslav Army or JA) and the third is armed and supported by the Croatian Army (HV).

27. In addition to these armies, the TDF were militarily active. In Croatia, TDFs were known as the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). The TDFs had a separate command structure from the regular army. Nevertheless, they joined in the armed conflict, frequently operating with their respective regular army and under regular army officers' command. They also operate independently in certain geographic areas, usually the areas from which most of the personnel in these units came.

28. Two other types of paramilitary groups and formations are also engaged in military operations. They consist of the so-called special forces, and local police forces augmented by local armed civilians. All of the warring factions make use of such forces among their combatants, but the lines of authority and the structure of command and control are confusing, even to the combatants. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces).

29. There are several reported paramilitary and special forces, (see Annex III.A), which usually operate under the command of a named individual and apparently with substantial autonomy, except when they are integrated into the regular army's plan of action. These forces are supplied and often trained by the governments that they serve. Many special forces answer only to senior political officials in the respective governments. Such relationships are frequently based on personal political allegiance and are not always publicly known. However, in time, information about the political sponsorship and support of these groups became more readily available though still nebulous. As these units usually operate independently and outside the apparent military chain of command, their order of battle is not known. Notwithstanding the strong links between these units and the respective
armies, the regular armies failed to restrain them from the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. Among the most notorious of the special forces are Arkan's "Tigers" and Šešelj's "White Eagles" (also referred to as "etniks"). Many of these units operate throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thus, the Serbian units operate in BiH and Croatia, and the Croatian units in BiH. These special forces have committed some of the worst violations of international humanitarian law. They are described in Annex IIIA.

30. Some towns and villages formed paramilitary units, which are not to be confused with the special forces mentioned above. These local forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally, they also lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same opština (county) and neighbouring areas. Their command and control is local, and the chain of command difficult to establish, though these groups, like the special forces, typically have an identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group is called by the leader's name. Otherwise, the unit or group uses a politically significant name or the name of their town, village or area. The leadership of these groups is local, mostly consisting of political figures. These units, particularly among Serbs in BiH and Krajina and Croats in Krajina and BiH, have, like the special forces, committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

31. The police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, also participate in military activities. These forces operate within a given municipality. They are nominally under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the respective Ministries of Interior also have national and regional police units, which usually operate outside the boundaries of local municipalities. The relationship between national, regional and local police is not always clear and varies in each country, and sometimes within the regions of each country. During the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and in BiH, the police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, operated without apparent command and control from the army. Their leadership was local and included many political figures. These forces acted with apparent autonomy in their respective areas, except when engaged in operations with their respective regular army.

32. During the early stages of the conflict, most of the combatants, including in many cases those in the regular army, did not wear distinctive uniforms, emblems or insignias of rank. As a result, officers freely moved from army to militia and from one unit to another. To further complicate matters, in the early stages of the conflict between Croatia and the FRY and other Serb forces within Croatia, and between BiH and the FRY and other forces within BiH (in May 1992, JNA forces from the FRY officially withdrew from Bosnia), the order of battle of many army and militia units was not clearly established. The chain of command was significantly blurred, even to insiders. Consequently, the organizations' command and control structures were seriously eroded, which resulted in much confusion. The confusion was more pronounced in BiH among Serb combatants until late 1992. It seems to have been purposely kept that way for essentially political reasons. This makes it difficult to ascertain units in a specific area and to establish command responsibility. The situation changed as the three regular armies managed or decided to control these combatants as of 1993. But that process was slow.

33. The outcome of such a structure and the strategies and tactics employed blur the chain of command and help conceal responsibility. This concealment may well be intended by some of the parties to provide a shield of plausible deniability. But, it could also be due to other factors existing at the early stages of the conflict, as stated by one expert:
"[t]here is a great deal of genuine confusion in the West as who actually controls the Serbian forces in BiH. To make the situation even more complicated, the regime in Belgrade consistently tries to do its best to muddle the issue by denying its own responsibility for war in the neighbouring republic. For example, the President of the self-proclaimed FRY, Mr. Dobrica Cosic (who is also Supreme Commander of the Federal Army) falsely asserted on 15 July that the army does not provide any weapons and military equipment to the former 'territorial Defense Forces of the Serbian Republic of BiH, except for some limited humanitarian aid'. Moreover, it does not command and control these forces. But the reality is quite different. The operational chain of command in the federal army runs from the Supreme Defense Council (composed of the president of the FRY and presidents of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro through the General Staff in Belgrade to the commanders of 1st MD (Belgrade), 4th MD (Podgorica), the Army of the Serbian Republic of BiH, Naval District (Kumbor, Bay of Cattaro), Air Force and Air Defense units." 10/

34. Special forces are apparently accountable only to senior political officials of the governments which they serve. Little is known about their order of battle except that restraint of these units by the regular army is conspicuously absent. Command and control, in effect, have been established through a policy of omission. The JNA, in particular, has at least tacitly permitted paramilitary units and special forces to engage in conduct that has resulted in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. In many instances, the JNA was on the scene and militarily supported these activities and these violations. A purposeful failure to act was therefore evident in many cases.

35. As stated earlier, paramilitary units and special forces have performed an important role in the conflict. In the early stages of the war in BiH, for example, paramilitary units coordinated their operations with the JNA. This was apparent in the attacks on Prijedor, Bijeljina, and Zvornik, as well as in other attacks in cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. The role that paramilitary and special forces have played in the conflict is explored in greater detail in Annex III.A.

36. A large number of Serbian and Croatian expatriates have joined in the fighting, mostly with paramilitary and special forces. There are also a smaller number of non-nationals, volunteers, and a few that could be called mercenaries also joining in the fighting. In contrast, a much smaller number of expatriates and non-nationals joined on the BiH side. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces)

37. All of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law for which military and, in some cases, civilian commanders are responsible under the principle of command responsibility. The largest number of these violations were clearly perpetrated by Serb combatants, and the largest number of victims have been from BiH.

38. The absence of command and control and the conditions created, particularly on the Serb side, were conducive to large scale and repeated violations. Persons who engaged in this conduct were encouraged by propagandistic rhetoric and comforted by the belief that they would have impunity. The absence of preventive action by military commanders and other purposeful omissions, such as the failure to punish known perpetrators, constitutes a clear basis for command responsibility.

39. The history of war clearly reveals that professional armies that are
under effective command and control commit fewer violations than fighting units that are not properly trained in the law of armed conflict and are not under the effective command and control of superior officers. But when military commanders order violations, permit them to happen, fail to take measures to prevent them, and fail to discipline, prosecute and punish violators, then the worst can be expected. Unfortunately, in this conflict, the worst did occur. This is a sad commentary on those who committed these crimes, but it is an even sadder one concerning the military and political leaders who ordered these acts or made them possible. War is sufficiently inhuman without having it carried out in the most inhuman ways. Tragically, in this case, these inhuman ways were designed to serve a political purpose. See the Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Annex IV.

40. The grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law occurring in this conflict are, in part, the product of the military structure that resulted in a lack of effective command and control. The violations are also the result of the strategies and tactics employed by the "warring factions", and the failure of military commanders to prevent and repress these violations.

41. The parties to this conflict are bound by the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II, both under State succession and by the parties' specific accession thereto. The parties are also bound by the Genocide Convention under State succession, in so far as that convention has been ratified by the former FRY. The parties are also bound by that Convention under jus cogens and customary international law. The parties are also bound under jus cogens and customary international law by the obligations arising under "crimes against humanity", as developed in conventional and customary international law.

42. The Federal Criminal Code of the former Yugoslavia embodied the international rules of armed conflict. JNA military personnel were instructed accordingly. Thus, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law are also part of the applicable national laws of all warring factions.

43. Furthermore, the ordinary criminal laws which existed in the criminal codes of all the former Republics of Yugoslavia also prohibited those acts (which are grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and other violations of international humanitarian law) as common crimes.

44. Lastly, the defence of "obedience to superior orders", finds no application in the cases of violations which occurred in this conflict.

45. The doctrine of "Command Responsibility" and the defence of "obedience of superior orders" are discussed in the Final Report, & 55-62.

III. WORLD WAR II AND THE BIRTH OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY

46. Eleven days after the German invasion of Yugoslavia in March 1941, King Peter fled with his government to England. The Royal Yugoslav Army, which had not yet been mobilized, surrendered. To eliminate a threat to their southern flank, the Axis powers divided Slovenia between Germany and Italy. A government was established in Croatia under Ante Pavelić, leader of the pro-fascist Ustaše. In addition, several border areas were ceded to Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania. The Germans then consolidated their hold on the population by introducing mandatory conscription and forced labour.
47. By the summer of 1941, guerrilla bands were operating in mountainous regions stretching through Slovenia, Montenegro, and Macedonia to the Greco-Yugoslav border. The guerrillas were members of two distinct, and eventually mutually hostile, groups: the Četniks and Partisans. The main group, the Četniks, operated under a regular army officer, General Draža Mihajlović, who established his headquarters in the mountains of western Serbia. The Četniks were known for their fierce fighting and guerrilla tactics. Politically, however, the Četniks were divided into those who supported King Peter's government-in-exile and those who favoured the establishment of a Republic.

48. The Partisans, who were aligned with the Communist Party, were a more cohesive group than the Četniks. This group, and its leader, Josip Broz (who adopted the nom de guerre Tito, later Maršal Tito), had been banned since 1921. Thus, they had 20 years experience living underground by the time of the invasion, resulting in a more disciplined and secretive force. Tito set up headquarters in Užice, not far from Mihajlović’s stronghold and exploited anti-German sentiment in Yugoslavia, taking aggressive offensive action against German forces. Mihajlović, by contrast, sought to avoid German reprisals by building a resistance movement for later cooperation with the allies. See Annex IV, Part 1, for further discussion of this period.

49. By 1942, Četniks and Partisans were fighting each other, and occasionally Četnik forces collaborated with the Italian occupying forces in BiH, Dalmatia, and Montenegro. Četniks in Serbia maintained a tacit truce with the German occupiers. In Croatia, Ustaše troops formed pro-Axis units, and cooperated in offensive actions against the Partisans and occasionally against the Četniks. Bosnian Muslims, along with Serbs and Croats from BiH, formed a brigade to combat the Partisans. Approximately one million people were killed in the former Yugoslavia during World War II. During the war, the Croatian Ustaše regime launched a campaign of annihilation against the Serbs. It has been estimated that the Ustaše killed a large number of Serbs during this period. Depending on the source, the number of Serbs killed varies between 200,000-700,000.

50. Political and military structures continued to evolve during the war. By mid-1942, Tito had two Partisan "divisions", unorthodox formations of about 2,500 fighters each. By late-1942, the Partisan army had been recast as the Yugoslav People's Army of Liberation, consisting of seven "divisions", ranging in strength from 2,500 to 3,500. These were loosely organized into brigades, and subdivided into battalions. Brigades and battalions were capable of independent operations, and were largely self-sustaining in terms of supplies and equipment. These units lacked artillery, air support, or effective communications. However, they were well-disciplined and fought effectively.

51. Tito's Partisans relied on leadership, security, mobility, and a strategic focus on offensive operations against "soft" targets -- enemy communications, supply, and rear service troops -- to keep German and other pro-Axis forces (an estimated troop strength of 140,000 German and 66,000 troops from other German Allies including Italy) tied down for the bulk of the war. In addition, the Germans supported 150,000 to 170,000 Croatian Ustaše, Bulgarian, and Četnik troops. The Partisans were faced by 36 pro-Axis divisions, but the bulk of these were Ustaše, followed by Italian and Albanian forces for a variety of reasons, their effectiveness amounted to less than one half of these forces. Still, a force equivalent to 1,415 effective divisions was checked by the Partisans' guerilla tactics.

52. In addition to his "regular" army, Tito relied on "part-time" partisans, sympathetic local citizens, who served as an auxiliary force. The Germans referred to these troops as Hauspartisanen, or "Home Partisans". The "Home
Partisans", farmers and tradesmen by day, conducted ambushes, sabotaged facilities, and mined roads at night. Their disruptive effect on the Germans was out of proportion to their numbers, and they were rarely caught. Mihajlović’s fears of German reprisal were borne out as the Germans killed or imprisoned tens of thousands of civilians to avenge their losses. The reprisals, however, tended to drive more civilians into "Home Partisan" units.

53. After German reprisals resulted in over 8,000 Serb deaths in Kragujevac, Mihajlović's Četniks suspended their operations against the Axis troops. Tito, however, continued his military activities. Thus, the split between Tito's Partisans and Mihajlović's Četniks deepened. The differences between the two forces, both tactical and ideological, were exacerbated by ethnic rivalries and led to a four-way civil war among the Ustaše, Četniks, Partisans and the rump Serbian regime. The power struggle that grew out of the struggle to expel the Axis Powers is not unlike those that have emerged in the current conflict.

54. Tito's Partisans received aid from the Allies throughout the war, although not in large quantities. Tito's requests for aid from the Soviet Union were generally ignored. However, because the Allies viewed Tito as the most effective opposition to the Axis Powers, he drew considerable British support. This, in turn, led to US support for Tito's forces. Thus, the Allied Powers, especially the United Kingdom, developed historic ties to Yugoslavia. At the close of the war, Tito filled the political vacuum left by the Royal Yugoslav and Četnik default. He was expelled from the Soviet bloc by Stalin, and succeeded in his post-1960s efforts of rapprochement with the Soviets while maintaining his independence. 19/

55. Tito was strongly influenced by his experiences in World War II. After being expelled from the Cominform in 1948, and especially after the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Tito feared an attack by the Soviet block from neighbouring Hungary and Bulgaria. Consequently, he developed the concept of "Total National Defence" (TND, later known as "General People's Defence"), which would require the coordination of the army, Territorial Defence Forces and the local population. The real centre of gravity of the TND was again in BiH, where Tito's Partisans were most successful. Their success was essentially due to the terrain of the region, which consisted of several mountains, heavily wooded areas, caves, ravines, and few roads, making it difficult for the enemy to transport heavy military equipment. Because of the limited access of heavy armour and artillery, the enemy had limited effectiveness. In addition, air superiority would not be a decisive factor because of the mountains, heavily wooded areas and caves and the winter weather. Thus, BiH became the favoured location for storing arms and supplies and building arms and munitions factories. This explains, in part, why the fiercest fighting occurred in certain areas within BiH. Also, because the JNA was in control of the military depots and most of its troops were Serbs, it provided access to the Serb paramilitaries and others to these depots. This provided them with military superiority over Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, because of the larger numbers of Serbs in the JNA, these troops joined in the fight against BiH Muslims and Croats.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY STRUCTURE

56. Under the 1974 constitution, the federal government of the former Yugoslavia was headed by a Presidential Council which consisted of one member from each Republic and province. The position of chairman of the Presidential Council rotated among the Republics and provinces annually. 20/ Tito retained the title of President, and virtually all of the political power. From 1948 until his death in 1980, President Tito cultivated cultural,
economic, and political contacts with western nations as a leader in the "non-aligned" movement. 21/

57. Under a policy of "socialist self-management", the Yugoslav government managed ethnic nationalism within the Republics and autonomous regions, while generally allowing the Republics to conduct their own economic affairs. 22/

Expressions of ethnic nationalism were prohibited, and demonstrations, as well as other anti-government activities, were dealt with harshly. 23/

58. As mentioned above, Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform had far-reaching consequences for the post-war structure of the Yugoslav military. Unlike the other communist countries of Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia's military planners focused not on a threat from Western Europe and the United States, but on the threat of an invasion from the Soviet Union. 24/

This threat gained currency with the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1948 (and again in 1968) and of Hungary in 1956. 25/ The specter of a Soviet invasion permeated Yugoslav strategic thought at all levels, and was directly responsible for the force structure that evolved in the former Yugoslavia and in the republics.

59. As mentioned earlier, TND sought to defeat a Soviet invasion by mobilizing all of the cultural, societal, and military resources of the country 26/.

60. The TND became official military doctrine after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and became official policy upon adoption of the National Defence law of 1969. 27/ As with other communist countries, the communist party apparatus was tightly integrated into the strategic scheme, and party structures at all levels were geared to support military and societal mobilization for war. 28/ Military structures accommodated a "shadow" chain of command responsible to the communist party apparatus. Political commissars, responsible for the political education of the army, were assigned down to brigade level.

A. Evolution of the JNA

61. The evolution of the JNA, particularly after the 1974 constitution, was intertwined with a variety of political trends. One trend was to maintain a strong, centralized, well-equipped mobile army modelled after the principal western armies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The modernistic conception of NATO was the anti-thesis of both the Soviet military doctrine, which had prevailed for a long time in the JNA, and more particularly, of those who urged a de-centralized army, which would reflect the ethnic and regional realities of this federal state. The 1974 constitution reflected the latter position. The die was then cast for a de-centralized military structure which combined a central army with regionally based and regionally staffed Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). As political events evolved, the centralized federal union began to give way to regional aspirations. The JNA's role as a federal army capable of preserving or imposing federal unity became the subject of intense political manoeuvres. Those who wanted to reduce that potential role of the JNA proceeded to de-centralize its structure and command, reinforce the TDFs under regional command, and reduce the federal defence budget.

62. The post-1974 process was significantly accelerated after 1988 with a number of amendments to the 1974 constitution, which had a strong impact on the increasing political autonomy of the regions (the term regions here includes the republics). This political evolution led to greater regional
control over the TDFs, as well as JNA units stationed in the various regions. In short, it was the beginning of the breakdown of a strong centralized army. By 1991, the JNA was, for all practical purposes, an army without a state, while the republics emerged as states without regular armies. This, to a large extent, explains the transformation that took place over the more than 15 years preceding the beginning of the conflict. It was also during this period, particularly between 1990-1991, that paramilitary units started to be formed. They represented the various ethnic groups, though most of them were Serbian (see Annex III.A, Special Forces).

63. As discussed below, the concept of an "armed people" combined with a professional army was appealing to those brought up in the communist tradition, as well as to those who believed that Yugoslavia and its regions would inevitably have to fight overwhelming foreign opponents and thus necessarily resort to some type of guerilla warfare. The result was a move to enhance the TDFs, de-centralize tactical military command, and pre-position weapons and supplies in areas where the people could have ready access to them. Thus, the people could fight without depending on a distant centralized command which would also lead to delays in receiving weapons and supplies.

64. Nationalistic ideologies grew stronger in the different regions, as reflected in the 1988 constitutional amendments, which increased local government powers. The JNA's central role was significantly affected, and later efforts between 1990-1991 by the JNA to disarm the TDFs and to exert both centralized authority and reinforce national unity proved ineffective.

65. The JNA was under the control of the collective Presidency, which rotated as to the President and whose decisions were based on a majority of its seven members, but also subject to a veto by any of its members. Thus, in time, control of the JNA was very much a consequence of the sharply divergent, political trends between those who sought to preserve federal unity and those who were preparing for a breakup of the federal system and the establishment of new independent states in some of the Republics based on historic ethnicity.

B. Total National Defence (TDF)

66. While national defence was a federal responsibility, the former Yugoslavia had a decentralized system of command and control. In part, it reflected the political trends towards regionalization and eventual separatism, as discussed above. However, it was, in part, based on a particular military doctrine. Reasoning that Belgrade was indefensible, and that national command, control, and communications facilities would thus be vulnerable, the Yugoslav military planners concluded that the federal government would be unable to control military forces throughout Yugoslavia. Thus, the governments of the various Republics were to cooperate with federal military authorities for regional defence.

67. TND required universal military service to ensure cadres of trained soldiers throughout the country. Based on their perception of the threat, and fueled by their World War II experience, Yugoslav military training emphasized guerilla tactics in the rough terrain that makes up the bulk of the country. Decentralized training and mobilization further required dispersed military training facilities throughout the country.

68. Weapons caches and supply stores, like training and facilities, were dispersed throughout the former Yugoslavia to ensure ready access to weapons in the event of invasion. The Yugoslav practice of putting pre-military
training in schools and of organizing its reserve units (Territorial Defence Force) around workplaces further ensured the wide distribution of weapons stores. 34/

69. As a matter of national defensive strategy, then, TND ensured the widest possible distribution of trained soldiers, weapons, and ammunition. Further, the structure of the military itself supported the decentralized concept of TND.

C. General structure of the Yugoslav armed forces

70. The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) referred collectively to the Army, the Navy, the Air and Air Defence Forces, and border troops. 35/ The JNA was controlled by the federal Ministry of Defence, with operational responsibility resting with the General Staff. The General Staff, in turn, was subordinate to the collective presidency. 36/ Thus, political events related to the power struggles within the collective presidency between 1989-1991 are very significant to the eruption of the conflict and the conduct of the war.

71. In 1991, before the conflict in Slovenia, the core of the JNA was a cadre of some 70,000 regular officers and soldiers, augmented by some 150,000 conscripts serving short terms. 37/ The JNA was intended to provide a unifying force in peace and in war. Thus, the Ministry of Defence sent conscripts out of their home districts for service to avoid ethnic dominance in regular army units. 38/ Despite this effort, however, units were to supplement their ranks with reservists (estimated at 400,000) drawn from the local areas. 39/ As a result, units would have a distinctly ethnic character on mobilization. Despite efforts to homogenize the military ethnically, the JNA officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. Serbs and Montenegrins collectively reflected 38.8 per cent of the Yugoslav population, but made up 70 per cent of the JNA officer corps. 40/ This ethnic character of the JNA is also relevant to understanding the evolution of the conflict.

72. In addition to troops controlled by the Ministry of Defence, the Federal Ministry of the Interior controlled intelligence and state security forces and police forces throughout the country. 41/ The Ministry of the Interior also controlled the People's Police, a paramilitary organization that performed riot control and security operations in addition to standard police functions. 42/ As a police force, the People's Police were relatively heavily armed. Several units had armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles, and helicopters. 43/ Because the People's Police were an important component of TND, they were well armed and received extensive infantry training. 44/ Locally recruited civilians would eventually serve with them in their respective Opštinas (counties).

73. TND also required the Republics and Autonomous Provinces to perform a critical role in mobilization. Specifically, each Republic and Autonomous Province was responsible for its own police forces and intelligence agencies under the republic's Ministry of the Interior. 45/ Further, each Republic and Autonomous Province was responsible for organizing, equipping, and mobilizing its own TDF and Civil Defence units. 46/ Each Republic maintained its own TDF headquarters, over which the Federal JNA General Staff was to exercise strategic control, leaving tactical control to the regional or local leadership. 47/

74. TDF units were a reserve force made up of veterans of active YPA/JNA service, leavened with a cadre of professional soldiers. 48/ The TDF was reportedly one million strong and organized into brigades. 49/ The basic
combat formation, however, was the company. TDF units drew their strength locally, and thus reflected the ethnic makeup of the local area. Furthermore, TDF units trained for combat operations close to home. Therefore, companies specialized in lowland, mountain, coastal, riverine, and urban warfare were accordingly trained and equipped.

75. Beyond the TDF and regular army, all citizens between the ages of 15 and 65 (55 for women) not otherwise serving were required to participate in the Civil Defence Forces. The Civil Defence Forces were administered through the Federal Ministry of the Interior, and were reported to have had a strength of two million on mobilization. This fact is also of particular relevance to this conflict.

D. Structure of the regular army

76. The JNA's structure was changed several times since the Slovenian War of Independence. Three major military re-organizations took place in 1991, 1992 and 1993. But, until the summer of 1991, the JNA was organized into three Military Districts (MD) and a Naval Military District. The Air and Air Defence Force had a separate headquarters at the same level of command as the MD. The MD, designated the 1st, 3rd, and 5th, represented an intermediate level of command between the General Staff and actual combat units. Each MD was responsible for exercising Federal control of forces within its geographic region.

77. The 1st MD, headquartered in Belgrade, was responsible for coordinating the defence of central and north-eastern Yugoslavia. Its estimated strength was 40,000 troops organized into six corps formations, plus units directly subordinate to the MD. Corps headquarters subordinate to the 1st MD were the following:

(a) 4th Corps, headquartered at Sarajevo;
(b) 5th Corps, headquartered at Banja Luka;
(c) 12th Corps, headquartered at Novi Sad;
(d) 17th Corps, headquartered at Tuzla;
(e) 24th Corps, headquartered at Kragujevac; and
(f) 37th Corps, headquartered at Ulice.

78. In addition to these forces, the 1st MD had a mechanized infantry division (headquartered in Belgrade), three mixed artillery and anti-tank brigades, and a rocket artillery brigade directly subordinate to the MD headquarters. The 1st MD was thought to have 968 tanks, 633 armoured combat vehicles, and 1,392 artillery pieces, including 92 multiple rocket launchers.

79. The 3rd MD, headquartered in Skopje, was responsible for the defence of Yugoslavia's southern flank. Its estimated troop strength was 41,000, again organized into Corps and direct reporting units. The five Corps headquarters subordinate to the 3rd MD were:

(a) 2nd Corps, headquartered at Titograd;
(b) 21st Corps, headquartered at Niš;
(c) 41st Corps, headquartered at Bitola;
(d) 42nd Corps, headquartered at Kumanovo; and
(e) 52nd Corps, headquartered at Priština.

80. Two brigades of armour and two brigades of mixed artillery and anti-tank weapons were directly subordinate to the MD. The 3rd MD had 729 tanks, 472 armoured combat vehicles, and 1,190 artillery pieces, including 60 multiple
rocket launchers.

81. The 5th MD, headquartered at Zagreb, was responsible for the defence of northern Yugoslavia and had an estimated troop strength of 35,000. The 5th MD had five Corps headquarters:

(a) 10th Corps, headquartered at Zagreb;
(b) 13th Corps, headquartered at Rijeka;
(c) 14th Corps, headquartered at Ljubljana;
(d) 31st Corps, headquartered at Maribor; and
(e) 32nd Corps, headquartered at Varaždin.

82. The 5th MD had 711 tanks, 367 armoured combat vehicles, and 869 artillery pieces, of which 64 were multiple rocket launchers.

83. The Naval MD, thought to be headquartered at Split, consisted of riverine and coastal naval forces, as well as two motorized infantry brigades and an amphibious brigade. Two Corps headquarters reported to the Naval MD, namely the 9th at Knin, and the 86th Guards 57th Motorized Corps, headquartered at Split. The Air and Air Defence forces were headquartered at Zemun, and had fighter and bomber aircraft, helicopters, and air defence artillery units at air bases throughout the former Yugoslavia.

E. Specialized units

84. In addition to standard infantry, armour, artillery, and associated support units, the JNA had a number of specialized units for particular missions or distinct types of terrain. These units included Mountain Brigades, Alpine Brigades, and the Amphibious Brigade. Of the five Mountain Brigades, only one was an active unit. 58/ 85. The JNA also maintained a uniquely Yugoslav formation known as the Partisan Brigade, with obvious historical links to the World War II experience. There were 21 Partisan Brigades spread throughout the former Yugoslavia, two of which were directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence. 59/ Partisan Brigades were lightly armed and equipped, and formed a territorial reserve force. Much of the Partisan Brigades' equipment was thought to be of World War II vintage.

86. Yugoslavia's forces were designed for mobilizing small, semi-autonomous armies. Universal conscription ensured a basic level of military training for virtually all citizens; the decentralized command and control structures required by Total National Defence ensured that these citizens were prepared for mobilization. Widely dispersed armouries, training facilities, and munitions dumps ensured that the armies of the various Republics would be relatively well-prepared to fight.

V. POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

87. In 1990, a dispute arose between Serbia and three of the other five republics. The disagreement concerned the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and BiH preferred a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more highly centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. 60/ This dispute resulted in the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and BiH from Yugoslavia. 61/ The Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and other pro-Serbs did not oppose Slovenia's secession, as it would leave the collective presidency with seven members, four of whom would
be Serbians and Montegrins. This would permit their control over the JNA.

88. Between April and December 1990, multiparty elections were held in all six republics. 62/ After the election of a democratic government in Slovenia, that Republic held an independence referendum in December 1990 that resulted in an 88.5 per cent vote in favour of secession from Yugoslavia. 63/ Croatia held a similar referendum on May 19, 1991, and 93 per cent of the population voted in favour of independence. 64/ This threat of secession prompted a military response from the Yugoslav federal government in an attempt to preserve the territorial integrity of the government.

89. In May 1991, when the leadership of the SFRY collective presidency was due for rotation, the tension increased considerably. A Croat, Stipe Mesić, was to assume leadership, 65/ but Serbia, Montenegro, and the representatives of the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina blocked the vote which would have approved Mesić's leadership.

90. On June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. On 27 June, the central authorities of the armed forces of the central authorities, the JNA in Belgrade decided to attack the provisional Slovenia militia. The Slovenian authorities announced that a "state of war" existed, and appealed for international assistance. 66/

91. By September 1991, the following disposition of JNA forces had evolved:

(a) First operative group: This group was directly controlled by the JNA general staff, with the sector command North consisting of the headquarters of 12 Corps Novi Sad, at least three brigades, and additional forces. It also comprises the sector command South, consisting of the headquarters of the Belgrade mechanized division, with at least six brigades, one Partisan and one artillery brigade.

(b) Second operative group: This group was also directly controlled by the JNA general staff, with the sector command West directed by the 37 Corps (Titovo) Učice, and at least three brigades and territorial forces, and the sector command Dubrovnik controlled by 2 Corps Titograd with three to four brigades and forces of the Montenegrin territorial defence.

(c) Sector Papuk, Nova Gradiška: Troops in this sector were controlled by 5 Corps Banja Luka, with at least three brigades and territorial forces, probably controlled by the first military district Belgrade.

(d) Sector Bosna, Sava, Drina: This sector was controlled by 17 Corps Tuzla, and consisted of at least three brigades and one Partisan brigade. These troops were probably also directed by the first military district in Belgrade.

(e) Sector Karlovac: This sector was controlled by the fifth military district, possibly by the 10 Corps Zagreb, with the remnants of the 32 Corps Varaždin and at least three brigades, an artillery brigade, and territorial forces. The Plitvice, Lika sector was controlled by the 13 Corps from Rijeka with at least one reinforced brigade, one Partisan brigade, and territorial forces.

(f) Sector Knin: Troops within this sector were controlled by the 9 Corps Knin. These troops consisted of forces organic to the corps and additional territorial forces. These troops were reportedly controlled by the general staff in Belgrade.
A. The conflict in Slovenia

92. Beginning in 1990, the JNA moved to pre-empt TDF combat power in Slovenia and in Croatia. As it had done in Kosovo in the 1980s, the Federal Army executed a series of surprise raids on TDF arsenals, training facilities, and caches in an effort to seize weapons and bring them under federal control. These raids were only politically successful. In Croatia, the raids netted the majority of TDF arms stores, but because of the large quantities and the relatively long period of time involved, the JNA seized only 40 to 60 per cent of the Slovenian TDF weapons.

93. The other Republics responded to the threat of Federal raids by expanding their import of arms to offset the potential loss of TDF weapons. Slovenia reportedly spent $50 million on imported anti-tank, small arms, and light anti-aircraft weapons. Slovenia also managed to seize some of the federal weaponry on its soil. Slovenia is also reported to have financially benefited from a complicated financial scheme in April 1991, guaranteed by the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade. As a result, the Yugoslav Dinar lost almost 50 per cent of its value. Slovenia, however, managed to obtain significant reserves in foreign currency, which financed its transition to independence. Some say that financial negotiations took place between officials in Belgrade and Ljubljana for the recovery by Belgrade of some of these funds. During that period of time, after Slovenia declared its independence and before the withdrawal of all JNA forces, it is reported that the military restraint of the JNA which was imposed from Belgrade was motivated by these negotiation considerations. This would explain why the JNA's overwhelming military superiority was not fully used against Slovenian forces which it could have easily crushed and also why there have been so few casualties and little damage. The JNA was not a willing participant in this restraining policy but it obeyed the political leadership in Belgrade. The result was a loss of morale in the JNA, particularly after its withdrawal from Slovenia. The prevailing wisdom, however, was that strategic considerations required restraint in order for the JNA to face the anticipated war in Croatia.

B. Slovenian forces

94. Relations between the Federal Army and Slovenia deteriorated rapidly throughout 1990, fueled by courts martial of Slovenian dissidents, and by the revelation of JNA contingency plans to topple the republic's leadership. The Slovenian president took over command of the Slovenian TDF, and the TDF began to serve as the nucleus of a national army. In January 1991, Croatia and Slovenia signed a defence cooperation agreement, and in March of that year, Slovenian draftees no longer reported for federal service. Also in March, the Slovenian parliament began requiring seven months service in the republic's armed forces. In June 1991, Slovenia recalled all Slovenian citizens from service with the JNA.

95. By April 1991, the Slovenian TDF was organized into 12 maneuver brigades and 10 independent detachments, which were subordinate to local and regional commands. While there were reportedly 68,000 soldiers available to the Slovenian TDF, there were only enough small arms for 40,000.

96. In June 1991, the JNA appeared ready to crush the Slovenian independence movement. On 26 and 27 June, forces of the 5th MD seized border crossings. However, the JNA's initial action was also subject to the approval of the political leadership in Belgrade, and that approval was withheld.

97. Notwithstanding the JNA's overwhelming military superiority, it acted
with restraint and reserve, ultimately allowing itself, by 3 July 1991, to be repelled by Slovenian forces. The JNA launched a mechanized attack in much the same way federal planners had envisioned a Soviet invasion would take place, and the mounted formations were road-bound, affecting link-up operations with previously inserted paratroops or forward detachments. Meanwhile the Air Force flew sorties in support of the invasion. But, while there was much show of force, there was in effect little action. There was, for example, no use of massed artillery.

98. A total of 45 YPA combatants were killed and 152 wounded in just over one week of fighting. Additionally, some 7,900 soldiers (including 1,000 officers), of a total deployment of 25,000, apparently defected or were captured by the Slovenian TDF. The JNA lost 31 tanks, 230 combat vehicles, and four helicopters.

99. Tactically, the Slovenian TDF forces effectively cut the JNA forces from their lines of support in much the same manner as had their partisan forbears had done to Axis forces. In the absence of concentrated artillery and air interdiction, the TDF mounted a successful anti-armoured defence. Slovenian TDF units cut off the columns of vehicles, or erected barriers on the roads to stop the advance, and then destroyed the stalled vehicles with light anti-tank weapons. Slovenian forces also captured and retained 124 tanks, plus heavy weapons and ammunition, from the JNA garrisons in Slovenia. The poor showing of the JNA, which was so much stronger in every respect, was due to the fact that it was not allowed by Belgrade to fight an all-out war. Thus, its troops became demoralized and uncertain as to the political goals of the leadership in Belgrade, which was restraining them. Some observers of the political scene attribute that to an earlier acceptance by the Serb leadership in Belgrade of Slovenian independence. Some see a connection to a financial settlement alluded to above. More obvious is the fact that Belgrade wanted to concentrate its forces against Croatia and to not have to fight on two fronts.

100. By mid-July 1991, JNA forces had agreed to withdraw from Slovenia within three months. The JNA completed the withdrawal on schedule in October 1991.

C. The conflict in Croatia

101. There are indications that the FRY's political and military leadership was preparing for military conflict in Croatia since 1990, if not earlier. By early 1990, the JNA had clearly shifted its attention to the growing independence movement in Croatia and had redeployed units to reinforce garrisons there. The character of the fighting, both in terms of tactics and intensity, was dramatically different than it had been in Slovenia.

102. Operation RAM called for the covert delivery of weapons from JNA arsenals to local Serb forces in Croatia and in BiH. A back-up plan reportedly was also developed by the JNA. The Psychological Operations Department of the JNA is reported to have had several plans for local provocation by special forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior, and "ethnic cleansing". According to an article appearing in the Slovenian newspaper, Delo, one of these plans, though unrelated to the plans for Croatia, called for mass rapes and executions of Muslims in BiH as a means of psychological warfare. 67/

D. Forces operating in Croatia

103. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia did not rely only on the TDF to form its army. Rather, the Croatians established their own armed forces. While the threat to
Slovenia was primarily an attack by JNA forces, Croatia perceived its threat to be resistance by its Serbian minority population. In Croatia, however, the TDF was named ZNG, and as of 1990, it was being gradually reinforced and strengthened.

104. Between August 1990 and April 1991, bombing and mining incidents, as well as attacks on Croatian police forces, resulted in frequent clashes between Croatian units and Serbian paramilitary forces. By mid-July 1991, the JNA moved an estimated 70,000 troops to Croatia, ostensibly to separate the local warring factions. The fighting rapidly escalated, eventually spanning hundreds of square kilometres from western Slavonia through Banija to Dalmatia.

105. The JNA's objectives in Croatia were not force-oriented, or even terrain-oriented in areas not inhabited by Serbs. Rather, the JNA and the ethnic-Serbian paramilitary forces targeted the civilian population in areas deemed to be part of the "Greater Serbia", primarily centred in the Krajinas. JNA operations in Croatia underwent at least three phases. First, JNA forces secured key bridges over major rivers and neutralized Croat police forces. Second, the JNA cut the capital of Zagreb off from Slavonia, the Krajinas, and Dalmatia. Then Slavonia, Banija, Krajina and Dalmatia were secured. The last phase involved an "ethnic cleansing" campaign to militarily expel non-Serbs from Serb controlled territory, to which the Croats responded in kind.

106. During the conflict in Croatia, the Serbs benefited from local Serbian support. Approximately 12,000 irregular Serb forces were armed and fighting alongside the JNA within Croatia.

107. The toll of the fighting in the first three months was heavy. It was reported that by October 1991, at least 200,000 buildings, 50 bridges, 100 merchant ships, thousands of privately owned vehicles, over 200 Catholic churches, 500 cultural monuments, 20 schools, and 250 post offices were destroyed. Twenty thousand Croats were killed or wounded, the majority of them civilians. The exact figures of the consequences of this war are yet to be established, particularly the losses and casualties on the Serb side which also suffered heavily.

108. Despite its control of approximately 30 per cent of Croatian territory, JNA forces experienced several problems. An estimated 25,000 draftees deserted, and the entire 32nd Corps, with its equipment, surrendered to Croatian forces in October 1991. According to Croatian sources, the JNA lost 618 tanks, 395 other armoured vehicles, and 100 aircraft during the fighting. In November 1991, the warring forces agreed to a JNA withdrawal from Croatia. Unlike the Slovenes, the Croats allowed the JNA to take its equipment with it. In return, the JNA agreed to return TDF weapons seized in the spring of 1991. The bulk of the JNA forces and their equipment were redeployed from Croatia to BiH. The following is a synopsis of the various military forces operating in Croatia.

E. Croatian army HV forces

109. The Croatian Army (HV) largely grew out of the former Territorial Defence Force in Croatia. Personnel was also obtained from police forces, volunteers and draftees. The HV is organized into six zones, each of which has mobile infantry and Home Defence Brigades. Although the HV is not officially a party to the conflict in BiH, Croatia has sent HV brigades into BiH on the side of ethnic Croats and their HVO forces.
F. Croatian National Guard (ZNG)

110. The most militarily significant new Croatian formation was the National Guard Corps (ZNG), introduced in April 1991. By May 1991, Croatian officials were listing "active" and "reserve" National Guard Corps brigades. National Guard Corps brigades were motorized and composed of several subordinate battalions, each composed of four to five 82-man companies. Seventy-five per cent of the troop strength is thought to be ethnic Croatian.

111. The National Guard Corps (ZNG) drew soldiers from the former republican police (a force of roughly 15,000 in 1990) and from reservists and Croatian TDF members. The bulk of the leadership positions were filled by former JNA officers who were Croats.

112. In 1991, Croatia announced that Croatian citizens would perform their military service in the National Guard Corps (ZNG), rather than in the JNA. The primary role of the National Guard Corps was to provide internal security and to fight the counter-insurgency war against Serbian paramilitary groups.

113. While its armament is ostensibly "defensive", the National Guard Corps (ZNG) is armed with armoured fighting vehicles, and has access to the former tank plant at Djuro Djaković. Croatia has purchased arms and munitions from Hungary, Romania, and from private sources in other countries.

114. In addition to the National Guard Corps (ZNG), the Croatian Ministry of the Interior formed units from its police reserves to serve as an internal security force. The Ministry of the Interior troop strength increased dramatically during 1991, to the point that many of its soldiers fought without uniforms in June and July 1991. The Ministry of the Interior troops also include the "Blue Berets", a special forces unit organized to conduct counter-terrorist operations. (See Annex III.A, Special Forces).

115. Croatia also has a small navy, consisting of approximately 30 ships seized from the JNA navy during 1991. Its primary mission is the defence of Croatia's territorial waters. It has limited capability for offensive operations using its two missile-gun boats, two missile craft, and one torpedo boat. In addition, Croatia launched a missile corvette in March 1992. The Croatian navy also controls a single regiment of naval infantry organized into eight companies. These units saw active service during the Croatian offensive into southern Dalmatia to relieve Dubrovnik.

G. Ethnic Serbian forces in Croatia

116. The Serbian minority in the self-proclaimed autonomous region of Krajina formed various paramilitary groups of approximately 12,000 men beginning in the summer of 1990. The largest of these was formed by the former chief of police for the region, Milan Martić, who became Secretary for Internal Affairs for the region. Ethnic Serbian members of the former police force, estimated to comprise 20 per cent to 50 per cent of Croatia's police, provided the bulk of the manpower for the "Martićevci" forces. Milan Martić, a former police officer in Krajina turned militia leader, is now President of the so-called Serb Republic of Krajina. These have been augmented by Serbian volunteers from Croatia, Serbia, and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. Martić also recruited local TDF units, with their weapons, to serve in the Krajina armed forces. The JNA provided substantial quantities of heavy weapons and supplies from within Serbia, as evidenced by reports that Krajina forces wore JNA uniforms and used JNA topographic maps. There were also reported increases in the quantity and sophistication of weapons in ethnic Serb training camps within the Krajina.
117. Serbian Krajina is composed of three autonomous regions: 1.) Kninska Krajina and Banija-Kordun; 2.) Western Slavonia; and 3.) Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem. A large number of Serbian militia groups and special forces have been operating in this area. (See Annex III.A, Military Structure.)

H. Serbian Regular Army of Krajina (SASK)

118. The regular Serbian Army of Krajina is composed of 6 Corps, which in turn are composed of 24 Brigades, for an estimated troop strength of 35,000 to 45,000. These 6 Corps are reported to be directly subordinate to the SASK General Headquarters Command of the Republic of Serbia Krajina in Knin.

I. Reorganization of the YPA/JNA after 1992

119. Following the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, the JNA reorganized its force structure to account for the changed geopolitical situation. The JNA planned its reorganization to coincide with the declaration of the new state of the FRY, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, in April 1992.

120. The plan called for the downsizing of the ground forces, along with a change in force structure to reflect the Army's new mission. That mission, as conceived by JNA planners, included the protection of the Serbian population outside Serbia proper by transferring its command structure to the local TDF units and subsequently to the armies of BSA and the Serb Republic of Krajina, and by supplying arms, ammunition and supplies. This explains the strategic importance of controlling the areas in BiH along the Drina and Sava rivers.

121. The Ministries of Defence in the Serbian autonomous regions of Croatia and BiH were initially subordinated to the new Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. While the "autonomous regions" would remain responsible for recruiting and organizing their own field forces, they could do so only with Belgrade's approval. The General Staff in Belgrade would retain operational control over all of these forces. Ethnically, the new "Yugoslav Army" was to be almost entirely Serbian and Montenegrin, a measure designed to ensure loyalty among officers and troops. 68

122. This plan for reorganization was overtaken by events on the ground, including the forced withdrawal of JNA troops from Macedonia and the worsening situation in BiH. By May 1992, the JNA had changed its name to the Yugoslav Army (YA), and had made a token withdrawal of forces from BiH. Roughly 80,000 former JNA forces deployed in BiH were officially transferred to the "Territorial Defence Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (SRBiH).

123. Salient features of the new JA include its smaller size and its greater reliance on professional soldiers. Fifty per cent of the JA were professional soldiers, recruited primarily from former conscripts. Along with downsizing, the JA initiated a rapid programme of equipment modernization. It transferred its older weapons to Serbian irregular units and replaced them with more modern, sophisticated weapons. Structurally, the JA created a force structure that includes forces capable of rapid intervention. New plans were prepared for the defence of the new FRY, particularly contemplating the eventuality of foreign military intervention in the conflict in Croatia and later in BiH.
J. Forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

124. At the beginning of 1993, the JA troop strength was estimated to be 150,000 with 400,000 reserves. An additional 110,000 troops was nominally subordinated to the Defence Ministries of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) and the Serbian Republic of Krajina. These forces receive instructions, arms and ammunition and other support from the JA and from the FRY.

125. JNA units were typically kept below full strength in peace time, to be supplemented by reservists as needed. The JNA units have the following characteristics:

(a) JNA Forces wear uniforms with distinctive emblems;
(b) Officers have identifiable rank; and
(c) Effective command and control exists.

126. The JNA exercised authority over Bosnian Serb and Croatian-Serb militias and armed civilian groups within their operational areas, but only during military operations in which the JNA was involved.

K. Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

127. On 1 March 1992, BiH became the fourth Yugoslav Republic to declare its independence from the former Federal Government. The first three were Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. The BiH declaration of independence caused a split in that former Republic along ethnic lines. The large Serbian minority, approximately 33 per cent of the population, had passed their own referendum opting to remain a part of Yugoslavia in November 1991. Bosnian Serbs boycotted the March, BiH-wide referendum on independence. The Bosnian Muslims, 44 per cent of the population, and ethnic Croats, 17 per cent of the population, voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession. This sparked a rebellion among the Serb population and led to the bloodiest fighting to date in the former Yugoslavia.

128. What follows is a brief description of forces deployed in BiH at the time that conflict erupted.

L. The Territorial Defence forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH)

129. In the months preceding the formal declaration of BiH's independence from the Yugoslav federation, the republic's civilian leadership had been involved in negotiations for the withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnian soil. In April 1992, the Government of BiH ordered the official withdrawal of all Federal forces, which were not ethnically from BiH. As a result, approximately 14,000 JNA troops were withdrawn from BiH in late May 1992. The Federal troops remaining, 80,000 combatants, were transferred with their equipment to the "Territorial Defence Forces of the SRBiH" (SRBiH).

130. The Belgrade government announced on 4 May 1992 that it would withdraw troops who were not from BiH. As a result, approximately 14,000 JNA troops were withdrawn from BiH in late May 1992. The Federal troops remaining, 80,000 combatants, were transferred with their equipment to the "Territorial Defence Forces of the SRBiH" (SRBiH).

131. Serbian forces have divided BiH into six areas: 2nd Corps in the north-west, the so-called Muslim Triangle; 17 Corps in the north-east; 1 Corps in the centre, the Romanija Corps in the area of Sarajevo; the Drina Corps in the area around Srebrenica; and the Herzegovina Corps in the South.
132. The commander of the SRBiH is General Ratko Mladić, a former JNA Brigadier General and former commander of the JNA's 9th Corps headquartered at Knin. 74/

133. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the Bosnian Serb force of the Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA). The Romanija Corps has surrounded the city of Sarajevo since the beginning of the siege. It is the successor of the JNA unit which occupied the same position until May 1992. There are indications that early in the siege the JNA was involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. 75/

134. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps' headquarters is located in the hills overlooking the city at Lukavica. The Corps was originally commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipić who was followed by Major General Stanislav Galić. The command structure has largely remained the same throughout the siege. The BSA forces have concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hills. (See Annex VI, The Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.)

135. Since the beginning of the siege, on 5 April 1992, the 1st Corps Sarajevo served as the BiH defensive force in and around Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the 1st Corps as having superior infantry numbers to the besieging forces, but clearly deficient in its firepower. The 1st Corps Sarajevo headquarters is located in Sarajevo and was originally commanded by Mustafa Hajrulahović. The most recent commander was Vahid Karavelić.

136. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the 1st Corps forces fought together in defence of the city throughout much of the siege, despite opposing one another in Mostar and in other parts of BiH. However, in late September 1993, there were reports that the Bosnian Serb forces (BSA) held their fire along sections of the front in Sarajevo which were defended by the HVO. These forces traded cigarettes and food across the Miljacka. In early November 1993, the BiH army disbanded the HVO unit in Sarajevo and arrested its commander, Slavko Zelić. The BiH army then invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the 1st Corps. (See Annex VI, The Battle and Siege of Sarajevo)

137. General Mladić is reported to have issued explicit orders to bombard non-Serbian civilian targets within the city of Sarajevo. 76/ Such targets have included the main hospital (which receives the bulk of its shelling during the mid-afternoon visiting hours), mosques, churches, and other civilian targets. 77/

138. General Mladić's headquarters moved from Pale, near Sarajevo, to more secure facilities near Han Pijesak, north-east of Sarajevo, in the summer or fall of 1992. 78/ From there, Mladić has secure communications with his deployed forces and with Belgrade. 79/ Mladić is the effective commander of these forces, but field commanders apparently have wide latitude in carrying out his guidance. 80/ Furthermore, cooperation and coordination between the SRBiH and local Serbian paramilitary forces have not been uniformly effective. 81/

139. Estimates of SRBiH troop strength have been unreliable, at least in part because of the confusion of SRBiH forces and the various ethnic-Serb paramilitary groups. Of an approximately 80,000 troops of the former JNA deployed in BiH, roughly 35,000 are considered an effective fighting force. 82/ Many of these troops move in and out of active duty, performing civilian functions when not called to engage in military activity.

140. By the beginning of 1993, in the Sarajevo area, SRBiH forces fell under the command of the IV East Bosnian Corps (also known as the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps), 83/ first commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipić, then by
IV East Bosnian Corps controls elements of the former JNA 4th Corps. 141. Units deployed in the Sarajevo area include the following:

(a) The 7th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Jovo Bartula, Slaviša Terzić (rank unknown), Svetozar Antić (rank unknown), and Ilija Stanarović (rank unknown), reportedly consists of three infantry battalions. It is reportedly operating to the south of Sarajevo.

(b) The 10th Infantry Brigade, which operates east of the city (no further information available).

142. The IV East Bosnian Corps is headquartered at Pale and retains several units in the vicinity of the headquarters. These units include the following:

(a) 14th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (no further information available);

(b) 215th Infantry Brigade (no further information available); and

(c) 9th Air Defence Artillery Regiment (no further information available).

143. In addition to these units, the IV East Bosnian Corps has several unidentified battalion formations of unknown strength, a military police element, and two regiments of artillery and mixed artillery/anti-tank weapons. The current deployment of these units is not known. Furthermore, the Corps controls two additional brigades of infantry (one of which is reportedly mountain infantry) whose whereabouts are unknown.

144. Croatian sources have reported that the SRBiH has approximately 350 tanks, over 200 armoured personnel carriers, and as many as 1,000 field guns, as well as mortars and recoilless guns. Much of this inventory is likely to be in a poor state of readiness because of combat losses and damage, and because of poor maintenance.

145. The SRBiH has large quantities of small arms and ammunition. The former JNA seized 450,000 small arms prior to its redeployment, 20,000 of which came from Sarajevo.

146. Apart from the former JNA forces deployed in BiH, troops from Serbia have augmented local paramilitary forces. These forces vary greatly in size, strength, armament, and effectiveness. Collectively, they are referred to by the traditional moniker "etniks.

M. Serbian forces

147. There has been no "Serbian Army" since 1915. However, in June 1991, Serbia's defence minister announced that Serbia would form its own army if the nation of Yugoslavia collapsed. Concern over the breakup of the Yugoslav federation led the Serb Republic to accelerate modernization of its TDF units should the need arise to re-establish the Serbian army.

148. Like the other republics, Serbia had troops under the control of its Ministry of the Interior, primarily police units. In April 1991, Serbia conducted a partial mobilization of its police reserves, ostensibly to keep peace in the Muslim populated Sandžak region of Serbia. By July, Croatian sources indicated that these police units were massing along Serbia's
The call up of police reserves was also designed to provide troop strength for Serbian paramilitary units. The mission of these units is to support Serb minorities in other Republics of the former Yugoslavia. These paramilitary units are linked with various Serbian nationalist political groups. Some of these units were fighting in Krajina by July 1991.

The paramilitary forces include units such as Arkan's "Tigers", Šešelj's "White Eagles", Captain Dragan's forces, as well as forces led by retired JNA General Dušan Pekić. Dušan is associated with the "League of Communists - Movement for Yugoslavia". These and other paramilitary units are discussed in Annex III.A., Special Forces.

In mid-July 1991, the Serbian Radical Party announced its intention to send volunteer forces to the Krajina. The Serbian ministry for internal affairs was allegedly responsible for de-stabilizing other Republics and encouraging the Serbian population in Croatia, BiH, and Kosovo.

In BiH, local Serbian leaders began to form paramilitary units in the summer of 1991, in response to the fighting in Croatia. These units were secretly armed and supplied by the former federal army. In addition, Serbian paramilitary groups based in Croatia and Serbia infiltrated parts of BiH where the Serbs comprised a majority of the population. Clashes among the Serbs, Muslims and Croats took place in late February 1992. Full scale hostilities broke out in April 1992, when Serbian irregulars opened fire on peaceful demonstrators in Sarajevo. At least 62 paramilitary units, or special forces, have been identified as operating within BiH. These units have close ties to the governments with which they are aligned. In fact, many of these units report to senior governmental officials in Serbia and Croatia.

Some towns and villages formed additional paramilitary units. These local forces operate in the areas of their towns and villages. Occasionally, they lend support to similar groups and other combatants in the same opština (county) and neighbouring areas. Their command and control is local and the chain of command difficult to establish, though characteristically these groups, like the special forces, have an identifiable leader. Frequently, the unit or group uses a politically significant name, or the name of their town, village or area. The leadership is drawn from the local area, and mostly consists of political figures. These units, particularly among Serbs in BiH and Croats in Krajina, have, like the special forces, committed many violations of international humanitarian law. The police (POLICIJA), augmented by "volunteer" armed civilians, also participate in military activities. These forces operate within a given municipality (opština) and are normally under the overall control of the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, the respective ministries of interior also have national and regional police units which usually operate outside the boundaries of local municipalities. The relationship between national, regional, and local police is not always clear and varies in each country and, sometimes, within the regions of each country. During the early stages of the conflicts in Croatia and in BiH, the police, augmented by volunteer armed civilians, operated without apparent command and control from the army. Their leadership was local, and included many political figures. These forces acted with almost complete autonomy in their respective areas.

N. Forces allied with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

The political leadership in Sarajevo was unprepared for the Serbian
paramilitary and SRBiH attacks. 101/ As a result, Serb forces controlled approximately 70 per cent of BiH before the Bosnian government mounted an effective resistance. 102/

154. Alarmed by Serbian attacks, local Muslim leaders organized paramilitary units in 1991. 103/ The first of these units was the "Bosna" organization, also known as the "Green Berets" for their distinctive headgear. The unit, composed of volunteers ranging in age from 15 to 60, is armed with former JA small arms, German-made light anti-tank weapons, and mortars. 104/ These and other paramilitary forces are discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces. It should be noted that there is no single unit called "Green Berets". Most BiH units wear green berets and are referred to as such by sources.

155. The "Patriotic League of the People", with a reported strength of 3,500 troops is another Muslim paramilitary force. 105/ The group's weaponry is unknown, but because of the generally poor preparations for war in BiH and the United Nations arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia, it is unlikely to have large quantities of arms.

156. The Serbs initially claimed that BiH had organized 50,000 soldiers into four divisions and an assortment of smaller, independent elements. This claim, however, appears to have been principally designed for propaganda purposes. 106/ In reality, the government of BiH was unprepared for war. 157. On 11 April 1992, the Bosnian government ordered unification of all armed groups under the republic's General Staff. The General Staff then locally organized 75 communal staffs to administer the army. These local staffs consisted of 122 former JNA officers and NCOs and 33 civilian employees. 107/

158. On 14 May 1992, the government established a regular army under the President. The troops were to be administered by the Ministry of Defence through the General Staff. 108/ The government remained in Sarajevo. As a result, the entire Cabinet has been confined in the besieged city. This has had an adverse effect on command and control within the army, and on coordination of the fight at all levels. 109/ What follows is a breakdown of the military forces allied with the Republic of BiH.

O. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

159. By 1993, the Army of BiH was organized into five Corps commands, with a total of about 70,000 troops. However, only about 44,000 of this total was armed. The Corps consist of five brigades of 1,000 to 1,500 soldiers each, although some brigades are reportedly much smaller. Brigades are responsible for defending specific geographical areas. 110/ Each Corps is assigned to an Operational Zone in either Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Mostar.

160. Unlike the HVO and BSA, which can rely on support from neighbouring governments with which they are aligned, BiH has no effective neighbouring support. Consequently, volunteers in BiH are generally poorly trained and equipped.

161. In the spring of 1994, BiH achieved some successes against Serbian Forces. In part, this may be due to an improved ability to produce arms within BiH. According to a report by one military analyst, BiH's defence industry employs approximately 15,000 persons. 111/ It has also been reported that production has been restarted on Kobra (Cobra) assault rifles, hand grenades, grenade launchers, and other weaponry. 112/ Other weapons
reached BiH from abroad through Croatia.

P. Territorial Defence Forces (TDF)

162. Muslim TDF forces represent the Republic's territorial defence structure, including some local-level militias. TDF forces are usually comprised of Muslim soldiers, although there are sometimes also Croatians and Serbians. The forces usually operate under local or regional command.

Q. Forces of the Croatian community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

163. The Bosnian Croat regular army is composed of 21 Brigades which include an estimated 60,000-70,000 troops in four operational groups. These operational groups are located in the four Operational Zones of south-east Herzegovina, south-west Herzegovina, middle Bosnia, and Posavina.

R. Croatian Defence Council (HVO)

164. These surrogate forces of the Republic of Croatian regular army (HV), known as the HVO. They are usually comprised of Bosnian Croatians armed and trained by Croatia, and tend to be more disciplined. This is the principal Croatian military force fighting in BiH.

165. Until 1994, the Muslim and Croat forces in BiH were poorly armed compared to their adversaries, both in terms of the quantity and quality of their weapons. Most of the small arms are former JNA weapons of early post-war vintage. 

166. In addition to indigenous ethnic Muslim and Croat forces, expatriots and volunteers from countries have contributed small forces to fight the Serbs. While reports have varied as to the number of mujahedin, volunteers from Islamic countries, the most accurate figure is between 400 and 600. In addition, Turkey and Iran reportedly sent military trainers and advisors to the Bosnian army.

S. The military industry in the Former Yugoslavia

167. Before 1991, Yugoslavia had over 150 government-owned companies which produced aeroplanes, tanks, trucks, armed personnel carriers, artillery, rocket launchers, small arms, munitions and spare parts, even submarines.

168. These industries were located in different parts of the country and came under different control as the overall conflict developed into three separate conflicts. This explains in part why some of the warring factions had certain weapons and equipment and not others.
Notes


3/ Id. at 30, 117.

4/ James Gow, "One Year of War in Bosnia Herzegovina", 2 Jane's Intelligence Review 1 (4 June 1993).


11/ Geneva Conventions Protocol I/ Protocol II

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13/ Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History (1975). See also Annex IV, Part I, which discusses the history of the region.

14/ Id.

15/ In contrast, 14 German divisions had an authorized strength of roughly 10,000 troops per division.
Notes (continued)

16/ The Partisan military accomplishments are even more noteworthy because, unlike most guerilla armies in history, the countryside in which they operated was not necessarily friendly. Ustaše and Četnik forces, using tactics similar to those of the Partisans, occupied the same woods. This reduced the "safe haven" factor historically crucial to guerilla forces.

17/ A frequently used tactic was to hide in the hills, allow the German combat formations to bypass the hidden Partisans, and then to attack the support troops that followed behind the infantry. This caused major disruption to the German lines of support and communication, and had an extremely demoralizing effect on the German troops.

18/ The Germans launched at least seven major offensives to destroy the Partisans, using German, Četnik, Ustaše, and other Axis troops. While the Partisans suffered serious casualties, they were never completely defeated.

19/ The depth of the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviets is underscored by the existence of a formal United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group in Belgrade from 1951 to 1961, at the height of the Cold War. Over the course of the Cold War, the United States extended some $600 million in military grants and an equal amount in economic assistance to Yugoslavia.


21/ Michael S. Evancevich, "Danger in the Balkans", in Military Intelligence 10, 12 (April-June 1993).

22/ Id.

23/ Id.


25/ Id.

26/ Id.

27/ TNID was codified in Article 240 of Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution, which states that the armed forces consist of the YPA and territorial defence units.


29/ Id. The assessment that command, control, and communications facilities were vulnerable was based on the assumption, probably accurate, that an invading Soviet force would achieve air superiority early in the campaign and would thus be able to destroy the military infrastructure from the air. Id.
Notes (continued)


31/ Id. at 395.

32/ Id.

33/ Id.

34/ Id. In addition to military weapons, an estimated 1.6 million citizens legally owned private firearms in 1989. Id.

35/ Id. See also James Gow, "The Yugoslav Army, An Update", Jane's Intelligence Review 501 et seq. (November 1993); Milan Vego, "Yugoslav Ground Forces", Jane's Intelligence Review 247 et seq. (June 1993).

36/ David C. Isby, "Yugoslavia 1991 - Forces In Conflict", 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 395 (1991). After 1991, the reorganized JNA effectively came under the direct command of President Milošević, who was reportedly personally involved in the appointment of succeeding chiefs of staff and also of other senior officers. He is also reported to have become increasingly involved since 1991 in strategic and major tactical decisions, such as the type and level of military supplies and assistance given to the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia.


38/ Id.

39/ Id.

40/ Id. at 396-97. The Air and Naval forces did not exhibit this striking ethnic imbalance. Id. at 397.

41/ Id. at 395.

42/ Id.

43/ Id.

44/ Id.

45/ Id. at 397.

46/ Id.

47/ Id. at 395.

48/ Id. at 397-98.

49/ Id. at 398.
Notes (continued)

50/ Id.

51/ Id.

52/ Id.

53/ Id.

54/ Id.

55/ The structural information presented here is drawn directly from Michael Brown, "Yugoslavia's Armed Forces - Order of Battle", 3 Jane's Intelligence Review 366 (1991).

56/ There were 230 M-84 model tanks, the Yugoslav version of the Soviet T-72 and 758 were the older, slower, and less heavily armoured T-55 model. Id.

57/ "Guards" is an honourific meant to recognize a unit's performance in combat.

58/ The active Mountain Brigade was the 6th, headquartered at Delnice, and subordinate to 13th Corps, 5th MD. Id.

59/ These were the 81st Partisan Brigade at Mostanika, and the 63rd Partisan Brigade at Zvezdara. The other 19 brigades were subordinate to various Corps headquarters, and through the Corps to the MD. Id.


63/ Id.

64/ Id.

65/ Id.

66/ Id. The YPA's performance against the Slovenes is discussed infra. See also supra note 6.

67/ See Annex IV.B.

68/ After its reorganization, the composition of the Yugoslav Army enlisted force was 50 per cent Serb, 20 per cent Montenegrin, and 30 per cent "other" -- primarily ethnic Albanians and Hungarians. The officer corps,
However, was 92.6 per cent Serbian, 7 per cent Montenegrin, and .4 per cent "other".


70/ Id.

71/ Id.

72/ Id.

73/ Id. The abbreviation "SRBiH" is used by the United Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR).


75/ See Annex VI, Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, for a daily chronology of the battle and siege and a detailed analysis and comprehensive breakdown of the forces in and around the city.

76/ Id. See also "Transcript of Radio Communications by Radovan Karadžić, Ratko Mladić and Others", (conversations reportedly between Mladić and his artillery commanders in which Mladić orders civilian targets hit repeatedly).

77/ Id.


79/ Id.

80/ Id.

81/ Id.

82/ Id.

83/ Id. at 447.

84/ UNPROFOR Order of Battle Document (25 May 93), IHRLI Doc. No. 2549-25123, at 25077.


86/ This analysis was made by comparing UNPROFOR Order of Battle Documents, with UNPROFOR Pictorial Information Summaries (PICINFSUM), 27 May 93.
Notes (continued)

87/ A more detailed and updated analysis is available in the Sarajevo report, Annex VI.


89/ Id.

90/ Id.

91/ Id.


93/ Id.

94/ Id.

95/ Id.

96/ Id.

97/ Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.


99/ Id.

100/ See Annex III.A, Special Forces.


102/ Id.

103/ Id.

104/ Id. at 63-4.

105/ Id. at 64.

106/ Id.

107/ Id.

108/ Id. at 65.

109/ Id. at 64.

110/ Id. at 65.
Notes (continued)


112/ Id.

113/ Id. at 64. Typical weapons include AK-74 assault rifles, 90 millimetre. M79 Osa [Wasp] and 120 millimetre. Zolja [Hornet] anti-tank rockets, and German Panzerfaust bazookas, as well as 60 millimetre and 80 millimetre mortars. Id. Older weapons include AK-47 assault rifles, and M48 rifles (early postwar vintage).

114/ Id.

115/ Id.

116/ Miodrag Ivanović, "The Fate of the Yugoslav Military Industry", Jane's Intelligence Review, 164 et. seq. (March 1993).
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ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX III.A
SPECIAL FORCES

Under the Direction of:

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has seen the widespread use of paramilitary organizations within the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Republic of Croatia, and to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The use of paramilitary organizations by all "warring factions" must be viewed in the context of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the structure of the military before the breakup. 1/ In the period of 1989-1991, political ferment indicated that a breakup of Yugoslavia was likely. However, there were no indications as to how the country would be divided. The rise of nationalism and ethnic tension caused Yugoslavs to become concerned for their own safety. This concern over their own self-defense, combined with the rhetoric of nationalist politicians, led many Yugoslavs to arm themselves. Furthermore, uncertainty about the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) role in post-Communist Yugoslavia led many to conclude that paramilitary organizations were a necessity.

2. The creation of paramilitary groups was further fueled by the wide circulation of stories of atrocities committed by all sides. Serbs, for example, were shown pictures allegedly depicting the Mujahedin forces holding the severed heads of Serb soldiers. All sides viewed themselves as victims, not as perpetrators, thereby creating a desire for revenge and providing justification for their own deeds.

3. Paramilitary organizations exist in several forms. Some are highly-organized groups and operate in several theatres in conjunction with regular military formations. Others are loosely organized and act alone in a single village or on an ad hoc basis. Some of the groups preceded the conflict, others followed it. Still others were formed as the need arose during the conflict. These groups have been organized by the governments or militaries of the warring factions, by political parties, as well as by local police, political, military or community leaders. The members of these paramilitary organizations have been drawn from the regular army, Territorial Defence forces, local militia and police, local civilians, expatriots, and foreign nationals. According to some reports, the paramilitary organizations also include criminals released from prison solely for the purpose of forming these units.

4. For purposes of this report, the paramilitary forces operating in the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be classified into four categories: Special Forces, "Militias", "Paramilitary units", and "police augmented by armed civilians". 2/ Special Forces usually operate with substantial autonomy under the command of an identified leader. They operate in several theatres, and sometimes engage in joint operations with the regular militaries. These groups are supplied, and often trained, by the governments they serve. Many of these Special Forces report solely to senior political officials. "Militias" consist of members of the former Territorial Defence Forces. They frequently operate jointly, in the geographic area from which they originate under the command of the regular army. "Paramilitary units" are forces under the command of a local leader. Their area of operation is often confined to the town or village from which the members were drawn, although they may occasionally operate alongside similar groups in other towns or villages. The "police augmented by armed civilians" are forces that operate within a given county 3/ under local, sometimes political, leadership. These forces frequently act with autonomy, although they are reported to be under the control of the Ministry of Interior or other political organizations. For purposes of this report, groups from these categories will be referred to generically as paramilitary groups, unless otherwise indicated.

5. This report attempts to identify the paramilitary organizations working
in support of all three warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. It also
discusses how these groups operate in relation to the regular military command
of the respective factions. Furthermore, this report discusses the reported
activity of these groups.

6. This report begins with a discussion of the research methodology, and is
followed by a brief discussion of the pre-conflict military defence doctrine
of the former Yugoslavia. This doctrine, with its reliance on a decentralized
command structure and locally-based weapons caches, provided fertile ground
for the creation of paramilitary groups. This discussion is followed by a
summary analysis of the data. Section II discusses the activity of six of the
most prolific paramilitary organizations: the Green Berets and Mujahedin,
working in support of the government of BiH; the HOS and troops under the
command of Jusuf Prazina, working in support of the Croatian government; and
those groups under the command of Vojislav Šešelj and Željko Ražnatović (nom
de guerre Arkan), working in support of the government of Serbia and the self-
declared Serb Republics. Section III is a listing of the other identified
paramilitary organizations containing all reported vital statistics, and
Section IV discusses paramilitary activity by geographic location.

A. Methodology

7. This report is based on information contained in documents and audio and
video tapes received by the Commission of Experts and the International Human
Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), as well as on information gathered from searches
of the Nexis and FBIS media databases. All of the organizations referred to
in paragraph 4 operated in substitution for, or supplementing, a regular
military force. 4/ All documents and media reports in the possession of
IHRLI were reviewed, and those containing allegations of paramilitary activity
were analysed. A large number of these reports referred to paramilitary
groups generically (i.e., Serbian paramilitaries or irregular forces).
Although these reports were consulted, only those reports referring to a
paramilitary organization by name (i.e., Tigers, Yellow Ants), or by specific
leaders or group members (i.e., paramilitary forces under Dragan Ikanović),
are included in the statistical data below.

8. Information sheets were created for each identified paramilitary
organization containing the following information: name of unit, ethnicity,
uniform, number of troops, place of origin, area(s) of operation, political
affiliation, leader(s), alleged members, source of information, and the
alleged activity. These information sheets were then used to compare
information on the paramilitary groups in a standardized format.

9. This report is limited by the quality and quantity of the documents
received by the Commission. In addition, the Commission was not able to
verify much of the information that it received. Consequently, this report
should not be considered all inclusive, though it is comprehensive.
Subsequent investigation may identify additional paramilitary groups and facts
that have not yet been discovered that may bear upon the information contained
in this report.

B. Brief military history 5/

10. Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform led to fears of a
Soviet invasion. These fears resulted in the development of a new military
defence doctrine in the former Yugoslavia called "Total National
Defence". 6/ This doctrine was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion by
mobilizing all of the nation's cultural, societal, and military resources.
The Communist party apparatus was tightly integrated into the military scheme, with the military structures accommodating a "shadow" chain of command responsible to the Communist party.

11. Yugoslav military strategists realized national command, control, and communications facilities were vulnerable. Therefore, they decentralized the system of command and control. The governments of the various republics would participate with the federal government for regional defence.

12. This strategy required universal military service and coordinated training in guerrilla warfare. This ensured that cadres of soldiers, trained in guerrilla warfare, would be available nationwide and capable of operating in a decentralized command fashion. Training facilities, weapons caches, and supply stores were placed throughout the country. The military also organized reserve units (Territorial Defence Forces) around workplaces to ensure the wide distribution of weapons.

13. Thus, with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, trained soldiers were available for mobilization, and weapons and ammunition were also available for distribution to national and local political or military leaders and their followers. These leaders sometimes used these resources to further their own political, military, or personal goals. This, along with the other factors, led to the proliferation of paramilitaries throughout the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

C. Summary analysis

14. This study found that:

(a) There are at least 83 identified paramilitary groups operating in the territories of the former Yugoslavia: 56 are working in support of FRY and the self-declared Serbian Republics; 13 are working in support of the Republic of Croatia; and 14 are working in support of BiH;

(b) The number of paramilitary groups, and the size of each group, has varied throughout the course of the conflict. The number and size of the groups rise, for example, when the conflict intensifies. The reports received indicate only a rough approximation of paramilitary troop strength. The number of persons in paramilitary groups fighting in support of BiH range from 4,000 to 6,000; between 12,000 and 20,000 have supported the Republic of Croatia; and between 20,000 and 40,000 paramilitaries have fought on behalf of the self-declared Serb Republics;

(c) In addition to the 83 paramilitary groups, there are groups which consist of persons who have been drawn essentially from outside the former Yugoslavia. Three groups specifically mentioned are the Mujahedin (operating with the BiH Army), the Garibaldi Unit (an Italian unit operating alongside the Croats), and Russian Mercenaries (operating in conjunction with the Serbs). There are also general reports of the presence of mercenaries from Denmark, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States;

(d) Paramilitary activity has been reported in 72 separate counties, but the vast majority has occurred in BiH.

15. The first report of paramilitary activity occurred in April of 1991. However, Arkan and Vojislav Šešelj began forming paramilitary organizations as early as 1990. The first reported paramilitary operation involved Šešelj’s troops in Vukovar County, Croatia. The most active period for Serb paramilitary activity in Croatia was in October of 1991. Those areas
reporting the greatest amount of paramilitary activity in Croatia were Knin, Podravská Slatina, and Vukovar.

16. There were no reports of paramilitary activity in BiH until early 1992. The first reports concerned paramilitary groups supported by Arkan and Šešelj. The activity in BiH was strongest in May and June of 1992 in the areas of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboj, Poča, Konjic, Modriča, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Višegrad, and Zvornik.

17. Paramilitary groups working in support of FRY, or the self-proclaimed Serbian Republics, have operated in the territories of BiH, Croatia, and FRY. Those groups working in support of Croatia were reported to have operated in both BiH and Croatia, while those supporting BiH have not been involved in operations outside BiH territory. 12/

18. The vast majority of the paramilitaries acted locally, with their operations confined to a single county, or opština. 13/ They operated under the command of a local leader with local command and control. These groups would often coordinate their operations with regular forces or other paramilitaries. 14/ The local groups would then take control of the area after it had been secured.

19. The most active paramilitary groups operating throughout the area of conflict were the Serb groups under the command of Arkan and Šešelj. 15/

20. Reliance on, or tolerance of, paramilitary and special forces served several purposes for the military and political leaders of the respective republics. It clouded the issue of command and control, reduced the chances of being identified, and therefore permitted the greater use of illegal violence. Many of these groups, for example, did not wear uniforms or other conventional military badges or symbols.

21. Involvement of paramilitary groups in the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law is alleged in the vast majority of the reports in which paramilitary groups are mentioned. The most frequently reported violations are the killing of civilians, torture, rape, destruction of property, and looting. 16/ There is also a strong correlation between reports of paramilitary activity and reports of rape and sexual assault, detention facilities, and mass graves. These types of activities (i.e., paramilitary activity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions) tended to occur in the same counties 17/ and evidence the localized nature of the activity.

22. FRY, Croatia, and BiH used paramilitary forces. However, the disproportionate number of paramilitary and special forces of Serbian ethnicity indicates that the Serbs more heavily relied on the use of special forces to accomplish their military and strategic goals. Of 38 counties where Serb paramilitary activity was reported, Serb paramilitary units were operating in conjunction with the JNA in 24 of them. In comparison there were reports for five counties of joint operations between forces operating in support of Croatia, the Croatian Army (HV), and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), 18/ and reports for only two counties of joint operations between the Army of BiH and forces operating in support of the Government of BiH.

23. The JNA was operating with the highest paramilitary activity in eight counties simultaneously: Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboj, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Višegrad, and Zvornik. Excluding Sarajevo, these counties are within the strategic arc the Serbs need to link all Serbian populations from BiH and Croatia within a contiguous Serbian state.
24. There is substantial evidence that Serbian government or military officials have coordinated, or at least have been aware of, the activities of the Serbian paramilitary or special forces:

(a) Serbian paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps; 19/

(b) There are reports of Serbian paramilitary groups or special forces entering a county at the invitation of local political leaders. In Prijedor, a Bosnian Serb government spokesman explained their use of Arkan: "He is very expensive, but also very efficient";

(c) In 36 of the 67 counties in which there were reports of Serbian paramilitary activity, there was a coordination of operations between two or more groups. In comparison, only six of the 17 counties had reported paramilitary activity in support of Croatia and five of the 11 counties had reported paramilitary activity in support of BiH;

(d) Fifteen of the 55 identified groups operated in more than one county, again suggesting a coordination of activity, compared to five Croatian and four working in support of BiH in more than one county.

D. General observations

25. While paramilitary groups have links to their respective governments, the nature of these links vary according to which agency furnishes funds, supplies, and military equipment to the group. Thus, Arkan is said to have strong links to Serbia's Ministry of Interior. The HOS in Croatia have links to political figures in that country, and the Green Berets have links to the Presidency of BiH. Control of the paramilitary groups is largely a function of the internal politics of the warring factions.

26. Members of ethnic and religious groups, such as Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims residing outside of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, have participated in the conflict as mercenaries. Some members of these groups, as well as persons of other nationalities, have been paid by the "warring faction" which they supported. 20/

27. In most cases, paramilitary groups have coordinated their activities with the armies of the "warring factions". The groups that have operated with the most independence are the HOS in Croatia and the Mujahedin in BiH. The smaller the group, the greater the tendency to operate outside of the army's control.

28. In many counties, Serbian special forces supported the work of local "crisis committees" when local militia or local police were unavailable. This further evidences the localized nature of most paramilitary activity. In some respects, it also reflects the doctrines of guerrilla warfare inspired by Tito's World War II experience.

29. In BiH, Serb paramilitary activity was at its greatest level in the second half of 1992. During this period, immediately after the JNA was officially withdrawn, there was disorganization and confusion within the regular armed forces of the Bosnian Serb Army. This led to a lack of command and control, and it was during this period that the greatest number of violations by Serb paramilitary groups occurred.

30. Serb paramilitary members have been recruited largely from the population of persons between the ages of 18 to 30. This population of young
persons is more capable of violence and less susceptible to control than older age cohorts. Paramilitary members have also been recruited from prisons. It has been reported that persons convicted of violent offences were released to fight in BiH. The Army apparently had the first pick from among these offenders. The others served in paramilitary units.

31. Most of the paramilitary units sustained themselves through lootings, thefts, ransoms and trafficking in contraband. This is especially true of the groups associated with Arkan, as discussed below.

32. The largest number of violations were committed by Serb paramilitary groups fighting in BiH in support of the breakaway Serb Republic. This can be explained, in part, by the following: There are more Serb paramilitary groups than those fighting on behalf of the other warring factions; Serb paramilitary groups have more members than the other groups; Serb paramilitary groups have operated over a wider range of territory, thus they have been in contact with a larger number of potential victims; and the Serbs have pushed a policy of "ethnic cleansing" on a wider scale than the other groups.

II. MAJOR SPECIAL FORCES WORKING IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (BiH), CROATIA, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (FRY), AND THE SO-CALLED "BOSNIAN SERB REPUBLIC" AND "SERB REPUBLIC OF KRAJINA"

A. Introduction

33. As mentioned earlier, this study identifies 83 separate paramilitary forces operating in the former Yugoslavia. Six of these forces are discussed in greater detail below. These are the Green Berets and Mujahedin operating in support of the government of BiH, the HOS and Juka's Army 21/ operating in support of the Republic of Croatia, and the forces under the command of Arkan, 22/ and Šešelj, 23/ operating in support of FRY and the self-declared Serbian Republics in BiH and Croatia. These forces receive special attention because of the scope and significance of their military operations; their direct links to their respective governments and the regular militaries of those governments; the numerous allegations that these forces have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law; and, in the case of Arkan and Šešelj, their political prominence.

B. Forces operating in support of BiH - the Green Berets and Mujahedin

1. The Green Berets

(a) Scope of military operations

34. Reports received by the Commission on the activities of BiH paramilitary units were essentially supplied by opposing warring factions. Their designations may not necessarily reflect those of the BiH paramilitary units. Thus, there is not a single unit called the Green Berets or the MOS, but several units which may have different names, but are identified as Green Berets or MOS. For example, the 7th Muslimanska Brigada is often referred to as MOS. It should also be noted that the Patriotic League was the political organization which organized cells of resistance fighters, many of whom had served in the JNA or seen action in Croatia in 1991. References hereinafter to the Green Berets does not, therefore, specifically identify the real BiH
name of the unit, if any.

35. Most paramilitary organizations working in support of the government of BiH are referred to by others as "Green Berets" or "MOS". It is important to note that several different paramilitary units wore green berets. Therefore, there was no one unit called the "Green Berets". However, the reports of the violations committed by units wearing green berets are combined here under one section. The units wearing green berets were reportedly active in at least 17 counties throughout BiH. 24/ They have often acted with the Muslim Territorial Defence (MTD), and at times with the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), other Muslim paramilitary groups, and local Bosnians. 25/ They were reported to be conducting operations against the JNA, Serbian military and paramilitary groups the Croatian Liberation Union, and in some instances the HVO. 26/ The total number of Green Berets troops is unknown. 27/

36. The Green Berets appear to be well-armed, 28/ yet there is no clear information indicating from where or whom they received their weapons. It has been reported that Turkey supplied the Green Berets. The Turkish Prime Minister, Suleyman Demirel, denied this during a meeting with then Prime Minister of FRY, Milan Panić. 29/

37. Most of the reported Green Beret activity occurred between April 1992 and June 1993, with the highest level of reported activity occurring between May and September of 1992. These activities were directed by the Patriotic League.

(b) Ties with the Government and regular military of BiH

38. The well-armed Green Berets often acted alongside regular army battalions and often conducted large-scale operations throughout the territory of BiH. This was in furtherance of the government's strategic goals, which implies the government was exerting some command and control over this group.

39. In the 21 October 1992 attack on Vitez, the Green Berets reportedly acted under the command of MTD and their commander Rasim Delić. It was reported that this attack was carried out under the orders of the MTD's Supreme headquarters in Sarajevo. 30/

40. It has also been reported that the units that wear the green berets are loyal to President Alija Izetbegović. Since 1993, the Green Berets are reported to be under the command and control of the BiH army. However, as stated before, several different units wore green berets. Therefore, there is not a single unit per se called the "Green Berets" under the control of the BiH army. Rather, there could be several different paramilitary groups wearing green berets under its control.

(c) Allegations of violations

41. Several reports allege that the Green Berets have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. The Green Berets have been implicated in the killing of civilians, rapes, the operation of prison camps (in which civilians were unlawfully detained and sometimes tortured or killed), the destruction of property, and interference with humanitarian aid.
(d) **Summary of reported paramilitary activity**

42. Green Berets were highly active in military operations throughout BiH. Many reports indicate that in the second half of 1992, the Green Berets conducted joint operations with the HVO. In July 1992, both forces launched an offensive on the Dubrovnik-Trebina front in the south-west section of BiH. 32/ In September 1992, the Green Berets and HVO attacked the villages of Dobrinja, Otočac, Rajlovac, Stup, Vogošća, Žuž, and all suburbs of Sarajevo. 33/ On 10 November 1992, the Green Berets and HVO forces unsuccessfully attempted to join in Gradacac due to the HVO's inability to break through Serbian lines. 34/

43. When conducting offensives against towns or villages, the Green Berets, in some instances, are reported to have targeted schools, residences, and local industries. 35/

44. In addition to military activity against other armed forces, there are also many instances in which Green Berets directed military action against innocent civilians. Five reports describe Green Berets as "picking up" Serb civilians for questioning about the location of Serb camps and weapons. 36/ Serbs were usually taken from their homes to camps or other detention facilities. Torture was often used in questioning. 37/ Those arrested were often kept in detention for unreasonably long periods of time after questioning.

45. There are three reports of women being picked up and taken to camps for the purpose of being raped. 38/ One report states that a young Serbian woman was arrested by two Green Berets and taken to Viktor Bubanj in Sarajevo where she was questioned and raped repeatedly. She only indicates that she was raped by "Muslim soldiers" and does not specifically indicate that the Green Berets were involved. 39/ Another report suggests that the Green Berets in the village of Dzepa converted a house into a rape camp in the months of July and August 1992. 40/ It was also reported that the Green Berets would rape women upon seizing a village. In Bradina, for example, 15 women were reportedly raped in a local school when the village was attacked in July 1992. 41/ Many of these incidents and others are described in Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault.

46. There are several reports of Green Berets killing Serb civilians. In some instances these civilians were killed during the attacks of villages and ambushes of transit caravans. 42/ Of particular note is an attack on Bradina on or near 25 May 1992. Right hundred Green Berets from Hrasnica are reported to have acted with the HVO from Kosovo and Muslim villagers from the surrounding area in a large-scale attack on Bradina. 43/ It was reported that between 3,500 and 4,000 people took part in this attack. Fifty-seven Serb refugees who were in Bradina were killed and buried in the churchyard of an Orthodox Church. 44/ In other instances, Green Berets entered prison camps to take Serbs to be raped or killed. 45/ The most graphic killings are reported to have occurred at the Koševo Stadium in Sarajevo.

2. **Mujahedin**

(a) **Introduction**

47. Mujahedin, or "holy warriors", is a generic term for Muslim volunteers fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Many Mujahedin originate from Muslim countries outside the former Yugoslavia. It was reported that the Mujahedin began arriving in BiH as early as June 1992. 46/ Reports on the number of Mujahedin forces operating in BiH vary, but it is unlikely that the Mujahedin
forces have made a significant military contribution to the BiH Government’s war effort. 47/ The Mujahedin forces came from several Muslim states and many of them were veterans of the Afghan war. 48/

49. The Mujahedin forces were reported to be under the command of the BiH Army. 49/ However, they frequently acted with independence and their presence is no longer welcomed. 50/ They are alleged to be terrorizing the Muslims they came to protect in an effort to enforce Islamic practices. 51/ Their presence, the Serbs and Croats have argued, is evidence that the Bosnian Muslims intend on turning BiH into a fundamentalist Muslim state. 52/

(b) Scope of military activity

49. Mujahedin forces were actively involved in military operations in seven counties throughout BiH. 53/ The dates of reported activity range from June 1992 through June 1993, with the heaviest activity reported in Travnik, Zenica, and Konjic.

(c) Ties with the Government and regular military of BiH

50. Several reports indicate that the Mujahedin were placed under the command of the BiH Army. 54/ The Mujahedin forces were closely associated with the 5th Corps, the 6th and 7th Zenica Brigades, the 7th Travnik Brigade, and the 45th Muslim Brigade which belongs to the 6th Corps in Konjic of the Army of BiH. 55/ They also allegedly fought alongside the Muslim Police, the Krajiška Brigade from Travnik, units of Kosovo Muslims, Albanian soldiers, and paramilitary groups such as the "Green Legion" and the "Black Swans". 56/

51. Reports also indicate that the Mujahedin had the support of President Izetbegović and his government. 57/ This was demonstrated in the Bihać pocket, where the Mujahedin joined BiH forces loyal to Izetbegović. Together, these forces battled separatist forces who entered into a separate peace treaty with Bosnian Serbs. 58/

(d) Allegations of war crimes

52. Reports submitted to the Commission of Experts alleged that the Mujahedin have been responsible for the mutilation and killing of civilians, rape, looting, the destruction of property, and the expulsion of non-Muslim populations. The deputy commander of the BiH Army, Colonel Stjepan Šiber, has said, "it was a mistake to let them [the Mujahedin] here ... They commit most of the atrocities and work against the interests of the Muslim people. They have been killing, looting and stealing." 59/

(e) Summary of reported paramilitary activity 60/

53. In Zenica, between 31 August and 2 September 1992, 250 Mujahedin troops allegedly came to BiH from Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran. These troops worked alongside the Green Legion and HOS paramilitary groups stationed in Zenica. The Mujahedin allegedly also operated a camp at Arnauti. 61/ It was reported that a unit of the Mujahedin, called the "Guerrilla", participated in the 16 April 1993 attack on Vitez and attempted to exchange 10 HVO hostages for foreign prisoners held in HVO prisons. 62/
54. The Croatian Ministry of Defence is reported to have provided information about an event occurring in June 1993 -- a joint BiH/Mujahedin unit reportedly attacked Travnik, allegedly forcing 4,000 Croatian civilians and military personnel out of the town. 63/ The Mujahedin allegedly fought alongside the 6th Muslim Brigade from Zenica and the Krajška Brigade from Travnik. Witnesses stated that they saw Mujahedin operating in small patrols ahead of the approaching BiH troops. 64/

55. According to HVO intelligence, Mujahedin forces arrived in Travnik sometime before June 1993 and came from Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The Mujahedin trained at a camp at Mehurići, where they were allegedly financed and equipped by a man named Abdullah, the owner of the "Palma" video store in Travnik. 65/ Once in town, the Mujahedin were linked to the Seventh Brigade of the BiH Army, and were reportedly assembled into units of 10 to 15 men, and moved about on regular patrols. 66/ The Mujahedin created tension in Travnik in the days prior to the attack on 3 June. One witness stated that the Mujahedin directed their actions towards the HVO personnel in town. They allegedly demonstrated, shouted slogans and fired their rifles in the air. 67/

56. Mujahedin allegedly participated in the attack on Maljine in Novi Travnik on 8 June 1993, killing 20 to 30 HVO members and transporting Croatian women and children to the training centre at Mehurići. 68/

57. In Konjic, the Mujahedin were part of a 100 member force stationed at Liščioi and led by Haso Hakalović. The unit was assembled in February 1993 and included some Kosovo Muslims and members of the Black Swans from the Igman mountain region. 69/ Allegedly, Mujahedin troops killed and expelled villagers, and looted and burned homes, when they moved against the Jablanica-Konjic area. 70/ The Mujahedin troops and members of the Black Swans reportedly conducted occasional raids without members of BiH forces. 71/ Reportedly, the Mujahedin volunteers arrived in Konjic in small groups. It was reported that they were from Afghanistan and that they claimed to be students. They were allegedly armed with Hekleri automatic weapons and former JNA equipment. 72/ Some Mujahedin were reportedly former students with no military experience.

58. Mujahedin forces were present in Mostar since early June 1993. They were reportedly stationed in the Šantića neighbourhood on the Muslim/HVO front, where they manned bunkers, usually in groups of six or seven, armed with 7.62 millimetre semi-automatic weapons, machine-guns, and Zolja anti-tank weapons. They were billeted in a building they shared with the Muslim military police on the east bank of the Neretva River. The Mujahedin forces apparently left Mostar on 15 August. 73/

59. FRY reported that the Mujahedin began operations near Teslić in July and August of 1992. Troops from Saudi Arabia allegedly killed three Serbian Territorial Defence members and placed the victims’ severed heads on poles near the "Tešanj turret". 74/ Beheadings of Serbs by Mujahedin forces have also been reported in other areas.

60. The Mujahedin were also alleged to be part of the forces that invaded the village of Trusina near Foća on 15 April 1993. According to the report, attackers wore white ribbons on their arms and fought beside Albanian Muslim troops. Twenty-two civilians reportedly died in the attack. 75/ The Mujahedin allegedly performed crude circumcisions upon Serbian police forces, who were later treated by an American surgeon at the Moševo hospital in Sarajevo. 76/
C. Paramilitaries operating in support of the Croatian Government

1. The Croatian Defence Forces (HOS)

(a) Introduction

61. Dobroslav Paraga formed the HOS in 1991 as the paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP). The HOS fought Serbian rebels in Croatia and Bosnian Serb rebels throughout western BiH until August 1992. Under General Blaž Kraljević, the HOS established paramilitary headquarters at Ljubuški, BiH, but the HOS reportedly took orders from Zagreb. Local Croats and Muslims, Croatian emigres and foreign mercenaries all fought for the HOS. Muslim fighters reportedly joined the Croatian HOS because its leaders pledged to keep the territory of BiH intact. According to military analyst Dr. Milan Vego, Muslims made up 30 per cent of HOS forces and at least 50 per cent in the Mostar area in March 1992.

62. The HOS reportedly wore black uniforms bearing the Croatian checkered shield, that were similar to those worn by the Ustaše of the Second World War. They carried Kalishnikov rifles, Scorpions, Uzis, shotguns, and daggers. They detained large numbers of Serbian civilians from Čapljina and Mostar counties at the Dretelj military facilities south-west of Sarajevo and in detention centres situated along the Dalmatian coast. Villages near Bradina and Donje Selo were reportedly targets of HOS ethnic cleansing operations. According to witness accounts, HOS units often operated alongside Muslim Green Berets, who fought in support of the government of BiH.

63. Because of its success in fighting Serb forces throughout the summer of 1992, the HOS gained many new members. However, HOS strength was undermined after General Blaž Kraljević was killed in early August 1992. In an effort to maintain unity, the HVO and the HOS signed an agreement on 23 August 1992, which officially linked the two forces under the banner of the HVO.

(b) Scope of military activity

64. The HOS operated in Croatia and in Konjic, Mostar, Sarajevo, Bosanski Brod, Novi Travnik, and Zenica Counties in BiH. The HOS reportedly ran camps where civilians were tortured, raped and killed. Their detention facilities ranged from metal sheds in Čapljina to large camps like Dretelj in south-western BiH, where 500 prisoners were reportedly held.

(c) Ties with the Croatian Government and with the regular army

65. Formed as the paramilitary wing of the ultra-right HSP, the HOS reportedly trained soldiers at former JNA facilities in Slovenia and was supplied, in part, by the Republic of Croatia. There are also reports that HOS units served directly under the regular Croatian army. A Croatian military court tried HSP leader, Dobroslav Paraga, in 1993 for attempting to overthrow the Croatian Government. A Reuters report on the trial stated that the "majority of HOS units were proved to be under Croatian Army Command." After 1993, the HOS soldiers were integrated into the HVO.
(d) **Allegations of war crimes**

66. Witness statements, media accounts, and reports from FRY allege that HOS paramilitary units committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law in Croatia and in BiH. The HOS reportedly looted, destroyed Serbian property, including 24 Orthodox churches, and killed, raped, and mutilated civilians, including women and children. They also engaged in ethnic cleansing and operated detention facilities where civilians were starved and tortured.

(e) **Summary of reported paramilitary activity**

67. Reports sent to the Commission of Experts allege that the HOS detained civilians, including women and children, in facilities in Croatia and in BiH. These prisoners were often killed or abused by members of the HOS. An officer, whose name is known but not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, and other HOS members allegedly kept 40 women confined in a metal shed, which was a former munitions warehouse outside of Čapljina. 87/ An HOS unit and a Muslim paramilitary unit controlled the "Viktor Bubanj" detention facility in Sarajevo, where Serbian civilians were subjected to killing, torture, and rape. 88/ An identified HOS member allegedly interrogated prisoners at a secondary school (perhaps at Ahmici). 89/ A witness alleged that she was taken from her home in Čapljina to a tobacco factory where she was raped by members of the HOS. 90/ From April to October 1992, the HOS ran the Drželj detention facility, which contained civilians from the Mostar and Čapljina municipalities. 91/ Victims stated that they were subjected to sexual torture, beaten with truncheons and sticks, burned with cigarettes and candles, and forced to drink urine and eat grass. 92/ One victim reported that she was held in a room with three other professional women for 10 days during which time women in the room were raped repeatedly. 93/

68. During the spring of 1992, the HOS and Muslim Green Berets reportedly burned two villages in southern BiH, Donje Selo, and Bradina, and sent the inhabitants to nearby detention facilities. Donje Selo was attacked first. Bradina was attacked on 25 May 1992. The HOS transferred women prisoners to Konćic Sports Hall, where some of the victims were raped. The men were taken to Čelebići camp. The HOS returned to Bradina on 13 July burned the town, and imprisoned all those who remained in an elementary school. Many civilians allegedly died in the attacks. 94/

69. The FRY Mission to the United Nations reported that two Serbian civilians were tortured for a month before being killed at an HOS detention facility at Ljubuški. One of the victims was impaled and burned to death and the other was killed with a knife. 95/

70. In Croatia, the HOS allegedly operated the Lora camp at Split and detention facilities at Tomislavgrad and Metković. All of these facilities reportedly held prisoners from the Čapljina municipality of BiH. 96/

71. Many witnesses alleged that the HOS killed civilians outside of the camps as well, often in the victims’ homes or villages. In mid-1992, members of the HOS allegedly killed a man and his daughter outside the B. Lalić school in Novi Travnik. On 6 May 1992, in Majevije, BiH, members of the HOS allegedly stabbed a man over 100 times, severed his head, spilled his brains and intestines onto the ground, and cut off his genitals and placed them in his mouth. 97/

72. The HOS reportedly looted and stole from civilians throughout the
regions where they operated. Statements report forced entries into apartments and theft of valuables including money, jewelry, and documents. In Kakanj, the HOS reportedly confiscated and rented out apartments. 28/

73. HOS units allegedly destroyed property in BiH and in Croatia. 29/ During the summer of 1992, members of the HOS destroyed 24 Orthodox churches and two monasteries. 100/

2. Paramilitary forces under the command of Jusuf Prazina, alias "Juka"

(a) Introduction

74. According to The Daily Telegraph, Jusuf Prazina, alias Juka, was a racketeer and underworld figure in Sarajevo before hostilities broke out in April 1992. During the war, Juka and his troops are reported to have killed and raped civilians in Sarajevo and Mostar. He allegedly took hundreds of prisoners, looted houses, stole cars, and handed out Mostar apartments to the HVO. According to these reports, he never stopped racketeering; throughout the siege of Sarajevo, Juka reportedly controlled the black market, which included stolen United Nations humanitarian supplies. 101/

75. Juka, who was 30 years old in 1992, admitted being sent to jail five times before the war. He survived an armed assault outside the military hospital in Sarajevo in May of 1992, sustaining injuries which caused him to limp. 102/

76. Juka attained notoriety by using his weapons and small, private army to defend Sarajevo during the Serbian assault. His men were allegedly armed with sawed-off shotguns, Kalishnikovs, Kochs/Hecklers. 103/ Estimates of the number of men under Juka's command during his two year involvement in the conflict range from 24 to 3,000. His troops, called the "Wolves", reportedly wore crew-cuts, black jump-suits, sunglasses, basketball shoes, and sometimes masks. 104/

77. Juka joined forces with the HVO in early 1993. After the formal break between Bosnian Muslims and Croats later that spring, Juka sided with the Croats and fought alongside the HVO in Mostar, where he apparently led ethnic cleansing operations against Muslim civilians. Juka had already been forced off Mount Igman (near Sarajevo) and most of his men jailed in January 1993.

78. Juka reportedly flew from Sarajevo to Zagreb with the assistance of UNPROFOR and French Lieutenant General Philippe Morillon. 105/ He lived for a time in a villa on the Dalmatian coast, given to him by the Croatian authorities, and later moved to Liege, Belgium, where a small Yugoslav expatriate community resided. He was killed there by one of his body guards by two gunshots to the head on 3 December 1993. 106/

(b) Scope of military activity

79. Juka operated first with his own private army in Sarajevo, commanded up to 3,000 men as a BiH Army commander, and later led paramilitary forces in Mostar. In the fall of 1992, Juka reportedly set up a stronghold on Mount Igman from which he attacked soldiers and civilians. He also reportedly ran prison camps including the Viktor Bubanj military facilities and the heliport detention centre outside of Mostar. Many of the prisoners at both camps were reportedly malnourished, physically abused, and killed. Juka was defeated by Zuka in January 1993.
Due to his early success in defending Sarajevo, the BiH Government granted Juka a position as Head of Special Forces during the summer of 1992. Before his appointment to a regular army position, Juka and his men reportedly received arms through the HSP paramilitary organization, the HOS. In September, he reportedly fell out with the Sarajevo authorities over what he perceived as the failure of commander-in-chief Sefer Halilović's plans for defeating the attacking Serbian forces. He was asked to resign his position as part of the General Staff after an allegedly threatening confrontation with Alija Izetbegović at his offices in Sarajevo. His renegade activities involving his private army and his alarming attitude towards the BiH authorities ultimately led them to issue a warrant for his arrest in October 1992. By January 1993, a Sarajevo radio broadcast stated that Juka was being sought for "permanently working to break up the order and hierarchy in the armed forces of the Republic of BiH".

After severing his ties to the BiH Government, Juka reportedly stationed himself and approximately 200 men on Mt. Igman overlooking the city of Sarajevo. On Mount Igman, Juka battled the BiH Army, attacking their headquarters and General Staff. According to The Daily Telegraph, much of the fall and winter witnessed battles between Juka and the BiH Government forces on the mountain. Command on Igman was reportedly split between the regular army and forces loyal to Juka, which included some Muslim soldiers and the HVO. In December 1992, the BiH Government, hoping to break the Serbian siege of the city, reportedly supplied the Mount Igman force with artillery and T-34, T-55, and Leopard-I tanks.

After Juka joined forces with the HVO in Mostar, Croatian authorities reportedly supplied him with a villa on the Dalmatian coast where he stayed before relocating to Belgium during the fall of 1993.

Paramilitary forces operating under Juka reportedly operated in Sarajevo and Mostar counties, BiH. Media accounts, witness statements, and reports submitted to the Commission of Experts allege that Juka and his men ran detention facilities for Serbian civilians near Sarajevo and for Muslims at the heliport near Mostar. On Mount Igman, Juka's paramilitaries allegedly hijacked vehicles and detained civilians. Juka's forces reportedly practised extortion, looting, rape, ethnic cleansing, and killing of civilians.

It was reported that Juka's forces abused their position as the city's defenders to extort money and valuables from residents and raid the city's warehouses and shops. Witnesses stated that Juka's men appropriated apartments and abducted and abused civilians. One witness claimed that three members of Juka's army and a commander entered an apartment and raped a woman on 30 September 1992. According to the report, the woman died as a result of the attack. The Washington Post reported that Juka's army looted the Yugo Sport warehouse and stole 20,000 pairs of shoes.

As head of the BiH Army's paramilitary units, Juka became the warden of a prison camp set up in the Viktor Bubanj army barracks. The detention
facility became known as "Viktor Bubanj", but was also called "Juka's Prison". Over 200 prisoners were held there and subjected to torture, hunger, and hard labour. The camp commander allegedly committed many criminal acts, including rape and murder. 119/

86. On Mount Igman, Juka beat and stole from soldiers and civilians alike regardless of nationality. He reportedly confiscated automobiles and, according to The Daily Telegraph, beat one fleeing civilian’s head against the hood of a car. 120/

87. Juka and his men reportedly conducted ethnic cleansing operations in Mostar after joining forces with the HVO. Juka’s forces evicted, imprisoned, physically abused, and killed many civilians. The London Times reported in May 1993, that Juka and his men drove out every Muslim civilian living in Mostar on the west bank of the Neretva river to "deny vantage points to snipers". 121/ Homes were looted and men were beaten up and arrested. 122/ Witnesses stated that sometime before 15 July 1993, Juka’s forces allegedly evicted the wealthy Muslim residents of Mostar from their apartments, which were then looted and turned over to members of the HVO paramilitary formations. According to reports, Juka’s forces were masked and heavily armed when they surrounded the apartments. They then blocked exits, fired their weapons in the air, and demanded that all Muslim residents evacuate the building. 123/ Witnesses stated that Juka and his men killed as many as 700 people in and around Mostar and that they ran detention facilities for Muslim civilians at the heliport outside the city. 124/

D. Paramilitary forces operating in support of FR Yugoslavia and the self-proclaimed Serb Republic in Croatia and BiH

1. Scope of military operations

88. Šešelj’s and Arkan’s troops were the most active of all the paramilitary groups identified. Šešelj’s troops were reported to have operated in 34 counties 125/ and Arkan’s troops in 28 counties throughout BiH, Croatia, and FR Yugoslavia. 125/ The vast majority of these counties are located within BiH. These counties lie within the strategic arc the Serbs need to control in order to link all Serbian populations in BiH, Croatia, and Serbia. 127/ Once linked, the counties could form a contiguous Serbian state.

89. Šešelj began organizing and arming his paramilitary forces in late 1990 and early 1991. The first reported activity of his troops was on 1 April 1991, six weeks before Stipe Mesić, a Croatian, was to become president of the collective head of state of the former Yugoslavia. Šešelj’s operation took place in the Vukovar village of Borovo. His troops were sent to the region to protect local Serbs. They surrounded and attacked two local police patrols, injuring five policemen, one critically. 128/ In mid-July, Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS) announced its intention to form volunteer forces in the Krajina region of Croatia. 129/ In August 1991, in an interview with Der Spiegel, Šešelj said his troops were sent “from Belgrade to the crises areas” in Croatia and BiH. He stated, "If there are 20 to 30 Četniks in every village, this is sufficient to encourage the people there". 130/ Šešelj’s troops were allegedly involved in the first paramilitary operations in BiH in April 1992.

90. Arkan’s first reported involvement in the conflict came on 28 November 1990. Arkan was present at a meeting of the “council of war” of the Knin uprising. 131/ On the way back from the meeting, Arkan and his three companions were arrested in Dvor na Uni, Croatia. They had several weapons and bombs in their possession. Arkan was tried and convicted, but he was
released from prison pending appeal. 132/

91. It was not until October 1991, however, that Arkan formed the Serbian Volunteer Guard, later renamed the Tigers. 133/ Training centres were established in Tenja and Erdut, Croatia. 134/

92. When fighting began in Croatia, the Tigers were thought to have no more than 200 troops, but their regular strength was said to be only 60. 135/ Although Arkan had more recently claimed that his Tigers had as many as 8,000 men, independent military analysts estimated the number to be closer to 500 to 1,000. 136/. The Tigers are well-armed with tanks, mortars, sniper guns, AK-47 sub-machine-guns, and Scorpion sub-machine-guns. 137/

2. Ties with the Governments of FRY, the self-declared Serbian Republics, and the JNA

(a) Vojislav Šešelj

93. There is substantial evidence that Šešelj and his paramilitary formations have direct links to, or the support of, the Serbian governments and the JNA:

   (a) Šešelj has stated that his paramilitary forces have received weapons from the JNA; 138/

   (b) The JNA and Šešelj’s troops operated in 14 counties simultaneously, suggesting that their operations were coordinated. Some of the reports indicated that they were conducting joint operations, while others alleged that the JNA permitted Šešelj’s troops to attack without intervening;

   (c) In the BiH county of Kalinovik, the presence of Šešelj’s men was reportedly requested to restore order to the local troops by Commander Ratko Mladić;

   (d) Šešelj has regularly transported plundered goods from BiH into Serbia, with the apparent permission of Serb authorities;

   (e) In his parliamentary campaign in the fall of 1993, Šešelj indicated that the following members of the Milošević government were involved in paramilitary operations: Radmilo Bogdanović, Milošević’s reputed second in command who was officially dropped as Serbian interior minister in 1991; Mihalj Kertes, a former Yugoslav deputy interior minister and now a Serbian minister without portfolio; Radovan Stojić, a deputy Serbian interior minister; and Franko Simatović, a senior Serbian secret police commander. Furthermore, Šešelj claimed that his men never acted outside the umbrella of the JNA and the Serbian police. 139/

(b) Arkan

94. Evidence of Arkan’s ties with the governments of FRY and with the self-declared Serbian republics, as well as with the JNA, includes:

   (a) Serbia’s Defence Minister has stated that Arkan is protected by Interior Ministry officials; 140/

   (b) Šešelj has stated that Arkan’s Tigers were operating under the instructions of Yugoslavia’s counterintelligence organization, 141/ a claim also made by Dragoslav Bokan, the leader of the White Eagles; 142/
On 28 November 1990, Arkan was present at a planning meeting of the "council of war" of the Knin uprising. Milan Martić, then secretary of the secretariat for Internal Affairs and now President of the SAO Krajina, was also present at the meeting.**143/**

Arkan’s forces and the JNA were operating simultaneously in 11 counties;**144/**

In at least three counties, Bijeljina, Brčko, and Zvornik, in which the JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups acted together, Arkan was reported to be the leader of the operation. In the siege of Vukovar, Arkan stated that his men were under the command of the JNA;**145/**

The "population exchange commission" in the BiH county of Bijeljina is headed by Major Vojkan Djurković. Major Djurković is a member of Arkan’s forces;**146/**

There are reports of Arkan’s forces entering a county at the invitation of local political leaders. In Prijedor, a spokesman for the Bosnian Serb Government in explaining Arkan’s involvement, stated: "He is very expensive, but also very efficient";**147/**

In February 1993, in response to accusations that he was planning a coup d’etat in Krajina, Arkan stated that he had "been a special advisor to the president of the Republic of Serbian Krajina for a year now". Arkan’s interference in the Krajina government prompted the commander of the headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Mile Novaković, to issue an order for the withdrawal of Arkan’s troops from the region;**148/**

Arkan, like Šešelj, reportedly has regularly transported plundered goods from BiH into Serbia, with apparent permission of Serb authorities;**149/**

The Milošević government has allegedly given Arkan control of formally state-run gas stations because of his success in smuggling petroleum products.**150/**

3. Political prominence

(a) Vojislav Šešelj **151/**

In early 1991, Šešelj formed the SRS. Previously, he had been the leader of the Serbian Freedom Movement, was instrumental in the formation of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, and had finished fourth in the 1990 presidential election under the banner of his Serbian Četnik Movement. The Movement was banned after the election.

In June 1991, Šešelj was elected to the Serbian Assembly in a special election to fill a vacancy. Šešelj’s campaign was said to be tacitly supported and funded by President Milošević. In the Federal elections on 31 May 1992, Šešelj and the SRS won 33 of the 138 seats in parliament, making it the largest opposition party. In the Serbian parliamentary elections held in December 1992, the SRS made an even stronger showing. To insure a majority in Parliament, Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) formed a coalition with Šešelj’s SRS.

In late September 1993, Šešelj challenged Milošević’s leadership by calling for a vote of no-confidence in the Serbian government led by Milošević’s SPS. This action prompted President Milošević to dissolve the
Serbian parliament and to call for special elections in December 1993. During the campaign, the SPS attacked Šešelj, claiming he was involved in the commission of war crimes. Šešelj was also denied access to the state-run media, in contrast to the intense coverage he had received in previous elections. Šešelj and his SRS suffered a 44 per cent reduction in the number of seats they held in parliament in the December 1993 elections, however Šešelj was re-elected.

(b) Arkan 150/

98. Arkan entered the political arena during the 1992 Serbian elections. Along with three of his followers, Arkan sought election in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo, even though he had no known ties there. Arkan and his followers were elected deputies for the Serbian parliament in the 1992 elections. The elections were boycotted by the ethnic Albanians, who comprised 90 per cent of Kosovo’s population.

99. Arkan formed a political party, the Party of Serbian Unity, before the special elections of December 1993. He was thought to have the backing of Milošević—who was no longer supporting Šešelj. 151/ Arkan reportedly spent three million US dollars on his campaign. However, despite the spending, the support of Milošević, and pre-election polls assuring that Arkan and the Party for Serbian Unity would win at least half the parliamentary seats in Kosovo, Arkan failed to win re-election and the Party for Serbian Unity failed to obtain any seats.

4. Allegations of war crimes

100. The forces of Šešelj and Arkan have been accused of committing some of the most serious violations of the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law. Their operations in Brčko led then United States Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to identify them as possible war criminals. Accusations that Arkan and Šešelj committed atrocities also emerged from within the former Yugoslavia. A month before the fall of Vukovar, in late 1991, an internal JNA memo identified Šešelj’s and Arkan’s forces as dangerous to “military morale” and stated that their “primary motive was not fighting against the enemy but robbery of private property and inhuman treatment of Croatian citizens”. 152/

101. In the 1993 Serbian Parliamentary elections, Milošević, Šešelj and Arkan accused each other of committing war crimes. Milošević’s SPS publicly attacked Šešelj, announcing that they considered him to be “the personification of violence and primitivity”, that he contributed “to war crimes, abetting war profiteers and criminals”, and that he was involved in “crimes committed by paramilitary groups against Moslem, Croat and Serb civilians”. 153/ Government authorities arrested 40 members of the SRS on charges of murder, rape, kidnapping, and illegal arms possession. 154/ Šešelj responded by implicating members of the Milošević government in the paramilitary operations and by claiming that the government was attributing crimes committed by Arkan to him. 155/

102. In an overwhelming majority of the counties in which Šešelj’s and Arkan’s forces were operating, there are alleged killings of civilians, rapes, looting, destruction of property, and prison camps.
5. Summary of reported paramilitary activity 156/

103. As mentioned above, Šešelj's forces were reported to be operating in 34 counties and Arkan's forces in 28 counties throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In many of these counties, Šešelj and Arkan exercised command over other forces operating in the area. These forces consisted of local paramilitary groups, and sometimes the JNA. 157/ In some counties, Šešelj's and Arkan's forces operated under the command of the JNA. 158/ At other times, they operated either independently or in conjunction with other paramilitary groups. The presence of Šešelj's and Arkan's forces was sometimes requested by local Serb authorities.

104. In the majority of the counties in which Šešelj and Arkan were operating, their forces, often in the company of the JNA or other paramilitary forces, would surround the village before entering it. In some instances, Šešelj and Arkan would speak to the local Serbs in the village to incite them and the other Serb forces. 159/ They would often warn the non-Serb residents before entering the village and request that they surrender their weapons. 160/ Because of the reputations of Arkan's and Šešelj's forces, these warnings often prompted non-Serb civilians to leave the village.

105. Upon entering a village, sometimes under the cover of shelling, particularly in those counties where they were operating simultaneously with the JNA, Šešelj's and Arkan's troops would begin their reign of terror. In an overwhelming majority of the counties in which Šešelj's and Arkan's troops were operating, there are allegations of killing of civilians, 161/ rape, 162/ looting, 163/ destruction of private or cultural property, 164/ and prison camps. 165/ In some instances specific individuals were targeted, such as prominent non-Serb leaders or intellectuals. 166/

106. After securing an area, Šešelj's and Arkan's troops would usually turn over control to a local paramilitary group or to local Serb leaders. 167/ In some instances, however, members of Arkan's and Šešelj's units remained and performed administrative functions. 168/

6. Personal histories of Vojislav Šešelj and Željko Rašnjatović

(a) Vojislav Šešelj

(i) Activities before the war

107. Vojislav Šešelj was born in 1950 in eastern Herzegovina. 169/ He grew up and attended college in the BiH capital of Sarajevo. 170/ Šešelj received a Ph.D. at the age of 26, after completing his doctoral thesis on Marxist justifications for war, making him the youngest Ph.D. in Yugoslavia. 171/ He spent one year teaching at the University of Michigan and then returned to Yugoslavia. 172/

108. After returning to Yugoslavia, Šešelj lectured in political science at Sarajevo University. 173/ On 22 May 1984, Šešelj was arrested after police searched his apartment and found an unpublished manuscript of an article criticizing Tito and the Communist Government. 174/ Šešelj was convicted of counterrevolutionary activities and sentenced to eight years in prison. 175/ After 22 months in prison, where he was allegedly beaten and tortured, Šešelj was released. 176/ According to his friends, Šešelj left prison emotionally disturbed as a result of this treatment. 177/ Šešelj settled in Belgrade, joined the leading Serb Nationalists, and began publishing nationalistic books. 178/ By 1990, he had lost the support of
his academic colleagues as he began carrying a gun and interrupting theatre performances he viewed as anti-Serb. At this time, he began his rise in the Serbian political arena.

(ii) Domestic political activity

109. In 1990, Šešelj became the leader of the Serbian Freedom Movement, one of 11 alternative movements and parties established in Serbia. In March of that year, Šešelj merged his Serbian Freedom Movement with a faction of the Serbian National Renaissance to form a new party led by Vuk Drašković, and known as the Serbian Renaissance Movement. This alliance lasted until June 1990, when Šešelj was expelled from the party for his extreme nationalistic views. Šešelj formed a new party, the Serbian National Renewal, within a week. His political party changed names again by the end of 1990. The Serbian National Renewal became the Serbian Četnik Movement.

110. In December 1990, Šešelj ran for president of Serbia although imprisoned for recruiting volunteers in Knin. While his party had no more than 10,000 members, he received 100,000 votes and finished fourth. Before the election, the Belgrade government reportedly did not take Šešelj and his followers seriously. However, Šešelj’s strong showing and his ultra-nationalist platform resulted in the banning of the Serbian Četnik Movement after the election. Šešelj went on to form the SRS.

111. By April 1991, Šešelj claimed that the SRS had at least 25,000 members, with about 80 city committees in Serbia as well as Baranja, Western Srem, Slavonia, BiH, Krajina, and Kosovo. SRS membership was growing rapidly in large part due to the almost daily party promotions and rallies. Oftentimes, they were attended by 3,000 to 5,000 participants.

112. In June 1991, Šešelj was elected to the Serbian Assembly in a special election to fill a vacant seat from Rakovica, a working-class suburb of Belgrade. Šešelj’s campaign was reported to be quietly supported and funded by Slobodan Milošević. Evidence of Milošević’s support was the uncritical, prime-time coverage Šešelj received on the Milošević controlled, state-run television, which, for many Serbs, is the only source of information.

113. As a member of parliament, Šešelj continued his attacks and threats against Albanians, Croatians, Muslims, and the West and became more popular. In the Federal elections held on 31 May 1992, Šešelj and the SRS won 33 of the 138 seats in parliament making it the largest opposition party.

114. Šešelj and the SRS made an even stronger showing in the Serbian parliamentary elections held in December 1992. A few days before the election, Šešelj stated that the SRS had 100,000 members, but in the election the SRS received over a million votes. The SRS won nearly 30 per cent of the seats in parliament, twice what was expected. The SRS gains meant that Milošević would have to form a coalition with it to ensure a majority in parliament. Šešelj quickly used his political strength to force a no-confidence vote against the moderate Yugoslav Premier Milan Panić.

115. The coalition between Milošević’s ruling SPS and Šešelj’s SRS thrived until early May 1993, when Milošević endorsed an international peace plan and seemed to abandon his support of the Bosnian
Serbs. 202/ The Bosnian Serb parliament rejected the plan prompting the Serbian government to cut off all but humanitarian aid to them. 203/ Šešelj, without naming Milošević personally, criticized the government for turning its back on fellow Serbs. 204/ Šešelj led 70 delegates out of the Serbian Parliament when a vote on the plan was scheduled, embarrassing Milošević. 205/ Though the plan was accepted, fewer than 200 of the 636 deputies eligible to vote were present. 206/ The plan was later rejected by the Bosnian Serb population in a referendum. 207/ The future of the SRS/SPS coalition was in doubt. 208/  

116. In an attempt to mend the fences between himself and Šešelj, and possibly out of fear of losing control of the nationalist movement, Milošević engineered a vote to remove President Dobrica Ćosić from the Yugoslav Parliament. Ćosić had been criticized for abandoning the Serbian nationalist cause. 209/ Milošević relied on his alliance with Šešelj to defeat Ćosić. Šešelj had long been a prominent critic of Ćosić. 210/ The removal of Ćosić triggered a large anti-government demonstration in front of the Parliament building. 211/ The demonstration, led by Vuk Drašković of the Serbian Renewal Movement, turned violent after one of Šešelj’s parliamentary deputies, an ex-boxer, punched an opposition deputy. 212/ Vuk Drašković and his wife were arrested and imprisoned for instigating the riot, and the Serbian Renewal Movement was banned. 213/ With the moderates, Ćosić and Drašković gone, and Milošević’s withdrawal of support for the peace plan, Šešelj was clearly the second most powerful politician in Yugoslavia. 214/  

117. In late September 1993, Šešelj called for a vote of no-confidence in the Serbian government led by Milošević’s SPS. 215/ This action prompted Milošević to dissolve the Serbian Parliament and call for elections on 19 December 1993, rather than see his government embarrassed. 216/ The SPS then began their public attack on Šešelj, announcing that they considered him to be “the personification of violence and primitivity”, that he contributed “to war crimes, abetting war profiteers and criminals”, and that he was involved in “crimes committed by paramilitary groups against Moslem, Croat and Serb civilians”. 217/ The authorities arrested 40 members of the Radical Party on charges of murder, rape, kidnapping and illegal arms possession. 218/ None of those detained, however, were charged with crimes that occurred outside the territory of the rump Yugoslavia. 219/  

118. Šešelj responded to the charges regarding his paramilitary activities by alleging that Milošević’s government was backing these activities. 220/ Šešelj said: “I have already expressed my readiness to go to the Hague and testify on war crimes, but I don’t know how anyone can go to the Hague if Slobodan Milošević does not go”. 221/ While denying any involvement in atrocities, Šešelj said his fighters were armed and supervised by Milošević’s police. 222/  

119. Šešelj indicated the involvement of the following individuals in Milošević’s government: Radmilo Bogdanović, Milošević’s reputed second in command officially dropped as Serbian Interior Minister in 1991; Mihalj Kertes, a former Yugoslav deputy interior minister and now a Serbian minister without portfolio; Radovan Stojčić, a deputy Serbian interior minister; and Franko Sinatović, a senior Serbian secret police commander. 223/ Šešelj said that his troops never acted outside the umbrella of the JNA and the Serbian police. 224/ He said two other groups, the White Eagles and Arkan’s Tigers, were also operating under the instructions of Yugoslavia’s counterintelligence organization, 225/ a claim also made by Dragoslav Bokan, the leader of the White Eagles. 226/  

120. Šešelj’s counter-attacks on Milošević were not widely heard within
Serbia, since he was denied access to the state-run media, a situation in sharp contrast to the intense coverage he had received the year before. 227/ Furthermore, Šešelj and the SRS did not hold public meetings before the election because they did not want to create the opportunity for provocations or incidents that might lead authorities to ban the party. 228/ These factors resulted in a poor showing for Šešelj and the SRS in the 19 December 1993 elections. The SRS won 39 seats in the Serbian parliament, a 44 per cent reduction in the number they had held before parliament was dissolved. 229/ In turn, the SPS and Milošević increased their representation by 20 per cent. 230/

(iii) Šešelj's paramilitary troops

121. Tracing the command and control of particular military or paramilitary groups is generally difficult. The task of determining which units are under the control of Šešelj is difficult as well. Šešelj has both confirmed and denied the existence of particular paramilitaries under his control or the control of his party. 231/ The paramilitary groups most often associated with Šešelj are the White Eagles, Četniks 232/ and Šešeljovci, which are estimated to have a combined force of 8,000 men. 233/

122. The name "Četniks" was originally used by Serbian royalist units that fought to restore the Serbian-dominated monarchy after Nazi Germany invaded Yugoslavia in 1941. 234/ Šešelj's Četniks claim to be the heirs of the Četniks who fought in World War II, and Šešelj has proclaimed himself their Vojvoda (Duke). 235/ The command structure of the original "Četniks" was based on small, locally controlled units that were better suited for guerilla warfare. 236/ Šešelj, having written his master's thesis on the theory of guerrilla resistance, 237/ has followed this same pattern. 238/ The name White Eagles was originally used in World War II by the only orthodox anticommunist youth organization that existed at the time. 239/ Many youths were killed for allegedly being members. 240/

123. Šešelj's original White Eagles group was founded in late 1990 by the Serbian Renaissance Movement (SPO), which was the party he formed with Vuk Drašković. 241/ However, Šešelj left this party in June of 1990, and the current leader is Mirko Jović. 242/ These White Eagles are now under the command of a 30 year-old graduate student in Philosophy, Dragošlav Bokan. 243/

124. Šešelj has armed his troops in a variety of ways. 244/ Weapons have been given to his troops by people who have permits to carry them, 245/ and some guns and ammunition have been stolen from police stockpiles. 246/ Šešelj has said that his men bribed former communist officials to sell surplus arms, which were then smuggled across the Croatian border. 247/ He has also claimed to have purchased guns from Croats. 248/ The World War II vintage American Thompson gun was standard issue in mid-1991. 249/ Šešelj claims to have purchased these guns from a European arms dealer, but press reports claim their presence is circumstantial evidence of direct Serbian Government involvement. 250/ Šešelj acknowledges that the federal army has not opposed their efforts, however, he refuses to disclose that he might be receiving any support from Milošević and the Serbian army. 251/
(b) Željko Rašniatović

(i) Activities before the war

125. Arkan was born on 17 April 1952 in Brežice, Slovenia. He was the fourth child of a retired air force colonel, and the only son. At the age of 14 or 15 he allegedly began to support himself through theft and burglary. At the age of 15, Arkan was incarcerated in a home for juvenile delinquents. After his release, he left Yugoslavia to travel abroad.

126. Arkan continued his criminal activities throughout Europe. He is wanted in several European countries for crimes ranging from robbery to murder. The Italian police seek Arkan in connection with the killing of a restaurant owner in 1974. He robbed banks in Stockholm and Göteborg, Sweden, leaving the bank tellers bouquets of roses. He was convicted of armed robbery in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. In all cases, he escaped from prison.

127. While travelling through Europe, Arkan also was alleged to be working for the Yugoslavian Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SSUP). In the early 1980s, the SSUP carried out assassinations of nationalist organization members abroad. Arkan engaged in technical operations such as servicing agents and acting as a courier. He and Stane Dolanc, head of the SSUP, are repeatedly mentioned in connection with the 1983 murder of the former director of a Croatian oil company, who defected and began publishing books critical of Yugoslavia's Communist Government.

128. When Arkan returned to Belgrade in the early 1980s, his ties to the SSUP remained strong, despite his continued criminal activity. When Belgrade police would arrest Arkan, they allegedly counted the minutes that went by until someone from the SSUP, often times Stane Dolanc, would intervene on his behalf. He was often seen wearing a white suit in casinos, disco clubs and night spots. He became a well-respected member of the Belgrade underworld, with a reputation for being a boss with a refined sense of justice. During this time, he also had a legitimate business in an ice cream and pastry shop located in a wealthy neighbourhood in Belgrade.

129. Before the war, Arkan was most known in Belgrade as the leader of the city’s Red Star soccer team fan club. On at least one occasion, Arkan offered the services of the fan club to Radmilo Bogdanović, a Serbian police minister, to disperse a crowd demonstrating against Milošević in June of 1990. The offer was accepted. It is thought that many of the members of his paramilitary group, the Tigers, are members of this club.

(ii) Activities during the war

a. Arrest in Croatia

130. Arkan’s first reported active involvement in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia came as early as November of 1990, when he traveled to Knin for a meeting of the “council of war” of the Knin uprising. He was accompanied by the following individuals: Dušan Bandić, a retiree and Četnik commander from Belgrade; Zoran Stevanović, a construction technician from Belgrade; and Dušan Carić, an electrician from Unčani near Dvor na Uni. This meeting, held in a shack in the village of Golubić, was also attended by Mije Martić,
then the secretary of the SUP (Secretariat for Internal Affairs) of the Krajina SOA; Marko Dobrijević, then the secretary of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS); and Nebojša Nešo Mladinić and Dušan Orlović, active organizers of the uprising in the Knin Krajina. The parties discussed how Belgrade would help in organizing and arming the Serbs in Krajina, and specific assignments were given to individuals. On the way back to Belgrade after the meeting, Arkan and his three companions drove into Đvori na Uni after midnight on 29 November. They were allegedly trying to familiarize themselves with the layout of the town so that they could better plan its "liberation". They were stopped by police around 2:30 a.m. and arrested. There were a number of automatic weapons, pistols and bombs in the car. The four were convicted on 14 June 1991 after a 42 day trial. Arkan was sentenced to 20 months in prison, including the six months and 15 days already served. The judge then released all four of the defendants, pending appeal of the convictions. Arkan left Croatia and sent a message from Belgrade that stated, "You will never take me alive!"

b. Breaking United Nations sanctions and other business ventures

131. Arkan not only gained notoriety through his leadership of the Tigers, but also through his business activities during the war. United Nations sanctions against Serbia resulted in unprecedented growth in the Belgrade underworld, in which Arkan is allegedly a leader. Arkan reportedly made millions of dollars on the Belgrade black market by selling looted goods from the territory his Tigers have captured. Arkan has also been successful in smuggling oil into Serbia. Reportedly, Milošević had agreed to turn over state-run gas stations to anyone who could get oil into Serbia. Arkan’s success in smuggling oil has resulted in his ownership of several gas stations. It is estimated that for every tanker load of oil delivered in defiance of international sanctions, Arkan makes $30,000. In addition to his gas stations and previously mentioned ice cream parlor, Arkan was also reported to own a shopping centre, a detective agency, and a savings bank, all allegedly supported by smuggling operations. Arkan also operates a protection racket in Belgrade, and a private prison used in kidnapping for ransom. There are reports that Arkan’s gang is linked to Milošević’s government and the local police.

(iii) Domestic political activity

132. Arkan entered the political arena during the 1992 Serbian elections. Arkan, along with three of his followers, ran in Serbia’s southern province of Kosovo, even though he had no known ties there. Although 90 percent of Kosovo’s population of two million are ethnic Albanians, Serbs have long considered the province as an integral part of their cultural heritage. It was here that the Serbs lost to the Turks in the 14th Century in the Battle of Kosovo Polje, a defining moment in Serbian history. It was at this battle site, on the 400th anniversary of the battle in 1989, that Slobodan Milošević first declared his policy of Serbian nationalism. It is feared that Kosovo will be the next major flashpoint in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

133. Fueling concerns that "ethnic cleansing" was eminent in Kosovo during the 1992 campaign, Arkan delivered a speech, in the presence of Milošević, swearing that he was an enemy to Albanian infants. While campaigning, Arkan drove a car with license plates that said "Vukovar" as a reminder of his role in the attack on that city. His campaign
posters featured a picture of himself in a World War I Serbian uniform, complete with ceremonial sword. 288/

134. Arkan and his three followers were elected deputies of the Serbian parliament in the 1992 elections, which were boycotted by the Albanians. 288/ While a deputy in parliament, Arkan and his deputies always supported government policies. 290/

135. In late September 1993, the Serbian Radical Party, led by Vojislav Šešelj, called for a vote of no-confidence in the Milošević led government. 291/ To avoid embarrassment, Milošević dissolved the Serbian parliament and called for new elections to be held on 19 December 1993. 292/ It is reported that Arkan had advance knowledge of this and got a head start on his political opponents by forming a new political party, the Party of Serbian Unity. 293/

136. Arkan and his Party for Serbian Unity campaigned with zeal. He spent over three million dollars 294/ and held large campaign rallies, complete with Serbian folk singers and fireworks. 295/ In addition to the lavish campaign, Arkan was thought to have the backing of Milošević who was eager to fill the far right void created by his falling-out with Šešelj. 296/ During the campaign, Arkan and Šešelj traded accusations of responsibility for war crimes. 297/ Despite the spending, the reported support of Milošević, and pre-election polls assuring that Arkan and the Party for Serbian Unity would win at least half the parliamentary seats in Kosovo, 298/ Arkan failed to win a single seat. 299/

(iv) The Tigers

137. Arkan formed the Serbian Volunteer Guard, better known as the Tigers, on 11 October 1991. 300/ as a paramilitary group with no party affiliation. 301/ Training centres were established in Tenja and Erdut, Croatia. 302/ The camp in Erdut, on the grounds of a Croatian winery, is a few hundred yards from the UN headquarters. 303/ An UN official has reported that every morning at 7:30 a.m. the soldiers speed march around Erdut with weapons. 304/ The units contain some women, as well as boys 13 to 15 years old. 305/ On 25 March 1994, in a ceremony attended by both Milan Martić and Arkan, the Erdut training facility was turned over to the Serbian Republic of Krajina to serve as a training facility for its special units. 306/

138. When fighting began in Croatia, the Tigers were thought to have no more than 200 men, and their regular strength was thought to be only 60. 307/ Although Arkan has more recently claimed his Tigers have as many as 8,000 men, the number is thought to be closer to 500 to 1,000. The exact number is difficult to determine as regular soldiers sometimes wear Tiger uniforms. 308/

139. The Tigers are well-armed with tanks and mortars and were trained by Radovan Bazda and Arkan himself. 309/ The Tigers have been seen with new sniper guns, AK-47 submachine-guns, and Scorpion sub-machine-guns. 310/ The Tigers have worn three types of uniforms: camouflage, all blue, and all black. 311/
III. OTHER IDENTIFIED PARAMILITARY GROUPS

A. Paramilitary groups operating in support of the Government of BiH

Name of Unit: Akrepi (Uglješ)

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Konjic County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man from Konjic, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

140. According to the Serbian Council Information Centre, the Akrepi killed 11 Serbs and burned 24 houses in the village of Blace on 15 May 1992.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Unit:</th>
<th>Alija's Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity:</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Troops:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area(s) of Operation:</td>
<td>Konjic, Sarajevo and Livno Counties, BiH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliation:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader(s):</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alleged Members:</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Alleged Activity:

141. Alija's Army members, along with Croatian Armed Forces (HOS), Croatian National Guardsmen (ZNG), and members of the Yellow Ants converged on Konjic on 26 April 1992. Upon arrival, the units allegedly established road blocks, set up machine-guns in nearby villages, murdered civilians and looted the villagers' homes.
Name of Unit: Black Swans (alias Brigada Zuka, Zuka Brigade or Zuka's Commandos, the Zukini) 316/

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniforms: Black clothing with a round unit patch on the sleeves. The patch depicts a black swan having intercourse with a supine woman. "Special Unit Army of BiH" is written in white lettering above the picture and underneath in black letters are the words, "Black Swans".

Number of Troops: At least 100

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Igman, Jablanica, and Konjic Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Three identified people, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: Five identified people, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons 317/


Alleged Activity:

142. The Black Swans allegedly committed most of the crimes against Bosnian Croats in the Konjic area. 318/ According to reports, the Black Swans arrived in the Konjic area on 1 April 1993. They reinforced Muslim troops, under commander Tulomović and were primarily deployed at the village of Handići, seven kilometres north-west of Konjic. 319/ In negotiations with the HVO, Tulomović denied that the Black Swans were under his control and blamed them for the criminal activity in the area.

143. The Black Swan force established at Handići, allegedly attacked the Croatian village of Čelepeci in early April 1993. The Black Swans reportedly burned three empty buildings and killed two elderly women and one elderly man, cutting off the man's arms and slitting his throat with a machete. Later, the Handići force was joined by Black Swans from Pokoijište, who used four or five Croatian civilians as human shields during the attack on the village. At least 70 men 320/ comprised the attacking force. After the action, Muslim forces allegedly prevented Spanish UNPROFOR troops from investigating the activities at Čelepeci. 321/

144. Also in the Konjic region, the Black Swans and Mujahedin troops allegedly launched infantry attacks on the village of Vrci every four or five days and helped run the P.O.W. camp for HVO soldiers at Parsovići. 322/

145. According to a witness from Jablanica, more than 100 Black Swans and MOS forces attacked Doljani on 28 July 1993, the fiercest action in the hamlets of
Kračić, Stupari, and Kosna Luka. Allegedly, the attackers killed and mutilated 24 people, including some soldiers. The witness stated that the corpses' eyes were plucked out, their ears were cut, and their stomachs were slit open. 323/
Name of Unit: Bogdan Gagić's Formation

Ethnicity: N/A

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: Thirty-two

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Benkovac County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Bogdan Gagić

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

146. On 21 December 1991, Bogdan Gagić and the other 31 members of his formation killed nine Croatians and one Serbian in the village of Bruška, in Benkovac, Croatia. Other inhabitants were either killed, tortured or evicted. 124/
Name of Unit: Forces of Hasan Hakalović

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Konjic County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Hasan Hakalović

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

147. According to reports, the paramilitary forces of Hasan Hakalović executed two civilians, ages 60 and 75, in the village of Mrkosovice. 325/
Name of Unit: Hrasnica Forces

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Konjic County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

148. According to reports submitted to the Commission of Experts, during May 1993, in the village of Zaslivlje, the Hrasnica forces cut off the ears and noses of Zlatka Trlin, Joze Brvenik, and Ante Banović. 326/

149. The Hrasnica forces allegedly desecrated churches, looted houses and mistreated Croats in the villages of Čelebići and Radešine. 327/
Name of Unit: Mecetove Bebe (Mecet’s Babies)

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: Bosnian army insignia

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Travnik, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Travnik County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): The leader’s full name does not appear in the documents, but he is identified by nickname.

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

150. The Mecetove Bebe allegedly carried out criminal activity, including theft and sabotage in the Travnik area.
Name of Unit: MOS or Muslim Armed Forces.

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: Scarves on their heads, olive fatigues, beards, and often green berets

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: MOS stationed on the Vjetrenica mountain near Zenica were from Zepče. Other MOS were from Jablanica.

Area(s) of Operation: Vitez, Zenica, Doljani, and Jablanica Counties, BiH.

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

Alleged Members: N/A


ECMM, Facts on the Aggression of the Muslim Forces, (included in a report submitted to the Commission of Experts, author unknown), IHRLI Doc. No. 41225-41250.

Alleged Activity:

151. According to Croats fleeing villages in south-west BiH, 18 civilians were killed by the MOS in Stipića Meadow, near Borovac, on 28 July 1993. Witnesses stated that they were cut down by gunfire when crossing Stipića Meadow while fleeing from Borovac. The survivors said that they were taken to a small room nearby where they were detained with others, including one HVO soldier who had been shot in the chest. They were given nothing to eat and only water to drink for the day they spent in detention. The prisoners allegedly heard shooting before they pried the bars loose on the windows where they were held and escaped. One of the victims recognized the MOS forces, saying that they were from Jablanica.

152. In the towns of central BiH, in the Vitez and Zenica municipalities, the MOS allegedly looted and burned homes and threatened Croat civilians. The MOS reportedly acted as police and arrested HVO personnel, who had been released earlier by the army of BiH.
Name of Unit: Mosque Doves (or Pigeons)
Ethnicity: Muslim and some Croatians.
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: 150
Origin: Zvornik, BiH
Area(s) of Operation: Zvornik County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Alleged Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): Information Centre of the Democratic League of Kosova, Fighting in Bosna River Valley and Bosanska Posavina, IHRLI Doc. No. 47969-48071, at 48029-48031.

Alleged Activity:

153. Quoting Tanjug, the Democratic League of Kosova reports that in the second week of October 1992, a unit of Muslim fighters calling themselves the Mosque Doves attacked the villages of Pantići and Miloševići, approximately 20 kilometres from Zvornik. Tanjug reports differed as to the number of people killed in the attack. On 12 October, Tanjug reported that 50 villagers, mainly elderly civilians were killed in the attack. A day later Tanjug reported that the victims included 13 civilians and 23 members of Serb forces.

154. According to the reports, the Mosque Doves used "rifles from Hungary and Arabic countries", and included some Croatians and Muslims from the Zvornik area who were trained in the Croatian Adriatic town of Šibenik. The Doves allegedly knew their victims and called them by name.
Name of Unit: Patriotic League

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: The Patriotic League insignia contains Lilies.

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: The members of the Patriotic League were the original wearers of the green berets. They were largely JNA officers of Muslim religion who prepared for the war once they saw that it was inevitable.

Area(s) of Operation: BiH

Political Affiliation: Patriotic League

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

155. One unconfirmed and unsubstantiated allegation has been made that members of the Patriotic League were active in Prijedor. 336/

156. The Patriotic League was also implicated in the 25 April 1993, attack on Zenica, in which civilians were killed and imprisoned. According to reports from the Croatian Information Centre, the Patriotic League acted in concert with several other military groups, including the MOS led by Commander Karalić, the BiH army, Third Corps, Brigade 314, and the Green League (or Legion) also known as the Zenica Hoodlums. 337/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary wing of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA or PDA).

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Odžak County, BiH

Political Affiliation: Party of Democratic Action (SDA or PDA)

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

157. Paramilitary formations of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), together with members of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), allegedly perpetrated crimes against civilians in Odžak County. The reports include allegations of rape, murder of civilians, looting, detention, and forced labour. 338/

158. Allegedly, the SDA received military supplies from abroad, primarily from Croatia. Weapons dealers affiliated with the CDU and the SDA, centred in Odžak and Tarevci reportedly moved freely between Croatia and BiH. 339/
Name of Unit: White Pumas
Ethnicity: Muslim
Uniform: Brown battle fatigues
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Bihać, BiH
Area(s) of Operation: Bihać County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

159. Reporting on clashes in the Bihać pocket, between the Fifth BiH Corps and Krajina militia, United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) noted the presence of paramilitary units dressed in brown battle dress and assessed them as members of the Muslim organization, White Pumas. 340/
Name of Unit: Yellow Ants
Ethnicity: Muslim
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Konjic County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

160. The Yellow Ants, along with HOS, Croatian National Guards (ZNG) and members of another paramilitary unit called Alija's Army, converged on Konjic on 26 April 1992. Upon arrival, the units allegedly established road blocks, set up machine-guns in nearby villages, murdered civilians, and looted the villagers' homes.
Name of Unit: Zenica Hoodlums/Green League (or Legion)

Ethnicity: Muslim

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Zenica County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

161. On the morning of 25 April 1993, Muslim forces attacked villages near Zenica. Some civilians were killed and others were taken to detention facilities at the former conservatory of music in Zenica. Several Muslim groups allegedly participated in the attack: the army of BiH, Third Corps, led by Enver Hadžihasanović; Brigade 314; The Green League, also called the Zenica Hoodlums; and members of the MOS led by commander Karalić. 342/

162. The Green Legion reportedly operated a prisoner of war camp in the nearby village of Bilimišće. 343/
B. Paramilitary groups working in support of the Government of Croatia

Name of Unit: Black Legion 344/

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: Black, except for the words "Black Legion" in white letters

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Allegedly, the members of the Black Legion are expatriates who lived in Germany before the war.

Area(s) of Operation: Tomislavgrad and Ožak Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

163. Witness testimonies, reported by the Serbian Council Information Centre, name members of the Black Legion as jailers. Allegedly, the Black Legion took prisoners from Split and Kupres and held them in deplorable conditions at Tomislavgrad. Detained women said that they were kept in cellars with no toilets or beds. The witnesses described the members of the Black Legion as wearing black and riding in a black Mercedes. One witness quoted one of the guards as saying that he entered the war to "protect his Fatherland". 345/

164. One witness stated that the "Black Legion" or "Black Shirts" 346/ arrived at a prison camp in Ožak on 15 July 1993, and asked prisoners for gold or money. The witness reported that once she surrendered her money to the Black Legion, she was released. 347/
Name of Unit: Black Shirts

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Virovitica County, Croatia

Area(s) of Operation: Grubišno Polje County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: Croatian National Guard (ZNG)

Alleged Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

165. According to witness testimonies reported by the Serbian Council Information Centre, Black Shirt troops from Virovitica arrived in Grubišno Polje on 13 August 1991, and proceeded to arrest and kill civilians, destroy property, and steal money and valuables from the villagers.

166. The Black Shirts allegedly began their activities in the area by blocking roads and setting up check-points. They also took over police duties and made arrests according to a previously compiled list. Allegedly, 124 people were arrested and held in the Grubišno Polje Hotel. Twenty well-respected men in the community, who were arrested according to the list, were later found dead.
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces of the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU)

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: Black headbands and fingerless gloves

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Odžak, Novi Grad and Bosanski Brod Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: Croatian Democratic Union (CDU)

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

167. The Serbian Council Information Centre alleged that the CDU financed many paramilitary groups in Slavonia, and that the CDU paramilitary forces were responsible for shelling Donja Dubica on 18 April 1992. CDU forces allegedly killed, raped, and tortured prisoners. They also allegedly evicted Serbian villagers, looted, operated a prison camp called "Tulekn" in Bosanski Brod, and used detainees for digging trenches, clearing minefields, and other war operations. 350/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Mile Dedaković
Ethnicity: Croatian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): Mile Dedaković, alias "Jastreb" 351/
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

168. The commander of this Croatian paramilitary unit is reported to have committed several violations. 352/
Name of Unit: Glavaš Unit or Paramilitary forces under Commander Glavaš

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Osijek County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Glavaš allegedly lived outside of Croatia for many years, held several positions of authority in Osijek, including Mayor, and was a member of the extreme wing of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ).

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

169. Glavaš was the reported leader of paramilitary formations in Osijek. He was responsible for criminal acts, including murder, which were intended to intimidate the ethnic Serbian community and force them to flee. By the fall of 1993, Glavaš was elected Mayor of Osijek after serving as the town council president. There are also reports of a number of violations, such as killings.
Name of Unit: Hawks (Sokoli)
Ethnicity: Croatian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Sisak County, Croatia
Political Affiliation: The Hawks are affiliated with the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 360/
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A
Alleged Activity:

170. In Sisak during the first half of 1991, the Hawks allegedly destroyed a slaughterhouse and four shops owned by Dragan Novaković. 361/
Name of Unit: Horses of Fire (Vatreni Konji) 362/

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: Fifty-eight identified members. According to reports submitted to the Commission of Experts, members of the Horses of Fire were recruited from the 102nd Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). 363/

Origin: Odžak County, BiH 364/

Area(s) of Operation: Odžak, Mostar, Bosanski Brod and Trebinje Counties, BiH 365/

Political Affiliation: Bosnian Croatian Defence Council (HVO) 366/

Leader(s): Four identified men, whose names are not disclosed, for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons 367/

Alleged Members: Fifty-eight named people, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

171. The Horses of Fire were a special unit of the HVO, 368/ created from the HVO's 102nd Brigade. 369/ The founders of the Horses of Fire included four identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. 370/ These individuals allegedly established concentration camps to house Serbs in the Odžak commune and illegally furnished arms to the Horses of Fire. 371/

172. The Horses of Fire are named repeatedly in reports to the Commission of Experts as perpetrators of ethnic cleansing against Serbian civilians. 372/ Allegedly, the Horses of Fire raped and killed Serbian civilians, and looted and destroyed Serbian property, including Serbian homes, and religious establishments. 373/ Odžak County, on the border of Croatia and BiH, was the target of such attacks between April and August 1992. 374/

173. According to a UN report, in June 1992, members of Horses of Fire locked 16 Serbian women and children inside a house in Novi Grad and set the house on fire. The survivors were forced to jump from windows. 375/ FRY reported that an elderly civilian was killed by the Horses of Fire on 15 July 1992. Reportedly, the victim lay sick in bed when a member of the paramilitary group beat him to death by striking him in the head and chest with a rock. 376/

174. Witness statements allege that the Horses of Fire frequently engaged in sexual assault and gang rape activities. 377/ Prior to defeat by the
Serbs in mid-July 1992, the Horses of Fire allegedly indulged in mass rape, and gang rape of Serbian girls and women. Witness reports contain relevant details which are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. One witness recalled how she was raped and abused in the middle of the night by six members of the Horses of Fire. In a similar case, 15 members of the Horses of Fire broke down the door of another witness's apartment where she resided with a relative. They were forcibly removed and taken to a location where they were raped by at least seven of their captors. The witness recognized the perpetrators as her neighbours.

175. Witness statements also document an incident which occurred in early June 1992. One member of the Horses of Fire allegedly raped four women and brutally beat another, throwing her to the ground and stomping on her chest and stomach. Also in June 1992, the Horses of Fire Commander and several of his men allegedly participated in the rape of several women. In early June 1992, a woman was raped and forced to walk naked through her village. On the evening of 4 July, nine rapes were reportedly committed by the Horses of Fire.

176. Another report alleged that in July 1992, a notorious criminal and member of the Horses of Fire raped a young girl. Allegedly, between 8 May and 15 July, several Serbian women from Odžak County were taken prisoner and raped. The women were detained in the village while men were taken to a camp. Reportedly, the Serbian men held at Odžak were forced to rape Serbian women who were brought to the camp.
Name of Unit: The Jokers (Jokeri or Džokeri)  

Ethnicity: Croatian  

Uniform: Black uniforms  

Number of Troops: N/A  

Origin: N/A  

Area(s) of Operation: Vitez County, BiH  

Political Affiliation: N/A  

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons  

Alleged Members: N/A  

Source(s): Christopher Bellamy, "Bosnian Serbs Adjust to New Order", The Independent, 1 April 1994, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.  

"Defence Minister Reports on Activities of Croatian Army Units in Bosnia", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 February 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.  


Alleged Activity:  

177. Bralo (Čičko) Miroslav allegedly commanded a special unit of Bosnian Croat soldiers called "The Jokers". In one account collected by the Bosnian Commission, a Muslim woman from the area alleged that she was raped repeatedly by Miroslav and other Bosnian Croat soldiers during the month that she was held captive.  

178. A resident of Ahmići, a village in Vitez county, reported that the Jokers shelled and occupied the village on 16 April 1993. The witness stated that after the Jokers arrived, a crowd of approximately 20 people, including Croatian neighbours, surrounded the witness' home and shot several of the witness' relatives. Time magazine reported that 107 Muslims died in Ahmići that day.  

179. Bosnian Defence Minister, Hamdo Hadžihasanović, identified the Jokers (džokeri) as one of the special units of the HVO which received training and support from the Croatian Army.  

180. A report in The Independent described a group known as the Jokeri as gangsters with "fascist inclinations". The Jokeri were allegedly responsible for attacks in violation of the cease-fire signed by Bosnia's Muslims and Croats in February 1994.
Name of Unit: Knights
Ethnicity: Croatian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Vitez County, BiH
Political Affiliation: Occasional ties to the HVO
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): UNPROFOR, Weekly Summary, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 25522-25527, at 25523.

Alleged Activity:

181. According to UNPROFOR personnel, the Croatian Knights paramilitary group set up a check-point approximately three kilometres north-west of Vitez where they detained a convoy of trucks for several days. Although the convoy was eventually returned, the action was apparently one of many designed to agitate the Muslim population and to increase tension in the region.

182. HVO officials in Vitez said that the Knights were a renegade group which did not follow official military command.
Name of Unit: Medići
Ethnicity: Croatian
Uniform: Police uniforms
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Travnik County, BiH
Area(s) of Operation: Travnik County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): UNPROFOR, Weekly Summary, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 25522-25527; at 25523.

Alleged Activity:

183. In talks with UNPROFOR personnel, the HVO said that a paramilitary formation called the "Medići" was responsible for the attacks, kidnappings, bombings and errant artillery fire which were perpetrated upon Muslims in and around Travnik in central BiH during the first weeks of April 1993. The HVO claimed that the Medići were not under military control. 396/
Name of Unit: Sombor Group

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: N/A

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

184. UNPROFOR documents report that the "Sombor" group, allegedly a Croatian organization guilty of sabotage, are being detained in FRY. In December of 1993, the Yugoslav government was considering exchanging the Sombor group for Serbian prisoners of war who were being held in Croatia. 397/
Name of Unit: Croatian Tiger Forces, "Kiseljak Tigers" and "United to Death"

Ethnicity: Croatian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Kiseljak, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Mostar and Vareš Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: Occasional ties to the HVO

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

185. The Tigers allegedly joined the HVO in Mostar on 1 June 1993. With the Tigers, arrived additional matériel, including 305 millimetre "Slavuj" guns and grenades manufactured at Slavonski Brod.

186. UNPROFOR reports stated that "an HVO unit named 'Tigers from Kiseljak' or 'United to Death'" participated in the attack on the Muslim village of Stupni Do on 23 October 1993. In a press release dated 27 October 1993 (one day after the UNPROFOR forces were allowed access to the village), UNPROFOR related that the village was attacked by HVO forces and that all 52 houses in the village were burned, that civilians were killed, and that women may have been raped. Later reports stated that the attacking force contained 300-600 troops, and that 42 civilians were killed, including nine children.
Name of Unit: Vjesta
Ethnicity: Croatian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Donji Rakić (County and Country unknown)
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): Interview with Cvijetin Maksimović (Karim Loutfi trans.), IHRLI Doc. No. 19947A-19947L, at 19947C.

Alleged Activity:

187. Cvijetin Maksimović alleged that he was captured by Croatian forces called "Vjesta" in May 1993. He said that he was held in a detention facility operated by the Vjesta at Donji Rakić.
C. **Paramilitary groups working in support of the Government of Serbia**

Name of Unit: Fifth Kozara Brigade from Prijedor

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Prijedor County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Sanski Most County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


**Alleged Activity:**

188. According to the Croatian Information Centre, the Fifth Kozara Brigade is a paramilitary formation in the Banja Luka Corps of the Serbian Army. On 24-25 July 1992, the Fifth Kozara Brigade, the Sixth Krajina Brigade and local Serb paramilitaries attacked the Bosnian Croat villages of Stara Rijeka, Briševo, Raljaš and Čarakovo in the Ljubija region. Seventy-three Croatian civilians were killed during the attack by over 3,000 Serbs. 404/
Name of Unit: Sixth Krajina Brigade from Sanski Most

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Sanski Most County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Sanski Most County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

189. According to the Croatian Information Centre, the Sixth Krajina Brigade is a paramilitary formation of the Banja Luka Corps in the Serbian Army. On 24-25 July 1992, the Sixth Krajina Brigade, along with the Fifth Kozara Brigade and local Serb paramilitaries, attacked the Croatian villages of Stara Rijeka, Briševo, Raljaš and Čarakovo in the Ljubija region of BiH. Over 3,000 Serbs participated in the attack, during which 73 Croatian civilians died.
Name of Unit: Unit of Daruvar

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega Counties, Croatia

Political Affiliation: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Slavonja and Baranja

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

190. In June 1991, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for Slavonia and Baranja formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade for the area of Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega. One formation of the brigade was the Unit of Daruvar, headquartered in Bijela.

191. The Unit of Daruvar and members of their police units allegedly participated in the following attacks and incidents, often in concert with other Serbian paramilitary forces and JNA:

(a) On 19 June 1991, members of special forces for Bjelovar killed two policemen and wounded five in an attack near Sirac.

(b) Three policemen—Robert Žilić, Miroslav Poljak, and Ivan Rončević, were killed in Daruvar on 20 June 1991.

(c) An unidentified member and others kidnapped several policemen.

(d) On 21 August 1991, the attack on Daruvar began. Nine mortar shells fell on the town and two policemen were wounded.

(e) From 27 August to 16 September 1991, 10 people were killed and 20 wounded in mortar attacks by "Četniks" on Doljani, Daruvar and Sirac.

(f) During 24-27 September 1991, Daruvar and Sirac were mortared. One person was killed and seven wounded.

(g) On 6 October 1991, "Četniks" shelled Daruvar. One member of the Croatian Army was killed and five persons were seriously wounded.

(h) "Četniks" shelled Daruvar and Sirac on 10 October 1991.
(i) On 9 November 1991, "Četniks" fired mortar shells on Širac and Šuplja Lipa. Two persons were killed and three wounded. 415/

(j) Two persons were killed and two wounded during shelling of Daruvar, Širac, Šuplja Lipa and Koncanica on 11 November 1991. 416/

(k) On 12 November 1991, one person was killed and eight wounded in shelling of Daruvar. 417/

(l) During "Četnik" shelling of Širac during 15-20 December 1991, five people were killed and 41 wounded. 418/
Name of Unit: XII Slavonian Shock Brigade

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Pakrac, Podravska Slatina Counties, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: Sixteen identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

192. In June 1991, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Slavonia and Baranja formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade. Units of the Brigade include the Unit of Daruvar and the Bilogorian Order.

193. On 19 August 1991, 39 members of the XII Slavonian brigade attacked Pakrac, Lipik and Prekopakra. An unspecified number of Croatian civilians were killed, evicted, or imprisoned in the camp at Bućje. Croatian property was stolen or destroyed.

194. Between 13 August and 31 October 1991, 61 members of the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade allegedly participated in the following actions:

(a) On 28 August 1991, two identified members of the group and a group of unidentified perpetrators kidnapped a man from G. Kovačića. The next day, nine identified members of this group and others kidnapped two people. The names of the perpetrators are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons;

(b) On 29 August 1991, four identified members of the group confiscated a villager’s car and gun. The names of the perpetrators are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons;

(c) An identified member of the group fired an automatic weapon at a private home in late August 1991 and murdered a man in September 1991. The name of the perpetrator is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons;

(d) On 16 September 1991, members from Grgjevac, Šibenik, Gremusina, and other villages launched a mortar and artillery attack on Veliki Grgjevac;

(e) On 18-19 September 1991, members of the brigade kidnapped nine men.
(f) On 18 September 1991, members of the brigade from G. Kovačića launched a mortar and infantry attack on Veliki Grđevac. 428/

(g) On 13 October 1991, members of the brigade kidnapped three men from Veliki Grđevac. 429/

(h) On 14 October 1991, a mortar attack was launched on Veliki Grđevac. 430/

195. The XII Slavonian Shock Brigade allegedly attacked the following villages with mortars, tank grenades, and rocket launchers during the months of October to December 1991: Četekovac, Golenić, Hum, Ivanbrijeg, Lisićine, Mačkovac, Mikleuš, Podravska Slatina 431/
Name: Adolf
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: Uniform of a Militia (police) reservist
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Bjeljina County, BiH
Area(s) of Operation: Brčko County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons
Alleged Members: This is a one man unit.
Source(s): BBC Breakfast News, IHRLI Doc. No. 39139 at No. 39140-39141

Alleged Activity:

196. An identified member of this group reportedly killed 150 unarmed Muslim and Croat civilians in early May 1992, in Brčko. According to the witness, Adolf found these civilians on the streets, briefly interrogated them, and made them form a line in front of the Old Hotel near the centre of Brčko. He then shot them one by one, with a Scorpion automatic pistol fitted with a silencer.

197. During the time of the initial killings, the police from Bijeljina and the local Serbian police operated in Brčko. The leader of the group worked with neither and was only being helped by a few reservists from Bijeljina. Yet, many people thought that he and the others had special permission to do the killing.

198. Those killed by the group are buried in mass graves in Brčko. Others killed were reportedly thrown into the Sava River.

199. Adolf allegedly participated in killings at the Brčko-Luka camp. However, because Adolf was not formally affiliated with the JNA, the Commander of Serb forces at the camp insisted that Adolf leave Brčko-Luka. Reportedly, Adolf then returned to Bijeljina.

200. Other identifying information is available, but not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.
Name of Unit: Antićevci  
Ethnicity: Serbian  
Uniform: N/A  
Number of Troops: N/A  
Origin: N/A  
Area(s) of Operation: Zvornik County, BiH  
Political Affiliation: N/A  
Leader(s): N/A  
Alleged Members: N/A  

Alleged Activity:

201. According to the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, the Antićevci participated in the Serbian attack on Zvornik which began on 26 April 1992. Allegedly, the Antićevci attacked Zvornik alongside Territorial Defence units, Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, Draganovci, White Eagles, Dušan Silni, Vukovarci, and other smaller units. According to the report, the Antićevci carried only light arms, but are accused of perpetrating the assault in the district of Srpska Varoš in which an entire village was killed on 15 April. 436/
Name of Unit: Armada Forces
Ethnicity: Serbian
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Banja Luka County, BiH
Area(s) of Operation: Teslić County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A

Alleged Activity:

202. According to Zdravko Grebo, a professor at Sarajevo University, the Armada Forces "terrorized" Muslim prisoners from Banja Luka. Reportedly, the Armada Forces came to Teslić to perform "ethnic cleansing" operations there. Serbian Militia and Red Berets also operated in Teslić. 437/
Name of Unit: Bilogora Unit (Bilogorski Odred)
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega Counties, Croatia
Political Affiliation: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of Slavonia and Baranja
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

Alleged Activity:

203. In June 1991, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for Slavonia and Baranja formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade for the area of Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega. The Bilogorski Odred was formed as part of this Brigade, and allegedly took part in the following attacks, in concert with JNA and "Četnik" forces:

(a) On 17 August 1991, the centre of Grubišno Polje was attacked. An unspecified number of people were wounded. 426/

(b) On 21 August 1991, infantry attacked Ivanovo Selo. One person was wounded and a policeman was kidnapped. 429/

(c) On 1 September 1991, the Croatian Army strongholds in Gornja Rašenica were attacked with mortars and infantry. 440/

(d) On 13 September 1991, two members of the Croatian Army were wounded in an infantry attack on Grubišno Polje. 441/

(e) On 15 September 1991, the village of Munije was attacked. The non-Serbian population was mistreated and a few Croats were captured. 442/

(f) On 21 September 1991, 27 members of the Bilogora Unit carried out an infantry and mortar attack on Ivanovo Selo, in the Grubišno Polje municipality. Seven people were killed and nine wounded. 443/

(g) On 6-7 October 1991, "Četniks" attacked Grubišno Polje with mortars and infantry. 444/

(h) On 15 October 1991, two people were killed on during a mortar attack on Ivanovo Selo. 445/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces from Borovo Naselje

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Vukovar County, Croatia

Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

204. On 8 October 1991, a group of civilians were reportedly imprisoned in Borovo Naselje, near Vukovar, when they attempted to extinguish a fire at the "Komerc" building. A paramilitary group from the town allegedly captured and then transported the civilians in JNA vehicles to the Stajićev prison camp in Serbia. The prisoners were abused during the ride to Stajićev by four members of the paramilitary unit. A witness also described Stajićev camp as holding 6,500 persons from Vukovar, Borovo Naselje and Mikluševci, Croatia, and said that many of the prisoners were women. At least one local member of the group was identified by a local witness.
Name of Unit: Forces of Miroslav Deronjić
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Bratunac County, BiH
Political Affiliation: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
Leader(s): Miroslav Deronjić
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 56320-57229, at 56909.

Alleged Activity:
205. On 23 May 1992, local paramilitary forces, commanded by Miroslav Deronjić, killed 70 Muslims in front of the mosque in the village of Glogova in Bratunac County. Deronjić, alias "Momo-Penzica", was President of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in Bratunac.
Name of Unit: Captain Dragans units

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Captain Dragans reportedly wore a Red Beret, featuring the Serbian cross and the four Cyrillic S's, and olive fatigues, with no insignia except for a metal plate on the shoulder bearing the name "Captain Dragana".

Number of Troops: As many as 1,000

Origin: Dragan's special forces consist of 1,000 soldiers of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" and some volunteers from countries outside the former Yugoslavia.

Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar, Zadar, and Knin Counties, Croatia; and Brčko, Zvornik, and Zavidovići Counties, BiH 449/

Political Affiliation: N/A

Alleged Leader(s): Captain Dragans Vasiljković or Daniel Sneden. 450/ Dragan is allegedly an Australian citizen who was born in Belgrade. He was a military advisor in both Tanzania and Angola, and, as a result, when speaking English, his accent is more South African than Australian. He reportedly arrived in Knin, Croatia, in 1990, returned to Belgrade in 1991, and left Krajina sometime in 1992. He later returned to Krajina to operate a training camp for special forces volunteers. 451/ Dragan also reportedly led paramilitary groups called the Knindže and the Red Berets. 452/

Alleged Members: Four identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.


Alleged Activity:

206. According to the UN, Captain Dragan led a force called the Kninže from Knin, Croatia, on raids in Croatia in 1990. He also participated in operations in Vukovar with other paramilitary formations, including those commanded by Arkan and Šešelj. In February 1993, having gained celebrity status in Krajina and in Belgrade, Captain Dragan was appointed to head a training camp for Alpha Special Forces in Knin in February 1993. As a result, forces trained by Captain Dragan moved throughout the territory of the former Yugoslavia under various commanders and as members of larger units. The training camp in Croatia allegedly contained over 1,000 troops. Most of the volunteers were soldiers of the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, but troops from outside the former Yugoslavia also trained there under Dragan.

207. Dragan claims to have deployed the Garibaldi Fighters from Italy in the Velebit mountains north of Zadar in Croatia. The size of the Garibaldo unit is unknown, but reportedly carried out reconnaissance and sabotage missions behind enemy lines on behalf of Serbian paramilitary commanders fighting in Croatia. Dragan claimed that by July 1993, as many as 114 missions had been performed by units trained by him at the camp.

208. Dragan has been accused of intimidating civilians and of orchestrating "ethnic cleansing" throughout Krajina. In November 1991, Captain Dragan and two other identified men used the burned remains of a human body to intimidate a Croatian civilian prisoner and force him to reveal information. This happened at the carpentry workshop in "Velepromet" in Vukovar. Captain Dragan was also an investigator for the "People's Court-Martial" at the carpentry workshop, where Serbian JNA and paramilitary forces condemned Croatian prisoners to death. A witness alleged that Captain Dragan and another identified man took a woman from "Velepromet". The woman was beaten and then returned to the room after being questioned about events in Vukovar and the treatment of Serbian residents there before the 1991 elections.

209. A 110-man unit under Captain Dragan allegedly attacked a village called Divić, near Zvornik, in May 1992. The group was billeted in Zvornik, which was occupied by Arkanovi at the time.

210. A witness stated that on 23 September 1991, civilians in Tovarnik, in eastern Croatia, were forced into a courtyard and divided according to nationality. One hundred Croats were reportedly separated from the group and taken towards Šid in Serbia.Reportedly, Captain Dragan claimed authorization to kill whomever he chose. Allegedly, one man was killed and left on the side of the road.

211. A unit named the Draganovi also allegedly participated in the April 1992 attack on Zvornik in north-eastern BiH along with other paramilitary
units including Arkanovci, Dušan the Mighty, Antićevci, the White Eagles, the Vukovar Unit under Pero Elez, and others. 458/

212. In January 1993, paramilitary formations under Captain Dragan allegedly participated in the “ethnic cleansing” operation of the Knin district, along with Arkan and Šešelj units. 459/

213. Captain Dragan’s troops allegedly removed prisoners from Luka camp to Belgrade during June 1992. 460/

214. Groups commanded by Captain Dragan reportedly include the Knindže, the Red Berets, and the Munja or Flash (lightning) troops.
Name of Unit: Drago’s Group (Draga Grupa)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: Nine identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

215. Drago’s Group was allegedly responsible for killing civilians in Tovarnik, a town near Vukovar in eastern Croatia, during 27-30 September 1991. About 80 persons were killed with knives, guns, bombs, etc. An identified Captain raped and killed young girls. Other members of Drago’s Group, who allegedly participated in the attack on Tovarnik, were identified, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. 461/
Name of Unit: Dušan the Great (Dušan Silni)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Camouflage, headbands or scarves and hats with insignia

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia and Zvornik County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: Six identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

216. According to the Croatian Information Centre, on 7 September 1991, in Tovarnik, Dušan the Great forces killed a Catholic priest and set fire to Croatian houses. 462/

217. Dušan forces were also allegedly involved in abuses conducted in the village of Lovas in eastern Croatia. Allegedly, male civilians in Lovas were mistreated and some were killed on 17 October 1991, when they were called to a meeting in a cooperative. Dušan the Great forces surrounded the cooperative, then searched and beat the prisoners. Later, the leader allegedly arrived and ordered some of the prisoners to perform work detail, and detained them in a house for the night. One witness reportedly was detained for roughly three months and made to perform work detail. He stated that Ljuban Devetak was in charge of operations and was encamped at the main police station in Lovas. The same witness also stated that Jovićevci, Šešeljovci and Arkanovci were also present in Lovas during the fall of 1992. 463/
218. Victims were reportedly beaten, forced to sit still in front of machine-guns, and forced to walk through a minefield. Another witness reported that 21 people died and that 13 were wounded. 464/

219. Dušan the Great allegedly participated in the April 1992 attack on Zvornik in north-eastern BiH, along with other paramilitary units including Arkanovci, the Vukovar Unit, Antićevci, the White Eagles, Captain Dragan's men, and others. 465/
Name of Unit: Serb paramilitary unit from Dvor na Uni

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Dvor, Croatia

Area(s) of Operation: Dvor, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: Thirteen identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

220. According to the Croatian Information Centre, a paramilitary group from Dvor na Uni attacked two nearby villages, Kozibrod and Struga, on 26 July 1991. The attack began at 10:30 a.m. and lasted until 9:00 p.m. Allegedly, the attackers used civilians from the two villages as shields as they advanced on the Croatian police station at Kozibrod. Once in control of the police station, the paramilitaries reportedly killed seven civilians and eight policemen. The report also lists eight civilians as seriously wounded by gunfire. 466/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Pero Elez including the Vukovar Unit (Vukovarci)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Camouflage fatigues bearing the red, white, and blue flag of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and/or the JNA star on the left front pocket

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Foća County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Foća and Zvornik Counties, BiH and Vukovar County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Pero Elez

Alleged Members: Two Deputy Commanders 467/ and others 468/ were identified, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.


Alleged Activity:

221. A Government report named the commander of the Vukovar Unit paramilitary force, which operated in Vukovar County, Croatia, and in Foća, Gacko, Zvornik, and Brčko Counties, BiH. 467/ Allegedly, many civilians were killed, imprisoned, or evicted from their homes by the Vukovar Unit. Reports also document that this group destroyed and looted property. The group is also accused of detaining women and young girls in separate facilities and raping them. Two identified members of the group allegedly transported women to detention facilities in FRY and Germany.

222. The US Government reported that the Vukovar unit participated in the 4 May 1992, attack on Foća, alongside members of the White Eagles and the Montenegro Guard. According to the report, the paramilitary units arrived together in seven military buses and followed orders to "comb" the area for Muslim and Croat civilians. The troops reportedly shot many of the civilians in outlying areas and detained the others at Foća Prison. 470/
223. Several witnesses stated that the commander operated in Poča from a hotel in Miljevina. Allegedly, many female prisoners were taken to the Miljevina hotel headquarters and then escorted to private homes, where they were detained for months and raped. The commander reportedly was the first to rape many of the women. The victims said that if they resisted, they were threatened with transfer to a local hotel, where many paramilitary troops raped prisoners regularly. Victims stated that they were held at the house of Nusret Karaman, who was allegedly part of a transport network run by the commander. Karaman reportedly provided passports for the women and took them from BiH to Belgrade and to Germany.

224. A report submitted to the UN estimated that 250 buildings in Poča, including a mosque, were burned to the ground, that the entire agricultural stock was burned, and that farming machinery was destroyed. Allegedly, 1,000 civilians were taken to Poča prison and abused. The prisoners included Muslims, Croats, Serb resisters, and patients and staff at the Poča Medical Centre. Witnesses stated that as many as 10,000 detainees were moved through the prison.

225. The Vukovar Unit also allegedly participated in an attack on the villages near Zelengora mountain in Gacko. Serbian forces allegedly began shelling the villages on 1 July 1992. Civilians were killed with knives or captured and sent to Kalinovik, where they were held in an elementary school. Witnesses stated that two identified men took 12 young women from the elementary school prison. Witnesses also reported that two elderly women died in captivity at the school.

226. The Vukovar Unit allegedly participated in the April 1992 attack on Zvornik in north-eastern BiH, along with other paramilitary units including Arkanovci, Dušan the Great, Antićevci, the White Eagles, Captain Dragan’s men, and others.
Name of Unit: Serbian Falcons

Ethnicity: Serbian

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: BiH

Political Affiliation: Serbian Royalist Party (SRP)

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

227. In May 1993, the group was reported to have 350 men training at Subotica, Serbia. Groups such as Helsinki Watch suspect the SRP paramilitary group, the Serbian Falcons, of atrocities. As of November 1992, an estimated 600 Serbian Falcons were fighting in BiH, with 700 to 800 in Serbia. 477/
Name of Unit: Garavi Sokak
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Goražde County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

228. According to the Bulletin, in June 1992, the Garavi Sokak paramilitary unit looted Muslim property and frightened Muslim residents of Goražde and surrounding villages. The Garavi Sokak unit worked together with Užice military units, Arkan's men, and local paramilitaries working under Braco Rakanović. Allegedly, these forces attacked a settlement near Kokino village and another near Površnica mountain.
Name of Unit: Grey Wolves

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: The Grey Wolves wore distinct, black wool caps and green uniforms with patches on both sleeves. The right-arm patch depicted a grey wolf; the left-arm patch bore the four Cyrillic S's.

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Bosanski Šamac County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Stepo Todorović, Minister of Internal Affairs, who originally lived in Serbia

Alleged Members:

Source(s): Marlene A. Young (National Organization for Victim Assistance), Recommendation for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-9162; at 9157-9161.

Alleged Activity:

229. The National Organization for Victim Assistance reported an attack on Bosanski Šamac on 17 April 1992, by Serbian paramilitary forces, including the Grey Wolves and Arkanovci. One witness stated that the paramilitary troops arrested and killed civilians in the days before and after the attack, and that the same troops mined and destroyed all of the bridges in the area. The witness stated that he was arrested and repeatedly beaten.

230. On 18 April the paramilitary forces were allegedly joined by the Territorial Defence and the JNA, who came with tanks and transport vehicles. Politically active Croats and Muslims were arrested, as well as anyone who remained outside. Seven or eight days later, all intellectuals were arrested. In the third and final wave of arrests, the only civilians who were not taken were those with "working obligations". Allegedly, detention centres were established at a Territorial Defence storehouse and the police headquarters. The prisoners were reportedly beaten and detained for a month.

231. Todorović was reportedly from Serbia and married to a Muslim woman. He allegedly demanded that civilians give up their arms for peace, and claimed that if even one Grey Wolf was killed, 100 Muslims and Croats would die. According to the witness, the civilians who surrendered their weapons were arrested.

232. A man, identified by one name only, was reportedly a member of the Arkanovci or Grey Wolves, killed 21 people in retaliation for the death of a 21 year-old Serb. A 60 year-old man was also reportedly shot to death.

233. The witness stated that he was eventually taken out of Bosanski Šamac and taken to Brčko and other camps.
Name of Unit: Serbian Guard in Karakaj

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Karakaj (county unknown), BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

234. The chief of the Serbian guard in Karakaj is reported to have engaged in several activities not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. 484/
Name of Unit:  Serb Hawks (Srpski Orlovi)

Ethnicity:  Serbian

Uniform:  N/A

Number of Troops:  N/A

Origin:  N/A

Area(s) of Operation:  BiH

Political Affiliation:  N/A

Leader(s):  N/A

Alleged Members:  N/A

Source(s):  Chris Stephen, "View from the Zoo", Houston Chronicle, 5 December 1993, at A33.

Alleged Activity:

235. The name "Serb Hawks" is reported in at least one newspaper article, but no information is available regarding their activities. 485/
Name of Unit: Četniks led by Dragan Ignjatović, Ljubisav, and Mile Mijatović

Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Zvornik County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): Dragan Ignjatović, Ljubisav, and Mile Mijatović (alias "Cicvara")
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): World Campaign "Save Humanity", Report on War Destruotions, 
Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in BiH, 27 

Alleged Activity:

236. Četniks led by Dragan Ignjatović, a former clerk in the Zvornik town 
hall, Ljubisav, a policeman, and Mile Mijatović, alias "Cicvara", attacked 
Kostjerevo village near Zvornik in May 1992. According to a witness, the 
entire population of Kostjerevo was taken to Drinjača. Thirty-five men were 
beaten and killed in a hall there and 12 teenage boys were taken prisoner and 
led in the direction of Zvornik. Women were raped and tortured. On 31 May 
about 150 women and children were taken in two buses in the direction of 
Tuzla, while others were allegedly kept for exchange.
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Dragan Ikanović

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Vogošća County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Dragan Ikanović

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.


Alleged Activity:

237. A witness reported that Dragan Ikanović and his men were responsible for the deaths of approximately 50 Muslim prisoners. According to the witness, Ikanović and his men loaded the prisoners onto a bus and drove them from Vogošća towards a village called Srednje. At one point in the journey, the passengers were told that the bus had overheated. The three Serbian guards left the bus, which was then fired upon by Serbian forces using rocket launchers, bazookas, machine-guns and hand grenades.
Name of Unit: Dragan Ilić's Group

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: N/A

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Dragan Ilić

Alleged Members: One man was identified, but his name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.


Alleged Activity:

238. Twenty-two year-old Dragan Ilić, son of Dragoljub Ilić, allegedly led a team that confiscated weapons from Muslims. One member of the team was identified. 489/
Name of Unit: Jovičevci
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: Camouflage
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

239. According to witness statements reported by the Republic of Croatia, the Jovičevci forces were involved in abuses conducted in Lovas in eastern Croatia. Male civilians in Lovas were allegedly mistreated and some were killed on 17 October 1991, when they were called to a meeting at the town cooperative. Jovičevci allegedly participated in searching and beating the prisoners. Twenty-one people were killed on the night of 17 October when they were forced to walk in a minefield located in front of the Borovo factory. A witness stated that the paramilitary groups present in Lovas at the time were the Jovičevci, Šešaljovci and Arkanovci. Also, many witnesses have corroborated that Ljuban Devetak, an economist, was in charge of the forces operating in Lovas during the fall of 1992. 450/
Name of Unit: Zoran Karlica

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Prijedor County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: Three identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

240. A Serbian paramilitary unit called Zoran Karlica was allegedly responsible for killings, rapes and other abuses in the village of Bišćani in Prijedor county in July 1992. A witness recognized and identified three men among the group. One identified man allegedly beat a man to death because of an earlier incident between them. 491/

241. The witness claimed that there were few survivors after "ethnic cleansing" in the village. Survivors were loaded into two buses and driven towards Prijedor. There were reportedly unburied bodies alongside the road during the drive. At Crna Jaruga, half of one bus' passengers were killed. One of the buses drove to the Omarska camp and then on to the Trnopolje camp because there was no room at Omarska. Later in the day, an identified member of the paramilitary group returned and reportedly removed and executed 13 people. 492/
Name of Unit: Knindža Turtles
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Knin County, Croatia
Area(s) of Operation: Modriča and Doboj Counties, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A

Alleged Activity:

242. According to an eyewitness, during May 1992, a paramilitary group who called themselves the Knindža Turtles, together with members of the White Eagles, interrogated prisoners at the Sutjeska school. The witness reported that he was held in a classroom with approximately 50 other men of military age. Women, children and older men were held in the school sports hall. The witness said that local Serbs acted as guards, while the two paramilitary groups performed interrogations. 494/

243. The witness was questioned about where the Muslims kept their weapons and about his activities before apprehension. He said that he was not beaten during the interrogation, but that one of the prisoners, a 47 year-old Muslim, was beaten with a pickaxe handle. 495/
Name of Unit: Vlado Kovačević and Četniks

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Vlado Kovačević

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

244. On 19 November 1991, Serbian paramilitary units, referred to by witnesses as "Četniks", took Vukovar civilians from their basements to the Pekara bakery, where they were killed with knives and burned in a baker's oven. Vlado Kovačević was seen among the perpetrators, apparently dressed as the commander. 496/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under command of Rajko Kušić

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Višegrad and Rogatica Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Rajko Kušić, Major Commander Battalion Borika, 1 Brigade Drina Corps, Serbian Republic of BiH

Alleged Members: An identified person, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

245. According to a witness, Serbian paramilitary forces under the command of Rajko Kušić killed 49 prisoners during a fake prisoner exchange. Serb forces under the command of an identified member of the group forced prisoners from Višegrad onto a bus, under the pretence of a prisoner exchange in Han Pijesak. However, once the prisoners were on the bus, several Serb soldiers tied them up, and then beat and taunted them. Eventually, the bus arrived at a curve along a muddy road. The Serb forces ordered the prisoners off the bus, walked them up the road, then killed 49 of the prisoners and piled them in a pit.
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Milan Lukić.

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Masked with camouflage uniforms and "Četnik insignias".

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Višegrad County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Višegrad County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Milan Lukić

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

246. According to reports submitted to the Commission of Experts, Milan Lukić from the village of Rusti in Višegrad, BiH, commanded paramilitary forces operating in the Višegrad region. Lukić's forces allegedly abducted two sets of Muslim civilians who have since disappeared. He is also accused of murder, deliberate destruction of Muslim property, and molestation of young Muslim women at the "Vilina Vlas" and "Bikavac" hotels. 499/

247. A report, based on information received from the BiH Ministry of Internal Affairs, states that on 18 June 1992, 22 Muslims were killed on the new bridge in Višegrad by Lukić and his men. According to the report, the Lukić forces killed the civilians by various methods: children were dropped from the bridge and shot before they hit the water, others died when their kidneys were torn out, and some were tied to car bumpers and dragged through the streets. The report states that Lukić's forces did not act alone on 18 June but were linked with members of the Popović Group (another paramilitary group operating in Višegrad at the time and commanded by Srpko Popović). 500/

248. Milan Lukić and his men allegedly abducted 16 Sandžak Muslims from the village of Sjeverin on 22 October 1992. According to Amnesty International, eight armed and masked men boarded a bus the victims were travelling in as it entered BiH in the Višegrad municipality. The men then escorted the Muslim passengers off the bus and onto an army truck. The truck, which had no license plates, carried the civilians towards the town of Višegrad. According to witnesses, the Muslims were told that they were to be exchanged for Serbs who were captured the night before. The Belgrade newspaper, Borba, citing
military sources in Serbia, reported that the Muslims were killed near Višegrad later that same day. 249/

249. On 19 February 1993, Lukić's forces allegedly performed a similar operation at the Strpci train station in BiH. Witnesses state that 19 Muslim passengers on the train were abducted by paramilitary forces under Milan Lukić. The forces all wore camouflage with "Četnik insignia". The victims were led onto a military truck and driven away from the train station. 250/

250. Lukić was reportedly arrested and detained briefly in relation to both of these incidents on 26 October 1992 and again in February 1993. According to Amnesty International, the leaders of the "Serb Republic of BiH" deny the existence of paramilitary forces in the Višegrad region and refer to Lukić and his paramilitary forces as "volunteers" fighting under the command of the Višegrad Brigade. However, according to Borba, Lukić's forces were not controlled by the army or the local authorities in Višegrad. 251/
Name of Unit: Martić’s Police or Militia (Martićevci)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Reportedly had access to federal army uniforms.

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Krajina, Banija, Kordun, Slavonia.

Area(s) of Operation: Regions of Krajina, Kordun, Banija, Western Slavonia, Eastern Slavonia, Croatia; and Brčko, Doboj, and Hadžići Counties, BiH.

Political Affiliation: Affiliated with Milan Martić, former police chief and Interior Minister of the Krajina region, and currently the president of the RSK.

Leader(s): Milan Martić, Captain Dragan, Dane Bunjevac (unit commander of Krajina militia in Plaški), 504/ Mladenović (local commander in UNPA Sector East) 505/

Identified Members: Five identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, to Georg Mautner-Markof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Zagreb, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-201 at 49197.


UNPROFOR, Press Summary Belgrade, 19 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 45390-393, at 45390.


Alleged Activity:

251. Milan Martić became the most prominent organizer of Serbian militia forces in the Krajina region of Croatia. When the armed conflict between Croats and Serbs began in the Serb strong-hold of Knin in August 1990, Martić served as the local Serb police chief and military organizer. Martić apparently continued as the leader of the Krajina militia when Croatian Serbs declared the autonomous region of "SAO Krajina" in March 1991 and when the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) was established. Martić served for a long period as the Interior Minister of the RSK and was elected president of the RSK in January 1994.

252. It is difficult to establish Martić's role in particular military and paramilitary activities. The reports submitted to the Commission of Experts do not clearly delineate Martić's authority over the various paramilitary groups which operated in the Serbian-controlled regions of Croatia and do not clearly signify how Martić's authority may have expanded or diminished as his own role within the rump RSK government changed. While Martić, as the Knin police chief and RSK Interior Minister, clearly controlled a large force of police and police reservists, it is not clear how this force was related to the "SAO Krajina-Militia", which has also been closely identified with Martić. A number of reports mention both Martić and a Krajina militias, suggesting that they may have been different forces. 506/ The organization of a RSK army separate from Krajina militia and police forces is not well understood, but by October 1993, the Politika newspaper reported that the RSK military supported RSK President Goran Hadžić, while the police backed Interior Minister Martić in their political disputes. 507/ For these reasons, this report summarizes only the activities of groups clearly identified as Martić forces.

253. Most of the reports on which this summary is based do not describe the personal involvement of Martić in planning or executing actions attributed to Martić forces. They are connected to him only because reports describe the groups involved as Martić's men, Martić police or Martić militia. An exception is the report from Croatian authorities, stating that Martić met with Komazec Ozren and Adam Davor on 10 April 1991 and instructed them to ignite explosives in Zadar, which they allegedly did. 508/

254. Serbs in Croatia began to organize paramilitary forces in 1990, prior to the declaration of an independent Serbian Krajina within the borders of Croatia. By mid-July 1990, the paramilitary forces reportedly had an estimated 12,000 members. 509/ The forces commanded by or loyal to Milan Martić were known as Martićevci. In an interview reported in July 1991, Martić claimed that the Krajina forces he commanded had 7,000 police regulars and 20,000 reservists. 510/ Several reports indicate that Captain Dragan commanded one of the Martićevci forces. 511/ but the links between Captain Dragan and Martić are not clear.

255. When the Serbs in Knin declared the autonomous region of "SAO Krajina", Martić headed the Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SUP) of the government led by Milan Babic. 512/ As Interior Minister and military organizer, Martić was widely regarded as effective in building the strength of the Krajina militia. 513/ Initially, the Martićevci was comprised largely of ethnic Serbian members of the existing Croatian police forces. Serbian members of Territorial Defence Forces and volunteers from other parts of Yugoslavia also joined the militia loyal to Martić. 514/
256. In the early stage of the conflict, Martičevci police forces attacked Croatian police stations and clashed with Croatian police forces in several villages. Federal army units were deployed to separate the Croatian and Serbian police after the battle for control of the Plitvice National Park, during which two people were killed. 515/

257. Following the fighting in the Plitvice region, the Serb authorities in Knin announced that they were uniting with the Republic of Serbia. Martić claimed that Serbian President Milošević had promised weapons and assistance to the Krajina Serbs if they came under attack. Officials in Serbia did not comment on his remarks. 516/

258. The Republic of Serbia and the Serb-dominated federal army reportedly backed the Martičevci and other Serb insurgents in Croatia. The Martičevci had access to federal uniforms, maps, vehicles, and weapons. 517/ The federal army also fought with the militias against Croatian forces, even as federal army officials continued to insist that the army was only acting as a buffer between Croatian and rebel Serb forces. 518/

259. Following the Croatian declaration of independence on 25 June 1991, the Serbian rebels attacked the Croatian police station in Glina. Three policemen were killed and seven injured. On 2 July Krajina militia forces attacked Croatian police in Lički Osik, and, according to Martić, 10 people were killed. 519/ Other Croatian villages were reportedly attacked as well. The federal army moved to separate the Croatian and Serbian fighters; Croatian sources claimed that the army was protecting the rebels. 520/

260. Martičevci forces and Croatian forces clashed often during the summer and fall of 1991. Fighting erupted in the regions of Krajina, Banija, Kordun and Western and Eastern Slavonia. Numerous cities and villages were engulfed in the conflict, including Gospić, Štari, 521/ Vinkovci, Mirkovci, Josipdol, 522/ Đvorska Uni, 523/ Pliski, 524/ Selo Plastovo, Šibenik, Otočac, 525/ Beli Manastir, Borovo Selo, Borovo Naselje, Topusko, 526/ Pakrac, and Okučani. 527/

261. Federal army and Serbian rebel forces jointly attacked Croatian towns and villages on several occasions. On 21 August 1991, the combined forces shelled Osijek, killing three civilians and damaging a cathedral and apartment buildings. 528/ The army did not deny taking part in the shelling but claimed that it was responding to an attack by the Croatian National Guard on a federal army installation near the city. 529/ On 28 August 1991, the village of Korana in Slunj County was allegedly attacked by army tankfire and Martić forces. Women and children reportedly fled from the village, while the fate of 20 remaining Croatian men is unknown. The village was allegedly destroyed. 530/

262. The federal army also allegedly followed a pattern of occupying Croatian towns and villages after attacks by Martičevci and other rebel forces. Therefore, even when the army did not directly participate in the fighting, it helped rebel Serb forces gain control of a large portion of Croatia. 531/

263. In addition to fighting other armed forces, the Martičevci and other Serb rebels have been accused of attacking civilians, "ethnic cleansing", and abuses in detention.

264. "Ethnic Cleansing" and Attacks on Civilians: Members of the Martić Police and Yugoslav Army allegedly killed civilians, burned houses, and looted property in Saborsko from 1 August to 12 November 1991. During this period, 40 civilians were killed and 34 people were reported missing in Saborsko. 532/
In the village of Široka Kula during August to October 1991, Martić police forces based in Lički Osik allegedly restricted the movement of Croatian villagers, cut off telephone links, and subjected prisoners to forced labour. Citizens of Široka Kula were allegedly tortured and killed, but it is unclear whether Martić police or other paramilitaries were responsible.\footnote{532/}

Approximately 70 members of Martić's group, along with other paramilitaries, were responsible for "ethnic cleansing" in the area of Donji Vakuf.\footnote{534/}

In December 1991, a named man and other members of Martić's police killed civilians, burned houses and evicted people from their homes in the Croatian villages of Smilčić, Sopot and Paljuv.\footnote{535/}

In December 1991, about 22 Croatian citizens were killed in their homes by Martić's militia, reportedly in retaliation for 19 Martić members allegedly killed while fighting against the Croatian Army.\footnote{536/}

A named member of Martić's Militia, along with members of the Territorial Defence of SAO Krajina, allegedly attacked civilians in Čatrnja on several occasions. On 1 June 1992, he reportedly killed a civilian man from Čatrnja; on another occasion, he killed three women from the village and then burned their bodies.\footnote{537/}

Abuses in Detention: Martić's militia and other paramilitary groups allegedly organized camps and prisons in Croatia at Beli Manastir, Knin, Stara Gradiška, Glini, Titova Korenica, Željava, and Bučje.\footnote{538/} In these camps, civilians, Croatian Army troops, and Croatian Ministry of Interior troops were mistreated and executed.\footnote{539/}

Martić and his forces imprisoned Croatian policemen in several cities. Croatian authorities alleged that two Croatian policemen from Šibenik were arrested by Martić in Civiljane on 1 April 1991, and detained for 15 days. According to one account, 120 Croatian policemen were being held in Knin on 26 June 1991, and Martić threatened to capture more.\footnote{540/} According to a Belgrade radio report, eight Croatian policemen from Dvor na Uni were imprisoned in Knin in July 1991, at which time the Knin prison contained 42 members of Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) forces.\footnote{541/}

In September 1991, six members of Martić's militia were accused of torturing and terrorizing imprisoned civilians and members of the Croatian Army held at the fortress in Knin.\footnote{542/}

On 31 December 1991, three Croatian soldiers travelling from Podgradina to Novigrad were captured in Paljuv by members of the ex-Yugoslav army and handed over to members of the Martić police forces. Martić's men allegedly killed one of the soldiers with a bullet to the head; the fate of the other two is unknown.\footnote{543/}

Martić police allegedly arrested a Catholic priest from Drežnik in the Kordun region and imprisoned him in Titova Korenica.\footnote{544/}

Martićevci Activity in BiH: In addition to the widespread involvement of the Martićevci in the conflict in Croatia, Martić forces also operated in BiH. On 8 June 1991, a special battalion of the SUP staged a one-day exercise in Titov Drvar to gauge combat-readiness. The exercise was reportedly commanded by Martić, who stated that there would be further exercises in BiH and that the exercise had erased the border between Krajina and BiH.\footnote{545/}
276. In October 1991, a group of Martićevci allegedly stormed a polling station in Hadžići near Sarajevo, to stop voting on a referendum on Sandžak autonomy. 546/

277. Martić forces from Bosanska Krajina were allegedly the last Serbian forces to hold Brčko following the Serbian attack which began on 1 May 1992. 547/

278. Martić forces were allegedly involved in the Serbian attack on Doboj, which began on 3 May 1992. A husband and wife were attacked and robbed by Serbian soldiers, identified by the victims as the "Martić gang". The man was beaten and cut with a knife; his wife was raped. 548/
Name of Unit: Montenegro Guard
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: Camouflage with white cloth tied around the left shoulder
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Foča County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A

Alleged Activity:

279. According to the US Government, the Montenegro Guard participated in "ethnic cleansing" operations in Jeleč, a village near Miljevina in south-eastern BiH. Allegedly, the Montenegro Guard and members of other paramilitary units, including the White Eagles and the Vukovar Unit, shelled the town and killed remaining Muslim civilians after 23 April 1992. The raid on Jeleč began on 18 April 1992, when paramilitary forces blocked the roads to the town and ordered Muslims to surrender their weapons by 22 April to a Bosnian Serb delegation at the military complex in Miljevina. On 23 April Serb forces began shelling Jeleč and the surrounding villages, forcing the residents into hiding in the surrounding hills. The Montenegro Guard and other ground forces moved into Jeleč on 4 May. They arrived in seven military buses and were given orders to search the area for Muslims. At least 16 Muslims were allegedly shot and buried in two graves in a potato field one kilometre west of Jeleč.
Name of Unit: Radoja Nikolić's Paramilitary Groups

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Zvornik County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Radoja Nikolić

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

280. Radoja Nikolić allegedly led Serbian paramilitary groups in Grbavci near Zvornik. 250/
Name of Unit: Special Forces from Nikšić

Ethnicity: Montenegro Serbs

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Nikšić, Montenegro, FRY

Area(s) of Operation: Gacko County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A

Source(s): Submission from David Hepburn, EOMM Liaison Officer, UK Mission, to the Commission of Experts, 29 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20269-20546, at 20271-20285.

Alleged Activity:

281. Witnesses from the villages around Gacko, BiH, stated that in June 1992, their villages were destroyed and Muslim civilians were tortured and killed by Nikšić paramilitary forces, White Eagles, local Serbs and JNA soldiers. On 18 and 19 June, the villages in the area allegedly were shelled, and Muslims were rounded up for interrogation and transported to Trebinje. Many of the civilians fled into the forests in the nearby mountains from where they could see the paramilitary forces moving through the villages and burning the homes. 551/

282. According to one witness, many of the civilians hiding in the forests surrendered on 12 July 1992. They were taken in military trucks to Gacko and interrogated at the police station, where witnesses reported many village possessions were stored. The civilians were asked where their male relatives could be found. The male Muslim prisoners were reportedly held in the basement of a hotel in the suburbs of Gacko. 552/

283. Eventually, in late July, the women and children were deposited at the front-line near Berkovići, where Serb forces were fighting members of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). The civilians were forced to cross the battle lines over minefields towards the HVO who fed them and transferred them to Mostar, Čapljina, or Ljubuški, BiH. 553/

284. Witnesses from the Gacko region alleged that the Serbian forces, including the forces from Nikšić, destroyed and looted villages, blew up at least one bridge, shot and burned some civilians and mutilated others. Witnesses stated that almost none of the Muslim males from the area survived. 554/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary Forces from Padinska Skela

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Large, black cowboy hats with ribbons

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Padinska Skela, FRY

Area(s) of Operation: Zvornik County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

285. According to the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, paramilitary forces from Padinska Skela participated in the April 1992 attack on Zvornik in north-eastern BiH, along with other paramilitary units including Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, Dušan the Great, Antićevci, the White Eagles, Captain Dragan’s men, the Vukovar Unit, and others. 555/
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Risto Perišić
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Višegrad County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): Risto Perišić
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

286. Risto Perišić, President of the Serbian community, was one of the organizers of "ethnic cleansing" in the Višegrad region. He was formerly a teacher of Serbo-Croatian. 556/
Name of Unit: Popović Group
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Višegrad, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): Srpko Popović

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

287. The Popović Group was reportedly involved in the deaths of 22 Muslims in Višegrad on 18 June 1992. The Popović unit worked with forces under Milan Lukić to kill Muslim civilians. A report also states that the Popović Group killed many Muslims at the Višegrad Electric Plant and threw the corpses into the Drina river. The Popović Group burned a group of 60 civilians in a house, drowned victims by tying them up and throwing them into the river, and looted Muslim homes in Višegrad. According to the report, Popović once killed 17 civilians in a single day.
Name of Unit: Radosavljević/Lukić Unit
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Podravska Slatina County, Croatia
Political Affiliation: Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)
Leader(s): Borivoje Lukić and Borivoje Radosavljević
Alleged Members: N/A
Source(s): Republic of Croatia, Report to the Commission of Experts, IHRLI Doc. No. 2794-2984, at 2810.

Alleged Activity:

288. During June 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) was established in Podravska Slatina, led by lawyer Ilija Sašić. Party members armed themselves and established "camps for the education of terrorists" in Voćin, Sekulinci, Bučje, Zvečevo and Čeradle. On 19 August 1991, a "terroristic unit" under the command of Borivoje Lukić and Borivoje Radosavljević disarmed and mistreated Croatian policemen at the police station in Voćin. On the same day, "Četniks" harassed Croats in the "Preveda" quarter of the city, searching their homes and confiscating their weapons. While Serbs remained in control of Voćin, Croats were tortured and arrested, and suffered forced labour and property confiscation. When the "Četniks" retreated on 12-13 December 1991, they killed Croatian civilians in Voćin, Hum, Kraljevci and Bokane. Public and private buildings were destroyed, including the Catholic church in Voćin.
Name of Unit: Radulović Irregulars

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Zecovi (county unknown), BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Prijedor County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: Three identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

289. Several members of this group were identified for their alleged violations in locations not identified for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.
Name of Unit: Forces under Braco Rakanović

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: 3

Origin: Goražde County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Goražde County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Braco Rakanović

Alleged Members: Two identified people, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

290. Several members of this group were identified for their alleged violations in locations not identified for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. 563/
Name of Unit: Rambos
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: Webbed masks, black gloves, and black ribbons tied around their foreheads
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Prijedor County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

291. According to one witness, the Rambos carved the Četnik insignia (four Cyrillic s's) into a victim's chest, cut the sinews in one individual's leg and the spine of another so that he was instantly paralysed. The witness noted that the Rambos were sexually aggressive and assaulted both men and women interned in the camp. On one occasion, the men allegedly took five 13-year-old girls to a private home and returned them the following day, bearing obvious signs of abuse. A resident physician managed to suture two of the victims, but the others had to be sent to the hospital in Prijedor. In another incident, the Rambos chopped off the testicles and gouged out the eyes of a Czechoslovakian medic.
Name of Unit: Red Berets

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Niš, Serbia, FRY

Area(s) of Operation: Brčko, Doboj, Prijedor and Teslić Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A 567/

Alleged Members: N/A


Victim Testimonies submitted by Dr. Christina Doctare, WHO (Jan. 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 39240A-39265A, at 39242A.


Alleged Activity:

292. In late December 1992, UNCVPOL and local police authorities inspected a Red Beret camp near Bapska village. The UNPROFOR report, which described the inspection, did not specify the incident under investigation or the nature of the camp. 568/

293. On 1 May 1992, Red Berets from Niš arrested two Bosnian Muslim brothers at the railway station in Brčko, while trying to escape from the city. The men were taken to the Luka prison camp, where they were mistreated and witnessed many atrocities. 569/

294. In May 1992, Red Berets participated in the attack on Gornja Puharska, a village of about 300 Muslim families and six Croatian families. On 17 May regular JNA forces surrounded and attacked the village. On 29 May, Red Berets entered the village in tanks, accompanied by some non-uniformed Bosnian Serb irregular forces. 570/ The village surrendered and all the men were taken 23 kilometres south-east to Omarska on two buses and a cattle truck. Women and children remained in the village. At Omarska, Red Berets, JNA, and police provided security and coordinated guard shifts. 571/

295. Red Beret troops allegedly raped women at the Secondary School Centre in Doboj. One victim reported that three Red Berets (whom she believed were part of the Knin Corps) raped her simultaneously after she had been taken to the school by other "Cetniks". 572/

296. Red Beret formations from Banja Luka participated in the "ethnic cleansing" of the Teslić region, along with the Serbian Militia and the Armada
Forces of the Serbian Republic of BiH. These groups also mistreated 600 prisoners in four prisons in the region, particularly in Banja Vrućica where 300 Muslims were imprisoned. 573/
Name of Unit: SAO Krajina Militia

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Dragović, Pakrac County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

297. On 12 April 1993, five armed members of the SAO Krajina Militia robbed a Croatian family of money, valuables and a vehicle in the village of Dragović, 400 metres from an UNPROFOR checkpoint. The family was released with the assistance of UNPROFOR and local police. According to witnesses, the SAO Krajina militia wore uniforms which were different from the regular army.
Name of Unit:  Momir Savić's Četniks

Ethnicity:  Serbian

Uniform:  N/A

Number of Troops:  N/A

Origin:  N/A

Area(s) of Operation:  Višegrad County, BiH

Political Affiliation:  N/A

Leader(s):  Momir Savić

Alleged Members:  Six identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

298.  Momir Savić, an independent toolmaker, allegedly organized "ethnic cleansing" in the Višegrad region. On 13 April 1992, he and his Četniks reportedly set fire to the villages of Repuševići, Jarci, Brežje, Šip, Bodežnik, Bluž and Moremslje. They reportedly stole humanitarian aid, but their actions worsened after the Užice corps left Višegrad on 18 June 1992. They then harassed and arrested Muslims, defaced a mosque, and destroyed the property of Muslims. 575/
Name of Unit: Serbian Democratic Party Forces (Srpska Demokratska Stranka) (SDS)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Vukovar County and the Crna Gora Region, Croatia

Area(s) of Operation: Gacko and Sarajevo Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: Serbian Democratic Party

Leader(s): Mišo Radulović, Vojin Popović

Alleged Members: Five identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

299. The State Department reported that the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), along with members of the Banja Luka Corps, attacked the village of Kozarac on 23 May 1992. The strength of their combined force was approximately 3,000 men, 70 T-84 and T-55 tanks, and an unknown number of armoured personnel carriers. Mišo Radulović, commander of the SDS troops, and a large number of his troops were reportedly from Vukovar and the Crna Gora region in Croatia.

300. Seven hundred Muslim villagers defended Kozarac for three days. Approximately 4,500 residents of the village were killed in direct fighting and by artillery and tank shelling. Once the Serbian force had taken the village, hundreds of Muslims fled to the forest. The SDS and Banja Luka Corps forces mined the perimeter of the forest to prevent Muslims from finding refuge there. As a result, many Muslims were killed or badly wounded.

301. A named member of the SDS Central Committee was located in Pale where he worked for the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina". He helped arm local Serbs with weapons obtained from the JNA and actively participated in the arrest of Muslim intellectuals outside Sarajevo by providing lists with their names and addresses for Serbian paramilitary units. 577/

302. Another identified member was the former Deputy Commander of the District Highway Patrol Police in Sarajevo. 578/ He joined the SDS in early 1992 and was a commander of troops in Stari Grad in April 1993. He worked with JNA officers to coordinate an attack on an army depot at Peletići in May 1992, during which over 20,000 weapons were taken. He and a man named Drago Sucur also participated in ethnic cleansing in the area around Stari Grad. 579/

303. Another identified member headed the police department in Gacko county and the SDS in Gacko. 580/ Popović came to Gacko from Serbia in early 1992. He ordered a named man to rid Gacko County of its non-Serbian population. Within two or three weeks, all Muslims were killed, sent to Macedonia, or to camps in Serb-held areas.
304. Another identified member was a former chief inspector in the Sarajevo Internal Affairs Department and a member of the SDS. Before the war, he was a prominent Communist. As of mid-April 1993, he was the main political advisor to the commander of the Kolacki Battalion near Sokolac. During mid-July 1992, this battalion participated in attacks on a number of refugee settlements, including the village of Sahbegovići, where 60 Muslim women and children were killed.
Name of Unit: Six Districts (Šesta Krajiška)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Banja Luka County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Sanski Most County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

305. According to the US Government, on 9 May 1992, the Šesta Krajiška, or Six Districts paramilitary unit, attacked Sanski Most, occupying the police station and other municipal buildings there. Seventeen days after the Šesta Krajiška attack, Sanski Most was invaded by the Serbian Regular army. The Šesta Krajiška allegedly was from Banja Luka and regularly conducted small-scale military operations in support of the Serbian troops in BiH.
Name of Unit: SOS (Srpske Oružane Snage)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Red berets and arm patches depicting white wolves

Number of Troops: Approximately 12 members

Origin: Belgrade, Pančevo, and Valjevo, Serbia; many had come from Serbia as part of Arkan's Forces.

Area(s) of Operation: Area from Brčko County to Banja Luka County, including Bosanski Šamac, Modriča, Odišak, Derventa, and Bosanski Brod Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Crni (Blackie), Lusar (Ranger)

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Source(s): US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62684.

Alleged Activity:

306. Members of the Srpske Oružane Snage (SOS) came to BiH as part of Arkan's Forces, but later operated independently. The SOS were reportedly extremely violent, looted property, and killed Serbs, Muslims and Croats.

307. The two leaders of the SOS, Crni and Lusar, allegedly killed about 5,000 people in the Brčko area with firearms and knives. They were reportedly criminals before the war and were incarcerated in the Kazneno-Popravni Dom Prison in Raška. Crni and Lusar both are described by the witness.

308. A witness alleged that the 12 SOS members were finally charged with looting and killing and locked up in Stara Gradiška Prison only because of the international community's awareness. Witnesses claimed that the SOS members were allowed to wander freely through the prison and repeatedly beat other inmates. No dates are indicated in relation to SOS activities.
Name of Unit: Paramilitary forces under Joja Tintor
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: Over 1,000
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Pale and Vogošća Counties, BiH
Political Affiliation: Eighty members were affiliated with the SDS.
Leader(s): Joja Tintor and four men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons
Alleged Members: Twelve identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Activity:

309. According to a witness, over 1,000 Serbian irregular forces, 150 soldiers from Rajlovac and Butile barracks, and 80 SDS extremists, entered Ahatovići and Dobroševići in south-east BiH on 1 June 1992 and killed approximately 20 Muslim men. The Serb forces also wounded several others and looted and set fire to Muslim homes. On 2 June 1992, Serb extremists mined and destroyed the mosque in Ahatovići. During the Serb attack, Serbian irregulars, under the command of Joja Tintor, also captured 400 women and children and 80 men. 588/

310. Previously, Serb forces captured 150 people from the villages Dobroševići, Bojnik, and Mihaljevići in Vogošća, BiH. The Serb forces beat 15 of the men, and eventually transferred them to Rajlovac, where they were held for 12 days. In Rajlovac, Serb guards beat and killed one of the prisoners. A named guard took 55 prisoners by bus to a supposed prisoner exchange. However, when the bus reached Sokolina, near Srednje, the Serb guards left the bus. Serbs troops in the surrounding hills then fired on the bus with rocket launchers, bazookas, and infantry weapons. Forty-seven of the prisoners reportedly died in the attack. 588/
Name of Unit: Commander Turtle's Units

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Poča, Višegrad and Čajniče Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): A man identified by the pseudonym of Duško Kornjača ("Commander Turtle")

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

311. "Duško Kornjača", 520/ a doctor, is allegedly a Bosnian Serb warlord who fought under the name of "Commander Turtle". He also held the titles of "Defence Minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina" and "Commander of the Čajniče War Committee". As of September 1992, he was the boss of portions of eastern BiH, including Poča and Višegrad. 521/
Name of Unit: Užice Corps
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: Stocking masks
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: Užice, Serbia, FRY
Area(s) of Operation: Goražde County, BiH
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): N/A
Alleged Members: N/A

Alleged Activity:

312. A witness stated that in May 1992, the Užice Corps shelled the Hotel Drina in Goražde, which housed refugees, including women and children. According to the witness, masked paramilitary forces harassed the Muslim citizens of Goražde for months. In mid-June, the witness saw Serbian forces in a settlement at the base of the Površnica mountain killing Muslims and throwing the corpses into the Drina River.
Name of Unit: Velebit Unit (Velebitska Jedinica)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Area(s) of Operation: Gračac County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons


Alleged Activity:

313. On 20 July 1991, a named man and nine other members of the Velebit Unit allegedly shelled Lovinac in the municipality of Gračac, killing one local woman. According to a report of the Republic of Croatia, they attacked Lovinac again on 5 August. One civilian was killed, and a reserve policeman and a civilian were wounded. The perpetrators also caused significant property damage in the attack. The members of the Velebit Unit kidnapped five villagers from their houses and killed them about two kilometres from Lovinac, in the direction of Raduča.
Name of Unit: Višegrad Militia

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: White ribbons tied around the arms.

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Serbia and Višegrad County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Višegrad County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

314. A witness stated that he narrowly escaped when the house where he was detained was set afire by Višegrad Militia guards. The witness stated that many other prisoners died in the fire. On 13 June 1992, Radomir Djurić reportedly came to Koritnik and told the Muslims there that they would be evicted. The next day, men in camouflage with white ribbons tied to their upper arms entered the village and loaded 57 civilians onto buses which headed towards Višegrad. At a Serbian checkpoint on a bridge outside Višegrad, the civilians were searched and forced to surrender their money and jewelry. The prisoners were then transferred to a house where the women were taken for what the guards called "interrogations".

315. The witness claimed that there were already five prisoners in the house near the checkpoint where the villagers were detained. At 10:30 a.m., one of the guards threw a torch into the house and fired his machine-gun into the rooms holding prisoners. The witness escaped through a window and ran. In the field behind the house, he was fired upon, pretended he was shot, and lay as if dead. Throughout the night, he heard machine-guns firing and suspects that none of the other prisoners survived.
Name of Unit: The Visors
Ethnicity: Serbian
Uniform: N/A
Number of Troops: N/A
Origin: N/A
Area(s) of Operation: Glina County, Croatia
Political Affiliation: N/A
Leader(s): An identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons
Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:
316. According to a report from the Republic of Croatia, 22 Croatians, mostly elderly people, were killed in Glinska Joševica village on 16 December 1993, by a special Territorial Defence unit, the Visors. The victims were killed in their own homes with guns fitted with silencers. The Croatian report claims that Serbian authorities in Glina initiated that attack as revenge for the death of 19 members of Territorial Defence units, killed in battle with the Croatian Army. 586/
Name of Unit: Weekenders (Vikendashi)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Bijeljina County, BiH

Area(s) of Operation: Brčko County, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

317. According to the US Government, the Weekenders are a group of Serbian men from Bijeljina who went to Brčko each weekend to plunder and vandalize. Apparently, they began raiding Brčko in May 1992, after the Arkanovci and the JNA attacked the town. They continued their raids during the entire time that the JNA occupied Brčko. 597/
Name of Unit: White Eagles (Beli Orlovi)

Ethnicity: Serbian

Uniform: Camouflage with white eagle patches or white bands on the shoulders; also military and civilian clothes with headbands and hats bearing Kokarda insignia; former JNA Young Officer and Squad Leader uniforms

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: N/A

Areas of Operation: Vukovar County, Croatia and Bileća, Gacko, Višegrad, Bosanska Krupa, Banja Luka, and Prijedor Counties, BiH

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): Nine identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Alleged Members: Nineteen identified men, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons

Source(s):

- Croatian Information Centre, Written Statement, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11663, 11679.
- Canadian Croatian Information Congress (Ontario), Undated Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 43864, 43892.
Alleged Activity:

318. A named man allegedly gathered and trained forces called the White Eagles to operate in BiH as the paramilitary wing of the Serbian Peoples' Renewal Party (SNO). Apparently, the SNO volunteer troops never fought in BiH or Croatia. However, paramilitary groups with no formal link to the SNO co-opted the name "White Eagles" and operated independently during the conflict. 318/ White Eagles groups allegedly operated in Bileća, Gacko, Višegrad, Bosanska Krupa, Banja Luka, Prijedor, and Zvornik Counties in BiH. White Eagles also allegedly participated in attacks in Vukovar County, Croatia.

319. White Eagles reportedly worked with the JNA, Užice Territorial Defence Forces, Dušan the Great, Arkanovci, Martiševci, Šešeljovci, Nikšić Special Forces, Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) forces, SUP, and local police. In Vukovar, the White Eagles and other groups reportedly received weapons from the JNA. 529/ White Eagles units reportedly targeted Muslim and Croatian civilians and rarely engaged enemy soldiers. 600/ The White Eagles allegedly beat, raped, and killed Muslims and Croats on the roads, in villages, and in camps.

320. White Eagles units allegedly entered Gacko in March 1992 with the JNA, SUP, Nikšić Special Forces, an "Interviewing Platoon", and local police. 601/ The Serbian forces blockaded the city, detained civilians at the Hotel Rudnik or at the Gacko power plant, and destroyed Muslim cafes, shops, homes, and cars. 602/ Members of the paramilitary units searched the hills around Gacko on foot 603/ and pounded the forests with artillery. 604/ In late June, the paramilitary forces told the Muslim civilians that they were free to leave Gacko. 605/ However, approximately six kilometres outside the town, the White Eagles robbed and beat the fleeing Muslims. One of the Muslim men was reportedly burned alive. 606/ The Serbs then returned the civilians to the Gacko "prisons" where, according to witnesses, some were tortured, disfigured, and killed by the guards. 607/ Muslim women and girls were allegedly killed in the woods or raped at the Košuta Motel. 608/ 

322. According to the European Community Monitoring Mission, the Interviewing Platoon and the White Eagles, who together ran operations in Gacko, maintained headquarters at the Hotel Rudnik, 609/ the Košuta Motel, and the Gacko police station. 610/ Paramilitary leaders in Gacko were reportedly Veljo Lojević (Deputy), Vojin Popović (Chief of Police), Milan Vuković (Inspector), Ranko Vujović (Policeman), and Ozren Govedarica (leader of the White
323. White Eagles allegedly participated in "ethnic cleansing" in Rodić Brdo near Višegrad. They worked as part of the Užice Corps from early April until the end of May 1992 with the JNA, Užice Territorial Defence Forces, and other Serb reservists. In April, the Užice Corps set up roadblocks and surrounded the village. Working from a list, they arrested the prominent Muslim civilians of the town and took them away. The village fell under full control of the White Eagles on 25 May 1992.

324. White Eagles arrested, interrogated, and killed Muslims in the villages of Grbavica and Kremaluša. They came to these villages in early April and May 1992. In Grbavica, the White Eagles reportedly killed the villagers and burned the corpses with the houses. In Kremaluša, they surrounded the village, opened fire on the people with machine-guns and mortars, and burned the houses. White Eagles units allegedly performed similar operations in Banja Luka, Bosanska Krupa, Novo Brčko, Filipović, and Lovas.

325. According to the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, White Eagles participated in an attack on Zvornik in April 1992 as part of a paramilitary force consisting of Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, Dušan the Great, Draganovci, the Vukovar Unit, and others. The troops reportedly stayed in the Alhos and Jezero hotels. The White Eagles allegedly participated in the second wave of the attack and concentrated on the city of Zvornik and the later assault on Kulagrad. They were involved in the shelling, siege, and occupation and primarily responsible for arrests, deportation and looting. The report states that the White Eagles were often drunk and "provocative" and that they drew white eagles on houses and storage buildings.

326. Allegedly the White Eagles' attack on Zvornik originated from nearby villages, across the BiH border with Serbia. Witnesses stated that the White Eagles wore mixed and matched JNA uniforms, which they modified by sewing white eagle badges on the caps and upper-arms.

327. At Prnjavor Camp in Krajina, members of a White Eagles paramilitary unit beat and killed two prisoners, one on 17 May and the other on 6 June 1992. At a detention camp in Bileća, White Eagles beat a Serb guard severely after he threw away the keys to the prison cells to prevent the White Eagles from beating the prisoners. Because they could not enter the cells, the White Eagles reportedly bombarded the prison with tear gas for five hours. White Eagles also reportedly operated at the Keraterm and Stara Gradiška camps.


330. The White Eagles also allegedly operated at the Hotel Rudnik and the Motel Koštuta.
D. Paramilitary groups from outside the former Yugoslavia

Name of Unit: Garibaldi Unit

Ethnicity: Italian

Uniform: N/A

Number of Troops: N/A

Origin: Italy

Area(s) of Operation: Zadar County, Croatia

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A

Source(s): "Croatian Serbs 'Recruit Italian Fighters', The Independent, 21 October 1993, at 12.

Alleged Activity:

331. An uncertain number of Italians fought in Croatia on behalf of Serbian paramilitary commanders. 626/ Captain Dragan, a Serbian commander, claimed that he deployed the Italian unit in the Velebit mountains north of Zadar, Croatia. The Belgrade news agency, Tanjug, reported that the unit carried out reconnaissance and sabotage missions behind enemy lines. 627/
Name of Unit: Russian Mercenaries

Ethnicity: Russian

Uniform: Black uniforms with black berets or flight caps

Number of Troops: 150

Origin: Russia

Area(s) of Operation: Eastern BiH, including Bijeljina County

Political Affiliation: N/A

Leader(s): N/A

Alleged Members: N/A


Alleged Activity:

332. Croatian prisoners in Serb-run detention camps reported the presence of Russian troops in eastern BiH in February 1993. The prisoners were working as forced labourers for the Bosnian Serb army on the front line on Majevica Mountain. Sometime between 15 February and 3 March 1993, prisoners from the Batković detention camp were allegedly told not to go near the radio and television relay tower on the mountain because it was the headquarters for Russian soldiers aiding the Bosnian Serbs. A Serb guard reportedly said that the Russians, none below the rank of captain, deserted the Russian military when Boris Yeltsin came to power and belonged to a special unit of the Soviet Ministry of Defence. 628/

333. One morning between 20 February and 23 February, Croatian prisoners working on Majevica Mountain observed about 17 of the Russian soldiers, carrying AK weapons, returning to their base from the direction of Tuzla. The Russians were reportedly dressed in all-black, one-piece uniforms, and some wore black berets or flight caps. Serb guards said that the Russians had volunteered and received 200 Deutsche Marks monthly. 629/

334. Russian soldiers were also allegedly present at the Stepa Stepanovic barracks and prison in Bijeljina in February 1993. A prisoner questioned one of the guards about Russian voices outside his cell. The guard indicated that 150 Russians had arrived in BiH to help the Serbs and that more were on the way. The guard also allegedly told the prisoner that the Russians were veterans of the fighting in Afghanistan, and that they had volunteered but were paid based on the territory they captured. According to the guard, one group of the Russian soldiers was to go to Maslenica, Croatia, with the forces of Arkan and Šešelj, while another group would remain in BiH. 630/
IV. ANALYSIS OF REPORTED PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

A. BiH

1. Banja Luka County 631/

335. Banja Luka county is in the north-west quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the county had a population of 195,139, of which 54.8 per cent were Serbian, 14.9 per cent Croatian, 14.6 per cent Muslim, 12 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", and 3.7 per cent as "other". 632/

336. During January and February 1993, while Serbs were seeking international relief to feed their people and rebuild ravaged towns in northern BiH, a campaign of violence was renewed against Muslims and Croats in that area. Leaders of both the Muslims and Croats have placed blame for these attacks on Šešelj and Arkan, whose units had been moving into the Banja Luka area in large numbers. 633/ The SOS (Srpske Oružane Snage) paramilitary group, whose members had originally come to BiH as Arkanovci, was also reported to be present in Banja Luka. 634/

337. In early February, 11 Muslims were killed and several others were choked to death by cables. Muslim homes were under attack and many people were fired from their jobs. 635/

338. Croats were also being pressured to leave the Banja Luka area. Homes were being blown up and robbed by unidentified armed men who told the Croat residents to "go away". Like the Muslims, many Croats were dismissed from their jobs. Four Croats were killed in early February, six homes were burned down, and one woman was raped. 636/

339. The nearby village of Čelinac experienced a similar fate. Muslims in that village were subjected to numerous restrictions forbidding them to drive, patronize businesses, make out-of-town phone calls or leave their homes between 4:00 p.m. and sunrise. Serb forces broke into Muslim homes each night, took away the men, and demanded that all money be turned over. Others were dismissed from their jobs. 637/

340. In March of 1993, Šešelj allegedly visited Banja Luka with his private guard force, the White Eagles. He stated in local media interviews that he intended to geographically unite the Serbian populations of Knin, Banja Luka, the Baranja region, and Montenegro. The visit was part of Šešelj’s failed attempt to wrest power from the local SDS leader, Radovan Brdjanin. 638/

341. During the first week of May 1993, two of Banja Luka’s mosques, Ferhad Paša and Arnaudija, both built in the 16th Century, were reduced to ruins by Serb gunfire and dynamite. Two weeks before the explosions, while standing before the two mosques, Šešelj was reported to have said, "Is it possible that they are still standing?" 639/

2. Bihać County 640/

342. Bihać County is in the north-west corner of BiH. According to the 1991 census, Bihać had a population of 70,896. The population was 66.6 per cent Muslim, 17.8 per cent Serb, 7.7 per cent Croat, 6 per cent "Yugoslav", 1.9 per cent "other".

343. UNPROFOR reported the presence of Muslim paramilitary units called the White Pumas in Bihać in December 1992. 641/
3. **Bijeljina County**

344. This county is in the north-east quarter of BiH with Serbia on its eastern border. According to the 1991 census, of its population of 96,796, 59.4 per cent was Serbian, 31.3 per cent Muslim, 4.4 per cent "Yugoslav", and 4.9 per cent "other".

345. Arkan was reportedly in the town of Bijeljina for about one month preparing his battle plans before the April 1992 attack. The attack began when a grenade was thrown into a Muslim-owned cafe. 643/

346. In the first week of April 1992, approximately 1,000 soldiers from Arkan's units crossed the Drina River from Serbia and entered the town of Bijeljina. The soldiers wore black uniforms and stocking caps and had unidentified small arms, at least one anti-aircraft gun, light armoured and regular transport vehicles. They were supported by an unknown, large number of local Serbs drawn from the area's Serbian population of approximately 45,000. 644/ Other reports indicate that in April 1992 Arkan bombarded Bijeljina with mortars supplied by the Yugoslav army. 645/ Another report confirmed that the units which attacked Bijeljina in April 1992 belonged to Arkan and referred to his men as the best trained and equipped Serbian force. 646/

347. Muslim defence units in Bijeljina fought back. The battles engulfed the town for three days and nights. Arkan captured the radio station and reportedly broadcast calls for Muslims to surrender their weapons. 647/

348. On 2 April 1992, Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network reported that most of Bijeljina had been "liberated" that afternoon by members of the Serbian National Guard of Semberija and Majevica, in cooperation with Serbian volunteers, Arkan's men, and the Serbian "radicals". A curfew had been imposed, and hold-outs were encouraged to surrender arms. Shooting could still be heard, according to the report, because "the last Muslim strongholds [were] being mopped up". 648/

349. According to a Zagreb Radio Croatia Network report, on the night of 2 April 1992, a delegation of the BiH Presidency and Government managed to approach Bijeljina but was unable to enter the town. Presidency member Pikret Abdić, Deputy Prime Minister Miodrag Simović, and Defence Minister Jerko Doko met near Bijeljina with Arkan but returned afterward to Sarajevo. Reportedly, the SDS crisis committee for Bijeljina said that the guard of the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Semberja" was controlling Bijeljina with the help of Arkan's units. 649/

350. A number of reports stated that Arkan's troops harmed residents and property after capturing the town. According to one report, Arkan's men roamed Bijeljina after it fell, shooting young men suspected of carrying arms. Yugoslav army troops at the local barracks did not intervene. They later issued a statement that they had received no orders from Belgrade to do so. 650/ One report says that citizens of Bijeljina phoned Sarajevo radio to say that Arkan's people were terrorizing the town, breaking into apartments, searching for arms and robbing and harassing citizens. 651/ In another report, residents of Bijeljina said that in the first week of April 1992 Serbian paramilitary troops belonging to Arkan and Jović harassed the town's population. 652/

351. It was reported that sporadic gunfire continued on 4 April 1992. 653/
352. A local newspaper reportedly published photographs of Arkan in war-torn Bijeljina. 654/ It is alleged that Arkan warned local Muslim defence units in other towns that if they did not surrender they would suffer "the same fate as the people in Bijeljina". 655/

353. Reportedly thousands of refugees fled from Bijeljina into Serbia. 656/ A May 1992 report describes a Bijeljina of bloodstained walls, families huddled in basements, dwindling food supplies, and the sounds of mortar explosions. 657/ The SDS crisis committee for Bijeljina reportedly placed the death toll at 20 and claimed scores of wounded. 658/ However, at least 42 bodies were recovered and identified in the town, 40 of which were described as Muslim. 659/

354. For approximately one month after the initial takeover of Bijeljina, there was an internal dispute between Arkan and the leader of the local Serbian paramilitary led by Mirko, the owner of the Serbia Cafe near the bus station. Apparently Arkan had promised control of the town to Mirko but did not turn it over quickly enough. Arkan's and Mirko's men worked separately in the town for this month. According to this report, it was Mirko's men, not Arkan's that were primarily responsible for the killing, raping and looting in Bijeljina. 660/

355. It was reported that Bosnian Serb citizens from Brčko and Tuzla began moving into Bijeljina and occupying Muslim homes vacated in the attack on the city. Reportedly, these moves were arranged to minimize Serbian civilian casualties in the military activities in Brčko and Tuzla in late April and May of 1992. To obtain exit permits from the area, Bosnian Muslims were forced to sign documents deeding their property to Bosnian Serbs. In mid-June 1992, the Serbian authorities stopped issuing these permits, and approximately 2,000 elderly Muslims remained in the town. 661/

356. As of 23 September 1992, Arkan and Mirko had turned Bijeljina over to the SDS. 662/

357. In a December 1992 interview, Arkan said that he was "invited" by local Serbs to put down a Muslim uprising before it began in Bijeljina. 663/

358. A May 1993 report described Bijeljina as under Serb control, with few signs of the "massacre", which had taken place over a year earlier. The report says that mosques had been blasted and trees planted in their place. 664/

359. In October of 1993, however, the reports of expulsions of non-Serbs continued. Those remaining Muslims and Croats in Bijeljina (estimates put the number at around 5,000) were still being harassed by the "population exchange commission", headed by Major Vojkan Djurković of the Arkan forces. Those who were able to arrange for passage out of the city have provided accounts of their forced evictions. Some were given less than 15 minutes to pack their bags. They were then transported to the agricultural school on the edge of Bijeljina, where they were forced to hand over all possessions, including their house keys. From there, the displaced civilians were taken to BiH territory and forced to cross a minefield on the front lines of Tuzla in order to reach safety. One report notes that every few nights nearly 40 Muslims were taken away by Serbs in this manner. 665/

360. Another technique to eject Croats and Muslims reportedly employed by the exchange commission is the movement of Serb refugees into Muslim and Croat homes. 666/ This process is called "cuckoo's nesting". Officials set the maximum amount of living room allotted to each civilian. This is called the "rationalization of living space". Any non-Serb found to exceed their
specifying amount must accept Serb refugees into their homes. The resulting tension between the two cultural groups often compels the non-Serbs to leave their own homes. Those individuals who are not "exported" in one of these ways are often duped into paying up to 500 DM to phony travel agencies who arrange for individuals to be left at the Serbian-Hungarian border.

361. Major Djurković has responded to the charges that these activities constitute "ethnic cleansing". Although he states that Muslims are leaving their homes voluntarily, he further notes that Bijeljina is situated on "sacred Serbian land". Djurković claims to have "thousands of Muslims separated by the conflict". Furthermore, the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Fund reveals that Bosnian Serb leadership has set a quota for the Bijeljina area, whereby only 5 per cent of the region's 22,000 Muslims will be permitted to remain.

4. Bileća County

362. Bileća county is in southern BiH. In 1991, it had a population of 13,269 with 80.3 per cent Serb, 14.7 per cent Muslim and 5 per cent "other".

363. The White Eagles, or Beli Orlovi, is a Serbian paramilitary group which reportedly operated at the Bileća camp between August and October 1992. One particular incident involving the White Eagles occurred on 5 September between 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. Here, members of the group shot and threw tear gas in the windows of a cell holding Muslims for nearly five hours because they could not get inside. Apparently, the Serb prison guard had thrown away the key to prevent the White Eagles from entering and was severely beaten for doing so.

5. Bosanska Krupa County

364. Bosanska Krupa is a county in the north-west of BiH. In 1991, it had a population of 58,212. Of this population, 74.5 per cent were Muslim, 23.6 per cent Serb, and 1.9 per cent "other".

365. Two Croatians report that they were severely beaten with sticks, baseball bats, metal rods, and a thick rope soaked in water by five members of the White Eagles. This beating occurred in June 1992, while the witnesses were in custody of "the Serbs" in Bosanska Krupa, and lasted for approximately two hours.

6. Bosanska Rača (county unknown)

366. Arkan's men controlled the bridge over the Sava River in Bosanska Rača. Every Bosnian who wanted to cross the bridge into Serbia was forced to pay 500 to 800 DM. These operations were also practised across the Drina River. Serbs operated small boats for a fee of up to 1,000 DM per person to cross the river. Serbs would rob Muslims under the guise of aiding their "voluntary resettlement".

7. Bosanski Brod

367. Bosanski Brod is in the northern region of BiH, bordering Croatia at the county of Slavonski Brod. Its population in 1991 was 33,962, with 41 per cent Croat, 33.8 per cent Serb, 12.2 per cent Muslim, 10.6 per cent "Yugoslav", and
2.4 per cent "other". There are reports of both Serb and Croatian paramilitary activity in this region.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

368. The SOS (Srpske Oružane Snage) came to BiH from Serbia as part of Arkanovci but later separated from them and operated as an independent entity in Bosanski Brod and the surrounding region. 677/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

369. There are reports of the HOS (Hrvatske Oružane Snage) and the forces of the CDU ( Croatian Democratic Union) operating in the Bosanski Brod area.

370. The HOS was formed in 1991 as the paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of the Right (HSP) and later combined with the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) under the HVO banner. 678/ The HOS had both Croatian and Muslim members who acted together against Serbian civilians and paramilitaries. They are reported to have acted in the Bosanski Brod region. 678/

371. The CDU is a Croatian paramilitary group which allegedly killed, raped, and tortured prisoners at the detention camp of Tulek in Bosanski Brod. Apparently, prisoners were used for digging trenches, clearing minefields, and other war operations. 680/

8. Bosanski Novi County

372. Bosanski Novi is in the north-west corner of BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 41,541. The population was 60.4 per cent Serb, 33.9 per cent Muslim, 3.7 per cent "Yougoslav", and 2 per cent "other".

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

373. The Fifth Kozarac Brigade from Prijedor and the 6th Krajina Brigade from Sanski Most are two Serbian organizations alleged to have operated together in the Ljubija region. The Croatian Information Centre reports that these forces attacked the villages of Stara Rijeka, Briševo, Raljaš and Ćarakovo. Over 3,000 Serbs participated in this large-scale attack, in which 73 Croatian civilians were killed. 681/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

374. The Croatian Defence Forces (HOS) headquarters are said to have been formally located at Ljubuški. 682/

9. Bosanski Šamac County

375. Bosanski Šamac is in the north-east quarter of BiH with Croatia on its northern border. As of 1991, the county's population was 32,835 of which 41.5 per cent was Serbian, 44.7 per cent Croatian, 6.5 per cent Muslim, and 7 per cent "other".

376. On 19 March 1992, Arkan's forces surrounded a police station in Bosanski Šamac. They allegedly demanded as an ultimatum that the police return the
automatic pistols with silencers which had been confiscated the day before from members of the Yugoslav Army and "Četnik formations". Apparently, the "Četnik formations" had been walking around the city in civilian clothing armed "to the teeth". 684/

377. Reportedly, a top-level Serbian army military plan of attack for this county, prepared in several versions, with the classification "NATIONAL DEFENCE-STATE SECRET" and the code name "MOST", was found on a high-level Yugoslav army officer. The plan established two possible courses of action for capturing villages in the region. On the one hand, Serbs could organize a wedding in a town and try to enter the town by making use of false documents and vehicles with Mostar license plates. The vehicles would contain coolers in which weapons would be hidden. On the other hand, Serbs could make use of officially custom-sealed truck cabs containing Serbian "commandos". Military analysts allegedly associated these plans with the tactics involving plain clothes which have been implemented by Arkan and his troops. 685/

378. On 17 April 1992, regular Serbian soldiers and Šešelj's men occupied Bosanski Šamac and imprisoned wealthy and politically involved Muslims. The prisoners were beaten with wooden sticks, truncheons, and shovels. At least seven died and seven others are still missing. 686/

379. It was reported that the SOS paramilitary group, led by Crni and Lugar, was also in Bosanski Šamac. The report, however, did not specifically provide the dates they were there nor did it describe their activities. 687/

10. Bratunac County 688/

380. Bratunac County is located in eastern BiH, bordered by Serbia. In 1991, the population was 33,575, of which 41.5 per cent were Serbian, 44.7 per cent Croatian, 6.8 per cent Muslim, and 7 per cent "other".

381. On 5 May 1992, Arkan’s and Šešelj’s troops surrounded the entire village of Bratunac and upon their attack, 10,000 Muslims reportedly fled small towns along the Drina River. 689/ The villages of Hrača, Glogovo, and Mihaljevići were burned. During the attacks, an estimated 500 Muslim houses were burned, and 50 people killed. The bodies of the villagers were found on the banks of the Drina. 690/ Two thousand Muslims were arrested on 9 May 1992. 691/ Some were taken to the police station, which was then allegedly under the control of Arkan and Šešelj, aided by the army. 692/

382. On 10 May, Serbian troops placed 4,000 to 5,000 civilians in a newly established concentration camp at the FC "Bratstvo" stadium. Others were taken to the playground. Civilians were separated by gender, and the male Muslims were transported to the elementary school Vuk Karadžić, where a number of men were beaten. One report states that between 600 and 700 male Muslims were moved to Vuk Karadžić Primary School Sports Centre. 693/ Arkan's and Šešelj's military troops and local "Četniks" tortured and killed scores of them. The torture included beatings with iron rods and wooden poles. Some prisoners were taken to an "investigation room" where they were forced to trample over their fellow inmates' dead bodies. Mutilation also occurred; ears, noses and genitals were cut off, and the sign of the cross was cut into prisoners' flesh. While being tortured, the prisoners were made to sing Četnik songs. Most were killed by gunfire, but in one day it is alleged that up to 150 people were killed from beatings. Reportedly, individual perpetrators were responsible for the deaths of 20 or more people. The corpses were eventually thrown into the Drina River. 694/
383. Eventually the remaining Muslims were brought to the playground, where Arkan and Đeljic's men stripped them of all personal property. They were then separated by gender and the women were taken to Kladanj by bus, while the men were returned to the elementary school to be beaten and tortured. Between 30 and 50 of the men were killed. A Muslim priest was stabbed to death in front of 600 other prisoners for refusing to accept the Christian faith and make a Serbian sign. The surviving prisoners were then transported to Pale, where the prisoners were forced to watch the bodies of dead prisoners being burned. One estimate put the death count at 300. Other killings took place near the River Križevica-Podgorac and in the quarry near the Drina. Eventually, prisoners were released as part of an exchange at Vratnica and Visoko.

384. Reportedly, on 23 May 1992, local paramilitary forces commanded by an identified man killed 70 Muslims in front of the mosque in the village of Glogova.

11. Brčko County

385. This county is located in north-eastern BiH, bordered to the north-east by Serbia. According to the 1991 census, Brčko had a population of 87,332, of which 20 per cent was Serbian, 25 per cent Croatian, and 45 per cent Muslim.

386. Brčko was overrun by JNA forces in late April and May of 1992. Some reports hold an identified officer of the JNA responsible for heading up the offensive, while other reports note that Arkan was in charge of the operation. Explosions destroyed both bridges in Brčko over the Sava River causing the death of 30 to 50 civilians.

387. After the shelling, troops under an identified commander as well as local mobilized Serbs occupied the town. Successive waves of military and paramilitary groups came to the city, and it appeared that a different group, including Đeljic's men, was in control every few days. Martić's units from Bosanska Krajina were the last to hold the city.

388. During this time, a Serbian group called the Weekenders (Vikendaši) went to Brčko each weekend, plundering and vandalizing. They began arriving via Bijeljina in May 1992 and continued to come during the entire time that the JNA occupied the town.

389. During the first 15 days of May, the Muslim males were put under house arrest and subjected to weapons searches and registration. The actual rounding up of the Muslim population began in the village of Gluhaković, close to Brčko. Survivors were taken to one of two collection points, the "Bimal" factory or the "Autoprevoz" complex. These prisoners were then taken to Luka Camp.

390. One witness statement noted that between 150 and 200 men were detained at a mosque for two days before being taken to Luka Camp. At the mosque, a man identified all SDA party members, and those individuals were killed by Arkan's men on the spot. The witness also reported that he saw between 300 to 400 persons executed in the town square, under the order of the head of police and the deputy head of police.

391. One witness reported that reservists from Bijeljina killed 150 unarmed Muslim and Croat civilians on 2-4 May 1992. They found the civilians on the street, interrogated them, and then shot them. At the same time, a JNA commander allegedly told the group not to kill people in the centre of town, only on the front line. One reservist was also reported to have participated...
in the tortures and killings at Luka Camp. 706/

392. A Muslim man from the Mraja-Rosulja section of Brčko had allowed 35 people to take refuge in his basement during the onslaught. Eventually they surrendered and were taken to the local medical clinic. The men were then taken to the mosque, and the women and children were later dispersed to predominantly Muslim villages in the Brčko municipality. The 50 remaining men were taken to the JNA military barracks gym and beaten by Arkan's and Šešelj's units at about 11:00 p.m. on 1 May. Approximately 10 men were beaten in the hallway of the gym and never seen again. 707/

393. In one instance, the Serbians living in an apartment complex rounded up the Croats and Muslims living there and put them in the basement. After six days in the basement of the complex, these prisoners were turned over to Arkanović. The Arkanović transported the prisoners to the military casern in the centre of town. Here, the women and children were separated from the men and transported to the nearby town of Brezovo Polje. The men were held in the casern's movie hall. 708/

394. Thereafter, approximately 5,000 civilians from Brčko were taken by the JNA forces and Serb paramilitaries to the detention camps at Luka. The main camp facilities consisted of an old brick factory and pig farm. 709/ There may have been a total of 10 to 12 warehouses at the camp. 710/ The soldiers responsible for the camp, identified as Arkan's, used metal objects for beating prisoners and cut crosses into people's foreheads to indicate they should be beaten. 711/ One account stated that these men wore black berets. However, responsibility for the camp's administration was said to have changed every month. 712/

395. One witness reports being placed in a room of one of the camp warehouses, where 200 other prisoners were being interrogated and beaten by several individuals. 713/ In another account, 100 prisoners were said to be warehoused in one room. This witness related that none of the prisoners received food or water for the first four days of detention. All prisoners were beaten and mistreated, and some simply disappeared. Most of the abuses occurred near a manhole. The witness personally observed four people being killed and was himself interrogated and beaten by several Serbian individuals, one of whom was identified by nickname and was a member of Arkan's units. 714/ Another inmate corroborated the allegations of abuse, stating that 24 men were shot, including two of his friends. However, another prisoner stated that no one in his warehouse was killed, and inmates were only beaten if they had been accused of something. 715/

396. Some witnesses relate that up to 50 prisoners at a time were killed at the camp. 716/ Many of the killings were carried out in front of the detainees in the third hangar. 717/ The bodies were stacked behind the hangar and then taken away at night to be either dumped in the nearby Sava River or buried in a mass grave. The mass grave is said to consist of four sites situated 50 metres east of and behind a tavern called "Westfalia". It is on the road between Brčko and Brezovo Polje, in a wooded area across from the agricultural complex "Bimex". 718/ Still others were destroyed at a rendering plant which boiled animal remains to manufacture lard. 719/ Estimates put the death count at the Luka camp at 3,000, all of which occurred between 1 May and 7 June. Another source said that between 3,000 and 5,000 people were killed at Brčko in the month of July alone. Many of those who were not killed at Brčko were taken to a facility at Batković where the prisoners slept outside on concrete slabs and were forced to work in the nearby fields. A number of American news reports place the responsibility for these killings upon Arkan, his forces, and Šešelj. 720/
397. Cvijetin Maksimović was a brick-factory worker who served as a prison guard at the Luka Camp and is being held in a prison camp at OROŠJE for the crimes he committed during May and June of 1992 against Luka camp inmates. Maksimović substantiated the terrible conditions the prisoners at the camp underwent. He said 500 to 600 Croats and Muslims slept on concrete floors and were fed one meal a day. He observed prisoners, classified by "Četniks" as "suspects", driven away for interrogation, and truckloads of as many as 90 dead bodies each shipped from the camp. Maksimović reported that Arkan's and Šešelj's forces, along with local Serb leaders, had free reign in the operation of the camp. As a mere guard, he was not allowed to enter the camp until he survived the Četnik "initiation rite". 721/

398. Slobodan Panić related similar experiences in the same news report. He was forced to rape five women or be killed. He was then ordered to shoot two men in the chest and slay two others with a knife. As with Maksimović, when Panić protested, a knife was placed in his hand and it was forced across one of the victim's throats by a Četnik. Both Panić and Maksimović fled the prison camp and were captured by Croatian patrol. They are now awaiting sentencing. 722/

399. The camp itself measured 230 by 150 metres and was surrounded by an electrified fence, fortified by mines. Prisoners were placed into one of three hangers: the first was 20 by 28 metres and housed up to 180 men, the second was 20 by 40 metres and housed up to 180 men, and the third was 20 by 40 metres and housed 300 men, women, and children. In the first hangers the detainees slept standing up. All detainees were permitted to use the washroom only once a day for no longer than a minute. In June, goats were brought into the hangers and lived with the detainees. 723/

400. During the same time period, 500 additional civilians were taken to the garrison that housed Arkan's and Šešelj's military formations. These prisoners were robbed and segregated by nationality and gender. Of these civilians, 474 were reportedly forced to beat each other to death. 724/ A major, identified by name, cut off the ear of one prisoner and forced another to lick the blood. In all, the prisoners were tortured for two days, which included placing a pistol in prisoners' mouths and using a bloodied comb to comb their hair. At the end of the two days, only 26 Muslims survived, and they were taken to Biheljina and the Luka camp. 725/

401. On 17 May 1992, Serb soldiers, wearing army uniforms and masks, entered the town of Brezovo Polje in Brčko County and rounded up all Bosnian Muslims. The able-bodied men were loaded onto buses and sent to Luka "for interrogation". One thousand women, children and elderly were packed into eight buses and driven around the countryside for two days. Arriving at the town of Ban Brdo, the group was held under armed guard in a parking lot for another four days without food or water. The Serbs invaded the buses each night and led women and girls off at gunpoint to be raped. The group was then taken to Caparde in Zvornik County, where 50 Serb irregulars, reportedly followers of Arkan, robbed the mothers and forcibly separated them from their daughters. The daughters were transported to the Osnovo furniture warehouse in Caparde, while the mothers were taken on another journey through the war zone. At the warehouse, the men selected the 40 "prettiest" young women and raped them in groups of ten. 725/ One of the perpetrators told his victim that Šešelj's men would have raped them "10 men to one woman". 726/

402. Meanwhile, the mothers had arrived in Tuzla on 23 June, their journey ending only after they were made to walk 12 miles through the war zone, where the path was littered with human corpses and animal carcasses. The daughters arrived four days later, after they were allegedly forced to walk across a
403. In March 1993, Sarajevo Radio Correspondent Salih Brkić reported that Serbian forces were "trying to take over the Vlasenica-Zvornik road" near Brčko and Gradašć, using multiple rocket launchers, mortars, and anti-aircraft guns. He noted that the Serbian forces were still holding up a humanitarian convoy that was meant to take wounded from Konjević Polje to Tuzla. Enormous losses sustained by Serbian forces prompted another 1,500 of Arkan's paramilitary troops to be mobilized to fight against the Bosnians. 727/

12. Čajniće County 728/

404. Čajniće is in eastern BiH, bordering Serbia. Of its 1991 population of 8,919, 52.9 per cent were Serb, 44.9 per cent Muslim, and 2.2 per cent "other".

405. Commander "Turtle's" units make up a Serbian paramilitary organization, which allegedly acted in Čajniće and other parts of eastern BiH. 730/ This group is under the command of a Bosnian Serb doctor, Duško Kornjača, who calls himself Commander Turtle. 731/ There are no details reported about their activities.

13. Derventa County 732/

406. Derventa is located in north-eastern BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia. Its 1991 population was 56,328, of which 40.8 per cent were Serbian, 39 per cent were Croatian, 12.6 per cent Muslim, and 7.6 per cent "other".

407. A man was arrested in mid-May 1992 in Derventa by one of Šešelj's men while trying to escort civilians over the Ukrajina River. Šešelj's men surrounded the party of 10 and they surrendered. This group was taken to an abandoned grain mill that held 50 other prisoners, male and female. Šešelj's men interrogated and beat the prisoners with heavy electric cable, truncheons, and the flat side of a sword. At least two prisoners died as a result. The man was held for 60 days in the mill, which did not have bathroom facilities and released through a prisoner exchange. 733/

408. The SOS paramilitary group was also alleged to have been active in Derventa, although the report did not provide any specific dates or incidents. 734/

14. Doboj County 735/

409. This county is located in north-eastern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 102,546. Serbs comprised 39 per cent, 13 per cent were Croat, 40.2 per cent Muslim, 5.5 per cent "Yugoslav", and 2.3 per cent "other".

410. Arkan’s paramilitary units, the White Eagles, and the JNA occupied Doboj in April and May of 1992. 736/ Other reports also indicate the presence of the Kninža Turtles, 737/ Red Berets, 738/ and Martić’s Militia during the attack on Doboj. They shelled and set fire to two mosques and the Catholic church. Croats and Muslims were ordered to remain indoors as their homes were searched and looted. Male residents were often arrested, and still others were beaten. Women were taken away on three buses to a high school, where they were held for 28 days and raped repeatedly. 739/ One report
specifically mentions the Red Berets as allegedly responsible for at least some of the rapes at the high school. 740/ The city was besieged until August. 741/

15. Donji Vakuf County 742/

411. Seventy members of the Serbian paramilitary Martić’s Militia acted in conjunction with other paramilitary groups in the “ethnic cleansing” of the Donji Vakuf area. 743/

16. Dragovići (county unknown)

412. In mid-May, Šešelj’s White Eagles reportedly skinned three Muslims after hanging them with meat hooks on an oak tree. 744/ Most of the village’s Muslim inhabitants were killed and the village was burned down. 745/

17. Foća County 746/

413. Foća County is located in south-eastern BiH with Montenegro as its eastern border. As of 1991, the population of the county was 40,513, of which 45.3 per cent was Serbian, 51.6 per cent Muslim, and 3.1 per cent “other”.

414. Arkan and Šešelj reportedly deployed soldiers in the county of Foća. Reports also indicate the presence of Commander Turtle’s Units, 747/ the Montenegro Guard, 748/ the Užice Corps, and Pero Šelež. 749/

415. During the occupation of Foća by Arkan’s men in late April 1992, many bodies were thrown into the river. A Danish photographer in Goražde witnessed these decomposed bodies downstream in the village of Goražde. A concentration camp was established in Foća in the former prison, and was run by Velibor Ostojić. Šešelj’s forces and volunteers were said to have participated in the fighting in the city of Foća, as assistance to the Serbian Democratic Party forces. The fighting took place in late April 1992. 750/

416. Between 15 April 1992 and 20 April 1992, nine people were killed in the village of Susješno by Arkan’s men. The nine victims were elderly and did not want to leave their homes. 751/

417. Šešelj’s forces were part of the paramilitary attack on Ustikolina during April 1992. Serbian Democratic Party forces and volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro also aided in the assault. All Muslims fled the village. Mortars, machine-guns, and armoured vehicles were used in the attack. The Serbian forces also entered the JNA facility in Ustikolina and killed several Muslim civilian refugees. 752/

418. In Paunci, Serbian Democratic Party forces and Serbian paramilitary forces reportedly killed a large number of people, mostly women and old men. 753/

419. According to the United States government, the Montenegro Guard participated in operations in Jeleć, a village in Foća. Allegedly, the Montenegro Guard, along with members of other paramilitary units, including the White Eagles and Vukovar Unit, shelled the town and killed remaining Muslim civilians after 23 April 1992. The alleged raid on Jeleć began on 18 April 1992, when these forces blocked the roads to town and ordered Muslims to surrender their weapons by 22 April to a Bosnian Serb delegation at the military complex in the nearby village of Miljevina. On 23 April, Serb forces
began shelling Jeleč and the surrounding villages, sending the inhabitants into hiding in the hills surrounding the village. The Montenegro Guard and other forces moved into Jeleč on 4 May 1992. They arrived in seven military buses and were given orders to "comb" the area for Muslims. Allegedly, at least 16 Muslims were shot and buried in two graves located in a potato field one kilometre west of Jelec. 754/

420. On 14 July 1992, Serbian soldiers identifying themselves as Šešeljovci entered the house of a Muslim family. A woman was beaten on the head by the soldiers who were inquiring about the location of her husband. These soldiers also cut the throat of a man, drawing blood but not killing him. The family was taken to the police station along with other Muslims who were separated into four groups. These groups were imprisoned for 27 days in four houses, confiscated from Muslims. The women were raped repeatedly. On 13 August 1992, these women were allowed to leave on a convoy heading for the Muslim-controlled Sandžak region of Serbia. 755/

18. Gacko County 756/

421. This county is located in south-eastern BiH and is bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 census, the population of Gacko County was 10,844, 62.4 per cent of which were Serbian, 35.3 per cent were Muslim and 2.3 per cent described as "other". Serbian paramilitary operations are reported in this county.

422. In March of 1992, the Serbian White Eagles began destroying Muslim-owned cafes, apartments and shops in the town of Gacko. Most of the White Eagle participants were local Serbs, except those who had been refugees from Mostar. On 15 May, the White Eagles began shooting into homes and making arrests. On 1 June, Muslim men who worked at the power plant were arrested by Serb soldiers. One hundred of the Muslim men were taken to the military prison in Avtovac. Meanwhile, more Muslim men were arrested from their homes and taken to the Hotel Terma. 757/

423. Reportedly, on 1 June 1992, Šešelj's men and the White Eagles launched an all out attack against Gacko's Muslim inhabitants. 758/ One report also stated that special forces of Nikšić and JNA soldiers were also involved in the attack on Gacko. 759/ The attack began with the burning of several Muslim homes. 760/ On 18 and 19 June, the villages were reportedly shelled. Many of the civilians fled into the forests in the nearby mountains, where they saw the Serb forces moving through the village burning Muslim homes. 761/ Other Muslims were killed or arrested. Those that were arrested were detained in the lobby of the Elektro Privreda's Hotel before being transported to the Serbian detention camp at Bileća. 762/

424. Later in June, many Muslims were attempting to leave Gacko with the permission of the Serbian Municipal Office when they were trapped and shot at by White Eagles. 763/ The Muslim men were pulled out of their cars and beaten. Others were set on fire, jumped upon or hit with iron rifle butts. 764/ The women and children were taken to the Motel Košuta and later reuniited with their families, but were forced to watch as the White Eagles beat the Muslim men. The women at the hotel were searched and robbed of their personal belongings, and some of them were raped. The women and children were eventually returned to Gacko, and the men were taken from the motel to Gacko prison. 765/

425. At the prison, the men were beaten nightly by White Eagles and by members of the "Interviewing Platoon". Some were shot to death. The prisoners were then to be taken to Bileća. In preparing to do so, soldiers
lined up to form a path through which the prisoners would pass from their

cells to the transport trucks. As the prisoners walked through the line of

soldiers, they were beaten with rifle butts and poles. Others were killed. A
total of 170 Muslims survived and were taken to Bileća, where they were kept
in a basement room, 120 square metres in size. The prisoners were beaten
three times during the night under 2,000 watt lamps. They were
allegedly beaten every day with wooden and metal sticks by as many as 10
guards at a time. Prisoners were not allowed to go to the bathroom or eat for
three days. Four men were beaten to death between 2 and 4 July. On
10 August, prisoners were to be interviewed by news agencies. They were
allowed to shower and shave for the interviews, but afterwards were allegedly
tortured for telling reporters the truth about the camp conditions and abuse.
The imprisonment continued from 1 June to 18 August 1992. At that
time, 378 prisoners were exchanged in Stolac.

426. One report stated that 4 July was the date of the final roundup of
remaining Muslim villagers. Soldiers went house to house and gave residents
two minutes to leave. One witness estimated that 980 people were forced to
leave at that time. They were taken to the Serbian-Macedonian border where a
relief organization took them on to Skopje.

427. However, another report indicates that those civilians that were hiding
in the forests did not surrender until 12 July 1992. These civilians were
allegedly taken in military trucks to Gacko and interrogated at the police
station where witnesses reported many village possessions were stored. The
civilians were asked about their male relatives and where they could be found.
Reportedly the male Muslim prisoners were held in the basement of a hotel in
the suburbs of Gacko. The women and children are reported to have been taken
to the front-line near Benkovići in late July where the Serb forces were
fighting members of the HVO. The women and children were forced to walk
across the battle lines over minefields towards the HVO who fed them and
transferred them to Mostar, Čaplina or Ljubuški, BiH.

428. Goražde County is in the south-east of BiH and had a 1991 population of
37,505. Of that population, 70.2 per cent were Muslim, 26.2 per cent were
Serb, and 3.6 per cent were "other". There are reports of both Serb and
Muslim paramilitary activity in this area.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

429. The following Serbian forces worked independently and in concert in
Goražde during the months of May and June 1992: the Užice Corps, Garavi Sokok
Forces, and units under the command of Braco Rakanović. These
groups are reported to have harassed Muslim civilians and looted property in
Goražde and the surrounding villages. They are also mentioned in connection
with the mid-June attacks on a settlement near Kokino village and one near
Površnica mountain. One witness reports seeing "Serbian soldiers" killing
Muslim civilians and throwing their corpses in the Drina River sometime after
these attacks.

(b) Muslim paramilitary activity

430. The Green Berets are a Muslim paramilitary group said to have operated
in the Goražde region. Apparently, the Green Berets attacked the village of
Vitkovci between 3 and 5 May 1992. Reportedly, they also took Serbs to local
Muslim-run detention camps, in order that they be killed. 774/

20. Jablanica County 775/

431. Jablanica is located in the central south-west region of BiH. According to 1991 figures, it had a population of 12,664 which was 72.1 per cent Muslim, 17.8 per cent Croat, 6.1 per cent "other", and 4 per cent Serb.

432. The Black Swans and MOS (Muslim Armed Forces), both are Muslim paramilitary groups alleged to have operated in Jablanica County. Apparently, these groups made a joint attack on the village of Doljani on 28 July 1993. 776/ The attackers are said to have mutilated and killed 24 people, both civilians and soldiers. The corpses' eyes were plucked out, their ears cut, and stomachs slit open. 777/

433. The same report indicates that Serbian villagers fleeing from the attack were shot down as they crossed Stipica Meadow. Those who did survive were taken to a nearby room where they were detained with others, including one HVO soldier who had been shot in the chest. They were given nothing to eat and only water to drink. After one day of detention, the prisoners pried the bars of the cell windows loose and escaped. One witness recognized the MOS forces acting in this incident, saying they were from Jablanica. 778/

21. Kalinovik County 779/

434. This county is in south-eastern BiH. The pre-war population was 4,657, of which 60.6 per cent were Serbian, 37.1 per cent Muslim, and 2.3 per cent "other". Only Serbian paramilitaries were reported to be operating in this county.

435. Šešeljovci and Russian volunteers were called in to Kalinovik during February 1993, at the request of Commander Ratko Mladić, when the Kalinovik "Cetniks" were reportedly refusing to obey orders from their most extreme commanders. The goal of the new troops was to restore the self-confidence of the local "Cetniks". 780/

22. Konjic County 781/

436. This county is located in the south central part of BiH, approximately 45 kilometres south-west of the centre of Sarajevo. Konjic's population as of 1991 was 43,636. The population was 15.2 per cent Serbian, 26 per cent Croatian, 54.5 per cent Muslim and 4.3 per cent "other". Serbian, Muslim and Croatian paramilitary groups were reportedly active in this county.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

437. Arkan's men were in Lukavica armed with sub-machine-guns and daggers. They beat Muslim civilians and cut crosses in some of the Muslims' foreheads. The dates of these incidents were not reported. 782/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

438. It was reported that the HOS, together with the Muslim Green Berets, conducted operations in the Konjic villages of Donje Selo and Bradina. Both of these villages were burned and the inhabitants sent to detention.
facilities. Donje Selo was attacked first and then Bradina on 25 May 1992. Female prisoners were transferred to Konjic Sports Hall, where some of the victims were raped. The men were taken to Čelebici camp. On 13 July, the HOS returned to Bradina, burned the town, and imprisoned all remaining inhabitants in an elementary school. Many civilians allegedly died in the attacks. 782/

(c) Muslim paramilitary activity

439. A report submitted by the United States alleges that the Muslim paramilitary group, the Black Swans, committed most of the crimes against Bosnian Croats in the Konjic area. According to reports, the Black Swans arrived in the Konjic area on 1 April 1993. They reinforced Muslim troops under an identified commander and were primarily deployed at the village of Handići, seven kilometres north-west of Konjic. In negotiations with the HVO, Tulomović denied that the Black Swans were under his control and blamed them for the criminal activity in the area. 783/

440. The Black Swan forces established at Handići are alleged to have attacked the Croatian village of Celopeči in early April 1993. They reportedly burned three empty buildings, killed two elderly women and one elderly man, cutting off his arms and slitting his throat with a machete. Later, the Handići force was joined by Black Swans from Pokoještë, who brought four or five Croatian civilians who were being used as human shields as they moved through the village. Estimates put the attacking force at 70 men. It is also alleged that after the action, Muslim forces prevented Spanish UNPROFOR troops from investigating the activities at Celopeči. 784/

441. The Black Swans, together with Mujahedin troops, allegedly launched infantry attacks every four or five days on the village of Vrci and helped run the P.O.W. camp for HVO soldiers at Parsovici. 785/

442. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reported that Alija's Army, the Yellow Ants, the HCS, and the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) entered Konjic on 26 April 1992. They are alleged to have established road blocks, set up machine-guns in nearby villages, and to have killed civilians and looted villagers' homes. 786/

443. According to the Serbian Council Information Centre, the Muslim paramilitary unit, the Akrepë, killed 11 Serbs and burned 24 houses in the Konjic village of Blace on 15 May 1992. 787/

444. Another report submitted to the Commission of Experts by the Croatian government indicates that a Muslim paramilitary group, Hrasnica Forces, desecrated churches, looted houses, and mistreated Croats in the villages of Čelebici and Radešine. 788/ This report also alleged that the paramilitary forces of Hasan Hakalović executed two elderly civilians in the village of Mrkovic. 789/

23. Kupres County 790/

445. This county is located in west-central BiH. Its pre-war population was 9,663 of which 50.7 per cent was Serbian, 39.6 per cent Croatian, 8.4 per cent Muslim, and 1.3 per cent "other". There is one report of Serbian paramilitary activity in this county.

446. In April 1992, Šešelj's White Eagles, along with the JNA under the command of an identified officer, were allegedly responsible for the killing
of about 200 men, women, and children. Machine-guns, knives, and hammers were used in the killings. A young girl witnessed her family being killed; she was then forced to strip and left to be raped by any of the soldiers who were so inclined. 791/

24. Livno County 792/

447. Livno County is in the west of BiH bordering Croatia at the county of Sinj. In 1991, its population was 39,526, of which 72 per cent was Croat, 15 per cent Muslim, 9.6 per cent Serb, and 3.4 per cent "other".

448. A rape victim testifies that she was held in a brothel in Livno and then Sarajevo by "Alija's warriors". It is not clear from the report whether the group she is referring to is the same paramilitary organization as Alija's Army or whether she is referring generically to the Army of BiH as President Alija Izetbegović's "warriors". 793/ The dates of her custody are not specified.

25. Maglaj County 794/

449. This county is located in south-central BiH and had a pre-war population of 43,294. This population was 30.7 per cent Serbian, 19.3 per cent Croatian, 45.4 per cent Muslim and 4.6 per cent described as "other". There was one report of Serbian paramilitary activity in this county.

450. A heavy attack on Maglaj was launched on 23 May 1993 by JNA forces, the Serbian Army, Šešelj's forces, and local "outlaws". One news report described the town as "literally burning". It further stated: "over 2,000 shells have hit the town so far". Many casualties were reported and poisonous gases were allegedly used. The Serb forces held more than 10 combat positions, from which all types of artillery were fired. 795/

26. Modriča County 796/

451. Modriča is located in north-eastern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population of the county totaled 35,413 of which 35.3 per cent was Serbian, 27.3 per cent Croatian, 29.5 per cent Muslim, and 7.9 per cent "other". There are three reports of Serbian paramilitary activity in Modriča.

452. The Serbian population began to get restless in January 1992 when influential local Serb leaders started making trips to Belgrade. 797/

453. During early May of 1992, Serb soldiers entered the village of Modriča. Some were believed to be from Šešelj's units, for they had blackened faces and wore dark uniforms with an insignia of a skull and eagle on the arms. 798/ The White Eagles, Knindža Turtles, 799/ and the SOS paramilitaries 800/ were also reported to have been in Modriča.

454. Allegedly, a group of Muslims, which had sought refuge in the cellar of a private home, were ordered out; they were kicked, punched, and beaten with rifle butts. They were taken to another cellar, where a total of 33 persons were eventually detained for 15 days. Some men were then taken to the school in the centre of town, while others were held in the school sports hall. Local Serbs stood guard while others interrogated the prisoners, including paramilitaries from the White Eagles and Knindža Turtles. Around 18 May, the school was shelled and most of the detainees were moved to a military barracks at Doboj, where approximately 300 Muslims and Croats were being held. In
early June, the Red Cross took away the women and children from the site, leaving only about 80 men. 801/

27. Mostar County 802/

455. Mostar is located in the south-central region of BiH. The total population in 1991 was 126,067 of which 19 per cent was Serbian, 33.8 per cent Croatian, 34.8 per cent Muslim, and 10 per cent described as “others”. There are reports of Serbian and Croatian paramilitary and Muslim mercenary activity in Mostar.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

456. The JNA entered the Mostar village of Radoš on 4 April 1992, and destroyed the home of a witness. According to this witness, all of the inhabitants of the village fled to the city of Mostar, which was already at war. After 26 days, the witness returned to the village for better shelter. After his return, the Yugoslav army blocked all access roads, and controlled all points around, the village. Several civilians were stranded in the village without water, electricity, food or supplies. The witness reported that Serbs set fire to all the houses. 803/

457. The witness claimed that in May 1992 he was arrested by "Četniks" who said they were under Arkan's command. According to his statement, the witness was taken to Mostar and then to a military prison. He was interrogated and accused of possessing weapons. He and nine others were beaten by guards and remained imprisoned for 81 days, during which they experienced physical and psychological mistreatment.

458. On 6 April 1992, a combined force of JNA special forces and Šešeljovci moved into the village of Vrapčići, allegedly in response to the explosion of a fuel truck at the JNA barracks in Mostar. The Bosnian and Croatian populations were encouraged to leave and most did. 804/

459. The Bosnians and Croatians in Potoci, three kilometres north of Vrapčići, erected roadblocks and barriers to guard against a similar fate. They were successful until 16 May 1992. On 16 May, the forces in Vrapčići were reinforced with 10 tanks and 10 armoured personnel carriers, at which point they began their attack on Potoci. They were assisted by JNA air attacks. Upon capturing the village, the Serbian forces began rounding up able-bodied Muslim and Croatian males from both villages. These men were taken to a stadium that had been converted into a detention facility. They were loaded onto trucks and taken to Bileća, BiH, where they were exchanged. 805/

460. On 12 June 1992, an additional 88 Muslim and Croatian residents of Vrapčići, including elderly men and women, were rounded up. They were taken to the stadium and killed. Their bodies were found in the landfill north of the village on 20 August 1992 after liberation by Croatian Defence Council and BiH Territorial Defence Forces on 20 June. 806/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

461. Allegedly, sometime before 15 July 1993, the Croatian paramilitary group, Juka's Army, evicted wealthy Muslim residents of Mostar from their apartments, which were looted and turned over to members of HVO paramilitary forces for habitation. According to reports, Juka's forces were masked and
heavily armed when they surrounded the apartments, which were located west of
the city centre. They then proceeded to block exits, fire their weapons in
the air, and demand that all Muslim residents evacuate the building. 807/

462. Another report states that the Croatian Tiger forces joined the HVO in
Mostar on 1 June 1993. The Tigers allegedly brought with them additional
weapons supplies, including 305 millimetre "Slavuj" guns and grenades
manufactured at Slavonski Brod. 808/

(c) Muslim paramilitary activity

463. Mujahedin forces were observed in Mostar beginning in early June 1993.
They were stationed in the Šantića neighbourhood on the Muslim\HVO front,
where they manned bunkers usually in groups of six or seven. They were
reportedly armed with 7.62 millimetre weapons, mortars, and Zolja anti-tank
weapons. They were billeted in a building they shared with the Muslim police
on the east bank of the Neretva River. The Mujahedin forces are reported to
have left Mostar on 15 August. 809/

28. Nevesinje County 810/

464. Nevesinje County is in southern BiH. Its population in 1991 was 14,421,
of which 74.5 per cent was Serb, 23 per cent Muslim, and 2.5 per cent "other".

465. In early April of 1992, Šešelj's forces were said to have been deployed
around the Nevesinje area to assist organized efforts at the border. 811/

29. Novi Travnik County

466. Pucarevo County is in central BiH near Travnik. The HOS (Hrvatske
Oružane Snage) is reported to have acted in this region. 812/

30. Odžak County 813/

467. Odžak is in northern BiH bordering Croatia at Slavonski Brod. Its pre-
war population was 30,651, with 54.2 per cent Croat, 20.3 per cent Muslim,
19.8 per cent Serb, and 5.7 per cent "other".

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

468. In February 1993, in the town of Novi Grad, between 700 and 1,000
troops, drawn largely from Arkan's and Šešelj's units, (but also including
volunteers from Kordun and Banija, as well as "Cetniks" from the Benkovac
garrison), reportedly attempted to cut the Smiljkes-Novi Grad communications
line in an effort to take Novi Grad. The Serbs were said to have been
"crushed" and pushed back to their positions. UNPROFOR was asked by the
Croatian military to enter the area and alleviate tensions between the two
sides. 814/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

469. There are reports of two Croatian forces operating in Odžak. One is the
Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) and the other is the Black Legion.
470. The CDU is said to be responsible for the shelling of Donja Dubica on 18 April 1992. 815/

471. The Black Legion is mentioned in association with a detention camp in Odžak run by "Muslim and Croatian forces". A witness stated that members of the Black Legion arrived on 16 July 1993 and asked prisoners for gold and money. The witness gave them money and was released. 816/

(c) Muslim paramilitary activity

472. The Green Berets and the paramilitary arm of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) are reported to have acted in Odžak.

473. A Serbian man testified that he was picked up by three Green Berets from the streets of Novi Grad in June 1992. They took him to a camp run by "Muslims", where he was detained for almost 10 months. 817/

474. The SDA acted together with members of the CDU in Odžak, raping, murdering, looting, and detaining civilians. 818/ Apparently, the SDA and CDU received military supplies from abroad in Odžak, the majority of them being procured from Croatia. Reports state that weapons dealers associated with these groups moved freely between Croatia and BiH, buying and selling arms. 819/

31. Pale County 820/

475. Pale is located in south-east BiH. During early February 1992, Šešelj’s Četnike reportedly shot at every car driving through the city of Pale. 821/

476. Reports also allege that Muslim and Croatian prisoners were being mistreated in the Pale detention camps. The camps were set up at the local sports hall, the Cultural Centre and the cinema, and were run by two identified men. During interrogations, prisoners were physically and mentally tortured. In one case, a death sentence was executed in front of a prisoner. Pre-written confessions were given to prisoners by members of the SIP. In all, over 20,000 persons were said to have passed through the camps at Pale. 2,500 are currently there. Several men are responsible for the investigation and interrogation of prisoners. At least one is alleged to be a member of Arkan’s formations.

477. Also, witness testimony from the BiH Bulletin claims that on 1 June 1992 over 1,000 Serbian irregular forces, 150 soldiers from Rajlovac and Butile barracks, and 60 SDS extremists entered Ahatovići and Dobroševeci and killed 20 Muslim men. The forces also wounded several others and looted and set fire to Muslim homes. On 2 June, Serb extremists mined and destroyed the mosque at Ahatovići. During these attacks, Serb irregulars, under the command of Joja Tintor, captured 400 women and children and 80 men. 822/

32. Prijedor County 823/

478. Prijedor is in the north-west of BiH. In 1991, its population was 112,470. Of that population, 44 per cent was Muslim, 42.5 per cent Serb, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslav", 5.6 per cent Croat, and 2.2 per cent "other". There are reports of extensive Serbian paramilitary activity in this region.

479. Prijedor citizens have claimed that Arkan’s paramilitary forces had set
up headquarters in the Hotel Prijedor when Serbian authorities assumed control of that city in a coup on 30 April 1992. The SDS had established headquarters at that location and some believe that Arkan's forces were situated there as well, but no witnesses have been able to confirm the allegation. However, one witness said that White Eagles were roaming the streets of Prijedor, and that Croatian and Muslim police officers were replaced by Serbs who wore a Serbian cross on their hats instead of the Yugoslav red star. Local Prijedor leaders were arrested by the Serbs.

480. Prijedor was attacked on 30 May 1992 by Serb forces, and the city fell within 13 hours. A mosque was burned, and many citizens were forced to leave their homes, arrested and bussed to detention facilities. One woman who was taken from her home and detained for four days stated that when she returned to her home, it had been robbed of all valuables. She was not mistreated within the detention facility, but she stated that others were frequently threatened. Another woman related that she was taken to the Prijedor police station and placed in a cell sprayed with fresh blood, along with several other civilians, before being shipped to Omarska camp. The involvement of Šešelj's forces in these activities is not clear from the report.

481. Also in May, a resident of Prijedor was summoned for interrogation by an identified commander of a Četnik brigade. Afterwards, he was taken to Ciglane camp in Prijedor. White Eagles were implicated in the imprisonment and killings of prisoners at Ciglane camp. Also women were raped. Furthermore, the witness saw a group of White Eagles kill five people, and saw "Četniki" take 15 children from their mothers and throw them into ovens. Another man was also detained at the camp and was forced to load dead bodies onto 13 trucks. He and 20 other prisoners were then taken to Omarska, where he spent six to seven days. Afterwards, he was able to escape.

482. A 27 December 1992 news report links Arkan's forces with a series of Serbian attacks on the Muslim village of Kozarac in Prijedor county. The attack was prefaced with a demand by Prijedor's rulers that the villagers sign a loyalty oath to the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serbian state, or be regarded as terrorists. Serbs in control of Prijedor drove cars that had "Wolves of Vukovar" written on them. Officers of the JNA were also reportedly involved. The residents attempted to set up a meager defence, but the town was sealed off on 14 May 1992.

483. On 24 May 1992, the villages of Kozaruša and Kozarac, in Prijedor county were surrounded by a Serbian force, which included units of the Serbian Army, Bosnian Serb irregulars, White Eagles, and Šešelj's men. The forces equipped with tanks and armoured personnel carriers, bombarded the villages for approximately two hours with artillery and rocket fire before entering the village of Kozaruša. Upon entering the village, local Serbs began identifying Muslims who were then shot in the street. Muslim homes were set afire after Serbian forces tossed grenades into them. Within hours, other Muslims were arrested and taken to the prison camp at the Keraterm factory.

484. The attack on Kozarac lasted three days and caused many villagers to flee to the forest while the soldiers were shooting at "every moving thing". Survivors calculated that at least 2,000 villagers were killed in that period. The villagers' defence fell on 26 May. When the Serbian forces entered the village, they began destroying the village's 14 mosques and nine minarets.

485. Serbs then reportedly announced that the villagers had 10 minutes to reach the town's soccer stadium. However, many people were shot in their homes before given a chance to leave. One witness reported that several
thousand people tried to surrender by carrying white flags, but three Serb tanks opened fire on them, killing many. Those who were successful in surrendering were separated according to gender. During the exodus to the soccer stadium, some men were randomly selected to be shot by a single Serb perched on a balcony. Upon their arrival at the stadium, the women and men were separated and delivered to concentration camps. Many were beaten and killed in the process. One refugee estimated 90 per cent of the region's leaders were killed.

Another report noted that all 24,000 residents of Kozarac were evacuated and told to walk towards Prijedor. En route, they were met by Serb police who separated the women from the men and began setting houses on fire. Some villagers were killed on the spot. Three hundred soldiers wearing the insignia of the "White Eagles of Knin", stood alongside the road or pulled certain residents out of the group, and took them to a house where they were executed. Those that were not shot were separated by sex.

The men were taken to a detention camp in a school in the nearby village of Trnjani, where they were held for four days without food or water. The men were then transferred to the camp at Trnopolje, where the women and children had been held for several days. A large number of the prisoners were allegedly killed at Trnopolje.

Major Arsić, the highest ranking member of the "Serbian Army" was said by some to have planned the attack; others named Major Kuruzović. Željaje, commander of JNA reservists from 12 different municipalities, was also involved. Weapons were taken from the territorial defence units and given to the Serbian army. K.D., a former member of the Kozarac civilian defence council, identified Major Arsić and Serbian JNA Commander Željaje as having played key roles in the attack. He also observed Serb police setting houses on fire and killing certain people in the convoy. A spokesman for the Bosnian Serbs' self-declared government also explained that the government used Arkan's forces in its "ethnic cleansing" operations: "He is very expensive, but also very efficient.

Forty men from Kozarac were selected for a prison work gang that was sent back into Kozarac to retrieve dead bodies. One of these men counted 610 bodies in all. Kozarac homes were painted with one of three colours for identification: yellow-marked homes were to be inhabited, blue-marked homes were to be rebuilt, and red-marked homes were to be destroyed.

At the same time, the Red Berets are reported to have been acting in the area and could have been working with or alongside Arkan's men and other Serbian forces. Apparently, the Red Berets participated in the attack of Gornja Puharska, a village of about 300 Muslim families and six Croatian families on 29 May. They entered the village in tanks with other non-uniformed Bosnian Serb irregulars. Following the attack, they took all male villagers south-east to the Omarska detention camp, leaving the women and children behind. At Omarska, the Red Berets worked with the JNA and local police to provide security and coordinate guard shifts.

On 23 June 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began shelling the village of Rizvanovići allegedly in response to the killing of two Serbian soldiers by Muslim Freedom Fighters somewhere near Prijedor. The village had a population of nearly 3,000, all of whom were Muslim with the exception of one family. The shelling lasted approximately four hours and was followed by an attack by Bosnian Serb infantry forces, consisting of the Fifth Banja Luka Corp, White Eagles, and Šešeljovci. The town mosque was damaged, one resident was killed, and another injured during the attack. After the attack, a small occupying force remained
in the town. The residents were kept under house arrest with limited movement. 845/

492. On 9 July 1992, all Muslim males from the village of Matrici were rounded up in groups by Arkanovci and White Eagles and marched to Trnopolje. Along the way, the Muslims were forced to hold their hands behind their heads and to keep their heads hung low. There were also random beatings and killings. After arriving at Trnopolje, the captives were loaded onto buses going to Omarska. The detainees did not stay at Omarska but were instead moved to Keratorm. 846/

493. In late July 1992, the same force that had attacked Rizvanovic conducted a sweep of the village, rounding up residents and burning homes. Some residents were able to escape to the woods outside the village and others were imprisoned in the cafe of a public building in the centre of the village. 847/

494. Also in July, a paramilitary unit called "Zoran Karlica" is reported to have been responsible for killings, rapes, and other abuses in the village of Biscani. 848/ A witness recognized and named three men among the attackers. He also reports seeing one of the men beating a villager to death. 842/

495. After the attack on Biscani, the witness and other survivors were loaded onto buses and driven towards Prijedor. At Crna Jaruga, half of the people from one of the buses were killed. One bus drove to the Omarska camp and then on to Trnopolje camp because there was no room at Omarska. Upon their arrival at Omarska, an identified paramilitary man took 13 people away. The witness learned later that these people had been killed at Prijedorsko Polje. 850/

496. Finally, there are reports describing the activities of two other irregular groups working in Prijedor, for which there are no dates. They may or may not have been operating during the time periods mentioned above. One group, the Rambos, is alleged to be extremely violent and sexually aggressive. According to one witness, Rambo members carved the Cetnik insignia (four cyrillic S's) into a victim's chest, cut the sinews in one individual's legs, and in the spine of another (so that the victim was instantly paralysed). In another instance, they took five 13 year-old girls from a camp in the area to a private home and returned them the following day, bearing obvious signs of abuse. A resident physician managed to suture two of the girls, but the other had to be sent to the hospital in the city of Prijedor. In still another instance, Rambo members chopped off the testicles and gouged out the eyes of a Czechoslovakian medic. 851/

497. The second group, the Radulovic Irregulars, are also reported to have worked in Prijedor. 852/ A US Government report identified three men in the group, reportedly from Zecovi, who were guards at the Serb-run Trnopolje camp. However, their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Some of them are claimed to have been involved in the looting and burning of Zecovi on 23 June 1992. Another identified member, however, is not specifically named as a participant in this attack. 853/

33. Rogatica County 854/

498. Rogatica County is in eastern BiH. Its population in 1991 was 21,812, of which 69.4 per cent was Muslim and 39.6 per cent was Serb. There are numerous reports of Serbian paramilitary activity in this county.
499. The village of Rogatica was shelled by Serb forces beginning on 22 May 1992. Between 25 May and 21 June, the town was shelled every day, with attacks concentrated on predominantly Muslim areas. 855/ All city services were discontinued and Muslims were forbidden to go outside or leave the city. SDS, White Eagles, Arkan's men, and Šešelj's men began looting and burning Muslim houses and apartments. It is estimated that over 100 individuals (women, children, and the elderly), were killed on 21 and 22 June. 856/ The civilians were burned and run over with tanks and troop carriers. 857/ Muslims began being forced out of their homes and captured by Serb forces on 8 June. 858/ Those who attempted to flee to the village of Vragolovo were fired upon. 859/ A camp was set up at the local high school where the women and children were taken, while most of the men were taken to Sokolac and Sladara camps. One account approximated the number of women and children detained at the school to be 300. 860/ At the school, many women were taken away by Serb soldiers and beaten and raped. 861/ Around 5 August, the women and children were loaded onto trucks and began a convoy to the Kreša section of Sarajevo. Detainees were forced to walk part of the way as Serb soldiers fired upon them. 862/

500. In July of 1992, Arkan's men began going door-to-door looking for weapons and valuables. Arkan's men then began taking people to the elementary school. Female prisoners were removed every night by armed guards carrying flashlights. They were usually kept out for two to three hours at a time. The prisoners were moved to Sarajevo after seven days in the school. 863/

501. Žepa, a small mountain village in Rogatica county usually populated by 5,000, surged to 30,000 persons due to a huge influx of refugees during late 1992. The BBC traveled with a U.N. military convoy to bring food and other relief to the villagers during the winter months. The convoy was stopped 12 kilometres outside Žepa by Serbian militia, one of whom was wearing the badge of Arkan. The militiamen told the BBC reporter, "The people of Žepa need food, not journalists". While it seemed that the convoy would be allowed through, the soldiers had actually directed the convoy to the one road leading to Žepa that was impassable. More than 20 trees were splayed across the road, and it seemed likely that the road may have been mined or booby-trapped. The U.N. convoy was forced to turn back and attempt an alternative route on a different day. 864/

502. During this time, there was also an incident in which the paramilitary forces, under the command of an identified man, killed 49 prisoners during a fake prisoner exchange. 865/ Apparently, Serb forces, under the command of another identified man, forced prisoners from Višegrad onto a bus and headed north towards Rogatica. The Serb soldiers explained to the prisoners that they were going to be exchanged at Han Pišak, but once on the bus, they were tied up and beaten. At some point during their trip, the bus was pulled off the road, the prisoners ordered off, killed, and piled in a pit. 866/ While the specific date of this incident is not noted, it was reported in the BiH Bulletin of March 1993 and must have occurred shortly before then.

503. In April of 1993, Šešelj called for the two Serb republics of BiH and Krajina to form a unitary state and reject the Vance-Owen plan. Šešelj pledged that his own party, the Serbian Radical Party, would do everything it could to gain recognition of a new joint state. He requested that the Serbian people "reject any signature that would mean the capitulation of the Serbian people to foreign powers. The Serbian people have to maintain all that they have won in a hard and bloody struggle." 867/
34. Sanski Most County 868/

504. Sanski Most is located in north-west BiH. According to the 1991 census, its population was 60,119, of which 47 per cent was Muslim, 42.2 per cent Serb, 7.1 per cent Croat, and 3.7 per cent "other".

505. There is one report of a Serbian paramilitary organization acting in this area called the Sixth District or Šest Kraška. 869/ Apparently, the Sixth District attacked Sanski Most on 9 May 1992 and occupied the police station and other municipal buildings. Seventeen days after their attack, the Serbian Regular Army arrived in the city. The Sixth District is said to often work with the army by conducting small-scale operations, like the attack at Sanski Most. 870/

35. Sarajevo County 871/

506. Sarajevo is in central BiH. In 1991, it had a population of 525,980, of which 49.3 per cent was Muslim, 29.9 per cent Serb, 10.7 per cent "Yugoslav", 6.6 per cent Croat, and 3.5 per cent "other". There are reports of Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim paramilitary activity in this region.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

507. In March of 1992, Zagreb Radio Croatia reported that large columns of Arkan's and Šešelj's troops were seen organizing at the entrance to Sarajevo, at the Višegrad gate, following the news that Muslim forces were in and around the Sarajevo area. Apparently, Arkan's and Šešelj's units were preparing to attack the town. 872/

508. In April of 1992, a series of violent attacks was launched on the citizens of Sarajevo. On 5 April, the police school at Vraca was attacked, and the students of the police school were beaten and mistreated. White Eagles later forcibly evicted many villagers from their homes and took them to Vrbanja. "Cetniks" looted and set fire to the houses which earlier had been vacated by residents. A 14 year-old boy's arm was allegedly sawed off by Serbs with a handsaw. The boy was then taken away by the White Eagles. A report also stated that JNA forces, under the command of an identified man, used their heavy artillery to attack Sarajevo residents. 873/

509. Armed SDS and White Eagles members allegedly raped a woman, slit the throat of a man, and engaged in beating unarmed civilians. The specifics of these incidents, which took place between June and December 1992, are not disclosed for confidentiality reasons. 874/

510. In late April of 1992, the BiH Ministry of Internal Affairs linked the attacks on Sarajevo with Šešelj's units. One-hundred sixty-two of Šešelj's men reportedly moved to the Sarajevo district of Pale in early April, and more continued to go to Vraca. The identified commander of the unit is said to be the leader of Šešelj's Četniks in Slavonia, Baranja and western Srijem. The unit moved from Pale to Vraca on 14 and 15 April, during which time they planned to launch an artillery attack on the garages of the city transportation company. The reported goal was to massacre the population as revenge for the capture of two criminals and Dragiša Kuljačić, a terrorist. This attack was abandoned when the prisoners were released. 875/

511. This same unit participated in the attack of the Novo Sarajevo area. In this instance, one group of men were surrounded by those defending Sarajevo, and their leader was wounded. Šešelj then threatened to withdraw all of his
units in BiH if his men were not released from the siege on Grbavica. Serbian Democratic Party forces went in to rescue the men. Šešelj’s units then withdrew back to Pale. 876/ In response to the withdrawal, Arkan considered an invitation by Biljana Plavšić, former member of the BiH Presidency, to bring his troops into Sarajevo. 877/

512. In Dobrinja, a suburb of Sarajevo, residents were confined to their homes in May and June of 1992, during an eleven-week attack on that city by Serb militia forces. Residents were told that they would be shot if they ventured outdoors. On 17 June, teams of Serb gunmen forced Muslims from their homes. The vacated residences were looted, and the ousted villagers were herded into a small basement room. Local Serb soldiers informed the residents that paramilitary units from neighbouring Serbia were mobilizing the drive to take Dobrinja, and that these units demanded that all Muslims be killed. One of the Serbs identified these units as led by Arkan and Šešelj. Two days later, the villagers were ordered outside their holding room and were taken to a trench in a highway that lay between Serb and Muslim forces. They were told to begin walking down the highway and were then forced to evade sniper fire. Two women were killed. As the sniper fire escalated, the 40 villagers began running. A woman’s arm was severed by gunfire. The villagers then dove into a ditch on the side of the road and crawled a half a kilometre in the rain and mud, at times over dead bodies. They were finally escorted to safety in territory controlled by BiH Government forces. 878/

513. Arkan’s men also allegedly operated in the area of Grbavica. In late September 1992, at least 500 Grbavica residents were seen fleeing their village amidst gunfire. Apparently, they were crossing over the bridge leading to Sarajevo’s city centre after Serb soldiers gave them less than 15 minutes to leave their homes with all they could carry. The soldiers threatened that they would kill the residents if they did not turn over all gold, jewelry, and foreign currency. The Grbavica Muslims said that many of the soldiers wore black jumpsuits and double-headed eagle badges, insignias which are said to be those of Arkan’s forces. Others related that before the mass evictions, people were subjected to midnight searches, denied pension payments, and harassed on the street. Some Muslim men were taken to detention camps or made part of working parties.

514. Another report implied that both Arkan and Šešelj deployed forces in Grbavica. At least 130 residents had been evicted from their homes and were seen fleeing Serb forces in Grbavica. A meeting at the commune building in Grbavica was reportedly held by the Serbian Democratic Party and its military command in September of 1992. An agreement was reached at the meeting, wherein all Muslims and Croats would be removed. To accomplish this goal, forces of Arkan and Šešelj were called in to help and to kill all Muslims of military age. This plan was said to be the final offensive in “cleansing” this area of Sarajevo. 879/

515. Muslims were imprisoned, interrogated, tortured, and killed at the concentration camp "Health Centre Stari Grad" in Ilidža, a section of Sarajevo. Arkan’s Četniks reportedly ran the camp. 880/

516. In July of 1992, the Sonja cafe and hotel, just outside Vogošća, served as the site for scores of rapes and killings of Muslim women by Serb forces. The "commander" of this detention facility was Commander Miro Vuković, a loyalist of Šešelj’s forces. Vuković reportedly established a system for Serb fighters to rape and kill women. 881/ Borislav Herak, a Serbian soldier standing trial for 35 killings and 14 rapes, related that soldiers were encouraged to go to the Sonja cafe to rape women and then take them elsewhere to be killed. Herak also witnessed or participated in the killings of at least 220 other Muslim civilians. Specifically, he watched as 120 civilians
were gunned down by a Serbian unit called the "special investigation group" in a field outside Vogošća. Herak was told by his commanders that raping Muslim women was "good for raising the fighters morale". He and three friends raped one woman and then shot her in the back of the head near a mountain bridge. He went to the Sonja cafe once every three or four days, and reported that even though soldiers were raping and killing women every day, more women were always arriving. He describes, "... it was never a problem. You just picked up a key and went to a room." 882/ Vuković provided the soldiers with justifications for killing the women after raping them. 883/ Vuković once told Herak, "You can do with the women what you like. You can take them away from here--we don't have enough food for them anyway--and don't bring them back." 884/

517. Herak said he was ordered to go to the Sonja cafe by his commander, Captain Borov. As he went to the cafe, he was met by Miodrag and Dragan, two members of Šešelj's private army. When Herak related that he had been sent by Borov, the two "Četniks" ushered Herak into a waiting room containing about 60 young women, from which Herak could select his rape victim. 885/

518. In August of 1992, the administrators of the Sonja cafe were asked to release all women, children, and elderly in preparation for a visit by an English delegation to the site. Consequently, 150 persons were released. "Četniks" reportedly cleared the camp and removed blood from the walls and floors. Three thousand civilians were said to have passed through the camp at Vogošća, hundreds of them dying at the hands of Arkan's and Šešelj's men and other "Četniks". 886/

519. The hotel "Park" was also the location of at least two rapes by members of Šešelj's units. 887/

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

520. There are reports of two separate Croatian groups acting in Sarajevo and the surrounding region. These are the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) and the forces under Jusuf Prazina, alias "Juka" or "Yuka".

521. The Republic of Serbia reports that an HOS unit, together with an unnamed Muslim paramilitary group, helped run the "Viktor Bubanj" detention facility in Sarajevo where Serb civilians have allegedly been tortured, raped, and killed. 888/ There are no dates noted as to when the HOS was present at the camp.

522. The Croatian forces were also involved in criminal activity at the "Viktor Bubanj" camp. 889/ It was reported that the leader of this group was appointed head of the BiH Army paramilitary units and became warden of the prison camp. For this reason, "Viktor Bubanj" was also called "Juka's Prison". Over 200 prisoners were held there and were tortured and forced to do heavy manual labour. "Juka" himself is accused of raping and killing prisoners at this camp. 890/

(c) Muslim paramilitary activity

523. Alija's Army and the Green Berets are two Muslim paramilitary units reportedly acted in the Sarajevo area.

524. A rape victim testified to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that she was held in a brothel in Livno and then in Sarajevo by "Alija's warriors". It is not clear from the report whether the group she refers to is the same
paramilitary organization as Alija's Army, or whether she is referring
generically to the army of BiH as President Alija Izetbegovic's
"warriors". 891/ Her testimony does not indicate any precise dates of
custody.

525. The Green Berets also operated in Sarajevo. On 22 May 1992, a Serbian
woman was picked up by two Green Berets and taken to "Viktor Bubanj" in
Sarajevo, where she was questioned and raped repeatedly. 892/ Another
report alleges that the Green Berets were responsible for the death of an
unspecified number of Serb children at the Koševro Stadium near this time as
well. Apparently, the members threw the children in the animal cages. Serb
soldiers could hear the children being killed from their surrounding positions
in Kromolj and Jezero. 893/

36. Srebrenica County 894/
526. Srebrenica is in eastern BiH bordering Serbia. As of 1991, it had a
population of 37,211, of which 74.8 per cent was Muslim and 25.2 per cent
Serb.

527. In May 1992, Arkan's men allegedly removed machinery and equipment from
local factories and looted appliances from local stores in Srebrenica and
loaded them into stolen cars and took them to Belgrade. 895/

528. Also in May 1992, the town of Rogatica was shelled, and other reported
violations took place, which are not disclosed for confidentiality and
prosecutorial reasons. 896/

37. Teslić County 897/
529. Teslić County is in the central northern region of BiH. In 1991, it had
a population of 59,632, of which 55.1 per cent was Serb, 21.5 per cent Muslim,
16 per cent Croat, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslav", and 1.7 per cent "other".

530. Arkan and his forces led the near-fatal attack on Kamenica in Teslić
during early spring of 1992. The Muslim enclave finally collapsed after
enduring 10 months of Serbian onslaughts. The entire village was abandoned by
its residents, and Serbs quickly moved to bomb the mosque and loot and burn
private homes. Mass graves were opened, which Serbs claimed to bury their own
who had died in combat.

531. A professor from Sarajevo University also reports that paramilitary
units of the Armada Forces, along with the Serbian militia and the Red Berets,
were brought into Teslić to perform "ethnic cleansing" operations
there. 898/ The report does not disclose any dates.

38. Tomislavgrad County 899/
532. Tomislavgrad is a western county of BiH bordering Croatia at Imotski
County. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 29,261. Of this
population, 86.6 per cent was Croat, 10.8 per cent Muslim, and 2.6 per cent
"other".

533. Witness testimonies submitted by the Serbian Council Information Centre
allege that members of the Black Legion, a Croatian paramilitary force, took
prisoners from Split and Kupres and held them at Tomislavgrad. Women who were
detained report that they were kept in cellars with no toilets or
The Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) are also reported to have participated in the operation of a detention facility in Tomislavgrad.

39. **Travnik County**

Travnik is in central BiH. Its pre-war population was 70,402, with 45.3 per cent Muslim, 36.9 per cent Croat, 11 per cent Serb, and 6.8 per cent "other". There are reports of Croatian and Muslim paramilitary activity in this county.

(a) **Croatian paramilitary activity**

UNPROFOR reports that a Croatian paramilitary formation called Medići was responsible for attacks, kidnappings, bombings, and artillery firing on Muslim residents in and around Travnik during the first weeks of April 1993. The HVO has claimed that the Medići are not under its military control.

(b) **Muslim paramilitary activity**

The US Government claims that Mecet's Bebe, or Mecetove Bebe, is a Muslim paramilitary organization that carried out criminal activity, including theft and sabotage in the Travnik area. It does not specify any dates of their activity.

40. **Tuzla County**

Tuzla is in north-east BiH. Its population in 1991 was 131,861, of which 47.6 per cent was Muslim, 16.6 per cent "Yugoslav", 15.6 per cent Croat, 15.5 per cent Serb, and 4.7 per cent "other".

The chlorine-alkaline complex in Tuzla and Lukavac was bombarded with artillery by Šešelj's men and local "Cetniks" during June of 1992. The attack was backed by aircraft from the military air force and an anti-aircraft defence provided by the JNA.

41. **Veliina**

According to an April 1992 report, the Pan-Yugoslav television network YUTEL, carried videotape footage of the attack on Veliina. The report states that Veliina was "overrun" by Arkan and his men, who were claiming to liberate it for the Serbs. Arkan told reporters that his forces were in BiH to prevent Muslim fundamentalism from gaining a foothold in Europe.

42. **Višegrad County**

Višegrad is in eastern BiH. According to 1991 census figures, it had a population of 21,202, with 62.8 per cent Muslim, 32.8 per cent Serb and 4.4 per cent "other". There are numerous reports of Serbian paramilitary activity in this county.

In 9 April 1992, Zagreb Radio Croatia Network reported that all Muslims from Višegrad had left in fear that Arkan was headed for the town.
542. Between 12 and 13 April 1992, residents of Višegrad were informed by their Serbian neighbours that Šešelj’s and Arkan’s units were coming into the area to perform a mass killing. Some residents left, and their houses were ransacked and riddled with bullets. Fourteen houses were burned down, leaving only five undamaged. 210/

543. On 13 April 1992, the city of Višegrad was occupied by the Užice Corps. This group consisted of JNA soldiers, reservists, Užice territorial defence forces, and White Eagles. They brought a large amount of JNA heavy equipment with them. The JNA forces wore their traditional uniforms, while the White Eagles wore identifiable outfits, combining military and civilian clothes. Some wore hats with the kokada emblem. Upon the corps’ siege, the civilian population fled the city and was fired upon. The corps then broadcast a message instructing the residents to return to Višegrad and assuring their safety. When they returned, the village was in shambles, with many homes burned. 211/ The JNA then blocked all roads leading out of Višegrad with help from the White Eagles and Užice Corps. Soldiers at the roadblocks would take away Muslims, whose names appeared on a master list. 212/ Between 18 and 25 May, the Užice Corps left Višegrad, leaving it to fall under the control of the White Eagles, Četnik gangs and Šešelj’s forces. 213/

544. After the retreat of the Užice Corps, the killing and torturing of Muslims began. Residents could not leave the city without permission. Many Serbs were seen throwing bound Muslims into the river to drown them. In early June, many girls were taken to the hotel Vilina Vlas, interrogated, and raped. 214/ Some of the females were not returned.

545. On 13 April 1992, Momir Savić’s Četniks set fire to the villages of Repuševići, Jarci, Brezje, Šip, Bodežnik, Blaž, and Moremeslje. 215/ They harassed and arrested Muslims, defaced a mosque, destroyed Muslim property, and stole humanitarian aid. Witness testimony submitted by the Republic of BiH identified one of the men who organized “ethnic cleansing” in the Višegrad region. Apparently, once the Užice Corps left on 18 June 1992, the criminal activity of Momir Savić’s Četniks grew markedly worse. 216/

546. Then in July, civilians were evicted and convoys left the city. 217/ Some of the men on the convoy were killed and thrown into the River Drina before they arrived in Olovo. The women were taken to Olovo, then to Visoko, then to Zenica. 218/

547. According to a witness, the Popović Group led by Srpsko Popović was also involved in criminal activity in the Višegrad area during this time. 219/ On 18 June 1992, the Popović Group is claimed to have killed 22 Muslims in Višegrad under the direction of Milan Lukić. 220/ The Popović Group is also alleged to have killed Muslims at the Višegrad Electric Plant and then to have thrown the corpses in the Drina River. In addition, Popović members allegedly burned 60 civilians detained in a house and drowned others by tying them up and throwing them into the river. They are also said to have regularly looted Muslim homes. In addition, Srpsko Popović, himself, is claimed to have killed 17 civilians in one day.

548. The Višegrad Militia was also active in the area. A witness from the village of Koritnik near Višegrad stated that he narrowly escaped when the house he was being detained in was set afire by Višegrad Militia guards in June 1993. 221/ The witness stated that in June 1993, an identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, came to Koritnik and told the Muslims that they would be evicted. The next day, members of the Višegrad militia came to the village and loaded 51 civilians onto buses headed towards Višegrad. At a Serbian checkpoint on a bridge outside Višegrad, the civilians were searched and forced to give up
their money and jewelry. The prisoners were then transferred to a house where the women were kept separately for supposed "interrogations".

549. The witness goes on to describe that there were already five prisoners in the house when they arrived. At 10:30 p.m., one of the Višegrad Militia guards threw a torch into the house and fired a machine-gun into the various rooms where he and others were held. The witness escaped through a window and ran. In the field behind the house, he was again fired upon. He does not expect that anyone else survived.

550. On 18 June 1992, the paramilitary forces under Milan Lukić killed 22 Muslims on the new bridge in Višegrad. 922/ The Lukić forces are said to have killed Muslim civilians in a variety of ways: children were dropped from the bridge and then shot before they hit the water; others were killed by pulling their kidneys out while they were still alive; and still others were tied to car bumpers and dragged across the bridge and through the streets of Višegrad. The report links the actions of Lukić's forces with those of the Popović Group. 923/

551. On 22 October 1992, Milan Lukić and his men allegedly abducted 16 Sandžak Muslims from the village of Sjeverin. 924/ According to Amnesty International, eight armed and masked men boarded the bus that the Muslims were travelling on as it entered BiH at the Višegrad municipality. The men, identified as Milan Lukić's, then ordered the passengers off the bus and onto an army truck. The truck, which had no license plates, headed towards the town of Višegrad. At this time, the passengers were told that they would be exchanged for Serbs who were captured the previous night. According to the Belgrade newspaper Borba, which cites military sources in Serbia, these Muslim hostages were killed near Višegrad that same day. 925/

552. On 19 February 1993, Lukić's forces reportedly performed a similar operation, this time at the Strpci train station. 926/ Witnesses state that 19 Muslim passengers on a train at Strpci were abducted by Lukić's forces, led onto a military truck, and driven away. The present whereabouts of these Muslims are not reported.

553. Finally, these reports indicate that Lukić was briefly detained on 26 October 1992 and again in February 1993 for the kidnapping of the Muslims from the bus and from the train. 927/ Furthermore, according to the Amnesty International report, the leaders of the "Serb Republic of BiH" deny the existence of paramilitary forces in Višegrad and refer to Lukić's forces as "volunteers" fighting under the command of the Višegrad Brigade. However, according to Borba, Lukić's forces are not under the direction of the army nor the local Višegrad authorities. 928/

554. Finally, it is reported that the paramilitary forces under the command of Rajko Kušić were also involved in the kidnapping and killing of Muslims in Višegrad. 929/ It is not clear whether their actions are linked to those of the Lukić forces. In this case, a witness claims that Kušić forces under the direction of an identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, forced 49 Muslim prisoners from Višegrad onto a bus. The paramilitaries told the prisoners that they were going to be exchanged in Han Pijesak. Yet, once on the bus, the prisoners were tied up and beaten. The bus pulled off the road somewhere between Višegrad and Rogatica, and the prisoners were ordered off. Then, they were killed and piled into a pit. 930/

555. A Serbian irregular force called Commander Turtle's units is said to have worked in portions of eastern BiH, including Višegrad. 931/ This group was led by a Bosnian Serb doctor named Duško Kornjića and operated
sometime after September 1992. 232/

556. Other testimony indicates that the Serbian forces under Risto Perišić, the president of the Serbian community, were active in Višegrad. Perišić is alleged to be one of the organizers of "ethnic cleansing" in the region. 233/

43. Vitez County 234/

557. Vitez is in central BiH. The pre-war population was 27,728. Of that population, 45.7 per cent was Croat, 41.4 per cent Muslim, 7.5 per cent "other", and 5.4 per cent Serb. There are reports of both Croatian and Muslim paramilitary activity in this region.

(a) Croatian paramilitary activity

558. According to UNPROFOR personnel, the Croatian Knights paramilitary group set up a checkpoint approximately three kilometres north-west of Vitez, where they detained a convoy of trucks for several days. Although the convoy was eventually returned, the action was apparently one of many designed to agitate the Muslim population in the region. 235/ HVO officials have stated that the Knights were an independent group that did not follow official military command.

(b) Muslim paramilitary activity

559. The Muslim Armed Forces (MOS) are alleged to have looted and burned homes and to have threatened Croatian civilians in the Vitez municipality. Specifically, witnesses report MOS activity in Čajdraš, Vjetrenica Mountain, and Busovača. Many civilians are said to have been killed in the area; their bodies have most often been found burned with their homes. 236/ It is also reported that the MOS acted as local police and arrested HVO personnel earlier released by the Army of BiH. 237/

44. Vogošća County

560. Vogošća is a small county in central BiH just west of Sarajevo. There are reports that the Serbian paramilitary units under the command of Dragan Ikanović operated there.

561. A witness who was held for several weeks at the army barracks in Rajlovac reports that Ikanović and his men were responsible for the deaths of approximately 50 Muslim prisoners. He claims that Ikanović and his men loaded prisoners onto a bus and drove them from Vogošća towards a village called Srednje. At one point in the journey, the passengers were told that the bus had overheated and needed water. The guards on the bus then got off. Immediately afterward, the bus was fired upon by Serbian forces using rocket launchers, bazookas, machine-guns, and hand grenades. 238/

562. The BiH Bulletin also reports details of this incident. 239/ It states that Serb forces took 55 Muslim prisoners, some of whom were from Dobroševići, Bojnık, and Mihaljevići, on a red bus to a supposed prisoner exchange. Then an identified man was said to take the prisoners. The report does not indicate whether other forces under Joja Tintor were involved. Later, the bus was fired upon as described above. Forty-seven prisoners were killed. 240/
45. **Zenica County**

Zenica County is in central BiH. In 1991, it had a population of 145,577, of which 55.2 per cent was Muslim, 15.6 per cent Croat, 15.5 per cent Serb, 10.9 per cent "Yugoslav", and 2.9 per cent "other". Croatian and Muslim paramilitary activity has been reported in this area.

(a) **Croatian paramilitary activity**

The Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) is an organization of Croatian and Muslim forces that have acted in the Zenica region. It is estimated that of the 1,500 troops in Zenica, there are at least 800 Muslim members.

(b) **Muslim paramilitary activity**

The Zenica Hoodlums (or Green League), the Muslim Armed Forces (MOS), and the Patriotic League have all been named in connection with the attack on Zenica on 25 April 1992.

46. **Zvornik County**

Zvornik is located in eastern BiH on the Serbian border. It had a pre-war population of 81,111. Of that population, 59.4 per cent was Muslim, 38 per cent Serb, and 2.6 per cent "other". Here, there are reports of Serbian and Muslim paramilitary activity.

(a) **Serbian paramilitary activity**

In late March, Šešeljovci units arrived in the area and informed the Muslim residents that they had 10 days in which to turn in their weapons. At a party held in April at the Tezeko Hotel in Zvornik, Šešelj read the names of local Muslim intellectuals from a list to an audience partly comprised of members of Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, and White Eagles. The people on this list were to be killed.

On 7 April 1992, the predominantly Muslim village of Grbavci was surrounded on three sides by the Serbian paramilitary units of Šešelj, Arkan and the White Eagles. They took over the village’s important buildings and announced that all Muslims were to turn in their weapons. They had a list prepared by local Serbs of the names of all the Muslims in the village who owned weapons. Those on the list who did not turn in a weapon were taken away and not seen again. Shortly after they were removed, gunshots were heard in the forest outside the village.

Zvornik was attacked on 8 April 1992. Arkan’s troops reportedly led the attack. They were aided by JNA forces, Šešelj’s, and Arkan’s men. Identified perpetrators included regular JNA troops, paramilitaries, and special police. but names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. The attack began with artillery fire that continued without interruption from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.

Zvornik was shelled from all sides, but especially from a hill 12 kilometres away. On 9 April 1992, Zagreb Radio Croatian Network reported that Serbian forces had entered the centre of Zvornik and that fighting had diminished. Likewise, Sarajevo Radio reported that Serbian troops had captured the town at about midday on 9 April.
Fighting, however, reportedly continued in the suburbs, which were under heavy mortar fire. A school, a timber processing plant, a secondary school centre, and many multi-story buildings in the centre of Zvornik were hit. Hospital staff reported 10 people wounded and one killed at the time of the broadcast on 9 April. A transmitter allegedly was damaged so that citizens of Zvornik could not receive information other than one channel of Belgrade television. 954/

571. General Milutin Kukanjac, the Yugoslav Army's local commander, reportedly said in a Sarajevo radio interview that an army unit in the Zvornik area would intervene only if the town’s civil defence forces surrendered their weapons. 955/ Zvornik’s Muslim fighting force, poorly armed and coordinated, held the city for five days before retreating to a castle near Kula Grad. They conducted night attacks from the castle but had to withdraw due to lack of ammunition. Some of these forces were later arrested and imprisoned. 956/

572. During the attack on Zvornik, approximately 200 houses were burned and 76 Muslims were killed. Young males were told that they either had to join the Serbian forces, leave, or be shot. The old men, women, and children were allowed to stay. Many of the males that left reported seeing JNA tanks on the Serbian side of the Drina. 957/

573. In the Kula section of Zvornik, no advanced warning was given to turn in weapons. The men were gathered in the basement of the hospital, where the young ones were beaten in an attempt to find out information on the defending forces. Those that refused to give information were taken away and not seen again. After a few days, the others were allowed to return to their homes. 958/

574. Serbian forces positioned across the Drina in Serbia began shelling the Muslim village of Diviš, two kilometres north of Zvornik. The village was then occupied by Serbian forces, who forced the residents to turn in their weapons. The residents were subjected to regular beatings by the occupying forces, but the village was relatively calm. 959/

575. People reportedly were imprisoned, first the intellectuals, and then others as well. Various registrations were ordered, and if they were not obedience, property would be taken. Many people who had left the town earlier came back for this reason. Many of them were then taken to concentration camps, tortured, and killed. Certain villagers were forced to sign statements that they "voluntarily renounced" all of their property. 960/ At least two prison camps were established in the Zvornik suburb of Karakaj: one at the Standard Shoe Factory, holding 35 prisoners, and another at the Ekonomija, holding 600 prisoners. The prisoners at Ekonomija were reportedly beaten on a regular basis by the Sešeljovići. 961/

576. A series of killings reportedly followed the fall of Zvornik. 962/ A number of them of have been attributed to Arkan’s soldiers: 963/ Arkan’s men allegedly stopped at each house checking the identification of residents. 964/ According to a Sarajevo radio report, on 9 April elders of the Islamic community of BiH accused Arkan's units of committing crimes against the Muslims in Zvornik. The elders claimed that Muslims were subjected to a "pogrom" because of their religion. The elders' statement disclosed that there were many Muslims killed and a great number wounded. The elders appealed to legal entities of BiH, to members of the public, and to the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations for protection. 965/ Another Sarajevo radio report on the same day stated that Arkan’s units were perpetrating a “massacre” of the Muslim population of
Zvornik. The report said that six people had died that day and 15 people were injured as a result of grenades and bombs launched from 120 millimetre calibre mortars. 566/

577. A Serbian woman told US Embassy officers in Budapest that several Yugoslav army tanks, led by Arkan, had come to Zvornik on 10 April. About 30 masked irregulars belonging to a unit under Arkan conducted a house-to-house search for Bosnian Muslim men by checking identity cards. The Serbs then allegedly cut off the heads, hands, and feet of their victims. 567/

578. According to the witness who made a statement to Amnesty International, Serbian paramilitaries, who described themselves as Arkan's men, strangled six people. At about 3:00 p.m. on 10 April, a group of about 10 men arrived at the outskirts of Zvornik and rounded up residents. They were taken out into the orchard and forced to lie down. There were 15 captives in total, nine women and six men. The men were killed, and the women were locked in the cellar of a house. After three days, people from a nearby village discovered the women. About 10 days later, the survivors were driven from the site at gunpoint and made to cross into Mali Zvornik in Serbia, from where they made their way to Hungary. 568/

579. An unidentified witness states that Arkan's soldiers visited Hasim Hadžiavdić's home. The witness maintains that the soldiers interrogated Hadžiavdić and his 74 year-old neighbour about where Muslim money and guns were hidden. When the men could not or did not answer, a soldier reportedly slit Hadžiavdić's throat. The neighbour fainted, and the soldier stepped on his chest and slit his throat as well. Then, the soldiers went to the next home, that of Šehić Hakića, and demanded the same information from him and his son. The soldiers slit the throats of Hakića and his son. It is alleged that 46 people were killed by Arkan's men in one hour on this day. 569/

580. The Zvornik hospital was overrun by Serb forces during the occupation. Arkan's men stored weapons and set up headquarters there. All those at the hospital were taken hostage until the body of "Rambo", Arkan's second in command, was returned. Around 20 April, White Eagle members arrived at the hospital, harassed hostages, threatened to kill the Muslims, shot from windows, and made people stand or squat in line. 570/

581. In mid-April 1992, Serbian forces began digging pits with a bulldozer in the Muslim cemeteries south-west of Zvornik. Trucks were seen there three times a day dumping bodies. Trucks loaded with bodies were also seen frequently in Mali Zvornik at the stone quarry near the Hotel Drina. 571/ Citizens hidden in "Little Zvornik" allegedly saw the digging of mass graves at the northern entrance of the town called Kazambašća.

582. On 11 April 1992, a news report stated that UN refugee workers had reported a day earlier that 10,000 Muslim women and children had been found huddled in a single village without food or shelter. Alija Izetbegović, the Muslim President of BiH, appealed to the international community for help after claiming that Serbian guerrillas had threatened to kill 3,000 civilians trapped near Zvornik. According to the news article, a UN refugee official had reported seeing heavily armed Serbian guerrillas clearing dead bodies from the streets. A shortage of bus drivers and concern about "armed gangs" controlling the region prevented Red Cross aid workers from approaching the area at that time. 572/ Relief workers said that Arkan's forces controlled Zvornik's centre, while Yugoslav army forces were stationed around the area. 573/

583. On 14 April 1992, Sarajevo Radio reported that members of Arkan's units were looting empty houses and apartments in Zvornik and taking the goods away
on trucks. Those who had left the village and returned to recover their property were taken to camps, tortured, and killed. Others were forced to sign statements wherein they surrendered all of their property. Dead bodies were lying in the streets, private houses, and apartment buildings. Shops had been closed for eight days, and the town lacked basic foodstuffs and medicine. The report carried an appeal on behalf of citizens remaining in Zvornik for EC observers and food. The report said that more than 10,000 refugees wanted to leave for a safe place but were unable to do so. 975/

584. Arkan reportedly appeared on Serbian state-controlled television, discussing his "exploits" in Zvornik, saying that he had "liberated" the area. 976/ Apparently, Arkan had most recently said on television that he would go on vacation with his family. 977/ Another news report said that international human rights organizations had accused the Serbian Volunteer Guard under Arkan of atrocities against civilians in Croatia before the cease-fire, whose observance was marked by Arkan's vacation.

585. Civilians continued to be assailed in May. Muslims were taken to facilities around Zvornik, where they were detained and beaten severely by Serbs. Shooting began in Zvornik on 18 May, causing most Muslims to flee to other villages or the woods at the edge of the village. Some of those in the woods returned to the village, following Serb instructions. The men who returned were shot in front of their families. 978/

586. On 17 May 1992, Šešeljovci entered Divič in Zvornik County and began to loot and pillage Muslim property for nine days. 979/ On 26 May 1992, the residents of Divič were loaded onto buses supposedly headed to Olovo. Instead the buses went to Tuzla and on to Zvornik. In Zvornik, they were housed for 36 hours on the second floor of an office building, where they were given regular meals and water. 980/

587. On 29 May 1992, the 174 male residents from Divič were moved to a movie theatre in a cultural centre in Čelopek, seven kilometres north of Zvornik. The prisoners were threatened with death unless they could come up with 2,000 DM per person, which they did. Nevertheless, the prisoners were still beaten, tortured, sexually abused, and killed. 981/

588. In May 1992, Serbian forces moved into the Zvornik village of Djulići, killing 60 residents. 982/

589. Also in May, local Serbs, including a policeman, attacked Kostjerevo village. Their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Apparently, the entire population of the village was taken away to Drinjača where 35 men were beaten and killed in a hall. A dozen teenage boys were taken prisoner and led in the direction of Zvornik. Women were raped and tortured. According to the witness, on 31 May, about 150 women and children were taken in two buses in the direction of Tuzla. 983/

590. In June and July, the number of detentions increased and the beatings continued. Both the Bosnian Serb police and Šešelj's men were responsible. 984/ A former prisoner related that on 4 June, the detainees were moved to a neighbouring house with another 120 Muslims, and kept there six weeks, during which time they were repeatedly beaten. Men from Šešelj's unit carved crosses into the heads of 10 Muslim prisoners. Bosnian Serb police tightened wires around other prisoners' necks. On 15 July, the prisoners were taken to a detention camp in Batkovic, where they were beaten regularly with sticks. The witness was finally released as part of a prisoner exchange. 985/
591. On 26 June 1992, Muslim men, women, and children were rounded up by what were believed to be Šešelj's men, as well as White Eagles. They were taken to the centre of town where they were put onto trucks that took them to Loznica. In Loznica, they boarded a train that took them to Subotica. After spending several days on the train in Subotica, the Muslims were moved to a campsite at Palić, where they were issued Yugoslav passports stamped by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Then they were taken in groups to the Hungarian border and accepted as refugees.

592. Charles Lane wrote in *The New Republic* in July 1992 that he, along with about eight carloads of Sarajevo-bound journalists, passed through Zvornik. He wrote that Zvornik had been the scene of numerous alleged atrocities against Muslims and perpetrated by paramilitary Serbian bands such as those of Arkan. Lane wrote that Arkan's name was daubed in black paint on the walls of burned-out homes and businesses in the town. He and the other journalists arrived shortly after midday. The Serb gunmen manning the local checkpoint "were drunk, mad, and in a mood to poke us with their automatic weapons". A policeman intervened, informing the journalists that "a battle" was going on up ahead which made the way dangerous. The journalists waited as a Serb paramilitary officer dressed in a camouflage tunic and riding breeches drove up in a Mercedes and waved an AK-47 at them. Reportedly the paramilitary officer said in "precise English", "If you take a single picture between here and Sarajevo, I will personally kill you".

593. Within moments, three buses passed through the checkpoint. Each bus contained Muslim men, their heads bowed and touching the seats in front of them, and their hands behind their necks. Lane caught a glimpse of one man's "fearful" eyes through the window.

594. According to a US Government report, Radoja Nikolić allegedly led Serbian paramilitary groups in Grbavci near Zvornik and an identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, served as chief of the Serbian Guard in Karakaj.

(b) Muslim paramilitary activity

595. Quoting Tanjug, the Democratic League of Košev reports that in the second week of October 1992, a unit of Muslim fighters called the Mosque Doves attacked the villages of Pantić and Milošević which are about 20 kilometres from Zvornik. There are only approximations of the number of people killed since Tanjug was inconsistent in its reports on these attacks. On 12 October, it reported that 50 villagers, mainly the elderly, were killed. Then, the next day, they reported that 13 civilians and 23 members of the Serb forces were killed. The Mosque Doves were said to use "rifles from Hungary and Arabic countries" and included Muslims and some Croatians from the Zvornik area.

B. Croatia

1. Beli Manastir County

596. This county is located in north-eastern Croatia, bordered by Serbia to the east. According to the 1991 census, Beli Manastir had a population of 54,160, of which 25.5 per cent was Serbian, 41.7 per cent Croatian, 16.5 per cent Hungarian, 7.9 per cent "Yugoslavs", and 8.4 per cent "other".

597. In August of 1991, 260 Croat citizens of the Baranja area were killed by local Serbs and Šešelj's soldiers. Marko Kvesić, representative of the
Government of the Republic of Croatia for the Beli Manastir District, stated that the Croatians of Baranja were ordered to leave their homes, and that those who refused to do so were shot. Explosions were set off, property was taken, and people were beaten. Those fleeing the village into Hungary were seen with broken limbs and disfigured faces.  

Furthermore, the Serbian paramilitary group, Martić's Militia, led by Milan Martić, was alleged to have been conducting paramilitary operations in Beli Manastir and to have organized camps and prisons in the county. In these camps, captured civilians and members of the Croatian Army were severely mistreated and/or killed.

2. Benkovac County

Benkovac County is located in west-central Croatia. The pre-war population was 33,079. The ethnic breakdown of the population was 57.4 per cent Serbian, 40.6 per cent Croatian, and 2 per cent "other".

On 21 December 1991, a paramilitary group under the leadership of Bogdan Gagić allegedly killed nine Croatians and one Serbian in the village of Bruška in Benkovac. Other inhabitants were reported to have been tortured or evicted. Although the report indicates that Gagić's group had 31 members it does not identify them nor does it provide any information as to the ethnicity of its members.

In February 1993, the town of Benkovac in Benkovac County was reported to be under the complete control of Arkan. No details as to how this was accomplished were reported.

3. Daruvar County

This county is located in north-central Croatia with a pre-war population of 29,978. Of this population 33.2 per cent was Serbian, 34.3 per cent Croatian, 27 per cent "other", and 5.5 per cent described as "Yugoslav".

In June 1991, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for Slavonia and Baranja allegedly formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade for the area of Daruvar, Grubišno Polje, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina and Slavonska Požega. One formation of the brigade was the Unit of Daruvar, headquartered in Bijela. They also formed the Police of SAO Krajina and West Slavonia.

The Unit of Daruvar and members of their police units allegedly participated in a number of attacks and incidents, often in concert with the JNA and other "Četnik" forces. On 19 and 20 June 1991, five policemen were killed and five wounded during two separate attacks by members of the Unit of Daruvar. On 21 August 1991, the Unit of Daruvar began shelling Daruvar. The report indicated that the shelling of various villages within this county continued through 12 November 1991.

4. Dvor County

Dvor County is located in south-central Croatia with BiH at its southern border. According to the 1991 census, the population was 14,636, of which 85.6 per cent was Serbian, 9.5 per cent Croatian, and 4.9 per cent "other".

According to the Croatian Information Centre, a Serbian paramilitary
group from Dvor na Uni, attacked two nearby villages, Kozibrod and Struga on 26 July 1991. The attack began at 10:30 a.m. and lasted until 9:00 p.m. that night. Allegedly, the attackers used civilians from the two villages as shields as they advanced on the Croat police station at Kozibrod. Once in control of the police facilities, the paramilitaries killed seven civilians and eight policemen. The report also lists eight civilians as seriously wounded by gunfire. 1000/

5. Glina County 1001/

607. This county is located in central Croatia, with Zagreb to the north and BiH to the south. The pre-war population was 22,997, of which 60.5 per cent were Serbian, 35 per cent Croatian, and 4.5 per cent "other".

608. Martić’s Militia allegedly organized camps and prisons in Glina. In these camps, captured civilians and members of the Croatian Army were allegedly severely mistreated and killed. 1002/

609. According to a report from the Republic of Croatia, 22 Croatians, mostly elderly, were killed in the Glina village of Glinska Joševica on 16 December 1993 by a special Serbian Territorial Defence unit, the Visors, led by an identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Victims were killed in their homes with small-bore, silencer-equipped guns. The Croatian report claims that the attack was initiated by Serbian authorities in Glina to revenge the death of 19 members of Territorial Defence units killed in battle with the Croatian Army. 1003/

6. Gračac County

610. Gračac County is located in the central coastal area of Croatia. According to the 1991 census, its population was 11,060. The ethnic make up of this population was 82.3 per cent Serbian and 17.7 per cent Croatian.

611. On 20 July 1991, about 10 members of the Serbian group the Velebit Unit allegedly carried out a mortar attack on Lovinac, killing one local woman. According to the report of the Republic of Croatia, they attacked the village again on 5 August 1991. One civilian was killed, and one reserve policeman and another civilian wounded. The perpetrators also caused significant property damage. On that same day, the members of the Velebit Unit took five villagers from their homes and killed them about 2 kilometres from Lovinac in the direction of Raduča. 1004/

7. Grubišno Polje County 1005/

612. This county is located in the central region of northern Croatia. Its pre-war population was 14,186, of which 32.1 per cent was Serbian, 42.3 per cent Croatian, 4.5 per cent "Yugoslav", and 21.1 per cent "other". There are reports of both Serbian and Croatian paramilitary activity in this county.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

613. In June 1991, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for Slavonia and Baranja formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade for the area of Grubišno Polje, Daruvar, Pakrac, Virovitica, Podravska Slatina, and Slavonska Požega. The Bilogora Unit was formed as part of this brigade and allegedly
took part in several attacks, in concert with the JNA throughout August, September, and October 1991. These attacks resulted in several casualties and mistreatment of the non-Serbian population.

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

614. According to witness testimonies reported by the Serbian Council Information Centre, the Croatian paramilitary group, the Black Shirts from Virovitica, arrived in Grubišno Polje on 13 August 1991, and proceeded to arrest and kill civilians, destroy property, and steal the villagers’ money.

615. The Black Shirts allegedly began their activities in the area by blocking roads, setting up check-points, and taking over police duties. They arrested, according to a previously compiled list, 124 people and held them in the Grubišno Polje Hotel. Twenty well-respected men in the community, who were on the previously mentioned list, were later found dead. The Black Shirts are reportedly led by an identified man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

8. Knin County

616. Knin County is located in the central, southern region of Croatia with BiH on its eastern border. According to the 1991 census, its population was 42,337, with 88.6 per cent Serb, 8.6 per cent Croat and 2.8 per cent "other".

617. In January of 1993, Petar Pašić, Commissioner of the Croatian Government for the Knin municipality, requested that UNPROFOR do everything possible to protect the Croats who had chosen to remain in Knin, 800 of them in all. Refugees had been pouring into Knin from Benkovac and Obrovac, and Pašić described that because local troops had organized under the command of "Captain Dragan" and Četnik formations and units of Arkan and Šešelj had arrived in the region, life was rendered "unbearable and impossible". The report notes that refugees were forcibly moved into Croatian homes, and that Croats were being taken to concentration camps and killed.

618. Serbian paramilitary forces led by Milan Martić are also alleged to have operated in and around Knin. Milan Martić is Minister of the Interior for the Republic of Serbian Krajina and, according to reports, he trained forces called the Martićevci for operations in Croatia and gave commands from offices stationed in Knin.

9. Krajina

619. A cease-fire between Croat and Serb forces broke down during the third week of January 1993, when Croat troops launched an offensive in and around Krajina. This act, along with reports of Croat soldiers committing atrocities upon Serbian civilians, prompted hundreds of Serbians to volunteer their services in the fight against the Croats. In addition to the independent Serb volunteers traveling to the front lines, militiamen belonging to Šešelj and Arkan had already arrived in Krajina and had seen action. In an interview, Šešelj stated, "We will not allow Croats, who killed one millions Serbs, to gain Serbian territory". Šešelj also bragged that his men were responsible for killing 12 Croatian policemen in a 2 May ambush in north-eastern Croatia. In all, close to 4,000 of Šešelj's and Arkan's men were said to have reinforced the Serb volunteers fighting in Krajina.
10. Metković County

620. This county is located north of Dubrovnik in southern Croatia with BiH on its eastern border. According to the 1991 census, the population was 22,774, of which 3.1 per cent was Serb, 93.7 per cent Croat, and 3.2 per cent "other".

621. Paramilitary units of the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) allegedly ran detention facilities for Serbian civilians at sites along the Dalmatian coast including one in Metković. Allegedly, these facilities contained civilians taken from the Čapljina municipality of BiH.

11. Nova Gradiška County

622. Nova Gradiška County is located in central Croatia along the northern border of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 60,461 of which 20.8 per cent was Serb, 71.5 per cent Croat, 3 per cent "Yugoslav", and 4.5 per cent "other".

623. Serbian paramilitary forces commanded by Milan Martić allegedly operated at Stara Gradiška, a village in Nova Gradiška on the Sava river.

12. Osijek County

624. Osijek County is located in eastern Croatia, just north of Vukovar County. As of 1991, it had a population of 164,577. The ethnic breakdown of the population was 20 per cent Serb, 66.6 per cent Croat, 8.4 per cent "other", and 5 per cent "Yugoslav". There were reports of both Serbian and Croatian paramilitary activity in this county.

(a) Serbian paramilitary activity

625. On 15 February 1991, Arkan's police entered the village of Šodolovci and invaded the homes of several Croatian residents. Eight of the civilians were abducted and taken to a home, and then to another home in Koprivna. They spent two nights there, during which time they were questioned, humiliated, and mistreated. On 17 February, 15 additional residents arrived. The next morning all 23 were loaded onto a truck and driven to the centre of Paulin Dvor. The residents were positioned into line-formation, and one resident was given a white flag. They were then ordered to walk over minefields towards Hrastin. 1015/

626. A 29 November 1991 news report said that the Serbian-led Yugoslav People's Army had conquered one-third of Croatia and had turned the territory over to Serb leaders, who had declared the area a new autonomous Serbian province. At the village of Erdut on the Danube River, temporary regional capital of the purported province, Arkan reportedly made clear that his irregular forces would never be replaced by U.N. troops. Arkan is alleged to have said, "United Nations forces are welcome in Croatia, but they should be sent to Zagreb. They aren't needed here." According to the report, like most Serbian fighters, Arkan and his Tigers did not consider the occupied regions to be part of Croatia. Therefore, they thought them exempt from a U.N. condition that all areas of conflict in Croatia be demilitarized. 1016/

A contemporaneous report states that Arkan, in the Serb-held village of Erdut, 12 miles from Osijek, said, "It would be better for the Croats to surrender Osijek without a fight, if they do not want a repeat of their defeat in Vukovar". 1017/
627. A December 1991 report states that Arkan and his troops held the town of Erdut. According to the report, Arkan said, "Next we are going to liberate Osijek, and then we are going to liberate Zagreb... We don't care about borders... We will respect the U.N. solution, but the U.N. must count all Serbs as one people. What I really want is for Serbian people to live in one state covering every place Serbs live now." At this time, Arkan was reportedly nursing "a bullet wound in his hand from the Serb-won battles for Vukovar and Borovo Naselje". 1018 /

628. On 23 June 1992, between 25 and 30 people were killed in the village of Ernestinovo, reportedly by Arkan supporters, the JNA and "Cetniks". Ten of the victims were Croatian soldiers, and there were indications that they were killed in combat. All of the bodies were buried in a mass grave, alongside the bodies of farm animals, in an Ernestinovo park between June and November of 1992. There is a possible second mass grave which also contains farm animals. 1019 /

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity 629. According to US Government reports, paramilitary forces under Commander Glavaš were responsible for criminal acts designed to intimidate the Serbian population in Osijek. Glavaš himself is alleged to have killed many civilians there and one Croat fighter from the region was reportedly captured wearing a necklace made from the fingers of young children. 1020 /

13. Pakrac County 1021 /

630. This county is located in UNPA Sector West. The 1991 census listed Pakrac County's population as 27,288, of which 46.4 per cent was Serb, 36 per cent Croat, 4.8 per cent "Yugoslav" and 12.8 per cent "other".

631. According to a report from the Republic of Croatia, on 19 August 1991, 39 members of the Serbian paramilitary units, called the XII Slavonian Shock brigade, attacked Pakrac. Croatian civilians were killed, evicted, or imprisoned at a camp in Bučje, and Croatian property in Pakrac was stolen or destroyed. The XII Slavonian Shock brigade was allegedly formed by the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party and included troops from the Unit of Daruvar and the Bilogorski Odred paramilitary units. 1022 /

632. Croatian civilians in the village of Prekopakra were reportedly attacked by units of the XII Slavonian Shock brigade on 19 August 1991. An unspecified number of Croatian civilians was killed, evicted, or imprisoned at a camp in Bučje. Also, Croatian property in Prekopakra was allegedly stolen or destroyed. 1023 /

633. The Serbian paramilitary group Martić's Militia allegedly organized camps and prisons in the village of Bučje, Pakrac county. In these camps, captured civilians and members of the Croatian Army were allegedly severely mistreated and/or killed. No further details were given in the report. 1024 /

14. Petrinja County 1025 /

634. Petrinja County is located in central Croatia, with a population of 35,622. This population was 44.9 per cent Serb, 44.2 per cent Croat, 5.1 per cent "Yugoslav" and 5.8 per cent "other".
635. In September 1990, Serbs from Petrinja and surrounding villages reportedly attacked the police station in Petrinja. It is alleged that they demanded the surrender of arms belonging to the Croatian Police Reserve. The Croatian Ministry of the Interior organized a transfer of arms in the direction of Sisak, but the Serbs reportedly stopped it at Mošćenica and returned it to Petrinja. 1026/

636. The tension in Petrinja increased and reached a peak in 1991. As early as June 1991, Serbs from the villages surrounding Petrinja, helped by Arkan’s and Šešelj’s men and units of the former Yugoslav army, attacked the Croatian Ministry of the Interior police station in the village of Kraljevčani. The policemen withdrew to Petrinja.

637. Mass killings of civilian villagers allegedly followed in July 1991. A witness reported that frequent explosions at night were targeted at, among others, Serbs who remained loyal to the Croatian authorities.

638. By 23 September 1991, all the defenders had left the city.

15. Podravska Slatina County 1027/

639. Podravska Slatina County is located in north-eastern Croatia, on the Hungarian border. The county had a population of 31,155 in 1991, of which 35.8 per cent was Serb, 57.2 per cent Croat, 3.5 per cent "Yugoslav" and 3.5 per cent "other".

640. During June 1990, the Serbian Democratic Party was established in Podravska Slatina. On 19 August 1991, paramilitary troops under the command of Borivoje Lukić and Borivoje Radosavljević occupied the police station at Voćin. 1028/ In December 1991, 42 Voćin Croats were killed by Serbian paramilitary forces, including local Serbs, White Eagles, and "Četniks". Many of the corpses were severely burned. Twenty other Croats from nearby villages were also reportedly killed. The Roman Catholic church was blown up and many of the houses in Voćin were destroyed. 1029/

641. On 4 September 1991, Šešeljovci and White Eagles allegedly attacked the villages of Voćin, Četkovac, Balinci, and Čoljug killing 44 residents. Some of those killed were said to have been tortured. 1030/

642. During the months of October to December 1991, units of the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade also attacked villages in Podravska Slatina. They used mortars, tank grenades, and rocket launchers in the attacks. 1031/

16. Sisak County 1032/

643. This county is located in central Croatia, south-east of Zagreb. The pre-war population was 84,247, of which 22.8 per cent was Serb, 64.5 per cent Croat, 3.1 per cent Muslim, 4.4 per cent "Yugoslav" and 5.2 per cent "other".

644. A report, sent from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Commission of Experts, alleges that, during the first half of 1991, a paramilitary unit called the Hawks destroyed a slaughterhouse and four shops belonging to Serbian residents in Sisak. The Hawks were reportedly linked to the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 1033/
17. **Slavonska Požega County**

645. This county is located in the central eastern region of Croatia. As of 1991, its population was 71,299, of which 14 per cent was Serbian, 79.4 per cent Croatian and 6.6 per cent "other".

646. After June 1991, the Bilogorski Odred participated in attacks in Slavonska Požega, along with other units of the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade and the JNA. Allegedly, the JNA and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for Slavonia and Baranja formed the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade for operations in Slavonia, including Slavonska Požega county. However, reports submitted to the Commission of Experts are not specific regarding paramilitary activity there. 1034/

18. **Split County**

647. Split County is located on the southern coast of Croatia. Its population, according to the 1991 census, was 206,612. The ethnic mix in Split was 4.2 per cent Serb, 87.3 per cent Croat, 8.5 per cent "other".

648. Before being disbanded in August 1992, members of the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS) ran the Lora camp in Split for Bosnian Serb prisoners captured in Čapljina County in south-west BiH. 1036/

19. **Titova Korenica County**

649. This county is located in southern Croatia. The pre-war population was 11,307, of which 75.8 per cent was Serb, 16.8 per cent Croat, 3.5 per cent "Yugoslav", and 3.9 per cent "other".

650. Serbian paramilitary forces commanded by Milan Martić also are alleged to operate in Titova Korenica County.

20. **Virovitica County**

651. This county is located in northern Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the county's population was 46,498. This population was 15.7 per cent Serb, 76.8 per cent Croat, and 7.5 per cent "other".

652. Virovitica is one of several Slavonian counties where the XII Slavonian Shock Brigade operated after June 1991. The Brigade launched infantry and mortar attacks and took prisoners throughout Slavonia, including Virovitica County.

21. **Vukovar County**

653. Vukovar County is in eastern Croatia, separated from Serbia by the Danube River. According to the 1991 census, the population of Vukovar County was 84,024, of which 37.4 per cent was Serb, 43.7 per cent Croat, 7.4 per cent "Yugoslav", and 11.6 per cent "other". There are reports of both Serbian and Croatian paramilitary activity in Vukovar County.

(a) **Serbian paramilitary activity**

654. On 1 April 1991, in the town of Borovo in Vukovar County, six weeks
before Croatian Stipe Mesić was to become the president of the collective head of state, some of Šešelj’s troops moved into the village of Borovo. 1039/ The “Četniks” had been sent to the region to protect the minority Serbs from the increasingly nationalistic Croatians. 1040/ The “Četniks” allegedly surrounded two police patrols, injuring five, one critically. 1041/ Barricades and armed sentries were established at various locations in the region, but reports suggest that they were mainly staffed by Serbs from the neighbouring communities of Vukovar and Vinkovci. 1042/ Šešelj, however, had personally visited Vukovar the night of 31 March. 1043/ The “Četniks” remained in the region and the JNA remained silent and made no attempt to disarm them. 1044/

655. Šešelj returned to the region on 21 April 1991 to give a speech in the village of Jagodnjak. 1045/ The speech prompted the district public prosecutor’s office to issue a warrant for Šešelj’s arrest on 7 May for provoking and fomenting national hatred and intolerance between Croatians and Serbs. 1046/

656. On 8 May 1991, a gun-fight broke out in the region between police in the village of Borovo Selo and 14 members of the “Četniks” accompanied by two members of the Serbian Renaissance Movement, and six local Serbs. 1047/ The shooting began as a result of an alleged ambush of the police by the “Četniks”, in which 12 police were killed and at least one had his eyes extracted. 1048/

657. Šešelj publicly acknowledged that his Četniks killed the 12 Borovo Selo police, but insisted that the altercation resulted after an attack by members of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and was an alleged ambush. 1049/ Šešelj confirmed that the eyes of one policeman were missing and attributed it to the strong impact of the bullet from the Thompson automatic sub-machine-gun to the head of the victim. 1050/

658. The names of the 12 or 13 police that were killed were not disclosed in the reports, nor were the names of the witnesses. According to a Newsday report, the deputy commander of the Četnik operation was 23 year-old Oliver Denis Barret. 1051/ A Los Angeles Times report did name Vladimir Mrklja, a 21 year-old unemployed Serbian, as one of the “Četniks” involved in the incident. 1052/

659. The battle over Vukovar raged in the summer and fall months of 1991. A report quoted Arkan, while in battle over Serb-populated areas of Croatia, as saying, “We have to free our children and our women which are holding [sic] as hostages there”. 1053/

660. On 14 October 1991, Serbian irregulars and members of the JNA entered the village of Bapska. In the first few days of occupation, 70 Croatian houses were burned and 18 Croatian civilians killed. In November 1991, Arkan’s troops arrived and the assaults against the Croatians increased. 1054/

661. A Yugoslav army internal memorandum, signed by Colonel Milan Eremija a month before the fall of Vukovar and sent to the army’s regional command office, identified two militia groups in the Vukovar region as dangerous to “military morale”. One was a band led by Arkan and the other, the Četniks led by Šešelj. The memorandum said that there were many paramilitary formations from Serbia and self-proclaimed volunteers, whose primary motive was not fighting against the enemy but robbery of private property and inhuman treatment of Croatian citizens. The memorandum reportedly recommended that all paramilitary groups in the area be disarmed. 1055/
662. In November of 1991, Serb militia forces devastated the city of Vukovar. According to a New York Times report, during the final days of the Vukovar battle, Western reporters saw Serbian soldiers pulling men in civilian clothes from columns of refugees and shooting them on the spot. Women, children and the elderly were among the victims. In late November 1991, the last defenders of Vukovar, which had been predominantly Croatian, hid in cellars with their families to escape the shelling. Reportedly, those who had refused to surrender when the army took the city's centre were blasted when guerrillas lobbed grenades to flush out each basement. Reports describe that on 19 November 1991, Serbian paramilitary units under the command of Vlado Kovačević took Vukovar civilians from their basements to the Pekara bakery, where they were reportedly killed with knives and burned in a baker's oven.

663. According to several witness testimonies, Sešelj himself was in Vukovar on 19 November 1991. He allegedly paid each of his troops 23,000 dinars. He gave the instruction, "Surrender and stab to death." About 960 persons were allegedly stabbed to death that day.

664. On 19 November 1991, having heard a report that hundreds of wounded Croats, many with gangrene, were hiding in the hospital basement without medicine or electricity, U.N. peace envoy Cyrus Vance and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) representatives reportedly demanded access to the hospital in Vukovar. The field commander of the Serb-led Yugoslav army, which had captured the city, did not permit access. The commander reportedly said that the hospital was mined, and he could not guarantee their safety.

665. Concurrent with the Vance/ICRC visit, Yugoslav Army soldiers and Serb paramilitaries put Vukovar hospital patients and medical personnel on several buses to Ovčara and frequently beat and mistreated the prisoners during the journey. Along the way, the buses stopped at the JNA barracks where the prisoners were again beaten. Upon their arrival at Ovčara, the prisoners were stripped of their belongings and further beaten. One witness stated that at least two men were beaten to death. On 20 November, the Yugoslav army soldiers divided the prisoners into groups of 20 and loaded each group onto a truck to be driven away. Fifteen minutes later the truck would return, empty and ready to take on another group of prisoners. A witness said that many of the Serb paramilitaries spoke openly of the shootings. One gunman reportedly said: "Since five in the afternoon to one in the morning, we were killing them in Ovčara". According to the 29 November 1991 edition of the Croatian magazine Globus, a Serbian soldier who introduced himself as one of Arkan's men told a reporter who visited Vukovar one day after it fell: "We summarily executed 300 prisoners. We have a people's court here, you shoot and that's it." Names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

666. Several witnesses related that several factions were involved in the imprisonment and eventual mass killing of the Croats from Vukovar Hospital: the White Eagles, the Serbian Volunteer Guard (led by Arkan), the Četniks (led by Sešelj), the first company of the territorial defence unit of Vukovar, and other Yugoslav army regulars. The SAO Krajina Police (possibly Martić's Militia) were also mentioned. A witness mentioned several individuals as perpetrators of the detention, beating, and killing of between 200 to 300 Croats. The witness identified six of the men who beat the prisoners while they waited at the JNA barracks to be transported to Ovčara. However, their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. The witness identified the officer who directed the Vukovar hospital evacuation and named four others. Names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.
In the fall of 1992, international forensic experts discovered a shallow mass grave about six miles south-east of Vukovar. The scientists found the mass grave by following detailed map information provided by a Vukovar hospital patient, who said he escaped from a truck full of prisoners by jumping out. At the mass grave, the scientists saw hundreds of bullet holes in nearby saplings and mounds of metal casings from spent machine-gun bullets. The experts reportedly concluded that the grave was the site of a machine-gun execution of about 200 people. They found an area of disturbed earth and, within minutes, skeletons. Reportedly the area looked as if a bulldozer had shoveled out a trench. Scientists had a list of 180 missing patients and 30 staff members who were in the hospital when Vukovar fell as well as hospital records showing what wounds the patients had when they were admitted to the hospital.

Clyde Snow, an American forensic anthropologist who headed the team investigating the Vukovar case, said in a January 1993 interview that evidence found at the mass grave was consistent with witnesses' testimony of how Croatian patients were taken from the hospital by Serb combatants. Snow indicated that the artifacts found on the bodies were Croatian, and that the bodies were suspiciously close to where witnesses said they would be. According to Snow, Roman Catholic crosses and rosary beads found on two bodies exhumed at the site suggested that the dead were Croats. Of the two bodies examined thus far, both had gunshot wounds to the head. Snow's team, organized by a US-based group called Physicians for Human Rights, released a report in January 1993.

Sešelj and his men were also said to have been at Velepromet, the holding facility for civilians who were eventually taken to other prison camps. This report stated that with help from local Četniks, 250 persons were stripped and killed with a knife. The bodies were stacked one upon another, face down. Croatians were forced to bury the bodies at an old brickyard at Sajmište. From there, the corpses were transported to Grabovo and thrown into a hole.

As a result of the fighting in Vukovar, 1,798 people are known to have died and 2,500 are missing on the Croatian side. The Serbian side has not released casualty figures. Another report puts the death toll at 5,000. Slavko Dokmanovic, the Serb-installed president of Vukovar's city council, said that about 5,000 people had died in the fight but did not indicate how he calculated the figure.

The city of Vukovar sustained massive destruction: every tree was reduced to splinters; every vehicle perforated; every roof torn off; not a single home habitable; no shop, church, or public building intact; and a rubber factory which had provided 60,000 jobs was in shambles. A report said that the stench of rotting flesh emanated from under the piles of rubble. In September 1992, a reporter observed in residential neighbourhoods, reportedly with no strategic value, that every single home had been gutted by grenades, tank fire, and machine-gun salvos, every window broken, and every roof blown off. Some homes had Orthodox Serbian cross painted on ruined walls, others the Catholic cross of Croatia, symbols reportedly intended to protect the homes from respective opposing armies.

According to a San Francisco Chronicle report, Arkan's troops were responsible for much of the destruction in the Croatian neighbourhoods. Another report attributed the wreckage to the work of Yugoslav federal forces, and quoted Arkan as saying that the destruction of Croatian "fascists" had been necessary in order to protect against "genocide." Shortly after the fall of Vukovar, Arkan
reportedly said that his forces were under the direct command of the Yugoslav armed forces. A news article claims that he told reporters in Erdut that Osijek would fall more easily than Vukovar. 

By the end of November 1991, Vukovar was named the capital of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and West Srem. After surveying the ruins of Vukovar, Belgrade, Mayor Milorad Unković vowed to rebuild the city as a monument to Serbian determination. Unković told a handful of unshaven, middle-aged guerrillas, "To rebuild this town is the humane thing to do. It's something that has to be done for the people who lived here and wish to remain." These guerrillas, who had stopped looting to join the Belgrade delegation, wore Serbian nationalist insignia.

Serb paramilitary groups also allegedly operated in Lovas and Borovo, two villages within Vukovar county. Arkan himself was once in Borovo, at which time he personally killed a village resident in front of witnesses.

The attack on Lovas began on 10 October 1991. During the first few days of the attack, "Četniks" allegedly killed over 70 persons and burned over 50 houses. The report identified the "Četnik units" as those of Dušan Silni and the White Eagles.

On 22 December 1991, a resident of Lovas was taken from his house with another civilian to the town police station, where Arkan's units were located, along with White Eagles and Knindia's units. The citizens were beaten, kicked, and abused. They were then taken to a garage with other villagers, and three of them were crucified and made to sing Croatian songs. Eventually all of the villagers were released.

In addition, an Amnesty International Report from March 1992 refers to numerous summary executions of civilians in the Lovas area. These executions were carried out by several different paramilitary groups, including the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), Dušan Silni (Dušan the Great), Arkan's and Šešelj's men, Jovićevci and Martićevci. Specifically, the report notes that on an unspecified date, 51 Croatian civilians were killed by Serb irregulars, and an additional 17 civilians were forced to hold hands and enter a minefield. Many of them were seriously wounded in the subsequent explosions.

Serb paramilitary forces were also active in Tovarnik, a town south-east of Vukovar city, on the border separating Croatia from Serbia. According to reports, on 7 September 1991, Dušan Silni forces killed a Catholic priest and set homes on fire there. Reports also describe how, between 27 and 30 September 1991, a Serbian paramilitary unit called Drago's Group raped two 14 year-old girls in front of their grandmother and killed approximately 80 people.

In Borovo Naselje, a local paramilitary unit allegedly detained civilians and transported them to a prison camp at Stajićevo in Serbia. A witness stated that during the ride to the prison camp, members of the paramilitary unit beat the prisoners. The same witness stated that the Stajićevo prison camp held 6,500 people from Vukovar County and that many women were detained there.

(b) Croatian paramilitary activity

Allegedly, Mile Dedaković, alias "Jastreb", commanded Croatian paramilitaries in Vukovar who killed and tortured civilians.
22. Zadar County

This county is located on the western coast of Croatia. Its population in 1991 was 134,881, of which 10.5 per cent was Serb, 83.4 per cent Croat and 6.1 per cent "other".

The Belgrade news agency, Tanjug, reported that the Italian mercenary unit trained by Serbian commander Captain Dragana carried out reconnaissance and sabotage missions along combat lines in the Velebit mountains, north of Zadar.

On 18 November 1991, Serbian paramilitaries, belonging to Shešelj, reportedly attacked the civilian population of Škabrnja in the county of Zadar using tank and infantry units, and killing 16 civilians.

C. Serbia

1. Hrtkovci

The activities of Shešelj’s men in Hrtkovci began in early May of 1992, when Shešelj delivered a speech on 6 May stating that all Croats and Hungarians who had been disloyal in the last year’s war would have to leave the town. One of his followers had a list which contained the names of 17 residents who were selected as the first group to leave. At the time, 70 per cent of the 3,000 person population was Croat. The first 17 left, but other lists followed. As of August of 1992, only 400 Croats remained in the village. Those who chose to stay were forced to endure threatening letters, beatings, and attacks on their homes. Streets were renamed after Serb historical figures. The Šešelj party even devised a slogan for its campaign to rid the area of Croats: "All Croats Out Of Hrtkovci".

Gangs of Serbs have forced Croats out of their homes, at times giving them mere days or hours to vacate their premises. Residents complained to the local police, but the police said that lacked authorization to act. Several people have been killed. Many citizens traveled to Belgrade in August of 1992 to protest the mistreatment of the Croats in Hrtkovci.

2. Kosovo

The province of Kosovo, which is 90 per cent Albanian, has been the site of much tension between Serb forces and the Albanian civilian population. Serbs began their attempts to influence the Albanians’ lives, both culturally and politically, in 1992 by closing colleges, dismissing 100,000 Albanian workers and replacing them with Serbs, and arming massive numbers of Serbs who live in the province. President of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, reported that he possessed secret information that paramilitary groups led by Arkan and Šešelj were already present in Kosovo in 1992. Shots were fired at Albanian civilians and their houses. In December 1992, Arkan was elected to the Serbian parliament to represent Kosovo, and he established his headquarters in a Priština hotel. Šešelj called for the expulsion of 360,000 Kosovo Muslims in January of 1993, adding yet another cultural group to the conflict in that province. Priština, the capital of Kosovo, was selected by Šešelj in May of 1993 as the site for an anti-Albanian rally. This rally was planned in response to a strike by 1,500 journalists and other employees of the Rilindia newspaper.

By June 1993, Serb police were noted to "control everything and
constantly terrorize the Albanian Kosovars. Belgrade had issued orders to "shoot to kill", and 25 innocent Albanians had already been shot at point-blank range. In all, 40,000 Serb military and 25,000 Serb policemen, as well as large numbers of the Serbian civilian population, were heavily armed. Thousands of Serb refugees from BiH and Croatia were purposefully resettled in Kosovo to weaken the huge Albanian majority in the province. Two Serb policemen were murdered in June, reportedly under Šešelj's order so that he could blame the murders on the Albanians and fan the flames of an already tense situation. President Rugova hypothesized that Serb aggression in the area might provoke a wave of Albanian radicalism, whereby Šešelj's followers might supply arms to radical Albanian groups to provoke incidents against the civilian population.

688. Although no longer Kosovo's representative in Parliament, Arkan was recently quoted as saying: "We are going to deport Rugova and open the border to (send back) all the emigrants from Albania. Over 700,000 Albanians must be sent back...Only those loyal citizens of Serbia will stay here."

3. Pljevlja

689. Six of Šešelj's followers were arrested for alleged involvement in acts of terrorism in the predominantly Muslim town of Pljevlja on 6 and 7 August 1992. The group was also charged with violent behaviour, interference with the work of the police, and aiding in the escape of arrested persons for incidents occurring on 8 and 9 August 1992.

4. Sandžak

690. Sandžak, the border area between Serbia and BiH, which is largely dominated by Muslims, was the locale for a wave of arson, kidnapping, and killing by Serb forces against the Muslim population. Allegedly, these acts were committed to distance Serbian Muslims from their ties with Bosnian Muslims. In March of 1993, 18 Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro were abducted from a train and remain missing. Other Muslims have been kidnapped from hospitals and villages. Beatings of civilians and the looting and burning of homes occurred in indeterminate numbers. A total of 9,500 people have fled from Sandžak and other Muslim districts in Serbia and Montenegro. Muslim party leaders charge that the attacks are another example of Serbian "ethnic cleansing", noting that Šešelj himself had previously called for the "cleansing" of Muslims from the Sandžak region.

5. Vojvodina

691. In the Vojvodina city of Sombor in late December 1991 and early January 1992, explosives damaged a Croatian church, two Croatian restaurants, and the home of a prominent Croatian political leader. Arkan announced these bombings on the local radio. The Croatians have been told that they must leave the city by a certain date or be killed.

692. In May 1992, Vojvodina Muslims and Croatians, as well as Hungarians, fled their homes in fear of Šešelj's men. Šešelj's forces were reportedly threatening the villagers of Vojvodina during June 1992. Witnesses claim that the men told the villagers that they would not leave Vojvodina alive because Šešelj's forces would kill them all. At night the forces were heard chanting, "Move out, Ustaša, today is your last day, we will slaughter all of you tomorrow". The exact number of departures is unknown. Serbia denies that the refugees were forced out of their homes, saying that Croats
departed voluntarily after agreeing to swap their properties for those belonging to Serbs in Croatia. 1106/

693. On 29 September 1992, in the northern Vojvodina town of Subotica, the local SRS leader stated that the party would be forming a paramilitary group to "cleanse Subotica of all those who do not recognize Serbia and its political and territorial integrity". Šešelj was reportedly handing out arms to Serbian farmers in the region. 1107/
Notes

1/ For a more detailed historical discussion of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, see Annex IV, and for a more detailed discussion of the military structure, see Annex III.

2/ Some of the reports received by IHRLI do not contain sufficient information to categorize all identified groups within these four categories. Therefore, further investigation is needed to separate these groups by some organizational or other criteria as well as to determine the internal and external chains of command.

3/ For the purpose of this report, county is used to refer to a region known as an "opština". An opština is larger than a municipality or town, and includes smaller villages and hamlets which surround the larger cities.

4/ This is a well-established definition for "Paramilitary" organizations or groups. See The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, The Unabridged Edition (1967).

5/ For a more detailed discussion of the military history and command structure of the armies of the former Yugoslavia, see Annex III, Military Structure.

6/ This was later known as "People's Total Defence".

7/ This figure counts the White Eagles as one group, even though there may be several separate groups operating under this name. For a more detailed discussion, see the section on White Eagles below.

8/ These numbers are estimates based on a review of the reports submitted to the Commission of Experts and have not been verified. Those same characteristics that make the use of organizations desirable, i.e., lack of uniforms and lack of an identifiable chain of command, also make it difficult to accurately state the number of paramilitary troops.


10/ In addition to the 72 counties, there were reports of paramilitary activity in eight villages (four in BiH and four in Croatia) in undetermined counties. For purposes of statistical analysis, these villages will be counted as counties.

11/ Paramilitary activity was reported in 45 counties in BiH, 21 counties in Croatia, and six in FRY.

12/ There were reports that Serbian paramilitary groups were operating in 39 counties in BiH, 22 in Croatia, and six in FRY. Croatian paramilitaries were reported to be operating in 11 counties in BiH and six in Croatia. There were reports that the groups supporting BiH were operating in 11 counties throughout BiH.
Notes (continued)

13/ Ten of the 14 groups working in support of BiH, eight of the 13 groups supporting Croatia, and 41 of the 56 Serbian paramilitary forces were reported to have operated locally.

14/ Paramilitary units working in support of BiH were reported to be conducting joint operations in five counties, those supporting Croatia in six counties, and those supporting FRY or the self-declared Serbian republics in 36 counties.

15/ Arkan’s troops were reported in 28 counties and Šešelj’s troops were reported in 34.

16/ Allegedly 55 paramilitary groups killed civilians, 26 allegedly destroyed property, 25 looted, 14 tortured, and 10 forcibly evicted.

17/ Of the 72 counties where paramilitary activity was reported, rape and sexual assault were reported in 32, prison camps in 46, and mass graves in 24. See Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault; Annex X, Mass Graves; Annex VIII, Prison Camps.

18/ In fact, until August of 1992 the most notorious Croatian paramilitary, the HOS, and the regular Croatian Army often had conflicting military objectives.


21/ Juka’s Army, led by Jusuf (Juka) Prazina, began its operations in support of BiH by defending the city of Sarajevo. However, it is reported that Juka’s frustration with the political and military leaders within BiH Government forced him to switch alliances and fight against the BiH forces with the HVO.

22/ These forces are most commonly referred to as the Tigers, however, they have also known as the Serbian Volunteer Guard, Arkanovci, or generically as Arkan’s Forces.

23/ Šešelj’s forces are sometimes referred to as "Četniks" or "White Eagles". However, these names are also used by other groups or generically, referring to any Serbian Soldier. These forces are also called Šešeljovci or Šešelj’s Forces.

24/ These counties are: Bihać, Bijeljina, Brčko, Donji Vakuf, Goražde, Gradačac, Kluč, Konjic, Livno, Oštak, Prijedor, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Visoko, Vogošća, Zenica, and Zvornik.
Notes (continued)


28/ One report alleged that the Green Berets were using 82 and 120 mm mortars in an attack on Serbian positions in Sarajevo. "Fierce Battles Rage near Novi Grad, Bratunac; Air Raids Reported on Srebrenica", BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 January 1993. In a report on an ambush in Zvornik, the Green Berets allegedly used grenade launchers and bombs. "Other Reports in Brief; SRNA Reports Muslims Massacre 10 Civilians near Zvornik", BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 1992.

29/ "FRY Premier Panić in Turkey; Discussed Balkans, Bosnia", BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1992.


31/ For a more detailed discussion of the Green Berets activity, see the Geographical Analysis section below.


33/ "Fierce Fighting on the Main Bosnia and Herzegovina Fronts as UN Supervises Artillery", BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 September 1992.


Notes (continued)


37/ One report describes the arrest of a man in Visoko who was beaten by "policemen" for four hours and then kept on a stretcher for three days without food or water. An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5863.


41/ Id.


45/ Green Berets entered the camp in the village of Vitkovci to kill Serb prisoners. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Report Submitted by the Charge d'Affairs to the UN Secretary-General, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48286. They were also present in the Čelebići Camp in Konjic which was under the command of the HOS. Id. Reportedly they killed and beat prisoners at Viktor Bubanj in Sarajevo. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Information on the Aggression of the Republic of Croatia, 27 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3140-3147, at 3147.


47/ Christopher Lockwood, "Muslim Nations Offer Troops", Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1993, at 14. According to Lockwood, Muslim nations depended on Western logistical support to deliver troops to BiH. He concludes that the same logistical troubles which kept the Muslim troops promised in July of 1993 from joining UN forces in the UN declared "safe havens" also limited the number of Muslim volunteers in the BiH armed forces. He states that the number of Mujahedin in BiH never exceeded three or four hundred. See also Mohamed Sid-Ahmad, "Muslim World Between Two Fires", War Report, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 63744. However, the Belgrade Daily, Večernje Novosti, reported that as many as 30,000 Mujahedin were operating in BiH. "Other Reports in Brief: Muslims from Abroad Settling in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade Daily Claims", BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 September 1992.


51/ The leader of the Mujahedin in BiH, an Arab by the name of Abdul Aziz, has said, "In Bosnia we have two duties, the first is jihad and the second is dawa, which means to teach correct Islam". Id.


53/ These counties are Bihać, Poža, Konjic, Mostar, Teslić, Travnik, and Zenica.

Notes (continued)


60/ For a more detailed discussion of the activity of the Mujahedins, see the Geographical analysis section below.


63/ US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62650. Media reports however claim that Croats left Travnik voluntarily. The incident was investigated by an organization, which reported that the forceful eviction did not take place.

64/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62724.

65/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62616, 62620, and 62715.

66/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62730.

67/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62720.

68/ Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 1, 9 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32774-32782, at 32780. The incident was investigated by an organization, which reported that it did not take place.


70/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62614.
Notes (continued)

71/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62752 and 62756. The village of Vrci was attacked on 25 May, and the village of Radežine was attacked on 10 June. See also Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, 17 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 52399-52435, at 52405 (alleging that the Mujahedin were involved in attacks at Kopjari on 21 October, Doljani on 27 and 28 June, and Maljane on 8 June). UN Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki claims that corpses of Mujahedin victims displayed evidence of protracted cruelty and mutilation.

72/ Id. at 62648 and 62756; Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435.

73/ US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62742 and 62677. For more details on the location of the Neretva living quarters, see Id. at 62739.


78/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 26349A8.

79/ Serbian Republic Presidency, To Serbs All Over the World, IHRLI Doc. No. 48122-127, at 48124. But see Ian Katz and Maggie O'Kane, "Real Lives: In for the Kill", The Guardian, 4 February 1994 (describing members of the HOS wearing "black boiler suits").

80/ Serbian Republic Presidency, To Serbs All Over the World, IHRLI Doc. No. 48122-48127, at 48124.


Notes (continued)

84/ Serbian Republic Presidency, To Serbs All Over the World, IHRLI Doc. No. 48122-127, at 48124.


86/ For a more detailed discussion of HOS paramilitary activity, see the Geographical Analysis section below.


88/ Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian Representative to the Commission of Experts Established-Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1 December 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11521-11643, at 11540.


91/ Serbian Republic Presidency, To Serbs All Over the World, IHRLI Doc. No. 48122-48127, at 48124 (explaining that the HOS ran Dretelj from early August 1992, until the HVO assumed control on 21 September).


93/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 28679.

94/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 28777-28788 and 28792.

95/ Serbian Republic Presidency, To Serbs All Over the World, IHRLI Doc. No. 48122-48127, at 48278.


97/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 28465. See also Letter Dated 6 November 1992, From the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/24779, (9 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 48265-48301, at 48279 (stating that several murders attributed to the HOS occurred in villages on 7 June 1992, and not in detention facilities).

Notes (continued)

99/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 28602-28603 (listing burned villages in Herzegovina).

100/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 28614-28619, 48296-48297, 48301.

101/ Terrence Sheridan, "Sarajevo's Song of the Wolves", The Plain Dealer, 9 February 1994, at 7B.


104/ Terrence Sheridan, "Sarajevo's Song of the Wolves", The Plain Dealer, 9 February 1994, at 7B.

105/ Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian Republic to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 1 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11542.


115/ For a more detailed discussion of Juka's paramilitary activities, see the Geographical Analysis section below.

116/ Terrence Sheridan, "Sarajevo's Song of the Wolves", The Plain Dealer, 9 February 1994, at 7B.

Notes (continued)


119/ Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Serbian Republic to the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, 1 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11541 and 11550.

120/ Patrick Bishop, The Daily Telegraph, 19 February 1994, at 38.

121/ Andrew Hogg, "Robin Hood Hero Turns Enemy in Hell of Siege City", Sunday Times, 16 May 1993.

122/ Id.

123/ An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 29760.


125/ The term "counties" includes Hrtkovci, Kosovo, Pljevlja, Sandžak and Vojvodina in FRY.

126/ Although there have been no military operations between the warring factions in FRY, both Šešelj's and Arkan's troops allegedly harassed the non-Serb populations in some regions of FRY.

127/ Šešelj was reported to have operated in the BiH counties of: Banja Luka, Bosanski Samac, Bratunac, Brčko, Derventa, Poča, Gacko, Kalinovik, Kupres, Maglaj, Modriča, Mostar, Nevesinje, Odžak, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Višegrad, and Zvornik.

Arkan was reported to have conducted operations in the BiH counties of: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bosanska Rača (county unknown), Bosanski Šamac, Bratunac, Brčko, Doboj, Poča, Konjic, Mostar, Odžak, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Teslić, Veljina (county unknown), Višegrad, and Zvornik.


132/ Id.


Notes (continued)

135/  Id.

136/  Id.

137/  Internal Commission of Experts' Memo to Chairman Cherif Bassiouni
from Anton Kempenaars, Assistant to the Commission, 7 December 1993.

Report (Eastern Europe), 5 August 1991, at 51-52 (interview with Vojislav
Šešelj).

139/  See section on Vojislav Šešelj below for a more detailed
discussion.

140/  Chuck Sudetic, "A Shady Militia Chief Arouses Serbs", New York
Times, 20 December 1992, at § 1 at 12. Arkan also testified in his 1986 trial
for assaulting a man in an elevator that he worked "for the Federal Interior
Ministry in the Division of Foreign Emigres." Id.

141/  Chuck Sudetic, "Rival Serbs are Admitting Bosnia-Croatia
Atrocities", New York Times, 13 November 1993, at 6. Šešelj also alleges that
the security service of the Yugoslav Army's main headquarters had received
orders from government officials to attribute all misdeeds of Arkan's forces
to SRS volunteers. "Šešelj Accuses Socialists of Putting Blame for War Crimes
on His Party", BBC, 30 October 1993.

142/  Jonathan S. Lindsay, "Belgrade Regime Tied to Alleged War Crimes",

143/  Salih Zvizdíc, "Arkan's Life, Crimes, Prison Release Viewed",
Vjesnik, 12 April 1992.

144/  George Rodrigue, "Serbs Systematic in Ridding Region of Muslims,
Many Say: Bosnia Corridor Considered Crucial to 'Republic'", The Dallas

145/  C.D. Popović, "Željko Rašnjatović Arkan Denies Rumors about his

146/  Id.

147/  Carol J. Williams, "A People Poisoned by Chaos: In What Remains of
Yugoslavia, a Sense of Injustice is Pervasive and Violent Crime is

148/  See the discussion of Šešelj's personal history below for a more
detailed account of his political activities.

149/  Blaine Hardin, "Old Worlds, New Maps; Myth and Memory in
at B1; Michael Montgomery, "Ethnic Discord: World War II Lives on for Militant
Serb Chetniks: the Disenchanted are Breathing New Life into an old Movement in
Notes (continued)

150/ See the section on the personal history of Arkan for a more detailed discussion of his political career.


155/ Id.

156/ For a more detailed discussion of the alleged activities of Šešelj's and Arkan's forces, see the Geographical Analysis section of Part I of this report.

157/ Arkan reportedly led the attacks on Bijeljina, Brčko, and Zvornik despite the presence of the JNA and other Serb forces.

158/ Arkan has stated that his troops were under the command of the JNA in the Vukovar operation.

159/ In the Vukovar village of Jagodnjak in April 1991, a speech by Šešelj prompted the local Croatian authorities to issue a warrant for his arrest for provoking and fomenting national hatred and intolerance between Croatians and Serbs. Seventeen days later the Serbs launched an attack in the area.

160/ In Zvornik, Arkan was an active participant in the negotiations for a peaceful surrender of the village. However, he led the military operations to seize control of the village after becoming dissatisfied with these negotiations.

161/ Killing of civilians by Šešelj's and Arkan's troops was reported in the following counties: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bosanski Šamac, Bratunac, Brčko (allegedly 3,000), Derventa, Dragovci, Poča, Gacko, Kupres, Maglaj, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Višegrad, and Zvornik in BiH and Beli Manastir, Petrinja, Podravská Slatina, Šabranje, and Vukovar in Croatia.

162/ In Sarajevo, for example, Šešelj's forces ran the Sonja Cafe and Hotel in which Muslim women were raped, and some subsequently killed, by Serb soldiers. There were also allegations of rape in the following counties: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bosanski Šamac, Bratunac, Brčko, Derventa, Doboj, Poča, Gacko, Konjic, Kupres, Mostar, Nevesinje, Odišak, Prijedor, Rogatica, Srebrenica, Teslić, Tuzla, Višegrad, and Zvornik in BiH and Benkovac, Knin.
Osijek, and Vukovar in Croatia.

163/ Looting was reported in the following counties: Banja Luka, Bratunac, Brčko, Rogatica, Srebrenica, Teslić, and Zvornik in BiH and Vukovar in Croatia.

164/ The destruction or burning of homes belonging to non-Serbs was reported in the following counties: Banja Luka, Dragovci, Doboj, Gacko, Maglaj, Prijedor, Rogatica, Teslić, and Zvornik in BiH and Vukovar in Croatia. Šešelj’s and Arkan’s forces also targeted cultural and religious property. In Banja Luka, for example, two historic mosques were destroyed after Šešelj, reportedly said, “Is it possible that they are still standing?”

165/ Prison camps were reported in the following counties in which Šešelj and Arkan were operating: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bosanski Šamac, Bratunac, Brčko, Derventa, Doboj, Dragovci, Poća, Gacko, Kalinovik, Konjić, Maglaj, Modriča, Mostar, Nevesinje, Ožak, Pale, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Teslić, Tuzla, Višegrad, and Zvornik in BiH and Beli Manastir, Knin, and Vukovar in Croatia.

166/ In Zvornik, for example, at a meeting held in April 1992, Šešelj read names from a list of local Muslim intellectuals to an audience comprised of local Serbs and members of the Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, and White Eagles. Those on the list were to be killed.

167/ In Brčko, for example, it was reported that after the initial occupation by Arkan’s and Šešelj’s forces, a new group would be in charge every two weeks.

168/ In Zvornik, a conflict arose between Arkan and a local paramilitary leader when Arkan remained in control of the town for too long. Although control was eventually given to the local leader, at least one of Arkan’s men, Major Vojkan Djurković, remained in a key position as head of the “population exchange commission”. In the Krajina region, Arkan’s continued involvement in local politics prompted the commander of the HQ of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Mile Novaković, to issue an order for the withdrawal of Arkan’s troops from the region.

169/ Carol J. Williams, “Balkans’ Graveyard of Hatred; There’s been a Spate of War-Victim Remembrances in Yugoslavia’s ‘Bible Belt’; Some Fear that Old Wounds are Being Reopened”, Los Angeles Times, 17 August 1991, at A1. There have been media reports, however, that allege that Šešelj is a Slovene and reports that he is of Croatian origin. Slavoljub Šeškić, “Who Is the Serb of Croatian Origin?” Pobieda, 21 March 1993.


172/ Id.
Notes (continued)


177/ Blaine Harden, "Serbia’s Treacherous Gang of Three", The Washington Post, 7 February 1993, at C1. One Belgrade academic colleague said, "When he came out of prison, he was disturbed, totally lost and out of his mind". Id.

178/ Id.

179/ Id.

180/ "Serbian Alternative Parties Meet", Tanjug, 9 March 1990. At the March meeting of the alternative parties, Šešelj stated his party’s position that a state of war be declared in Kosovo, a military administration be established, and that people be moved to a 50 kilometre zone along the Albania border for Army control. Id. These positions were agreed upon by the other parties in attendance. Id.

181/ "Split in Serbian National Renaissance Cited", Tanjug, 14 March 1990. Vuk Drašković was the leader of the party which he said would fight "for an order that will rid the Serbian people of communists, papists and other shackles". Id. The Serbian Renaissance movement founded the paramilitary unit the White Eagles. European Community Monitoring Mission, Memo Regarding "White Eagles", 1 July 1993, ECHR Doc. No. 25126. A more comprehensive discussion of the White Eagles follows.

182/ Bojan Veselinović, "Crowds Demand Early Multiparty Serbian Elections", Ljubljana, 13 June 1990.

183/ Id. Loudly singing members of his party disrupted a demonstration being held by opposition parties trying to force early elections. Id. Security forces prevented Šešelj’s followers from getting out of control but not before Šešelj sent his guards after Vuk Draškovic’s bodyguard. Vojko Flegar, "The Serbs in the Cauldron", Ljubljana Delo, 14 June 1990.
Notes (continued)


186/ Id.

187/ Id. "Šešelj himself was mainly described and perceived in personal terms as a grotesque figure and a disappointed man." Id.


190/ Momčilo Bošković, "Demonstrators Praise Volunteers in Borovo", Belgrade Domestic Service, 4 May 1991. One such demonstration took place on the steps of the Josip Broz Tito Memorial Centre in front of 3,000 to 4,000 participants protesting an altercation in Croatia that resulted in Serbian casualties. Šešelj was demanding that the remains of Tito be returned to Croatia. Id. Although frequently interrupted with chants of "We want arms, a Serbian army, and warlord, warlord we will kill Ustašas, and we will kill Tudjman", Šešelj addressed the crowd with the following:

"The Serbian people [have] already passed a sentence on Tudjman. The blood of the Serbian people that was shed will not be unrevenged. The Serbian people of the heroic Serbian Krajina, heroic Serbian Slavonia, Serbian Baranja, and the Western Srem are resisting fierce attacks by Ustasha bandits. Therefore, Serbs and our sister Serbs, Serbs from this reduced Serbia and other Serbian lands are also fighting arm in arm with Serbs in Croatia."

Id.


193/ Michael Montgomery, "Ethnic Discord; World War II Lives on for Militant Serb Chetniks; the Disenchanted are Breathing new Life into an old Movement in Strife-Torn Yugoslavia", Los Angeles Times, 9 July 1991, at 1. In an interview on 22 March 1992, Milošević, in response to a question about Šešelj, commented: "I respect Seselj because he is consistent in his political beliefs and because I believe that both he and his party are not

194/ Gwynne Dyer, "How will it End in Yugoslavia?" The Washington Times, 17 November 1991, at B4. In response to the possibility of United Nations or European intervention to end the war, Šešelj stated:

"If the West interferes, tens of thousands of Western soldiers will be killed. It will be total war, a war without mercy....We would poison their food, we would poison their water. There is no means we would not use against foreign intervention."

195/ "End Sanctions, Serb Authorities Say: They Cite Comments in U.N. Report", Star Tribune, 5 June 1992, at 2A. Vuk Drasković, a former ally of Šešelj's, led a campaign by his and other opposition parties boycotting the election and denouncing the results. Id. An attempt was made on Šešelj's life a few days before the election. Adam Sabotić, a Moslem, threw a bomb in the car waiting to take Šešelj from a political rally he was attending. "Muslim Alleged Responsible in Attack on Šešelj", Tanjug, 26 May 1992. Šešelj was not injured, but 61 other people were. Id.

Less than two weeks after the election, on 11 June, taxi drivers in Belgrade tied up traffic around government buildings in protest over gas rationing. Michael T. Kaufman, "Effects of War Come Home to Belgrade", The New York Times, 14 June 1992, at 24. The protest became violent when Šešelj allegedly traded punches with one of the drivers. Id. During the scuffle, according to Belgrade police, a shot was fired by one of Šešelj's men. "Shooting Occurs at Belgrade Taxi Protest", Tanjug, 11 June 1992. There were no casualties. Id.

Šešelj is not a typical opposition leader. Šešelj, discussing the SRS relation with Milošević's Serbian Democratic Party (SPS), stated before the election:

"We are collaborating with the SPS, supporting its endeavors to change itself. As for reproaches that we are excessively inclined toward the SPS, I say we have not changed anything in our program, but perhaps others have inclined in our direction."


Šešelj, however, often zealously supports Milošević. Šešelj was quoted as saying, "Milošević's opponents should be assured that if they try to overthrow him, we will shoot them". Jonathan S. Landay, "UN Sanctions Jolt Serbs into Resistance to Milošević Regime", The Christian Science Monitor, 15 June 1992, at 1. When student organizers were planning large demonstrations against Milošević, they received threats reportedly from Šešelj's men. "Sarajevo Radio Views FRY Political Scene", Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network, 23 June 1992. The students proceeded with the peaceful demonstration, at which Šešelj took out his gun and threatened to use it against them. "Students Demand Arrest of Radical Party Leader", Tanjug, 10

197/ Nenad Lj. Stefanović, "Claimant to Leadership", Vreme, 20 December 1992. The election was held only days after United States Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger named Šešelj as a war criminal. Don Oberdorfer, "A Bloody Failure in the Balkans: Prompt Allied Action Might Have Averted Factional Warfare", The Washington Post, 8 February 1993, at Al. In an interview Šešelj called Eagleburger’s attack the secret to his success and "a certificate of honor and patriotism". Id.

198/ Id. The surprisingly strong showing caused pollsters to say that they either made a mistake or that the results were fixed. Id. The gains were impressive as the SRS had not conducted a visible campaign and did not hold a single rally. Instead, Šešelj used all his free television exposure to praise Milošević. Id. SRS support came from those that agreed with the ideals of Milošević’s party but were disappointed with the slow government pace in resolving the question of a united Serbia. Id.


This was the second time Šešelj proposed a vote of no-confidence. The first was in September of 1992. Carol Williams, "Belgrade Ties Frayed on Panić Issue: Politics: Premier’s Survival may Indicate Maneuvering to Undercut Serb Strongman Milošević", Los Angeles Times, 6 September 1992, at A5. The first attempt was in response to Panić suggesting acceptance of the pre-war republic borders as a condition of peace. Id. He accused Panić of taking "orders from some enemy Western powers". Id. Although this attempt fell short, Šešelj continued his attack on Panić. In response to Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the United Nations later in September, Šešelj stated:

"Milan Panić held talks with foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the Security Council and, according to all reports, all of them supported him, all of them paid him respect, all of them gave him promises, which means they support Panić as head of the Yugoslav government, but as a traitor to Yugoslavia who will conclude their business for them here in Belgrade."

"... Prime Minister Panić is again working as in the past, he is violating the constitution and the positive legal regulations of this country, thus demonstrating that he cannot retain the position as head of the federal government."


In a speech in parliament before the successful no-confidence vote, Šešelj called Panić a traitor and foreign agent guilty of embezzlement and
acts against the Serbian people’s interests. Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslav Premier Ousted by Foes 6 Months after Return from U.S.", The New York Times, 30 December 1992, at A1. Šešelj also indicated that Panić would end up in jail. Id.


204/ David Ottaway, "Serbian Leadership Divided Over U.N.-Backed Plan for Bosnian", The Washington Post, 4 May 1993, at A17. These remarks were not reported on the state-run television. Id.


206/ Id.


208/ David Begoun, "Serbia Coalition Shows Signs of Coming Apart, Milosevic’s Alliance with Extreme Right in Question", The San Francisco Chronicle, 29 May 1993, at A8. Milošević could not control parliament without a coalition. If he lost the support of Šešelj’s SRS, then he would be forced into a more moderate position to forge a coalition with the moderate opposition parties. Id. However, Šešelj’s power relies heavily on access to the state-controlled television which Milošević could deny. Id.


210/ After Croatia attacked the Serbian enclave near the Adriatic Sea in January 1993, Šešelj demanded Čosić’s resignation and referred to him as a traitor. Laura Silber, "Yugoslav Army Alerted as Battles Rage in Croatia, Bosnia", Los Angeles Times, 26 January 1993, at A10; Wilbur G. Landrey, "Crackdown a Brain Drain for Serbia", St. Petersburg Times, 1 February 1993, at 1A.

Note (continued)


217/ UNPROFOR Local Press Summary - Belgrade, 29 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 42678-42681, at 42680. According to one published report, a hallmark of Milošević is comprehensive files he keeps on the activities of his political allies. If these people turn against him, or need to be disposed of for political reasons, the compromising material is leaked to the state-controlled media. Ian Traynor, "Serb Enemies Trade Claims of War Crimes", 15 December 1993.


221/ Id.

222/ Id. Šešelj alleges that the security service of the Yugoslav Army's main headquarters had received orders, not from its military superiors but from Radmilo Bogdanović (former Serbian Interior Minister) to attribute all the misdeeds committed by the Red Berets and Arkan's paramilitary units to SRS volunteers. "Šešelj Accuses Socialists of Putting Blame for War Crimes on His Party", BBC, 30 October 1993.

223/ Id.


225/ Id.
Notes (continued)


228/ UNPROFOR Press Summary--Belgrade, 26 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 45402-45407, at 45406. Šešelj claimed there had been several such attempts, including an automatic weapon, which Šešelj claims was planted, found in a hotel room of a SRS parliamentary deputy. Id.


230/ Id.


"We have no connection with paramilitary bands. Only some of our followers joined voluntarily when the war with Croatia broke out and were quickly incorporated into the Serbian army fighting in that region. Later we had cases of followers who joined the Serbian military forces in Bosnia. At this moment, however, we have no connection with paramilitary groups and our party machinery has no military character."

232/ White Eagles and "Četniks" are names associated with several paramilitary units and also are used when referring generically to Serbian soldiers. Therefore, only those reports that specifically link a White Eagle or Četnik unit to Šešelj are included in this section of the report.

233/ "Nearly 70,000 Illegal Fighters at Large in Serbia", Agence France Presse, 7 October 1993.

234/ Michael Montgomery, "Ethnic Discord: World War II Lives on for Militant Serb Četniks; the Disenchanted are Breathing New Life into an Old Movement in Strife-Torn Yugoslavia", Los Angeles Times, 9 July 1991, at 1. Šešelj's use of this name has made it more difficult to determine what alleged atrocities his men may be guilty of because Croatian and Muslim victims, remembering World War II, use "Četnik" as a generic term for Serbian soldier.


236/ Id.

Notes (continued)

238/ The White Eagles is the militant youth organization within the
Chetnik organization. V.K. "Does Neofascism Threaten Yugoslavia?", Borba, 6
June 1991. The White Eagles most resemble the Četniks of World War II. P.D.,
"Party Armies in Yugoslavia", Danas, 1 October 1991. They are trained in
Serbia and are under the command of Mirko Jović and Dragoslav Bokan. Id.

239/ Dejan Anastasijević, "Eagles with Clipped Wings", Vreme, 22
November 1993.

240/ Id.

241/ European Community Monitoring Mission Memo on the White Eagles, 1

242/ Id.

243/ V.K., M.M., & G.K., "Does Neofascism Threaten Yugoslavia?", Borba,
6 June 1991. In an interview Dragoslav Bokan said of the White Eagles:

"I wanted the young to be involved in the national issue, so I thought
of renewing the "Eagles". The name attracted the kids who were putting
up posters all over the city so we drew a considerable membership.
There were quite a few of them who had broken the law previously, but I
tried to turn them into decent people and protect them from political
manipulation. Many of them were pacifists. I was an ideologist, a kind
of political commissar. The war broke out in the middle of our
engagement. I simply had to act. Anything else would have only been
phrases. There were a number of boys whose families were killed by
Ustaši during the last war. I am one of them. They arrived and we sent
them."


The organization was financed by donations, and the training of young
members was conducted in military camps under the guidance of top athletes and
priests who educated them about Orthodox virtues. V.K., M.M. & G.K., "Does
Neofascism Threaten Yugoslavia?", Borba, 6 June 1991. There were three camps:
one on Ravna Gora, a second near Belgrade, and a third in Kosovo. Id. The
association with the SPO weakened when Jović did not want the party to be
accused by the Serbian Regime of being responsible for war crimes. European
Community Monitoring Mission, Memo on the White Eagles, 1 July 1993, IHRLI
Doc. No. 25126.

The White Eagles remain under the command of Bokan who, on several
occasions, has been arrested and interrogated by government officials. Id.
However, he claims that his troops at the front were under the command of and
armed by the local territorial defence units. Dejan Anastasijević, "Eagles
with Clipped Wings", Vreme, 22 November 1993. Bokan also said that his troops
were not put under the command of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior. He
explained that they never offered because they knew he would not agree to it.
Id. Bokan indicated that his troops were not allowed to seize an area which
would be kept under their control. Id. He said that they would make offers
to transfer his people to other units such as those of Captain Dragan or the
Red Berets. Id.

After surviving several assassination attempts, Bokan split with the SPO
Notes (continued)

and now claims to be devoting his life to reflection. Id.; European Community Monitoring Mission, Memo on the White Eagles, 1 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 25126. Bokan denies committing war crimes and states that one reason he is disliked by the Serbian Regime is his punishment of persons under his command who committed war crimes. Dejan Anastasijević, "Eagles with Clipped Wings", Vreme, 22 November 1993. Bokan stated:

"No one in my vicinity ever raped anybody, and if he did, he had to pay for it dearly . . . ."

"The other day I gave a long interview to BBC television. They asked me whether I was ready for a hearing by an international commission for war crimes. I replied that I would first like to see the documents they are charging me with. But, I would be a poor example for such a trial. I don't belong to the same bag with the people on the list of Helsinki Watch."

". . . Even the Croatian press wrote about me with a certain dose of respect. They also predict that I will be sacrificed, and even they draw a distinction between me and the others on the list. I believe that such a process would do me more good [than] harm, compared to Šešelj."

Id.


247/ Id.

248/ Id.

249/ Id. Šešelj went on Serbian television with a Thompson sub-machine-gun, explained its operation, and described how the "victims eyes fall out" when they are shot in the head. Nenad Lj. Stefanović, "Claimant to Leadership", Vreme, 28 December 1992.

250/ Id. Blaine Harden, "Old Hatreds, New Allies Spur Serbs: Guerrilla Group Battling Croats", The Washington Post, 28 July 1991, at A1. These guns are difficult to buy in large quantities from arms dealers. Id. However, the US Government provided thousands of Thompsons to the Yugoslav army in the early 1950's as part of a military aid programme. Id. They were standard issue for the Yugoslav army until the 1970's when they were put in storage. Id.

Notes (continued)

253/ Id.
254/ Id. The inspectors who had dealings with him at the time say that [Arkan] was unusually strong for his age and as agile as a top, never dirty or sloven, always clean and properly dressed. In their first encounter he confused them. During one of the first arrests, at the age of 14 or 15, two inspectors found him in a Ćubura pastry shop. Without enough experience, they thought that arresting [Arkan] would be a routine matter. But [Arkan] resisted stubbornly, slipped away, and deftly escaped until the policemen realized that in this case they would have to apply treatment intended for much older delinquents. "If he had gone out for any sport, he certainly would have achieved extraordinary results. That was just the way he was-capable of anything," one Belgrade policeman stated. Id.
255/ Id.
258/ Id. Arkan, along with Slobodan Kostovski and Carlo Fabiani, an Italian citizen, are suspected in a 5 September 1979 armed robbery in a bank in Stockholm. Fabiani was arrested and on 11 September 1979, he was taken to the City Court of Stockholm for a court hearing. When Fabiani was taken into the courtroom, Arkan and Kostovski reportedly helped him escape by firing several gunshots at the guards. On 21 September 1979, this same group is alleged to have committed armed robbery in a large department store in Gothenburg before moving on to the Netherlands. Memo to M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, Commission of Experts, from Christina Steen Sundberg, Chief Prosecutor, Stockholm, Sweden, 18 November 1993, IERLI Doc. No. 52361-52365.
259/ See "Serbia's Treacherous Gang of Three", The Washington Post, 7 February 1993, at Cl; Cook Report. Goran Vuković, a Serbian criminal known as the murderer of Ljuba Zemunac, said the following about Arkan's skill as a bank robber:

"Of all of us, Arkan robbed the most banks: He walked into them almost like they were self-service stores. No one can quarrel with that fact about him. I don't know about politics, but as far as robbery is concerned, he was really unsurpassed. That is all he has done his entire life. Banks were his specialty, as well as spectacular escapes from prison. He managed to escape from the same prison two or three times. He even escaped from the Germans."

Dada Vujasinović, "Biographic Data on Serbian Fighter Arkan", Duga, 1 February 1993.
260/ Chuck Sudetic, "A Shady Militia Chief Arouses Serbs", The New York Times, 20 December 1992, at 12. Some reports have suggested that Arkan's father offered Arkan's services to Stane Dolanc, head of the SSUP, so that his son could expend his surplus energy, skill, and intelligence usefully. Id.;
Notes (continued)

see also Dada Vujasinović, "Biographic Data on Serbian Fighter Arkan", Duga, 1 February 1993. Arkan also had close relations with some of Tito's generals, including Jovo Popović, who is thought to be largely responsible for Arkan's physical and mental conditioning. Id.


262/ Id.

263/ Id.

264/ Dada Vujasinović, "Biographic Data on Serbian Fighter Arkan", Duga, 2 February 1993. An example of this was in early 1986 when Arkan beat someone up in an elevator after losing money gambling. The SSUP tried to clear Arkan of responsibility while the city police sought the harshest punishment possible. The court refused to exonerate Arkan because a search of his house revealed an arsenal of weapons, identification cards from several different countries, 11 passports from nearly every European country and the United States, a diplomatic passport and six press passports. Still he was only sentenced to eight months in prison. Id.

265/ Id. Allegedly, when at the casinos, if Arkan won, he would demand payment immediately. If he lost, he would use his gun to insure that he did not have to pay his debt. Id.

266/ Dada Vujasinović, "Biographic Data on Serbian Fighter Arkan", Duga, 2 February 1993.


268/ Id.


270/ European Community Monitoring Mission, Information Section Briefing - Arkan, File 1002, IHRLI Doc. No. 25141-25142. There was another incident involving a political party in opposition to Milošević, namely the party led by Šešelj. Šešelj tried to enter a soccer match with a group of his supporters but was denied entrance by security. This resulted in an uprising at the stadium. Arkan intervened in support of security officials and argued to bar Šešelj from the game because of the politically divisive effect on the fans. Eyewitnesses say that during the meeting between Arkan and Šešelj, their first, the conversation was the following:

"Do you know who I am? Do you know how many people I have killed for the fatherland?" Arkan asked."
Notes (continued)

"No, I don't. I have not killed a single one, but I will begin with you. I will strangle you with my bare hands." Sešelj responded.


272/ Id.

273/ Andrew Bilski, "Wild in the Streets; Lawlessness in Belgrade is a Brutal Extension of Wars in Bosnia and Croatia--and it is Worsening", Maclean's, 14 December 1992, at 20.

274/ "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings", American Broadcasting Corporation, 7 June 1993. One Belgrade journalist who traveled with Arkan for several weeks stated: "I saw Arkan in his white Pajero driving in and out of eastern Croatia in the fall of 1991. He was supervising as his men drove truck after truck of plunder across the Danube into Serbia. They were taking blankets, tires, shoes and whiskey." Blaine Harden, "Serbia’s Treacherous Gang of Three", The Washington Post, 7 February 1993, at C1.


276/ Id.

277/ "Serbia; Beyond the Ultras", The Economist, 5 June 1993, at 56. There are several private banks in Belgrade offering outrageous interest rates to encourage deposits. The banks' interest rates are 10 per cent a month for foreign currency and 70 per cent for dinars. The interest payments provide the only means of support for most of the unemployed. However, as one Western diplomat stated: "These banks are going to crumble like houses of cards one of these days . . . It's pretty sure they are laundering Bosnian loot - but it defies any kind of logic that they can keep it up." Louise Branson, "Young Gangs Rule Belgrade Streets", The Christian Science Monitor, 6 November 1992, at 2. Arkan is said to have sent armed men to Belgrade's black market areas to threaten rivals who offer a higher rate of return on investors' money than he does. Andrew Bilski, "Wild in the Streets; Lawlessness in Belgrade is a Brutal Extension of Wars in Bosnia and Croatia--and its Worsening", Maclean's, 14 December 1992, at 20.

It is also reported that Arkan owns a "pizzeria" in Erdut near his training facility. Internal Memo of the Commission of Experts to M. Cherif Bassiouni, Chairman, from Anton Kempenaars, Assistant to the Commission, 7 December 1993.

278/ "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings", American Broadcasting Corporation, 7 June 1993. The Serbian Orthodox Church often blesses these boxing matches. Id.

279/ Id. Arkan allegedly received as much as $1,000 per month from each business he protected. Id.
Another indication of government or police involvement in Belgrade's organized crime is that with a force of 40,000 men only one in every 14 reported crimes was solved last year. "World News Tonight with Peter Jennings", American Broadcasting Corporation, 7 June 1993. In an ABC interview an anonymous Arkan insider stated: "It is certain that the police are involved with the highest government officials. In my opinion, up [as high as] the minister of the interior. The police are connected with the top gangsters who are doing the dirtiest jobs for the government." Id.


284/ Id.

285/ Id.


291/ Id.


Notes (continued)


301/ Arkan has said that: "Those who join [the Tigers] have to lock up any politics in the lockers in their rooms." Id.


304/ Internal Commission of Experts Memo to Chairman Cherif Bassiouni from Anton Kempenaars, Assistant to the Commission, 7 December 1993.

305/ Id.

306/ "Arkan: No Longer any need for "Tigers" to be Concentrated in Erdut", BBC, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 April 1994.


308/ Id.

309/ Id.

310/ Internal Commission of Experts Memo to Chairman Cherif Bassiouni from Anton Kempenaars, Assistant to the Commission, 7 December 1993.
Notes (continued)

311/ Id.

312/ All of the footnotes in section III of this report, entitled "Other Identified Paramilitary Groups," are cites to the sources contained in the text of this section.


314/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28661. A rape victim stated that she was held in brothels in Livno and Sarajevo by "Alija's warriors". It is not clear from the report whether the group she refers to is the same paramilitary organization as Alija's Army, or whether she is referring generically to the army of BiH as President Alija Izetbegović's "warriors".

315/ IHRLI Doc. No. 3129 and 5465. The report lists the villages which were attacked, namely, Zaslivlje, Zabrdje, Turija, Jošanica and Repovica.

316/ See IHRLI Doc. No. 11540-11550, 28645, 28652-28653 and 29760. Although some reports question the existence of this group, it was reported by an official source that the Black Swans exist and include many foreigners. Their headquarters, which reportedly displays a black flag with arabic writing, is east of Konjic on the Mostar to Sarajevo road.

317/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45763.

318/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62629.

319/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62756.

320/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62613 provides information on the troop strength at Handići there were allegedly 40 to 50 men and the forces from Pokojište contained 30 to 40.

321/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62613.

322/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62756.

323/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45756.

324/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2804.

325/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45754.

326/ Id.

327/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45768.

328/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62620.

329/ IHRLI Doc. No. 51640.

330/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45752.
Notes (continued)

331/ IHRLI Doc. No. 41234. An official source reported that the MOS, like the HOS, is a term used by many paramilitary units. Much of what is written in this section was the responsibility of the 7th Muslimanska Brigada in Zenica, and some can be credited to Zuka’s forces or to a mixture of foreign Mujahedin.

332/ See also IHRLI Doc. No. 45756, which states that the Black Swans commanded by Zulfikar Ali Spage were also involved in the attack at Stipića Meadow.

333/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45752.

334/ IHRLI Doc. No. 51637, 51631, 51640, 51669. Three villages, Čajдраš, Vjetrenica Mountain, and Busovača are mentioned in the reports. Witnesses also relate that many civilians were killed in the area. The bodies of the victims were usually found burned in their homes. Id.

335/ IHRLI Doc. No. 48029 and 48030.

336/ IHRLI Doc. No. 14581

337/ IHRLI Doc. No. 35750.

338/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28952

339/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28817 and 28977. Ibrahim Đinić, a member of both the 102 Ožak Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the Municipal Committee of the Party of Democratic Action in Ožak, allegedly procured arms and matériel in Vinkovci, Croatia.


341/ IHRLI Doc. No. 3129 and 5465. The villages attacked were Zaslivlje, Zabrdja, Turija, Jošanica, and Repovica.

342/ IHRLI Doc. No. 35750

343/ IHRLI Doc. No. 51657

344/ Documents submitted to the Commission of Experts indicate the existence of two paramilitary organizations, the “Black Legion” and the “Black Shirts”, although at least one witness testimony implied that the names were interchangeable. See IHRLI Doc. No. 22201-22203.

345/ IHRLI Doc. No. 46203.

346/ IHRLI Doc. No. 22201-22203.

347/ Id.

348/ See IHRLI Doc. Nos.’s 46072-56106 (containing witness statements that refer consistently to attacking groups as “Croatian National Guardsmen”).
Notes (continued)

348/ IHRLI Doc. No. 46078.

350/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28817-28825, 28952. See also IHRLI Doc. No. 28817-19 (containing information on CDU finances and how the organization purchased and transported war material).

351/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56202.

352/ Id.

353/ See IHRLI Doc. No. 56202.

354/ Id.


356/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56202.


360/ IHRLI Doc. No. 48295.

361/ Id.


363/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28988.

364/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28644 and 28704-28705. The commander of the Horses of Fire, Majran Brnić, reportedly was from Posavska Mahala, Ožak (IHRLI Doc. No. 028965-67).

365/ The Horses of Fire reportedly operated at the following locations: Ristanj, Bogodol, Raška Gora, Dobrić, Biograci, Medjine, Vihovići, Slipčići, Bačevići, Potoci, Salakovac, Vraptići, Gnojnica, Buna, Hobrina, Pijeski, Blagaj (near Mostar), Dračevo, Rečice, Burnazi, Paprat, Opičići, Ošanići, Donji and Gornji Poplat, Ploštevac and Prenj (near Stolac), Čaša, Drvarica, Orašje, Gornje Hrasno, Čevaljina and Orahov Do, Žavala, Golubinac, Belenići, Kjević Do, Gorogaš, Dobromiri, Pozamo, Baljivac, Ratpi, Šćenica, Suše, Misite, Čopice, Podmoje, Slivnica and Lopoč, Bobani Plato, Zaplanjak, Ivanjica, Začula and several other villages in the municipality of Trebinja. IHRLI Doc. No. 28602-28603.
Notes (continued)

366/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28539.
367/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28965-28967.
368/ IHRLI Doc. No. 12613-12614.
369/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28988.
370/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 28997-289001.
375/ IHRLI Doc. No. 12613-12614.
376/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28958-28962.
379/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28644.
380/ IHRLI Doc. No. 11932.
381/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28966.
382/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28965-28967.
384/ Id.
386/ IHRLI Doc. No. 28539.


Notes (continued)

389/  Id.
390/  Id.
394/  Id.
396/  IHRLI Doc. No. 25523.
397/  IHRLI Doc. No. 55366.
398/  IHRLI Doc. No. 45351, 41159. Reports mention that "Tiger" units joined the HVO forces in Mostar in June 1993. Later reports mention an HVO unit named "The Kiseljak Tigers" (also called "United to Death") in connection with the October 1993 massacre at the Muslim village of Stupni Do near Vareš. It is not clear whether these two groups are the same "Tiger" forces.  Id.
399/  IHRLI Doc. No. 41159.
400/  IHRLI Doc. No. 45351.
401/  Id. For UNPROFOR press release, see IHRLI Doc. No. 43929-43930.
402/  IHRLI Doc. No. 45351.
403/  IHRLI Doc. No. 19947C.
404/  IHRLI Doc. No. 34965.
405/  Id.
406/  IHRLI Doc. No. 2804.
407/  Id.
408/  IHRLI Doc. No. 2805.
409/  Id.
410/  Id.
411/ Id.
412/ Id.
413/ Id.
414/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2806.
415/ Id.
416/ Id.
417/ Id.
418/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2807.
419/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2804. This brigade is also referred to as simply the XII Slavonian Brigade. IHRLI Doc. No. 2810.
420/ Id. See IHRLI summary sheet for Unit of Daruvar.
422/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2810.
423/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2926.
424/ Id.
425/ Id.
426/ Id.
427/ Id.
428/ Id.
429/ Id.
430/ Id.
431/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2927.
432/ After the first day of killing, on 2 May, a JNA commander passed the hotel and told a policeman that the killing should only be done on the front line. He said he would personally kill anyone who was killing people in the centre of town, IHRLI Doc. No. 39141.
433/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39141.
434/ Id.
Notes (continued)

435/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39140.
436/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63996.
437/ IHRLI Doc. No. 49197.
438/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2807.
439/ Id.
440/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2808.
441/ Id.
442/ Id.
443/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2894. But see IHRLI Doc. No. 2808 (indicating that the Bihor Gornje Odrje launched a mortar attack on Grubišno Polje and Ivanovo Selo in concert with JNA and "Četnik" forces and that eight people were killed and an unspecified number wounded).
444/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2808.
445/ Id.
446/ IHRLI Doc. No. 47023.
447/ Id.
448/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56909.
449/ See IHRLI Doc. No. 56615, which reports that Captain Dragan Kalinić worked alongside Arkan as a commander of forces in Brčko on 1 May 1992.
450/ The BBC quoted Milan Martić who revealed in August 1991 that Captain Dragan's real name was Daniel Sneden.
452/ Id.
453/ "Croatian Serbs 'Recruit Italian Fighters'". The Independent, 21 October 1993, at 12.
454/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34965.
455/ IHRLI Doc. No. 42890. The witness provides a detailed account of the atrocities at Velepromet in Vukovar, but Captain Dragan is named only in regard to the incident regarding the witness's daughter. Id.
Notes (continued)

457/ IHRLI Doc. No. 47018.

458/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63996 (listing the paramilitary units involved in the Zvornik assault under "Other Formations").

459/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34963.

460/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56995.

461/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2878.

462/ IHRLI Doc. No. 47019.

463/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34959, 42896 and 42899. Dušan the Great forces allegedly attacked Lovas with members of the "Territorial Defence".

464/ Id. See also IHRLI Doc. No. 15123, which reports that 51 people were killed in Lovas on 17 October.

465/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63996 (listing the paramilitary units involved in the Zvornik assault under "Other Formations").

466/ IHRLI Doc. No. 47022.

467/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62783.

468/ IHRLI Doc. No. 35705.

469/ IHRLI Doc. No. 35685.

470/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62782.

471/ IHRLI Doc. No. 35687. Karaman's house has also been described as a warehouse. Id.

472/ IHRLI Doc. No. 30291.

473/ IHRLI Doc. No. 49192.

474/ IHRLI Doc. No. 30246.

475/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63996 (listing the paramilitary units involved in the Zvornik assault under "Other Formations").


Notes (continued)

478/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29875-6. See also IHRLI Doc. No. 11921, containing a witness statement which refers to the Užice Corps action at Površnica mountain.

479/  IHRLI Doc. No. 9157.

480/  Id.

481/  IHRLI Doc. No. 9158.

482/  Id.

483/  IHRLI Doc. No. 9159.

484/  IHRLI Doc. No. 56879.


486/  IHRLI Doc. No. 52131.

487/  See also IHRLI Doc. No. 29870 (alleging that Dragan Ikanović participated in operations in Vogosća County conducted by paramilitary leader Joja Tintor).

488/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29870.

489/  IHRLI Doc. No. 56879.

490/  IHRLI Doc. No. 42899. Devetak was apparently raised in Lovas, worked in Osijek and later moved with a private firm to Belgrade before the war.

491/  IHRLI Doc. No. 39953.

492/  The witness was held in the camp for several days, during which time many people were killed. He did not specifically identify the Zoran Karlica paramilitary group as perpetrators of the abuses that occurred at Trnopolje camp. Id.

493/  U.N. Military Information Branch, Who's Who in Former Yugoslavia, No. 1, 1 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 62101-62173, at 62124 states that "Captain Dragan" "led a force called 'Knindže' in Knin during 1990-91." It is unclear whether the Knindža Turtles are the same 'Knindže' as those mentioned in Who's Who, or whether they operated under the command of Captain Dragan. The Turtles may be linked with Captain Dragan through his training camp, which contained over 1,000 Republic of Serbian Krajina volunteers.

494/  IHRLI Doc. No. 3620-3621.

495/  Id.

496/  IHRLI Doc. No. 34956.
Notes (continued)

497/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62141.
498/ IHRLI Doc. No. 29887.
499/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34734.
500/ IHRLI Doc. No. 49192.
502/ IHRLI Doc. No. 52430.
503/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34993.
505/ IHRLI Doc. No. 15903.
506/ See, e.g., IHRLI Doc. No. 55087.
507/ IHRLI Doc. No. 45390.
508/ IHRLI Doc. No. 24432.
511/ IHRLI Doc. No. 26349A26; Dessa Trevisan, "Yugoslavs Arm for All-Out War", The Times, 1 August 1991 (reporting that the special task force known as Kninšt, commanded by Captain Dragan, is one of Martić's forces).
512/ IHRLI Doc. No. 24432.
Notes (continued)


529/ Id.

530/ IHRLI Doc. No. 55087.


532/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2955.

533/ IHRLI Doc. No. 19123.

534/ IHRLI Doc. No. 49197.

535/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2813.

536/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2886.

537/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2895.

538/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2798.
Notes (continued)

539/ Id.


542/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2834.

543/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2846.

544/ IHRLI Doc. No. 55095.


547/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34170.

548/ IHRLI Doc. No. 29827-29828.

549/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62762-62786.

550/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56879.

551/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20271-20296.

552/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20272.

553/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20275.

554/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20271-20296.

555/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63996 (listing the paramilitary units involved in the Zvornik assault under “Other Formations”).

556/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34734.


558/ IHRLI Doc. No. 2810.

559/ Id.

560/ Id. The source is ambiguous regarding the involvement of the unit commanded by Lukić and Radosavljević in the attacks and abuses committed by "Četniks". Id.
561/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62693.
562/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56883.
563/ IHRLI Doc. No. 29875-29876. See also the witness statement at IHRLI Doc. No. 11921, which refers to the Užice Corps action at Površnica mountain.
564/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39930.
565/ Id.
566/ Id.
567/ See also U.N. Military Information Branch, "Who's Who in Former Yugoslavia", No. 1, 1 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 62101-62173, at 62124-5, where "Captain Dragan" is reported to command paramilitary forces called "Red Berets". It is unclear whether Captain Dragan is the commander of this unit, or whether this is one of many paramilitary units trained in camps run by Captain Dragan, which operate under independent command in the field.
568/ IHRLI Doc. No. 8276.
569/ IHRLI Doc. No. 57050.
570/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56328.
571/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56329.
572/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39242A. The victim states that she and up to 2,000 other women were raped repeatedly during her stay at the school, but the Red Berets are specifically identified as perpetrators in only one incident in her statement. Id.
573/ IHRLI Doc. No. 49197.
574/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34956.
575/ IHRLI Doc. No. 34733-34734. On 24 June 1992, a number of Muslim civilians were arrested in the stable of Salko Guso by order of Momir Savić. Savić's group also removed two Muslims from a bus carrying refugees from Višegrad. Id.
576/ The attack of Kozarac is described in IHRLI Doc. No. 62693.
577/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62711-62713.
578/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62711-62712.
579/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62712.
580/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62713.
Notes (continued)

581/  Id.

582/  IHRLI Doc. No. 30212.

583/  IHRLI Doc. No. 56632-56633.

584/  The US State Department document alleges that they personally killed 5,000 people, but there is no explanation under what circumstances this killing may have occurred.

585/  This is hearsay information.

586/  IHRLI Doc. No. 62684.

587/  Their names can be found in the April 1993 Banja Luka Serbian Voice, or Glas Srpski, newspapers.

588/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29868.

589/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29870.

590/  Kornjača means "turtle" in Serbo-Croatian. Kornjača claims it is his real name, while others claim he adopted it as a nom de guerre. Peter Maas, "In Bosnia War, a Serb Doctor Becomes 'Commander Turtle'", Washington Post, 12 September 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.

591/  Id.

592/  IHRLI Doc. No. 11921.

593/  IHRLI Doc. No. 2894.

594/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29864.

595/  Id.

596/  IHRLI Doc. No. 2886.

597/  IHRLI Doc. No. 34186.

598/  IHRLI Doc. No. 25126.

599/  IHRLI Doc. No. 29843.

600/  But see IHRLI Doc. No. 2842 (describing members of the White Eagles beating Croatian soldiers in the village of Paklenica, 22 November 1992).

601/  IHRLI Doc. No. 5892-5895, 20271, 20277, 20281-20284, 20285-20291, 20317, 20320, and 62864.

602/  IHRLI Doc. No. 20277 and 20285.
Notes (continued)

603/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20281-20284.

604/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20292 (describing that on 19 and 20 July 1992, White Eagles, JNA, Nikšić Special Forces, and local Serbs reportedly shelled the forests from 6:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.).

605/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20317.

606/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20285-20291.

607/ Approximately 170 men at Gacko prison were later transferred to Bileća. IHRLI Doc. No. 5892-5895.

608/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20285-20291, 20320.

609/ IHRLI Doc. No. 5892-5895, 20317.

610/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20285-20291.

611/ IHRLI Doc. No. 20317.

612/ IHRLI Doc. No. 11945, 33248-33299.

613/ IHRLI Doc. No. 11945.

614/ Id.

615/ IHRLI Doc. No. 33248-33299, 35683.


617/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62835, 11922-11923.

618/ IHRLI Doc. No. 11922-11923.

619/ IHRLI Doc. No. 29793-29832 (Banja Luka); IHRLI Doc. No. 11662-11663 (Bosanska Krupa); IHRLI Doc. No. 11916 (Novo Brčko); IHRLI Doc. No. 15123 (Lovas).

620/ See IHRLI Doc. No. 63996 for a list of paramilitary formations involved in the attack. The Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights reported many units participating in the attack and naming the units according to the regions where they were formed.

621/ IHRLI Doc. No. 63995.

622/ Id.

Notes (continued)

57034.

625/ IHRLI Doc. No. 56425 (Keraterm camp); IHRLI Doc. No. 56960 (Stara Gradiška camp).

626/ “Croatian Serbs ‘Recruit Italian Fighters,’” The Independent, 21 October 1993, at 12.

627/ Id.

628/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62735.

629/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62736.

630/ IHRLI Doc. No. 62736-62737.

631/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 28-34. For a detailed discussion of the prison camps reported in this county, see also Annex VIII, Prison Camps paragraphs 251-436.

632/ All following population and demographic figures are also from the 1991 census.


636/ Id.


640/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault paragraphs 35-36. For a detailed discussion of the prison camps reported in this county, see Annex VIII Prison Camps.
Notes (continued)

paragraphs 437-461.


642/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 37-41. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, Mass Graves paragraphs 25-31. For a detailed discussion of the prison camps reported in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 462-507.


647/ Andrew Bilski, with Louise Branson, "Terror Among the Ruins; War Takes a Heavy Civilian Toll", Maclean's, 4 May 1992.


650/ Andrew Bilski, with Louise Branson, "Terror Among the Ruins; War Takes a Heavy Civilian Toll", Maclean's, 4 May 1992.


655/ Andrew Bilski, with Louise Branson, "Terror Among the Ruins; War Takes a Heavy Civilian Toll", Maclean's, 4 May 1992.
656/ Id.

657/ Id.


659/ Andrew Bilski, with Louise Branson, "Terror Among the Ruins; War Takes a Heavy Civilian Toll", Maclean's, May 4, 1992.


664/ Id.


670/ Id.

671/ For a detailed discussion of the prison camps reported in this county, see Annex XIII Prison Camps, paragraphs 508-563.

672/ For details of the incident at Bileća, see US State Department, Supplemental U.S. Submission to the U.N. Security Council, 12 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11925 and US State Department, Submission to the U.N. Committee of Experts, IHRLI Doc. No. 57034.

673/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII Prison Camps, paragraphs 588-604.
Notes (continued)

674/ Croatian Information Centre, Written Statement, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11662-11664, at 11663.


676/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 47-60. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 32-34. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 605-628.


678/ The HVO and the HOS joined under a signed agreement in August 23, 1992. The HOS is referred to as the Croatian Defence Forces. See Milan Vego, "The Croatian Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina", Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 26349.


683/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 64. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 659-693.


685/ Id.


Notes (continued)

688/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 65-66. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 694-710.


691/ Id.


696/ Id.


698/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 67-76. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 49-63. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 711-865.


Notes (continued)


705/ Danish Helsinki Committee First Submission, May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20974-20987.

706/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39139-39141.


715/ Id. See United States Government Submission, Case No. 94-222, IHRLI Doc. No. 57050, wherein an ex-prisoner describes an incident in which Arkan’s men brought a Croatian into a warehouse and asked the prisoners to kill him. When no one volunteered, Arkan’s men forced the Croatian to kneel and shot him in the head.

Notes (continued)


718/ Id. at 11363.


721/ George Rodrigue, "Serb Describes War Atrocities: He Says He Was Forced to Rape, Kill", The Dallas Morning News, 17 December 1992. But see George Eykyn, "Interview with a Captain in the Bosnian Serb Army", BBC Breakfast News, 27 September 1993, wherein the captain states that there were 30-40 of Arkan's men at Luka but he did not think they were involved in the killings.


729/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 902-910.


731/ Kornjača, which means "turtle" in Serbo-Croatian, claims it is his real name; others say he adopted it as a nom de guerre. Id.
Notes (continued)

732/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 89. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 963-974.

733/ Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Staff Report: The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina, August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 8997-9038, at 9017.


735/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 90-100. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 64-67. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 975-1020.


742/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1021-1034.


744/ United States Government Submission, Case No. 0523292, IHRLI Doc. No. 56598.

745/ Id.
Notes (continued)

746/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 102-125. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X paragraphs, 68-78. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1035-1109.

747/ Peter Maass, "In Bosnia War, A Serb Doctor Becomes 'Commander Turtle'", Washington Post, 12 September 1992. According to this report, Commander Turtle, Duško Kornjača, was the boss of portions of eastern BiH, including Foća and Višegrad as of September 1992.


753/ Id.


756/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault that occurred during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault paragraphs 126-127. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X paragraphs 79-86. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1116-1153.


759/ Submission from David Hepburn, European Community Monitoring Mission Liaison Officer, UK Mission, to the Commission of Experts, 29 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20269-20546 at 20271-20285.
Notes (continued)


761/ Submission from David Hepburn, European Community Monitoring Mission Liaison Officer, UK Mission, to the Commission of Experts, 29 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20269-20546 at 20271-20285.


764/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 5893-5895.

765/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 5890.

766/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 5893-5895.


770/ Submission from David Hepburn, European Community Monitoring Mission Liaison Officer, UK Mission, to the Commission of Experts, 29 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20269-20546 at 20271-20285.

771/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 128-129. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1157-1161.

772/ For more on these groups' activities, see BiH State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Bulletin, Number 3, March 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29841-29884, at 29875 and United States Mission, Supplemental Submission of Information to the Commission of Experts, 12 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11912-11946 at 11921.


774/ Id.

775/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 131-132.
Notes (continued)


777/ Id.

778/ Id.


780/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 144-147. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 102-104. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1259-1335.


784/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62613.

785/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 62756.


788/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 45768.

789/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 45764.

790/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 112-119.

Notes (continued)

792/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 153. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1378-1395.


794/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1412-1414.


796/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 120-124. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1415-1425.

797/ United States Government Submission, Case No. 0818112, IHRLI Doc. No. 56822-56825.


799/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 3620-3621.

800/ United States Government Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 62684.


802/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 155-157. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 125-144. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1426-1467.

803/ IHRLI Incident No. 52064.000.


805/ Id.

806/ Id.

807/ An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 29751-29770 at 29760.

Notes (continued)


810/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 168. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1474-1477.


813/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 150-151. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1478-1506.


817/ Unidentified Written Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 18656.


819/ Id. IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-29019, at 28817.

820/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2378-2521.


823/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 172-189. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 196-275. For a
detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1530-2255.


825/ BiH Submission to the United Nations, IHRLI Doc. No. 6584.

826/ Id.; The Society of Threatened Peoples, Ethnic Cleansing - Genocide for Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 14422-14502 at 14482.


829/ Id.

830/ Id.

831/ Id.


837/ Id.


Notes (continued)

841/ IHRLI Incident No. 44126.000.
843/ Id.
845/ Id.
847/ Id.
848/ All information relating to the activities of the Zoran Karlica at Bišćani are from the Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-40025, at 39953.
849/ "Zoka's" description is available, but not disclosed. Id.
850/ The witness does not indicate that the Zoran Karlica members were running either of these camps, just that the prisoners were brought there by them. Id.
851/ All incidents connected with the Rambos are described by the Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-40025, at 39953.
852/ According to US Government documents, there is also a paramilitary commander named Mišo Radulović from Vukovar who led an attack on Kozarac, BiH, 23 May 1992. IHRLI Doc. No. 62693. The report of these men comes from the US State Department, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 56320-57229, at 56883.
854/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 190-199. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 276-279. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2276-2328.
855/ Statement of Berina Hurem, dated 19 August 1992 at Sarajevo.
Notes (continued)


858/ Statement of [Witness], dated 15 August 1992 at Sarajevo.

859/ Statement of [Witness], dated 19 August 1992 at Sarajevo.


862/ Statement of [Witness], dated 15 August 1992 at Sarajevo.

863/ BiH State Commission on Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Testimony Number 10/04-55, IHRLI Doc. No. 25225-25234, at 25227.


866/ Id.

867/ Vladimir Nikolić, "Seselj Calls For Unification of 'Serbian Countries'", Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network, 1 April 1993.

868/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2336-2377.


870/ Id.

871/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 201-217. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 288-296. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2378-2521.


Notes (continued)


876/ Id.


889/ Id.

890/ Id.


Notes (continued)


894/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 22. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 304-305. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2543-2545.


897/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 224-227. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2555-2575.


899/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 229. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 312-320. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2607-2612.


902/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 230-231. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 314-320. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2607-2612.


905/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 234-241. For a detailed discussion of reported
camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2616-2643.


208/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 244-253. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2658-2717.


911/ Id.


214/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces II (January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5511-5527, at 5524; see also Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony SIL-419, IHRLI Doc. No. 39543A-39552A, for another account of rape at the hotel Vilina Vlas.


916/ Id.


919/ All of the details of Popović activity come from the following report: Zdravko Grebo, Report sent to Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-49201, at 49192-49193.
Notes (continued)

920/ Id.

921/ It is not clear whether this report is the same described in connection with the Popović Group. All details laid out here come from the BiH State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Bulletin, Number 3 (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29841-29884, at 29864.


922/ Id.


925/ This citation from the newspaper is also taken from the Amnesty International report. Id.


928/ Amnesty International, Submission to the Commission of Experts, IHRLI Doc. No. 34993.


930/ Id.


932/ Id.


934/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 254-255. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2733-2744.


Notes (continued)

937/ Id.


939/ Id.

940/ Id.

941/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 258. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 378-385. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2808-2840.


943/ Other groups named include the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Third Corps, and Brigade 314. Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, Number 5 (6 September 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 35746-35751, at 35750.

944/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 259-266. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 386-397. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2847-2912.


951/ Id.
Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


971/ United States Government Submission, Case No. 0901052, IHRLI Doc. No. 62860.


979/ Id.

980/ Id.

981/ Id.
Notes (continued)

982/ United States Government Submission, Case No. 0901052, IHRLI Doc. No. 62860.

983/ All details of the events at Kostjerevo are from the World Campaign Save Humanity, Report on War Destrucitons, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. 52111-52135, at 52131-52132.


985/ Id.


989/ Information Centre of the Democratic League of Kosovo, Fighting in Bosna River Valley and Bosanska Posavina, IHRLI Doc. No. 47969-48071, at 48029-48031.

990/ Id.

991/ For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2913-2920.


994/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 267.


996/ Special Correspondent, "War Without End", The Economist Newspaper, 6 February 1993.

997/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 268. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2942-2956.
Notes (continued)


999/ Id.


1001/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 270. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2979-3002.


1003/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 2886.

1004/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 2984.

1005/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 272.


1008/ Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 46708.

1009/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 273. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3026-3049.

1010/ "Knin Demands UNPROFOR Protection For Croats", Zagreb Radio Croatia Network, 27 January 1993. See also Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, Number 4, 1 (30 August 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 34962-34966, at 34963 (reporting that 177 Croatian civilians were arrested on 31 January 1993, evicted and forced to sign a document stating that they were leaving Knin of their own free will). For information regarding Captain Dragan's involvement in the January 1993 events, see IHRLI Doc. No. 34963.


Notes (continued)


1014/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 275. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 155-163.


1019/ IHRLI Incident No. 23323.000.


1021/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 164-183. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3143-3164.


1023/ Id.


1025/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 184-192.


1027/ For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 193-195.

Notes (continued)


1030/ Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, Number 1, 2 (9 August 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 32774-32782, at 32778.


1032/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 276.


1035/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 279. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3242-3250.


1037/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 280. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 306-311.

1038/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraphs 282-284. For a discussion of the mass graves allegedly located in this county, see Annex X, paragraphs 337-377. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3272-3361.


1040/ "Serbian Radical Leader Explains Use of Četniks", Tanjug, 8 May 1991. According to this press report Šešelj claimed to have sent Četnik units, well-armed and well-dressed for terrorist activities, to places in the territories of Croatia, BiH, and Macedonia to defend Serbians.


1042/ "Četniks Reportedly Ambush Two Police Patrols", Tanjug, 2 April 1991.
Notes (continued)

1043/ Id.


1046/ Id.


1049/ "Serbian Radical Leader Explains Use of Ćetniks", Tanjug, 8 May 1991. Šešelj claims that his Ćetniks killed 13 police and wounded at least 20 others". Duško Doder, "Old-Time Guerrilla Bands Re-emerge in Yugoslavia", The San Francisco Chronicle, 17 May 1991, at A13. At a rally on May 16, in Ravna Gora, Šešelj promoted the participants in the Borovo Selo incident, including the leader of the unit, who was given the rank of major, and his deputy who became a captain. Id.

1050/ Id.

1051/ Roy Gutman, "Murders Keep Hate Alive", Newsday, 19 May 1991, at 27. In an interview Barret responded to the question of whether he killed any of the policemen with, "I don't know. But I hope someone died." Id.


1053/ World News Tonight With Peter Jennings, 3 September 1991.


Notes (continued)


1068/ Id.


Notes (continued)

1075/ Id.


1080/ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony Identified as MG-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 4975.


1083/ Amnesty International Report, March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 15123. The report cites the date of the killings as 17 October 1992. It is unclear whether the report date or the incident date is a misprint. However, the report goes on to cite additional incidents which occurred in October of 1991. See also Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, Number 1, 4 (9 August 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 32775-32782, at 32780.


1088/ For a discussion of the incidents of rape and sexual assault during the alleged paramilitary activity in this county, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault, paragraph 285. For a detailed discussion of reported camps in this county, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3362-3369.

1089/ "Croatian Serbs 'Recruit Italian Fighters'", The Independent, 21 October 1993, at 12.
Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX IV
THE POLICY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING

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Summary and Conclusions

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Part I of the following Annex briefly describes the historical antecedents to the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Part II describes the development of the policy of "ethnic cleansing" and the early stages of its implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Part III focuses upon one "ethnic cleansing" campaign in the Bosnian city of Zvornik and describes the military attack on and expulsion of the Muslim population of the city.

2. As used in this report, "ethnic cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic or religious group.

3. All parties involved in the conflict have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. These violations include the killing of civilians, rape torture, and the deliberate destruction of civilian property, including cultural and religious property, such as churches and mosques. But, there are significant qualitative differences. Most of the violations were committed by Serbs against Bosnian Muslims. The second largest group of victims were Croats, whose perpetrators have been Serbs from Serbia, BiH, and the Krajinas. Both Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats have also victimized Serbs in BiH and Croatia, but in lesser number. The policy of "ethnic cleansing", however, has been systematically carried out by Serbs in BiH and Croatia against their opponents, though Croats have also carried out similar policies, but on a more restricted scale, against Serbs in Croatia and Muslims in Herzegovina. Forceful population removal by BiH of Serbs has also occurred in some limited areas, but not as a policy. In fact, BiH occupied areas contain both Croats and Serbs, while Bosnian Serb areas have been cleansed of all but Serbs. The Krajinas in Croatia also have been cleansed of Croats, while eastern and western Slavonia (Croatia) have been cleansed of Serbs.

4. Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and BiH have engaged in "ethnic cleansing" practices against Serbs and Muslims. Croats, for example, have conducted "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and in parts of the Krajina region, as well as against Muslims in the Mostar area. While Bosnian Muslim forces have engaged in practices that constitute "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, they have not engaged in "ethnic cleansing" operations. The vast majority of reports alleging "ethnic cleansing" operations involved Serbian forces who have used means, such as the mass killing of civilians, torture, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, and other practices to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb-claimed territory.

5. "Ethnic cleansing" by Serb forces has been systematic and apparently well-planned. As early as mid-1990, the Yugoslav Army (JNA) began to arm and supply local Serb forces in BiH. The "ethnic cleansing" campaigns in the early stages of the conflict involved coordinated attacks by JNA and paramilitary forces that sometimes operated from the Republic of Serbia. As the war and "ethnic cleansing" continued, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) persisted in supplying logistical support, arms, fuel, and other supplies to Serb forces in Croatia and BiH. "Ethnic cleansing" has involved means, such as the mass killing of civilians, sexual assault, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, the confiscation of property and similar measures to eliminate, or dramatically reduce, Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb held territory.
6. According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, by late 1993, over 2.1 million people had been displaced from their homes since the conflict in the BiH region. 1/

II. EARLY HISTORY

7. The Slavic people migrated from the caucuses to the Balkan peninsula between the Sixth and the Eighth Century. Between the Ninth and Twelfth Century, Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs developed distinct historical and cultural identities.

8. The division of the Christian Church in 1054 reinforced the fault line that earlier divided the Roman Empire. 2/ On the eastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greek world, the Eastern Orthodox Church and users of the Cyrillic script. On the western side lie the Roman Catholic Church.

9. In the 17th Century the Ottoman Turks encroached on the Balkan peninsula and defeated Serb, Bosnian, and Albanian forces at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Field of Blackbirds) in June 1389. The event was to become of particular historical significance to the Serbs and is commemorated as the symbolic end to the independent Serbian medieval kingdom. 3/

10. Members of the Bosnian Church, which was distinct from the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches, converted to Islam during this period. These conversions were in part due to the promise of better conditions by Turkish rulers.

11. In the 17th Century, the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires clashed and the Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottoman lands to Christian powers in 1699. The entry of the European powers into the region further accentuated the divisions that had occurred earlier. Croats and Slovenes were firmly part of the west, embracing Catholicism and looking towards the western powers for leadership. The Serbs and Bosnians remained within the Ottoman Empire. For the Serbs, Russia became a growing influence, and as Ottoman power in the region waned Russia assumed the rule of protector of all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.

12. Independence movements appeared in Serbia in the early 19th Century and by 1830, Serbia had achieved autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. Strong nationalist sentiments continued to grow throughout the Nineteenth Century. Serbs increasingly viewed their mission as one of liberating and unifying the lands in which Serbs lived. It was during this period that the idea of a "Greater Serbia" first emerged.

III. THE BALKAN WARS AND THE WORLD WARS

13. Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finally freeing the peninsula from Ottoman control. 4/ Serbia made territorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia. However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting with Serbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Vojvodina. 5/ The two Balkan wars experienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worst atrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite the peninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an International Commission found:

"[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and..."
brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions." 6/

14. Serb nationalists, incensed by the Hapsburg annexations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The event, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, sparked the first World War.

15. Following the First World War, unity was finally achieved when King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued by ethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbian domination, sought greater self-government within a looser confederation. It was during this period that the Croatian Ustaša (Uprising) movement was born. Its goal was Croatian independence, through violence if necessary.

16. Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leading to German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, the Germans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedić. During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaign of annihilation against its Serbian population. Some Muslims joined the Croats' efforts against the Serbs, though many have fought alongside the Ustaše regime and against the Germans and the Italians. Pavelić sought to create an ethnically and religiously homogenous state. The Serbs of Croatia were faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. Serb officials maintain that a system of death camps, covering 210 square miles, ran along the Sava River. It has been estimated that between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs were killed during this period.

17. In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance, took Belgrade and a communist regime was established. A federal system was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a high concentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Ethnic tensions persisted in the post-war years. Tito, however, effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements, such as the Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s.

IV. PRELUDE TO THE BREAKUP

18. After Tito's death in 1980, a resurgent Serbian nationalism was led by Slobodan Milošević. To achieve, and later to consolidate his power, Milošević organized massive demonstrations in support of Serbs living in the province of Kosovo, which had a predominantly ethnic Albanian population. When disturbances broke out in Kosovo in 1989, Milošević imposed martial law.

19. Within the Republic of Serbia, the tenor of political life became increasingly strident. Faced with a disintegrating nation-state, Milošević denounced his domestic political opponents as "enemies of Serbia". His opponents in the other Republics were compared to vampires and fascists.

20. In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amended its constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with the use of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the other Republics. The resulting tension between the six Republics led to the breakup of the League of Communists in early 1990. In January of that year Slovenian delegates to the Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists demanded an end to the Communist party's
"leading role" and the establishment of a multi-party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenians walked out of the Congress.

V. THE CURRENT CONFLICT

21. The present conflict emerged in early 1990 when Serbia and three of the other five republics failed to reach an agreement concerning the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) sought a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. This conflict resulted in efforts by Croatia, Slovenia, and later BiH and Macedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.

22. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991. Two days later, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) attacked the provisional militia. The war in Slovenia lasted only ten days, but it soon spread to Croatia, where the conflict would be more protracted and bloodier.

23. In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbs living in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian National Council and scheduled an August referendum on their secession from Croatia. Breakaway republics were also established by the Serbs in BiH. These breakaway republics received small arms, artillery, missile launching systems and other support from their supporters in Serbia. In addition, Croats living in BiH established the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna, and they received arms and other assistance from supporters in Croatia. 9/

24. The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in the conflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs of Croatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was a massive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serb paramilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx of supplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large number of sophisticated weapons and vehicles. 10/

25. Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces was apparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass grave found at Ovca is thought to contain the remains of at least 200 Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarily executed, and buried in a shallow grave.

26. In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNA had approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May, General Ratko Mladić was appointed JNA commander. Under pressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, the FR Yugoslavia announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However, Yugoslav officials said that JNA personnel from BiH could remain there and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs (see Annex III, Military Structure).

27. In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the European Community, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian towns such as Prijedor and other villages in the Kozarac region of northeast BiH, and Zvornik in northwest BiH. Similar attacks have occurred in many cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. These areas of BiH have high concentrations of Bosnian Serbs. The purpose of the attacks seems clear: Serb forces have sought to consolidate their control over these territories and link them with each other, as well as with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia.
VI. THE "ETHNIC CLEANSING" CAMPAIGN IN BiH

28. Although "ethnic cleansing" occurred to some extent in the conflict in Croatia, it was in BiH that a distinct pattern of "ethnic cleansing" could be discerned. First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the area. In many cases, Serbian residents are told to leave the area before the violence begins. The homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural and religious monuments, especially churches and mosques, are destroyed. Second, the area falls under the control of paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents with random killings, rapes and looting. Third, the seized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction with paramilitary groups. During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten and sometimes transferred to prison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, have occurred. Non-Serb residents are often fired from their jobs and their property is confiscated. Many have been forced to sign documents relinquishing their rights to their homes before being deported to other areas of the country.

29. According to one military expert of Jane's Information Group:

"[the Commander of the Bosnian Serb military forces] has a clear military aim: the consolidation of Serb-held territory of Bosnia; the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them, such as Gorajde, and the severance of any possible military link between Muslims in Bosnia and those in the Sanzak area of Serbia." 11/

30. The policy of "ethnic cleansing" has been implemented consistently throughout an area incorporating an arc that ranges from north-eastern BiH through the regions of eastern and western BiH, adjacent to the Serb Krajina area of Croatia.

31. The Serbs "ethnic cleansing" campaign was shaped by several factors. First, the demographics of the region ensured that any attempt to establish "ethnically pure" areas would entail tremendous dislocations. In BiH, the pre-war population was approximately 40 per cent Muslim, 32 per cent Serb, and 18 per cent Croat. 12/ The areas of Serb preponderance are primarily located in the north-east, south-east and north-west portions of the country. However, these areas are neither homogenous nor contiguous. The areas in which Serbs are numerically dominant include substantial populations of Muslims and Croats.

32. Populations can be removed, even forcibly removed, without extreme bloodshed. Ethnic minorities could have been ejected from their homes, gathered at a central locations, and transported to another region. This, however, would have required a strong and well-organized regular army. The Bosnian Serb Army was neither numerically strong enough, nor sufficiently well-organized, especially in the first stages of the conflict in BiH, to accomplish this task. Thus, Serb officials relied on the use of terror, entailing mass killings, torture, rapes, and prison camps to eradicate the non-Serb population. The non-Serbs had to be sufficiently terrorized to ensure that they would flee the area and never return.

33. The character of "ethnic cleansing" was partly determined by its reliance on local officials and paramilitary leadership. Local officials relied on police and militia to help expel non-Serbs from Serb-controlled land, and these forces were often ill-equipped and untrained. The use of terror was their most efficient weapon. Police and local militia were frequently supplemented by paramilitaries. These groups often operated outside any discernable centralized command and control structure. Paramilitaries were often recruited from a population of rural, uneducated
youth. Sometimes a deliberate effort was made to recruit those with criminal backgrounds. The apparent lack of control over paramilitaries conveyed the message that the most brutal acts would be permitted, or at least they would go unpunished.

34. The fragmentation of authority has provided FRY and Bosnian Serb officials with "plausible deniability". If ties between paramilitaries and officials are obscured, government officials might be able to evade responsibility for "ethnic cleansing". Thus, even after the JNA became better organized and able to assert greater control in 1993, it did not establish effective command and control over the paramilitaries.

35. While regular military units, militia, police and local citizens have all participated in "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of "ethnic cleansing." Two of the units that have played a major role in the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in BiH, the "Četniks" associated with Vojislav Šešelj and the "Tigers" associated with Željko Ražnatović (Arkan), have been active in the Republic of Serbia as well. Šešelj's followers have reportedly waged "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against ethnic minorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. Arkan's "Tigers" have staged military training exercises allegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo.

36. These paramilitary units have launched operations from within the Republic of Serbia. In addition, paramilitary training camps are located within the Republic of Serbia.

VII. THE ATTACK ON ZVORNIK

37. The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals a similar pattern of events that was repeated throughout much of the area. In the weeks prior to the attack (which occurred on 8 April 1992), tensions between ethnic groups in the city had increased. Members of each ethnic group had obtained weapons for their personal use. Muslims were warned by their Serb friends that they should leave the area. Prior to 8 April, many Serbs left Zvornik, apparently having been forewarned of the impending attack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbs constructed a barricade, preventing many Muslims from reaching their work site or school. In retaliation, Muslims also erected a barricade at the same location. It was protected by Muslim police officers and armed volunteers.

38. On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into the region. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that the JNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack by Muslim extremists.

39. On 8 April, Serb representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), as well as the paramilitary leader known as "Arkan," called for the Muslims to peacefully surrender the city. Negotiations proceeded in which the division of the city into Muslim and Serb enclaves was discussed. The negotiations broke down, however, apparently because Arkan was dissatisfied with the result.

40. After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on the town began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units, was joined by Arkan's paramilitary troops, sometimes known as "Arkanovci." There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections of the city.

41. The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary units known as "Šešeljovci" and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), entered the city. Serb
territorial defense units (TOs) also participated. It was reported that these troops committed random executions and rapes after entering Zvornik.

42. The next day, a provisional government was established that was headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfew was imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit to travel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the police station to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deported to an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnel such as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented from working. During the following days, paramilitary units continued to patrol the streets, and there were many reports of looting, rape and other acts of brutality.

43. In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return to the area from which they had fled. Many returned because they feared losing their property. On arriving in Zvornik, Muslims were told that they must register their property. An "agency for the exchange of houses" was established. In exchange for relinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homes of Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible on the condition that their property was turned over to Serb authorities. From late May to early June 1992, the entire Muslim populations of villages in the surrounding area were deported. The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personal possessions with them. Even these items were often stolen at Serb checkpoints on the roads leaving the area.

44. According to an account in Vreme, the "cleansing" was followed by organized looting. "Some stole gold, hard currencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbed department stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the walls and children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroom suites could be seen floating down the river". 14/

Part One

I. INTRODUCTION

45. This overview is designed to place the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia in a historical perspective. Many of the issues discussed in the following sections of this report, such as those dealing with "ethnic cleansing" and military structure, have historical antecedents (see Annex III, Military Structure). Ethnic rivalries and the fear of Serbian hegemony in the region, for example, have deep historical roots. Events which occurred during World War II that led to a large number of brutal killings and expulsions of Serbs from Croatia are also relevant to contemporary events. However, an appreciation of the tumultuous history of the Balkan peninsula can help understand the perspectives of the parties involved in the current war.

46. Mindful of the different historical perspectives, what follows is as objective an account that can be made of the conflict's historical background. It is only intended to provide background and context to the extent that it is relevant to the purposes of this Annex. No judgments are made regarding the positions or historical claims of the warring factions.

II. EARLY HISTORY

47. Early in the First Century A.D., the Dalmatian Coast was annexed by the Roman emperor, Tiberius. The Roman domain gradually moved inland, encompassing the land that would become Yugoslavia. The Romans called this domain Illyria, named after the region's inhabitants.
48. The Roman empire was divided into eastern and western districts during the reign of Diocletian (284-305). This boundary became one of the region's major fault lines. On the eastern side of the line lie the cultural heritage of the Greek world, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and users of Cyrillic script; on the western side, lie the cultural heritage of the Roman world, the Catholic Church, and users of the Latin alphabet.

49. The Slavic peoples migrated to the area from the Caucuses between the Sixth and Eighth Centuries. By the end of the Eighth Century, most of the area of the former Yugoslavia south of the Sava-Danube line was colonized by the Slavs, whose influence expanded into Albania and Greece.

50. Throughout the Ninth Century, the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church struggled to gain adherents among the Slavs. In 803 A.D., the Croats accepted the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Emperor, Charlemagne. The Serbs and the Macedonians adopted the Christian faith in the mid-Ninth Century. In 891, the Serbs were placed under the jurisdiction of Byzantium and ruled by the Župan (ruling prince) of Raška, a Serbian principality.

51. In the 10th Century, King Tomislav founded the kingdom of Croatia. By the early 12th Century, Croatian nobles had relinquished power to the King of Hungary. This transfer of power began a relationship with Hungary which was to last for centuries.

52. In the late 12th Century, a Bosnian state emerged, led by Kulin Ban, who rejected Christianity and embraced the Bogomil heresy instead. Other new converts were principally Slavic Serbs. Most of the Slavs who were to convert to the Islamic religion in the 15th Century had belonged to the Bogomil sect, rather than the Catholic or Eastern Orthodox faiths.

III. THE OTTOMAN AND HAPSBURG EMPIRES

53. In 1389, the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbian forces at the battle of Kosovo Polje (Kosovo Field). By the end of the 15th Century, the Ottoman Empire had gained control over much of the peninsula. Ottoman rulers granted a considerable degree of self-government through churches and other local institutions. Nevertheless, persons who retained their religious identity were not considered equals, and by converting to Islam a local inhabitant could enter a privileged section of society.

54. In the 16th Century, continuous Turkish encroachment on the borders of Croatia and Slavonia led the Hapsburgs to establish a southern border region, called the Military Frontier. The Frontier was to act as a bulwark against the Ottoman empire. The Frontier, however, was sparsely settled. To establish an effective line of defence, the Hapsburgs resettled the area with Orthodox Serbs.

55. The Treaty of Karlowitz transferred some Ottoman lands to the Christian powers in 1699. The Hapsburg Empire acquired Croatia, Slavonia and other Balkan territories. Despite the repeated battles that were to take place during the 18th Century between the Ottomans and the European powers, relatively little territory changed hands on a long-term basis during this period.

56. The entry of the major European powers into the Balkans adumbrated the conflicts that were to recur, and the alliances that would persist, for centuries. The Catholic Slovenes and Croats would look to the west, influenced by centuries of close contact with Austria, Hungary and Italy. The Orthodox Serbs, on the other hand, would look east towards Russia.
57. In the early 19th Century, a Serbian Rebellion against the Ottomans was crushed. However, in 1815, another insurrection led to substantial concessions. By 1830, Serbia had achieved an autonomous status within the Ottoman Empire. It was during this time that the Serbs forged close ties to Russia. Russia shared the Serb's desire to expel the Turks from the region. As the seat of the Orthodox Church, the Russians also shared a common religious background with the Serbs.

58. In 1867, the Hapsburg Empire split into two parts: one ruled by Austria from its capital in Vienna, the other ruled by Hungary from Budapest. Austria assumed control over Dalmatia, Bukovina and the Slovene lands, while Hungary ruled Croatia, Slavonia and Voivodina. The Balkan peninsula was refuged again in 1878 by the Congress of Berlin. This accord permitted Austria-Hungary to administer Bosnia-Hercegovina, although the Ottoman Empire officially retained sovereignty over that region. In addition, Serbia and Montenegro became independent states.

59. Throughout this period, Serbian nationalists viewed their mission as one of liberating and unifying the lands in which Serbs lived. According to the historian Barbara Jelavich, "[t]heir [the Serbian nationalists'] major objective throughout the nineteenth century had been the unification of the lands they regarded as Serbian, including Bosnia-Hercegovina, Old Serbia, Macedonia and the Serbian-inhabited lands of the Habsburg Empire."

IV. THE BALKAN WARS AND THE WORLD WARS

60. In June 1903, Serbian King Alexander Obrenović and his wife Draga were assassinated by military officers. In an event that reverberated throughout Europe, the assassins threw the king and queen's mutilated bodies out of a palace window. The officers involved became members of the terrorist groups that were created in the following years.

61. Intense Serbian nationalist sentiment led to the formation of secret societies. These societies--using distinctive symbols, flags, oaths and ceremonies--flourished at the end of the 19th century and in the early 1900s. In 1908, for example, the Narodna Odbrana (National Defence) was founded. It established a network of agents throughout South Slav lands. Another organization, Vjedinjenje ili Smrt (Union or Death), commonly called the Black Hand, appeared in 1911. The Black Hand was headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević (a.k.a. Apis) who had participated in the assassination of King Alexander and his wife.

62. Two Balkan wars were fought in 1912 and 1913, finally freeing the peninsula from Ottoman control. Serbia made territorial gains by absorbing Kosovo and part of Macedonia. However, Serbia did not achieve its objective of uniting with Serbian regions of the Hapsburg Empire, including sections of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, and Voivodina. The two Balkan wars experienced ethnic conflict on a massive scale. The worst atrocities appear to have been related to efforts to unite the peninsula's Serbian population. In 1914, an International Commission found: "[h]ouses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred en masse, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind--such were the means which were employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions."
63. Serbian nationalists were incensed by the Hapsburg's annexations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. It was this Pan-Serbian sentiment that led to the 1914 assassination of Austria-Hungary's Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb. The event sparked the First World War. The Archduke, who was the heir to the Hapsburg throne, and his wife were killed on 28 June, the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo.

64. Following the First World War, unity was finally achieved when King Alexander of Serbia proclaimed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The new state, however, was plagued by ethnic conflict from its inception. Croats, fearing Serbian domination, sought greater self-government within a looser confederation. It was during this period that the Croatian Ustaša (Uprising) movement was born. It was created by Ante Pavelić in 1929, with the support of Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Its goal was Croatian independence, through violence if necessary. During these inter-war years, hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, also fearful of Serbian hegemony, fled to Turkey.

65. In 1929, King Alexander attempted to deal with rising internal conflicts by suspending the constitution, declaring a dictatorship and changing the country's name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These actions, however, further alienated the nation's non-Serbs and, in 1934, King Alexander was assassinated by Macedonian terrorists.

66. Yugoslavia surrendered to the Axis powers in 1941, leading to German and Italian occupation of the country. In Serbia, the Germans installed a regime headed by Serbian General Milan Nedić. In Croatia, an independent state, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH), was established which included Bosnia-Herzegovina. There were more than two million Serbs living within NDH, approximately one third of the entire population. Despite its status as an independent state, Croatia was split into two spheres, the dividing line running north to south. Italy controlled the western section, adjacent to the Adriatic. The German military command was assigned to Zagreb, to the east. Mussolini, however, was permitted to determine who would be the head of state. He selected Ante Pavelić, the Ustaša leader.

67. During the war, the Croatian leadership launched a campaign of annihilation against its Serbian population. Some Muslims joined the Croats' efforts against the Serbs. Pavelić sought to create an ethnically and religiously homogenous state. The Serbs of Croatia were faced with the alternatives of extermination, expulsion, or conversion to Catholicism. Serb officials maintain that a system of death camps, covering 210 square miles, ran along the Sava River. It has been estimated that between 350,000 and 750,000 Serbs were killed during this period.

68. Resistance to the Axis powers came from the Četniks, who tended to be anti-Croat and anti-Communist, and from communist partisan forces, led by Josip Broz Tito. Tito also served as general secretary of the Yugoslav Communist Party. At first, the Četniks, who were loyal to King Peter's London-based government-in-exile, worked with the partisans to resist the Axis powers. However, serious disagreements over resistance strategy and over Yugoslavia's post-war future soon became apparent. The two groups struggled, each seeking a more favourable position in the emerging post war period. To enhance their position, the Četniks began collaborating with the Axis occupation forces. When this collaboration became apparent to the British, the allies developed closer ties with Tito's partisan forces.
V. THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA

69. In October 1944, Tito's partisans, with Soviet assistance, took Belgrade and a communist regime was established. A federal system was constructed, consisting of six Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia included two autonomous provinces, each containing a high concentration of an ethnic minority: Kosovo and Vojvodina. The communist party and Leninist ideology were centripetal forces. The Socialist Republic successfully established a federation of ethnic communities, each with its own territorial base. Although each Republic generally maintained its ethnic identity, the prewar boundaries of the Republics were altered in the peace negotiations that followed the Second World War. Changes also were made by the Tito regime in the following years.

70. Ethnic tensions persisted in the post war years. Tito, however, effectively repressed ethnic and nationalist movements, such as the Croatian reformist movement of the early 1970s. In the late 1960s, for instance, tensions between Croats and Serbs increased when the Republic of Croatia demanded that the Serbian and Croatian languages be recognized as separate languages, with Croatian being used in the schools. Serbs countered with the demand that the 700,000 Serbs living in Croatia be given reciprocal rights. The most significant Croatian grievances, however, were economic. Croats complained that the most prosperous enterprises, including the nation's largest banks and insurance companies, were located in Belgrade. Croatian officials also complained that the Republic did not receive its fair share of foreign currency. This was especially troubling, they argued, because a large proportion of that foreign currency was earned by the tourist industry on the Dalmatian coast. Furthermore, most of Yugoslavia's foreign trade went through Croatian ports.

71. The movement had begun with demands for greater decentralization and autonomy. By the end of 1971, however, the demands had escalated. Croatian nationalists called for self-determination and the right to secede. When Croatian officials failed to respond to Tito's warnings, he intervened. As a result, 400 Croatian nationalist leaders were dismissed or resigned from their official positions.

72. In the late 1960s, problems also erupted in the Kosovo district of Serbia. Although the area's population is overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian, Serbs had a disproportionate number of top state and party positions. Serbian officials also controlled the local police and security forces. Allegations of Serbian abuses of the Albanian population led to riots in 1968. In response, the districts of Kosovo and Vojvodina, an area with a large Hungarian population, were given greater autonomy. Kosovo was granted the use of its own flag and anthem. The Albanian language was also permitted greater use in education and local administration.

73. Political repression in Yugoslavia, however, was relatively benign compared to its eastern European neighbours. Yugoslavs, for example, could travel fairly freely, visas were granted to foreign visitors or were not required at all, and foreign books, periodicals and newspapers were available. In the 1950s and 1960s, the economy was liberalized and laws were passed eliminating state control over most investments. It was the loosening of these political and economic bonds, however, that fueled nationalist or ethnic sentiments.
VI. PRELUDE TO THE BREAKUP

74. After Tito's death in 1980, the power of Yugoslavia's central government rapidly diminished. Public corruption scandals and the collapse of the Soviet Union impeded the government's ability to deal with its mounting problems.52 In 1981, Albanian demonstrations broke out in Kosovo. The disturbances were suppressed by the Yugoslav military, but they led to allegations that ethnic Albanians had committed atrocities against the district's minority Serb population. 53

75. A resurgent Serbian nationalism, led by Slobodan Milošević, fueled Yugoslavia's crisis. 54 Milošević, who had become President of the League of Communists of Serbia in 1986, fanned the fires of Serbian nationalism, which he had opposed earlier in his career. He proceeded to establish himself as a strongman ruler, gradually eliminated democratic opposition, and prepared for the eventual conflict and break-up of the federation. 55 By the late 1980s, however, he was expressing sympathy with the Serbs of Kosovo. In 1988 and 1989, Milošević orchestrated mass demonstrations by his supporters to topple communist party leaders in Kosovo, Vojvodina and the Republic of Montenegro. They were replaced by leaders who were loyal to Milošević. 56 Disturbances again broke out in Kosovo in 1989, and Milošević sent a large contingent of the Yugoslav army to support the regime. In 1989 and 1990, approximately 40 persons were killed in rioting within the province. Most of those killed were ethnic Albanians. 57

76. The plight of Kosovo's Serbs was taken-up by Serbian intellectuals in the mid-1980s with the publication of a document prepared by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU). 58 Referred to as the SANU Memorandum, the document asserted that Serbia had suffered economic discrimination within the Yugoslav federation, especially in relation to the more prosperous Republics of Croatia and Slovenia. However, the Memorandum's greatest concern was directed towards the Serbs of Kosovo. The report referred to the "genocide" of Serbs by Albanians and to crimes including arson, murder, rape, and necrophilia. 59

77. The SANU Memorandum, according to Misha Glenny, "prepared the ideological ground for Milošević by focusing public opinion yet more tightly in the Kosovo issue . . . ." The report also indicated that "there was a real base among intellectuals for the nationalist assault on the leadership of the Serbian League of Communists". 60

78. The Memorandum permitted Milošević to organize the demonstrations by his supporters in the provinces. The demonstrations,

"were part of a well-organized plan designed to intimidate the non-Serb peoples of Yugoslavia, instill among Serbs the idea that their fellow Serbs were being widely discriminated against, but on a higher political plane, to underline Milošević's determination to mark his territory as the undisputed master of post-Titoist Yugoslavia." 61

79. In February 1989, the Serbian Republican Assembly amended its constitution and revoked the autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. This display of Serbian nationalism, coupled with the use of force in Kosovo, generated apprehension within the other Republics. 62 The resulting tension between the six Republics led to the break-up of the League of Communists in early 1990. In January of that year Slovenian delegates to the Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists demanded an end to the Communist party's "leading role" and the establishment of a multi-party state. Clashing with the Serbian delegates, the Slovenians walked out of the Congress.
80. The immediate origins of the present conflict emerged in early 1990 when Serbia and three of the other five republics failed to reach an agreement concerning the structure of the federal government. The Republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) sought a loose confederation in order to exercise greater autonomy. Serbia, on the other hand, wanted a more centralized federation in order to maintain its dominant role. This conflict resulted in efforts by Croatia, Slovenia, and later BiH and Macedonia, to secede from Yugoslavia.

81. In April and May 1990, Slovenia and Croatia held the first free elections in post-war Yugoslavia. In both states, the newly elected non-Communist governments threatened to secede if Yugoslavia was not transformed into a looser confederation. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991.

82. In response to the Croatian vote for independence, Serbs living in Croatia's Krajina region established a Serbian National Council and scheduled an August referendum on their secession from Croatia. The Council proposed the establishment of a community of opštinas (counties) that would adopt the Cyrillic alphabet and celebrate Serbian holidays such as St. Vitus Day.

83. In August 1990, armed Serb irregular forces entered Croatia "to protect the villages of ethnic Serbs from discrimination". These troops took over the town of Knin and promised to hold a referendum on independence. During the same month, a Serbian Council of National Resistance was formed. Its members included Milan Babić, Milan Martić, and Jovan Rašković.

84. Croatian Serbs declared their autonomy on 1 October 1990. President Milošević urged federal forces to intervene to "defend Serbs from repression". When the Croatian Government labeled the declaration illegal, Vuk Drašković, the leader of the Serbian Renewal Party, called for a declaration of war against Croatia. Between August 1990 and April 1991, almost 200 bombing and mining incidents, as well as 89 attacks on Croatian police forces, were reported. These attacks occurred mainly in Knin.

85. During 1990, tensions had increased considerably throughout the former Yugoslavia as newly elected governments in the Republics expressed strong nationalist sentiments. In Croatia, for example, after Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ—Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica) came to power in April 1990, a law was enacted adopting Croatian as the official language of state administration and the red and white checkered shield, a symbol of the Croatian nation, hanged from many windows. Furthermore, many Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, especially within the police forces, and replaced by Croats. In addition, the new Croatian constitution spoke of the "national state of the Croatian nation". As one scholar put it, the constitution's repeated use of the term "Croatian nation" (Hrvatski narod) "has an ethnic rather then political connotation and excludes those not ethnically Croat". In any case, the Serbian minority of BiH clearly felt threatened. The symbols, such as the flag and coat of arms adopted by the new Croatian government, were quite similar to those used by the fascist Croatian government during the Second World War. The Croatian Ustaša state, as mentioned earlier, had been responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Some of these symbols were modified within a few months by the new government. However, many Serbs, especially those in the Krajina region, had already been alienated. Moreover, the fears of Croatian Serbs were undoubtedly heightened by officials in the Republic of Serbia who asserted that a fascist Croatian state had been reborn.
86. Violent confrontations took place in western Slavonia in March 1991 when Croat officials replaced Serb personnel in the town of Pakrac. In early May, Croat forces attacked the predominantly Serb village of Borovo Selo where approximately 20 Serb civilians were killed. After the fighting in Borovo Selo, the conflict escalated. 79/

87. Throughout 1991, the leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) appeared to be unable to assert control over the escalating crisis. 80/ The State Presidency, for example, was unable to maintain its ethnic balance when Croat Stipe Mesić resigned his position. Prime Minister Ante Marković also resigned in late 1991 after a no confidence vote by one chamber of the Federal Assembly. Marković resigned in December, protesting a war budget in which 80 per cent of the nation's expenditures were designated for the military. 81/ Thus, during the year, power within the federal government slipped away from the moderates and the national executive was left in the hands of pro-Serb forces.

88. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991. 82/ Two days later, on 27 June, the Yugoslav's Peoples' Army (JNA-- Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija), attacked the provisional Slovenia militia. Slovenian officials announced that a "state of war" existed, and appealed for international assistance. 83/

89. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), on 1 July 1991, called for a cease-fire between Slovenia and the JNA. Less than one week later, European Community (EC) mediators obtained an agreement providing for withdrawal of JNA forces in Slovenia and the disarming of the Slovenian militia. 84/ The conflict between Slovenia and the Federal Republic had lasted for 10 days. However, violence within the former Yugoslavia erupted again in late June 1991 when Serbian irregular forces, with the help of the JNA, mounted an attack on Osijek, in eastern Croatia. This area, called "Slavonia", was depicted by news agencies as the "fighting in Slovenia". 85/

90. On 27 August 1991, the EC indicated that it would not recognize any border changes as a result of the conflict. The EC also denounced the military support that the JNA had provided to the Serbian minority within Croatia 86/ and called upon the parties to agree to arbitration. On 1 September 1991, a cease-fire agreement was reached. 87/ The agreement, however, was not long-lasting. The truce collapsed when JNA and Serb irregular forces launched attacks on Croatian towns in Dalmatia, as well as the city of Vukovar. The fighting intensified throughout September 1991. Lord Carrington, who had been asked by the EC to help mediate the dispute, negotiated another cease-fire agreement in mid-September. However, that same day Yugoslav ships began their blockade of Croatia's Adriatic coast. On the following day, the Croatian cities of Split and Zagreb were shelled.

91. The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 713 on 25 September 1991, which imposed an arms embargo prohibiting weapons from entering the region. 88/ Following the adoption of the Resolution, the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez, asked former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to represent the United Nations as a mediator and to cooperate with Lord Carrington of the EC in resolving the conflict. 89/

92. As the fighting in Croatia continued, a coalition of Bosnian Muslims and Croats supported a declaration of sovereignty that was adopted by BiH's legislature. Bosnian Serbs, members of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS - Srpska Demokratska Stranka), refused to support the measure. Instead, they organized a referendum in predominantly Serb areas of BiH. The vast majority of Serbs voted to remain in "a common Yugoslav state". 90/
93. Between September and November 1991, ethnic Croatian regions within BiH formed their own "Croatian Communities". These communities, located in western Herzegovina, threatened secession if BiH became part of a Serb-dominated Yugoslav state. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party to which most Bosnian Croats belong, was split on the issue of independence. Mate Boban, the leader of Herzegovina's Croats, urged an irredentist position, seeking the linkage of Croat controlled areas in BiH with Croatia. Other prominent Croats, such as then Vice President Stjepan Kljujić, were committed to maintaining a multi-ethnic, independent state.

94. On 18 October 1991, Lord Carrington proposed a draft document calling for the protection of human rights and the establishment of autonomous regions in areas in which a minority ethnic group was dominant. Presidents of five of the six Republics agreed to the plan which also provided for a lose confederation. Serbia, however, rejected the agreement on 5 November. In early November, the coastal resort city of Dubrovnik fell under heavy bombardment and the EC ordered its peace monitors to withdraw from the city. By mid-November, the city of Vukovar fell to Serbian forces after an 86-day siege. Several early battles in Croatia occurred in the Krajina region, which is densely populated by Serbs. The conflict then spread to Slavonia, the region between Zagreb and Belgrade. In a major campaign, Croat forces attempted to expel Serbs from over 20 villages in western Slavonia, forcing thousands of Serbs to flee BiH. The Serbs, on the other hand, expelled thousands of Croats from villages in eastern Slavonia.

95. On 20 November 1991, Serbia petitioned the Arbitration Commission to recognize the post-conflict borders between Serbia and Croatia, and between Serbia and BiH, as international borders based on principles of international law. The Commission extended the protection of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter--concerning the principles of territorial integrity and political independence of member states--to the individual republics. This action marked the first time that the international community extended the concept of territorial integrity to political subdivisions within a state.

96. Representatives of Croatia, the FRY, and the Republic of Serbia, signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" on 27 November 1991. The agreement pledged the parties to comply with particular provisions of the Geneva Conventions.

97. The EC released guidelines in mid-December, which the Republics had to endorse before the EC would consider recognizing them as states. The guidelines required the Republics to respect the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and the Charter of Paris. The Republics were also required to disavow any territorial claims on the territories of other UN-recognized states. They were also to provide guarantees for the rights of ethnic groups and minorities.

98. Slovenia and Croatia accepted the EC guidelines and applied for recognition as independent states. A cease-fire agreement was reached between Croatia and Serbian forces on 3 January 1992. The agreement effectively ended the conflict. However, approximately one-third of Croatian territory was occupied by Serbian forces and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees. On 15 January 1992, the EC granted recognition to Slovenia and Croatia.

99. BiH accepted the EC's guidelines on 20 December 1991 and applied for recognition as an independent state. The Arbitration Commission, however, determined that the will of the Serbian minority had not been expressed in BiH's earlier declaration of sovereignty. Consequently, a
referendum was held on 29 February and 1 March - 63 per cent of the population supported independence. The Bosnian Serbs, however, boycotted the election, fearing that they would become a disadvantaged minority, permanently aligned against a coalition of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.

100. To help safeguard the cease-fire agreement in Croatia, the United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) was established on 21 February 1992. The UN deployed 14,000 troops, which were in place by July. The troops were deployed in United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia where ethnic Serbs are in the majority. UNPROFOR's original mandate in this region was to prevent a renewal of the conflict between Croats and Serbs, oversee the withdrawal of JNA forces, and assist in the return of displaced persons.

In the summer of 1992, UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded to provide for the delivery of humanitarian aid to BiH. UNPROFOR's role has repeatedly been strengthened, and by June 1994 UNPROFOR could request air power to enforce the mandate.

101. Early in March 1992, the EC attempted to negotiate an agreement that would bring peace to the area. At a meeting held in Brussels, between 7 and 9 March 1992, the EC approved a plan that would have maintained BiH's independence. However, the plan also permitted the division of BiH into ethnic cantons. The plan failed to receive the support of the various factions. The Serbs and Croats could not agree on how BiH's territory was to be divided. The Bosnian Muslims remained skeptical of any plan to partition the country.

102. Bosnian Serb leaders approved a constitution for the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH) on 27 March 1992. The break-away republic would become part of a reconstituted all-Serb state of Yugoslavia, containing a large portion of BiH—Serbia, Montenegro and parts of Croatia. On 6 April 1992, the EC formally recognized BiH. It was on this weekend, between April 4th and 6th, that the JNA and Bosnian Serbs began the shelling of Sarajevo.

103. Following the referendum in late February and early March, sporadic conflicts between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims occurred throughout the country. Road blocks, for instance, were set-up by Bosnian Serbs to demonstrate their displeasure with the referendum results. On 22 March, fighting broke out between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in Goražde. In late March, the fighting spread to Bosanski Brod and Kupres, where Bosnian Serbs battled Bosnian Croats for the control of territory.

104. In late March and early April 1992, the fighting spread to northern and eastern Bosnia, along the Serbian border. It was there that a pattern of "ethnic cleansing" first clearly emerged, with the JNA shelling a village, followed by an attack by paramilitary forces sent in to "cleanse the territory."

105. The UN condemned, on 24 April, the use of force and demanded that all outside parties cease interfering in the conflict in BiH. The UN also called for an immediate cease-fire and demanded that unrestricted access be given to all humanitarian organizations. On 27 April 1992, the former Republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the FRY (FRY). On 22 May 1992, the UN admitted Slovenia, BiH, and Croatia as member states.
107. The JNA announced the withdrawal of its forces from BiH on 19 May 1992. However, the troops, including General Ratko Mladić, who were from BiH, were permitted to stay and fight as part of the forces of the Serb Republic of Bosnia. Thus, approximately 80 per cent of the JNA troops stationed in BiH were permitted to remain. The tanks, equipment and supplies that belonged to the Yugoslav Army also stayed in BiH. 

Part Two

"ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN BiH

I. INTRODUCTION

108. This report examines the policy and practice of "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia. As used in this report, the term "ethnic cleansing" means rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. Reports received by the Commission of Experts allege that all of the parties involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia have committed "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. But, as the Commission noted in its Final Report, there are qualitative and quantitative differences. Thus, no "moral equivalence" argument should be advanced. The grave breaches and other violations of international humanitarian law include acts such as the killing of civilians, rape, torture, destruction of civilian, public, and cultural property, looting and pillaging, and the forcible relocation of civilian populations. Croatian forces in the Republic of Croatia and in BiH have engaged in "ethnic cleansing" practices against Serbs and Muslims. Croats, for instance, have conducted "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against Serbs in eastern and western Slavonia and some parts of the Krajina region, and against Bosnian Muslims in the Mostar region.

109. Bosnian Muslim forces have also engaged in practices which constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law. However, abuses by Bosnian Muslims have not been part of an "ethnic cleansing" campaign, and the number of reported violations is substantially lower than for those of the other warring factions.

110. The vast majority of reports received by the Commission allege that Serbian forces have used means such as the mass killing of civilians, rape and sexual assault, torture, the bombardment of cities, the destruction of mosques and churches, the confiscation of private property, unlawful detention of civilians in harsh and sometimes inhuman conditions, and other unlawful practices designed to eliminate Muslim and Croat populations that lie within Serb-claimed territory. Unlike the violations committed by the other warring factions, "ethnic cleansing" by the Serbs appears to be the result of a highly-developed policy that has been planned, coordinated, and financed by Serb officials with support from the FRY and the JNA which was, at times, directly involved in some of these operations.

111. "Ethnic Cleansing", as a practice, is not new to history nor, as the previous section on the history of the conflict has shown, is it entirely new to the Balkans. Ethnic conflict has been involved in efforts to establish nationhood and define national boundaries in the Balkans since the 19th century. This report, however, discusses "ethnic cleansing" as part of a broader policy, pursued by Serbian forces within BiH, Croatia, and the FRY, to create a "Greater Serbia".
112. The described events are put in a historical context. However, in Part I of this Annex, no attempt is made to assess the validity of historical claims by any of the warring factions. There is no justification under international law for committing crimes such as the deliberate killing, rape, and torture of civilians during an armed conflict. The distinction between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* instructs us that combatants are not necessarily responsible for the outbreak of war, but they are responsible for their conduct during the war. Even a just war can be fought unjustly. Those who have committed serious violations of international law should be held accountable, regardless of the justifications offered for the conflict itself.

II. THE POLITICS OF CREATING A "GREATER SERBIA": NATIONALISM, FEAR AND REPRESION

113. While the notion of establishing a "Greater Serbia" has deep historical roots, the concept gathered new momentum within Serbia during the mid-1980s. It was then that Serbian intellectuals and political leaders began to embrace a new nationalism. The decade of 1980 began with the death of President Josip Broz Tito and with demands by Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population for greater autonomy. While Kosovo's population is overwhelmingly Albanian, the province contains Kosovo Polje, the site of the Serbs' defeat by the Ottoman Turks in 1389. Kosovo is widely considered by Serbs to be the cradle of their culture. Demonstrations by Albanian students in Spring 1981 led to military intervention by Yugoslav military forces and the brutal repression of the dissenters. The demonstrations, which were accompanied by some violence against Serbs, gave rise to the allegation that the Serbs of Kosovo faced genocide at the hands of Albanians.

114. In the mid-1980s, Serb intellectuals, as well as public officials, took up the cause of Kosovo's Serb minority population. The SANU Memorandum, referred to in Part I of this Annex, expressed in emotional terms the plight of Kosovo's Serbs. The Memorandum, drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, was considered by many to be the heralding of a new ethnic nationalism. It was, apparently, instrumental in spreading anti-Albanian sentiment. Perhaps most important, it also placed the imprimatur of Serbia's most prestigious intellectuals on the cause of militant Serbian nationalism. Political figures such as Dobrica Ćosić, who was to become President of the FRY, and Slobodan Milošević, the President of the Republic of Serbia, embraced the cause of Kosovo's minority Serb population. Allegations of "genocide" against Kosovo's Serbs became commonplace.

115. The Serbs' sense of injustice was not confined to concern over events in Kosovo. The writings of Serbs throughout the decade reflect a strong sense of victimization. "The Serbs", Aleksa Dijlas has written, "more than any other nation of the former Yugoslavia, are fully convinced that history has treated them unfairly". Thus, the Serbs' collective historic memory recounts domination by the European powers, conquest by the Ottoman Turks, occupation by the Axis powers during the Second World War, betrayal by their fellow Slavs of the Croatian Ustaše regime, and discrimination under President Tito's communist government.

116. This "dark vision", stressing the role of the Serbian nation as a victim, has led to the demonization of Serbia's adversaries and the promotion of an idealized image of the Serbs. Thus, Croats have been repeatedly referred to as "Ustaše" and "fascists", recalling the animosities of the Second World War. In addition, Bosnian Serbs have been warned of the impending establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State,
although Bosnian Muslims are largely secular and committed to a multi-ethnic state. 134/

117. Just as political opponents of the regime were demonized, the attributes of Serbs were idealized. Jovan Rašković, who was to become a founder of Croatia's Serbian Democratic Party (SDSC), for example, wrote that "[t]he Serbs are . . . the only ones with an instinct for leadership and they must exercise it over the other peoples of Yugoslavia. They must dominate them." 135/ Croats, according to Rašković, "are castrated and afraid of everything. They cannot exercise any authority. It is up to the Serbs to guide them." On the other hand, "Muslims have anal-erotic personalities and are the sort who love to amass riches." 136/

118. Rašković, a psychiatrist, helped to organize the referendum on political autonomy for the Krajina Serbs in Croatia. The event led to an armed confrontation between Croats and Croatian Serbs. 137/ Shortly before he died, Rašković stated on Belgrade television that he felt responsible for having "lit the fuse of Serbian nationalism". There has been much speculation that Radovan Karadžić, also a psychiatrist, may have been influenced by Rašković's theories of Serb superiority. 138/ In May 1990, when Karadžić was asked if he had a role-model or mentor, he responded, "above all, Jovan Rašković." 139/

119. Although the war in the former Yugoslavia is fueled by past hatreds, it has also involved discrete policy choices by governmental leaders. "History can be a weapon, and tradition can fuel ethnic conflict", Donald Horowitz has said, "but a current conflict cannot generally be explained by simply calling it a revived form of an earlier conflict". 140/

120. As the Yugoslav nation disintegrated in the late 1980s and 1990s, each of the Republics that composed the state began to express strong nationalistic sentiments. As Part I of this Annex indicated, many Serbs living in Croatia were dismissed from their jobs and suffered other forms of discrimination as Croatia approached statehood. Croat officials also restored many of the symbols of the Ustaša state, which had been responsible for the mass murders of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies during the Second World War. Later, during the conflict in Croatia in the Spring of 1991, Croat forces "cleansed" Serb villages in western Slavonia. Croat paramilitary forces, such as the "Glavaš Unit" headed by Branimir Gavrić, have committed atrocities against Serbs similar to those committed by Serb paramilitary forces. 141/ Serbs living in Croatia then were genuinely fearful of Croatian nationalism. These apprehensions were exploited by some Serb leaders who increasingly viewed the cause of a "Greater Serbia" as the path to power.

121. Slobodan Milošević, for instance, reportedly pursued a domestic political strategy based "on appeals to a xenophobic and authoritarian version of Serbian nationalism". 142/ The strategy was designed to help him attain and consolidate his political power. 143/ In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, President Milošević used appeals to nationalist sentiment and Serbian unity to obtain and maintain his hold on the party leadership. In launching an "anti-bureaucratic revolution", the party leaders of Vojvodina--who were critical of Milošević's leadership--were accused of being "autonomists" (seekers of autonomy and opposed to Serbian unity) and removed from power. By 1989, Kosovo had been placed under martial law and the party leadership of Montenegro--who were also potential adversaries of Milošević--was forced to resign. As a result, according to Branka Magaš, "by 1989 Serbia had acquired control of four out of eight votes on the federal state presidency", and control over the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). 144/ Thus, as the 14th Extraordinary Congress was about to convene in January 1990, Serbia had already revoked the autonomous
status of its two provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo); established considerable control over Montenegro; and used military force (in Kosovo) to enforce Serbian rule.

122. In the early 1990s, Serbia's political leadership faced not only a dissolving nation-state, but also growing opposition within the Republic. Milošević labeled the Serbian anti-regime protesters "enemies of Serbia". In referring to his political opponents in the other Republics, the rhetoric became even less restrained. In addressing Serbia's parliament in 1991, for example, Milošević, said that:

"Serbia and the Serbian people are faced with one of the greatest evils of their history: the challenge of disunity and internal conflict. . . . All who love Serbia dare not ignore this fact, especially at a time when we are confronted by the vampiroid, fascistoid faces of the Ustashas, Albanian secessionists and all other forces in the anti-Serbian coalition which threaten the people's rights and freedoms." 147/

123. Within Serbia, some of Milošević's political opponents have promoted an even more aggressive nationalism. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS), led by Vojislav Šešelj, for instance, has accused Milošević of being too timid in protecting the rights of Serbs who reside outside of Serbia. An even more vehemently nationalistic party, the Serbian Unity Party (SSJ), was formed in November 1993 by Željko Rašnjatović (Arkan). The SSJ, which is based in Kosovo, failed to win any parliamentary seats in the 1993 election. 151/

124. Both Šešelj and Arkan control paramilitary units that have conducted "ethnic cleansing" campaigns in BiH. Arkan's "Tigers" allegedly have also engaged in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and in Serbia's Sandžak region, where a large Muslim community is located. 152/

125. Vuk Drašković, the leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DEMOS), while more moderate than Šešelj and Arkan, has also criticized Milošević for failing to adequately advocate a "Greater Serbia". The criticisms of Milošević suggest that his political opponents believe that even the most militant appeals to nationalistic sentiment resonate among Serbs.

126. In response, Milošević and the ruling party have taken repressive measures against the ruling party's opponents on both the right and left. Vuk Drašković, for example, was arrested after a demonstration in June 1993 and his party offices were raided by police. The Serbian Prosecutor General has asked the Constitutional Court to ban Drašković's Serbian Renewal Party. The Constitutional Court previously had been asked to ban another political rival, the Sandžak Democratic Party. 156/

127. Government control and manipulation of the mass media have been used to generate support for a "Greater Serbia" and to selectively punish dissenters within the mass media. The UN's Special Rapporteur on Human Rights recently expressed concern over "the incitement to national and religious hatred in public life and in the media". He also stated that "leading political figures make inflammatory and threatening statements against minority groups on a regular basis". According to the report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights,

"[t]he prevailing climate of ethnic and religious hatred is also encouraged through misinformation, censorship and indoctrination by the media. . . . In particular, the coverage of atrocities committed in the conflict between Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
selective and one-sided. The media denigrates Muslims and Islam through sensationalist and distorted accounts of historical and existing 'crimes' which they have committed 'against the Serbian people' while grave violations perpetrated against Muslims are either rarely reported or discounted as malicious accusations forming part of an 'anti-Serbian conspiracy.'" 159

128. There have also been allegations that President Milošević ordered the dismissal of journalists who have publicly criticized the government's war policies. 160/ Glenny, for example, has stated that Milošević ordered a thorough purge of Politika and Radio-Television Belgrade. 161/

129. The resentments bred by virulent nationalism have also proved to be instrumental in engendering the support of some Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. For instance, Serb leaders, including Karadžić and Milošević, have taken advantage of the resentments that had grown among the recently urbanized Serb populations in BiH and Croatia. In BiH, for example, many Serbs had emigrated to more urbanized areas in the hope of finding greater material prosperity. Often, however, they have remained less affluent than their Muslim neighbours. The allure of pillaging Muslim and Croatian communities has become a means of attracting new adherents to the cause of a "Greater Serbia". 162/

130. The growing nationalistic sentiment, and the repression of dissent, created an environment in which support for establishing a "Greater Serbia" could flourish. In fact, the objective of establishing a "Greater Serbia" has been endorsed by the major Serbian leaders and political parties both within and outside of the Republic of Serbia. President Milošević, for instance, who is also the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), has repeatedly stated that all Serbs should enjoy the right to be included in Serbia. 163/ In August 1991, the Belgrade newspaper, Borba, reported that:

"[Milošević] believes he now has the historic opportunity to, once and for all, settle accounts with the Croats and do what Serbian politicians after World War I did not--rally all Serbs in one Serbian state." 164/

131. Vojislav Šešelj, 165/ the head of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), stated that he hoped to see "the republics of BiH, Macedonia and Montenegro, and the Serbian areas of Croatia. with the borders at Karlobag, Karlovac, and Virovitica" incorporated into Serbia. 166/

132. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM), headed by Vuk Drašković, also has called for the creation of a "Greater Serbia" which would include Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Macedonia and Montenegro, as well as regions within BiH and Croatia with high concentrations of Serbs. 167/ In addition, Mihajlo Marković, the Vice President of the Main Committee of Serbia's Socialist Party, has urged the rejection of any solution that would make Serbs outside Serbia a minority. 168/ The optimal solution, according to Marković, would entail establishing a federation consisting of Serbia, Montenegro, BiH, Macedonia and Serbs residing in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina, Slavonia, Baranja, and Srem. 169/

133. A preliminary step towards formally creating a "Greater Serbia" took place when representatives from the Serb Republic of BiH and delegates from the break-away Serb republic in Croatia voted to merge into "one government, one army, one police and one administration". 170/ However, the President of the Serb Republic of Bosnia, Radovan Karadžić, has repeatedly denied that the creation of a "Greater Serbia", is the Bosnian Serbs' objective. 171/
134. These factors framed the backdrop to the resurgent Serbian nationalism that emerged. This revived nationalism would spur the quest for a "Greater Serbia" and help to launch the "ethnic cleansing" campaign that was to follow.

III. PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE "ETHNIC CLEANSING" CAMPAIGN

A. Preparing for War

135. The history and demographics of the BiH region leave little doubt that any attempt to establish "ethnically pure" areas will necessarily entail tremendous dislocations and bloodshed. Ethnic Serbs constituted approximately 34 per cent of the population of the former Yugoslavia, according to the prewar census. 172/ Within BiH, Serbs accounted for approximately 31 per cent of the population. In BiH, however, the areas of Serb preponderance are not contiguous; they are primarily located in the north-east, south-east and north-west portions of the country. Moreover, the areas in which Serbs are dominant include substantial percentages of ethnic minorities, primarily Bosnian Muslims and Croats. 173/

136. Prior to its break-up, a central political problem of the Yugoslav state lay in the numerical and political dominance of the Serbs over other ethnic groups. A critical issue in BiH has been how Bosnian Serbs could come to terms with a numerically and politically dominant coalition of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. 174/ Facing the prospect, real or imagined, of becoming a permanent minority aligned against a coalition of Muslims and Croats, the Serbs adopted an irredentist strategy. Serbs residing outside the Republic of Serbia would be united into one political unit - a "Greater Serbia". As a military strategy, this has been described as "the consolidation of Serb-held territories in BiH, the eradication of Muslim enclaves within them such as Goražde, and the severance of any possible military links between Muslims in BiH and those in the Sandžak area of Serbia". 175/ The strategy is reflected in the Serbs' "ethnic cleansing" campaign. The areas that have been cleansed can be represented by an arc which extends from Goražde in the south-east and follows the Drina River through Zvornik, Banja Luka and Prijedor. The arc continues along the Sava and Korenica Rivers, which form the boundaries with the Serb Krajina area. Through the practice of "ethnic cleansing", the goal of creating a "Greater Serbia" has largely been achieved. Serbian forces now control approximately 70 per cent of BiH and one-third of Croatian territory.

137. In late June 1991, as the 10-day conflict with Slovenia was coming to an end, 176/ violence again erupted as the Yugoslav Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitary groups mounted an attack on the Slavonian village of Osijek, in eastern Croatia. In the following weeks, similar attacks would occur in numerous Croatian villages, such as Čeliče and Bobota. In these villages, the homes of non-Serbs were looted and burned as the Serbs' "ethnic cleansing" campaign commenced. In the months that followed, the city of Vukovar in eastern Slavonia would be almost completely destroyed. On the Dalmatian coast, the ancient city of Dubrovnik would be shelled.

138. The shelling of Dubrovnik (like the later attack on Prijedor, in BiH) indicates that Serbian ethnic cleansing is not confined to areas in which Serbs are a majority of the population. Ethnic Serbs occupied approximately 11.6 per cent of Croatia and 32 per cent of BiH prior to June 1991. As would later occur in BiH, a breakaway government (The Serb Republic of Krajina) was formed in Krajina, an area of Croatia heavily populated by Serbs. By the time a cease-fire was signed in Spring 1992, Serbian irregular forces and the JNA
had captured one-third of Croatia's territory; over 16,000 persons were killed, and there were hundreds of thousands of refugees. 177/

139. In a pattern that would be repeated in BiH, local Serb forces in Croatia would coordinate their military operations with the JNA. In Serb-controlled areas such as Knin, in the Krajina region, and in eastern Slavonia on Serbia's border, non-Serbs would be expelled from their homes. The forced evacuation of non-Serbs would often be followed by the resettlement of Serbs in the homes of those who had fled. There is strong evidence that massive human rights violations have occurred in Croatia, including the mass execution of Croatian prisoners in Ovcar, outside of Vukovar in November 1991. Helsinki Watch has also reported that in Serbian Krajina, Serb authorities have executed Serbs who were willing to reach an accommodation with Croat officials.

140. The first sustained clashes between Serbian and Bosnian Muslim forces occurred in the Spring of 1992. 178/ This violence erupted after BiH's Declaration of Independence on 1 March of that year. The level of violence escalated following the European Community's recognition of BiH's statehood on 6 April 1992. 179/ There is evidence, however, that the JNA, the Republic of Serbia and Serbs in Croatia and BiH were preparing for war as early as 1990. It was then that the Yugoslav military began providing arms to Croatian and Bosnian Serb groups and encouraging unrest in Serb-populated regions of Croatia and BiH. 180/ In a project (operating under the acronym "RAM") coordinated from Belgrade, thousands of weapons were reportedly delivered to Serbs in Bosanska Krajina in the north-west, Herzegovina in the south-west, and Romanija, a mountainous area east of Sarajevo. 181/

141. In August 1991, Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković released a tape-recorded conversation between Serbian President Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs. According to Misha Glenny, the tape recording revealed that Milošević instructed Karadžić to accept delivery of weapons. The arms would be supplied by General Nikola Uzelac, the head of the Banja Luka Corps. 182/

142. According to a report appearing in the Ljubljana newspaper Delo, an additional plan was developed by the JNA to supplement RAM. The plan reportedly called for the mass killings of Muslims and the use of mass rapes as a weapon of psychological warfare. 183/ According to the Delo article, the JNA plan stated that, "[a]nalysis of the Muslim's behaviour showed that their morale, desire for battle, and will could be crushed most easily by raping women, especially minors and even children, and by killing members of the Muslim nationality inside their religious facilities". 184/

143. As the war in Croatia continued, the JNA began military movements in BiH. 185/ The federal army relocated its troops from the cities to the countryside and deployed units at major communications points. 186/ In late 1991 and early 1992, as the war in Croatia came to a close, the JNA redeployed troops from Croatia to BiH. 187/ The 37th Corps, for instance, was transferred to the 4th military district in Sarajevo. 188/ The Corps' headquarters was established in Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina. 189/ JNA's General Staff appointed only Serbs and Montenegrans to fill the higher posts in the redeployed units. 190/

144. The JNA also adopted a new defence plan in early 1992 calling for the protection of the Serbian population outside of Serbia. Territorial defence units in Croatia and BiH were to be supplied with small arms, artillery, armour and missile launching systems. 191/ Moreover, the Ministry of Defence of the Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs) in Croatia and BiH were to be subordinated to the Serbian Ministry of Defence. The JNA and the SAOs were to
coordinate their defence plans and jointly protect their external borders and constitutional system. 192/

145. In the months preceding the independence referendum, the JNA also began to disarm Bosnian troops. The JNA maintained that in order to secure the peace in BiH, it must place all of the Republic's weapons in the hands of the federal army. 193/ The disarmament campaign ostensibly included weapons held by Bosnian Serbs, thus the campaign to collect the weapons initially had the support of the Bosnian government. 194/ The net effect of these measures, however, was that by Spring 1992, the JNA was in an advantageous position to launch its "ethnic cleansing" campaign and establish a "Greater Serbia". According to James Gow, a military analyst at King's College, University of London:

"[a]s a result of these measures, the Serbs had succeeded in prepositioning their forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of their strategy of securing the infrastructure that was to be a part of a 'mini-Yugoslavia', carving up the new state in the process: the eastern part was to be attached to Serbia, the southern part to Montenegro, and the western part to Serb-populated and -occupied regions in Croatia."
195/

146. In April 1992, when the conflict in BiH broke out, the JNA had approximately 80,000 troops deployed there. In early May, General Ratko Mladić was appointed JNA commander. Under pressure from the international community, on 19 May 1992, the FRY announced that it was withdrawing its forces. However, Yugoslav officials said that JNA196 personnel from BiH could remain there and fight on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.197 Thus, General Mladić and 55,000 JNA troops, as well as JNA military weaponry and equipment, were transferred to the Territorial Defence Forces of the SRBiH. 198/

B. Implementing the "Ethnic Cleansing" Campaign 199/

147. In the weeks following BiH's recognition by the European Community, JNA and Bosnian Serb forces attacked Bosnian towns such as Prijedor 200/ and other villages in the Kozarac region 201/ of north-east BiH, and Zvornik 202/ in north-west BiH. Similar attacks have occurred in countless cities and villages along the Drina and Sava Rivers. The purpose of the attacks seems clear - both north-east and north-west BiH have high concentrations of Bosnian Serbs. Serb forces have sought to consolidate their control over these territories and link them with each other, as well as with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia. 203/

148. These attacks have followed a similar pattern. First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the area. In many cases, Serbian residents are told to leave the area before the violence begins. The homes of non-Serb residents are targeted for destruction and cultural and religious monuments, especially churches and mosques, are destroyed. 204/ Second, the area falls under the control of paramilitary forces who terrorize the non-Serb residents with random killings, rapes and looting. 205/ Third, the seized area is administered by local Serb authorities, often in conjunction with paramilitary groups. 206/ During this phase, non-Serb residents are detained, beaten and sometimes transferred to prison camps where further abuse, including mass killings, have occurred. 207/ Non-Serb residents are often fired from their jobs and their property is confiscated. Many have been forced to sign documents relinquishing their rights to their homes before being deported to other areas of the country. 208/
149. In Prijedor, for example, witnesses have stated that there was tension between the three ethnic groups, Muslims, Croats and Serbs, prior to the Serbs' seizure of the town on 30 April 1992. Serbian authorities assumed control of Prijedor through a nighttime coup. The next day, Muslims were dismissed from their jobs at hospitals and schools. Bosnian Serb snipers positioned themselves on rooftops.

150. The takeover was engineered by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), working in conjunction with the JNA. In addition, paramilitary forces, known as "White Eagles" roamed the streets. A curfew was imposed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. In the following weeks, prominent non-Serb residents were arrested, such as the President of the local chapter of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). In mid-May, the JNA attacked surrounding villages and towns.

151. On 30 May 1992, the military attack on Prijedor began. There was some resistance from the Patriotic League, a group of Muslims and Croats who served in the local militia, but the battle lasted less than fourteen hours. JNA and paramilitary forces took an active part in the conflict. The following day Muslims and Croats were forced out of their homes and interrogated. In many cases, their homes were robbed during their absence. Many non-Serbs were later taken to prison camps. In Bosnian villages such as Bukovica, Mala Vukovica, Tombak and Zajir, similar attacks occurred and the entire non-Serb populations of these towns appear to have been killed or deported.

152. According to a report by Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), the non-Serb population in the outlying villages in the Kozarac region suffered a similar, and sometimes worse, fate. Based on interviews with 60 residents from the Kozorac region who had been held in prison camps, the study found that:

(a) The siege of the area appeared well planned; for example, television programmes from Sarajevo were blocked before the conflict began and replaced with programmes originating in Belgrade.

(b) Prominent and well-educated citizens were targeted to be killed—many were doctors, teachers and political leaders; after non-Serb residents were taken from their homes and gathered together, a Serbian militiaman, whose face was hidden by goggles, identified the persons who were to be killed; they were either shot or their throats were slit.

(c) Females as young as 12 years of age were raped.

(d) The region contained 13 mosques, a Catholic church and an Orthodox church; all were destroyed (apparently, the Orthodox church was unintentionally destroyed by shelling).

(e) Mass executions took place in Hambarine, Rizvanovići, Rakovčani Biščani, Sredići and Čarakovo; three-quarters of the 4,500 inhabitants of these villages appear to have been executed.

(f) Male and female non-Serbs were separated and taken in convoys to prison camps at Keraterm, Omarska, Manjača and Trnopolje; at the camps prisoners were subjected to beatings, torture and summary executions.

(g) Three persons interviewed told of a mass execution of male prisoners from Trnopolje who had been taken on a convoy towards Bosnian lines apparently to be released; all of the approximately 250 men in the convoy
were taken off, lined up and shot; 11 survived and eventually found their way to a Bosnian-Muslim zone.

153. The attack on Zvornik, in north-eastern BiH, reveals a similar pattern of events. \(219\) In the weeks prior to the attack (which occurred on 8 April 1992), tensions between ethnic groups in the city had increased. \(220\) Members of each ethnic group had obtained weapons for their personal use. Muslims were warned by their Serb friends that they should leave the area. \(221\) Prior to 8 April, many Serbs left Zvornik, apparently having been forewarned of the impending attack. On the weekend before the attack, Serbs constructed a barricade, preventing many Muslims from reaching their work site or school. In retaliation, Muslims also erected a barricade at the same location. It was protected by Muslim police officers and armed volunteers. \(222\)

154. On the day before the attack, JNA troops moved into the region. On television, a Belgrade commentator reported that the JNA was needed in the region because they expected an attack by Muslim extremists. \(223\)

155. On 8 April, Serb representatives of SDS, as well as the paramilitary leader known as "Arkan", called for the Muslims to peacefully surrender the city. \(224\) Negotiations proceeded in which the division of the city into Muslim and Serb enclaves was discussed. The negotiations broke down, however, apparently because Arkan was dissatisfied with the result. \(225\)

156. After the failure to reach an agreement, the attack on the town began. The JNA, using tanks, artillery and infantry units, was joined by Arkan's paramilitary troops, sometimes known as "Arkanovci". \(226\) There was heavy shelling of the Muslim sections of the city. \(227\)

157. The next day Arkan's troops, along with paramilitary units known as "Šešeljovci" \(228\) and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles), \(229\) entered the city. Serb territorial defence units (TOs) also participated. It was reported that these troops committed random executions and rapes after entering Zvornik. \(230\)

158. The next day, a provisional government was established that was headed by local Serbs, primarily members of SDS. A curfew was imposed, and residents had to obtain a police permit to travel within the city. Several Muslims who went to the police station to obtain a permit were taken into custody and deported to an outlying prison camp. Except for indispensable personnel such as hospital employees, Muslim men were prevented from working. \(231\) During the following days, paramilitary units continued to patrol the streets, and there were many reports of looting, rape and other acts of brutality. \(232\)

159. In late April, an appeal was made to Muslims to return to the area from which they had fled. Many returned because they feared losing their property. \(233\) On arriving in Zvornik, Muslims were told that they must register their property. An "agency for the exchange of houses" was established. In exchange for relinquishing their homes, Muslims were promised the former homes of Serbs in Tuzla. Departure from the town was only possible on the condition that their property was turned over to Serb authorities. \(234\) From late May to early June 1992, the entire Muslim populations of villages in the surrounding area were deported. The expelled Muslims were allowed to take few personal possessions with them. Even these items were often stolen at Serb check-points on the roads leaving the area. \(235\)
160. According to an account in *Vreme*, the "cleansing" was followed by organized looting. "Some stole gold, hard currencies, household appliances or cars. Others robbed department stores. Electricity plugs were torn out of the walls and children's toys were sold and bought. Even entire bedroom suites could be seen floating down the river". 236/

161. The events in the Kozarac region and in Zvornik demonstrate the use of terror to expel Muslims from Serb-claimed land. Killings, rapes and torture were carried out in a manner that was designed to frighten the non-Serb population into leaving and never returning to the area. Thus, killings, and sometimes rapes, are committed openly, often in front of large numbers of witnesses. 237/ In other instances, however, killing seems to have been an end in itself. The UN's Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, for example, found that Serb troops prevented civilians from escaping the encircled town of Cerska by ambushing Muslims as they attempted to flee. 238/

162. Borislav Herak, a captured Serbian fighter, has stated that before attacking Muslim families near the village of Vogošća, Serbian commanders described the military operation as "čišćenje prostora" (cleansing the region). 239/ According to Herak, his unit had been told to leave no one alive. 240/ Herak stated that his unit was:

"... told that Ahatovici [a village near Vogosca] must be cleansed Serbian territory, that it was a strategic place between Ilidza and Rajlovac, and that all the Muslims there must be killed ... We were told that no one must escape, and that all the houses must be burned, so that if anybody did survive, they would have nowhere left to return to. It was an order, and I simply did what I was told." 241/

163. Herak admitted to killing 29 persons. He killed many of them in their homes by shooting them or slitting their throats. He also said that he had raped and murdered eight Bosnian Muslim women and abandoned their bodies on hilltops and other deserted places.

164. According to a news report of Herak's confession, "his account offered new insights into the ways that tens of thousands of civilian victims of the war have died, most of them in towns and villages where there have been no independent witnesses". For example, Herak said that he saw a Serb unit machine-gun 120 men, women and children in a field outside of Vogosca. Their bodies were transported to a railway yard, piled in an open pit, doused with gasoline, and set afire. 242/

165. A similar pattern of killing occurred in many prison camps. Although the prisoners had already been forcibly removed from their homes, many were deliberately tortured and killed anyway. In the Omarska camp, for example, Serbian guards were said to have executed prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 every few days. 243/ Instances such as these suggest that mass killings are not always committed for the purpose of terrorizing others into fleeing. In at least some instances, the killing of non-Serbs appears to be an alternative means of "cleansing" Serb-claimed territory.

166. According to Pero Popović, a former prison guard at the Bosnian-Serb prison camps of Sušica, executions at that camp were a nightly occurrence from June through September 1992. 244/ A victim of the camp also reported that men were frequently shot to make room for more civilians who came from the nearby town of Vlasenica. The former prison guard stated that mass executions also took place, generally in reprisal for the killing of a local Serb. In mid-June 1992, he stated that he witnessed the killing of 26 persons. However, he estimated that at least one thousand persons had been executed in mass killings at the camp during the summer of 1992. Popović also
reported that shortly before the camp was closed, a decision was made to execute the 200 surviving prisoners. According to Popović, "[o]ver half of them were taken up to the ravine and shot", while the others were put to work digging trenches. 245/

167. "Ethnic cleansing" campaigns have continued through 1994. In September 1994, for instance, over 500 Bosnian Muslims were reportedly driven from their homes in Bijeljina, in northern BiH. In addition, more than 2,000 persons were expelled from their homes in the areas of Banja Luka and Rogatica. A United Nations official characterized these expulsions as "a final push to create a Serb-only state". 246/

IV. ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR "ETHNIC CLEANSING"

A. Civilians

168. Among Bosnian Serbs, there appears to be widespread involvement in various aspects of "ethnic cleansing". Neighbours have attacked Bosnian Muslim and Croat families whom they have known for years; and they have guarded them at prison camps as well. Serb families have moved into the homes of Muslims and Croats who had been killed or expelled. Serb civilians have also taken part in looting the homes and stealing the possessions of Muslim and Croat families. 247/ In many cases, however, it is not known whether civilians acted pursuant to orders from Serb authorities. 248/

169. Many Serbs, on the other hand, have taken actions to help persons of other ethnic groups and have protected them from harm. Serbs who have helped their neighbours, however, risk being labeled as traitors by local Bosnian-Serb officials.

B. Police Units

170. The involvement of civilian police units in "ethnic cleansing" has primarily involved the deportation and detention of non-Serbs. Serb police forces, for example, were chiefly responsible for the forced movement of civilian prisoners from the detention facility at Trnopolje to the town of Travnik in BiH. 249/ Reports indicate that from 150 to 200 men were taken from two buses and summarily executed in a mountainous area known as Vlaši. 250/ In addition, police units were involved in administering the detention facility at Omarska. 251/

C. Paramilitary Units 252/

171. Paramilitary units are responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of "ethnic cleansing". Two of the units that have played a major role in the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in BiH, the "Četniks" associated with Vojislav Šešelj and the "Tigers" associated with Željko Ražnjatović (Arkan), have been active in the Republic of Serbia as well. 253/ Šešelj's followers have reportedly waged "ethnic cleansing" campaigns against ethnic minorities in Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. 254/ Arkan's "Tigers" have staged military training exercises allegedly designed to intimidate Albanian residents in Kosovo. 255/

172. In addition, Mirko Jović's "Knights" and Dragošlav Bokan's "White Eagles" are also based in Serbia. Šešelj, Arkan and Jović are also leaders of political parties in the Republic of Serbia. 256/
173. Šešelj's "Četniks" have reportedly committed some of the worst atrocities of the conflict. In the Krajina region of Croatia, for example, members of Šešelj's "Četnik" forces are believed to have participated in the torture of Muslim civilians at the Prijedor detention facility. 257

174. A former monarchist, Šešelj dropped his support of Prince Alexander when the Prince praised the democratic elections held in Slovenia and Croatia. 258/ He has stated that he envisions a Serbia whose borders encompass all of BiH, as well as Macedonia and Serbian areas of Croatia. 259/ In August 1991, Šešelj told a Der Spiegel interviewer that his troops received weapons from Belgrade. Šešelj's troops are sent "from Belgrade to the crisis areas" in Croatia and BiH. "If there are 20 to 30 Četniks in every village, this is sufficient to encourage the people there", Šešelj said. 260/ Troops loyal to Željko Ražnatović (Arkan) have been most active in eastern BiH, 261/ such as Zvornik 262/ and Bijeljina. 263/ The "Tigers" have a reputation for extreme brutality. Photographs taken at Bijeljina, for instance, show Arkan's soldiers shooting Muslims and kicking their corpses. 264/

175. The "Tigers", and Arkan himself, allegedly have been involved in organized plunder. A Belgrade journalist who was with the "Tigers" at Zvornik reported that Arkan's troops stole television sets and VCRs. After expelling Muslim families from their homes, they even dug up gardens looking for buried valuables, such as jewelry. 265/ These plundered goods are loaded onto trucks and transported across the Danube to Serbia where they are resold.266

176. Although Arkan has described himself as being a "sweet shop proprietor", he is reported to be involved in a number of businesses including a detective agency, a chain of money-exchange shops and gas stations. 267/ Arkan, who was born in Slovenia, reportedly has a criminal record dating back to his teens. 268/ He is alleged to have been involved in bank robberies throughout Europe. Sweden, and other countries, have outstanding warrants for his arrest on charges of bank robbery, attempted murder and other crimes. 269/ According to NIN, Serbia's major news weekly magazine, 270/ the Italian police are seeking Arkan in connection with the 1974 murder of a restaurant owner. The Yugoslav press has also reported that Arkan is suspected of being involved in the 1983 slaying of a Croatian oil company executive. 271/

177. Šešelj's Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Arkan's Serbian Unity Party (SSJ) have competed in elections for Serbia's parliament. Arkan's SSJ is based in Kosovo and has pursued a militantly anti-Albanian policy. 272/ SRS has a substantial presence in Serbia's parliament, having 39 seats in the 250-seat legislature. Šešelj's party received 13 per cent of the votes cast in the December 1993 elections. Arkan's Serbian Unity Party failed to take any seats. 273/

178. During the 1993 election campaign, Milošević's Socialist Party (SPS) accused SRS and its supporters of committing war crimes against Bosnian civilians. According to an account in Borba, Milošević supporters "furnished allegations and eyewitness accounts" of Četniks under Šešelj's command slaughtering civilians and stealing property. 274/ The allegations appear to have been prompted by a motion of no confidence in Milošević's government that SRS introduced on 7 October 1993.275 Šešelj has accused members of Serbia's Socialist party of committing war crimes, as well.276

179. Dragoslav Bokan's "White Eagles" borrowed its name from an organization that was active during the Second World War. According to Bokan, it was "the
only orthodox anti-communist movement at the time. Bokan revived the former organization when he returned from the United States in 1990.

180. The "White Eagles" were active in Borovo Selo, Croatia in 1991. According to Bokan, his troops operated under the direction of the Territorial Defence units (TOs) established in Serb-controlled territory in Croatia and BiH. Bokan has stated that the "White Eagles" were not permitted to control territory that had been seized.

181. Dragoslav Bokan was arrested in 1992 for the possession of a hand grenade and bullets found in his apartment. He received a suspended sentence of six months imprisonment. Following his arrest, Bokan severed his relationship with Mirko Jović, the head of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO). When the war in BiH broke out, Bokan said that he "started [his] private war" and departed for Rajlovac in BiH. Although Bokan has been identified as a suspected war criminal, he has claimed that he does not "belong to [sic] the same bag with the people on the list of Helsinki Watch" (i.e., Arkan and Šešelj).

182. The paramilitary forces of Arkan and Šešelj appear to have received support from the Serbian government, or agencies within the government. For example, while Serbia's Defence Minister has disavowed any involvement with Arkan, he has indicated that Arkan is protected by Interior Ministry officials.

183. Šešelj has criticized the federal army and has stated that "[w]e retreat immediately if the army appears". However, he has also stated that his paramilitary forces have received weapons from the JNA, if only "discarded German guns". Šešelj, as a member of Serbia's parliament, is a public official.

D. The Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Civilian and Military Officials

184. The top civil and military leaders of the break-away republic have also been identified as having committed war crimes. For example, Radovan Karadžić, the President of the Serbian Republic, and General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the BSA, may be held accountable under the principle of command responsibility for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and for crimes against humanity committed under their direction or with their knowledge.

185. President Karadžić cooperated with Serbian President Milošević in arming Bosnian Serbs. Karadžić's role in planning "ethnic cleansing" activities with Milošević was mentioned earlier. President Karadžić has continued his control over the military units that have shelled civilian targets in Sarajevo. He has also publicly stated that "almost all of the [Bosnian Serb] commanders are under our [the Serbian Republic's] control".

186. Roy Gutman has also reported that close associates of Karadžić have been directly involved in military assaults, such as the attack on Foča in April 1992. For instance, Velibor Ostojić, a minister in the Serbian break-away government, is said to have "conceived and organized war crimes in the Foča region, helped plan and organize the arming of Serbian Democratic Party members, prepared the attack and invited paramilitary forces from Serbia "to undertake the armed conquest of a large portion of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina..."
and ethnic cleansing through annihilation, terror, persecution, detention, mistreatment and murder". 295/

187. General Ratko Mladić, a former officer in the JNA, became a commander for the breakaway Serb Republic of BiH in May 1992, just days after he had been assigned to BiH by Serbia's President Milošević. 296/ Before coming to BiH, he had commanded troops in the war in Croatia. 297/ He is known to have ordered the shelling of Sarajevo's civilian areas. 298/

188. Mladić's military campaigns are characterized by fierce artillery barrages designed to level enemy towns. 299/ Colonel Gajo Petković, a former editor of the military journal Narodna Armiija, has described Mladić's tactics as "giving vent to his inherent sadism". 300/ Several groups have identified Mladić as a suspected war criminal; most recently, allegations have centred on Mladić's shelling of the civilian population of Goražde which killed 390 persons and wounded more than 1,000 of the city's residents. 301/ It has also been reported that General Mladić has recruited persons convicted of violent crimes to serve in the Bosnian Serb Army. Persons serving lengthy prison terms for violent acts have had their sentences suspended after agreeing to join the Bosnian Serb troops. 302/

E. The Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Civilian and Military Officials 303/

189. There is substantial evidence that President Slobodan Milošević and JNA forces have been involved in the conflict in BiH from its inception. Moreover, their involvement has continued.

190. As previously mentioned, paramilitary units operating within BiH are based in the Republic of Serbia and have also conducted "ethnic cleansing" operations within the Republic of Serbia (in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Sandžak). 304/ Šešelj reportedly has regularly transported plundered goods from BiH across the Danube to Serbia, with the apparent permission of Serb authorities. In addition, paramilitary groups have established training centres in Kosovo, where they operate free from interference from Serbian police and the JNA. 305/

191. The JNA, according to numerous reports, was involved in the conflict in Croatia from its inception. When the Serbs of Croatia's Krajina region declared their independence, there was a massive transfer of heavy weapons from the JNA to Serb paramilitary forces. In addition, there was an influx of supplies from Serbia itself. Serb paramilitary units operating in Croatia have worn federal army uniforms and used JNA topographical maps. They also were able to obtain a large number of sophisticated weapons and vehicles. 306/

192. Coordination between the JNA and local Serb forces was apparent in the destruction of Vukovar in 1991. A mass grave found at Ovcara is thought to contain the remains of at least 200 Croats who had been taken from a Vukovar hospital, summarily executed, and buried in a shallow grave.

193. According to military analyst James Gow, after the FRY announced its withdrawal from BiH in May 1992, its assistance to Bosnian Serbs continued. The Belgrade government, for example, continued to supply Bosnian Serb troops. Gow has stated that "General Ratko Mladić maintained daily contact with both the Bosnian Serb and the federal Yugoslav Defence Ministries in Belgrade; and officers in the field claimed that they could not hold their fire until they received orders from Belgrade". 307/
194. Milan Vego, writing in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, has also reported that the defence plan adopted by JNA in 1992 called for the federal army to protect Serbs outside of Serbia. 308/ The plan called for the transfer of JNA's *command structures into Territorial Defence Units and supplying these forces with small arms, artillery, armour and missile launching systems. The Ministry of Defence of the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAO) in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was subordinated to the Serbian Ministry of Defense.* 309/

195. According to UN observers, the JNA's involvement has been even more direct. For example, a Yugoslav army jet was observed as it dropped a cluster bomb on a Muslim-controlled hill near the centre of Sarajevo in June 1992. 310/ UNPROFOR officials have also stated that the JNA has been directly involved in the attacks on Srebrenica. According to a US Senate Committee report, JNA artillery units positioned themselves in Bratunac, or Bosnian territory, in order to better target the city. 311/

196. Reports from military analysts also indicate that Serbian forces in BiH regularly receive supplies and military equipment from Serbia. This includes fuel for aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles. Serbian tractor-trailers, including oil tankers, reportedly deliver supplies to BiH on a daily basis. Serb vehicles transport these supplies and equipment from north-west BiH, across the Drina River to Bijeljina and then to Banja Luka and other cities in western BiH. 312/

197. For the military discussion, and the implementation of the policy of "ethnic cleansing", see Annex III, Military Structure; Annex III.A, Special Forces; and Annex VIII, Prison Camps. The case-study of Zvornik follows in this Annex and the case study of Prijedor is contained in Annex V.

198. In August 1994, President Milošević tacitly admitted that the Belgrade government had supplied arms to Bosnian Serbs. In announcing that it would sever most political and economic links to Serb-held portions of BiH, Milošević stated that the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb state "would not survive" without aid from Serbia. 313/ News reports of the embargo imposed by Serbia on Serb-controlled territory in BiH noted that Milošević's government has been the "principal source of weapons, supplies and political support" for Bosnian Serbs. 314/

Part Three

REPORT ON "ETHNIC CLEANSING OPERATIONS" IN THE NORTH-EAST BOSNIAN CITY OF ZVORNIK FROM APRIL THROUGH JUNE 1992

I. INTRODUCTION

199. This report reconstructs the genesis and pattern of the expulsion ("ethnic cleansing") of nearly the entire Muslim population of the city of Zvornik. While attempting to evaluate events in a detailed and chronological manner, the investigation focused primarily on the identification of those responsible for the military operations, for war crimes and for human rights violations. The study also sought to identify a likely structure or distinct system of operations, ranging from the attack on the city to the expulsion of its Muslim citizens.
200. The investigation relied on information that the Ludwig Boltzman Institute for Human Rights (BIM) obtained from a preliminary evaluation of 500 interviews which were part of an interview study of some 900 Bosnian refugees from the Zvornik region. It was conducted within the context of the research project "Human Rights Violations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Perspectives for Repatriation and Integration of Bosnian Refugees" (subsequently "BIM-project"). In addition, complementary information was obtained from additional interlocutors, as well as from 31 in-depth interviews conducted by the BIM.

201. The Institute designed a complex questionnaire using open and closed question techniques, as well as a special "check list" available to the interviewers only. The purpose of the latter was to double-check and question events and reports recounted already once, and to clarify remaining questions. The BIM interviewed individuals whose names and addresses were known to the Institute, and who are knowledgeable about the events described in this report. Some of the interviewees had occupied key positions in the socio-political life of the city.

202. In one part of the questionnaire the respondents were asked to identify the groups participating in the military attack and in the expulsion units of the former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and paramilitary units. Furthermore, respondents were asked to render these troops' positions during the military operations, and to describe any likely cooperation between the single units.

203. The expelled respondents were also asked to reconstruct the course of the events in chronological order. The following phases were identified for this purpose:

(a) Phase 1: The time prior to the attack.
(b) Phase 2: The attack itself from 8 to 10 April 1992.
(c) Phase 3: The time up to the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April 1992.
(d) Phase 4: The time after the fall of Kulagrad until 15 May 1992.

204. Subsequently, the expelled respondents could recount freely how they had experienced the individual phases, with particular focus on the behaviour of units of the former JNA, the paramilitary troops (former territorial defence units and guerilla units), the members of the militia, and the Serbian Democrat Party (SDS), all of which stayed in the city. The interviewers initiated the response to each phase asking the following question: "Please describe as exactly as possible how you experienced the respective phase". In addition, the interviewer could use the above-mentioned "check-list" on every phase to complement the open-question technique, if necessary. Furthermore, structured questions had been prepared regarding important events during the attack, as well as during the occupation (ultimatums, call to return after the first escape wave, forced registration, forced expropriation, deportation, detention in camps, war crimes, human rights violations, etc.).

205. During the interviews, the expelled respondents could rely on two city maps: one of the city of Zvornik itself and the other of Karakaj industrial area situated outside the city limits. These maps served to identify the positions of the troops participating in the attack, the starting points, targets, and the developments of the military operations, as well as the site of "concentration camps", particularly in Karakaj.
206. The interviews were conducted by experienced, bilingual interviewers, who had been particularly trained for the special requirements of the report. They took place in the Austrian federal states of Vienna, Lower Austria, Styria, in the refugee camp near Gabelkovo, Slovakia, and in the refugee shelter in Düsseldorf, Germany, between 10 and 28 March 1994. The interviewers themselves translated the records from the Bosnian or Croatian language into German.

II. SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA

207. According to the 1991 census data, the district of Zvornik had a population of 81,111: 48,208 (59.4 per cent) of which were Bosnians Muslims and 30,839 (38 per cent) were of Serbian nationality. A total of 14,600 people lived in the city of Zvornik, 8,942 (61.0 per cent) of them were Bosnians Muslims, 4,281 (29.2 per cent) of the Serbian nationality, 74 (0.5 per cent) of Croatian nationality, and 1,363 (9.3 per cent) were defined as "others".

208. The following additional municipalities are relevant for the study: The municipality of Jardan north of Zvornik, which includes the towns of Jardan and Lipovac, had a population of 2,503, with a 53.1 per cent share of ethnic Serbs, and a 46 per cent share of Bosnians (Muslims). These villages were situated at the border to the industrial area of Karakaj, where JNA units were stationed prior to the attack; later the "headquarters" of both the "Serbian militia" and the JNA units were moved there, and several camps were established. The municipality of Čelopek, situated north of Jardan, had a population of 1,894, of which 93.1 per cent were of Serbian nationality and 6.3 per cent were Bosnians (Muslims). Well before the attack, units of the former JNA were stationed in Čelopek.

209. In 1981, a total of 27,095 (38.5 per cent) people held jobs - 9,487 of them in the farming and forestry sector and 18,308 in the non-agrarian sector. The total number of self-employed was 2,202. The "Birac" company in the industrial area of Karakaj was the biggest single local employer. It produced preliminary material for aluminum production (it was one of the biggest producers world-wide and part of the "Energo Invest" concern in Sarajevo).

III. STRATEGIC SITUATION OF ZVORNIK

210. Being a border town situated at the Bosnian-Serb Drina river, Zvornik had a strategically important position. It is significant because Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are linked at that point not only through a road bridge between the Zvornik urban area and the Karakaj industrial zone, and another one in Zvornik itself, but also via a railroad bridge between Karakaj and the town of Čelopek. Thus, Zvornik represents an important link along the Belgrade-Sarajevo line, as well as within the Belgrade-Tuzla line.

211. Control over Zvornik meant that possible troop or logistical movements from Serbian territory towards Tuzla or Sarajevo could be accomplished without any hindrance. The early deployment of units of the former JNA indicates that the plan to secure control over the two corridors of Belgrade-Tuzla and Belgrade-Sarajevo, via control over Zvornik, was pre-conceived. For the Bosnian side, Zvornik was strategically important only in a defensive sense, i.e., to interrupt the above-mentioned supply lines. Moreover, because of its geographic location, Zvornik was not relevant to the armed conflicts and military movements within BiH and Herzegovina.
IV. MILITARY SITUATION (JNA AND PARAMILITARY UNITS)

212. Apart from units of the former JNA, paramilitary units (guerilla-type units, "volunteers", and members of the former Territorial Defence units (TO)) participated in the attack as well as in the ensuing occupation of the city. The following formations could be identified as the main participants:

A. JNA

1. Identification

213. Officially, there was no garrison of the former JNA in the Zvornik district. The Zvornik region itself was controlled by the 17th Corps Tuzla. Up to the fall of 1991, the 17th Corps consisted of 3 brigades and one partisan brigade, and was part of the First Military District of Belgrade.

214. After the re-organization of the JNA in the spring of 1992, it formally fell under the command of the Second Military District of Sarajevo, but most likely continued to be led by the First Military District of Belgrade.

215. By the turn of the year 1991/1992, preliminary tank units (apparently from the abandoned Jastrebarsko garrison in Croatia) were stationed near Zvornik. By February or March 1992 (at the time of the referendum on independence), additional units of the former JNA-tank units and artillery and anti-aircraft positions were stationed in the Zvornik region. Initially, the tanks still carried the JNA emblems. It was only later that they were replaced by the Serbian flag and the coat-of-arms emblem. But, the troops themselves, officers and soldiers, had Serbian badges (showing a Serbian flag on the front part of the beret and on the upper arm).

216. On the Serbian side of the Drina river bank, various tank positions could be identified as well. Additional forces, including artillery, anti-aircraft weaponry, and tanks were being positioned there.

2. Units involved

217. According to witness accounts, former JNA troops from the following garrisons were involved during the attack:

(a) Garrisons

   (a) Tuzla (BiH): some of the tanks used in Zvornik were part of the units which were transferred from Jastrebarsko, Croatia to Tuzla.

   (b) Bijeljina (BiH): The infantry divisions of the former JNA were reserve units of the mobilization base, Bijeljina.

218. Members of the units from Tuzla were already stationed near Zvornik, particularly on the Bosnian side of the Drina river bank, prior to the attack. In Čelopek, in the "Dom Kulture", there were "small barracks" housing roughly 100 soldiers (infantry unit); moreover, there were also barracks in "Novi Standard" in Karakaj, which purportedly housed more soldiers than the ones in Čelopek. According to accounts by some of the individuals interviewed, the soldiers accommodated in both towns were from Tuzla; even General Janković from Tuzla is said to have visited the unit. But there is also some evidence that the infantry units in "Novi Standard" belonged to a newly-formed so-called territorial defence force (see B. Paramilitaries, below), while the one
at the "Dom Kulture" in Čelopek was the reserve unit from Bijeljina. Another facility for soldiers was said to have been located in an apartment building in Meterize. Soldiers were put up in the workers' apartments of the "Birac" company, while the Muslim population was expelled.

219. The planes and helicopters which participated in the aggression are also reported to have come from Tuzla.

(a) Novi Sad (Serbia) 316/
(b) Šabac (Serbia)
(c) Sremska Mitrovica (Serbia) 317/
(d) Valjevo (Serbia) 318/

220. Prior to the attack, these units were partly stationed along the Serbian side of the Drina river bank, and partly on the Bosnian side. They further participated in the attack on Zvornik, operating from Serbian territory. One unit from Šabac purportedly was housed in the "Dom Kulture" in Mali Zvornik. It was further claimed that there was a "small barracks" also in Radalj north of Mali Zvornik.

(a) Niš (Serbia) 319/

221. There were indications that a "special unit" from Niš might have been involved in the attack on Zvornik and later on Kulagrad. This could have been part of the 63. Airborne Brigade NTS of the "Special Task Corps Belgrade". It was specially trained to handle "issues pertaining to the policies of domestic security".

222. Infantry units which had been withdrawn from the combat area in Croatia (Vukovar) and which were reported to have been involved in the aggression against Zvornik could not be allocated in greater detail.

3. Commanders

223. A number of commanding officers were reported, but their names were not included for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Zvornik was part of the second Military district of the JNA after its reorganization.

4. Armament

(a) General

224. Canons 122 millimetres and 130 millimetres; howitzers 60 millimetres, 80 millimetres, and 120 millimetres, T 12; Anti-aircraft artillery; Samohodka; Tanks T 55, T 84, T 72 and 3 "Marda(er)" armoured personnel carriers with 2 automatic canons; T 54, T 55, T 34, older versions; transporters; 2 kinds of anti-tank grenade launchers; Machine-guns M 70A and M 70B; hand grenades fired from M 59 and M 66; (portable) mortars; knives and bayonets.

(b) Infantry

225. Machine-guns M 52, M 65, M 66, M 70A, M 70B, M 72; hand grenade launchers Zolja; kalashnikov; knives.
(c) Air Force

226. MIG 21 and Mig 29, Jastreb with machine-guns and gunners, Gallop, "Eagles" (aerial photographs); helicopters MT 6 or MT 8, actually only for procurement of food and weapons (except for an attack operation against Liplje and Sekovici on April 9 around 12:00) MT 9, Gazella.

B. Paramilitary units

1. General remarks

227. Paramilitary units, except for Arkanovci, were under the authority of two identified JNA officers. However, regarding their non-military actions, the paramilitaries operated without any reservations, particularly when murdering or looting.

228. Apart from the Arkanovci, who participated in the attack, the most important paramilitary units were the "territorial defence units" (TO), the Šešeljovci, and the Beli Orlovi. It was not possible to distinguish these three units clearly from each other, nor from the infantry divisions of the former JNA.

229. Regarding the infantry units, there is evidence that these units were not only composed of the "regular members" of the former JNA and of mobilized reserve forces, but also of "volunteers". Several of the individuals interviewed said that they had noted that prior to the attack, (i.e., in March 1992), and throughout the attack, the soldiers--and, some claimed, officers as well--no longer wore the badges of the former JNA. Instead, they had Serbian badges and cockades. However, at that time, the vehicles and machinery still had the old Yugoslav identity symbols. Moreover, many soldiers wearing "old JNA uniforms", used a "white band" on the upper arm as additional identifying marks. This identification only made sense if somebody wanted to distinguish himself from the uniformly dressed soldiers. At the time of the attack on Zvornik and during its occupation, such a distinction was only relevant if one stood out among "other JNA units", or among "forces in JNA uniforms" which participated (with the "Serbian side") in the attack, since a Muslim counterpart did not exist in this form. Furthermore, the soldiers wore long beards, which would not have been permitted for a regular member of the former JNA. Moreover, the description of how these units looked and where they were stationed corresponded to the description and location of the "territorial defence units", the Šešeljovci, and the Beli Orlovi, provided by other respondents. Members of the latter three units have also frequently taken part in the attack in composite units.

230. Some of the officers of this reserve infantry unit came from the Zvornik region while at the same time being well-known SDS activists.

231. In addition, respondents said they had recognized the same persons from the surrounding towns in Serbia proper showing up one time with the Šešeljovci, another time with the Beli Orlovi, and then again with the "volunteer forces".

232. The so-called "territorial defence" (TO) was reportedly integrated into the infantry units of the JNA at a later point.

233. Most of the members of the Beli Orlovi could be recognized by their "white eagles". The Šešeljovci could be recognized because of the fur caps and cartridge bands which they carried in a cross-shaped manner over their chests.
234. Thus, it is fair to assume that an essential part of the infantry belonged to the newly-formed "territorial defence units", which purportedly were established for the Zvornik region approximately six months prior to the attack on the city.

235. Nevertheless, a differentiation of these groups has been made below. Regarding the units of the former JNA, it was assumed that infantry units had already existed.

2. Territorial Defence (TO)

236. Shortly after the dissolution of the Yugoslav territorial defence in BiH (in the fall of 1991), SDS leaders in Zvornik began recruiting, equipping, and apparently also training a new "Serbian territorial defence". Most of their members came from Serbian villages (Čelopeč, Šemlije) near Zvornik, or from Serb-populated parts of Zvornik (Lisići). Its commando base was in Karakaj.

237. However, many of those interviewed also pointed out that the TO's headquarters was reportedly in Lisići. The unit itself stayed at the "Novi Standard" in Karakaj. These forces wore old JNA uniforms. Like all other paramilitary units, they cooperated with the JNA and honoured their command. Being locals, they could have had a special role, i.e., as informants for the military officers, and later in the looting and the turning-over of rich and important Muslims to the Arkanovci. The TO arrived early in the attack, shortly after the arrival of the Arkanovci.

3. Arkanovci ("Srpska Dobrovolska Garda"/"Serb Volunteer Guard")

238. Their hair was cut short, and they wore black woollen caps, black gloves cut off at mid-finger, and black badges on the upper arm. According to descriptions by other witnesses, they wore multi-colored uniforms, red arrows, knit caps, a badge showing the Serbian flag on the right arm, and an emblem showing a tiger and the words "Arkanove delije" on the shoulder.

239. A main characteristic was their strict disciplinary code. The supreme command was held by Arkan. Other well-known figures apart from Arkan included "Rambo" (Arkan's brother-in-law, who was killed in the battles over Kulaqrad) and a number of identified persons who committed and ordered torture, killings, and other violations.

240. The Arkanovci, and in particular Arkan himself, are unanimously described as the key figures in the attack. During the actual attack operations, Arkan's standing was reportedly above that of the commanders of the former JNA, as well as that of the leading figures of the local SDS.

241. Arkan reportedly arrived in Zvornik on 8 April. It has been confirmed that he not only participated in "negotiations" on Zvornik's future on 8 April and the following day, but that he actually dominated those talks. An ultimatum for the surrender of the town and of the weapons in the morning of 9 April was reported to have been announced by Arkan himself. Members of the Arkanovci were reported to have been present in the city since the end of March.

242. Their participation in the fighting began on 8 April with mortar fire and attacks by snipers located in Mali Zvornik. They conquered the city and assumed control of it on 9 April. They conquered the most important bases and took control of the city until they could hand it over to the Serbian...
administrators. Throughout the battle, the Arkanovci were supported by JNA artillery and logistics.

243. Later the securement of the city was taken over by other groups, Šešeljovci, Beli Orlovi, the so-called "territorial defence", and "volunteers" from neighbouring towns in Serbia. After the occupation of the city (10 or 11 April) the core troops left Zvornik, but later returned when necessary, as was the case with the attack on Kulagrad.

244. The Arkanovci were highly mobile and had many privately owned vehicles. Apart from their "military tasks", the Arkanovci were responsible for many of the atrocities and lootings. Arkan himself ordered Muslims and patients from the hospital to the execution sites. They were responsible for mass killings and murders. For example, Arkanovci murdered 4 men in the house of Salim Donjić, and committed massacres in Zamlaš and Hrid (about 150 people). In the morning of April 9, they were said to have committed another massacre in Vidakove Njive and at the access road in Zvornik. Also, they purportedly committed a massacre in the "Klempić" coffee house that same morning. However, this might refer to the same massacre, as the coffee house was situated in the direction of Vidakove Njive.

245. They had a reputation of being extremely cruel. There is indication that they had lists containing the names of rich Muslims whose gold and money were stolen. Local Serbs were accused of having drawn up these lists. For example, the Arkanovci were reported to have been accompanied by local Serbs during the first few days as they went from house to house, killing and raping the residents and looting the buildings. The "right to be the first to loot", which they apparently enjoyed, obviously served as a means of "payment".

246. Their armament included: guns and grenades; automatic rifles M 70A, M 70B and US rifles, "Škorpion" rifles, hand grenades; anti-tank launching grenades; ropes for choking people; long "Rambo-style" knives; only light weapons; bullet-proof jackets.

4. Šešeljovci

247. They are described as "bearded" men. They wore Serbian military berets with the Serbian flag on the front side, or black fur hats with a Serbian cockade. A further identifying characteristic was their ammunition which they wore in a cross-shaped manner over their chests, and the hand grenades on their belts.

248. The leaders wore a giant pointed fur hat with a coat of arms. Several of them were identified.

249. Reports said they were always drunk, and they always recruited additional new people, criminals, or "weekend fighters". They are said to have been particularly active as regards violence against civilians.

250. It was difficult to identify their headquarters. Some mentioned the "Standard" in Karakaj, the companies "Inžinjering", "Alhos", and "Vezionica" in Karakaj, the hotel "Drina" and the pre-school in the radio station.

251. Members of the Šešeljovci were already present as civilians prior to the attack. It is further reported that Šešelj himself had been in Zvornik to meet with his local party friend Boško Ceranić. They participated in the attack very early on and stayed involved throughout the entire period of the occupation until the seizure of Kulagrad. They assumed control of various
parts of the city and were responsible for lootings everywhere. They always cooperated with the JNA, both with regard to strategy and command structure.

252. Their armament included: automatic rifles M 59, M 66, M 70A, M 70B; long, curved knives, hand grenades; ammunition worn in cross-shape over chest.

5. Beli Orlovi (White Eagles)

253. They were sloppily dressed and wore uniforms from various JNA stocks, or civilian clothes, and had a white eagle badge on the cap and the upper arm. For the most part they came from surrounding towns in Serbia (Loznica, Valjevo, etc.). Their headquarters, too, was hard to locate. They reportedly have stayed in the "Alhos" together with the Arkanovci, and in the "Jezero" hotel.

254. They only participated (like the Šešeljovci) in the second wave of the attack. Their "task" was to assist in the fighting, and to secure strategic points. They participated in the shelling, siege, and occupation of the city, as well as in the later attack on Kulagrad.

255. Apparently, however, they were primarily responsible for arrests, deportations (securing of deportations), and looting. They were frequently seen near road crossings, in the streets, etc., drunk or provocative. They repeatedly held up or arrested "suspects" on the street, or took what the Arkanovci had left after pillaging the city. They drew white eagles on houses and storage buildings, and it was forbidden to remove them. They cooperated with the JNA.

256. They had only light weaponry (no details given).

6. Draganovci

257. The Draganovci of "Kapetan Dragan" (Captain Vasiljković Dragan) was another important unit. Although it did not participate in the attack, it played a key role later in the occupation of Žvornik. Members wore red (French) berets, were rather well disciplined and dressed properly. Their commander "Kapetan Dragan" was described as second in importance to Arkan. The Draganovci arrived at the end of May and participated only occasionally in the fighting. Their "main task" was patrolling the city, executing deportations, and intimidating the population. Their headquarters was at the hotel "Vidikovac" in Divić.

258. They had only light weaponry (no details given).

7. Other formations

259. Other formations participating during the entire course of the raid included: Anticevci (who are being blamed for one massacre in the district of Srpska Varoš on 15 April); special forces of the local Serbs wearing a stocking tied over the knee; Serb volunteers from Loznica, Šabac, Valjevo (dressed in black), who may have been part of the Beli Orlovi; the "Dušan Silini" unit which also may have been part of the Beli Orlovi; the Group of Pusula from Rastošnica, a Group from Padsinska Skela (prisoners; big black hats with shining ribbons; cowboy-look); and the Vukovarci.

260. Many partisans, particularly from the towns of Loznica, Valjevo, and Šabac, apparently came to the city as part of several groups (Šešeljovci, Beli
Orlovi, "volunteers"), and at various times. All of these partisan units carried only light arms.

V. CHRONOLOGY

261. For a chronology of the aggression, the following classification was used: after a brief outline of the time preceding the attack, the period of the aggression is differentiated along two lines of development. The first line covers the military events, i.e., the (military) attack on Zvornik and the decisive attack on Kulagrad just two weeks later. The second line illustrates the civilian development in the town, which can be clearly split into different phases that are linked to the military developments. Accordingly, the crucial moment in the civilian development line is the attack on Kulagrad on April 26. A further decisive disruption of civilian life occurred in mid-May.

A. The time before the attack

262. As could be observed in the context of the BIM project, social life between the various ethnic groups rapidly deteriorated in the months before the attack. There were tensions in the workplace, at school and in the neighbourhood. Each ethnic group began to distance itself from the others. There was an increasing militarization of the society, and the Serbian side was suspected by the respondents to have been informed about any kind of impending action.

263. There are various pieces of evidence indicating that both the attack and the expulsion of the Muslim population was pre-planned.

264. About 2-3 months prior to the attack, military training exercises lasting up to 2 weeks were conducted in Osmaci near Kalesija and other villages. The JNA organized these exercises and only Serbs were invited under the pretext that the TO had to be trained.

265. Already in the weeks prior to the attacks, members of all ethnic groups procured weapons for their personal use. According to those interviewed, Serbian citizens of Zvornik obtained their weapons mainly through the SDS or the JNA, while the Muslim population procured weapons through "private channels". 320/

266. In regard to the month of March preceding the attack, there was agreement among the respondents—and this was also consistent with the results of the BIM project—that many Serbs left the city for the weekend, but showed up back at work on the following Monday. It cannot be proven that this was an SDS-organized training exercise for the evacuation of Serbian citizens in the event of an actual attack on Zvornik. However, there were strong reasons to assume that this was an organized action. For example, a majority of Serbian families had left town over the weekend. Likewise, women and children of Serb nationality were away from the town when the attack began.

267. In the days preceding the attack, respondents were repeatedly warned by Serbian friends and colleagues that they had better leave the town rather soon. This supported the assertion of many respondents that the Serbian inhabitants of Zvornik had been informed about the attack, at least on short-notice.

268. On the weekend before the attack (4 or 5 April), a barricade was erected near Meterize by Serbs using company trucks owned by the firm "Boksit" (a
bauxite pit at Milići, 30 km south of Zvornik). On the following day, 6 April, Muslims were prevented from going to work. Additionally, students going to the technical training centre at Karakaj were forced to turn back at the barricade.

269. These events, as well as the fear of a military conflict, were also causing many Muslim families to leave the town via the Old Bridge. In reaction to the Serbian barricade, the Muslims erected a barricade of their own at the same site which was composed of trucks and protected by the Muslim police and by armed volunteers. Initially, however, there were only verbal conflicts going on at the barricades. Demonstrations were held at the barricades, in the course of which members of all ethnic groups advocated a state of peaceful coexistence.

270. On 6 April, a few days before the attack, the local police force was divided. The police headquarters in Zvornik was liberated by the Serbian police staff, who transported the weaponry, equipment and vehicles to the industrial zone of Karakaj in the north of Zvornik. In the weeks before that, there had still been joint patrols driving around the town and at the bridges in order to demonstrate the togetherness of the two ethnic groups.

271. Already, on 6 and 7 April, a large part of the Muslim population of Lipovac and Karakaj fled to Zvornik. On the evening of 7 April, i.e., one day before the attack, the large numbers of JNA units present were explained by the Belgrade TV station as being due to an impending attack by "Muslim extremists" positioned on the Kulagrad hill.

272. On 8 April, negotiations took place in Mali Zvornik between the SDS from Zvornik (Branko Grujić), the Party of Democrat Action (SDA) from Zvornik (district president Asim Jusbašić), and Arkan. The talks reportedly aimed at a "peaceful surrender of the city", i.e., a "capitulation by the Muslim population". Moreover, the two representatives from Zvornik apparently reached an "agreement" which aimed at dividing the city. The centre of the city of Zvornik would remain "Muslim", while the northern part, including the Karakaj industrial zone, would be "awarded" to the Serbs. According to one person interviewed, who had briefly talked with the chief negotiator of the SDA shortly after the meeting, the SDS and the SDA agreed to this scenario. However, the SDA representative still feared an attack, since Arkan was said to have been dissatisfied with this meeting and reportedly announced that he would take charge of things from then on. According to similar reports, Arkan even attacked the two other individuals. In the morning of 9 April, negotiations were also conducted in Mali Zvornik, but they were not successful. This pattern of negotiations was designed to calm the other side, while concurrently preparing a military attack, which had been observed on the international level, was thus applied locally as well.

B. The attack on Zvornik

273. The military attack on Zvornik occurred on 8 April. Later, there were sporadic military operations with units of the former JNA cooperating with paramilitary units. These operations mainly focused on the medieval fortress of Kulagrad, situated to the south-west of Zvornik, where some dozen resistance fighters were holding out. However, on 26 April, this fortress was conquered in a concerted attack by former JNA troops, with air support, and by paramilitary units. Immediately after the fall of Kulagrad, the town of Divić, situated south of Zvornik, was attacked. Divić was almost exclusively populated by Muslims and was situated at the hydro-electric power plant. Since Divić could also be controlled from Kulagrad, the aggressors did not consider a decisive attack on Divić possible until after the capture of
Kulagrad. Diviç was also considered a "Muslim stronghold" from where strong resistance could be expected, and where the power plant dam might possibly have been mined.

274. The attack on the town was conducted both from the Serbian side and from Bosnian territory, using tank forces, artillery, and infantry units with portable mortars. JNA units and paramilitary units cooperated. Arkanovci operated in front-line positions, taking the city. Their core troops left the city after the successful attack to prepare a raid on the next city, Bratunac.

275. The attack began on the morning of 8 April, with mortar fire on the Bukovik and Meterize city districts, as well as on the Muslim-held defence positions on the Debelo Brdo hill. It came from the artillery positions in Karakaj, from the Bosnian side before Meterize, and from the Serbian side of the River Drina (Mali Zvornik). First shots were fired in the Meterize suburb. This attack was mainly carried out by the heavy equipment of the JNA (artillery and tanks). There are also reports of Arkanovci snipers firing from Mali Zvornik on the opposite river bank, and of snipers aiming at residents from positions on highrise buildings in Zvornik itself. The Muslim position on Debelo Brdo, however, fell on that same day and was occupied by the aggressors.

276. During the night there was heavy shelling of the town. The capture of the city did not begin until the following day, 9 April. In the morning, there were again negotiations with Arkan, which ended in an ultimatum for the surrender of weapons and the town by 8:00 a.m. At 8:00 a.m. artillery fire started again, followed by the capture of the town by the infantry. The Arkanovci assumed a leading role in the take-over of the city, proceeding from the north via the Bukovik and Meterize city districts heading for the city centre. In addition, infantry units of the JNA in cooperation with "Serb volunteers" (Šešeljovci, Beli Orlovi, "TO") also took part in the seizure of the city. They approached the city primarily from the west—via Šemlije and Lisljnjak in a "second wave". It was reported that on the very first day, as well as during the subsequent weeks, there were random executions, rapes, and massacres. In these, the units of the Šešeljovci, Beli Orlovi and the so-called "territorial defence" were also involved. On 10 and 11 April, Zvornik was captured. The Kulagrad fortress north of Zvornik and the town of Diviç bordering Zvornik to the South had not yet been occupied.

277. The attack on Kulagrad and Diviç

277. Kulagrad is a settlement in the vicinity of a medieval fortress on the Kula hill, located on the south-western outskirts of Zvornik. In view of the geographical location of Zvornik and the strategic positioning of the attacking units, there were only two escape routes open to the population after the beginning of the artillery fire: either to the east across the Old Bridge to Serbia or in a south-western direction via Kulagrad and Liplje to Tuzla. Kulagrad and Liplje were only used as short stopovers and, during the period after the attack, had to accommodate highly fluctuating numbers of refugees.

278. On 9 April, artillery attacks on Kulagrad started as the attacking units were expecting major Muslim resistance forces. Even before the attack, Serbian media reported that "several thousand Muslim extremists" were hiding in Kulagrad. In fact, there were probably no more than a few dozen armed Muslims under the command of a former JNA officer who spontaneously organized a resistance movement with light equipment (small arms).
279. From 11 April onward, there were almost daily attempts by small combat groups from various paramilitary units to capture the fortress. These attempts failed, however, despite the fact that Kulagrad was constantly under fire from mortars, anti-aircraft guns and tanks. The reason for this failure might be due to the apparent lack of coordination of the attacks, as well as deficiencies in the training of the infantry units involved.

280. On 25 April, an identified senior JNA officer presented an ultimatum to the inhabitants of Diviće to turn in their arms. The defenders of Kulagrad had been given a number of ultimatums since the beginning of the attack on April 11. The last ultimatum came on 26 April, the day of the decisive attack on Kulagrad.

281. In the morning of 26 April, the villages around Kulagrad were the first to fall in the wake of a concerted attack. At the same time, Kulagrad and Diviće were attacked by heavy artillery fire from the Serbian bank of the Drina river. This enabled the attackers, who this time had coordinated their actions, to capture Kulagrad. The units were able to approach the fortress from all directions, including from the power station in the south. In addition, the attack was conducted more effectively. Some respondents stated that a special unit, possibly members of the 63rd Niš parachute brigade, were involved in the decisive attack and the seizure of Kulagrad.

282. The Muslims remaining in Kulagrad, along with the other inhabitants and refugees in Kulagrad (approximately 100 persons), left town at approximately 10:30 a.m. together via Liplje in the direction of Tuzla. In Liplje, they were only able to stay very briefly, as later that afternoon this village was also taken by the aggressors without any resistance. On the same afternoon, paramilitary units marched into Diviće and pilages were reported. Some time later, Diviće was also occupied by the JNA.

283. Thus, the attack on Zvornik and the capture and occupation of the city took place before 5 May (i.e., prior to the time when the Yugoslav national Presidium officially gave up the supreme command over the units of the JNA in BiH). Those troops originating from "left-over Yugoslavia" were given orders by the Belgrade national Presidium to withdraw from BiH.

VI. CIVIL DEVELOPMENTS IN ZVORNIK AFTER THE ATTACK

A. From the aftermath of the attack on Zvornik until the fall of Kulagrad

284. Control over the "civil administration" was first in the hands of the so-called "emergency staff" which above all included members of the local SDS and the militia. Some of these persons were also integrated into the so-called "territorial defence". On the basis of a document, it becomes clear that the "emergency staff" not only was in existence on 8 April, but had already decided on an "ordinance on the introduction of the general work requirement" within the borders of the Serbian district of Zvornik. All workers were required to report to their employer. However, already during the early days of the aggression (around 10 April), a "Provisional Government" of the so-called "Serbian District of Zvornik" was founded.

285. A few days later (around 10 or 11 April) the above-mentioned "ordinance on the introduction of the general work requirement", along with an extension of the deadline, was broadcast by Radio Zvornik. But this appeal was not followed either, as there were still numerous paramilitary troops in town who were looting and terrorizing the locals. Therefore, the appeal was broadcast once more a few days later (approximately 15 or 16 April). The overall
response to these appeals was however rather poor. The experiences of those who did follow the appeal to return to the workplace showed that the true purpose of this appeal, and of others that followed, was to monitor the male Muslim inhabitants.

286. Immediately after the occupation of the town, a night curfew was imposed which remained in force until the "ethnic cleansing" was completed. During the day, men were allowed to move around only with a permit issued by the Serbian police at Zvornik. Many of the men who went to Karakaj (or later to the police office in Zvornik) in order to apply for a "permit" were suddenly deported into one of the camps in the industrial district of Karakaj.

While at the camp, they were subjected to severe torture and murder, in particular by members of the paramilitary troops whose quarters were partly in the same buildings as those in which the prisoners were detained. The detainees were entirely at the mercy of their torturers. Many of the men, therefore, did not dare to pick up their passes themselves, but remained in hiding in houses. However, even persons with a pass were not safe from random aggressions by the numerous paramilitary units in town. It was reported by some witnesses that immediately upon leaving the police station, they had their passes taken away or torn into pieces by members of a paramilitary group. Some of them were attacked and deported into camps.

287. Women were permitted to leave the house during the daytime in order to go shopping. However, they were obliged to cross the old bridge to Mali Zvornik (Serbia) as the stores in Zvornik had already been looted. At the check-points on the bridge, the women were frequently molested. There were also several reports of rape.

288. From the onset of the occupation, Muslims were prohibited from working, except for persons deemed indispensable by the aggressors (e.g. hospital personnel, who were not released until the end of May). Everyday life was dominated by the fact that marauding paramilitary troops, who were not controlled by any authority, terrorized the Muslim population of Zvornik.

289. There is little available data on the behaviour of the local Serb population because the respondents were almost exclusively Muslims. Also, there were only a few Serbs left in Zvornik at the time of the attack. When asked why they thought the Serbs had left town during that period, many respondents expressed a suspicion that the Serbs "had been fully informed" and had therefore left town in time before the attack. This suspicion is substantiated by the fact that some of the Muslims were warned by Serbian friends about an impending attack. Apart from that, local Serbs took part in numerous acts of violence in town as members of paramilitary groups and units of the police and the SDS. Apparently, it was disadvantageous for local Serbs to talk to the Muslim inhabitants. However, there were also reports indicating a positive behaviour on the part of the Serbs. These reports included cases of food being supplied as well as the much-cited example of a young Serbian woman whose throat was cut by fighters of paramilitary units when she tried to protect her Muslim friends.

B. After the fall of Kulagrad

290. There is agreement on the fact that after the fall of Kulagrad the situation in Zvornik became less strained. Many members of the paramilitary units, as well as parts of the troops of the former JNA, were reported to have left town by the end of April. Many of the Serb inhabitants who had also fled from Zvornik returned to town. The SDS started to organize an administration in the new "Serbian District of Zvornik".
291. At the end of April, probably immediately after the fall of Kulagrad, the "Serbian District of Zvornik" issued a further appeal for the Muslim refugees to return to Zvornik. On the basis of a large number of consistent reports, the message of the appeal could be summarized as follows: the situation in town was back to normal and everyone would be able to return unharmed. Any personal property would have to be registered with the Zvornik police by 15 May as it would otherwise fall to the "Serbian District of Zvornik". This appeal to return was broadcast daily for a period of approximately two weeks by Radio Zvornik, Radio Loznica and, most likely, also by the Belgrade TV station in a variety of versions. The appeal was more successful with the escapees than an earlier appeal to return to the workplace.

292. The fear of losing their property as well as the situation in town seemed to have been the decisive reason for an astonishingly large number of persons to return. However, the normalization and the establishment of a regular municipal organization, in connection with the appeal to return, had grave consequences for the Muslim inhabitants. Now that the paramilitary groups had left town again, it was possible to convert the existing general chaos into an organized "Serbian administration" of the town. The systematic conduct of the "ethnic cleansing" procedure was only possible after a large part of the Muslim escapee population had returned. Therefore, it was not until the fall of Kulagrad that one could actually speak of an organized expulsion of the Muslim population.

293. Consequently, after a relatively short time, around 10 May, the situation for the Muslim inhabitants began to deteriorate again. New paramilitary units came into town, breaking into Muslim homes, frightening the residents and mistreating them in a variety of ways, as well as frequently deporting men in the camps at Karakaj. In particular, former members of the SDA fell victim to such deportations into the camps in Karakaj or Batković near Bijeljina. The militia and other local Serbs who were frequently referred to as members of the SDS appear to have been regularly involved in these aggressions. There seems to have been a further exacerbation of the situation around the end of May or the beginning of June. This is seen by some respondents as being linked to the arrival of the Draganovci in town.

VII. EXPULSION AND ORGANIZED DEPORTATION

294. After the stage of "unorganized" expulsion of the Muslim population by means of terror, the next step was to prepare the total expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants with the support of administrative measures. The first step had already been the appeal to return. The registration of property that was mandatory for all inhabitants, including the Serbian population, served above all the purpose of registering the male Muslim population. For this reason, only men were eligible for registration, which had to be completed before the "Serbian municipality" or the "Serbian militia", even if a property was originally registered under the wife's name. As a result, these registrations led to arrests and deportations to camps, apparently on the basis of pre-established lists.

295. An "agency for the exchange of houses" was set up, to which the Muslim inhabitants were to transfer their houses. In return, the Muslims were promised houses belonging to Bosnian Serbs (e.g. in the Tuzla region) who supposedly had also assigned their homes to the agency. In order to make this "offer to exchange houses" more attractive looking, Serbian radio stations transmitted broadcasts about the successful exchange of houses by prominent Muslim inhabitants. These exchanges were, in many cases, found out to be falsified, incorrect, or conducted under coercion.
296. Departure from the town was only possible on the condition that the property was renounced and transferred to the "Serbian District of Zvornik". This forced transfer of property was executed by the "Serbian District of Zvornik" in cooperation with the police and paramilitary units, especially the Draganovci. Eventually, the Muslims were glad to sign the deed in order to get away from the terror.

297. It is difficult to precisely reconstruct the "model type" procedure employed by the authorities for the conduct of the ethnic cleansing during the following weeks. The measures of forced registration and assignment of property preceding the actual expulsion were characterized by a variety of approaches. Despite the fact that there was no clear indication as to the method used for expulsion, the following pattern emerges from a large number of consistent cases:

298. After their return, the refugees first had to be registered. This registration had no immediate consequences for the "organized deportations". Registration was, however, a prerequisite for the subsequent transfer of property. Registration had to be done before the police, and, in many cases, it immediately preceded the actual deportation. The forced transfer of property to the "Serbian District of Zvornik" made registrants eligible for obtaining an official entry of change of domicile on their ID card. This ID card entry was a prerequisite for being allowed to leave the town. Some expellees, especially men, were also required to prove that they had "donated blood" (large quantities were indeed taken by coercion from many of the camp prisoners). 324/

299. Documents that had to be shown upon leaving the town included:

(a) a personal ID card, in which the date of the notice of change of address was entered by the authority.

(b) a permit which guaranteed the holder the freedom of movement on the territory of the "Serbian District of Zvornik" and the access to the territory of the FRY.

(c) a stub certifying the "change of address".

300. From the end of May to early June, there were days in which the Muslim populations of entire municipal districts or neighbouring villages were deported. A chronological accumulation of deportations could be observed on 22 and 23 June. These organized deportations were reportedly carried out by means of vehicles provided by the firm "Drinatrans", which brought the deportees to Mali Zvornik and from there via Loznica to Subotica325 or into the Bosnian territory of Tuzla. The deportees were only permitted to take a very limited number of personal belongings along with them. Quite frequently, however, even these were taken away from them at the check-points.

VIII. ASSESSMENT

A. Participation of JNA units

301. A detailed assessment of the level of involvement of the former JNA in the attack on Zvornik is possible only to a limited degree. What is certain is the fact that units of the former JNA were involved.

302. It is also certain that a tank unit (or parts thereof) was deployed that, until the winter of 1991, had been stationed in Jastrebarsko/Croatia and integrated into the 17th Corps Tuzla, following the abandonment of JNA
positions in Croatia. The unit was stationed in the village of Celopek north of Zvornik, with a number of tanks located in the industrial district of Karakaj and proceeding towards the Zvornik city limits (precinct of Meterize) when the attack began. The artillery and air defence emplacements localized on the Bosnian side may be counted as part of the former JNA.

303. As regards the infantry units, which some of the refugees have attributed to the JNA, there are indications that they are not composed exclusively of "regular members" of the former JNA and draftees of the reserve corps, but also of "volunteers". This assumption is supported by several factors.

304. First, according to some respondents, the soldiers and the officers had, prior to the attack (i.e., in March 1992) as well as during the attack, begun to wear Serbian badges and cockades instead of the badges of the former JNA on their uniforms. Vehicles and machinery, however, still had the old Yugoslav identification signs. Many of the soldiers wearing "old JNA uniforms" were also using a "white ribbon" around their arms or other identification marks. These identifications only make sense, if they serve to differentiate the person using them from others wearing basically the same uniforms. Such a differentiation, however, was only relevant at the time of the attack or the occupation of Zvornik in regard to "other JNA units" or "units in JNA uniforms" taking part in the attack (on the "Serbian side"), since there was no counterpart on the Muslim side.

305. For those former JNA units that were stationed on the Serbian side, such a detailed distinction is not possible. Here, temporary military barracks were installed (in Radalj and Mali Zvornik). The unit stationed in the "Dom Kulture" in Mali Zvornik was said to have come from Šabac.

B. JNA Commanders in charge

306. The responsible officers of the former JNA during the attack and occupation periods were identified. After the fall of Kulagrad and the final consolidation of "Serbian control" over Zvornik, the respondents identified the successor commanders.

307. This change from the former JNA to a (newly established) "territorial defence" (and not to the "Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina") may be seen as yet another indication that there had already been cooperation between "regular" members of the former JNA and "irregular" members (reserve, volunteers) at the time of the attack on Zvornik.

C. Strategic planning of the attack

308. From the analysis of these factors the following can be concluded:

309. The strategic preparation of the attack was carried out by officers of the former JNA who were also responsible for coordinating and directing the actual attack.

310. The squads, which were identified by many respondents as JNA units, were to a large extent at least composed of "volunteers" or "reservists". This assessment is consistent with the fact that the former JNA was already suffering from great personnel losses during the Croatian war and, above all, at the end of the military actions there (especially with many "non-Serbian" recruits refusing to report for active duty and many "non-Serbian" soldiers and officers deserting). The personnel-intensive infantry units, in
particular, required additional manpower, a fact which is supported by the observations made in Zvornik. The fact that local SDS activists were named as "officers", especially of the infantry, also suggests that they acted in their capacity as "officers of the reserve" or as officers of the so-called territorial defence.

311. The tank units, which were also active in Zvornik, were less labour-intensive, but required better training. This suggests that these units were made up of "regular" JNA personnel. Intelligence reports and observations of the troops in combat further showed that there were only rare occasions where a complete brigade was deployed and that "combat groups" were instead usually formed consisting in parts of infantry, artillery and tank units.

312. In May 1992, the Commander of the JNA's Tuzla Corps resigned. JNA officers and military equipment, however, continued to be part of the attack and occupation of the city and surrounding areas. This implies orders and coordination from another command source.

D. The attack on Zvornik

313. The attack was initiated by barrage fire from artillery and tank units of the former JNA that supported the seizure of the town by units of the Arkanovci. According to several respondents, destruction caused by artillery and tank fire was rather infrequent. There was no indication that the town was to be destroyed, but rather that the aim was to frighten and terrorize the inhabitants. This suggests that the attackers wanted to take over the town.

314. The seizure of the town was carried out by a "special unit" of the Arkanovci. This assumption is supported by the fact that members of the Arkanovci who were involved in the capture of the town left again a few days later, whereas other Arkanovci stayed in town and were joined by more members of Arkanovci. The seizure of the town may therefore have been carried out by a "special unit", which had already captured Bijeljina and which after the seizure of Zvornik, went on to occupy Bratunac. The other paramilitary units arrived in a second wave, led by Šešeljovci, with the Beli Orlovi and the so-called "Serbian territorial defence" with "volunteers" from adjacent Serbian villages or from neighbouring towns in Serbia.

E. Military control of Zvornik following the occupation

315. It is difficult to determine which groups exerted control over Zvornik at the various stages following the occupation of the town. In general, supreme control has frequently been ascribed to the JNA. The fact that these were high-profile personalities and former JNA officers may have led many expellees to assume that supreme control was in the hands of the JNA. Indeed, these two officers had supreme control over the town, albeit not as JNA, but as leading officers of a new "territorial defence" which had been established by local leaders. This later formed the core element of the "Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in the region of Zvornik and was officially declared in May 1992.

316. It may be assumed, however, that there was a concerted effort to distribute responsibilities and thus authority over the town. At least during the period until the fall of Kulagrad, there appears to have been a sharing of power between the officers of the former JNA (Pejić and Pavlović) and SDS (Grujić) and the militia.
317. These testimonies, though, were modified by the fact that nearly all of the respondents said that the various paramilitary units marauder around Zvornik had unlimited freedom of action (terrorizing the civilian population, randomly performing executions and arrests or looting). The JNA units were reported by the respondents to have participated in war crimes and severe human rights violations only to a very limited degree throughout the entire period. They were, however, accused of looting. Guards working in those camps where war crimes and human rights violations were committed were partly members of JNA units. It is unclear, though, whether they were "regular units", drafted reservists or members of the so-called "territorial defence".

318. There are many indications that the complete freedom of action on the part of the paramilitary units led to a tolerated chaos, which was due to the fact that the potential authorities of the JNA and local militia were not accepted as such by these violent paramilitary units. The Arkanovci, especially, acted completely autonomously and rarely bowed to the authority of JNA officers or, even less, to the local authorities. Overall, the descriptions given by the respondents create the impression that the various paramilitary units only accepted the authority of their respective "leaders" and that many of the less strictly organized paramilitary groups regarded their complete freedom of action as a kind of "remuneration" for their work. This circumstance may, however, also be seen as suggesting that the uncertain distribution of power only served to cover-up those responsible for the war crimes and human rights violations. At this point, the violent chaos may not yet have been associated with the aim of using the terror exerted by the paramilitary groups in order to accelerate the expulsion of the Muslim population.

F. Civilian preparation of the attack and subsequent civilian control

319. After the attack, the control authority was initially in the hands of the "emergency staff", which later became known as the "Serbian District of Zvornik". Its president became the apparent principal decision maker.

320. The logistics of the attack on Zvornik appear to have been prepared on the civilian level. In February, for example, a truck was reported to have brought uniforms and arms to Boško Ceranić, and another respondent stated that Vojislav Šešelj visited Ceranić on 25 March 1992 and brought arms into the church of Šćemlije.

321. The civilian preparations also included an "evacuation exercise" on the last or next to the last weekend in March 1992. On that weekend, to the surprise of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik, the greater part of the Serbian families had left town on Friday and did not return until Monday.

322. The local SDS representatives, who were reported to have had contacts with Šešelj's Radical Party in Serbia, had already made provisions for enforcing their seizure of power, during the months preceding the attack. Back in the fall of 1991, they had declared Zvornik to be part of the "Autonomous Serbian Region of Semberija and Majevica". As can be seen from the document on the dismissal of a Muslim citizen from his workplace, the "emergency staff" had decided on 4 April on an "ordinance on the introduction of the general work requirement". Apparently, preparations for an "access to power" were already being taken on the civilian administrative level as well.

323. The preparations for the attack seem to have been coordinated with the regional business leaders, several of whom were identified by the respondents. Some of the business leaders were seen distributing arms, while others
provided means to transport expellees from Zvornik to Serbia. The director of
the largest local employer was also accused by the press in the fall of 1991
of having provided the SDS with large quantities of fuel.

G. The Territorial Defence (TO)

324. Shortly after the dissolution of the Yugoslav territorial defence in
BiH and Herzegovina in the fall of 1991, SDS leaders in Zvornik began with
the recruiting, equipping, and apparent training of the new "Serbian
Territorial Defence" (TO). During the months before the attack, there were
also military exercises organized by the JNA. Only Serbs were drafted for
these exercises, which were allegedly held for the purpose of training the
"territorial defence".

325. This new "territorial defence", which had taken part in the attack on
Zvornik as part of an infantry unit, was mostly dressed in old JNA uniforms
or camouflage uniforms. Men dressed in civilian clothing were also involved
in the combat activities. They were equipped, at least during the attack,
with traditional infantry armament. Among them were former members of the
territorial defence from the Serbian villages near Zvornik or from Zvornik
which had been dissolved in the fall of 1991, as well as SDS members from
the suburbs of Šešeljove, Lisićnjak, Čelopek, and newly recruited Serbs from
the neighbouring villages.

326. One possible indication supporting this hypothesis is the fact that
many Serbs from the neighbouring villages who were known by name could be
identified either as Territorial Defence commanders (among them important
SDS members). Others are reported to be JNA officers.

327. They arrived in town early (either together with or after Arkan, but
in any case, during the attack and together with the Šešeljovci). This
frequently-made statement is supported by further allegations. After the
assault detachment of the Arkanovci, which was protected by mortar sections
had captured the town, the second line of combat became operational. The
second line of combat included local Territorial Defence units and the
Šešeljovci, consisting mostly of people from the nearby places in Serbia.
One of their tasks at that time was to deliver to the Arkanovci outstanding
Muslim personalities on the basis of pre-established lists.

328. The military operations against the Muslim-controlled position at
Kulagrad, which started after 11 April, were mostly conducted by the
"territorial defence" (TO) and by "volunteers" from Serbia and the
neighbouring villages. In the actual attack on Kulagrad, the tanks were
followed by operations also carried out by the TO and the Beli Orlovi.

H. The expulsion of the Muslim population
(“ethnic cleansing”)

329. After the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April, the situation in Zvornik
became more stabilized. The SDS began to rebuild the local administration
and simultaneously started to prepare for the expulsion of the Muslim
inhabitants of Zvornik.

330. The first step was, paradoxically, an appeal to the escaped Muslim
inhabitants to return. In that appeal, which was broadcast by Radio Zvornik
and Radio Loznica, as well as by the Belgrade TV station, the escapees were
called upon to come back as the situation had returned to normal. They were
required to return by a certain date (probably 15 May) in order to have their
property registered. They would otherwise lose any title to their property. The exact wording of the appeal could not be ascertained anymore as it was apparently broadcast frequently and in a number of different versions. Similarly, there were several testimonies as to who had issued the appeal. Essentially, however, these statements are consistent with each other.

331. The registration, which the respondents were required to do from the end of April onward (first mentioned on 28 April), had to be done before the "Serbian municipality" or the "Serbian militia". When people showed up for registration, the true purpose of the procedure was revealed: a registration of male inhabitants. Only men were permitted to register with the authorities. There were even reports of cases where a man had to register for an apartment despite the fact that this apartment had been registered under his wife's name. In line with the true purpose of the registration, men were arrested and deported into camps on the basis of lists which had apparently been prepared beforehand. The conduct of these forced registrations was the responsibility of the new local administration (SDS) and the militia.

332. After the forced registration, the situation of the Muslim population deteriorated rapidly. The increasing terror caused by, to the greatest extent, the newly arrived unit of one "Kapetan Dragan" was the preparatory stage for the ultimate, forceful expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik.

333. Some time later, around the end of May to early June 1992, the first forced deportations were carried out, preceded by a "compulsory transfer of property", without which it was not possible to leave the town. The Serbian administration then issued documents which "permitted" the person to leave the town in the direction of Mali Zvornik and which were frequently connected with an ID card entry stating that the person moved to a Serbian town. These documents had to be shown upon departure or were a prerequisite for being "allowed" to leave the town. The task of the militia was to organize these compulsory assignments, while the subsequent forced expulsions were carried out in cooperation with the paramilitary units.

IX. SUMMARY

334. It may be concluded on the basis of the present facts that not only were the aggression and the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants intended and initiated by the local Serbian authorities but other hierarchically superior institutions were also involved both in the preparation and the actual attack and expulsion operations.

A. Military and paramilitary operations

335. The employment of heavy equipment, trained personnel and officers of the former JNA can be proved. The squads themselves, especially the personnel-intensive infantry units, were composed of drafted reservists, "volunteers" and members of paramilitary units. The equipment of these units came partly from the JNA, and partly from other sources, such as supplies of the former territorial defence or private arms, and was equivalent to the usual infantry equipment.

336. Several important facts are indicative of an involvement of supra-local institutions:
(a) The recruitment and stationing of infantry reservists in improvised barracks in the town of Čelopek near Zvornik quite some time before the attack.

(b) The cooperation with the trained combatants of the Arkanovci, who conducted a swift and radical capture of the town.

(c) The participation of paramilitary units from nearby towns in Serbia, the dimensions of which also required prior planning.

(d) The identification of the soldiers taking part in the combat activities. There is general agreement that they already wore Serbian badges and colors on their uniforms instead of the old Yugoslav emblems.

(e) The stationing of JNA units from different corps, all of which were subordinate to the 1st Belgrade military district, both on the Bosnian side of the Drina and on the Serbian side.

(f) The forced retirement of the Supreme Commander of the Corps Tuzla, General Janković, in May 1992, in the course of a restructuring of the former JNA, as well as the new formation of the so-called "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina".

337. All in all, these facts also support yet another hypothesis, namely that these newly equipped units formed the core element of the subsequent "Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina". The "Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina", as those members of the former JNA who had remained in BiH were called, was not officially founded until 5 May 1992. However, the attack on Zvornik was carried out one month earlier. The establishment of this new army and the furnishing of its equipment must therefore not only have been planned sometime before (i.e. long before the attack on BiH), but was already carried out in March 1992.

338. The local civilian preparations for the conduct of the impending attack, as well as the local measures aimed at the creation of a "Serbian territorial defence" in Zvornik, coincide with the establishment of a new "Serbian Army" in BiH. This territorial defence may even have been involved in the preparations for the new "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina" and may have served as a basis for the 36th infantry brigade of the Drina corps of the "Serbian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina", meanwhile stationed in Zvornik.

B. "Ethnic cleansing"

339. The expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants of Zvornik, like the military attack, required preparation. When the various stages of the assault are examined, an underlying systematic approach is revealed.

340. The SDS leadership had declared in the fall of 1991 that Zvornik formed part of the so-called "Autonomous Serbian Region of Semberija and Majevica". Before the attack, requests for a separation of the town according to ethnic principles were voiced by representatives of the local SDS. During the military occupation phase, lasting until the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April 1992, the aim of the violent chaos imposed on the town by the paramilitary units and the massive and systematic war crimes and human rights violations was not yet intended to accelerate the expulsion of the Muslim inhabitants. However, the preparations for a total and final expulsion had commenced at that stage. The specific terror activities designed to expel the Muslim population only started in May 1992.
341. These preparations for a total, and final, and systematic expulsion became obvious when the proclamation for the Muslim inhabitants to return to Zvornik was announced. Apart from an allegation that order and peace in the town were restored, the proclamation was linked to an appeal to the Muslims to return in order to have their property registered. If owners failed to do so, their property would fall to the "Serbian District of Zvornik". A great number of expellees followed the appeal. They did so not only in view of the above-mentioned allegation and appeal, but also because many of them were concerned about the fate of members of their families who had stayed in town.

342. The registration conducted upon their return revealed the primary purpose of the appeal: to register all male Muslim inhabitants. The men who had fled to surrounding Bosnian and Serbian regions were to be neutralized as potential resistance fighters. As a result, many of the returning men were immediately deported into a camp.

343. The appeal to return, however, had yet another, even further-reaching aim: the systematic expulsion of the Muslim population. For it was only after the Muslim inhabitants, not only from the town but from the entire region, had returned and were thus ready to be "gathered" that their total and final expulsion became possible. This enabled the aggressors not only to move them away from Zvornik, but also to deport them in an organized and comprehensive manner across the national boundaries of the former Yugoslavia. The geographical location of Zvornik, as a border town to neighbouring Serbia, enabled the Bosnian-Serb leaders to deport the expellees from of BiH to other countries without any problems. By means of bussed mass deportations, the expellees were brought as far as Subotica at the Serbian-Hungarian border. There, many of them were issued a "Yugoslavian passport", with which they were sent, mostly in corridor trains, via Hungary to Austria.
Appendix I to Part III

CAMPS

344. The reference to places and camps as well as to perpetrators is based on corresponding statements by witnesses. It is therefore safe to say that these did, in fact, exist. However, one has to take into account that the list is by no means complete.

I. ĆELOPEK - DOM KULTURE

345. The Dom Kulture has served as headquarters since December 1991 and is said to have served as an internment camp as well.

II. KARAKAJ

A. Ekonomija

346. Ekonomija was an agricultural cooperative. Due to its secluded location, its buildings were used in particular to torture and kill numerous individuals. According to corresponding witness accounts, this must have been the "worst" of all camps. In a chamber which used to be a slaughter area, people were literally butchered. Not only people from Zvornik and its surroundings were detained there, but also members of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), among others.

B. Technical School Centre

347. The principal, Fehim Kujundžić, was murdered by Arkanovci in the Technical School Centre on 9 or 10 April. In the school's training labs in particular many acts of violence were committed.

C. Alhos

348. Alhos was a garment factory. Initially, the factory accommodated the police (from 6 April on). In addition, the emergency staff also stayed there.

D. Novi Standard

349. Novi Standard was a new building of the shoe factory complex. At the time of the attack, the entire shoe production had been stopped. For some time it served as headquarters of the Serbian police (it was moved from Alhos to Novi Standard). It further accommodated paramilitary units—reportedly the Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, and the "volunteers" from Loznica. Individuals who had picked up their pass certificate from the police were kept there for days and severely tortured. In addition, citizens who had been randomly arrested were carried off to the quarters of the paramilitary units, where they were severely tortured.

E. Novi Izvor

350. At the time of the attack, Novi Izvor consisted of two plants: "Kamenolom", a quarry, and "Ciglana", a brick factory. Both were in operation
during the attack. Captured Muslims were forced to work alongside regular Serbian employees in three shifts. The Muslims routinely faced violent attacks by various groups. In early June, the camp counted about 70 prisoners. Some of them had been held there since mid-April. Many acts of torture and killings are reported.

351. A number of persons were identified as guards and torturers in the camps (in some cases only the nick-names are known).

III. ZVORNIK

A. SUP/Opština

352. At this prison inmates were tortured during interrogation, and several were killed.

B. Court Building

353. This building was turned into a prison. Women and children from Divić who had witnessed and/or survived the massacre at Čelovek were detained and mistreated there.

C. Hotel Drina

354. This hotel served as quarters for the police. Acts of torture and arrests are reported.

D. Hospital "5th of July"

355. In mid-April, Arkan took all patients hostage, so that the remains of his brother-in-law "Rambo" be handed over to him. Men were detained on the street and forced to donate blood. Murders even occurred as a result of excessive withdrawal of blood. Patients and staff were frequently attacked, in particular by Arkanovci. Several people were detained in the basement.

IV. TRANSFER FROM THE CAMPS

356. On 15 July, a great number of prisoners from various camps were transferred to Batković near Bijeljina. It is unclear whether any prisoners were left behind.
Appendix II to Part III

MASS GRAVES

357. Based on numerous, consistent witness accounts, the following mass graves can be identified.

358. Kazanbaša: Kazanbaša is a Muslim cemetery in Zvornik's Meterize district. According to reports, the first mass graves were dug there very soon after the attack.

359. City dumping grounds: These grounds are situated by the Drina. Their name is unknown.

360. Kreçana: Kreçana is a lime pit in Mali Zvornik.

361. Ranun Grob: This site is located between Radakovac and Šćemlije.

362. Šljunkara: Šljunkara is a flint pit north of Čelopek by the Drina.

363. Drina: Many respondents stated that numerous corpses were thrown into the Drina (mostly from bridges).
Appendix III to Part III

MASSACRES AND MASS SHOOTING DEATHS

364. The BIM holds a list of numerous massacres and mass killings by gun shots. In order to prevent any premature attribution of guilt, the following list includes only those perpetrators who have been identified independently and in consistent statements by several witnesses. Moreover, we have witness accounts of massacres and mass shooting deaths by individual respondents.

365. Thirty citizens from Diviće, who had been deported there around mid to end of May, were shot to death.

366. On 9 April, Arkanovci randomly shot to death people they had dragged out of basements in Hrid and Zamlaz.

367. Šešeljovci and Arkanovci together committed mass killings in Hrid and Bukovik.

368. At the checkpoint by the Old Bridge in Zvornik, Muslims were shot to death and dumped into the Drina river.

369. Around mid to end of May, a considerable number of Muslim patients were shot to death in front of the hospital of Zvornik by Arkanovci. In the pediatric ward, dozens of babies were murdered with bare hands.
Notes


4/ The First Balkan War was largely an effort by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. Montenegrin, Ottoman and Rumanian troops joined the conflict to oppose Bulgaria. The two Balkan Wars ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans, except for a part of Thrace and Constantinople. Id. at 99.


8/ Id.

9/ James Gow, "One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina", RFE/RL Research Report 11 (4 June 1994). Gow states that as early as mid-August 1991 "... the activities of the Yugoslav Army units stationed there [in BiH] were, in fact, aimed at linking most of the Republic with Serbia. According to Gow, the JNA expected a major influence on events in BiH from 1990 onward, including providing arms to the Serb population and encouraging local unrest.


13/ The attack on Zvornik is one of two case studies on "ethnic cleansing". For the other study related to the Prijedor region, see Annex V.

Notes (continued)

15/ The dividing line ran north-south from the Sava River near Sirmium (Stremska Mitrovica) to Lake Scutari (Skadar), on the current Montenegrin-Albanian border. For a general history of the Balkan peninsula, see Edgar Hosch, The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day (Tania Alexander trans. 1972). See also René Ristelhueber, A History of the Balkan Peoples (Sherman David Spector ed. and trans. 1971).

16/ A majority of scholars have adopted the view that the Bogomils were adherents of a Christian medieval sect that emerged in Bulgaria in the early middle ages. They were considered heretics by church officials. Because of their persecution, and the fact that the Bogomil sect contained a strain of mysticism that was receptive to the Islam practiced by some Islamic mystic orders, many Bogomils converted to Islam following the Ottoman conquest. See Smail Balić, "Culture Under Fire", in Why Bosnia? 81 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). Another view suggests that the medieval Bosnian Church was not Bogomil. Rather, unlike the Bogomils, the Bosnian Church accepted the Trinity, an omnipotent God and at least part of the Old Testament. See John A. Fine, "The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society" in The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 5-20 (Mark Pinson ed. 1994).


20/ Id. at 3.

21/ Id. at 6.

22/ Russia had declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1877. In March 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano created a large Bulgarian state and greatly expanded Russian influence in the region. This upset the region's balance of power, leading Britain and Austria--Hungary to call for a new accord. As a result, the Congress of Berlin was held in June and July 1878. Id. at 7. For an interesting account of the Congress of Berlin, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 155-58 (1994).

23/ Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 109 (1983). Jelavich also states that "[t]he greater Serbian goal . . . was thus a state based not on strictly ethnic principles, but on the acquisition of lands that had historic associations or that had at some time been under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Church".

24/ Id. at 111.

25/ Id.
Notes (continued)

26/ The First Balkan War was largely an effort by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. The Second Balkan War broke out when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece. Montenegrin, Ottoman and Rumanian troops joined the conflict to oppose Bulgaria. The two Balkan Wars ended Ottoman rule in the Balkans, except for a part of Thrace and Constantinople. Id. at 99.


29/ Id. See also Jelavich, supra note 3, at 112. When one of the co-conspirators was arrested, he stated, "I am a Serbian hero". The Archduke was murdered because they feared that he would join Bosnia with the other South Slav lands in a separate autonomous state controlled by the Hapsburgs. The timing of the Archduke's visit, on Serbia's most celebrated anniversary, may have been a deliberate provocation.


32/ Id.

33/ Yugoslavia was partitioned by its German and Italian victors into spheres of influence. Macedonia fell under Bulgarian domination. Hungary took areas in Bačka and Baranja. Italian-ruled Albania was given Kosovo and some Macedonian and Montenegrin lands. Germany and Italy each annexed a part of Slovenia. Italy assumed control over the Adriatic coast and the Adriatic Islands. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 262 (1983).

34/ Id. at 264. Croatia was recognized by the Axis powers and became a signatory of the Tripartite and Anti-Comintern Pacts. Id. at 263.

35/ Id. at 264.

36/ Serbs constituted about one-third of Croatia's population at the time. As a Fascist state, Croatia's 6.5 million inhabitants included: 3.4 million Croats; 1.9 million Orthodox Serbs; 700,000 Muslims; 150,000 Germans and 18,000 Jews. Id. at 263.

37/ The Bosnian Muslim community had three major divisions: some aligned with the Ustaša regime; some wanted a separate state allied with Germany; others joined the Communist partisans fighting the Ustaše. Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 3 (Comm. Print 1992).

39/ The Četniks were organized by Colonel Draža Mihajlović, who also served as a minister in Yugoslavia's Government-in-exile, which was based in London. Initially, Mihajlović's resistance movement consisted of a small group of Serbian officers who went to the hills where they organized local inhabitants into fighting units. These forces were called the Četnik detachments of the Yugoslav Army. Eventually, the Četniks largely became loosely knit bands of fighters organized under local leaders. The term "Četnik" recalled similar groups that had struggled against Ottoman rule. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 266-67 (1983).

40/ Jelavich, for instance, writes:

"Although instances of cooperation between members of all resistance forces and the occupying powers can be found, the most widespread collaboration, and the most easily documented, was established between the Chetniks and the Axis command".

Id. at 270.

41/ Id.

42/ Tito's ties to the Soviet Union were soon broken. Although the first meeting of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was held in Belgrade (in fact, its first headquarters were in Belgrade), Yugoslavia was expelled on 28 June 1948. The Cominform motion stated: "the Information Bureau [Cominform] declares that the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party is pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union". The resolution went on to express the fear that Yugoslavia would turn into "an ordinary bourgeois republic" and "a colony of the imperialist countries".


44/ Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 32 (Comm. Print 1992). Tito was a Croatian by birth. He was born in Kumrovec, Croatia to a Croatian father and a Slovene mother. As a young man, he apprenticed to a locksmith and later worked as a mechanic. Barbara Jelavich, II History of the Balkans 385 (1983).

45/ Id. at 396.

46/ Id. In the 1980's, the Serbs would argue with vehemence that it was Serbia which had suffered economically during the Tito years.
Notes (continued)


49/ Id. at 398.

50/ Id. at 394.

51/ Id. at 393. For a critique of the communist regime during the 1950s, see Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (1957) and his Conversations with Stalin (1962).

52/ Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 32 (Comm. Print 1992). Allegations of corruption also did much to diminish the stature of the Yugoslav federal army. For example, in the mid-1980s, investigative reports alleged that military labour was used to build expensive villas for communist party and military officials. See Karl Wheller Soper, National Security in Yugoslavia: A Country Study 225, 253 (Glenn E. Curtis ed. 1992).

53/ Such allegations can be found in Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle for Yugoslavia 163-64 (1992).

54/ Id.

55/ In January 1986, Milošević succeeded Ivan Stambolić as Chief of the Serbian Community Party. Slobodan Milošević's background and rise to power is described in Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81, 81-95 (Summer 1993). According to Djilas, when Milošević was still the head of the Belgrade Party Committee, "[h]e frequently attacked dissident intellectuals, firmly opposed all demands for liberalization, and punished any manifestation of Serbian nationalism". Id. at 86.


58/ The document was prepared by members of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences who are not identified in the document. However, the editor of the document is widely reported to be Dobrica Ćosić, a well-known Serbian historian and novelist who served as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for approximately one year until June 1993. See Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 33 (1992). A copy of the Memorandum (translated into English by teachers of English at the Centre of Foreign Languages in Zagreb, Croatia) is on file with the Commission of Experts.

59/ Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 23 (1992). Since the late 1960s, Serbs had been emigrating from Kosovo--between 200,000 and 300,000 had left by the mid-1980s. Many Serbs believed that the exodus was due to mistreatment by ethnic Albanians. Another complaint often
voiced by Serbs concerned the fact that Serbia was the only Republic with autonomous provinces within its territory. Under Yugoslavia's 1974 Constitution, Kosovo and Vojvodina had their own representatives in federal, state and party bodies, where they had cast their votes in opposition to Serbia. The two provinces (like the six Republics) also could veto changes in the Constitution. Aleksa Džilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", *Foreign Affairs* 81, 82 (Summer 1993).


64/ These Republics eventually seceded; Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991, BiH on 6 April 1992, and Macedonia voted to separate from Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991. Macedonia alone has not been recognized by the European Community (EC). Greece has objected to Macedonia's recognition because its name is the same as that of a region in northern Greece. The Greek government argues that adoption of the name "Macedonia" implies claims on Greek territory. Bulgaria and Turkey have recognized Macedonia's independence. For a discussion of the situation in Macedonia, see Freedom House, *Freedom in the World, 1992-1993* 340-42 (1993).


66/ Id.

67/ Id.

68/ See *Chronology of Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia* (prepared by Research Analyst Shannon M. McLeod on file with the IHRLI Database). The Serbian National Council was formed on 25 July. On 18 August, the Serbs of Knin began a two week referendum on whether to establish a "Serbian Autonomous Region" (SAO) of Krajina. On 1 October 1990, it was announced that 99 per cent of the voters favoured autonomy. Id. at 6.


70/ See *Chronology of Negotiations for Peace in the Former Yugoslavia* (prepared by Research Analyst Shannon M. McLeod on file with the IHRLI Database).
Notes (continued)

71/ Id. On 21 December 1990 the Serbs of the opštinas of Knin, Benkovac, Vojnic, Obrovac, Gračac, Dvor and Kostajnica adopted the "Statute of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina". The Statute provides that "[t]he SAO executes laws, other ordinances, and general acts of the Republic of Croatia and the federation". A legislative Assembly was created, consisting of 60 deputies who would serve four year terms. The Chairman of the Executive Council of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina was Milan Babić. He appointed Milan Martić, a former policeman with Croatia's Ministry of Internal Affairs to the post of Secretary for Internal Affairs for the region of Krajina. Id. at 9.


74/ Id. at 12-14.


76/ Id. at 657. Croatia's Constitution, which was adopted on 21 December 1990, provides in its preamble that:

the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the national State of the Croatian nation and the State of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews, and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of their ethnic rights in accordance with the democratic norms of the United Nations and of the free world countries.


77/ Id. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 12-14 (1992).

78/ Robert M. Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics", 51 Slavic Review 654, 657, n.10 (Winter 1992). See also Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 151 (1994). The new Croatian regime renamed a school after an Ustaša minister who had cooperated with the Nazis in sending Croatian Jews to Auschwitz. The school had been named after a school principal killed by the Ustaše.


81/ Id.


84/ Id. at 573.

85/ Id. at 574.

86/ Id. at 575.

87/ Id. at 576, 577.

88/ Security Council Resolution 713, S/RES/713 (25 September 1991). The Resolution also recognized that aggression within the former Yugoslavia threatened the peace and security of the region. It again called upon the parties to resolve their disputes through arbitration.


95/ The five-member Arbitration Commission was composed of two members appointed by the former Yugoslav federal presidency, and three members appointed by the European Community and its member states. Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 86 American Journal International Law 569, 589 (1992).
Notes (continued)

96/ Id. at 589.

97/ The signatories agreed that all wounded and sick combatants would be treated in accordance with the First and Second Geneva Conventions; that all captured combatants would be treated in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention; and that all civilians would be treated in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. Further, the signatories agreed to conduct hostilities in accordance with Additional Protocol I and the Protocol On Prohibition or Restrictions On the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devises, annexed to the 1980 Weapons Convention.

98/ Id. at 587.

99/ Id. at 594.

100/ Id. at 586.

101/ Id. at 591. A declaration from the Serbian minority dated 10 November 1991, expressed a desire to either remain with the Yugoslav Federal Republic, or, if BiH formed its own state, to proclaim an independent Serbian republic within the territory of BiH. Id.


103/ "Pink zones" were established adjacent to these areas. These are zones that do not fall within UNPROFOR's jurisdiction, but that contain a majority Serb population or where Serbs constituted a large minority. In July 1992, the "parties agreed to permit the establishment of a Joint Commission that would oversee the establishment of Croatian authority in these regions. Steven Woehrel & Julie Kim, Croatia: Background and Current Issues, Congressional Research Service Report 4-5 (3 December 1992).

104/ Id. at 4.


106/ Id. at 12-13.


108/ In August 1994, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they would formally seek to link their territory with Yugoslavia and Serb-held portions of Croatia. Associated Press, "Bosnian Serbs Press for 'Greater Serbia,'" Chicago Tribune, 19 August 1994, at 1, p. 4.

Notes (continued)


111/ Id. at 165. This was the beginning of the "ethnic cleansing" campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, "ethnic cleansing" had previously occurred in the conflict between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 274-359 (1992). Ethnic cleansing in BiH is discussed in the following section of this report.

112/ On 15 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 752, demanding that the cease-fire be recognized and that Yugoslav and Croatian armies refrain from interfering in the internal conflict in BiH. See "Documents on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia", 31 International Legal Materials 1421-1594 (1993); see also Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 394-95 (1992); Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 86 American Journal International Law 569, 593 (1992). Resolution 752 also required that all parties respect the territorial integrity of BiH. The resolution also insisted that future humanitarian assistance programmes and convoys be given unimpeded access to all parts of BiH.


114/ Id. at 595.

115/ These included the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their Protocols additional of 1977, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, the Genocide Convention of 1948, and "crimes against humanity" as developed by conventional and customary international law. The following are the dates of ratification/succession, by the newly formed states, to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols additional of 1977:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protocol I/</th>
<th>Protocol II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Yugoslavia (Ratification) 21 April 1950
Slovenia (Succession) 11 May 1992
Croatia (Succession) 11 May 1992
BiH (Succession) 31 December 1992


Notes (continued)

117/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 35 (1992). Estimates vary concerning the actual number of JNA troops left to fight in BiH. One report estimated "at least 30,000 men with tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launches and large stocks of ammunition". Id. at 36 (quoting a New York Times article). However, according to one independent analyst, approximately 80,000 JNA troops were transferred to the Territorial Defence Forces of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina". Milan Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia-Herzegovina", Jane's Intelligence Review 445 (October 1992). See also Annex III, Military Structure.

118/ In June 1993, for example, it was reported that Bosnian Croat forces in Mostar evicted Muslim residents from their homes and burned their personal belongings in the streets. The Muslims were told that "they were being evicted to make room for Croats who were coming from Travnik". Bosnian Croat forces have also been accused of the summary execution of Muslim civilians, mass deportations, and the rape of Muslim women. Within the Republic of Croatia, Croatian military forces have been accused of conducting "ethnic cleansing" operations against Serbs residing in the Croatian villages of Divoselo, Citluk, and Požitelj, located in the "Medak Pocket". The United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Human Rights has reported that forces under the control of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina have also committed human rights violations. These violations include the summary execution and arbitrary arrest of civilians. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 8-9 (17 November 1993).

119/ See, e.g., Roger Cohen, "In Bosnia an Island of Tolerance is Sinking", New York Times, 12 May 1994, at 46 (although Bosnian Muslims have destroyed some Serbian villages in retaliatory attacks "there appear to have been few instances in Government-held Bosnia of the brutal 'ethnic cleansing' perpetuated by the Serbs . . . .").

120/ For example, Felice D. Gaer has stated: ". . . Although there were some actions by Muslims and Croats to cleanse their own areas of Serbs, United Nations and private observers agreed that these were mostly reactions to Serb policies and not the result of well-planned, coordinated and funded policies". Felice D. Gaer, "The Former Yugoslavia", in A Global Agenda: Issues before the 48th General Assembly of the United Nations 7 (John Tessitore & Susan Woolfson eds., 1993). Serb planning of the "ethnic cleansing" campaign is discussed infra.

121/ See Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing", Foreign Affairs 110-14 (Summer 1993). Examples from antiquity include the policies of Assyrian ruler Tiglath-Pileser III (745-727 B.C.) who is said to have displaced one-half of the population of conquered territories. In medieval times, the Jews were expelled from England (1290), France (1306), Hungary (1349-1360), Austria (1421), Lithuania (1445), Spain (1402), and from other countries as well. The Holocaust is the principal modern example. The German term "Judenrein" (clean of Jews) was used to designate areas from which Jews had been eliminated. Id. at 114. For further examples of ethnic conflict, see Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (Joseph V. Montville ed. 1990); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (1985). See
also David Binder, "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy", New York Times, 7 February 1993, at 1, 12 (identifying 48 current ethnic conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America).

122/ The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 were largely wars waged against civilian populations. The Greeks attacked Bulgarian villages, the Bulgarians massacred Turks, and the Serbs committed atrocities against Albanian civilians. According to the report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which was published in 1913:

"the object of those armed conflicts, overt or covert, clearly conceived or vaguely felt, but always and everywhere the same, was the complete extermination of an alien populations. In some cases this object expressed itself in the form of an implacable and categorical 'order' to kill the whole male population of the occupied region".


123/ The political philosopher, Michael Walzer, said of German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel: ". . . he was, we are told by one biographer after another, an honorable man . . . when he fought he maintained the rules of war. He fought a bad war well, not only militarily but also morally". Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 38 (1992).


125/ It was officially reported that 12 persons were killed and 150 wounded but unofficial estimates are higher. In addition, Branka Maqaš has reported that 140 persons were tried and sentenced to prison. See Branka Maqaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 6-7 (1993).

126/ See Annex IV, Part 1, supra.


128/ Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993).

129/ The use of the term "Serbs" does not, of course, mean "all Serbs". The term is used to refer to Serbia's political and intellectual leadership. In this instance, however, it appears that a very large number of Serbs, in fact, shared the concern over Kosovo's Serbian population. See generally Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81 (Summer 1993); Branka Maqaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 6-7 (1993).

130/ Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993).
Notes (continued)


132/ Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81, 93 (Summer 1993) (". . . it is clear that an ideology with such a dark vision of history and the contemporary world could only lead to ruthless and cynical policies").

133/ See infra.

134/ See, e.g., John Kifner, "Through the Serbian Mind's Eye", New York Times, 10 April 1994, 4, at 1 ("The Muslims--whom the Serbs call 'Turks'--are alone among Bosnia's three combatants in being identified by religion, even though they are, overwhelmingly, secular Slavs").


138/ See, e.g., P. Forestier, "Psychiatric Genocide! How the Barbarities of "Ethnic Cleansing" were Spawned by Psychiatry", Freedom 6-8 (May 1993).

139/ For a discussion of Rašković's influence on Karadžić's career, see Vjesnik, 9 February 1992.


143/ See Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic", Foreign Affairs 81 (Summer 1993). For a description of Milošević's rise to power, see Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 100-06 (1994).

invariably included intimidation of minority residents". Id. For a
discussion of the Federal Republic's governmental structure, see Glenn E.
Curtis, "Government and Politics", in Yugoslavia: A Country Study 197 (Glenn
E. Curtis ed. 1992). By 1989, the State Presidency had evolved from a 23
member group to an eight member group. One member was elected from each
Republic and Province.

145/ For example, in early March 1991, demonstrations were held in
Belgrade protesting the ruling party's tight control of the news media, as
well as Milošević's economic policy and his policy of provoking conflicts with
the other republics. Police were called in to crush the demonstrations. V.P.

146/ Id. at 126.

147/ As quoted in Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third

April 1994).

149/ The SRS holds 39 seats in Serbia's 250 seat parliament. It
received 13 per cent of the votes cast in the December 1993 parliamentary
elections. Id. at 95. For a discussion of Šešelj as a paramilitary leader,
see Annex III.A, Special Forces.

150/ According to Markotich, "Šešelj campaigned on a platform
emphasizing that Milošević and the SPS had grown soft on promoting Serbian
nationalism and were weak in pressing for a Greater Serbia". Stan Markotich,

151/ Id. at 96.

152/ Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces. For additional
examples of human rights abuses against non-Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro,
see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Human Rights Abuses of Non-Serbs in Kosobo,
Sandžak and Vojvodina (May 1994).

153/ Stan Markotich, "Serbia", 3 RFE/RL Research Report 99 (22 April
1994). Milošević has also been criticized by members of his own party. For
example, Andjelko Miškov, a prominent SRS supporter who broke with the party,
alleged that Milošević "stood by, arms folded" as Croats attacked Serbs in
Krajina. Id. at 98.

154/ There were reports that Drašković was severely beaten after his
arrest. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human
Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr.
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993,

155/ Id.
Notes (continued)

156/ Id.

157/ The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia directly controls nationwide television programming (Radio-TV Serbia); however, there is independent news coverage in the print media, such as Vreme. The United Nations' Special Rapporteur has also noted that Croatia's government-controlled electronic media has exacerbated the climate of political hostility. Sixth Periodic Report of the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/110, at 18 (21 February 1994).

158/ Id. at 21.

159/ Id. According to Mihajlo Crnobrnja, Yugoslavia's former Ambassador to the European Community, "the media stopped at nothing to spread false accusations and even barefaced lies, which had the effect of gradually but surely increasing distrust and even hatred between members of different nationalities". Mihajlo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama 148 (1994).


165/ Šešelj also controls paramilitary units that have engaged in paramilitary operations. See Annex III.A, Special Forces.

166/ As quoted in Der Spiegel 5 August 1991, at 124-26, trans. in Daily Report, FBIS, 5 August 1991, at 51. See also S. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia - 1962–1991 260-63 (1992). Šešelj is also a leader of a paramilitary unit that has been accused of committing some of the worst atrocities of the conflict. See infra; see also Annex III.A, Special Forces.

168/ As reported by Belgrade Radio, 1 July 1991, trans. in FBIS, 2 July 1991, at 69.

169/ Id.


172/ According to the 1991 census, ethnic Serbs constituted 31.4 per cent. See Marc Weller, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", 86 American Journal International Law 569, 569 (1992). In 1991, it was estimated that the former Yugoslavia's population was 23.4 million. Of BiH's population of 4,364,574, 31.4 per cent were classified as Serbs. See Stjepko Golubić, Susan Campbell & Thomas Golubić, "How Not to Divide the Indivisible", in Why Bosnia 209, 211-12 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). Within BiH, Muslims are the most numerous group (43.6 per cent) and Bosnia Croats are the third most populous group (17.3 per cent). Id. at 215.

173/ This is true of all three of the principal ethnic groups (i.e., their areas of predominance are neither homogeneous nor contiguous). Id. at 217.

174/ For a somewhat different formulation of these problems, see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 100 (1992) ("[T]he essential problem of the Yugoslav state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Serbs over Croats; the essential problem of the Croatian state lies in the numerical and political dominance of Croats over Serbs").


Notes (continued)


178/ Sporadic violence, however, had occurred as early as September 1991 when two Bosnian Muslims were killed by Serbs near Bratunac, Bosnia. On 12 September 1991, the town of Kostajnica fell to the Serbs. This marked the first time that a section of Bosnia came under such control. Olga Ramljak, "Chronology of Serb Rebellion in Croatia", FBIS, at 23, 26 February 1993.


182/ Id. at 150.


184/ Id.


186/ Id.


188/ Id. at 248. According to Vego, the JNA's "reorganization was primarily aimed at consolidating the Serbian-dominated position in BiH and part of Macedonia". Id. In the summer of 1992, further reorganization occurred, and the 4th Military District reportedly was abolished. Id. at 252.

189/ Id. at 250.

190/ Id.

191/ Id.

192/ Id.

Notes (continued)

194/ The Bosnian government's cooperation with the JNA ceased a few days before the EC recognized the independence of BiH. Id. According to Gow, "[i]n retrospect . . . this campaign had left the Bosnian Territorial Defence Force (already largely disarmed a year previously) and the forces of the Bosnian Internal Affairs Ministry . . . stripped of the means to defend the country . . . ." Id. at 8. Gow also notes that reports of the trial of Colonel General Andrija Vasiljević in Belgrade indicate that Bosnia's Minister of Internal Affairs, Alija Delimustafić, may have been working for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's military counter-intelligence. Id. at 18 (citing Vreme, 19 April 1992).

195/ Id.


198/ Rodovan Karadžić, the President of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced on 17 May 1992 that 55,000 Bosnian Serbs would be transferred from Yugoslav Army units in Bosnia to the Serb Republic. He also said that Yugoslav General Ratko Mladić would command the troops. Nevertheless, Karadžić maintained that this new army was completely independent of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He stated "Serbs or Yugoslavs have nothing to do with our rights down there [in Bosnia]. I can see that nobody believes this, but it is the truth". John F. Burns, "Understanding and Letting Loose, Historic Hatreds in the Balkans", New York Times, 17 May 1992, § 4, at 7.

199/ See generally Annex III, Military Structure; Annex III.A, Special Forces; Annex V, Prijedor.


201/ See Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina) (7 December 1992).

202/ See infra part 3 on "ethnic cleansing" operations in the north-east city of Zvornik from April through June 1992 (Vienna, 6 April 1994).

203/ See infra.

204/ Many of the homes of Bosnian Muslims are not only destroyed by artillery fire; they appear to be deliberately destroyed by Bosnian forces to prevent the Muslim population from returning. For example, T.D. Allman, a foreign correspondent for Vanity Fair magazine reports, after travelling through Serb-held Bosnia, that ". . . every house has been destroyed in exactly the same way--from within, by demolition squads . . . [t]here is no resentful population in the towns Serbs have seized, because there is no one left". T.D. Allman, "Serbia's Blood War", in Why Bosnia 47 (Rabia Ali & Laurence Lifschultz eds., 1993).
Notes (continued)


206/ See discussion of Prijedor and Kozarac, infra.

207/ Id. Mass killings have also been reported in Bijeljina, Foča, Visegrad and Bratunac. See Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 63 (1992).

208/ For instance, Helsinki Watch states:

"Prior to their expulsion from Serbian-controlled areas of Bosnia, some non-Serbs are forced to sign statements that they are voluntarily leaving the area. In other cases, civilian authorities draft and issue statements in which the signatory relinquishes all claims to his or her property to the local Serbian-controlled agencies, usually to the municipal [opština] authorities or to the town council [mesna zajednica]."

Helsinki Watch II, supra note 184, at 12.

209/ Id. at 42. The pre-war population of Prijedor was 44 per cent Muslim 42.5 per cent Serb and 5.6 per cent Croat (the remainder "other") according to the 1991 census. Stjepko Golubić, Susan Campbell & Thomas Golubić, "How Not to Divide the Indivisible", in Why Bosnia 209, 231 (Rabia Ali & Lawrence Lifschultz eds., 1993). See also Annex V (The Prijedor Report).


211/ SDS is the "Sister Party" of Serbia's Socialist Party (SPS), headed by Slobodan Milošević. Prior to the dissolution of FRY, SPS had been the ruling Communist Party.

212/ Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 44 (April 1993).

213/ Id.

214/ Id. at 45.

215/ Id. at 48-49.

216/ See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, at 11 (17 November 1993). In addition, only 1,000 Muslims remain in Doboj, out of 43,000 who were there for the 1991 census. In Bosanski Novi, only 800 of 15,000 Muslims remain. Id.
Notes (continued)


218/ Id. at 6.

219/ See Boltzman Report, infra. See also Helsinki Watch, II War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina 222 (April 1993).


221/ Id. at 222 infra.

222/ Id. at 223-29 infra.

223/ Id. at 226 infra.

224/ Id. at 227 infra. "Arkan" is the nom de guerre of Željko Ražnatović. His role in the conflict is discussed further, infra. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.

225/ It was also reported that Arkan attacked the Muslim negotiators. Boltzman Report, 227 infra.

226/ Arkan's troops are also known as "Tigers". See infra.

227/ Boltzman Report, 231 infra.

228/ The Šešeljovci are loyal to Vojislav Šešelj, a member of the Republic of Serbia's parliament. His role in the conflict is discussed further, infra, this section. Šešelj's troops are more commonly called "Četniks".

229/ The White Eagles are a paramilitary unit led by Mirko Jović, the leader of the Serbian National Renewal Party. See infra this section. See also Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 39 (1992).

230/ Boltzman Report, 231 infra.

231/ Id. at 234 infra.

232/ Id. at 243 infra.

233/ Id. at 247 infra.

234/ Id. at 251 infra.

235/ Id. at 255 infra.

236/ Monster Town, Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993, at 18.

Notes (continued)


240/ Id. Herak also stated that he killed five Muslim men who had been taken from a prison camp to dig trenches for Serb troops. Herak killed them after his companion told him the Muslims were performing their work poorly. Id.

241/ Id.

242/ Id.

243/ Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide 44 (1993) (quoting a former prisoner at Omarska identified only as "Meho"). See also Annex VIII, Prison Camps.


245/ Id.


247/ See Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 15 (7 December 1992) ("[t]he camps are administered by armed and uniformed Serbs. The majority of the guards are known to the detainees as they come from neighbouring villages; one former camp detainee is quoted as saying of the guards "[w]e used to party together; our children went to school together"). Staff of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina 8-9 (Comm. Print 1992).

248/ This issue is relevant with respect to establishing individual guilt under applicable international law. A finding of "state action", for example, would be necessary before the provisions of international humanitarian law could be invoked. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity 248-59 (1992).


251/ Roy Gutman, "There is no Food, There is no Air", Newsday, 19 July 1992, at 7.
Notes (continued)

252/ See generally Annex III.A, Special Forces.


254/ Id. at 96.

255/ Id.

256/ Vojislav Šešelj is the leader of the Serbian Radical Party; Arkan, the Party of Serb Unity; and Mirko Jović is the leader of the Serbian Renewal Movement. For a review of Šešelj's and Arkan's role in Serbian domestic politics, see generally Stan Markotich, "Serbia", 3 RFE/RL Research Report (22 April 1994).


259/ Id.

260/ Id.


262/ Arkan's troops also were involved in the attack on Zvornik. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.


265/ Id.

266/ Id.

267/ Id. See also Annex III.A, Special Forces.


269/ Id.
270/ Id.

271/ Id. (The press in Slovenia, Croatia and Belgrade also have reported that Arkan once worked abroad as a government "hit man").


273/ Id. at 96.

274/ Id. at 97 (citing Borba, 11 November 1993).

275/ Id. at 97. A vote was not taken on the motion; Milošević dissolved parliament and called for elections instead. Id.

276/ Aleksandar Čirić, "The Balkan Archeology", Vreme, No. 112, 15 November 1993, at 7. In November 1993, several prominent SRS party members were arrested. Milenko Retrić, vice president of the Sid SRS, for example, was arrested for committing four murders in Vojvodina. According to Radio Serbia, none of the persons arrested have been charged with crimes committed outside of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Id. at 97. But see Id. at 9 ("Radicals in Belgrade are being charged with crimes against the civilian population in the vicinity of Zvornik; a radical who was there said they had 'fooled around a bit, cleansed the place and had a bit of fun.'" Id. In June 1994, a Serb was indicted in the district court in Šabac, Serbia for killing 16 Muslim civilians in Zvornik. Dušan Vučković, described as a 31 year-old volunteer, was charged with killing a group of Muslims as they huddled in a cultural centre that had been converted into a prison. Roger Cohen, "Serbs Put a Serb on Trial for War Crimes", New York Times, 12 June 1994, at Y4.

277/ During the Second World War, the "White Eagles" was closely aligned with another organization, Zbor, which was a pro-fascist military movement during the Second World War. See Dejan Anastasijević, "Eagles with Clipped Wings", Vreme, No. 113, 22 November 1993, at 15.

278/ Id.

279/ Id. at 16.

280/ Id. at 17.

281/ Id. at 17.


284/ Id. at 18.
Notes (continued)


287/ Id.

288/ See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Names Figures to be Prosecuted over War Crimes", New York Times, 12 December 1992, at A1 (then Secretary of State Laurence S. Eagleburger identified Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić as suspected war criminals; also identified were Borislav Herak; "Adil" and "Arif", two members of a Croatian paramilitary unit; Željko Ražnatović; Vojislav Šešelj; Drago Prčac, the commander of Omarska prison camp; Adem Delič, commander of the Celebići prison camp; and Slobodan Milošević).

289/ M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity 240-44 (1992) (discussing the public law connection between individual conduct and state action or policy). For the prerequisite legal elements of "Crimes Against Humanity", see id. at 248; see also Genocide Convention, art. IV ("Persons committing genocide . . . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals"). Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 United Nations Treaty Series 277, reprinted in 45 American Journal International Law 7 (1951) (Supp.).


295/ Id. at 159 (quoting the Bosnian State Commission on War Crimes).

296/ See discussion infra.


298/ Id. See also John F. Burns, "A Serb, Fighting Serbs, Defends Sarajevo", New York Times, 26 July 1992, at 12 (General Mladić quoted as telling his officers "burn it [Sarajevo] all").
Notes (continued)


300/ Id.


302/ TGRA Press Release (Zagreb, Croatia), 9 April 1994 (captured Serb states that he was released from prison where he was serving a sentence for rape; he stated that the warden told him that the warden had been authorized by General Mladic to recruit the most violent criminals).

303/ See Annex III, Military Structure.

304/ For examples of repression in Serbia's Sandžak region, see Dino Ramović, "Misery in a Land of Plenty", Bosnia Winter Watch, No. 2, 29 November 1993, at 7. See also Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 95-100 (March 1993).


308/ Milan Vego, "The Yugoslav Ground Forces", Jane's Intelligence Review 250 (June 1993).

309/ Id.


311/ Report by the Chairman, Subcommittee on European Affairs, to the Committee on Foreign Relations, to Stand Against Aggression: Milošević, the Bosnian Republic, and the Conscience of the West, United States Senate (19 April 1993).

312/ See Milan Vego, "Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Jane's Intelligence Review 448 (October 1992). Other supply routes reportedly run across the Drina River at Loznica, Bratunac, and Visegrad. Id. Croatian forces in Bosnia have also received assistance from Croatia. See Milan Vego, "The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Jane's Intelligence Review, 99-102 (March 1993).
Notes (continued)


315/ The Bijeljina garrison belonged to the 17 Corps Tuzla.

316/ Until the re-organization of the former JNA, the headquarters of the 12th Corps Novi Sad commanded "operative groups" as part of its "sector command North", which were under direct control of the general staff, including at least 3 brigades and additional forces. Further "operative groups" were under the authority of the "sector command South", consisting of the headquarters of the Belgrade-based "mechanized division" with at least 6 brigades, one partisan brigade and one artillery brigade.

317/ All along, the units from Šabac and Sremska Mitrovica were under the authority of the 12th Corps Novi Sad.

318/ The unit in Valjevo was always under the command of the 1st Corps Belgrade. Until the fall of 1991 the units from Šabac, Sremska Mitrovica and Valjevo were readily-deployable units. All these units belonged to the First Military District of Belgrade.

319/ Up to the re-organization of the former JNA, the 21st Corps stationed in Niš was under the authority of the Third Military District of Skopje. Later a separate Third Military District of Niš was established.

320/ According to one respondent, on 25 March, Šešelj personally brought hand-carried weapons into the church of Šćemlije, where he was received by Boško Ceranić, a SDS activist in Šćemlije.

321/ The Serbian Police of Zvornik repeatedly transferred its headquarters: from April (i.e., immediately after the separation into a Muslim and Serbian militia) until mid-April, it was located on the premises of the "Alhos" factory in the Karakaj industrial zone. After that, the Serbian militia moved into the factory of "Novi Standard", then after the fall of Kulaškrd into the Hotel Drina in the town of Zvornik, and finally back again into the building of the former militia (SUP).

322/ A number of detailed testimonies from survivors of the camps at Karakaj are available to BIM. All of them are suitable for submission to the International War Crime Tribunal.

323/ For a list of the camps see Appendix I.

324/ According to some witnesses, fatalities occurred in the Zvornik hospital, mostly as a result of blood withdrawals being conducted until the advent of death.

325/ In Subotica, some of the deportees encountered persons who had already taken part in the aggressions in Zvornik. In Subotica, these people were responsible, inter alia, for the issuance of Yugoslav passports to deportees from Zvornik.
Security Council

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FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSIONS OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX V
THE PRIJEDOR REPORT

Prepared by:

Hanne Sophie Greve
Member and Rapporteur on the Prijedor Project,
Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992)

Contributor, Part One:

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<td>B. Evictions</td>
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<td>C. No legal protection</td>
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<td>D. Forced labour</td>
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<td>F. Reprisals</td>
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<td>G. Total evacuation of the non-Serbs?</td>
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<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part One

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

OPŠTINA PRIJEDOR,
A DISTRICT IN NORTH-WESTERN BIH:
ALLEGED GENOCIDE
AND MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF THE ELEMENTARY DICTATES OF HUMANITY

I. THE STATEMENTS

1. The statements were collected and presented by Commissioner Hanne Sophie Greve and Assistant to the Commission Morten Bergsmo.

2. For security reasons, the information gathered from victims and witnesses is kept confidential. These statements are contained in four separate volumes (a total of 911 pages) and are provided exclusively to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY).

II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION

3. Opština Prijedor is a district located in north-western Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) in an area which is part of Bosnian Krajina. It is located in between the town ofSanski Most (to the south), the Bosnian-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional capital of Banja Luka (to the east). Except for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations before the armed conflicts started in BiH.

4. According to the 1991 census, Opština Prijedor had a total population of 112,470 people, of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6 per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslavs" and 2.2 per cent others (Ukrainians, Russians and Italians). In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately 120,000 people, augmented, inter alia, by an influx of people who had fled the destruction of their villages in areas to the west of Opština Prijedor.

5. Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count of June 1993, as published in Serbian-controlled media, gives the following overall picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>New arrivals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>47,745</td>
<td>53,637</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>49,454</td>
<td>6,124</td>
<td>43,330</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>3,131</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>2,621</td>
<td>6,350</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, the total number of killed and deported persons as of June 1993 is 52,811 (including limited numbers of refugees and people missing). Since then, the number of non-Serbs in the district has continued to decrease. The extreme persecution to which non-Serbs are subjected and their almost total lack of protection in the district is illustrated by the fact that the ICRC and the UNHCR asked permission from the Serbs, ultimo March 1994, to evacuate all remaining non-Serbs from Opština Prijedor.
III. SERBS TAKE POWER ON 30 APRIL 1992

6. According to Kozarski Vjesnik, a Serbian-controlled newspaper in Opština Prijedor:

"The man [Simo Drljača], who the Serbian Democratic Party of the Opština Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police after half a year of illegal work, had done his job so well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the takeover of power [by the Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The assembly of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him Chief of the public security station [i.e. in charge of the secret police]. He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence his new function in Bijelina on Monday." 1/

7. More than six months prior to the power change in 1992, the Serbs started to build up their own administration parallel to the legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor, what they called the Serbian Opština Prijedor. This included, inter alia, a pure Serbian police force with secret service functions. The legitimate authorities in Opština Prijedor had been lawfully elected and the Prijedor Assembly reflected the ethnic composition of the district.

8. In early 1992, a very small Serbian paramilitary group took control of the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain in Opština Prijedor. As a consequence, the population in the district could not receive television programmes from Sarajevo or Zagreb any longer, only from Belgrade and later Banja Luka. The television programmes from Belgrade insinuated that non-Serbs wanted war and threatened the Serbs.

9. Prior to the power change on 30 April 1992, Serbs secretly armed other Serbs in the district. Many soldiers from the JNA withdrew from Croatia to north-western BiH in early 1992. Instead of demobilizing those who returned to Opština Prijedor, the legitimate authorities were pressured to accept redeploying them to control all inroads to and exits from the district together with police and the TO. The pressure applied was an ultimatum. The legitimate authorities were invited for a guided sightseeing tour of two Croatian villages just north of Bosanska Gradiška which had been destroyed and left uninhabited. The message was that if the ultimatum was not met, the fate of Prijedor would be the same as that of these villages. The ultimatum was accepted.

IV. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SERBS TAKING POWER

10. An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opština Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel and the telephone system was no longer fully operational. A curfew was introduced in Prijedor town – the main town in the district – and travel permits were required in many areas even to move among local villages. Bus services were closed down.

11. In the wake of the power change, most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as police, public officials or even manual workers. In all
key functions such as police and local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs.

12. Already before 30 April 1992, Serbs had started to visit the non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demand that they give their weapons up. This process was intensified after the takeover, and combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and Territorial Defence Forces (Teritorijalna Odbrana or TOs) were instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms.

13. Also, the local media, Radio Prijedor and Kozarski Vjesnik, joined in the anti non-Serb propaganda. The media slandered former non-Serbian leaders by criticizing everything from their alleged lack of efficiency to their private lives. In addition, the media claimed that many dangerous - in particular Muslim - extremists were in the area, preparing genocide against the Serbs.

V. THE MAJOR SERBIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT

14. Following an incident in which less than a handful Serbian soldiers were shot dead under unclear circumstances, the village of Hambarine was given an ultimatum to hand over a policeman who lived nearby where the shooting had occurred. As it was not met, Hambarine was subjected to several hours of artillery bombardment on 23 May 1992. The shells were fired from the aerodrome Urije just outside Prijedor town. When the bombardment stopped, the village was stormed by infantry, including paramilitary units, which sought out the inhabitants in every home. Hambarine had a population of 2,499 in 1991.

15. On 24 May 1992, a large-scale attack on the entire Kozarac area east of Prijedor town, under the Kozara Mountain, was carried out with intensive bombardment from all directions by artillery, tanks, and small firearms. The bombardment lasted for more than 24 hours, before infantry and paramilitary groups stormed Kozarac and nearby villages and searched for people in every building. The affected area had a total population of almost 27,000 non-Serbian people.

16. On 30 May 1992, a group of probably less than 150 armed non-Serbs had made their way to the Old Town in Prijedor to regain control over the town. They were defeated, and the Old Town was razed. In the central parts of Prijedor town, all non-Serbs were forced to leave their houses as Serbian military, paramilitary, police and civilians advanced street by street with tanks and lighter arms. The non-Serbs had been instructed over the radio to hang a white piece of cloth on their homes to signal surrender.

17. Starting on 20 July 1992, a large area of predominantly non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner to the Kozarac area. However, it was predominantly infantry and paramilitary groups that carried out the destruction. At the time of the attack, the areas had a population of close to 20,000 people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages west of Opština Prijedor had been destroyed.

18. Today, the former homes of almost 47,000 people in the Kozarac and Hambarine/Ljubija areas are empty and destroyed. Some were hit by artillery shells, while others were set ablaze in the initial attack. All the homes were pillaged and a large number blown up, one at a time from inside, destroying especially the inside and the roofs. Most of the artillery used during these attacks had been moved into position some time before the Serbs
took power on 30 April 1992.

VI. CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND DEPORTATIONS

19. As non-Serbs were attacked in the villages and Prijedor town, hundreds, possibly thousands, were killed in their home areas, frequently after maltreatment. The survivors who temporarily managed to flee or hide were divided. Females, boys under the age of sixteen (sometimes the age limit may have been lower) and elderly men (older than 60 or 65) made up one group, while the other men comprised the second group.

20. The second group - the men - were taken to hastily opened concentration camps in a ceramic tile factory, Keraterm, next to Prijedor town and on the premises of the iron ore mine and processing plant at Omarska. Massacres, torture, and appalling living conditions quickly depleted the number of detainees.

21. In an interview of Simo Drljača (Chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor), he stated that:

"In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm', and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjača', on the basis of solid documentation of active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republica Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjača." 2/

22. As the "informative talks" or interrogations basically took place in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, it can be concluded that more than 6,000 adult males were taken to these concentration camps in the short period they existed (from the end of May to the beginning of August 1992). Since only 1,503 were moved on to Manjača camp according to Mr. Drljača, a limited number transferred to the Trnopolje camp, and almost none released, it may be assumed that the death toll was extremely high, even by Serbian accounts. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. On at least one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of newly captured people being arbitrarily executed en masse. Some 37 women were detained in Omarska, whilst no women were kept over time in Keraterm.

23. The women's groups (almost all the females, the boys under the age of sixteen and the elderly men) were normally taken to the Trnopolje camp. Here the regime was far better than in Omarska and Keraterm; none the less harassment and malnutrition was a problem for all the inmates. Rapes, beatings and other kinds of torture and even killings were not rare. Some of these detained women were released after a few days as there was a lack of space in the Trnopolje camp as well.

24. On their way to the concentration camps, some captives were detained for shorter periods at improvised detention facilities such as sports halls in schools and stadiums (notably in the Prijedor suburb of Tukovi, and in Ljubija).

25. As soon as the Serbs had captured the first groups of non-Serbs, the large-scale deportations of the women's group started. Some were deported straight from the improvised detention facilities, the majority from the
Trnopolje camp. The majority of deportees were cramped into buses or onto military trucks and sent towards Travnik. These deportees had to walk almost 30 kilometres from where the trucks and buses dumped them in a desolate area on the outskirts of the Vlašić Mountain, to reach non-Serbian-held areas in central BiH. A few were deported the safer way to Bosanska Gradiška. Sizable numbers were taken by rail - many in cattle wagons - to Travnik, some were let off the trains in Doboj from where they were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla. Some individuals perished during the transport due to the mid-summer heat and next to suffocating conditions both in cattle wagons and on closed military trucks where the deportees were also deprived of food and water.

VII. THE STRATEGY OF DESTRUCTION

26. The Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor on 30 April 1992, after more than six months of careful planning. After this, the non-Serbs had their homes and communities destroyed, their families split, and their employment denied. The majority of the non-Serbs were soon captured, thousands incarcerated in concentration camps, and even larger numbers deported. This all happened after the Serbs had sealed off most exits from the area. The non-Serbs presented no real threat to the Serbs under these circumstances, the district of Prijedor being surrounded at the time by areas controlled and dominated by the Serbs (the non-Serb majority population in the Sanski Most district was purged simultaneously as in Prijedor).

27. Despite the absence of a real non-Serbian threat, the main objective of the concentration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm, seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership. Political leaders, officials from the courts and administration, academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, key business people and artists - the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities - were removed, apparently with the intention that the removal be permanent. Similarly, law-enforcement and military personnel were targeted for destruction. These people also constituted a significant element of the non-Serbian group in that its depletion rendered the group at large defenceless against abuses of any kind. Other important traces of Muslim and Croatian culture and religion - mosques and Catholic churches included - were destroyed.

VIII. THE GENERAL LACK OF PROTECTION FOR NON-SERBS

28. From the time when the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, non-Serbs in reality became outlaws. At times, non-Serbs were instructed to wear white arm bands to identify themselves. Non-Serbs were subjected to crimes without the new Serbian leaders attempting to redress the problem. For example, rape became a serious problem for many women who were left alone as their husbands had been detained. The impression was allowed to spread among Serbs that they would be exonerated if they made life difficult for non-Serbs so that the latter would ask permission to leave the district. According to new Serbian regulations, those leaving the district had to sign over their property rights to Serbs and accept never to return, being told that their names simultaneously would be deleted from the census.

IX. RESPONSIBILITY

29. When the Serbs took power in the district of Prijedor, they immediately declared the existence of a Crisis Committee of the Serbian district of Prijedor (Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor). Some of the members of this
crisis committee were the military commanders Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Željaja, and other district leaders, such as Major Slobodan Kuruzović; the Chief of Police, Simo Drljača; Mayor Milomir Stakić; the President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor, Mijo Kovačević; the President of the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) in Prijedor, Simo Mišković; and the President of the Red Cross in Prijedor, Srdjo Srđić.

30. The military destruction of the non-Serbian habitations in Opština Prijedor took place when the area was under the command of Colonel Vladimir Arsić and Major Radmilo Željaja in close cooperation with military superiors, at least in the regional capital Banja Luka. Units stationed outside of Opština Prijedor assisted in the military destruction, as did paramilitary units whose attacks were timed to fit with the artillery attacks and the manoeuvres of the regular army units.

31. In the above-mentioned interview, Simo Drljača stated that:

"[T]hey [the police force (including the secret services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior.

... the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups." 3/

32. The secret police and the military police provided the concentration camps with interrogators and guards. For some of the most gruesome torture and killings of detainees, the assistance of paramilitary units and some locals was also called upon. The joint police and military intervention units were used to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership. The latter units killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manjača camp and arranged mass-killings of "deported" prisoners in the Vlašić Mountain area.

33. The other members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor ran the community in which all these violations occurred. They participated in the administrative decision-making. The gains of the systematic looting of non-Serbian property were shared by many Serbs on different levels.

34. The Commission of Experts possesses the names of hundreds of alleged perpetrators at different levels and in a variety of capacities.

X. CONCLUSIONS

35. It is unquestionable that the events in Opština Prijedor since 30 April 1992 qualifies as crimes against humanity. Furthermore, it is likely to be confirmed in court under due process of law that these events constitute genocide.
Part Two
THE CONTEXT

36. "Though this be madness, yet there is method in it."
   -William Shakespeare, Hamlet

I. PREFACE

37. The Commission of Experts has been mandated to examine and analyze information gathered and to pursue actively its investigations with regard to, in particular, the practice of "ethnic cleansing".

38. This initial analysis of the context of the events in Opština Prijedor is based on almost 400 statements by surviving victims of and witnesses to these events currently living in different countries, local Serbian media reports of the events and research into the context of the events. The statements from almost 400 victims and witnesses are contained in four separate confidential volumes.

39. The hundreds of informants presented descriptions of different parts of the events and also various versions of the events - differences appear, however, only as far as details are concerned. When it comes to the overall and general picture, the witnesses speak as if with one voice - as the case often is with the expression of the collective memory of a population having shared in a major painful event. More often than not, available Serbian media reports and statements made by Serbian leaders to foreign visitors to the area - official delegations among them - support the general overall information obtained from the victims and witnesses.

40. When mapping experts map out alien territory, the obligatory reservation on each map reads, "Compiled in 19.. from best available source material". A similar reservation is necessary concerning the accuracy of this analysis. The analysis is, save for the reproduction of generally available facts, based on allegations. As always in criminal cases, the judgement is for the court to make under due process of law.

II. OPŠTINA PRIJEDOR - GENERAL DESCRIPTION

A. Geography

41. An opština is an administrative unit in the former Yugoslavia. The neutral translation is a district.

42. Opština Prijedor is located in north-western BiH in an area which is part of Bosanska (i.e. Bosnian) Krajina. It is located in between the town of Sanski Most to the south, the BiH-Croatian border towns of Bosanski Novi (to the west) and Bosanska Dubica (to the north), and the regional "capital" of Banja Luka to the east. Save for the area of Sanski Most, the other neighbouring districts had Serbian majority populations prior to the disintegration of and violence in the former Yugoslavia.

43. More important in the context of the events from 1992 onward, Opština Prijedor as part of north-western BiH is clearly located inside any corridor that Serbs could want to clear between Serbia proper and the Serbian-occupied Croatian Krajina. One obstacle to such a corridor is that when crossing the Drina River (the frontier between Serbia proper and BiH) and moving westward through BiH towards the Croatian Krajina region, the population - before the
violence started in 1992 - was multi-ethnic and the Serbs were not even a
majority in many of these areas. Any Serbian demands for territory for a
corridor was thus unlikely to gain political support in BiH. In 1993, Serbian
military leaders in Banja Luka acknowledged the need for the conquest of a
corridor as mentioned. It was a prerequisite for the "bringing in of
humanitarian assistance".

44. The district Prijedor has one main town, which is also named Prijedor,
two smaller towns called Ljubija and Kozarac, and numerous villages and
hamlets. The Sana River flows through the district (which has a shape that
resembles an irregular vertical rectangle) from the west towards the centre,
and then bending to the south. Prijedor Grad (i.e. town) is located in the
valley of the river, where the Sana River bends to the south. There is a
large artificial lake for fishfarming to the south-east of Prijedor town. The
district is mountainous especially in the northern and western areas, with the
Kozara Mountain in the north and parts of the Majdanska Mountain in the south-
west. The mountains are forested.

B. Population profile

45. Opština Prijedor, according to the 1991 census, had a total population
of 112,470 people of whom 44 per cent were Muslims, 42.5 per cent Serbs, 5.6
per cent Croats, 5.7 per cent "Yugoslavs", and 2.2 per cent others
(Ukrainians, Russians, and Italians). "Serb" is considered synonymous to
Orthodox, and "Croat" is considered synonymous to Catholic. "Yugoslavs" were
people of mixed ethnic/religious parentage, and people who for conscientious
and/or political reasons did not want to declare themselves by
ethnic/religious groups. Muslims probably counted for the majority of the
"Yugoslavs".

46. Many people have stated that it never occurred to them that serious
difficulties between the ethnic groups - not to say war - ever could happen in
the area. None have said the opposite.

47. In early April 1992, the total population may have been approximately
120,000 people due to an influx of refugees from Opština Bosanski Novi (see
Chapter VII.A, infra).

48. Comparing the 1991 census figures with the results of a population count
of June 1993 as published by the Serbs, give the following overall picture:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>Reduction</th>
<th>New arrivals</th>
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<td>Serbs</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of killed and deported people as of June 1993 was 52,811
(including limited numbers of refugees and people missing). Since then, the
number of non-Serbs in the district has continued to decrease.

49. In general, it is claimed that the population of BiH, heterogeneous as
far as religions are concerned, had developed a unique and cohesive regional
identity and culture. The people of BiH for centuries coexisted in a
pluralistic society. One illustration of this is their proverb, "Sto sela,
sto običaja" (i.e. "One hundred villages, one hundred habits"). According to
the 1991 census, more than one-fourth of the entire population in BiH had
mixed ethnic/religious parentage. To many there were no marked differences
between the ethnic/religious groups, save that Muslims could usually be recognized by their names.

50. Traditionally, both Croats and Serbs have claimed that the Muslims in BiH were actually Croats and Serbs respectively, of the Islamic faith. The Muslims have preferred to call themselves Bošniaks, a name with an ethnic rather than religious connotation.

51. Prior to the 1960s, the Muslims were ethnically undeclared in population counts, or they opted for the denomination "Yugoslav". In the 1961 census, they were for the first time allowed to register as "Muslims in the ethnic sense". In the 1971 census, Muslims were included as a distinct and equal nationality in all of the former Yugoslavia. Many people from BiH considered this move by Tito, in his old age, to be a trap. Why not let the people in BiH call themselves Bosnians as they wanted to, regardless of whether they were Muslims, Catholics or Orthodox? This way the people were forced into different groups, which created partially artificial linkage between Bosnian Serbs and Serbs elsewhere and Bosnian Croats and Croats elsewhere, rather than emphasizing the existing ties internally in BiH.

52. In retrospect, many of the refugees and deportees speak about what happened in Opština Prijedor and elsewhere in BiH as an effort by those opposed to its pluralistic culture to dismiss the Bosnian soul (*istjerati bosanski duh*).

53. In 1574, Sultan Selim II issued a decree awarding tax privileges to Gypsy miners *(inter alia*, to Gypsies working in an iron ore mine near Banja Luka, possibly the mine - which is said to be very old - in Ljubija in Opština Prijedor, see Chapter II.D. infra). This is considered as the first recorded specific reference to Gypsies in BiH. The Gypsies had more or less the same rights as their Muslim or Christian brethren respectively. The majority of Gypsies in BiH were Muslim. During World War II, the Gypsies were targeted both by the Ustaše and the Četniks, and numbers of survivors took refuge in north-western BiH.

54. Opština Prijedor is subdivided in the following naselje (i.e. towns and villages):

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Ališići</td>
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(Some of the figures quoted vary slightly in the official statistics.)
C. Some remarks concerning the history

55. Opština Prijedor had a remarkably high percentage of Partisans (from all the different ethnic groups) during World War II. The district was the first to be a liberated Partisan area in 1942. It was recaptured by German, Ustaša, and to a lesser extent Četnik forces, with many people killed not the least - but not only - Serbs. Both the World War II heros Esad Midžić (Muslim) and Mladen Stojanović (Serb) were locals. They even had a song about the Četniks killing the latter. Kozarac has a war monument which reportedly surpasses any other war monument in the former Yugoslavia.

56. The district at large was anti-German during World War II.

57. It is said that the word Četnik is a traditional term for the much-heroicized bandit fighters of earlier Serbian history. There were Serbian veterans from World War I who called themselves Četniki. Many other Serbian groupings also made claim to the Četnik name during World War II. The main Četnik movement during World War II was that formed by the royalist, Yugoslav Army Colonel, General Draža Mihailović. With reference to the latter group of Četniks, Noel Malcolm writes:

"Among the leading Četniks there were several rabid Serb nationalists whose desire it was to absorb not only Bosnia but Dalmatia, Montenegro, parts of Croatia and Slavonia, and even northern Albania, into the territory of Serbia. Such aims were nurtured by two dominant intellectuals in the Četnik movement: the Serbian lawyer and politician Dragiša Vasić and the Bosnian Serb lawyer (from Banja Luka) Stevan Molević. In June 1941 the latter drew up a memorandum entitled 'Homogeneous Serbia', in which he demanded the inclusion in Serbia of the territories mentioned above, and explained that the 'fundamental duty of all Serbs was 'to create and organize a homogeneous Serbia, which must include all the ethnic territory inhabited by Serbs'. In a letter to Vasić in February 1942 Molević wrote that Serbian land should be extended all the way to Dalmatia, and that there should then follow 'the cleansing (čišćenje) of the land of all the non-Serb elements. The thing to do would be to send the offenders on their way: Croats to Croatia, and Muslims to Turkey or Albania.' With people like this influencing the policy of the Četniks (Molević became political director of the movement in early 1943), there was clearly a theoretical basis for a virulently anti-Muslim policy.

But on the other hand there is no definite evidence that Draža Mihailović himself ever called for ethnic cleansing. The one document which has frequently been cited as evidence of this, a set of instructions addressed to regional commanders in December 1941, is probably a forgery - though it must be pointed out that it was forged not by enemies wanting to discredit Mihailović but by the commanders themselves, who hoped it would be taken for a genuine Četnik document. Mihailović was certainly capable of using the rhetoric of Serbian nationalism. In one proclamation attributed to him there is a declaration: 'I am from Serbian Šumadija [district of central Serbia], from Serbian land and of Serbian blood. As such, I shall fight for the most sublime ideas which a Serb can have: for the liberation and unification for ever of all Serbian lands ... Wherever Serbian graves are found, there is Serbian land.'"

58. The name Četnik awakens different emotions and allows for different interpretations. For some people, it is a genuinely patriotic and decent
concept also in terms of fundamental respect for human beings as such. For others, and possibly most people due to the main events during World War II, it is as ominous and horrifying as Fascist and Nazi - associated with destruction and death for any and all envisaged enemies. The Četnik concept reinvigorated and incarnated by the Serbs in the 1990s in BiH has gathered followers among Serbs of different interpretational creeds, but in practical terms the re-awakened Četniks have taken up only the most gruesome of the Četnik traditions - linking the name once again to barbarious behaviour. Among non-Serbs in BiH, the word Četnik is used in the vernacular as a generic term for evil.

D. Rudnika Ljubija

59. The modern iron ore mine in Opština Prijedor was started in 1916 by the Austrians. Up to World War II, the leaders were Western-oriented, after the war the orientation shifted towards Belgrade and the USSR. Up to World War II, the production was some 300-400 tons a year. In the late 1980s, the production was three million tons a year: Rudnika (the mine) Ljubija was the largest and most important mine in the former Yugoslavia and one of the largest in Europe, and in terms of the quality of the metals produced, the mine was considered second only to the one in Kiruna, Sweden.

60. More than 85 per cent of the directors of the mine were Serbs, the rest were Muslims. Rudnika Ljubija was divided into three different main production areas: Ljubija, Tomašica and Omarska. The latter was the larger where the largest investments had been made. The mining company was in charge of all the three areas. The distance between the most distant part of the mines in Ljubija and Omarska was approximately 30 kilometres. In the late 1980s, the mine was fully modernized. All the republics in the former Yugoslavia had invested in the latest upgrading of Omarska. The mining company, Rudnika Ljubija, had 5,000 employees. Most of the Croatian and Muslim workers in the mine in the early 1990s have now been killed or deported.

E. Other economic activities

61. In addition to Rudnika Ljubija, there were smaller plants and production units in Opština Prijedor. The second largest enterprise was Celpak producing cellulose and paper. The paper mill was located on the outskirts of Prijedor town, to the south. It had 3,000 employees. There were also many small saw mills spread around in the forested parts of the district, including in the Kozarac area.

62. Several small factories were producing their goods (such as biscuits, soft-drinks, etc.) mainly for local consumption. The agricultural production was good, and animal husbandry played a significant economic role. Citopromet consisted of a flour mill and a bakery employing some 800 people.

63. Located in between and linking the nearby towns of Banja Luka, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, and Bosanska Dubica, Opština Prijedor offered employment in the transport section and related services. A railway crosses through Opština Prijedor from east to west. The Kozarac area with the Kozara Mountain and the World War II memorial attracted tourists.
F. Political and administrative structure

64. It was first in the early 1990s that nationalist political parties had been established. These parties had not existed one year earlier. There was initially a reasonable relationship between the Muslim party, called the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije, the SDA), and the main Serbian party, named the SDS, in Prijedor. This, however, changed especially after Vojislav Šešelj came to several SDS meetings and expressed surprise that the Serbs could live in such harmony with the non-Serbs.

65. In the local elections in Prijedor in 1990, the SDA won. Following the local elections, the Prijedor Assembly of a total of 90 seats had 30 representatives from the SDA, 28 representatives from the SDS, two representatives from the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, the HDZ), and 30 representatives from the other, mainly leftist parties, including the Political Action Party (Stranka Političke Akcije, the SPA), where the Serbs counted for the majority.

66. Although the Serbs made up only 42.5 per cent of the population in Opština Prijedor, they traditionally held almost all key positions in the Opština. The legacy from the Communist era - part and parcel of which had been the distribution of all leading positions to trusted party members - was not altered considerably after the first free elections. The Serbs said that Prijedor had been Serbian, and would remain Serbian. Thus, the Serbs tended to block proposals made by Muslims or Croats in the Assembly in Prijedor. The Serbs more or less tried to obstruct the work of the Assembly as such. To avoid conflict, the others more often than not let the Serbs have it their way. Thus, the Muslims also refrained from asking to take over a number of leading positions to which the election victory actually entitled them.

67. The Muslims were 44 per cent of the population, but held only a limited number of leading positions. It is claimed that from a total of 200 plants, only three were Muslim and two Catholic (i.e. Croatian). The Serbs were not underprivileged. Conversely, the Serbs held almost 90 per cent of the key positions.

68. In Prijedor, Marko Pavić was alfa et omega in the SDS; he had previously been mayor of the town. He studied law at the University of Zagreb. He worked for the police and the "Federal Security Service" (the Secret Service of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) which had close ties to the JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, i.e. the Yugoslav People's Army). Marko Pavić established the Reformist Forces Party (a reformed Communist party) in Prijedor before he joined the SDS. At the time when the Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor, he was director of the post, telephone and telegraph in the district. Allegedly, he played a pivotal role in the power change. Reportedly, Serbian de facto control of the post was used to facilitate financial transactions needed in this period. Apparently, the post office under the leadership of Marko Pavić was used, among other things, to channel and launder money during the advent of the Serbian takeover, and in the time following the power change.

69. Key Serbian people in commercial and service activities in Opština Prijedor were:

Dir. Ostoja Marjanović, Rudnika Ljubija (the mining company),
Dir. Dragan Kaurin, Celpak (paper mill, 3,000 employees),
Dir. Vaso Cvijić, Žitopromet (mill and bakery, 800 employees),
Dir. Živko Vujićić, Velepromet (the cooperation),
Dir. Slobodan Gajić, Trgoprodaja (shops),
Dir. Risto Banović, Bolnica (hospital),
70. Radio Prijedor and the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik were directed by three Serbs (whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). Twice a week they were driven in a Mercedes with drivers in JNA uniforms with the Yugoslav flag, without the Red Star, on their hats and jackets, to the main front in Croatia at Pakrac.

### III. POLITICAL AND MILITARY BACKGROUND TO THE CATASTROPHE

71. Telford Taylor stated the following prior to the Nuremberg trials:

"It is important that the trial not become an inquiry into the causes of war. It cannot be established that Hitlerism was the sole cause of the war, and there should be no effort to do this. Nor, I believe, should there be any effort or time spent on appointing out responsibility for causing the war among the many nations and individuals concerned. The question of causation is important and will be discussed for many years, but it has no place in this trial, which must rather stick rigorously to the doctrine that planning and launching an aggressive war is illegal, whatever may be the factors that caused the defendants to plan and to launch. Contributing causes may be pleaded by the defendant before the bar of history, but not before the tribunal."  

72. The question of responsibility for causing the war/wars in the former Yugoslavia is not addressed by the United Nations Commission of Experts. It may, however, be useful for the general understanding of the context of the events in Opština Prijedor to include a brief presentation of some relevant information concerning the political and military background to the catastrophe.

#### A. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

73. According to the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), dated 1974, Basic Principle I:

"The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right to secession [emphasis added] . . . have, . . . united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a socialist federal community . . .

... In order to carry these principles into effect the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall strive: . . . for the right of every nation freely to determine and build up its own social and political system by ways and means of its own free choice; for the right of nations to self-determination and national independence, and for their right to wage a liberation war to attain these aims;"

74. Article 1 of the Constitution continues:

"The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal state
having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, . . ."

75. In March 1989, the Serbian Assembly passed constitutional amendments which abolished the political autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo.

76. On 9 January 1991, the Presidency of the SFRY decided to arm paramilitary groups (primarily to counterbalance the Croatian national defence). Only about one month later, President Slobodan Milošević reportedly delivered a speech on television stating that, inter alia:

"Yugoslavia has entered into the final phase of its agony. The Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not functioned for a long time, and the illusion of the functioning of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and its powers, which in reality do not exist, has since last night finally expired. . . . the Republic of Serbia will no longer recognize a single decision of the Presidency under the existing circumstances because it would be illegal."

B. Overall political changes

77. The Muslims and Croats wanted cooperation between and coexistence among the different ethnic groups in BiH. A number of Serbs dreamt of establishing Greater Serbia - a 600-year old dream. The once huge Serbian empire broke up soon after the death in 1355 of its creator, Stephen Dušan - King of Serbia. Nationalism in Serbia reached a new height in 1989, 600 years after the battle at Kosovo Polje (i.e. the field of Kosovo). President Milošević went there to commemorate the 600th anniversary and then told the people what he wanted to achieve. Large numbers of Četniks, possibly from different schools of thought, participated in the commemoration, sporting their Četnik emblems and uniforms. Later, the general policy became increasingly nationalistic. Various kinds of Četnik meetings were held. Suddenly, many people started whispering. The SDS made public statements to the effect that they wanted peace, but hardly ever tolerated a meeting in the parliament in BiH to be properly concluded.

78. The Orthodox church celebrates Christmas on 6 January. Even during that religious feast, Serbs went around shouting and singing an old Četnik song from World War II, "Od Topole pa do Ravna Gora svud su straže Generala Draža" ("All the way from Topolje to Ravna Gora General Draža has his guards"). This was considered a highly ominous sign by the non-Serbs. Previously, such Četnik songs had been banned in public.

C. The war in Croatia

79. When the war in Croatia started in August 1991, it was followed by general tension between the Serbs on the one side and Croats and Muslims on the other. Life became more difficult also in Prijedor. The Muslims and Croats did not want to join the Serbs in their fighting in Croatia against the Croats.

80. As the war in Croatia ended, the Serb-controlled JNA withdrew in part to or through BiH.
D. BiH

81. In elections held in BiH, on 18 November and 2 December 1990, the parties received votes reflecting the ethnic composition of the population.

82. The Republic’s Constitution stipulated that decisions of vital importance to BiH needed consensus of the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in the Republic.

83. In April 1991, Serbian politicians in Banja Luka initiated the proclamation of the Bosanska Krajina Srpska Autonomna Oblast (SAO, i.e. Serbian autonomous region). Opštine Banja Luka, Glamoč, Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Srbac, Prnjavor and Čelinac all wanted to join this SAO. Opštine Prijedor and Sanski Most did not join. The decision to enter the SAO was made by the respective Opština assemblies after informal discussions.

84. On 14 November 1991, the Constitutional Court in BiH declared the so-called SAOs unconstitutional.

85. On 9 January 1992, the "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina" adopted a "Declaration on the Proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Hercegovina". The "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina" described itself as "a legitimate, freely and democratically elected representative and protector of the Serbian people", and stated that by adopting the Declaration, it was "implementing its [the Serbian people's] will expressed in a plebiscite [see Chapter III.E. infra], and the decision based on this plebiscite to form the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", or as stated in the Declaration Article I, "on the basis of the plebiscite held on 9 and 10 November 1991, at which the Serbian people decided to remain in the joint State of Yugoslavia". The members of the Assembly were the Serbian politicians who had been elected to the Parliament in BiH. The Declaration was to enter into force on the day of adoption.

86. According to Article II of the Declaration, the new Republic would remain within the Yugoslav Federal State as one of its units. Pending the promulgation of its own legislation, the new Republic was to apply federal regulations in its territory, as well as the regulations of the Socialist Republic of BiH as far as the Assembly did not deem the latter regulations contrary to the federal Constitution (see Article VIII).

87. The new Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in the territories "of the Serbian autonomous areas in the region and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two" (see Article I).

88. The Serbian point of view is that it was the Muslim and Croatian majority in BiH which acted in an illegal and illegitimate manner by requesting international recognition of BiH as an independent State. In other words, the Serbs claimed that by remaining within the Yugoslav Federation, they did not make an unlawful disassociation from the rest of BiH. As far as the Serbs were concerned, they were still a part of the Yugoslav Federation even after BiH gained international recognition as an independent State.

89. On 15 January 1992, the Serbs in BiH withdrew the proclamation of an independent republic and wanted thence to negotiate for a cantonisation based on ethnic division.
90. On 13 February 1992, a dialogue was started between the three parties - the SDS (the Serbs), the SDA (the Muslims) and the HDZ (the Croats) - in BiH concerning the future of the Republic.

91. On 28 February 1992, the "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina" adopted a "Decision on the Proclamation of the Constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina" (as proclaimed in January the same year under the name the "Republic of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina"). By a later amendment to the Constitution, Amendment VI dated 12 August 1992, the name of the Republic was once again altered from the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina" (SRBiH) to the "Republic of Srpska".

92. On 22 February 1992, a meeting was held in Lisbon between the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats concerning the future of BiH. An agreement was reached that the Republic should be upheld within its existing borders with a Swiss-style cantonisation solution for dividing up the Republic on the basis of ethnic groups.

93. According to an article by Slobodan Kljakic printed by the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia (i.e. Serbia proper):

"[T]he crucial contribution to the outbreak and expansion of the war was the fact that it was precisely on April 6 last year [1992] that the European Community recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state. . . . what preceded the April 6 events and the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state. What is involved were negotiations concerning the new constitutional and political set up of Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducted under the auspices of the European Community by Portuguese diplomats."?

94. On 7 April 1992, an Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina declared the independence of the SRBiH.

95. On 15 April 1992, the Presidency of the SRBiH proclaimed the immediate danger of war and gave an order of mobilization.

96. On 27 May 1992, deputies from the parliaments of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed a new Yugoslavia. The new country was named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY); its flag would continue to be the horizontal blue, white and red bands, but without the red star.

97. On 30 April 1992, the Republic of BiH was accepted - with the consent of Belgrade - as a full member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

E. The Serbian plebiscite

98. The basic version of the Serbian coat of arms is a double-headed eagle with a shield and four crescent-shaped flints, two pointing to the east and two to the west. There are two explanations as to why the Byzantine double-headed eagle has its two heads. One interpretation is that the two heads symbolize two powers; the other is that one head looks to the east and the other head looks to the west. Each crescent-shaped flint looks much like a C. Today the most powerful example of Serbian ichnography is said to be the symmetrical cross adorned with four Cs (the Cyrillic letter S), the two left-
hand ones being printed as mirror images of the right-hand ones. It is referred to as an acronym for the phrase "Samo Sloga Srbi na Spašava" (i.e. "Only Unity Can Save the Serbs"). The Cs may, however, also be an acronym for the phrase "Saint Sava is the patron saint of the Serbs".

99. On 9 and 10 November 1991, the "Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina" of which the members of the the SDS comprised the majority, organized a plebiscite in BiH which was considered unconstitutional by the Croatian and Muslim members of the government in BiH. The question posed read:

"Do you agree with the decision of 24 October 1991 by the Parliament of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Hercegovina for the Serbian people to remain in a common State of Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro, SAO Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem and all others wishing the same?"

100. More than 98 per cent of the participants answered yes. The number of people who went to the polls corresponded with about 85 per cent of the approximately 800,000 Serbs who were eligible to vote. In the plebiscite, the Serbs had blue ballot papers, while the non-Serbs had yellow. According to the Serbs, the different colours were to distinguish between the different ethnic groups as the non-Serbs were given a ballot paper where the question was slightly different from the question to the Serbs, to reflect that these voters were non-Serbs. The non-Serbs perceived the difference as an example of discrimination against them, and even more so as the names of everyone voting were marked in the census.

101. Due to arguably different standing under international law, the Serbs decided to use a plebiscite form in contradistinction to a referendum.

102. When the Serbs were preparing their plebiscite (in November 1991), they went from house to house and counted the electorate. The non-Serbs charge that the Serbs included also those under-age down to children, Serbs from Serbia, and Serbs living abroad. (Among those active in the process were allegedly Dušan, alias Dule, Tadić from Kozarac - see Chapter VII.B. infra - and at least one of his immediate family members.) It was allegedly a strong Serbian pressure for all Serbs to vote.

F. The referendum in BiH

103. The European Community (EC) required a referendum in BiH as a pre-condition for recognition of BiH as an independent State. In the referendum, the people would be asked if they were in favour of a unified and sovereign BiH.

104. On 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum was held in BiH concerning the independence of the Republic. Participating were 63.4 per cent of the electorate, and of those more than 99 per cent voted in favour of independence. The election committee was the same as for the 1990 general elections.

105. Radovan Karadžić ordered all Serbs (approximately 32 per cent of the population in BiH) to boycott the referendum. As Serbs allegedly were threatened by fellow Serbs that they might even lose their jobs if they participated in the referendum; some, it is said, avoided the problem by arranging sick leaves. Most Serbs, thus, did not participate in the referendum, and it was commented on by their own people if they did. A member of the election committee in Opština Prijedor later commented that she had a
feeling that her Serbian colleagues knew already what was going to happen.

106. Radovan Karadžić later used the lack of Serbian participation in the referendum to dismiss it as unconstitutional although there was an overwhelming independence vote by the Croats and the Muslims (and other smaller groups). In this context, it ought to be remembered that the Serbs unilaterally had changed the status of the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina respectively bringing them directly under Serbian control without paying adequate attention to the will of the people in those provinces and the formal procedures for such changes as enacted in the Constitution of the SFRY. This happened way before any of the republics opted for independence.

107. After the referendum, the Muslims and Croats in BiH favoured the withdrawal of the JNA, whereas the Serbs were against it.

108. In March 1992, the legal BiH authorities were still in power also de facto. The chairman of the election committee in Opština Prijedor for the legal referendum in BiH was later killed in Logor (i.e. the camp) Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. infra). His name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. His name was called out three times in Logor Omarska. The first time he was beaten and maltreated so that his body had turned black when he was returned to the room where he was detained. Returning the second time he could hardly move at all. The third time his name was called out, he did not return. All the other members of the election committee were also detained in Logor Omarska. Their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. One, a man, was half blind, but he was a judge held in high esteem and chairman of the court. He was also killed in Logor Omarska. The three others are women who survived the horrors of Logor Omarska.

G. The general situation concerning arms in Opština Prijedor

109. From the early 1980s until the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia started, there had been a limited military presence in Opština Prijedor.

110. There were primarily a few soldiers guarding a small air field, called Urije, where there was a military cache. The Urije aerodrome was used for sports planes and located close to Prijedor town. The main military barracks were also located in the Urije area, near the aerodrome. In addition to a partisan brigade, the JNA had a motorized brigade in Prijedor. The JNA was officially considered as a Yugoslav entity, but in reality it was fully Serb-controlled, that is a full-fledged Serbian army.

111. The TO was an integrated part of the SFRY military system. The TOs were locally recruited to serve in their home areas. They received some basic military instruction and served in the TO when called upon. Save for a state of emergency, they retained their civil functions when enrolled in the TO.

112. Only four per cent of the Muslims in Prijedor had been licensed to have weapons. Many Muslims and Croats had had their applications for a license to carry arms turned down without any reason given. This was in contradistinction to Serbs, who normally would be granted permission to have weapons if they asked.
IV. PRELUDES TO THE CATASTROPHE

113. As early as 1991, the Serbs organized an alternative and pure Serbian administration in Opština Prijedor, or rather in what they called the Srpske (i.e. the Serbian) Opštine Prijedor. People in Opština Prijedor were aware of this, but they did not take it seriously. The Serbian Assembly first met in a community building close to Urije, and later the meetings were moved to a building in Ćirkin Polje. The members of the Serbian Assembly in Prijedor were under guidance from a central administration in Banja Luka. The Serbian Mayor was Dr. Milomir Stakić from the SDS who functioned as Deputy Mayor within the elected authorities of Opština Prijedor.

114. Possibly in February 1992, so-called "Crisis Committees" (Krizni Štab) were established by the Serbs. There was a central "Crisis Committee" in Prijedor town, and other additional committees in different parts of the town, and in other towns and villages. In the beginning, the headquarters of the central "Crisis Committee" was in Urije, but later it was moved to Ćirkin Polje. There are indications that in February 1992, the most important members of the central "Crisis Committee" were:

(a) Živko Knežević, retired police commander;
(b) Boško Petrović, secretary of the "Union of Communists" (the old Communist party) in Prijedor;
(c) Đadjo Milutin, retired policeman;
(d) Slobodan Kuruzović, teacher in a primary school;
(e) Vaso Škondrić, retired policeman;
(f) Milan Dragojević, butcher and the president of the SDS for Urije;
(g) Ranko Ćurčija, driving instructor and local president of the Serbian Radical Party (the party of Vojislav Šešelj, the self-proclaimed leader of the Četniks in Serbia);
(h) Savan Runjo, teacher of "people's defence"; and
(i) Miodrag Grublješić, owner of a private transport company.

The "Crisis Committees" were, at least in some areas, organized by the TO.

A. Moving the artillery and military personnel into place

115. Probably in the summer of 1991, a heavy armour brigade (with tanks) - the Pančevo Brigade (or parts of this brigade) from Serbia - came to Prijedor where it was well-received by the Serbs. The pretext for its arrival was the war in Croatia, but the Pančevo Brigade did not primarily become involved in the that war. It established itself at the aerodrome Urije. In general, the JNA was still held in high esteem by the people at large. During the war in Croatia, numerous tanks from Banja Luka passed through Prijedor on their way to Kostajnica, Petrinja and Karlovac. Some units were allocated to Prijedor.

116. In 1992, an artillery unit of the JNA, which had participated in the war in Croatia, took up a strategic position in Benkovac on the Kozara Mountain. The Serbs also brought artillery into other areas which would be strategic positions if one would consider attacking Kozarac (see Chapter VII.B. infra).

117. Canons and a big number of tracked vehicles were brought to Prijedor by railway in the first months of 1992.

118. Some time before the Serbs took power, some 200 Serbian soldiers came from outside to stay in Hotel Prijedor in Prijedor town. They were a special forces unit, more disciplined than other soldiers. They were well-behaved and did not associate with others. By mid-May 1992, it is claimed that it was Arkanovci (Arkan's paramilitary men, see Chapter V.C. infra) who stayed in...
119. The discipline of the soldiers staying in Hotel Prijedor stood in stark contrast to the general impression of other soldiers in the area at the time who were often drunk and ill-behaved, especially the soldiers returning from the war in Croatia. It was common that soldiers on their way to the front at Lipik/Pakrac in Croatia were troublesome and even fired their weapons randomly. During the war in Croatia, Serbian soldiers also used the Prijedor area for rest and recuperation, much to the dislike of the local inhabitants.

120. Due initially to the war in Croatia, there were many military men in Opština Prijedor and especially in the regional centre in Banja Luka, but also in the other neighbouring districts. This augmented military presence proved useful for the Serbs when they took power on 30 April 1992.

B. Disrupted communications with Sarajevo

121. In mid-April 1992, the Serbs arranged for roadblocks to be erected on all main roads to and from Opština Prijedor (see Chapter IV.G. infra). It started to become more difficult to travel even earlier, due in part to the war in Croatia and the related massive movements of troops and military equipment.

122. Belgrade Radio, on 14 April 1992, broadcasted that within troubled multi-ethnic BiH, "movement is strangled by Serbian roadblocks".

123. On 28 April 1992, there was a regular programme on Radio Prijedor with guests in the studio. The guests were Simo Mišković (from the SDS), Mirza Mujadžić (from the SDA, see Chapters VI.A. and VII.D. infra) and Draško Velaula (from the leftist party, the SPA). The question to be debated was the influence of the general situation in BiH on life in Prijedor. By then Opština Prijedor had started to experience a virtual blockade of communication with Sarajevo. The programme was prolonged by one hour. It was closed by an assurance given by Simo Mišković and Mirza Mujadžić that people could sleep well - "This is Opština Prijedor with its Kozara brotherhood, we shall continue to live peacefully as we always have!"

124. There never were United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) stationed in Opština Prijedor. On 28 April 1992, the UNMOs in nearby Banja Luka were withdrawn due to the dangers inherent in their continued presence.

C. Serbian control over the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain

125. The television relay station is situated near Lisina, where the peak of the mountain is 978 metres above sea level, and called Mali Vis.

126. The Serbs took control of the relay station/television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain possibly some time between 21 and 28 March 1992 (possibly earlier, see the next paragraph infra). At this time, the studio in Banja Luka was also under the firm control of Serbs. The transmitter on the Kozara Mountain was taken over by paramilitary Četnik units from Lamovita, Bistrica, and Omarska, allegedly supported by special Units of the JNA in Banja Luka. They disarmed the local guards and forced the personnel to change the programmes together with some Serbian technicians. The paramilitary units mentioned were not the so-called "Wolves" from Prnjavor.

127. The "Wolves" from Prnjavor or rather Vukovi sa Vučjaka (i.e. the "Wolves
from Vućjaka") took their name from the Vućjaka Mountain near Prnjavor. Apparently, this group was also at one time involved in taking control of the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain - maybe at an earlier time. These paramilitary fighters were dressed in camouflage uniforms having a badge with a wolf on their upper arms. Following subsequent protests the JNA said that it was unable to control the "Wolves", although close by the television transmitter there was a JNA unit stationed. The police in Prijedor warned a group from a local peace movement not to approach the "Wolves" or the television transmitter as "something unfortunate might happen".

128. As a consequence, the people of Opština Prijedor could no longer receive any television programmes from Sarajevo (only from Belgrade and Pale, and later also from Banja Luka). As with all other controlled transmitters, the one on the Kozara Mountain was now operational only for transmissions from Serbian-controlled television stations - neither Sarajevo nor Zagreb. The local Serbian military said that they would take action to retake control of the transmitter, but no efforts were made.

129. Like in the preparation for other wars, the programmes transmitted became more and more militant. Much propaganda was also broadcast. It was repeatedly broadcast that one ought to be terribly afraid of Muslims, Albanians, Croats and Slovenians - only Serbs and Montenegrins were not dangerous. The Serbs and the Montenegrins were the defenders of Yugoslavia. Non-Serbs will insist that the latter was not true, most people favoured Yugoslavia as such - but leading Serbs were striving for Greater Serbia.

130. When the Serbs took over control of the transmitter on the Kozara Mountain, they already had full control over the main relay station for the whole of BiH on the Vlašić Mountain.

D. The propaganda

131. As writes Noel Malcolm:

"Having travelled widely inside Bosnia over fifteen years, and having stayed in Muslim, Croat and Serb villages, I cannot believe the claim that the country was forever seething with ethnic hatred. But having watched Radio Television Belgrade in the period 1991-2, I can understand why simple Bosnian Serbs came to believe that they were under threat, from Ustaša hordes, fundamentalist jihads or whatever. As the independent Belgrade journalist Miloš Vasić put it to an American audience, it was as if all TV stations in the USA had been taken over by the Ku Klux Klan: 'You must imagine a United States with every little TV station everywhere taking exactly the same editorial line - a line dictated by David Duke. You too would have war in five years.'"

132. The Muslims who made up the majority of the political leaders were blamed for everything that came with economic crisis, especially unemployment and inflation. In addition, they were branded as extremists, meaning Muslim fundamentalists or rather violent fanatics. The Croats were discredited as Ustaše wanting revenge over Serbs for what had happened in the war in Croatia with Serbs taking power in Knin and Vukovar and other areas. Non-Serbs were portrayed as savages to be feared at the same time as they were used as scapegoats.
E.  Secret Serbian police activities

133. Anxiety was building up in the police force for some months prior to the change of power on 30 April 1992. The Serbs were talking about dividing the police stations. The Serbs did not come regularly to work as they had to attend meetings most of the time. There was a lot of secrecy.

134. In this period, the Serbs were actually secretly setting up nine new police stations. At the time, there were only four police stations in Opština Prijedor: in Prijedor town, in the towns of Ljubija and Kozarac, and in Omarska village.

135. Austrian Television reported on 1 April 1992 that Serbs left the police force in BiH to form their own purely Serbian police force. This paralleled the actions of Serbian police in Croatia at the outset of the crisis in that Republic.

136. According to an interview which journalist Siniša Vujaković had with Simo Drljača (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, see Chapter V.B. infra) printed in the Serbian-controlled Kozarski Vjesnik:

"The man [Simo Drljača], which the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] of the Opština Prijedor put in charge of forming the Serbian police, after half a year of illegal work had done his job that well that in 13 police stations 1,775 well armed persons were waiting to undertake any difficult duty in the time which was coming. In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he directed the take-over of power [by the Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The Assembly of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him chief of the public security station [i.e. in charge of the secret police]."

F.  Serbs rearming other Serbs

137. Misha Glenny reports:

". . . RAM, a plan whose name was never uncovered beyond its acronym. It has been alleged that the full extent of this programme was Milošević's concept of a core Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia. . . . It also, naturally envisaged Bosnia-Hercegovina as an integral part of the core Yugoslavia. There is no proof as to whether such a comprehensive plan existed . . . That within the project of RAM there was a place for Belgrad's strategy for Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, is beyond doubt thanks to testimony provided by former Prime Minister Ante Marković, . . . Organized from the Serbian capital by the SPS [i.e. the Socialist Party of Serbia] MP Mihalj Kertes, . . ., at the heart of this programme lay the distribution of arms throughout the Serb communities of BiH. . . . Throughout 1990, Kertes ordered the dispatches of hundreds of thousands of pieces of weaponry mainly to the two militant Serb regions of BiH, Bosanska Krajina in the north-west and . . . Throughout 1991, Kertes's secret convoys of lorries bulging with guns and munitions ploughed their furrow with a diligence not usually associated with Serbs. Eastern Hercegovina and Bosanska Krajina were especially privileged recipients of this booty as they were both to play a critical logistical role during the war
with Croatia. . . . In August, when his humiliation was reaching its peak, the federal Prime Minister, Ante Marković, revealed the existence of RAM and leaked a tape conversation between President Milošević and General Nikola Uzelac, who ran the Banja Luka corps of the JNA with his own particular touch of evil. During this conversation, Milošević ordered Uzelac to release weapons to the leader of the SDS, Radovan Karadžić."10

138. The Serbian army, in close cooperation with the SDS, distributed weapons to the Serbian population in Prijedor town and other towns and villages in the Opština. Often these deliveries took place openly in broad daylight. The distribution was mainly organized by trucks and seemed aimed at arming every Serbian male between the ages of 15 and 70. Many Serbian women and old men were provided with arms. Serbian policemen were also moving around especially at night handing out weapons to fellow Serbs.

139. Weapons and military equipment were even flown in by military helicopters to Serbian military officers. It is said that by the end, almost no Serbian house was without an automatic gun. Many Serbs may also have received grenades.

140. The pretext for the arms deliveries and the rearmament was that this was necessary for the defence against "the enemies of the people" - the Muslim extremists and the Ustaše.

141. The Serbs were provided with new automatic weaponry. Serbs who had been armed in this manner started to establish checkpoints in the villages.

142. Ample distributions of ammunition were also made, and even larger quantities of ammunition were stored locally. Approximately five kilometres from Mało Palańżête on the road to Knežiča, there is an ammunition cache. A Serbian teacher (now director of the school), whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, who used to sign out ammunition for the heavy artillery there, boasted that there was enough heavy ammunition stored that it would suffice for one year if 1,000 rounds were fired each day.

143. In this period, some Serbs went around firing shots at random. Other people often tried to stop them. Sometimes these Serbs inflicted wounds on themselves, but once a woman and two children were injured. Some of the local Serbs returning from the war in Croatia were quite excited and very easily provoked - there were more and more Serbs in this category.

144. Many non-Serbs, who saw truck-loads of weapons being distributed in their home areas to Serbs, were so frightened that they did not dare to believe what they saw. In general, Muslims and Croats became scared. At the same time, Serbs had their informants among the Muslims and Croats who spread the word that Serbs had weapons for sale. One Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), later ill-reputed and then belonging to a so-called intervention unit (see Chapters IX.C., XII.C. and XII.D. infra), and other Serbs, who later came to play important destructive roles when the Serbs had taken power, were involved in selling rather faulty weapons to non-Serbs. The sellers simultaneously registered the buyers for illegally being in possession of firearms. The people wanted, it seems, to buy these weapons as they were frightened and wanted to have something for self-defence. The number of such weapons around remained none the less limited.

145. When the later Serbian chief of police, Simo Drljača, briefed visitors on the background of the events in Opština Prijedor, he insisted that the Muslims and Croats had been preparing for war for more than 22 years, and that
the Serbs had "documents showing that 3,491 men who could fight from Kozarac, had accepted weapons". Simo Drljača would obviously not quote a deflated figure; there are, however, reasons for believing that his figure is highly inflated. Considering the later attack on the Kozarac area and the interrogations conducted in the main concentration camps where the possession of arms seems to have been a main theme of accusations against camp inmates (see Chapters VII.B., VIII.A. and VIII.B. infra), it may be questioned whether the sale of rather faulty weapons to perceived enemies by key people in the Serbian military ranks was designed to give the Serbs a pretext.

146. Radio Prijedor was, prior to 30 April 1992, constantly broadcasting that people ought to hand over their weapons to the authorities. The TO and the police kept their weapons. People who had no license to own weapons hid them if they had any. Muslims and Croats who had legal authorization to have weapons (normally for hunting) were visited by Serbs and threatened to hand over the weapons which they legally possessed. It is noteworthy that the non-Serbs, who "illegally" bought weapons from and were registered by the above-mentioned ill-reputed Serb and others associated with or members of the Serbian military, were not similarly visited. People on these sales lists were, however, among the first to be liquidated in the later Serbian military attacks whether or not they had kept their arms and whether or not they had taken any recourse to arms.

G. The ultimatum and official rearmament of the TO

147. Not only the Serbs, but also the Muslims, had established their own checkpoints. At least in one of the Muslim villages on the left bank of the Sana River, this happened when a Serbian representative from the police came to the village and advised it to establish such checkpoints in order to protect the village. The Serbs even gave the Muslims some weapons to be used for this purpose. These weapons were, however, of a very bad quality. On duty at these checkpoints, there were normally two or three young males with very limited, if any, experience.

148. A meeting in the local National Defence Council in Prijedor in mid-April 1992 demanded that the soldiers returning from the war in Croatia be demobilized. The Council had politically appointed members, but was chaired by Colonel Vladimir Arsić, the military commander of the area. He allegedly gave the politicians an ultimatum not to demobilize the soldiers but to have them redeployed outside of Prijedor town, together with police and TOs (which were to be mobilized and armed), to control all roads to Prijedor - from Banja Luka, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi and Bosanska Dubica. This would become a stranglehold on both the district and the town of Prijedor. The army wanted to control all movement there.

149. Major Slobodan Kuruzović (who had returned from the war in Croatia, see Chapter V.B. infra) then invited those opposed to redeployment to come for a guided tour to Novi Varoš and another Croatian village in Western Slavonia flattened and depopulated in the war, to see allegedly the fate that would befall Prijedor if the politicians rejected redeployment and mobilization of the TO. Some of them went with Kuruzović. The ultimatum was met.

150. Radio Prijedor took active part in the propaganda to mobilize and rearm the TO. Some time earlier it had been decided that the weapons belonging to the TOs had to be stored in the military barracks in Prijedor town. Now the TOs were again provided with weapons. Many non-Serbian TOs seem to have been provided with old weapons, especially rifles. At the time, it is claimed that the weapons available for the TO in the entire Kozarac area were five machine guns. Moreover, the staff members had Dobosk (Russian rifles) with 72 bullets
in the cartridge, calibre 762. The rest had old M 48 rifles (made in Serbia) and some hand carried grenade launchers, but no grenades. More or less, all of the weapons were substandard.

151. From this time, it was indicated that the TOs were to move into the army barracks and be controlled by the army. Then, the Serbs changed their mind and wanted the TOs to hand over their weapons and demobilize.

H. A fake declaration of war

152. On 29 April 1992, Radio Sarajevo stated that a feigned telefax was circulated. The fake fax pretended to be instructions sent from the Minister of Defence in BiH to the TO, inter alia, in Banja Luka and Prijedor, to attack the JNA. The Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo immediately denounced the fax as fraud, charging that the fax showed on Television Belgrade was fake and not rubber-stamped with the seal of the Ministry of Defence in Sarajevo. It also insisted that no such instructions to attack existed or ever had existed. Television Banja Luka was persistent that the telefax and the instructions were authentic.

153. The telefax which later was circulated by Serbian leaders to prove their claim that the fax and the instructions were genuine, had the following layout and wording (the original is in the Bosnian language):

"BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA
TERRITORIAL DEFENCE STAFF
SARAJEVO
29 04 1992

ORDER TO CARRY OUT

THE DECISION OF THE PRESIDENCY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH 02-11-327/92


I HEREWITH GIVE THE ORDER:

1. CARRY OUT A COMPLETE AND MASSIVE OBSTRUCTION ON ALL ROADS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINA WHERE THE FORMER JNA HAS BEGUN THE WITHDRAWAL OF TECHNICAL MATERIAL, IN DIRECT COORDINATION WITH THE MUP [i.e. the Ministry of Interior].

2. CARRY OUT A BLOCKADE IN A WIDER REGION OF MILITARY OBJECTS FROM WHICH THE JNA WILL TRY TO TAKE OUT TECHNICAL MATERIAL, THROUGH DIFFERENT KINDS OF FORMATIONAL AND NATURAL HINDRANCES TO BE SAFEGUARDED BY UNITS OF THE TERRITORIAL DEFENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH AND THE MUP.

3. PREVENT UNITS OF THE JNA, UNLESS AUTHORIZED OR ACCOMPANYED BY THE MUP, FROM LEAVING THE BARRACKS AND COMMUNICATING ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BIH.

COMMANDER
COLONEL
HASAN EFENDIC"

154. There is no evidence to sustain a claim that a telefax like the above-quoted ever was produced by the legitimate authorities of BiH. Conversely, they had every reason to facilitate the departure of the JNA as soon as possible. For the legitimate authorities in BiH to have declared war against the JNA at the time, would have been suicidal. Moreover, if the leadership in BiH would have wanted to confront the JNA by force, there is every reason to believe that they would have taken certain carefully planned steps and not let it all materialize by means of a rather casual telefax.

155. Misha Glenny reports:

"As early as September 1991, President Izetbegović urged Lord Carrington's conference on Yugoslavia to pay immediate attention to the question of the JNA in BiH. With considerable foresight, Izetbegović proposed that the European Community open a fund which could finance the pension of Bosnian officers and provide for the gradual dismantling of the JNA in Bosnia and the local military industries. Preoccupied with the war in Croatia, neither the conference nor anyone else heeded Izetbegović's entreaties . . ."11

156. Although the Serbian authorities did not later defend their actions in BiH on the basis of the fake declaration of war, it was one of several means successfully applied to agitate fellow-Serbs, especially the simple-minded ones.

V. THE SERBS TAKE POWER - 30 APRIL 1992
A. The actual takeover

157. Two or three days before 30 April 1992, the Serbian army had established itself in all strategic positions on the mountains surrounding Prijedor town. In the town itself there were small groups of two or three JNA soldiers at all important places. The local population did not recognize these soldiers as coming from the area. The JNA soldiers looked tired, they were unshaven and were wearing shabby uniforms. It is believed that they may have arrived from the war in Croatia. They did not talk to anybody outside their circle. The groups of soldiers were, however, visited by officers driving around among them. They were provided with food which was distributed by army vehicles. After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, these soldiers, who were alien to the local population, were replaced by Serbian soldiers well-known in the district.

158. In the early morning of 30 April 1992, there were Serbian flags on all official buildings in Prijedor town. Sandbag shelters for soldiers with automatic weapons had been erected at all the main intersections, in front of the banks and other important buildings. There were snipers on the roofs of most tall buildings.
159. The JNA, paramilitary men, policemen, and local Serbs participated in the actual power change. Among the paramilitary soldiers were units from the Martjeveci (the Krajina Militia, see Chapter V.C. infra).

160. The premises of Radio Prijedor were crowded with military people. There were some 40 to 50 armed people in the studio and a Serb employee of the radio, Mile Mutic, was with them. Milomar Stakic was introduced to the Radio Prijedor editor-in-chief as the new mayor in Opština Prijedor. At 6:15 a.m., the editor (who was a non-Serb) was presented by Serbs with a written text and told “We have taken power in Prijedor, and you have to read this text.” The editor requested that Milomar Stakic join him to read the text himself, and to answer questions from the editor. In the studio, he asked Milomar Stakic what it meant that they - the Serbs - had taken power. Milomar Stakic replied that they, meaning the Serbs, were only interested in areas where there were Serbs. The editor asked him, “What then about the Muslims?” Milomar Stakic replied, “The Muslims may organize themselves as best they can.” Thence the text was read by the speaker.

161. The key point in the statement was that the Serbs had taken power without one shot being fired against them. They had taken over control of all public buildings, and from then on everything was to be organized by them - the Serbs. From now on, it was the Srpske (i.e. the Serbian ) Opštine Prijedor. Earlier other institutions and activities had already been given the pre-fix “Srpske”.

162. According to an interview with Simo Drljaća (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor, see Chapter IV.E. supra, and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor):

"In the night between 29 and 30 April 1992, he [Simo Drljaća] directed the take-over of power [by Serbs], which was successfully achieved in only 30 minutes, without any shots fired. The Assembly of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, at the end of March last year [1992], appointed him chief of the Public Security Service [i.e. in charge of the secret police and thus also the ordinary police]. He was in charge of this job during the most demanding period and remained in the position until January 1993. These days he has been appointed as Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Serbian Republic. He will commence in his new functions in Bijelina on Monday."12

163. Bijelina is a town not far from the BiH border with Serbia proper, on the BiH side of the Drina River. It has been selected as seat for the Interior Ministry due to its geographical linkage between east and west, north and south. Earlier in the era of the SFRY, the secret police had an office in Prijedor.

164. The interview continues:

Vujakovic: "Your work at the Public Security Station [i.e. the secret police] has recently been very much disputed. How do you consider your work during the last year?"

Drljaća: "The situation concerning public order in the Opština [Prijedor] is described in a report on the work of the Public Security Service (Služba Javne Bezbednosti or SJB) in Prijedor during the last 6 and 9 months. The reports have been handed over to the Executive committee of the Opština and the SJB [the secret police] Banja Luka. My strong demand that the report should be made available to the Assembly was not successful, and the report
was never put on the agenda of the Assembly. In 15 pages is presented the work of the SJB during the last 12 months. Since the SJB is under the control of the SJB Banja Luka and the Ministry of Interior (MUP) of Republika Srpska, the control was made by an expert group from the SJB Banja Luka. This station [the SJB Prijedor] got the highest esteem of professional work. Due to the insisting of the leader of the SDS and the demand from one leader from the authorities, a commission was formed inside the MUP, which carried out the control of the SJB's work. To the disappointment of those who ordered the investigation, also this commission of experts gave the best evaluations of this Station's work.

In the taking over of power, the workers of the SJB, Serbs, one and all took active part. From the beginning of the military actions, the workers of the police took active part, until this very day. 13

165. It was announced over Radio Prijedor that the Serbian people and the SDS had taken power and control to secure their survival. Reference was particularly made to the imminent threat posed by the above-mentioned (see Chapter IV.H. supra) and disputed "telefax". It was also argued that neither the Prijedor Assembly nor the local banks functioned properly; this was cited as further indication that the Serbs were endangered. Prior to the Serbs taking power, there had been pressure on the Služba Društvenog Knjigovodstva (i.e. the Public Accountancy Service) to stop all transactions with Sarajevo and redirect them to Belgrade. The non-Serbs in Opština Prijedor had not agreed to this, which was the practice in the Bosanska Krajina SAO. After the Serbs took power, they changed the money flow according to their own wish; that is also financially they withdrew from BiH and made Belgrade their federal capital. Financial assets belonging to non-Serbs were frozen and later confiscated together with everything else belonging to them (see Chapter X.D infra), and the financial links with the authorities in BiH were severed.

166. But as Simo Drljaga and other Serbian leaders in Prijedor later told visitors, the underlying reality was that:

"The Serbs cannot allow a government in which they are a minority. The Serbs in this area are a constituent nation. We will never accept Izetbegović as President. The Muslims did not want to accept that policy. So, a war happened."

167. The Muslims wanted to make the country an Islamic State again as it had been once before in history, so the argument went. Although there were no real indications of that at the time, it would be better for the Serbs to take pre-emptive measures against it, Serbs asserted. "If we cannot reach an accommodation, we will fight to annihilation", Simo Drljaga reportedly later told visitors.

168. Radio Prijedor also broadcasted an interview with Major Radmilo Željaja asking him what was happening. He answered that he was not interested in civilian questions and that the army was not involved. He added, however, that the army was on the alert as it had intelligence information indicating that the army would be attacked. But the attack did not materialize, and Major Slobodan Kuruzović proclaimed himself on the radio as leader of the TO of the Serbian people. According to the forged telefax, it was the TO which was ostensibly to attack the JNA (see Chapter IV.H. supra).

169. Concerning the change of power in Opština Prijedor and the subsequent Serbian use of force, this seems not to represent an aberration, but rather the events seem to an unpleasant degree to follow a pattern well-established
in the by then Serbian-controlled areas in Croatia and the now Serbian-ruled areas in BiH.

B. Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor

170. A key position in the changes was held by the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor. Key roles in the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor were held by the military, the police and the SDS leadership.

171. All recorded information ascertains that the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor had, among others, the following members.

Military:
(a) Colonel Vladimir Arsić (from Banja Luka);
(b) Major Radmilo Zeljaja (from Banja Luka);
(c) Major Slobodan Kuruzović (teacher from Prijedor later director of that same school, he was not in active military service before the war in Croatia).

Civilian:
(a) Simo Drljača, Chief of Police;
(b) Dr. Milomir Stakić, SDS, Mayor;
(c) Dr. Mijo Kovacević, President of the Executive Board of the Assembly in Prijedor (medical doctor);
(d) Simo Mišković, President of the SDS in Prijedor (retired policeman from Banja Luka, about 45-years old, no previous political activities);
(e) Srdjo Srdić, President of the Red Cross in Prijedor (after the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992) and Representative of the SDS in Prijedor, later in the SRBiH (dentist, about 65-years old, amateur actor, well-known in public life, close associate of Radovan Karadžić).

Those here mentioned have identified themselves publicly as members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor. The names of four other identified members and three possible members are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Among them are key people from the local industry, including the iron ore mine Rudnika Ljubija.

172. The chairman of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor was possibly Major Slobodan Kuruzović.

173. The President of the Red Cross is said to have been responsible for the propaganda against the non-Serbian people. He is allegedly personally responsible for plunder and physical and psychological terror. As a President of the Red Cross, he made the false pretence that the Red Cross was helping prisoners in the concentration camps. He, moreover, is accused of having organized "ethnic cleansing" by using Red Cross vehicles.

174. Mile Mutić, reporter and (after the Serbs took power) editor-in-chief of Radio Prijedor, and editor of the local newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik, and Jovan Vukoja, Director of the Centre for Social Welfare, were probably not members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor. Both men have, however, been mentioned as members in some information.

175. Concerning his meeting, on 5 August 1992, with some of the members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor journalist Ed Vulliamy related:

"The next hurdle is a room full of local dignitaries on the first floor of the police station. There is the military commander of the region, Colonel Vladimir Arsić. There is the 'civilian' mayor
Milomir Stakić (in military uniform) and his deputy, Milan Kovačević, whose job it is to oversee the 'transit centres', including Omarska, and who was himself born in Jasenovac in 1941. He says that 'what you will find here are not concentration camps, but transit centres. We are people born out of concentration camps, determined to protect our nation from genocide yet again.' . . . Colonel Arsić and Major Milutonić stress that Omarska is run by the civilian authorities. Manjaša is available for a visit, but not Omarska. . . . and then some extraordinary inexactitudes from Mayor Stakić: 'We have tried to get the other side to live in peace with us. Our problems are with the extremists, not the population. We are trying to get Muslims not to leave the area, but to stay and live with us, but they want to go to Croatia, and Germany, or back to Bosnia [we are in Bosnia, aren't we?] while the extremists bring weapons into the area, kill the Serbian people and commit appalling atrocities . . . There are no camps, there are only transit centres where people are taken for their own protection. Others are people who want to leave and we are assisting them.'

176. According to an interview Simo Drljača (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor):

Vujaković: "How would you characterize the cooperation between the SJB and the civilian authorities, and the SJB and the military police?"

Drljača: "In the period of taking over the power, the cooperation between the SJB and the civilian authorities was satisfying. Everybody did his job. But after the change of authority the new people did not understand the true role of the SJB. The attempt that it should become an organ of the Opština, which would execute the orders of the civilian authorities of the Opština, was not acceptable, and the misunderstandings began. It was demanded that a total change of the staff should be undertaken and replaced by people from the SDS, regardless of their qualification and expertise. I think it was more appropriate that I leave, but the professionals should not be touched. They will remain professionals in every system, and so they are now - while SDS is in power. If something is not done well, I should be changed and not they, because they carried out my orders and the orders of the chief of CSB (Centar Službi Bezbjudnosti i.e. the Public Security Center [the superior to the SJB]) Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior.

It was unnecessary to make such a fuss about the chief of the SJB and insist so much on changing the chief. The change was demanded by those people who urged the present vice president of the Opština Assembly to take over with his army the station in Omarska, what he also did. At this occasion he wounded a woman lodger at the second floor, destroyed an official car and took prisoner the commander and the staff on duty. All this he did when the police (500 men) this morning was about to go to Orasje. Against this person were brought 3 (three) criminal charges to the Military Court. A change was demanded by the present leader of the SDS, because I did not go [to him] every morning 'in order to get wise'. In the Law on internal affairs it says that such 'wisdom' (orders) is given by the chief of CSB Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior (MUP). When two honest policemen and the honest family of Butinski were killed in Trnopolje, the same
leader of SDS stated in front of me and my men that if their chief had been elected, the murders would not have happened. One knows who killed the two policemen and the Butinski family, I believe that no chair on earth is worth their lives. For the first time I inform the public that I personally insisted to the Minister of Interior that I should not carry out this function any longer, in order not to raise dust about the leader of the SDS. After the presented arguments the Minister agreed that I should no longer have the function of chief of the SJB.

In contrast to the present civilian authorities (i.e. individuals), the cooperation was excellent with the Army of the Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleaning of the terrain of traitors [otpadnik which also may be translated as heretics, renegades, or deserters], joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbance of public order and in fighting terrorist groups. Leaving this job I wish that the officers of the Army of the Republika Srpska and the army continue with a still better cooperation with the SJB in order to achieve the common goal."

Vujakovic: "How do you interpret the completely different evaluation of your work by the Opština and the Republika Srpska?"

Drljača: "When we speak about change, it is a fact that the Opština Committee of the SDS has removed those people who carried through the revolution, only the leader of the SDS is left. By replacing the chief [of the SJB] by their man (as if I were not their man), the Opština would be complete as a state. I did not join this revolution in order to create a principality and a prince, but the Republika Srpska, and that is why I insisted to leave. Why have I been appointed by the Minister to this function? I believe that the Minister is well informed about my work so far by people who are competent to evaluate this."15

C. The military and the armed entities

177. The concept of the Krizni Štab existed already in military strategic theory in the former Yugoslavia prior to the wars. The military as such was in a sense always afraid of the people. The military were above the people and had privileges which easily could lead to the people turning against the military. The military consisted of rather conservative or reactionary Communists, whereas the people seemed to be progressing towards democracy. The military wanted to control the people and thus needed to give the people the impression that in actual fact, the people controlled the military. In this the military, generally speaking, succeeded. The worst case scenario contained the plan that the military would establish the Krizni Štab. Thus, the military would make sure to have included in the Krizni Štab people whom they trusted. Trust in this context means loyalty and subordination.

178. The Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor was involved in the logistic support and production for the army. The Krizni Štab was an instrument of gaining complete control of the entirety of Opština Prijedor (or over any other geographic area where a Krizni Štab was proclaimed). Soldiers who worked for the interests of the army were posted also in industry and other production units to control the production, to gain support, and to control civilians.
179. The Krizni Štab also had as its function to arm the Serbs within its operational area. Other functions were to block communications and make provocations within mixed ethnic settings. The pivotal function, however, was to voice that the Serbian people as such were threatened by the non-Serbs, the consequence of which was the urgent need for the JNA to act to protect the people. The idea was to be able to mobilize strategically with the consent of the people, i.e. to take up positions with artillery and tanks, etc. and soldiers to "defend" the Serbian people.

180. On 30 April 1992, the JNA still existed. On 27 April 1992, the Presidency of BiH had issued a decree to the effect that the JNA was to leave the country. At the same time, JNA personnel were invited to join BiH's newly formed TO. As a cease-fire agreement was signed in January 1992 for Croatia, a sizable number of JNA military personnel withdrew to BiH.

181. When the Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor, the army in the area was still officially under the leadership of the Minister of Defence in Belgrade, General Veljko Kadijević. The Acting Federal Secretary for National Defence and Chief of General Staff at the time was General Blagoje Adžić (who later replaced Veljko Kadijević as Minister of Defence).

182. Opština Prijedor belonged to the 2nd Army District of the JNA. At the time, Lieutenant General Milutin Kukanjac was the commander of the 2nd Army District. His deputy was Lieutenant General Milan Aksentijević. The regional command for Opština Prijedor was in Banja Luka, where the 5th Corps was headquartered. In March and April 1992, the 5th Corps was under the command of Major General Vladimir Vukovic and his deputy Major General Momir Talić. Major General Vladimir Vukovic was ill at the time, and died later in the year in Belgrade; he thus is considered to have taken no active part in the military operations in Opština Prijedor in 1992. (Also the 9th, 10th and 13th Corps were under the same 2nd Army District of the JNA. These corps were, according to Croatian military sources, engaged in military operations in Croatia from February to April 1992.) Colonel Arsić was among the brigade commanders in the 5th Corps.

183. The 11th Partisan Brigade of the JNA was stationed in Prijedor, its headquarters was the 5th Corps in Banja Luka. The commander for the 11th Brigade was probably Colonel Mainković. The 343rd Motorized Infantry Brigade (with its artillery support unit) of the 5th Corps is likely to have been stationed in Prijedor already by February 1992.

184. A partisan brigade is one of the regular brigades in the JNA. The JNA has motorized brigades, infantry brigades, mountain brigades, heavy armour brigades (with tanks), partisan brigades, and the TO. The JNA also has de facto ties to paramilitary groups. The different units are well-coordinated to work towards the same goals.

185. A partisan brigade is a light infantry brigade armoured with light weapons (including 60 millimetre and 80 millimetre mortars). Whereas a motorized brigade may have 6,000 members, a partisan brigade will be some 1,000-1,500 men large. Normally, the partisan brigades operate in the home areas of their soldiers where they are fully familiar with the terrain. Primarily, a partisan brigade will be stationed in an area where it is difficult for a motorized brigade to advance or operate at all. The small partisan brigades are ideal for the task of moving into an area to clear it.

186. On 4 May 1992, the Federal Presidency in Belgrade ordered the complete withdrawal within fifteen days of all JNA personnel (and their families) who were citizens of the FRY. On 8 May 1992, General Blagoje Adžić, the Acting Federal Secretary for National Defence and Chief of General Staff of the JNA,
retired and 28 other commanders - Lieutenant General Milutin Kukanjac among them - were forced to retire, probably in order to placate outside concern over the fact that the JNA was Serbian-dominated.

187. From late May 1992, when the JNA ostensibly had left BiH territory as far as its members originating from outside BiH were concerned, the remaining Serbian military in the region of Banja Luka (as well as in other regions) officially converted the remaining JNA into the Army of the SRBiH (also known as the BSA, i.e. the Bosnian Serb Army). The transformation essentially was characterized by a change of name and insignia. The Army SRBiH was to be commanded by General Ratko Mladić. When he was appointed to his new duty in the first half of May 1992, General Ratko Mladić was still commander of the Knin Corps (based in the Croatian Krajina). Under his leadership, large areas had been laid waste during the war in Croatia. The overall command structure, the lion's share of the military personnel, the weaponry and the ammunition of the JNA, remained in place with the Army SRBiH. In Banja Luka, the 5th Corps of the JNA thence became the 1st Krajina Corps. The commander was Major General Momir Talić (who had previously been the deputy commander of the 5th Corps). His deputy commander was Bosko Kelecevic. When the SRBiH changed its name on 12 August 1992 to the Republic of Srpska (see Chapter III.D. supra), the Army SRBiH changed its name and acronym to VRS (Vojска Repубliка Srpsка, i.e. the Army of the Republic of Srpska).

188. It is recalled that the Republic of Srpska was proclaimed as a separate entity only in the sense that this new Republic would remain within the joint State of Jugoslavia (now the FRY) as one of its units (see Chapter III.D. supra).

189. Under the new regime, the 5th Corps, as mentioned, became the 1st Krajina Corps; the partisan brigades were renamed as light infantry brigades; and the 343rd Motorized Infantry Brigade thenceforth became known as the 43rd Motorized Brigade.

190. The 1st Krajina Corps has two divisions, the 30th and the 10th Division - including the 1st and the 2nd Armoured Brigade. The 1st Krajina Corps uses the T-12 cannons, 120 millimetre calibre. The light infantry brigades equal the partisan brigades. These are the brigades which together with the paramilitary groups have caused the most destruction. In the case of the military attacks in Opština Prijedor, the military forced the non-Serbian inhabitants to hand over their property to the military. As far as the military operations were concerned, the military had the command and the civilian administration had marginal direct influence.

191. The 43rd Motorized Brigade was stationed in Prijedor. It is said about the Brigade that it fought fiercely in Hambarine, Kurevo and Kozarac (as in many other areas outside Opština Prijedor). The 6th Battalion of the 43rd Brigade was formed in the village Ljeskare (a village in the Ljubija area in Opština Prijedor) in June 1992. The 6th Battalion is also known as "Ljubija" or "Bilbija's" after its commander, Rade Bilbija. "Combatants of this Battalion played an important role in the 'cleansing' of the Kurevo area". According to Commander Rade Bilbija:

"Regarding the ethnic structure of the population in the region where the 6th Battalion was formed, it included a large number of Croatian and Muslim combatants. This did not reduce the military alertness and the fierceness of this Battalion."

192. To add a sense of urgency, fully enlist the local Serbs in the military course, and take advantage of their capabilities, local inhabitants were also used as infantry. In order to persecute the non-Serbs (who cannot be
distinguished from the Serbs by appearance and not automatically by language) with military means without wiping out the entire population, thorough knowledge about the people in the district was required. The declared enemy was not an entity of combatants.

193. According to former high-ranking military personnel in the JNA, there was within every military corps a recognized need for having (concentration) camp personnel. The personnel to be available for the camps were from:

(a) the military police;
(b) the public security (služba bezbjednosti) or secret police; and
(c) an intervention unit.

194. The intervention units were to trace and capture the potential camp inmates. The military police would guard the camps. The služba bezbjednosti personnel would interrogate, torture, and kill camp inmates and be in charge of the psychological part of the operation. The most brutal functions of the služba bezbjednosti personnel could alternatively be carried out with the assistance of paramilitary units. Among such paramilitary units were the Red Berets (also reported on by Television Banja Luka). The Red Berets were trained in the Kozara military barracks in Banja Luka. They were so-called SOS forces (Srpske Obrambene Snage i.e. Serbian Defence Forces). The Red Berets were possibly also used in Prijedor town when the Serbs staged their coup on 30 April 1992, these Red Berets were particularly well-armed.

195. Concerning the composition and functions of the intervention unit in Opština Prijedor, Simo Drljača (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor) in an interview stated that:

"[T]hey [the police force (including the secret services)] carried out my orders and the orders of the CSB [the Public Security Centre] Banja Luka and the Minister of Interior. . . . the cooperation was excellent with the Army of Republika Srpska and with the officers of that army. The cooperation was manifested in the joint cleansing of the terrain of traitors, joint work at the checkpoints, a joint intervention group against disturbances of public order and in fighting terrorist groups [emphasis added]."**

196. The intervention unit was in other words an amalgamated entity with shared responsibility for the police and the military. The intervention unit was used, inter alia, to trace and capture the non-Serbian leadership, and allegedly members of the intervention unit killed prisoners arbitrarily during transport to the Manjača camp and participated in mass-killings of "deported" prisoners in the Vlašić Mountain area (see Chapters XII.C. and XII.D. infra).

197. Several paramilitary forces were operating in Opština Prijedor in 1992 and possibly later. Among them were units from the Martićeveci, the Krajina Militia created by Milan Martić - Milan Babić’s Interior Minister and military organizer. The Martićeveci units have earned the reputation as one of the most terrifying organizations which participated in the fighting between Serbs and Croats during the war in Croatia. Another entity was Arkanovci - or Arkan’s Tigers. Željko Ražnatović - alias Arkan - is a Montenegrin by birth. Arkan himself reportedly claims that he has a past as an assassin for the secret police in the former Yugoslavia. He was probably called upon by the same secret police to take the leadership in the fan club of the Red Star football club in Belgrade to channel the political energy of the football fans and the hooligans. In any event, Arkan has a criminal record from several countries.
His followers in the former Yugoslavia are known to have committed very violent crimes. Now, having made himself a fortune, Arkan has become a Serbian politician. Arkan's Tigers are normally dressed in black, but on occasion may carry red berets. A third unit, also named after its leader, is the Šešeljovci. Vojislav Šešelj is the self-proclaimed leader of the Četniks in Serbia. As a politician, he runs the Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, the SRS). Šešelj is considered to have adopted a fanatic ultra-nationalist stance, thus he is also referred to as the Red Duke.

Finally, as far as major paramilitary groups are concerned, there are the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi) under the command of Dragoslav Bokan. The White Eagles are the paramilitary formation of the extremist Serbian National Renewal Party (Srpska Narodna Obnova, the SNO) founded by Mirko Jović. (For more information on these and other paramilitary groups, see Annex III.A, Special Forces.)

198. When, in July 1992, Captain Milovan Milutinović, spokesperson of the Army SRBiH in the regional centre in Banja Luka, was asked about the multitude of uniforms and insignias in use, he was adamant that this did not change the fact that there was only one army. After 15 May 1992, he stated that there were no more irregulars or paramilitary forces. There had been such fighters previously, but all military forces were subsequently put under a unified command. He added that those who had resisted a unified command had been imprisoned.

199. It may be informative to pay attention to what Serbs later say about the relationship between the political leaders and the regular military forces on the one hand and the paramilitary units on the other. In an interview with Vreme, Colonel Milan Milivojević, speaking about the army which he has been serving for 35 years, explained:

"All volunteers fought under the command of the former JNA. They were armed by the JNA and the Territorial Defence. Today, some of those volunteer units are being called Fascist due to certain political and party interests. They are being accused of genocide. Well, we all know who is responsible for that. Such volunteers were suited for the purposes of the former JNA authorities because they did their job for them. And they did it the best they could." 20

200. A Serbian association of war veterans related its plight in an interview with Vreme:

"Our proposed statute comprises only the most human goals. The Association is a non-political organization which includes all combatants, regardless of their differences - JNA, Yugoslav Army, Territorial Defence, all kinds of volunteers. All volunteers have been armed and sent to the front lines by the JNA and the Serbian Ministry of the Interior; they served under the direct command of the JNA or the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian Republic of Krajina and the Serbian Republic, or under the command of the local commanders in those armies." 21

The introduction to the same article reads:

"The participants of the recent Yugoslav wars - since 1990 until date - are suddenly expendable: neither Serbia for which they thought they were fighting, nor the army under whose flag and command they fought, want them any more. Serbia has not been at war, the army have not had a State, and it cannot support its active soldiers." 22
201. In a general article about the army and the paramilitary published in *Vreme*, it is alleged:

"The police who has only recently helped bullies and criminals, protected and armed them, and provided them with undisturbed passage on the Drina and Sava rivers in both directions, now arrests them, and brings them to justice. In Srem, Niš, and other places, the political showdown is at full swing, made possible only due to the conditions of total anarchy.

Often such unlawfulness were concealed: the best example is the relationship of the official authorities of the Republic of Serbia towards grave breaches of international humanitarian law regarding armed conflicts conducted first in Croatia and then in Bosnia and Hercegovina. The data about that arrived from various sources. They were registered by the international community through its authorized bodies. Regular army units have been blamed, along with numerous paramilitary formations (established by various political parties) whose influence and power grew so much that they were equated with the official authorities, as simultaneously existing institutions of growing anarchy. SPS [Socialistička Partija Srbije i.e. the Socialist Party of Serbia] and the Republic of Serbia ignored those events. Not by accident: in the circles of newly established VIPs who first accumulated enormous material wealth by breaching all norms of the international humanitarian law, showing in such a manner an amazing appetite for political influence and power, representatives of the official government in Serbia found the safest footholds to maintain their drastically shaken position. The crimes were covered up, denied, and at the same time instigated so that the noble cause of the Serbian national interests be realized: the ethnically pure regions for the future Greater Serbia." 23

202. In September 1991, the United Nations had introduced an arms embargo against the whole of the SFRY. Although the United Nations recognized the State of BiH and accepted it as a member-State on 22 May 1992, the arms embargo was not lifted for this new and independent State. Even if the embargo continued to apply also for the Serbs, the Serbs were in control of most of the stockpiles of the JNA (which had just been augmented with an extra 14,000 tons of weaponry from the Middle East prior to the arms embargo being introduced).

D. Victory for the SDS

203. Misha Glenny wrote the following about the "peculiar political development" in Opština Prijedor prior to Serbs taking power:

"For some unknown reason, the former federal Prime Minister, Ante Marković, had decided to hold the founding conference of his Reformist Forces Party in Prijedor before the 1990 elections in BiH. The population of the Prijedor region was 44 per cent Muslim and 42 per cent Serb, while 8 per cent considered themselves Yugoslavs. Marković's campaign in the Prijedor region split the Serb vote, as many in the town itself voted for the Reformist Forces. As a consequence, Izetbegović's Party, the SDA, secured a relative majority which made Prijedor the only district in the Bosanska Krajina which was not under the control of Karadžić's Serbian Democratic Party. This created a problem for the local SDS leaders as they found it impossible to co-opt Prijedor into
their SAO (Serbian Autonomous District) Bosanska Krajina, the pride of Serb militancy. During the war in western Slavonija in the summer and autumn of 1991, General Nikola Uzelac, commander of the Banja Luka corps, mobilized the local population in order to take part in the fighting in Croatia, to the north. Not unnaturally, the Muslims refused to respond to the mobilization and in Prijedor, the SDA-dominated government refused to cooperate with the issuing of the call-up papers.  

Later, when Simo Drljača once was to explain to visitors the Serbian taking of power on 30 April 1992, he started with contemplating the previous political situation in Opština Prijedor. As he said, 85 per cent of the Muslims in the district had voted for the SDA. However, because of "that robber Ante Marcović" the Serbian votes were divided. Ante Marcović’s party received the votes of the intellectual Serbs and 90 per cent of the votes from Serbs living in mixed marriages (12 per cent of the population). Other Serbs also voted for the leftist party. The SDS got only 28 per cent of the votes, although the Serbian population counted for 42.5 per cent of the population. When Simo Drljača was asked how the SDS then took power, he did not hesitate to state that it happened by force. The power change in Opština Prijedor had been by the gun. Thenceforth, the Serbs had submitted to the SDS. 

VI. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES

A. Control of information and increased propaganda

Opština Prijedor had two main local media: Radio Prijedor and the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik. Both became, almost immediately after the Serbian takeover, mouthpieces of the new Serbian leaders, or rather the latter took control over these media. Strict censorship was one aspect of this; the dissemination of propaganda another. Smaller media entities followed suit if operated by Serbs; if their executives were non-Serbs, these media were silenced with the persecution of the non-Serbs.

After 30 April 1992, the Serbs working in Radio Prijedor were even dressed in camouflage uniforms. It made no difference that Radio Prijedor was financed mainly by advertisements. Serbian leaders who wanted to make statements over the radio or to have announcements read came with military people and guards to the studio to have their will. All the time, during the first days after the Serbs took power, terrified listeners called the radio for advice and solace. At 9:00 p.m., probably on 2 May 1992, Bećir Medunjan and Ilijaz Memić, both from Kozarac - the latter the local leader of the SDA, came and asked permission to broadcast a statement. The two, who were both Muslims, wanted to state that there was no reason for unrest in Kozarac; no Serb had or should have anything to fear and guards had even been posted outside the Orthodox church. The editor of Radio Prijedor agreed to let them broadcast their message. As they were half way into the studio, they were stopped by four or five Serbian military people with guns. Three identified Serb leaders whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, spoke on behalf of the Serbs and said that the Muslims from Kozarac had to seek permission from the police in Prijedor town before they could transmit their communication. It made no difference that the editor became upset and questioned the independence of the radio threatening to resign if it was not restored. The Muslims from Kozarac were prevented from broadcasting their message of reconciliation - Kozarac was a predominantly (approximately 90 per cent) Muslim town.

On 3 May 1992, the entire editorial staff met and the Serbs insisted
that the radio was independent and that everyone, that is the Serbs and the non-Serbs, should work together. The next day, however, an instruction came from the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor that the editor had to read a communication which was biased against the Muslims. Being the chief editor, he had the speaker read the communication. Thence the editor-in-chief asked for and accepted his resignation. The Serbs let him off "for annual leave".

209. The Serbs spread much fascist and Serbian nationalist propaganda at the time also through the two main media. As the radio was operating full time and the newspaper published only once a week, the radio became the key propaganda instrument for the new Serbian leaders. Previously banned Četnik songs were again allowed and much played in radio programmes. Radio Prijedor was used also for political and private attacks on leading SDA members, such as Mirza Mujadžić, Bećir Maduwjanin (it was stated that he was a Kosovo-Albanian which was not true), and Muhamed Čeharić, the now unseated mayor of Prijedor town. The propaganda was malevolent. The Serbs claimed that, in particular, Muslim extremists were many in the area and dangerous, preparing genocide against the Serbs.

210. The general situation deteriorated with the propaganda. There were occasions when Serbs were walking in the streets in Prijedor town shouting "All Muslims and Croats ought to be slaughtered", or "Your Alija [President Izetbegović] will lead you to extinction." When the killings started later, males with the first name Alija were targeted - if for nothing else - because of their names.

211. From the outside, radio amateurs in Zagreb were among the first to pick up information that Prijedor was afflicted. As others learned it from them and tried to call relatives and friends in Opština Prijedor, the latter would - if their telephone lines had not yet been disconnected - briefly state that everything was fine and hang up the telephone. Fear was immediately pervasive among non-Serbs. Soon most non-Serb telephone lines were disconnected.

B. Control of movement

212. An immediate consequence of the Serbian takeover was severed communications between Opština Prijedor and the outside world. It became more difficult to travel even within the district. Bus services were closed down.

213. From when the Serbs took power, people could be asked to show their identification cards at any time. On 30 April 1992, identification papers were asked at almost every intersection in Prijedor town at least if the people in question were not known to the controllers as being Serbs. Later, identification was asked at checkpoints, and also at random. Non-Serbs easily had serious problems when they were identified as such - even if their identification cards were valid and carried at all times.

214. Almost all the mjesna zajednica (the administrative units into which an Opština is subdivided - one for each village and part of town) had its Serbian Krizni Štab which could issue travel permits, but in practice the travel permits had limited value and the roadblocks were actually effective. One example: A 20-year old young man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, lived in Rakovčani. He had a Serbian girl-friend and with a travel permit went on his bicycle to see her in Prijedor town. On his way back, he was stopped near the suburb Tukovi by policemen in a car, one of them, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, asked for his identity card and travel permit. The young man had his papers in order, but regardless of that he was brought to Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. infra). Some ten days
later the young man was called out in Keraterm at night, beaten for hours, and died just after he was carried back into the hall where he was detained.

215. Starting probably on 2 May 1992, a nightly curfew was introduced in Prijedor town. Later a curfew was introduced also in Ljubija town. The curfew was in effect for non-Serbs as well as Serbs. Even medical doctors on duty had to get a special permission to move anywhere during the curfew hours.

216. After the attack on Prijedor town (see Chapter VII.C. infra), the inhabitants even needed a written permission in order to move from one part of the town to another.

C. Dismissal of the non-Serbian workforce

217. Within days - in most cases - of the Serbs taking power, most of the non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it as public officials or manual workers. In all key functions, such as in the local administration, the empty posts were taken over by Serbs. But it was no precondition for workers being discharged, that there were Serbs who could fill their places. Rather, even when it was a clear disadvantage also for the Serbs that a certain job was left vacant, the non-Serb was - save for a few exceptions - fired.

218. After the power change the courts put all their non-Serbian legal staff on a list (all were Muslims, two Croats had left the Opština earlier). Later everyone on this list was detained in a concentration camp.

219. At the time of the coup, the police received two sets of conflicting instructions. Sarajevo gave their normal instructions that were the same for all the police officials regardless of ethnic group. Banja Luka ordered the police to split up and Serbian and non-Serbian police to be treated differently. Just after the coup, the non-Serbian police were called for a meeting in the town hall chaired by Simo Drljaća. The latter informed everyone that henceforth they would have to abide by Serbian law and sign a declaration to that effect within a 15-day time limit. Furthermore, they would have to display Serbian emblems. Very few non-Serbian policemen signed the declaration of consent, and no one remained in the police more than the first 10 to 15 days. The non-Serbian policemen did not dare to appear at the police stations, and they did not receive the last salary from prior to the coup. Retired Serbian policemen and reservists from among the Serbs were called in for service. Simo Drljaća had a law degree, but earlier he had only held posts of a marginal character in the legal profession. Former non-Serbian policemen were soon among the people particularly targeted for persecution. One former inmate, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, in Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. infra) claims that on one occasion, 20 non-Serbian policemen from Prijedor were executed by the Serbs in that concentration camp.

220. Only in a few cases is it known that the Serbs accepted the continued services of non-Serbs. A female doctor was permitted to continue her work, as was a scientist working on technical questions. The latter worked from a position of house arrest imposed by the Serbs, and he was provided with his work by the Serbs. A number, fewer than 30, workers from Autotransport Prijedor also kept working until they were allegedly executed in late July 1992 (see Chapter VIII.E. infra). Considering the latter instance and the extreme need for transport facilities which the Serbs soon were to have, it may be assumed that it was the needs of the Serbs that gave the remaining non-Serbian workers some respite concerning the fate awaiting them under the new regime.
D. Disarming of the non-Serbs and ultimatums

221. The Serbs continued as they had started before taking power, and enforced a unilateral demilitarization of Muslims and Croats and all other non-Serbs. The process of Serbs visiting non-Serbs who were licensed to hold weapons and demanding that they give their weapons up was intensified after 30 April 1992. It was now combined with a campaign where non-Serbian police and TOs were also instructed to hand over their weapons, and non-Serbian houses and villages were searched for arms. However, those who were registered for illegally having bought arms from Serbs - many of these Serbs were prominent under the new regime - were not approached at the time like those who were licensed to possess arms. Later, illegally held weapons were used against non-Serbs as a warrant to annihilate them.

222. Most important, the self-appointed Serbian administration in Prijedor started soon to give ultimatums to the non-Serbian population. Using the radio, the Serbs every day named a village, a town or a part of town where at a given time the Muslim and Croatian inhabitants and other non-Serbs had to hand over their weapons. Two distinguished Muslims, whose names are not disclosed for confidential or prosecutorial reasons, tried to convince the Muslims to give up their weapons. Most Muslims and Croats did hand over their weapons. The Serbs were none the less not satisfied and used this to brand them as extremists. It seemed as if the Serbs were constantly looking for something for which to blame the non-Serbs.

223. In named areas in the Ljubija region, for example, there were ultimatums issued that the weapons held by non-Serbs were to be presented to the Serbian administration between 22 and 30 May 1992. Shelling of non-Serbian habitations gave weight to the urge in the Serbian demands. Subsequent to the Serbian ultimatums, weapons were surrendered as follows:

(a) on 23 May 1992: from Ljeskare, Croatian villagers; from Kalajevo, Croatian villagers; from Jugovci, Muslim villagers;

(b) on 24 May 1992: from Gornji Volar, Croatian villagers; from Šurkovac, Croatian villagers; from Donja Ljubija, Muslim residents;

(c) on 24 and 25 May 1992: from Ljubija, Croatian residents; from Žune, Croatian villagers;

(d) on 31 May 1992: from Briševo, Croatian villagers;

(e) on 1 June 1992: from Gornja Ravska, Croatian villagers; from Donja Ravska, Croatian villagers.

E. Provocations or pretexts

224. It happened, possibly one of the last days in April or on the first day of May, that a Serbian reserve policeman was killed in the centre of Prijedor town. Both Radio Prijedor and the newspaper Kozarski Vjesnik were implying that the Serbian policeman possibly was killed by a Muslim. People - among them the SDA chairman - called the radio afterwards claiming that Serbs had killed the Serbian policeman. The main belief was probably that the policeman had been killed in the wake of an argument with fellow Serbian policemen, when at night time they had been drinking at the Cafe Bijelo Dugme in the town. Another version has it that the Serbian policeman was shot dead by an unidentified man who ran away from the scene of the crime in the direction of some Muslim dwellings, on the basis of which it was concluded that the perpetrator was a Muslim. Others claim that the Serbian policeman was killed
by two of his colleagues, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons (one of them by then retired as a policeman), according to a plan to have Muslims blamed.

225. The Serbian policeman lived in a village some four kilometres north of Prijedor town in the direction of Bosanska Dubica. Probably on 2 May 1992, after the policeman had been killed, a bus heading south from Bosanska Dubica and towards Prijedor was stopped by a neighbour of the policeman. The neighbour asked the passengers to show their identity papers. Coming across a Muslim woman and her young daughter, he forced them both to leave the bus and shot them dead on the spot, for no other reason than that they were Muslims.

Approximately half an hour later, a tractor loaded with hay came on the same road driven by the manager of the agricultural pharmacy in Prijedor town who was with one of the workers (their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). The neighbour once again asked for identity cards and established that the two were Muslims. He killed them by allegedly using a knife. Both victims lived in villages near Prijedor town.

226. The next day the elected but just ousted mayor of Prijedor, Muhamed Čeharić, wanted to speak over Radio Prijedor, and he invited everyone to join the funeral of the manager of the agricultural pharmacy as a demonstration. The editor-in-chief of the radio was very much criticized for allowing the former mayor to speak over the radio. No incidents occurred in connection with the funeral on 5 May 1992, but the cemetery was heavily guarded by Serbian military and police. The people participating in the funeral were reportedly scared.

227. Radio Prijedor later reported that the liquidation of the four Muslims was under investigation, which the non-Serbs considered a lie. It was also stated on the radio that Serbian police and army (after the Serbs took power they referred to their military just as Vojska, i.e. the Army, and not as the JNA or other specific military entities) tried to stop people from Gornji Jelovac from assailing Gornja Puharska - the suburb Donja Puharska was where the alleged killer of the Serbian policeman was to have been running.

228. Serbian-controlled television stations sent, moreover, propaganda from other districts causing trepidation among simple minded Serbs. The Serbs were constantly referring to three or five killed Serbs and showing pictures of arsenals of weaponry allegedly confiscated from non-Serbs who had planned to use these arms against Serbs. Rumours among non-Serbs would have it that the Serbs collected some of their dead soldiers from Pakrac in Croatia and used them for propaganda purposes, throwing them carefully around in other places where that seemed to be of advantage. The Serbs were quite successful with their propaganda, and they constantly reiterated that the Croats and the Muslims were extremists.

VII. THE MAJOR SERBIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS

229. Before any of the major Serbian military operations started, an SDS official had been questioned in an interview broadcast by Radio Prijedor whether members of the Arkanovci and the Šešeljovci were in town. He had answered in the affirmative.

230. The Serbs continued their arms race also in the days just after taking power. On 2 May 1992, people saw long columns of artillery being transported through Prijedor town in the direction of Sanski Most, i.e. to the south towards the Hambarine area.
A. The attack on Hambarine

231. Before Hambarine and later other villages on the left bank of the Sana River were attacked by the Serbs, the population in many of those villages had been augmented by an influx of Muslims and Croats who had fled from attacks - similar to those to come in Opština Prijedor - by the Serbs on their home villages to the west of Opština Prijedor. Many Muslims seeking shelter in Hambarine and nearby villages had fled from the destruction of Donji Agići and Budimlići Japra. The non-Serbian villages in Opština Bosanski Novi had been purged before the Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor. Over Radio Prijedor, the people in the Ljubija region had been called upon to receive and shelter the fleeing non-Serbs from Opština Bosanski Novi.

232. On 22 May 1992, at about 7:00 p.m., a black car - probably a VW Golf - came up to a checkpoint on the road to Ljubija held by non-Serbian TOs near a cluster of houses just outside the village of Hambarine. Except for the driver who was a Croat, there were four Serbs in the car - all reportedly members of the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi) paramilitary unit. The Serbs had allegedly forced the driver to bring them to the Hambarine area. The car was stopped at the checkpoint and the Serbs were asked to surrender their arms which would be returned to them on their way back. At that moment, one of the Serbs opened fire with his machine gun. The commander at the checkpoint was wounded. The other non-Serbs at the checkpoint returned fire and killed two of the Beli Orlovi and wounded the two others and the driver. The Serbs thence asked the non-Serbs to surrender themselves and the checkpoint. The wounded non-Serbian TO commander later died from his wounds. An identified Serb, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, interviewed one of the wounded Serbs on Radio Prijedor. The interviewee confirmed that the Serbs had fired the first shot. The wounded Serb used the interview as an opportunity to state that all Serbs should welcome and support the members of the Arkanovci and the Šešeljovci.

233. A Muslim former policeman, whom the Serbs had dismissed after they took power in Opština Prijedor, lived in a house alongside the road from Prijedor to Hambarine, not far from the checkpoint. After the shooting incident, the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor delivered an ultimatum over Radio Prijedor in which they demanded that the former policeman be handed over to them (probably together with three identified persons whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, who had manned the checkpoint when the shooting took place) and that all weapons in Hambarine be surrendered to the Serbs. There was no information to indicate that the former policeman had been a party to the events at the checkpoint. Unless the ultimatum was met by noon the next day, the Serbs would attack Hambarine.

234. As the ultimatum was not met on time, the Serbs more or less immediately after the deadline was passed started a heavy bombardment of Hambarine with artillery fired from the aerodrome at Urije, across the valley where Prijedor town is located. People in Prijedor town could see that a number of houses in Hambarine caught fire. As the artillery fire ceased, the village was attacked by tanks and by infantry in full cooperation and coordination with paramilitary units. There was grenade and gun fire and more houses were set on fire, starting all along the road leading from the Serbian-inhabited quarters in the suburb of Tukovi (in Prijedor town) and up to Hambarine.

235. When the bombardment of Hambarine started, large numbers of villagers fled to other nearby Muslim or Croatian-dominated villages and sought shelter there, others took to the woods and remained under the open sky until they considered the immediate danger over. Those who had escaped to the Kurevo woods also came under artillery fire. Many of the runaways later came back to Hambarine of which Serbian soldiers had taken control. The mosque in
Hambarine had by then been destroyed by the Serbs. Some of the returning civilians were at first pushed back again to the woods by the Serbian soldiers. Save for the houses having been burnt to the ground – allegedly some fifty only in the first day of the attack – other houses had been damaged. Rampant pillaging by Serbs took place and lasted for some two weeks.

236. Also on 22 May 1992, the so-called Serbian army entered the town of Ljubija (further to the south) and occupied its main square. All cultural, entertainment, and sports activities stopped in Ljubija. The people were terrified. The Serbs introduced a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., and it was prohibited for people to meet in groups on the streets and to use the main square for traffic. Soon after, the Serbs started to arrest people from Ljubija town and intern them in the concentration camps.

237. The number of dead and wounded after the attack on Hambarine is not yet known. Some estimate it at approximately 100.

238. After Hambarine was conquered the Serbs renamed it Petrovo Brdo (i.e. Peter's Mountain).

239. When the ousted mayor of Prijedor was arrested in his home in Prijedor town on 23 May 1992, the Serbs charged him with having arranged the "attack" on Serbian soldiers in Hambarine the previous day. There is no information to sustain such an accusation against the former mayor, who later apparently was killed by the Serbs.

240. Kozarac was a small town located approximately 12 kilometres east of Prijedor town, at the foot of the Kozara Mountain. Regardless of its size, Kozarac was an industrious town with small-scale industry, trade and service industry. Including villages and hamlets in the surroundings, the Kozarac area had almost 27,000 non-Serbian inhabitants. The area as such was relatively wealthy also because many people living there had been guest workers in Western Europe and had brought home their hard currency savings.

241. Having consolidated their power and position in Prijedor town, the new Serbian administration at one point in time urged all Muslims to leave Prijedor town for Kozarac which would become a kind of Muslim borough, ethnically pure. This idea never materialized. If it had, it would probably have achieved nothing but to add more victims to those actually afflicted in the Serbian military onslaught on the Kozarac area.

242. The Kozarac area had regular defence positions on the road Prijedor - Banja Luka at Trnopolje, and at Mrakovica (on the Kozara Mountain) near Kotovac where there were eleven TOs and also police both in active service and reservists.

243. After the Serbs took power in Opština Prijedor, all Muslim police were ordered to join the Serbian police and to wear Serbian uniforms and Serbian insignias. Before the attack, the Serbs had moved in heavy artillery and posted it strategically on the mountains. The Serbs even had a rocket unit on the Kozara Mountain. Those who controlled the main weapons were Serbs from Serbia proper and Knin. The Prijedor Brigade had been fighting in the Pakrac area and was nicknamed "The Wolves". There were also other "Wolves" from an area east of Prijedor. The Serbian military had started to be posted in the area two or three years back – "for training purposes", it was said.

244. Following the Serbian takeover in Prijedor, a number of Serbian driven
cars in the town had "The Wolves of Vukovar" written on them. In mid-May 1992, a number of Serbian trucks were observed in Kozarac. The head of a bull had been placed on the first truck. Attached to this truck was an inscription reading, "These are the Wolves of Vukovar" - the area of Vukovar in Croatia had by then been heavily ravaged. Locals interpreted this as intended to frighten them. As the weapons locally available were being collected by the Serbian army at the same time, the overall situation rendered the non-Serbian people with the feeling that they could do nothing. On occasion, Serbian aeroplanes were flying low over the roofs of private houses, scaring the dwellers and the local population at large even more.

245. The telephone lines were disconnected by the Serbs and so was the electricity supply. The area was surrounded by the Serbian army. No buses were in operation, and on 24 May 1992, the Serbs closed the main road traffic. Traffic between Prijedor and Banja Luka was then redirected via Tomašica and Omarska. On 24 May 1992, the air-raid alarm sounded.

246. Major Radmilo Zeljaja from the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor allegedly gave a delegation from the Kozarac civilian defence council an ultimatum either to sign a loyalty pledge to the Serbian self-appointed leaders (and hand over their weapons) or Kozarac would be attacked. The delegation asked for two days to consult with the population. The Serbian military attack followed.

247. Before the attack on the Kozarac area started on 24 May 1992, an announcement was made over Radio Prijedor that military forces with tanks were on their way from Banja Luka to Prijedor, and that if these were stopped, fire would be opened. Radio Prijedor insinuated that a barricade might exist near the village Jacupovići along the road - this, however, does not seem to have been the case. Simo Drljača later claimed that there had been both barricades (in the plural) and mines on the road, and that the Serbian army went to the Kozarac area to clear the road and remove the barricades.

248. Colonel Vladimir Arsić is said to have been the superior in charge of the Serbian military operation in the Kozarac area. Commander for the Serbian military in the field was allegedly Major Radmilo Zeljaja. Over the communication system, he allegedly instructed destruction of all Muslim property such as houses and mosques. The commander of the Serbian military police is identified, but his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Also, a Serbian police commander from Prijedor, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, was one of the leaders of the attack. Major Slobodan Kuruzović was allegedly involved as a military leader and especially as coordinator of the subsequent deportation of the population.

249. Initially, the Kozarac area was subjected to heavy bombardment by artillery, coming possibly from eleven different places (like Benkovac on the Kozara Mountain, Topica Brdo - another mountain, and nearby Serbian-dominated villages such as Babići and Gornji Orlovci), and from tanks and smaller firearms. On 25 May 1992, after 24 hours of shelling and after approximately 5,600 grenades had fallen on the area, Serbian tanks and Serbian infantry moved in all at once with an estimated 3,600 people. Prior to this, civilians had, inter alia, observed that one of the villages outside of Kozarac was completely on fire. Panic had spread. The local population did not organize any real resistance; it was considered futile anyway. The Serbian military men came into the area like ants from all sides, as described by one female non-Serbian survivor.

250. In came regular soldiers, paramilitaries, Serbian TOs, and armed local Serbs, all of whom acted in a coordinated manner in the operation, to the
extent that people believed that all these Serbian armed entities were under one unified command. Some Serbian soldiers were wearing the five-pointed red star of the JNA on their caps and no other insignia. Other fighters carried various insignia of the "White Eagles of Knin", the like-sided cross with the four Cs above an eagle, or just an eagle on their camouflage uniforms. There were also armed Serbs from Banja Luka and Arkanovci.

251. Another paramilitary unit was the so-called "Gypsy Brigade" from Omarska. The leader of the group was Momčilo Radanović nicknamed "Cigo" (i.e. Gypsy). He was a taxi driver who fought in the war in Croatia. He is now said to be the Vice President of Opština Prijedor. During the attack by infantry and paramilitary units on the Kozarac area, the "Gypsy Brigade" apparently was one of the most cruel, committing massacres in the villages Alići, Softići, Brđani, and Jakupovići. He and his group are also ill-reputed for other alleged heinous acts against non-Serbs, for example, in the concentration camps Omarska and Keraterm.

252. Infantry and paramilitary troops went searching for people in every building. In some areas, like in Kozarac town, the incoming soldiers first went from house to house to ask the men to come out and assemble in front of the mosque. There the Serbs told their gathered congregation that in half an hour all women and children would have to gather as well; if not, the Serbian military would go from house to house and burn and pillage the entire area. In other areas - villages and hamlets - the latter was the first strategy.

253. When the first Serbian soldiers entered Kozarac town, they brought with them lists of names of people who were called forward and killed. These people were the politicians, influential people, police officers, and reserve police officers. Other intellectuals and prominent people from the Kozarac area were incarcerated in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. Dušan Tadić, who was a local of Kozarac, was among those who allegedly had produced such death lists.

254. The police, approximately 35 people, from the Kozarac police station all gave themselves up after the shelling had stopped. They were reportedly executed en masse by gun fire in front of the primary school in Kozarac.

255. Information was sent over Radio Prijedor that everyone had to surrender voluntarily and with white flags. People followed the instruction and moved out, for example from Brđani, in a very long column of women and children. The Serbs fired more grenades as the column moved ahead, killing some women. The column passed by a number of Serbian TOs, who also killed some women and children at the roadside. As another column from another village walked along, a Serbian man from Serbia arrived and spoke to one of the local Serbian leaders saying that "This way we want to show you our gratefulness for what you did for us in Croatia!" Civilians were, moreover, allegedly taken out of the columns at random and killed on the roadside. Mock executions were also performed.

256. Extremists put civilians - women and children - in front of them and wanted to leave the area, that is why the civilians suffered casualties as the Serbs "never really killed women and children", as Simo Drljača explained afterwards.

257. Non-Serbs, who were enrolled in the TO but unarmed and without uniforms, were arrested if recognized and taken to police stations or military barracks for interrogation before they were incarcerated in concentration camps.

258. In contradistinction to what happened after the first attack on Hambarine (see Chapter VII.A. supra), the entire non-Serbian population from
the Kozarac area was herded out in the course of and after the Serbian military attack. Men were detained in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm, while children, women and the elderly were first taken to Logor Trnopolje and then deported out of Opština Prijedor. Due to the large numbers involved, some of the children, women and elderly men were at first temporarily housed in Prijedor town, and villages just outside of the attacked area. They were, however, soon gathered by the Serbs for deportation. People who at first had tried to seek shelter on the Kozara Mountain were sought out there or surrendered either to be killed or to follow in the footsteps of the rest of the civilian population to the concentration camps. Grenade bombardment had also been aimed at fleeing civilians. En route to the main concentration camps, some of the captives were detained overnight in the Rade Kondic school in the Serbian-dominated village Radvjice.

259. A number of young Muslim women were reportedly sexually abused after being herded to Serbian military positions - such as the barracks on Benkovac, on the top of Mrakovica, in Hotel Mrakovica, in Biije Vode on Mrakovica, and in Tito's Villa. The latter location was allegedly frequented especially by military superiors.

260. According to surviving witnesses, Serbian military subjected significant numbers of local non-Serbs to the most outrageous torture and extermination under extreme pain when clearing the Kozarac area of its non-Serbian population.

261. Just one example of summary executions: on 27 May 1992, eight elderly people, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, were shepherded into a cellar and massacred.

262. When asked later about how many civilians had died in the military operation in the Kozarac area, Serbian leaders related that it probably was many, but that they had no records.

263. Some claim that a total of 5,000 people were killed in the Kozarac area. One informant was taken back to Kozarac from one of the concentration camps in the area together with 39 other men to collect dead bodies. He himself counted 610 dead people, he stated.

264. The Serbian military attack on the area south of the Kozara Mountain afflicted, inter alia, the following Muslim and Croatian habitations: Alići, Brđani, Dera, Forići - Donji and Gornji, Hrnici, Jakupovići, Kanižani, Kevljani, Kenjari, Kozarac, Kozaruša, Mahmuljini, Mujanovići, Rajkovići, Rustići, Saleši, Softići, and Suhi Brod.

265. After the population had been ousted from the Kozarac area, all buildings were pillaged and everything else of value, such as vehicles and heavy equipment, were stolen by Serbs. A large number of homes, which had not been destroyed by artillery shells or set ablaze in the military attack, were blown up by the Serbs - one at the time from inside - destroying especially the inside and the roof.

266. Captain Milovan Milutinović, spokesperson of the Army SRBiH in Banja Luka, later explained to visitors that:

"In Kozarac, there was a really big group of extremists. They were refusing any kind of negotiations about organizing community life. They resisted all attempts to find a peaceful solution or to disarm. So we answered energetically. Power does not pray to God. The majority of people were outsiders, from Kosovo, Sandzak and foreign mercenaries. There were some black people too. The
majority were financed by the Muslim organization in Zagreb, through financial and material means."

267. Simo Drljić ascertained that the reason why Kozarac subsequently did not look like it had been hit by war, but rather by systematic destruction, was that every house had a bunker and thus was destroyed (separately). He claimed that before this was done all Serbian houses had been burned, but provided no information to sustain that claim.

268. Later another school of thought seems to have developed and the Serbian administration both in Opština Prijedor and Opština Banja Luka started to inform visiting journalists that the Muslim population of Kozarac had left the town voluntarily - for economic reasons to better themselves elsewhere in Europe. At that time, Kozarac was deserted, except for a few Serb policemen and soldiers who had occupied the municipal building.

269. When a prisoner later was transported by Serbs through Kozarac, he was told by his Serbian guards that this was no more Kozarac, but "Radmilovo" after the commander Major Radmilo Željaja. Allegedly, the name "Radmilovo" was for some time written on a sign on the roadside replacing the sign announcing Kozarac. It is also reported that the area was referred to as "Radmirovac" after the conquest.

C. The attack on Prijedor town

270. One day after the people in Hambarine had been given an ultimatum (see Chapter VII.A. supra), an ultimatum was also issued to the non-Serbs in Prijedor town that every policeman and TO member in possession of weapons had to hand these over to the Serbs in the military barracks at Urije. Afraid that non-Serbian quarters could be bombarded like Hambarine had been, the weapons were handed over. This transfer of weapons was filmed by Television Banja Luka.

271. On about 20 May 1992, an identified Muslim, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, attacked a drunken Serbian soldier in the latter's car and stole his arms. "The Muslim" was about 40-years old, he was a drug-addict, and having a criminal record, he had spent some 20 years in prisons. He was arrested for the attack-cum-theft and brought to Banja Luka, but turned up again, surprisingly enough, in Prijedor only two days later.

272. Since about 10 May 1992, there had been a group of non-Serbs hiding on the Kurevo Mountain on the left bank of the Sana River. The group gathered more members by the day. The group had organized itself and was without linkage to any party or any military unit. Although the leader (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) was a Croat, he had been fighting together with the Serbs and against the Croats in the war in Croatia. Some non-Serbs believe that "the Muslim" during his brief detention in Banja Luka had agreed to collaborate with the Serbs. In any event, "the Muslim" approached the leader in the forest and convinced the latter that they ought to stage an attack on Prijedor town. "The Muslim" claimed that there were many well-armed Muslims, especially in Stari Grad (the Old Town) and the suburb Puharska who wanted an insurrection, but that they needed support from outside - the claim was ill-founded.

273. In the early morning of 30 May 1992, before 4:30 a.m., the "troops" of the leader and "the Muslim", probably not more than 150 men, attacked Prijedor town. These attackers were reportedly badly armed, having only guns and perhaps ten hand grenades. Twenty of the attackers had no weapons at all, but
joined in the hope that they might be able to obtain arms during the attack.

274. One Serbian version, as related by Simo Drljača, is that the attack on Prijedor town was organized by the Muslim political party, the SDA, under the leadership of Mirza Mujadžić, Hilmia Hopovac and Hasan Tulundžić. The attackers numbered 2,000 non-Serbs. They killed 11 Serbian policemen. There was fighting all around before the attackers withdrew to the mountains, where Drljača claimed that the Serbs were looking for them even months later. This account is not corroborated by any other available information.

275. As almost all Serbs deserted Stari Grad the night before the attack started on 30 May 1992, it seems likely that they had been alerted. This does not correspond with the proposition that the attack was a Muslim and Croatian attack on Serbs.

276. Special police units from Niš (in Serbia proper), which at the time were stationed in Banja Luka, Martićevec from Knin (in Croatia), and a unit with some 50 tanks and canons from Banja Luka participated on the Serbian side in the fighting. The mentioned groups came in addition to approximately 5,000 military men stationed in Prijedor after the destruction of the Kozarac area. Numerous Serbs from Prijedor town, moreover, participated in the fighting.

277. The "troops" of the leader and "the Muslim" apparently divided themselves into four smaller groups for their attack on the centre of Prijedor town from across the Sana River. All groups seem to have made their way through Stari Grad (the old part of Prijedor town) which is located on an island surrounded by the Sana River and a canal, two groups seeking to enter the town via the one bridge to the west and the two other groups fighting their way across one of the two eastern bridges each. The building used by the Serbian reserve officers is located just across one of the latter bridges, and nearby is also Hotel Prijedor. There was fighting on the eastern bridges and near the mentioned buildings and at the police headquarters which some from the leader's group entered.

278. As the attacking group received no support from people in Prijedor town, it was soon defeated by the Serbs. By 9:00 a.m. the same morning, the Serbs had regained total control. Some of the attackers were killed, some 40 were captured alive and brought to the concentration camps, the rest probably managed to flee across the river and back in the direction of the Kurevo Mountain. "The Muslim" seriously injured a Serbian military leader (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) who subsequently died from his injuries. A Serbian military unit later was named after him. "The Muslim" himself was killed after wounding the Serbian military leader. The leader of the non-Serb mountain group was captured alive and brought to Logor Omarska, where it is said that he later was killed.

279. People living in Prijedor town may have believed that any rebellion on their part would only have resulted in the town having suffered the same total devastation as Vukovar in Croatia previously had.

280. According to a different version, the attackers did not come from across the river but emerged from a butchery. It is believed that this is misinformation spread by the Serbs, as they killed particularly many civilian non-Serbs living in the quarter around the slaughterhouse.

281. In the early morning the same day, Radio Prijedor announced that "Green Berets", meaning Muslims, and Croatian "HOS troops" (Hrvatske Odbrambene Snage or the Croatian Defence Force, which is the military wing of the Croatian Party of Rights) had attacked the town. The town population was called upon to behave loyally to the Serbs – to stay at home and listen to the radio – the
The Serbian army would very soon have solved the problem. The "announcement to the citizens" read over the radio also stated that the attack affected Stari Grad, the centre of the town and the quarters of Skela, Gomjenica, Puharska and Raškovac, for which reason the population there was endangered and would be evacuated by the Serbs. These people were to leave their houses to be brought to safe territory by Serbian buses.

282. As related by a non-Serbian woman who lived in Stari Grad, the Banja Luka Corps attacked Stari Grad with tanks starting at about 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., shelling the Muslim houses and the mosque. At 1:00 p.m., Četniks from Prijedor came to gather all the people in the area saying that they were to protect them from the "Green Berets" meaning the Muslim forces. The gathered people, who were all civilians, were transported to Logor Trnopolje (see Chapter VIII.C. infra). Arriving in this concentration camp on 30 May 1992, all the new arrivals were registered. Most of the women and children were released after some three days if they had relatives or others with whom they could stay elsewhere in Prijedor town - namely in the suburb Puharska. The civilians were not provided with food these first days in Logor Trnopolje. The men remained detained when the women and children were freed.

283. When the attack by the non-Serb mountain group was still on, the Serbs had started artillery bombardment of some quarters in Prijedor - Stari Grad, the suburb Skela and the vicinity of Muhammed Suljanović Street. The bombardment of Stari Grad continued throughout the day and the next two days. After the fighting with the intruding non-Serbs had stopped as the latter had been defeated, the Serbs attacked one quarter after the other in Prijedor town and systematically forced out most of the non-Serbian inhabitants. On 31 May 1992, it was especially the parts of town known as Puharska and Čejreci/Raškovac which were targeted.

284. A non-Serbian man recounts:

"On 30 May 1992 at 04.30 hours, it was raining and one could hear machine gun fire from Stari Grad and from up along the river in an easterly direction. It lasted for about an hour and a half. At about 07.00 hours he heard two tanks passing to the street of the JNA (which was a prominent street) from an area near the Sana River. He heard shots from rifles and tanks. The sirens had signalled that people were to seek shelter at about 06.00 hours. Radio Prijedor announced that an attack on Prijedor was imminent. There was a mortar attack on Stari Grad and the New Hotel, possibly from the direction of the airport at Urije. Infantry fire ceased to be heard, but mortar fire lasted until about 13.00 hours. Someone who lived on the ninth floor nearby Radio Prijedor said that tanks and soldiers attacked the radio building. Radio Prijedor was reporting that Ustaša and 'Green Berets' (i.e. Muslims) were the attackers, and the Serbs were called upon to take up arms to fight these enemies of the Serbian people. At 08.00 hours Radio Prijedor announced that the Army and the Serbian police were in full control but moving on to wipe out all the snipers in the town. He saw many soldiers on a main street nearby his house. Radio Prijedor also instructed all Croats and Muslims to hang a white piece of cloth outside their dwellings, and not to leave their homes.

At approximately 13.00 hours detonations were getting closer to his home. People - men, women and children - some barefoot, mainly Muslims, came running from the neighbouring street. Then he escorted his wife and children over to a Serbian neighbour walking through his garden. His mother and two brothers lived on
the ground floor. One minute later Serbian soldiers (JNA) came into the street. He watched this from the Serbian neighbour's house. Six or seven soldiers entered his garden and fired some shots. His brothers and mother came out of the house. His brothers were beaten with rifle butts, they were commanded to kneel down and hold their hands up behind their necks, the same fate befell also two other Muslims and one Croat plus three more men. All the men who had fled into the street where he lived, were also ordered to take up the same kneeling position, women and children were lined up in a row. A military car arrived. Four identified Serbs [whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] came out of their houses and joined the Serbian fighting forces. In passing the kneeling non-Serbian males the Serbs kicked them so that they fell over. Later the 'captives' were ordered to stand up and move towards the radio building, one among them was an identified man almost 90-years old [whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons]. In the Ilije Bursafrica Street an identified man [whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] was shot dead in his garden when the Serbs asked him where his children were and he answered that one of them was married in Zagreb. From the area of Radio Prijedor the subdued men were loaded on buses and taken to Logor Omarska. Approximately ten people who had been killed by the Serbs were left outside of the radio station, among them were seven identified men [whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons]. Women and children were transported from the area of the radio station to Logor Trnopolje."

285. On the other side of the Sana River, in the suburb Tukovi where all three ethnic groups lived together, people woke up to see armed men in the intersection where the roads take off to Ljubija and Sanski Most. Since World War II, the Serbs have counted for the majority of the population in Tukovi (i.e. they have at least been the largest of the ethnic groups). The armed men were Serbs. All were in uniforms, some in the uniform of the army, others in camouflage uniforms, some having the Red Star emblem some the Četnik insignia - some were known locally, others were new faces. The people living in Tukovi were surrounded by the Serbian military and they could not leave the area or even their houses. People learned, moreover, from Radio Prijedor the order for the non-Serbs to hang out a white flag. When the non-Serbs had done what they had been instructed to do, their houses were ransacked - people knew who lived where anyhow.

286. All over the town, Serbian military claimed that they were looking for weapons among the non-Serbs. They looted many houses at the same time. They went on like this for about one week. During this time, they hit some people. In general, they attacked people both physically and psychologically. Some of the pre-World War II Serbian inhabitants in Tukovi assisted non-Serbs in the area so that these people were spared from the "ethnic cleansing" - it was an exception that an area was spared like this.

287. At the intersection of Partizanska Street and JNA Street, there was a bakery. All Croatian and Muslim men living in that area were gathered outside the bakery. Women and children were shepherded into a house vis-à-vis and were not allowed to look at the area where the men were. This was at about 8:00 a.m. At about 10:00 a.m., the women and children were transported to Logor Trnopolje, as they left there were allegedly some 30-35 dead non-Serbian men lying in a heap outside of the bakery.

288. On the outskirts of the city, at Pećani near the stadium, there was
reportedly another heap with some 20 dead non-Serbian men.

289. In all the targeted areas, the same happened - everyone had to get out of their houses and men and women were separated. The adult males were brought to concentration camps to be detained there. The women, children, and elderly men were transported to Logor Trnopolje - some to be deported out of Opština Prijedor more or less immediately, others to be temporarily released after some days. In Prijedor town, Stari Grad and adjacent areas were "ethnically cleansed" first, that is already on 30 May 1992. Other parts of the town were "cleansed" in raids or in connection with ransacking the following days. As Serbs spotted non-Serbs, they could report on them to have them arrested.

290. The fate befalling non-Serbs when apprehended was often violent. Just one example: one survivor from the area relates that an identified Serb commander of a so-called intervention unit (see Chapter XII.A. infra (his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), in June 1992, had come together with three or four other Serbian soldiers to arrest four brothers in their home in the suburb Tukovi. When their mother started to weep because she did not want her sons to be arrested, the Serb commander of the so-called intervention unit shot dead both the mother and her four sons (the names of the five victims are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons).

291. On 20 July 1992, a commission was established in Prijedor town by the executive committee of the Opština. Allegedly, it was the task of the commission to provide expert opinions concerning the restoration or the demolition of buildings in different quarters of the town. The buildings in question were especially to be found in Stari Grad, and the streets most heavily damaged during the attack on Prijedor town. Ostensibly, the commission was to revive a town planning project dating back to 1987, according to which a number of buildings had to be demolished. The experts were to advise on whether renovation of a building was still possible, or whether it was inevitable that the building be razed. The real purpose of the commission seems to have been to give a justification to the public why entire quarters of the town - Stari Grad in particular - were to be flattened after these quarters had been captured following their Muslim and Croatian inhabitants having been killed, deported or expelled. One indication of this being the purpose was the fact that the whole of Stari Grad (save for three houses used for military purposes) was levelled when the commission was still working on its recommendations concerning the houses there. The expert commission by then had completed its work concerning about 100 buildings, recommending that 20-30 buildings be renovated. The latter buildings were, however, demolished as well. Some 20 new buildings in Stari Grad - which had been built in a traditional Muslim style - were also torn down. If a building belonging to a Serb was flattened, the owner was granted compensation. No compensation was offered to Muslims or Croats.

292. Attractive housing facilities, which had belonged to purged non-Serbs and which were not demolished, were taken over by Serbs.

D. The attack on villages on the left bank of the Sana River

293. Starting on 20 July 1992, a larger area of predominantly non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (the larger Hambarine/Ljubija area) was attacked in a similar manner as the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra). Here, however, it was predominantly Serbian infantry - paramilitary groups included - who performed the destruction. Artillery was not used to the same extent as in the Kozarac area. At the time of the attack, the areas
had a population of close to 20,000 non-Serbian people, including people who had come for shelter after their villages to the west of Opština Prijedor had been assailed.

294. On 19 July 1992, the Serbs rounded up non-Serbs in Ljubija filling four buses. The passengers in one bus were adult males, some of whom were brought to the police station in Prijedor town and the others to Logor Keraterm. The three other buses held children, women, and elderly men. These buses passed Logor Trnopolje and continued straight to the Travnik area deporting the passengers (see Chapter X.C. infra).

295. In the beginning of July 1992, after the inhabitants in the neighbouring villages of Bišćani and Rizvanovići had handed over their weapons, but before the village was attacked, a number of Serbian soldiers from the JNA came to Rizvanovići and plundered the area. The soldiers, inter alia, demanded that the villagers hand over calves and lambs. On 19 July at about 3:00 p.m., a quarrel erupted between some Serbian soldiers and/or policemen. There was a truck parked in Rizvanovići which belonged to someone in Hambarine (see Chapter VII.A. supra). The Serbs asked the local administration to get the key to the truck. Thence, the Serbs started to argue about who was to have the loot. One Serb was shot dead, it is said, by another Serb in the argument. The dead was an identified Serb from the district, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. The other Serbs brought the dead over to the checkpoint at Bišćani and accused the "Green Berets", i.e. Muslim fundamentalists, of having killed the Serb. The Serbs then abducted ten old men from Rizvanovići as hostages to a camp in Ljubija. The villagers were given an ultimatum to name the non-Serbian perpetrator who the Serbs claimed had killed the Serb, and to hand over their arms. Neither alternative was possible as there was no such perpetrator and no more arms to be relinquished.

296. Subsequently, the area was bombarded with grenades from the surrounding heights. The villages there are situated in a kind of depression and were bombarded from positions at Karan, Spalanciste, Volar or Topica Brdo. On 20 July 1992, at about 6:00 a.m. the bombardment stopped. On the radio, it was announced that none in the area were to leave their houses as imminent searches were to be expected.

297. At about the same time, the army - one personnel carrier and several lorries - came to the intersection next to the gas station in Tukovi. An identified army commander, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, read out some kind of a command to the soldiers and they split up - some going to Sredice and Bišćani, others to Hambarine. Another group of soldiers went to Hegić. Other groups of Serbian military were apparently coming in from other directions simultaneously.

298. When the Serbian forces arrived at Sredice, all the villagers were ordered to leave their houses. Women and men were separated. Children and elderly men were incorporated in the women's group. Men were gathered in the intersections of the roads in the area, where most of the men killed were reportedly executed. Women, children, and elderly men from 10-12 houses were herded into one house. In the wake of the Serbian military assault, buses came to bring the men who had not been killed to Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska. Hall No. 3 in Keraterm had been emptied to receive them (see Chapter VIII.B. infra). The women and children were kept overnight in the houses where they first had been gathered before they were taken to the new athletic field in Tukovi.

299. A small village further to the west, Hadžići, was not attacked that same day and some men from the village were gathered by the Serbs to collect dead
bodies. Allegedly, they picked up about 30 dead people in Hegić, and from the intersection between Biščani and Rizvanovići some 40 dead. They were ordered not to move far away from the roads. In Kadirici, they found 12 dead bodies partly covered by soil. In Durtovići, there was a larger group of dead people but their number is unknown. They used three or four days to collect dead people. Altogether, including the above-mentioned corpses, it was eight truck-loads of dead people. The women and children were brought to the stadium on 21 and 22 July 1992. In passing, they could see many of the corpses.

300. Every non-Serbian village and hamlet on the western bank of the Sana River was now visited and house by house destroyed by the Serbs, including regular army personnel, paramilitary fighters, police, and armed local Serbs. Almost all non-Serbian males were beaten before being killed or thrown into buses. One bus with male prisoners, for whom no room could be found in Logor Keraterm or Logor Omarska, was parked in an open field. Some 20 Serbian soldiers reportedly surrounded the bus and the prisoners were ordered to get out and leave the place. As they were leaving, almost all of them were shot dead (see Chapter VIII.E. infra). Some people could observe some of this from nearby houses; for others, the firing was within earshot, and some of these listeners later went to see what had happened. There were some holes in the sandy ground in the area, but the executed prisoners were left behind in the open.

301. In July 1992, some 40 prisoners from Biščani were killed in Logor Omarska, according to other camp inmates. It was gruesome. The prisoners from Biščani cried out in agony as they were pulled out of the bus and thrown head first against a brick wall. Their heads were allegedly smashed into the wall for each of them to "dig" out a five centimetres deep hole, the Serbian perpetrators announced.

302. After the attack on the Hambarine area in July 1992, women and children were detained at the stadium near Tukovi before being deported. Others were held captive - often for several days - in the athletic field in Ljubija before internment in camps and deportation.

303. Very hard hit in this major Serbian military attack on villages on the left bank of the Sana River were, among others, the villages Biščani, Čarkovo, Rizvanovići, Sredice, and Zekovi. A total of more than 1,300 people were allegedly killed on 20 July 1992 alone. The mass killings in Čarkovo first started on 23 July.

304. In Sredice and Rizvanovići, for example, the Serbian infantry, paramilitary soldiers, and other Serbs with them reportedly went from house to house mutilating, killing, and deporting the inhabitants and other civilians having sought shelter there (refugees from Opština Bosanski Novi and fugitives from the previous attack on Hambarine, see Chapter VII.A. supra). Within a few days, no living beings were left in the villages, but in numerous places there were piles of dead men - often fathers and sons together. Many of the dead bodies are said to have been terribly mutilated, 15 dead persons had been chained together, many smaller piles contained approximately 10 dead bodies each. Smaller piles were found even on the doorsteps of private homes, larger ones were in more central locations. In front of one particular house, in a sand pit, there was a relatively larger pile. From here, the Serbs had intended to take numerous captive non-Serbs by bus for detention. But, as the bus was totally overcrowded, it is claimed that the Serbs forced almost half of the passengers to leave the bus and executed them on the spot.

305. Čarkovo was encircled on 23 July 1992 at about 3:00 a.m. by Serbs coming in from all directions, not only from the main road along the Sana
River. The majority of the Serbs were wearing the uniform of the Serbian army. Some were dressed in the light-blue uniform of the reserve police. Some of those in the army uniform in addition wore red ribbons and red berets. It was believed that the latter belonged to the Martićevci — among them were Serbs from neighbouring villages. Some soldiers were wearing white ribbons on their shoulders — they may have been White Eagles. All around were the sounds of bombs and grenades exploding and machine gun fire. Some of the Serbs gave commands such as "Burn down!" and "Kill!". It was like a hunt, as one survivor recounts, in which also the nearby forest was searched for non-Serbs. Hundreds of people were killed — shot, burnt alive, beaten or tortured to death in other ways.

306. The Serbs were also looking for some civilians such as the leader of the Muslim political party, the SDA, in Prijedor (see Chapters VI.A. and VII.C. supra), and the party’s secretary (see Chapter VII.C. supra). In Čarakovo, there was a very large family with a name similar to that of the SDA leader. The Serbs mixed up this name with the family name of the SDA leader and for this reason allegedly killed every member of that family which they could find. Two elderly non-Serbs from the area registered 268 people whom they knew by name, killed in Čarakovo on 23 and 24 July 1992. On their list are 31 identified persons with the surname of the family mistaken for that of the SDA leader (their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). Reportedly, a total of approximately 100 members of this family were exterminated during the attack. There is also a hamlet named Hopovci in the area, where people had the same family name as the SDA leader. Two elderly men have 19 identified persons with this name on their list (their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). The SDA secretary is not on the list. On the list there are, however, other large family groups included, such as 29 people sharing a common family name. Altogether there are only 30 surnames on the list, save for an identified murdered imam (whose first name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) whose surname was unknown to the two elderly men.

307. In the settlement Donja Mahala, some 50 women were gathered and allegedly raped.

308. There is information to indicate that altogether more than 760 people were killed in the onslaught on Čarakovo. According to the 1981 census, Čarakovo then had 2,263 inhabitants. A number of non-Serbs who had managed to run away when their villages in the area were attacked the previous days may have been caught in Čarakovo.

309. It is claimed that young women from, inter alia, the villages Gornja Ravska, Gornji Volar, Stara Rijeka and Šurkovac together with young women from other districts were detained and sexually abused by Serbian military in Korćanica Motel. It is claimed that they were abused to "give birth to better and more beautiful Serbs". Among the high ranking Serbian military named as rapists and/or organizers of these sexual orgies are two identified members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

310. Other registered killings committed allegedly by Serbs of named non-Serbs in their place of residence and non-Serbian residents from the same areas killed in (a few missing from) Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska are, to give but a few examples, from villages not mentioned specifically above:

(b) Donja Ljubija: six persons killed on 26 May 1992; one person killed in June 1992; in Logor Keraterm - one person killed in June 1992; in Logor Omarska - three persons killed in June-August 1992;

(c) Gornja Ljubija: five persons killed in June 1992; in Logor Keraterm - one person killed in June 1992; in Logor Omarska - one person killed in July 1992, two persons killed on 5 August 1992, ten other persons killed in June-August 1992, three persons missing (probably killed) since June-August 1992;

(d) Gornja Ravska: two persons killed July 1992; two persons killed on 7-8 September (or November) 1992 (one being a Catholic parish priest); in Logor Omarska - two persons killed in June/July 1992;

(e) Gornji Volar: four persons killed on 12-13 September 1992; one person killed on 31 December 1992; two other persons killed in 1992; two persons killed on 22-23 April 1993; in Logor Omarska - one person missing (probably killed) since 21 August 1992;

(f) Ljeskare: one person killed on 16 June 1992; one other person killed in 1992;

(g) Raljaš: two persons killed in July 1992; in Logor Omarska - one person killed on 5 August 1992, one other person killed in June-August 1992;

(h) Stara Rijeka: 12 persons killed on 24 July 1992; one other person killed in August 1992; one other person killed in 1992; one person killed on 8 March 1993; in Logor Omarska - one person killed in June-August 1992; in Logor Krings (a concentration camp established on the premises of what had previously been a cement block factory in the city of Sanski Most, Opština Sanski Most) - two persons killed in June-August 1992;

(i) Šurkovac: in Logor Omarska - one person killed on 15 July 1992;


Names of victims are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

311. There are also allegations of, inter alia, the following executions:

312. In Redak (strip mines, part of the Ljubija iron ore mines, but south of Ljubija) on approximately 1 August 1992, more than 200 Muslim civilians were killed. The Muslim civilians had been arrested in the village of Miska Glava where they had sought refuge from the Serbian attacks on the villages Bišanji, Rizvanovići, Hambarine, and Čarakovo.

313. In Lisina (a part of the Kurevo forest, approximately two kilometres south-east of Ljubija), between 20 and 25 July 1992, between 70 and 100 Muslim civilians were killed.

314. Near the hamlet of Volarić (in the village of Šurkovac, approximately two kilometres north of Ljubija) nine civilian Gypsies were killed.

315. At the Prijedor-Donji Volar and Jugovci-Cikote crossroad, called Trzna (approximately eight kilometres north-east of Ljubija) at the end of July 1992, between 100 and 120 Muslim civilians from the village of Jugovci were
killed.

316. In the area of Prijedorsko Polje, next to the left bank of the Sana River (close to the villages of Bišćani and Rizvanovići) at a place known as Bajeri (gravel pits, approximately 8 kilometres north-east of Ljubija) in the period from May to August 1992, more than 100 non-Serbian civilians from the Prijedor area were killed.

317. Like the attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra), the Serbian attack on the villages on the left bank of the Sana River was aimed at the total subjugation of the non-Serbs. They were no longer (like in the first attack on Hambarine, see Chapter VII.A. supra) given a possibility de facto to seek shelter in nearby villages (which in any event would have been difficult at this time when all non-Serbian villages and hamlets in the area were targeted).

318. When this larger Hambarine/Ljubija area was targeted, the pressure on both detention facilities and means of deportation reached a peak, as it had two months earlier, in late May 1992, when first the Kozarac area and then, in part, Prijedor town had been "ethnically cleansed". Thus there were also improvised detention facilities made in the Ljubija iron ore mine. In the central mining area, it is claimed that the main separator was used temporarily to incarcerate prisoners. Also other areas which could relatively easily be guarded may have been used - possibly also some of the open pits. Logor Ciglane is mentioned in this context; it may have held at least up to 1,000 prisoners at the time. Limited numbers of captives from the southernmost parts of the Ljubija area were moved south for detention in Opština Sanski Most (from where a number of the Serbian armed forces participating in the attack had come).

319. After the non-Serbs had been ousted from the area, their property was pillaged and many buildings were destroyed.

E. General characteristics

320. The main target of all the Serbian military attacks has been the non-Serbian peoples in Opština Prijedor and not installations and positions of strategic importance.

321. Over Radio Prijedor, the Serbs also demanded that the Muslims and Croats living in areas with mixed ethnic populations of Serbs and non-Serbs should mark their housing by hanging out a white flag, and identify themselves by wearing white armbands when they moved outdoors as a sign of surrender. This applied for some time.

322. In early June 1992, all non-Serbs in Prijedor were ordered to wear white armbands when they went outdoors. During World War II, in comparison the Nazi regime in Belgrade legislated that all Jews were to wear yellow armbands.

323. The Serb taking over the position as editor-in-chief of Radio Prijedor was Zoran Baroš. In Prijedor town, women, children, and elderly men were detained for deportation in the sports hall at the high school after the attack on the Kozarac area. Zoran Baroš was removed from his position as editor-in-chief of Radio Prijedor after he had permitted Muslims to use the radio to trace missing family members after the Serbian attacks had started and the first non-Serbs had been taken into detention at the high school.

324. Notably all involvement by paramilitary and irregular units were fully synchronized with the efforts of the regular Serbian armed forces, and can
have been nothing but well-coordinated, the regular army being in charge. One reason for this conclusion is that all the major Serbian military operations started with heavy artillery barrages or the use of tanks as operated by the regular army, and were immediately followed by the onslaught of paramilitary and irregular units working in tandem with regular army infantry. There is, moreover, not one single report to the effect that there was ever a paramilitary or irregular unit working to obstruct or even slightly hinder the objectives of the regular army. The same reportedly has been the case when individual Serbs from the neighbourhood or elsewhere have participated in the attacks.

325. There were, of course, a number of non-Serbs who managed to run into hiding on the mountains, in the forests, and even in adjacent villages when their homes were attacked. However, given the overall situation in and isolation of Opština Prijedor, that was in the vast majority of cases only a temporary escape from the oppression. The forests and mountains were searched meticulously by the Serbian military and all their different Serbian collaborators — often with the understanding that any living being caught was to be killed. Non-Serbs in hiding tempered a difficult time in the forests and on the mountains — although it was summer and reasonable temperatures, on the average, for outdoor life — people were not accustomed to foraging for food. Some of the people in the forests and on the mountains tried more or less immediately to return to their home areas as the military attacks seemed to be over. Others preferred the relative security of the uninhabited areas until the scavenging for food became rather unbearable or medical problems called for assistance. When leaving the mountains and forests the non-Serbs tried to return to inhabited or former inhabited areas, sometimes with the hope of blending into a not too unfriendly environment, sometimes knowing that they would have to surrender immediately. In hamlets, villages, and towns, there were, every once in a while, round-ups of non-Serbs, or non-Serbian individuals being reported on by supporters of the new Serbian-dominated system.

326. It is extremely difficult to have any precise idea of the number of non-Serbs who perished in the Serbian military attacks and later when detained by the Serbs. There are, however, general characteristics of the overall situation that give some indications. After the military attacks, the Serbs had a consistent practice of singling out the surviving non-Serbian males from 16 to 60-years old (sometimes even younger boys and men up to the age of 65) and incarcerating them in the two concentration camps — Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. Significant numbers (the exact figure is unknown) of these men were killed after they had been gathered and before the rest boarded buses. Others were killed literally en route to a concentration camp. Save for very limited numbers of men who were able to flee Opština Prijedor, for example, by bribing their way out — the vast majority of the non-Serbian male population suffered the above-mentioned fate.

327. Today, a total of some 9,000 non-Serbs remain in Opština Prijedor (see Chapter XIII.G. infra). One fourth of the population is in the age group 0 to 15-years old in most Western countries. In developing countries, the ratio is up to one to three of the total. According to the 1991 census, the total population in Opština Prijedor was 112,470 — the Serbs counted for 47,745 and the non-Serbs were 64,725. Considering that approximately half of the latter group (some 32,000 people) probably were males, a breakdown in age groups will give a rough idea about how many men between 16 and 60 years there were in the first place, even without including those who had fled into the area after Opština Bosanski Novi was purged. It is recalled that the surrounding districts — Opština Bosanski Novi, Opština Bosanska Dubica, and Opština Banja Luka — had Serbian majority populations already prior to the difficulties started in Opština Prijedor. Opština Sanski Most saw the non-Serbs
"ethnically cleansed" at about the same time as it happened in the district of Prijedor. There was, in other words, no safe haven nearby to which the non-Serbs in Opština Prijedor could have recourse. Comparing the total group of non-Serbian men in the age groups taken to the concentration camps Omarska and Keraterm, and the number of male prisoners released from there (see Chapter XII. infra), a high fatality rate is indicated and the overall picture of males in these age groups exterminated is at best bleak.

328. Questioned by a foreign visitor about how many people had been killed in the Serbian military operations in the region, Mićo Kovačević from the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor reportedly replied that:

"It is in the thousands. If you want this [exactly] you have to make it up yourself."

F. The disposal of the dead

329. In the village Sivci (south of Kozarac), at least 45 non-Serbian people, possibly as many as 120, were killed by uniformed Serbian soldiers wearing Četnik insignia. The dead were buried at the village cemetery, four or five in each grave. A cemetery in the nearby village of Hrnići was probably also used. Some corpses were interred in the meadows as people came across them. After the Serbian military attacks, it seems that a number of the dead were buried by survivors almost wherever it was feasible under the circumstances: at graveyards, in gardens, along roads, in fields and meadows, in the woods and on the mountains.

330. On 5 November 1992, it is claimed that in the immediate vicinity of Ljeskare village, in a area known as Dubočaj, at the foot of the Ljubijica Mountain, Serbs were burning the remains of people killed between 20 and 25 July 1992 in the part of the Kurevo forest located east of Ljubija. Serbian police sealed off the area of Dubočaj at the time, among them was one identified police officer from Ljubija whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. The odour was carried by the wind and could be smelled kilometres away.

331. In the Borik forest north of Čarakovo, a survivor claims that he, his father and his uncle buried 370 people in small graves with five to 10 dead people in each. When the Serbs launched their military attack on the villages on the left bank of the Sana River, many villagers from neighbouring villages sought shelter in both Čarakovo and the Borik forest. When the Serbian soldiers attacked Čarakovo, it is claimed that they killed a minimum of 760 and probably an even higher number of non-Serbs. The Serbian forces also searched the forest for fugitives, allegedly killing all human beings they came across.

332. Serbian soldiers have reportedly said that after the destruction of the villages on the left bank of the Sana River, non-Serbian survivors were transported by buses and trucks to locations which belonged to the iron ore mine, where they were executed by shooting, and thence buried with the use of construction machinery from the mine. Non-Serbs, first shepherded into mine pits, may have been among those thus exterminated and interred. According to the Serbian soldiers, some kind of powdery substance was put on top of the bodies to accelerate the decomposition process.

333. Some dead bodies may have been discarded in abandoned mine shafts.

334. Some days after the attack on the villages on the left bank of the Sana River started, there was an announcement on Radio Prijedor that people in ...
Prijedor town should stay away from the area behind the Soše Mažar Street for a certain time. People did, however, observe five (there may have been more) trucks with dead bodies coming across the Sana River (from its left bank) and turning down the Partizanska Street towards the mine in Tomašica. Blood stained the passage route for days. The dead bodies were supposedly disposed of or destroyed in Tomašica.

335. From 1 to 12 July 1993, Serbian police blocked the Svoznica Road which connects Ljubija to villages to the south (such as Stara Rijeka) and which in part passes through the Ljubija iron ore strip mines. In this period, underground explosions (making houses quake kilometres away) and the motors of heavy mining equipment could be heard around the clock. As the road was reopened to traffic, passers by noticed that areas where mass graves were known to have been located, were dug up and filled in with fresh soil and gravel. It is claimed that the Serbs had removed the remains of people who had been buried here during the months of July and August 1992, and taken the remains in the direction of Prijedor possibly to the Tomašica iron ore mine where there are machines, inter alia, for grinding iron ore.

336. As illustrated by the above examples, the dead non-Serbs may have been disposed of in many different areas - varying from the odd locations almost anywhere to the regular graveyards to large-scale burials on the estates of Rudnika Ljubija (see Chapter II.D. supra; see also Annex X, Mass Graves).

VIII. THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS

337. After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, they opened three concentration camps in Opština Prijedor. No concentration camps had existed in Opština Prijedor at the time of the Serbian takeover, or for that matter, in the region since World War II. Two of the concentration camps were de facto death camps - Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. The third - Logor Trnopolje - had another purpose as it functioned as a staging area for massive deportations of primarily women, children, and elderly men (see Chapter X.A. infra). Whereas the death camps were under the authority of the Serbian military and the Serbian police, Logor Trnopolje had more of a civilian image, notably with the local Serbian Red Cross having a pivotal function.

338. Throughout this analysis the word logor, which in translation means just camp, is used. The reason is that the word "camp" in the English language is associated with everything and anything from leisure to rigour. Using the term "logor" is intended to link these institutions to their inhumane characteristics, as described below.

339. Special mention ought to be made of the fact that the United Nations Commission of Experts, as represented by Chairman M. Cherif Bassiouni, prepared a separate report on camps and detention facilities with analysis of, inter alia, Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje (see Annex VIII, Prison Camps).

A. Logor Omarska

340. A Serbian guard in Logor Omarska told (before 29 June 1992) a friend outside the camp that:

"Interned here are reportedly Prijedor elite from before the Serbian take-over of government control: The President of the Council (Mayor), Members of the Executive Council, The President of the Court, two judges, doctors, presidents and directors of firms, owners of private factories and businesses."
341. The informant asked the Serbian guard, his friend, if the Serbs were going to kill the people.

"Oh no, we will not waste our bullets on them. They have no roof, there is sun and rain, cold nights, beatings twice a day, we give them no food and water. They will starve like animals."

342. Numerous leading Muslim and Croatian citizens had notably been immediately targeted for extermination when still in their homes, towns or villages.

343. Among the prominent citizens of Prijedor who had survived the initial phase of the devastation and were detained in Omarska, are long lists of identified persons whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Among them were (to mention but some): the mayor; politicians from the SDA and the HDZ in Prijedor; an imam; judges and lawyers; employees from the military and civilian sectors; a veterinarian, a physiotherapist, a dentist, and a number of medical doctors; an engineer and some economists; headmasters and teachers from schools at different levels; journalists and an editor of Radio Prijedor and of Kozarski Vjesnik; an author and an actor; directors and members of the Rudnika Ljubija management board; directors and managers of Bosnamontaža, Kozaratourist, Celpak, and the biscuit factory Mira Cikota; the director and the secretary of the Prijedor Red Cross, the president of Merhamet (the Muslim charity organization) in Prijedor; restaurant owners, business men and entrepreneurs; leaders of sports clubs and football players.

344. In Logor Omarska (and in part for reasons of space in Logor Keraterm), the Serbs detained almost the entire non-Serbian elite - including political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders, and others. In addition to the judges and lawyers, all other segments of the non-Serbian law-enforcement personnel, policemen in particular, were incarcerated. Media people, artists and sports men - all the groups of people who in their different fields led and influenced the non-Serbian populace, were incarcerated. The leaders of the voluntary agencies - such as the local Red Cross and Merhamet - endured the same fate.

345. Thirty-seven women were among the captured brought to Logor Omarska. There were 36 non-Serbian women in leading positions and/or politically active. One of the first women arriving at the camp recounts that:

"After she was first arrested and interrogated she was moved on to a prison cell in Prijedor where she was together with one other woman (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). The latter was a teacher and politically active, she was later most probably killed in Logor Omarska. The next day the two women together with three men were taken in a car (from which they could not look out) via Tomašica to Omarska, where they arrived at approximately 17.00 hours. In Logor Omarska they were commanded to stand up along a wall, facing the wall, with their hands up with three fingers lifted (in the originally Serbian religious way to signify the Holy Trinity) and thoroughly bodily searched, then the chief of the guards arrived. He started to swear as there were two women, and said he had no room for women. He asked what he should do with them. The women were subsequently taken to a prison in Omarska village. The women were detained in a small cell with no air and no electricity, the only thing they were provided with was a bucket. They remained in this cell over night. Thence they were taken back to Logor Omarska. In Logor Omarska a Croatian woman arrived, she worked in the
postal service. This woman threatened with hunger strike and thus was temporarily released, but was returned again to the camp later."

346. One Serbian woman, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, was arrested reportedly because her late husband was Croatian. She was, however, released from the camp.

347. Simo Drljaća, chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, later told a foreign visitor to Prijedor that Logor Omarska opened on 27 May 1992 when 700 prisoners were detained there. At this time, Logor Keraterm was already operational, and there is information to indicate that a number of individual prisoners or smaller groups of prisoners may have arrived at the camp from at least 25 May 1992. Several survivors report that the camp leadership was not fully on top of the situation the very first days when there were prisoners in the camp. There may even have been some initial confusion among the Serbs concerning, for example, how to treat female detainees and concerning who was who (one early detainee may, as described infra, have just walked out of the camp and back into freedom, passing as a Serb).

348. It is very difficult to estimate the exact number of prisoners who were detained in Logor Omarska, both in total and at any given time. The number varied over time as new prisoners were moved in, especially in the wake of the major Serbian military operations, but more or less continuously due to individual arrests and smaller round-ups. On 15 June 1992, there were reportedly 2,736 plates used by camp inmates, each detainee having utilized one plate. In late July 1992, before the emptying of the camp into other camps started, there may have been approximately 3,000 camp inmates. The estimated total number of inmates to have been in the camp also varies considerably. Some estimate that there may have been a total of 5,000 prisoners, others believe that it may have been closer to 7,000. Under these circumstances, it is even more difficult to make any approximation concerning prisoners directly or indirectly killed in the camp - according to Serbian leaders there were only two prisoners in the camp who died from natural causes.

349. It is, however, possible to establish with a relatively high degree of certainty the total number of males in the relevant age groups in Opština Prijedor (see Chapter VII.E. supra). The fate of this group was, save for the limited numbers still remaining in the district (see Chapter XIII.G. infra), death outside of camps or detention in Logor Omarska or Logor Keraterm - a very limited number may have been taken into other camps primarily, at least initially, in the district of Sanski Most. The exact number of people included in each group, thus, is less relevant to appreciate the true character of the catastrophe which the Serbs brought about for the non-Serbs in Opština Prijedor.

350. Serbian leaders have made some statements relevant to the questions of numbers. Simo Drljaća, chief of the Serbian secret police and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, was asked about the numbers of prisoners, their crimes, and fate by journalist Roy Gutman who reports from that encounter that:

"Drljaća, . . ., said 3,334 people were arrested on suspicion of resisting or plotting against the new Serb authorities and were taken to Omarska. Drljaća insisted that no one had been killed at Omarska and that only two prisoners died between May 25 and mid-August, both of 'natural causes'. Another 49 'disappeared', including the former lord mayor of Prijedor . . . and were
presumed dead, Drljača said.

In the official version, detainees were interrogated for four days and shipped out. Drljača said 800 detainees who were alleged to have 'organized the whole thing,' among them rich Muslims who financed the Muslim SDA political party, were taken to Manjača, which was operated by the Bosnian Serb army as a prisoner-of-war camp, to await criminal trial. Taken with them were 600 people who reputedly commanded units of the Muslim and Croat resistance. The remaining 1,900 were found innocent and taken immediately to Trnopolje, which officials said was a transit camp, Drljača said.27

351. Željko Meakić, the chief of security in Logor Omarska, reportedly told a journalist from the New York tabloid Newsday that:

"There was a power cut at 11:47 P.M. on July 26, and it lasted until 4:30 A.M. the next morning. [Čehajić] disappeared among seven who left at that time."28

352. According to an interview with Simo Drljača:

"In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm' and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjača', on the basis of solid documentation on active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republika Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people."29

353. Interrogation - or informative talks - were conducted in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm, but not in Logor Trnopolje. The number of prisoners in Keraterm may have been about half of the number in Omarska.

354. The number of people, who were killed or who died in Logor Omarska, has yet to be established by outsiders. Confronted with the statement, "People say that 1,200 to 2,000 people were killed at Omarska", Mićo Kovačević (member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor and deputy mayor in Prijedor in the Serbian regime) reportedly replied that:

"It's your choice. The police chief has definitive information. All the rest is Hitchcock."

355. Logor Omarska was hastily opened in the administrative centre of the Omarska Iron ore mine - one of the three main extensions of Rudnika Ljubija - located to the south-east of the Kozarac area. The Omarska mine is situated just south of the railway from Prijedor town to Banja Luka. Omarska village, which was and remains predominantly Serbian populated, is positioned next to the railroad on the northern side of it. The mine is primarily an open pit mine, and there are numerous open pits in the vicinity of where the camp was established.

356. There was almost no reconstruction of the mining company's facilities before they were converted into a concentration camp. There were none the less rumours in the surrounding area before the concentration camp was opened that something special would be arranged at the place. The premises were not used by the mining company after the main change of usage - there are not known to be any mining related activities there, even at present.

357. The compound had four buildings which all definitely were used as part of the concentration camp. These buildings were the canteen building, the
larger building, the White House, and the Red House. The canteen building had a canteen and a kitchen on the ground floor, where there also were toilets, showers and a wardrobe for the miners. There was also a small garage. On the first floor in the canteen building, there were one main office and several smaller ones, or altogether eight rooms used for interrogation of camp inmates. The larger building was in part a huge garage for dumpers, etc. On the ground floor, in addition to the garage, there was one relatively large room. The first floor - which covered only parts of the ground floor - had several rooms (one, ill-famed, was known as No. 26) and an electrical workshop. The White House was a tiny construction totally out of proportion to the horrors reportedly taking place there. It had four rooms all allegedly constantly used for torture and killings. One of these rooms was known as "the room of death". The Red House, which was small as well, also had an ignoble function - this reportedly was where prisoners were taken for more or less immediate execution. For the latter reason, all reports about this building are from prisoners who have not been inside it themselves. There are limited numbers of survivors of the White House.

358. There are also reports to indicate that prisoners have been detained in a separator belonging to the mining company - this may, however, have been in another extension of Rudnika Ljubija, namely in Ljubija.

359. Around the canteen building and over to (and on three sides of) the larger building, the ground had a cement layer on top. This cement area was known as the "Pista". Outside of that, the ground was grass-covered.

360. Concerning the general conditions in the camp, a marked difference existed between the main period when the camp was open and after it, for all practical purposes, was closed on 6 August 1992. Thenceforth, the camp was more of a showcase for foreign journalists and the ICRC to visit. By then, most of the prisoners had been moved from the camp, the camp had been cleaned up and to some extent renovated (bullet holes had been covered and walls painted, etc.), beds had been brought into the camp, and more food and better hygiene were provided for the detainees. More importantly, the extreme violence and in-camp killings prevailed no more (see Chapter XII.A. infra). This chapter is focused on the main period when the concentration camp was open.

361. Logor Omarska was not surrounded by barbed wire or otherwise directly fenced. The camp was however, in the iron grip of three groups of guards - each comprised of 30 men. There was one group of guards in the camp itself, then one group of soldiers some 50 meters outside and another group some 100 metres away from the camp. The last group would reportedly shoot anything that moved. It is said that the two first groups primarily were to prevent prisoners from trying to leave the camp, whereas the third group was to protect the camp from attacks from outside. Former prisoners state that there were only two detainees who ever managed to flee from the camp. Both of them were later captured and returned to the camp, where one of them was allegedly immediately killed. The fate of the other appears to be unknown.

362. In addition, there is the non-Serb who claims that he was arrested and brought to the camp at the time of its opening. As the camp was not yet well-organized, and the people involved on the Serbian side were not yet fully familiar with one another, he pretended to be a Serb and walked out of the main entrance. He was not searched for as a fugitive, but was eventually persecuted as a non-Serb.

363. The Serbian leaders (as quoted supra) claim that 49 "disappeared" from the camp, seven of whom they say fled during a power outage during the night of 27 July 1992. Simo Drljača later told a foreign visitor that, "In legal
terminology we use that term [disappeared]. Maybe some who disappeared died in disappearing."

364. Starting, at the latest, on 27 May 1992, the conditions in Logor Omarska were more than crowded. One former detainee arriving at the camp on that day, recounts that he was squeezed into the room adjacent to the huge garage together with an estimated 400 other prisoners (the group was to prepare lists with the names of those present, with 30 names on each list). He states that the prisoners were packed so close together that their situation resembled that of sardines in a tin. After the doors to the storeroom had been closed, the prisoners had to remain there and in that position for four days, with neither food nor water or any toilet facilities. Everyone had to stand in an upright position all along as there was no space for anyone to lie down. Others estimate that this room may have contained up to 500 detainees at the time. The huge garage may have taken up to 1,000 men at the time. There were also several hundred men cramped in on the first floor of the same building. In addition, hundreds were ordered to stay on the cement floor outdoors - there are said to have been 700 in early June 1992.

365. In the canteen building, there was only the garage which held any sizable number of prisoners. It is with reference to this garage that a former prisoner is reported to have informed that he, on 30 May 1992, was "stuffed with 130 others [prisoners] into a one-car garage". Others claim there were times when there were as many as 160 prisoners squeezed into this garage. In the canteen building, the women had their quarters on the first floor in the offices where prisoners were interrogated in the daytime. Concerning the number of prisoners kept at any one time in the White House, this may have varied considerably. There may have been up to some 70 people in one room at the same time, but often far less - for example, only 20 people in each room or even less. As prisoners were killed/died in the White House, their place was not necessarily immediately filled with new prisoners although there reportedly were always some prisoners in each room. The detainees taken to the White House had reportedly normally been detained elsewhere in the camp at first, but this was not always the case.

366. Not only was the camp crowded, but the detainees were not to move around freely in the camp either. Whether detained indoors or in the open area outside, they were only to move when specifically permitted to do so - regularly only to receive food and to go to the toilets/the open fields. Under these circumstances, which were aggravated by several other factors as well, sanitation more or less immediately became a problem for the prisoners.

367. There was far too little water provided for the detainees to drink, and personal hygiene thus naturally came second in the competition for water in the camp. This was mid-summer when the days often were hot. Also, indoors it was hot due to the generally cramped conditions there. The prisoners' clothing was never properly washed, and it became more and more dirtied and ragged by the day. Since most prisoners had only one pair of summer clothes on them when coming to the camp, the clothing also had to serve as bedding such as pillows and blankets. There were no beds or bedding provided for the prisoners in the camp, with the exception that the women were provided with some kind of mattresses, two women sleeping on each. One female prisoner relates that she made good use of two sets of underwear that she stuffed into her pocket before she had to leave her house during one of the Serbian military attacks. No clothing was provided for the detainees. Soon pieces of cloth were also needed to tie around wounds and other inflicted injuries.

368. Rainy weather would bring temporary relief concerning water, but there was not much chance of collecting the rainwater, and the rain had other sanitary disadvantages. In the emaciated condition of the prisoners, being
soaking wet was far from ideal. The mud that followed the rain also made life in detention more difficult.

369. Twice before the camp for all practical purposes was closed on 6 August 1992, male prisoners had a "shower". In groups of 50, the guards had them disrobe and aimed fire hoses at 10 of them at a time. The high pressure of the water on the prisoners' weakened bodies was painful and not a relief, particularly so as the guards reportedly amused themselves with aiming at the prisoners' wounds and genitals.

370. There were no sanitary provisions for the prisoners in the camp; some rooms had plastic barrels at times. Reportedly, the Serbian guards frequently beat the prisoners on their way to meals as well as on their way to the toilet - a reason why there were occasions when the prisoners preferred rather to urinate or defecate in their trousers or shoes.

371. The women in the camp had much better general conditions for personal hygiene, engaged as they were also in cleaning both in the kitchen and the offices (the rooms used for interrogation), etc. But, the relative cleanliness of the female prisoners was possibly more for the advantage of the Serbs abusing them than to themselves under the circumstances.

372. As there were no sanitary provisions for the prisoners, the women had to manage as best they could during menstruation. The women improvised sanitary napkins from newspapers. They also stole toilet paper from the toilets of the Serbian inspectors (which they had to clean) if the inspectors had forgotten any paper there. At a late time in the history of the camp, the women received one kilo of cotton to share between them.

373. As the prisoners hygiene deteriorated, so did the hygiene in the detention locations. This soon became a vicious circle exacerbated as prisoners were maltreated and wounds and illnesses entered the scene. In the White House, it is said, blood, hair, teeth and small pieces of human flesh and bones made the rooms look like a primitive slaughterhouse. Bullet holes and damage to the construction reportedly also affected the prisoners' mental soundness.

374. Hair and beards grew long. Soon lice were a problem. Diarrhoea and dysentery quickly became unwelcome frequent, and then later permanent, visitors. Under these circumstances, even minor wounds could represent serious - sometimes lethal - problems because they were easily infected and there were no proper remedies for disinfection available. Like the lice found their breeding ground in open wounds, so did reportedly worms. A variety of illnesses found suitable general conditions to break out, but this does not seem to have plagued the camp inmates to the extent that one could have feared, or which could have become the case, if the camp had been open for a longer period of time.

375. The combination of unsanitary and depressing conditions, fatigue due also to malnutrition and nutritional deficiencies, physical and mental stress, and maltreatment rapidly weakened the prison population.

376. The Serbs had, as already mentioned, detained a number of medical doctors in Logor Omarska (names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). All of these doctors were prisoners themselves, and their high social status due to their profession seems a main reason for their detention. Whether they died in the detention or survived varied, as did the length of time before they were unable to assist anyone.

377. It can be expected that all of them tried to assist their fellow inmates
to the extent possible. One doctor, for example, was an ear, nose and throat specialist who to the extent possible provided all kinds of medical assistance in the camp until he was taken out of it in early August 1992 (for exchange supposedly, but he was probably executed possibly on the next day, see Chapter XII.B. infra). His medical and other assistance to fellow inmates is remembered with much affection and appreciation.

378. The medical doctors were called upon also to assist Serbian guards and officials in the camp, primarily when they were in need of first aid and concerning minor ailments. Though this was assistance to their actual tormentors, it probably benefitted the prisoners, both because medical doctors could live on and as there were no repercussions for disobedience.

379. The medical doctors had no medical equipment to assist their fellow camp inmates. Albeit inventive skills were stretched to a maximum, there is just so much that can be achieved with wooden pieces, bits of cardboard, and pieces of cloth.

380. There are reports that one small room on the camp premises was used as a sick ward - for some time at least - where prisoners could be kept for some days. But there was neither medical assistance nor food to be received there. Camp guards came by at times and allegedly mistreated the people in the room for no special reason.

381. When the prisoners first arrived at Logor Omarska, most of them, it is said, did not receive food or water the first four days or so. Later, they were permitted to come out from the buildings and rooms where they normally stayed to obtain daily food rations.

382. The routine in Logor Omarska allegedly was that when the prisoners were to receive food in the canteen (on the ground floor in the canteen building), they had to run through an L-shaped corridor. The camp guards frequently tossed wax on the floor to make it slippery. There were metallic wardrobe cabinets along the corridor and prisoners fell and hit the cabinets and were beaten by the guards. There were four Serbs in particular who allegedly beat the prisoners. The names of the alleged perpetrators are known but not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

383. To receive their daily food rations, the prisoners normally arrived in groups of 30. They received a piece of bread and a ladle of some soup-like fluid. The groups had to eat their food within two to three minutes. Each piece of bread weighed approximately 800 grams, one piece was normally divided between eight people, sometimes between four. The last prisoners sometimes received no bread at all. The female prisoners (who were charged with distributing the food) sometimes tried to give prisoners in special need a little extra, mainly from their own rations.

384. Some prisoners were so afraid of being beaten that they disregarded some of their daily rations. The daily food rations were handed out between 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. Thus, it was often more that 24 hours between times when each person received his rations. Once, a prisoner received some crumbs of bread in a newspaper. He remembers how he tore up the newspaper to get hold of every single of the crumbs.

385. One of the women relates that she had some sugar which she mixed with water for prisoners who fell unconscious. After serving the prisoners food, she had to prepare coffee for the guards, and that was the occasion on which she could steal some sugar. She also stole some coffee to be able to provide it for prisoners with dysentery. During one period, the women were permitted to go outside to the area where the kitchen garbage was thrown away. Here
these prisoners harvested some plants that would help prisoners suffering from diarrhoea.

386. Diarrhoea, as mentioned, was one problem for prisoners, and so was its counterpart, constipation. Several prisoners reportedly did not defecate for more than a month, some for up to two months - a highly painful experience. Regardless of physical ailments, all the prisoners soon lost considerable weight. During one and a half months, one prisoner says he lost 25 kilograms of weight. Other prisoners lost as much as 39 to 45 or even 50 kilograms during their stay in Logor Omarska.

387. When the prisoners arrived at the camp, they were normally searched. Either then or later Serbian guards demanded to have the prisoners' money, watches, and shoes - the latter only when they were in a good condition. All of a sudden, a guard would demand DEM 50 or 100 from a group of prisoners. If the guard did not receive what he had asked for, guards would often take out one of the prisoners and mistreat him. The guards, moreover, made money from selling cigarettes - not food or water - to the prisoners.

388. For the prisoners, camp life was at best an endless period of waiting - waiting for the present to pass, never sure if there was going to be any future, or more concrete, a new day tomorrow. A constant worry for self and not the least for those next of kin. Many fathers and sons, brothers and other close relatives were interned together, but could do next to nothing to assist one another. Similar pains related to friendships.

389. The prisoners spent their waiting periods standing, sitting or laying down when there was space enough for that. The prisoners laying on the cement floor outside often had to lay face down in the daytime so that they would not be able to observe in full what was happening around them.

390. The male detainees were not given any ordinary work to do, but were called upon to carry maltreated and dead fellow inmates in and out. It was more often than not that the prisoners themselves had to lift corpses up on trucks that would remove the dead, and on occasions when the number of dead was reportedly relatively high, the live workers out of the camps as well. The prisoners who had to follow such transports have allegedly not been heard of again.

391. After some two months in the camp, the youngest of the adolescents and the men over 65-years old were transferred in two buses to Logor Trnopolje. This was not long before Logor Omarska was to be practically closed on 6 August 1992 (see Chapter XII.A. infra). There possibly may have been a few people released from the camp. The Serbian leaders later interviewed about the camp have, however, made no mention of any prisoners released, and camp inmates say that they are not aware that any non-Serbian prisoners were ever released. It is only known that one of the female prisoners was out of the camp for a while before she was brought back in again. It is possible that some of the prisoners who disappeared from the camp were not executed as feared, but actually were helped or bribed into safety somewhere. There were, moreover, a few so-called exchanges of prisoners arranged, but there is concern that the term "exchange" may have been but an euphemism for execution (see Chapter XII.B. infra). The vast majority of detainees thus stayed in the camp until it was closed, if by then they were not yet dead.

392. Concentration camp inmates were called for interrogation in the offices on the first floor of the canteen building. Interrogations were normally conducted from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. The interrogators are generally referred to with the more civilized title of "inspectors". The inspectors arrived at the camp in the morning in a small bus together with clerks
assisting with typewriting. Thence, camp guards went around in the camp and collected the unfortunate ones to be interrogated. Camp guards participated in interrogation sessions as well. Sometimes the guards seemed to have started the interrogation sessions elsewhere in the camp before they brought the prisoners to the inspectors. All the time, it is claimed, beating screaming and moaning could be heard from the interrogation offices. Survivors relate that they were badly maltreated and tortured when interrogated. Beatings with a variety of implements were probably most common, but there are long lists of other methods used as well. The number of prisoners who died during interrogation is not known to anyone other than the Serbs in charge; the number is allegedly not very small. Time and again other prisoners claim that they observed dead bodies taken out from interrogation and left on the ground outside for others to see. Fellow prisoners also noted that a number of prisoners taken for interrogation never returned to their detention room and were later not seen elsewhere either.

393. During interrogation, some were asked about political activities, a majority perhaps about their access to weapons. In general, the inspectors seemed to have asked all kinds of questions - sometimes they questioned the prisoners of things that seemed of no relevance to their case whatsoever. If a prisoner denied any charges made against him or her, the person allegedly was likely to be or continued to be maltreated. Many a time prisoners reportedly agreed to anything held against them just to avoid or reduce the mistreatment, but then the guards and interrogators would find just another excuse to proceed with the mistreatment it seems. In a number of reported cases, there appears to be limited, if any, correlation between what the prisoners explained when interrogated and the records made from the interrogation sessions. One detainee, for example, was questioned about participation in the Serbian plebiscite and the referendum held in BiH, and about political activity in general. This person was convicted on the basis of the interrogation session, but for armed revolt, stealing weapons, and for planning genocide against the Serbs - which were issues not at all addressed during the interrogation. It was a death sentence. There were not many prisoners officially sentenced to death. Of those who were sentenced, some were executed immediately, others were just to remain in the camp until death one day caught up with them. The person just mentioned was in the second category and survived.

394. Allegedly, the inspectors had long lists prepared ahead of time according to which the prisoners were called for interrogation - it was not done at random or at the whim of some individual Serbs. The precise character of the lists used is not yet known to outsiders, meaning non-Serbs. Since they were lists with thousands of names, they were not prepared readily although camp facilities to some extent seemed improved in practical terms. One possibility could have been that the lists were taken straight from the 1991 census. This possibility, however, does not seem to correspond with the actual lists which prisoners themselves claim to have seen on occasion.

395. All the women reportedly experienced bad interrogation sessions.

396. In general, when prisoners were called for interrogation, other prisoners tried to provide them with some clothing which was not all in tatters so that they would have a little protection for the skin. It is stated that it even happened that prisoners - before potential interrogation sessions - smeared themselves with blood from fellow prisoners maltreated already, with the hope that it could give them an easier time. Blood stained clothing served a similar purpose.

397. Mistreatment and torture were not confined to interrogation sessions. Extreme abuses were reportedly carried out by camp guards at any time, but
especially at night. Sometimes the guards seemed to select their victims at random. Sometimes they probably had personal grudges to settle with someone. Sometimes they seemed to act in a kind of follow-up after the day’s interrogations, coming back for victims from then.

398. At night, the guards were often more or less drunk. Sometimes they were joined by unruly elements from outside the camp, but that could happen in the daytime as well. Dušan Tadić is one example. Also, the Red Berets from Banja Luka (see Chapter V.C. supra) came to assist their Serbian comrades in the camp. Normally, the guards lit a bonfire at night and played loud music to overpower screams and moaning from prisoners.

399. When prisoners were called out at night - it could, for example, be five to 10 people from the large garage plus some from other rooms - they reportedly more often than not did not come back to their rooms ever.

400. Every night the prisoners were seized with fear that this could be their night - the night when they would be subjected to maltreatment and possibly, or rather probably, death. The guards allegedly organized sheer orgies in brute force and destruction. Some prisoners were victimized next to or in the bonfire, others in the White House, and some were walked towards the Red House. Some experienced two of these options. It seems that the same prisoners were not taken both to the White House and the Red House.

One former prisoner relates:

"Arriving to Logor Omarska they were ordered up against the wall facing it and with their hands up - they were beaten. All the eight of them were taken to the White House, the second room to the right. The room was approximately 25 square metres and there were some 60 to 70 barely alive prisoners there. It was mainly young people who had surrendered themselves on the Kozara Mountain. Himself he was allowed to settle down next to a person [whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons], who later was killed in the camp. Of all the other people who were there, it was only one deaf and dumb man and himself who were not killed in the camp. There was one window in the room, and guards outside it. The door was half wood and half glass. Maybe 30 minutes later, it was dead silent in the room, a guard came in screaming that the one who was intended to flee had to come outside. He was ordered outside, where a bonfire was lit. All the guards were drunk. They asked him where he was hiding his weapon. He did not know how Logor Omarska was operated. He said that he had no weapon. They asked him for his name. He was then allowed to return inside. The guards outside the window were poking around like pigs, swearing at him, calling him names. They told him to come to the window and to lean his head out - he could see very little, it was dark. He saw only a knife gleaming in the dark. They asked him if he wanted to buy cigarettes, he answered in the affirmative and was given two packets. He shared one packet and was ordered to shut the window. The next day he saw a horrible - unimaginable and overwhelming - sight outside, they were all his fellow men who had been tormented. [Five men were named by the witness, who stated that two of them were killed in Omarska]."

401. Starting from the very beginning of the camp, female prisoners were allegedly raped by the Serbian camp guards, Serbian camp officials, and other Serbs. Rapes were reportedly often combined with beatings and other abuses. Often rapes were committed by several perpetrators one after the other.
Sometimes the rapist had an audience, sometimes it was merely fellow perpetrators waiting to take turns. Like the rest of the prison population the women were not as such protected against either ill-treatment or torture.

402. Two of the youngest women spent most of the time in the White House where they were raped and tortured. Almost all the women were badly tortured when in the camp. Most women were subjected to sexual assault - they were humiliated by being promised privileges and threatened that if they did not obey, they would not survive.

403. The guards reportedly tried to force one prisoner (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) to rape his fellow prisoner (whose name is also not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), a young woman. He did not want to. He had angina pectoris. The guards stripped both. The male prisoner begged and screamed, “I cannot, I cannot, she could have been my daughter”. The guards beat him, his heart could probably not take it. In any event, he was carried outside where it was raining heavily. The next morning other prisoners saw the male prisoner's dead body laying outside of the White House.

404. Men were also reportedly sexually abused in the camp. Prisoners were, inter alia, forced to have homosexual intercourse with one another, close relatives - like fathers and sons - among them. Worst of all were numbers of reported castrations carried out by a variety of primitive means. On one occasion, Dušan Tadić allegedly forced one prisoner to bite off the testicles of other prisoners who all died subsequently. In most cases, the guards are said to have performed the castrations themselves. Probably all the victims of castrations died due to severe losses of blood. On one occasion, the guards aimed a fire hose on the victim's wound afterwards. (For more information regarding rape and sexual assault, see Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault.)

405. According to the Gregorian calendar, Saint Peter’s Day is on 29 June, but according to the Julian calendar, which is followed by the Serbian Orthodox church, all religious feasts are celebrated 13 days later. Christmas, just to mention one other example, is celebrated on 6 January. On 12 July 1992, Petrovdan (Saint Peter's Day), the Serbian guards reportedly took care to beat every single prisoner on their way to receive the daily food rations. There were 30 prisoners eating at a time. The guards beat them both on their way in and on their way out. The guards reportedly also celebrated this religious feast with other more severe acts of violence, killing more prisoners than they did on an average day and night.

406. Due to the violence in the camp, all the inmates felt a strong urge to blend into the background and be as invisible as possible. It was a matter of life or death never to do anything that possibly could provoke a Serb – but it was unpredictable what could inflame someone. Whatever a prisoner did, it could be wrong. In general, it was not advisable for a prisoner to look a Serb camp official in the eye. The subservient prisoner's position was head bent low and eyes looking to the ground, with the hands at the back. One prisoner eating a piece of bread from his meal was addressed by a guard and offered the latter to have some. The prisoner used a Turkish word used in Bosnia, saying "Bujrum!" - meaning "Please have some!". The guard was infuriated and allegedly killed the prisoner (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). Those who successfully avoided drawing attention experienced relief. But at the same time, they also had an irrational feeling of guilt of having some personal responsibility for those prisoners who under these circumstances remained visible and thus were targeted by the Serbs.
407. When new prisoners arrived at Logor Omarska, they were normally received with beatings from the very moment they disembarked from the vehicles in which they arrived. Some newcomers died, as they immediately had their heads smashed into a brick wall. Killed upon arrival - they were murdered, but not actually detained in Logor Omarska. How these captured non-Serbs were recorded in the camp files is unknown.

408. Survivors suggest that of five deaths, four were due to torture and one resulted from shooting.

409. In general, the suffering of each individual prisoner became a burden for all the prisoners. There was so little they could do to assist one another under the circumstances. There were obviously some small practical things that one could do to be of some help. But, when it really counted in matters of life and death and personal integrity and dignity, they were all powerless victims. It did none the less make a difference that they shared in the horrors and that they to some extent could console one another. It was probably also important for those dying and being abused that there were witnesses to their suffering or at least to the general situation.

410. The terror of never knowing when something would happen and what that would be not only incapacitated the prisoners, but it also affected their mental health. The latter was also the effect of the overall suffering in the camp. It did not ease this situation that the dead prisoners normally were thrown out on the grass where the other prisoners would see them. Some prisoners estimate that on an average there may have been 10 to 15 bodies displayed on the grass each morning, when the first prisoners went to receive their daily food rations. But there were also other dead bodies observed in other places at other times. Some prisoners died from their wounds or other causes in the rooms where they were detained. Constantly being exposed to the death and suffering of fellow prisoners made it impossible for anyone over any period of time to forget in what setting he or she was.

411. There are reports to indicate that a few dead prisoners were soaked with gasoline and set on fire next to the garbage container in the camp. But most of the time, the dead bodies were removed from the camp in a small yellow pickup truck. Five Serbs, who were in charge of the actual removal of the dead bodies, are known by name. However, their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

412. Given the length of time Logor Omarska was used, the numbers of prisoners detained in the open, and the allegations that dead bodies were exhibited there almost every morning, it will be surprising if there are no satellite photographs of the camp facilities when still in use, which may shed some light on the issues addressed in this chapter.

413. Simo Drljaća, chief of police, when asked by a visitor (in 1992) if Omarska did come under the civilian government of Prijedor, replied that Logor Omarska "was run together with the [Serbian] army and the [Serbian] police". Being told that an army spokesperson had said the camp was run under the local police, Drljaća just said "Maybe". Questioned again under whose authority the camp was run, he responded that, "Military was doing the investigation: they had 40 inspectors".

414. Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor Omarska, their names are all known to the United Nations Commission of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the camp leadership and the different shifts of guards inside the camp, the inspectors, and the clerks are available. In addition, the names of individuals who visited the camp and allegedly committed serious crimes there, such as Dušan Tadić, have been registered. Here it suffices to
mention but some of the central people involved.

415. The names of the camp leadership and the commanders of shifts of guards are known, but not disclosed here for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. One of the identified camp leaders was suspended on 27 June 1992, because he attempted to help his Muslim brothers-in-law and some other Muslims and Croats.

416. Four of the members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor are known to have visited Logor Omarska. Their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

417. Also, one identified journalist, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, reportedly did visit the camp. Whether he was a member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor is not quite clear.

418. Two members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor have themselves allegedly on occasions performed brutal interrogations and torture in Logor Omarska. Their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

419. Some high-ranking Serbian officers from Banja Luka once visited Logor Omarska, arriving by a large transport helicoptre. In leaving, they brought with them from the mine and ore processing plant a huge quantity of rubber conveyor belts. (It is known that this kind of rubber belts are used in the wars in the former Yugoslavia to protect tanks.)

420. As concerns the local Serbian leadership - military as well as civilian - there is nothing to indicate that Logor Omarska was ever considered a secret. Conversely, all available information indicates that the existence of the concentration camp as such was common knowledge when it still was used as a camp. Ed Vulliamy reported that:

"[T]he local Red Cross had indeed visited Omarska, and given it a clean bill of health. Dr. Duško Ivić said later: 'Oh yes, I have certainly visited Omarska, and my professional assessment of the health of the people there is very good, apart from some diarrhoea.'"*

421. Before 6 August 1992, when the camp was virtually closed, no humanitarian organization (neither the ICRC nor anyone else) had visited Logor Omarska. In actual fact, it was the focus of the international media on the camp that prompted the camp closure (see Chapter XII.A. infra). Both when journalists were eventually permitted limited Serbian guided tours in the camp and the ICRC visited, the five women still detained in the camp were always hidden. Sometimes in such cases, the women were squeezed into the back seat of a Mercedes and driven to Omarska village, where they were guarded. After 6 August 1992, the ICRC thus registered only the male prisoners remaining in Logor Omarska, not the women as they were hidden. From this time on, the ICRC visited the camp once or twice a week. Now, the male detainees received food twice a day.

422. When the camp for most practical purposes had been closed and cleaned with only a limited number of prisoners left to be paraded for international media and aid agencies, journalist Ed Vulliamy described those deemed in good enough condition to be paraded for him as follows:

"Nothing could have prepared us for what we see when we come through the back gates of what was the Omarska iron mine and ore
processing works, and are ushered into the canteen area. Across a
yard, a group of prisoners who have just emerged from a door in
the side of a large rust-coloured metal shed are adjusting their
eyes to the sunlight and being ordered into a straight line by the
barked commands of a uniformed armed guard. Then, as part of some
rigid, well-worn camp drill, they run in single file across the
courtyard and into the canteen. Above them in an observation post
is the watchful eye, hidden behind reflective sunglasses, of a
beefy guard who follows their weary canter with the barrel of his
heavy machine gun.

There are thirty of them running; their heads newly shaven,
their clothes baggy over their skeletal bodies. Some are barely
able to move. In the canteen, there are no more barked orders,
the men know the drill all right. They line up in obedient and
submissive silence and collect their ration: a meager, watery
portion of beans augmented with bread crumbs, and stale roll,
which they collect as they file along the metal railings. The men
are at various stages of human decay and affliction; the bones of
their elbows and wrists protrude like pieces of jagged stone from
the pencil-thin stalks to which their arms have been reduced.
Their skin is putrefied, the complexions of their faces have been
corroded. These humans are alive but decomposed, debased,
degraded, and utterly subservient, and yet they fix their huge,
hollow eyes on us with looks like the blades of knives. There is
nothing quite like the sight of the prisoner desperate to talk and
to convey some terrible truth that is so near yet so far, but who
dares not. Their stares burn, they speak only with their
terrified silence, and eyes inflamed with the articulation of
stark, undiluted, desolate fear-without-hope.

They sit down at sparse metal tables, and wolf down their
meal. It is very obviously the only one of the day; if they ate
even twice as much, they would not be so gaunt and withered. The
meal takes precisely one minute; the guards signal that time is
up, and the men make up another queue by the exit." 32

423. Furthermore, according to Ed Vulliamy:

"In between more waffle about the jihad and genocide against
Serbs, we learn that Omarska is an 'investigation centre' for men
suspected of being members of the Government Army. The men are
rounded up, then 'screened' to determine whether they are
'fighters' or 'civilians'. Those found guilty of 'preparing the
rebellion' go into 'Category A', explains Mrs. Balban [who
translated for the Serb regime in Logor Omarska when Vulliamy
visited the camp]. There is no information on their next
destination. Those found to have been territorial defence
soldiers (but not 'preparing the rebellion') go into 'Category B'
and are sent to Manjaća, and the rest go to another camp,
Trnopolje, down the road. [A fourth category was hostages,
meaning people for exchange, see Chapter XII.B. infra.]" 33

424. In short, all information available about Logor Omarska seems to
indicate that it was more than anything else a death camp. The detainees were
not there to work or serve a specific purpose. There is no information to
sustain a claim that the detainees were in transit to somewhere else. As far
as the prisoners were concerned, the interrogations led nowhere out of the
camp, and the camp conditions were such that very few, if any, prisoners would
have survived long-term detention.
B. Logor Keraterm

425. In most respects, Logor Keraterm resembled Logor Omarska. The two camps had much the same status and organization. In a sense, it is probably correct to consider Keraterm almost like a smaller, but basically not better, extension of Omarska.

426. Also, Logor Keraterm received non-Serbian male adults. To this camp came leaders from the villages and those further down on the social ladder. It seems, however, to some extent, to have been a question of space where a specific group of prisoners were to be detained. At least on one occasion, it is known that a bus with captive non-Serbs was driven between the camps in order to unload the prisoners in any one of the detention facilities. As there was considered to be no room available in any of these camps, all but two of the prisoners were reportedly executed (see Chapters VII.D. supra and VIII.E. infra). Logor Trnopolje was, it seems, not viewed as an alternative for these prisoners. Trnopolje had, as will be related in the next chapter, a different character from that of Keraterm and Omarska.

427. Also when describing Keraterm, one could start with a list of prisoners incarcerated, but in an analysis like this that seems unnecessary. The point is already made that the entire non-Serbian leadership who survived the military attacks was brought for detention in Omarska or alternatively, in Keraterm. In the following, the focus will be on the respects in which Logor Keraterm differed considerably from Logor Omarska.

428. No women were apparently detained in Logor Keraterm for any length of time or killed there. After the Serbian military attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra), a mixed group of captured civilians were reportedly taken through Keraterm. Subsequently, a number of males and at least one, though possibly a few, women were taken to Omarska. Some other women and elderly men passed the camp probably on their way to Trnopolje. Later there were reportedly transfers to Omarska once or twice a week. Between 10 and 20 women may have passed through the camp with a more or less immediate onward transfer.

429. The exact number of detainees in Logor Keraterm varied over time. The average was reportedly between 1,000 and 1,050 captives. But on occasion, the number of prisoners may have been considerably higher, up to 1,500 men.

430. Keraterm was built as a ceramic tile factory in 1987. The industrial production reportedly first started in 1990. The factory premises are located in the Cirkin Polje district of Prijedor town, next to the main road Prijedor - Banja Luka, and not far from the railway linking the same towns.

431. There is one main building at the industrial plant - the factory building - in which the prisoners were detained. The factory building is possibly a combination of two structures. The entire complex was not far from rectangular, rather long and narrow, with one part (a little less than half the length of the building), narrower than the rest. At the back of the building was the production area of the ceramic factory. The narrower part of the entire structure was two stories tall. On the first floor, there were two halls (No. 1 and No. 2) where prisoners were detained. At the short wall of the factory structure, there was an entrance to the production area and to interrogation rooms on the second floor. Where the overall structure widens out and connects with the second part, or the rest of the building complex, there is a storage room which apparently was not normally used to detain prisoners. In the previous in-between storage room or next to it, there was a room with toilet facilities. Next to this again were Hall No. 3 and Hall No. 4 which both were used to detain prisoners. At the far end of the structure,
adjacent to Hall No. 4, there was a room to which prisoners, at least on occasion, were taken to be beaten or otherwise tortured.

432. The camp was surrounded by a wire fence (approximately two and a half metres high), and had one guard house at the entrance to the camp and another one next to a cargo scale for trucks - also close to the camp entrance. All the main doors to the detention halls faced the camp entrance.

433. There are allegations that the military police of the Army SRBiH had a base on the first floor in the area where the interrogation rooms were. There was no first floor above the toilet, Hall No. 3, Hall No. 4 and the adjoining chamber of maltreatment.

434. Across the main street, there was a separate office building for the Kozaraputcevi, a separate road repair entity. Reportedly, there were two military units occupying this office building, one is referred to as merely a military unit, the other one as a communication unit which also had at its disposal three vehicles - TAM 150 - with sizable antennas. In the period when Keraterm was used as a concentration camp, the Kozaraputevi office was, however, used as a facility related to the camp and used also by Serbian camp officials for different purposes. Some prisoners, who were never detained in Logor Keraterm, were taken there for interrogation.

435. Like in Omarska, the prisoners in Logor Keraterm were squeezed into detention in a sardines-in-a-tin-like fashion. In Hall No. 1 and Hall No. 4, there may have been an average of up to 200 prisoners detained in each at any time. Hall No. 3 may normally have had a population of 200 to 250 detainees. Hall No. 2, however, being the biggest one - possibly 120 square metres - may have given room for between 500 and 700 inmates.

436. The cramped conditions in Keraterm and a similar lack of sanitary provisions and hygiene as in Logor Omarska gave the same ensuing problems of hygiene as in that camp (see Chapter VIII.A. supra). The toilet room had four urinals which the prisoners could use if and when the guards agreed. As maltreatment was part of the camp routine in Keraterm also, the picture of everything from blood stained walls to lethally injured prisoners with infected wounds were part of the overall camp scenery. It is not known if there were any medical doctors who stayed for any length of time in Keraterm, but at least one medical doctor passed through the camp on his way to Omarska.

There is no information to suggest that ill or wounded prisoners in the camp were ever provided with any medical aid by the Serbs, and there is no information about any sick-ward. Conversely, reports suggest that some seriously ill or severely wounded prisoners were deposited together with dead camp inmates (see Chapter VIII.F. infra).

437. The food provided to the detainees in Keraterm was similar to that provided for the Logor Omarska inmates. Generally speaking, the prisoners would be provided with their daily food rations from the time when they arrived at the camp. Two cooks came every day to the camp to arrange for the prisoners' daily food rations. The food is said normally to have consisted of a piece of bread and a spoonful of boiled cabbage or beans. The cooks took up their position next to the toilet facilities. The prisoners had normally less than 30 seconds to finish their daily rations, some say. Others think that it was arranged so that 10 prisoners had a total of two minutes to get hold of their daily rations. As many as one third of the prisoners would face the risk that there would be no more food available for them in one particular day. Sometimes the detainees were instructed to crawl to receive their rations. Sometimes the guards reportedly amused themselves by shooting above the heads of those coming up for their meals or eating. The prisoners were reportedly beaten on the way to their meals.
438. Inside the camp, the dead prisoners would normally be collected in a refuse dump or in a garbage container. Sometimes an identified psychiatrist, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, reportedly came to the camp and issued death certificates for such prisoners. When there were transports of corpses out of the camp, fellow prisoners would, it is said, normally be the ones to pile them on transport vehicles. These prisoners were, in most cases, allegedly ordered to follow the transports out of the camp. Later, it is said, these prisoners were not heard from again. About one month after the Serbian military attack on the Kozarac area, a number of detainees were taken out to collect and bury dead bodies in that area. At least one of them survived later to tell about the undertaking.

439. As mentioned, some prisoners just entered Keraterm to be transferred to Logor Omarska or to Logor Trnopolje (women and elderly males). Allegedly, a few prisoners were released from Logor Keraterm up to 5 June 1992 - after interrogation - but there are said to be no known cases of releases after this time. The rest of the inmates either succumbed in the concentration camp or were transferred out of the camp as it was closed in early August 1992 (see Chapter XII.A. infra). There is no information to suggest that anyone successfully fled the camp - possibly there may have been some such cases from among those released from the camp with such working obligations as described above - to inter corpses from the camp and people killed during Serbian military-ethnic cleansing campaigns.

440. Reportedly, Serbian military police, civilian police, ordinary military and paramilitary fighters almost every day came with new groups of non-Serbian captives to the camp. The prisoners were ordered out of the vehicles just inside the camp entrance, normally next to the scale. Here they were lined up and were asked for identity papers and valuables. More often than not, a guard would approach the prisoner or prisoners first in line and ask them what they were doing in the camp. Without waiting for an answer, the guard would beat the one or those questioned, or have them beat one another, all according to the whim of the guards. As the prisoners were pushed and hurled into one of the detention halls, most of them were beaten.

441. Sometimes the maltreatment upon arrival was even worse. On 14 June 1992, it is claimed that two bus-loads of captives from the hamlet Sivci (in the Kozarac area) were brought into Logor Keraterm. These prisoners were ordered to leave the buses ten at a time and lay down on the ground where allegedly guards (the name of their identified shift commander is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) beat the newcomers with rifle butts, before the same prisoners were ordered up against the wall where another group of alleged perpetrators (from outside the camp) came to cut the prisoners’ armpits and pierce their arms and legs with bayonets. Afterwards these prisoners were taken into Hall No. 3 and a majority was probably later moved on to Logor Omarska.

442. At night time, the guards - not on one of the commander's shift, it is stated, but under the two other shift commanders, and allegedly with the approval of the camp commander - called prisoners out from the detention halls and beat and otherwise tortured them. (The names of the four identified commanders are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.) The guards would, for example, call out every prisoner with a certain surname. Participating in these orgies were reportedly people from outside the camp - locals like an identified taxi driver whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons (the taxi driver is said to have been a frequent and particularly brutal participant), soldiers back from the front for some days, and a gang of villains dressed entirely in black (long black leather coats, large wide-rimmed black hats, black boots, etc.) and with shaved heads. The men in the latter group were about 30-years old; they
reportedly also came to Logor Omarska and carried out torture and killings. Sometimes camp guards and/or people from outside the camp came into detention halls and fired shots above the heads of the prisoners. As the walls were of metal some bullets allegedly ricocheted and wounded prisoners. One day in mid-July 1992, to give but one example of the brutality, an unknown Serb came to the camp and pointed out some five or six prisoners from the village Gornji Orlovi, who thence were severely tortured. One from the latter group of prisoners - his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons - reportedly died during this torture.

443. Reportedly, there was almost no day with less than two or three prisoners killed in Logor Keraterm.

444. One Serb is known to have been detained in the camp - allegedly for having participated in the referendum in BiH (see Chapter III.F. supra and having voted in favour of a unified and sovereign BiH. His name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. He came from the village Ljeskare (in the Ljubija area).

445. One former inmate in Keraterm relates the following about the by far largest alleged massacre taking place in the camp:

"On 20 July 1992, Hall No. 3 was emptied for prisoners. These detainees were dispersed into the three other detention halls. Later in the day, new bus-loads of captives arrived to the camp. At this time detainees in Logor Keratem could observe that it was burning in the Hambarine area [see Chapter VII.D. supra]. The newcomers were detained in Hall No. 3. Starting at the same time the prisoners in the three other halls were ordered to urinate in plastic barrels only.

In Hall No. 3 the doors were firmly closed and there was no fresh air for the prisoners squeezed in there. No food and no water was provided for the newly arrived detainees as long as they stayed in Hall No. 3. A door from the toilet area to the hall was firmly blocked by Serbian camp officials. Thenceforth the barrels with urine were emptied next to this blocked door to flow into Hall No. 3.

In the night of 24 July 1992, one camp commander's shift [in the following referred to as shift A] came to the camp possibly at about 19.00 hours, later also another commander's shift of camp guards [in the following referred to as shift B] appeared. [The names of the two identified commanders are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.] Earlier in the day some 15 people in military uniforms had come to the camp. There were four machine gun posts outside the front of the factory building, now the weapons were all aimed at Hall No. 3. In the evening the guards on shift B took out in front of the factory building some ten prisoners, had them kneel in a circle with their hands behind their heads. The guards than ran around the circle screaming as they beat the prisoners severely. One of the people thus maltreated was subsequently thrown next to Hall No. 2 by the guards, and died there some 15 minutes later. Others may have encountered similar consequences.

At about mid-night it could be heard that windows high up on the front wall to Hall No. 3 were broken. Someone cried out, 'Do not shoot unless the commander of shift A instructs that.' (Shift A was on duty that night.) Then someone else cried out, 'They [the detainees] are fleeing.' Then heavy machine gun fire started. The commander of shift A yelled that the shooting should stop. His instruction was ignored, and someone mocked him saying..."
that, 'A Serbian mother has given birth to an Ustaša son.' At first, prisoners like himself detained outside Hall No. 3 thought that the long-lasting shooting was merely to terrorize the prisoners. At dawn he was told by fellow prisoners that it seemed that the prisoners in Hall No. 3 had been killed. A little later he himself saw a huge pile of dead bodies outside of Hall No. 3. At about 05.00 hours a large lorry - FAD 1620, 24 tons - driven by an identified man [whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] arrived to the camp. Some prisoners probably from Hall No. 1 and Hall No. 4 (he was detained in Hall No. 2 himself) and a few who appeared to be survivors from Hall No. 3, were ordered to heap the dead bodies on the lorry. First they had to take out dead prisoners from Hall No. 3, thereafter to remove the pile of corpses laying outside this hall. One prisoner participating in loading the dead - and with the corpses also wounded prisoners - on the lorry, afterwards told him that he had counted 98 dead and 62 or 63 wounded prisoners. Others claimed the total of dead was 150, and that the wounded numbered between 30 and 40. Later in the day, two fire trucks came and hosed down Hall No. 3 and the area outside it to remove all the blood there. The night of the mass-killing and the next day the main road (from Prijedor to Banja Luka) passing the camp was closed for traffic."

446. All available information supports by and large this account. As for the fate of the corpses from the massacre and wounded prisoners removed from the camp with the dead, see Chapters VII.F. supra and VIII.F. infra.

447. On the morning of 26 July 1992, it is reported that a total of 21 dead prisoners were placed in front of the factory building. Before being removed, the corpses were photographed laying face up.

448. At daytime, prisoners were taken for interrogation, like in Omarska. The prisoners were interrogated in the camp itself in the interrogation rooms on the first floor. Also in Logor Keraterm, the interrogators were inspectors coming into the camp for this specific purpose - again like in Omarska. The inspectors were assisted by camp guards in mistreating their victims. Among the inspectors were policemen in active service, retired policemen, and lawyers.

449. It is said that approximately one half of the camp guards were in police uniforms, and the other half in military outfits.

450. The camp location next to the main road Prijedor - Banja Luka, made even the dead prisoners visible, at least on occasion, to bypassers. Normally, the dead would be laying outside of the factory building in the morning, before they were removed to the refuse dump/garbage container or out of the camp.

451. Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor Keraterm, their names are all known to the United Nations Commission of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the camp leadership and the different shifts of guards inside the camp and the inspectors are available. In addition, the names of individuals who visited the camp and allegedly committed serious crimes there, have been registered. Here it suffices to mention but some of the central people involved.

452. The names of the camp leadership and the commanders of shifts of guards are known but not disclosed here for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Reportedly, there was a change of camp commander and general chief of security from 28 or 29 July 1992.
453. Former inmates in the camp allege that some named members of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor visited Logor Keraterm. The names of the “visitors” are not disclosed here for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

454. Logor Keraterm has for several reasons been given less attention than Logor Omarska. The latter was the camp where the very elite of the non-Serbian community – the upper echelons in all fields – were primarily incarcerated. Logor Omarska was furthermore more than double the size of Logor Keraterm, and Logor Omarska became the main focus of the media – both television and newspapers. Several books – chronicles in part – about Logor Omarska have also been published.

455. None the less, Logor Keraterm has the same character as Logor Omarska in terms of being a death camp. For the individual prisoners, the traumas of having been detained in Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska respectively may have been much the same. Both concentration camps presented the inmates with utterly gruesome experiences.

C. Logor Trnopolje

456. Prior to Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm being closed, essentially only children, women, and elderly men were taken to Trnopolje. The adult and not too old men (normally those between 16 and 60 or 65-years old) were taken to Omarska and Keraterm camps. It was, in other words, the non-Serbian people in the categories later deported (see Chapters X.A., X.B. and X.C. infra) who were detained in Logor Trnopolje. Some non-Serbs rounded up for deportations were reportedly brought to the camp even from the Sanski Most and Ključ districts.

457. The total number of camp inmates reportedly varied on an average from between 4,000 to 7,000 people. In the wake of the major Serbian military attack on the non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River (see Chapter VII.D. supra, there may have been altogether some 7,000 detainees in Logor Trnopolje. This period – together with the one just after the military campaigns in late May and early June (see Chapters VII.A., VII.B. and VII.C. supra) – may have been the single most crowded time in the camp's history.

458. Some people stayed in the camp for a very limited period of time, such as for a few days (some reportedly even stayed for one night only), others remained there for months as they were not deported. Some arrived at least twice to the camp – first rounded up and detained, then released for lack of space, and then rearrested.

459. Non-Serbs were, after the Serbian military attack on Prijedor town (see Chapter VII.C. supra), first gathered in different locations inside and just outside of Prijedor town and then taken to Trnopolje. A number of women and children from houses in Prijedor town, which had not been destroyed, were at least temporarily released after some three or four days. In late June 1992, non-Serbs who had sought refuge in the Puharska suburb of Prijedor town together with long-term inhabitants from this suburb (which had a predominantly Muslim population) were rounded up and brought to Trnopolje.

460. There are reports of non-Serbs having approached the local Serbian Red Cross in Prijedor to ask for the whereabouts of relatives who had “disappeared”, were detained or deported, and who then were forcibly taken by Serbian Red Cross personnel into one of their buses and transported to Logor Trnopolje to be incarcerated without any reason given.
461. The camp was located very near the first station, Stanica Kozarac, on the railway from Prijedor to Banja Luka. The area is said to have been predominantly Muslim. The local school had, however, been occupied by Serbs who made it a stronghold before they converted it into a concentration camp.

462. The camp was opened in an area of and adjacent to a primary school. The entire area used has the shape of an irregular triangle. There were three main building complexes in the camp compound: the school with its sports hall, a cinema hall with some smaller rooms next to it, and a storage building. A number of tents were put up in the camp yard as well.

463. Some of the detainees were instructed as to where in the camp they were to stay. Others were simply told to find themselves a place where they could sleep.

464. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire, and a number of camp guards watched the detainees. The inmates had limited possibilities to move or to find anything to eat. A permission could be obtained to leave the camp for some hours - but that gave no inalienable rights for those going out neither vis-à-vis those guards who had given them permission to go out nor those guards who happened to be around when they came back. These detainees were left at the mercy, behest, or whim of the guards. At best, those going out had no problems when outside or upon return to the camp, in other cases they were lucky if they could pay in cash or kind to return. Outgoing prisoners often had family members in the camp so that they were likely to return - if for nothing else than for the safety of their relatives. Outside the camp, they were outlaws, and de facto they had normally nowhere to run. It was bad in the camp and so it was outside as well (see Chapter IX.C. infra).

465. Furthermore, as the camp was a staging area for deportations, those going out of the camp ran the risk that they would be separated from family members in case they were not all in the camp when detainees were deported. The separation of relatives together in the camp could, however, happen at any time during the deportations. The deportees were to move at the behest of their Serbian captors. Bribes could bring about some flexibility, it is said, but not necessarily.

466. It was summer and early autumn, meaning harvest time. Some prisoners - especially farmers from nearby areas - were ordered by the camp guards to leave the camp to harvest especially vegetables in their own or other local fields. These workers had, however, no protection outside the camp either. One even claims that the majority of the detainees from Trnopolje killed in August 1992 were people on this kind of work assignment, whom the camp guards killed outside the camp. The one man who makes this allegation reports that he himself was commanded together with others to bury eight people killed in vegetable fields.

467. Basically, there was far too little space for all the camp inmates in Logor Trnopolje, but the detainees were not cramped in like in Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. The sanitation in the camp was far, far better than in the two other camps. There were better toilet facilities and more water available for the detainees who also had more private belongings such as the odd cooking pots, buckets, some additional clothes, etc. Still the sanitation and hygiene as such was bad in the camp. But due to the deportations, the turn-over rate of the majority of the prisoners was high and eased the sanitary situation. There were no proper provisions for camp inmates in terms of food and water, clothing, bedding, or medical care.

468. Sometimes the prisoners received no food for the first three days in the camp. For the short-term detainees, there could even be no food made
available at all. Thus, many were rather exhausted before being deported — during deportations there would again often be no food at all made available for days (see Chapters X.B. and X.C. infra). There was at least one medical doctor detained in the camp for some period of time. The doctor provided fellow detainees with assistance to the extent possible, but did not have proper medical equipment on hand.

469. The detainees were, in general, not working in the camp. Five boys 13 or 14-years old were once ordered to load or remove some timber. When the job was done, they were reportedly all shot dead by an identified camp guard, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

470. The detainees in Trnopolje were more or less systematically deprived of their valuables and frequently also of their identification papers and other documents on hand. There are numerous reports of embezzlement and pilfering by camp guards and other camp officials. In addition to the actions of camp officials, there are reports suggesting that a number of Serbian soldiers back from the war for the weekend or a few days functioned as camp guards to enrich themselves and take out aggression in terms of committing rapes and otherwise seriously abusing detainees. These occasional guards are even said to have killed or participated in killing camp inmates.

471. There were no formalized interrogation sessions in Logor Trnopolje. There were in other words no inspectors arriving to question the camp inmates. The incoming captives only had their names and whereabouts recorded.

472. Killings were not rare in the camp, nor was the infliction of torture. Harassment in general is claimed to have been the rule and not the exception. Rapes were reportedly the most common of the serious crimes to which camp inmates were subjected. The nights were when most of the injustice was performed. The nightly terror of possibly being called out for rape or other abuses was reportedly a severe mental constraint even for short-term detainees in the camp. Many detainees reportedly never returned after venturing with or without explicit permission outside of the camp. Other former detainees report that there were times when they were ordered to bury non-Serbs, who had been killed, in fields and meadows near the camp.

473. The allegation is that on one occasion some camp inmates had their hands and feet chained and were forced to lay down on the ground in the camp enclosure. Then, tractors were driven over their legs. Those who did not perish from their injuries relatively quickly, were later shot dead. Guards had taken up positions to prevent fellow prisoners from assisting those in agony. Reportedly, mainly wealthy people were shackled and killed. It is said that in the camp this kind of execution took place at least on four different occasions.

474. The first period was allegedly the worst in Trnopolje, with the highest numbers of inmates killed, raped, and otherwise mistreated and tortured.

475. At night, the detainees could hear the noises of drunk soldiers and other visitors to the camp, and the screaming of fellow inmates abused or taken out of the camp. It was expected that inmates taken out of the camp would be abused. A number of those taken out at night allegedly never returned to the camp and have not been heard from again. For this reason, fellow inmates believe that they were killed after departure from the camp, possibly after being abused or raped.

476. On 6 June 1992, to give just one example of what is reported, Serbian tank drivers came into the camp and seized some 30-40 young female camp inmates. Arriving between 10:00 p.m. and midnight, the soldiers — one
identified name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

were more or less drunk. They forced the girls and women out with them. When the female prisoners were returned to the camp, they had been raped and mistreated, and their clothing was in tatters.

477. The people killed in the camp were usually removed soon after by some camp inmates who were ordered by the Serbs to take them away and bury them. These workers would normally come back to the camp.

478. Concerning the Serbs who were directly operating Logor Trnopolje, their names are known to the United Nations Commission of Experts and the ICTFY. That is, the names of the camp leadership and the guards inside the camp are known. In addition, the names of individuals who visited the camp and allegedly committed serious crimes there were registered, but are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. There are also long lists with names of Serbian soldiers who served as occasional guards in the camp, or who arrived in the camp to take out detainees to abuse them.

479. The name of the camp director in Logor Trnopolje, who was also a member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

480. The local Serbian Red Cross was abused by the Serbs then running it, to play a central role in the management of and the abuses related to Logor Trnopolje - in clear violation of the Red Cross mandate as such.

481. A staff member of the Red Cross in Prijedor, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, worked at the secretariat in Trnopolje where he was responsible for food supplies coming to the camp. Allegedly keeping food away from the internees, he caused terror and hunger, which was one of the reasons why prisoners in the camp succumbed.

482. Also, Logor Trnopolje changed much - meaning that the general situation in the camp was considerably ameliorated - after Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm were closed (see Chapter XII.A. infra). Most important was that the violence against camp inmates decreased, especially killings. All of the food provided by the ICRC did not reach detainees, but nutrition-wise the conditions are said to have improved.

483. None the less, it was when trying to describe the conditions in Logor Trnopolje at this later time (after it had become an "open reception centre", see Chapter XII.A. infra) that United Nations Human Rights envoy Mazowiecki said that "words fail me". One other representative of the international community relates (after a visit to the camp in the same period) that the road in front of the camp was strewn with empty cartridges when international observers first were admitted to the camp. According to camp inmates, random shooting by Serbs into the camp was just one of the various methods used to terrorize the detainees.

484. In late August 1992, most detainees from Prijedor town who had a house to return to, had been released from Trnopolje. People from the Kozarac area (and other destroyed areas) were registered by the ICRC. Former detainees from the camp (among them people transferred to Trnopolje as Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm were closed) then returned to the camp to be registered by the ICRC as well. Registration was considered the "passport" needed to flee the Serbian persecution. Many released prisoners had not dared to leave their houses upon return to Prijedor town, as they reportedly were afraid of being killed. Later, there were non-Serbs paying camp guards to enter the camp to seek a safe transport out of Opština Prijedor. This the Serbs used to illustrate what an agreeable place Trnopolje was.
485. Albeit Logor Trnopolje was not a death camp like Logor Omarska or Logor Keraterm, the label "concentration camp" is none the less justified for Logor Trnopolje due to the regime prevailing in the camp.

D. Other places of detention

486. Several other places of detention were used at the same time as the above-mentioned camps. These detention facilities were mainly used for two purposes, one was initial interrogations and the other staging areas for deportations. A number of people were held in these areas for a relatively short period of time prior to being taken to one of the above-mentioned concentration camps.

487. Some of the male inhabitants of Prijedor town were, after being forced out of their homes there in late May and early June 1992, detained temporarily in a school in Svodna (a village outside Opština Prijedor, located along the road to Bosanski Novi). Another camp was established in a school building in the small village of Čela, about six kilometres south of Prijedor town.

488. Women, small children (sometimes only those below 12 years of age, sometimes also adolescents up to the age of 15), and elderly men (those from 60 or 65 years old and older) were gathered for deportation in stadiums (such as in the suburb Tukovi in Prijedor town, and in the town of Ljubija) or in sports halls at different schools. For a night or so, they might initially have been detained even in private houses in attacked areas.

489. After the attack on the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra), the high school in Prijedor town - its courtyard and sports hall - was used to detain several thousand children, women, and elderly men. Initially, for the first hours that is, from outside - such as relatives and friends - could enter the high school to speak with people, bring them some food, and even release the internees.

490. Men and other prisoners of special interest were occasionally detained at police stations and in military barracks or in other more or less randomly selected areas of convenience. Normally, such detention facilities were used for the individual prisoner for relatively short periods ranging from some hours to a few days. From these detention facilities, the prisoners were either released after having been given the message that they were no more wanted in the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, or transferred to one of the above-mentioned camps. Some were killed when in detention - like non-Serbs could be killed anywhere: in their homes or gardens, on the streets, in the woods, on the mountains or in the hills, or actually wherever they were captured or merely attacked.

491. A number of women may have been short-term detainees in places, such as military barracks, where they allegedly were abused (see Chapters VII.B. and VII.D. supra).

492. As for the civilian non-Serbs rounded up in the attack on the villages on the left bank of the Sana River, many - especially from the southernmost areas - were taken to detention centres in Opština Sanski Most, inter alia, to Logor Krings. For some, at present unknown, period of time, there was also a detention facility in the Ljubija area referred to as Logor Ciglane. Whether the latter is identical with the detention facility used in a central area of the iron ore mine - possibly the separator - is not clear either. Allegations are, however, that there may have been as many as 1,000 people detained in the place at the same time. The detainees were reportedly a mixture of both sexes and different age groups - a breakdown of which is not available for the time
E. General characteristics

493. On 23 May 1992, Serbian spokesmen officially announced the establishment of the first detention centre near Prijedor in northern BiH.

494. Soon after the Serbs took power, in late May 1992, Muslim and Croatian leaders in Prijedor started to "disappear", only later it became known that they had been taken to Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm. Political leaders, officials from the courts and the administration (inclusive the police), academics and other intellectuals, religious leaders, leaders from enterprises and businesses - the backbone of the Muslim and Croatian communities that is - were no more tolerated at liberty, or rather they were taken away apparently with the intent of their removal being permanent. Left behind without guidance and the strength of leadership were the much bewildered ordinary Muslim and Croatian people. This way Logor Omarska and in a similar way, but not to the same extent, Logor Keraterm became instruments of the overall destructive policy. Forcibly transferring children from one group to another group (not to say killing the same children) may be intended to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group - i.e. depriving the actual group of its future. Taking away the leaders of such a group deprives it of its present vitality, its ability to determine its political status and pursue its economic, social and cultural goals. Taking away the leaders means disarming the group intellectually and spiritually - it is a tactical, but lethal move facilitating further destruction of the group by rendering it open to almost any kind of abuse and destruction. Moreover, revival of a group requires leaders.

495. Among those detained in the camps were former non-Serbian policemen and other law and order people such as judges and jurists in general. Moreover, former military personnel, such as people enrolled in the TO, were particularly targeted. This left the non-Serbs also without any legal or armed protection.

496. As the camps of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje were opened, only a few cases from there were opened for investigation although the criminal sector of the legal system was functioning in its own exclusive Serbian way.

497. In running the concentration camps, the Serbian police and the Serbian military cooperated. As in the military campaign against the non-Serbian habitations, the police and the military took advantage of the assistance of quasi-military elements and locally gathered manpower (for example, from the villages nearby Logor Omarska) also in the concentration camps. A number of the camp guards may have been recruited into the police or the military from the reserve, others were possibly new recruits. Whether to have assistance in exterminating detainees, or to give an outlet for general aggression and to legitimize aggression against non-Serbs, or a combination of these purposes, the Serbian leaders furthermore opened up the camps to the most brutal people around - belonging to paramilitary forces or just anybody. Especially in Logor Trnopolje, but also in the other camps, Serbian soldiers on leave from their ordinary service seem to have gratified both their greed and whatever sadistic inclinations they had.

498. Almost all the people in offices after the power change reportedly had knowledge of the death camps. These camps were spoken of in the SDS party, in broadcasts from Radio Prijedor and Television Banja Luka. The media mentioned names of some of the detainees and charged that the mentioned people were accused of having undermined society and of having prepared genocide against
the Serbs.

499. According to an interview of Simo Drljača (chief of the Serbian secret police and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor):

Drljača: "In the collection centres 'Omarska', 'Keraterm' and 'Trnopolje' more than 6,000 informative talks were held. Of this number 1,503 Muslims and Croats were sent to the camp 'Manjača', on the basis of solid documentation on active participation in the fighting against the Army of Republika Srpska, and also participation in genocide against the Serbian people. Instead of letting them get their deserved punishment, the powerful men of the world expressing disdain forced us to release them all from Manjača." 34

500. The concentration camp premises were sometimes so packed with people that no more inmates could be crammed in. At least on one occasion, this allegedly resulted in an entire bus-load of newly captured non-Serbs being executed en masse. The bus, which was packed with captives from villages on the left bank of the Sana River, first tried to leave passengers at Logor Keraterm, then in Logor Omarska, and finally at Keraterm again - but in none of these places was there any room for the prisoners. Then, the bus was driven back across the Sana River. The bus passed the athletic field in Tukovi and continued towards the Rizvanović area stopping at the gravel pit in "Suhi Prijedor" in front of a private house. All the captives but two were shot dead (see Chapter VII.D. supra). Another bus with fewer passengers - 27 all together - was on its way to the same gravel pit, but the bus-load of non-Serb workers primarily from Autotransport Prijedor were killed. It is believed that the dead bodies may have been left in the area to be washed away by a later inundation by the Sana River.

F. The disposal of the dead

501. The dead bodies from the massacre in Hall No. 3 in Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra) on 24 July 1992 were possibly later driven to the Kozarac area. At least it is reported that a truck with many dead bodies, from which blood was dripping on the road, was observed on the road from Kozarac towards Mrakovica (possibly some three kilometres from Mrakovica). The non-Serb who observed and reported this belonged to a group of concentration camp inmates who had been taken out of the camp to bury dead bodies in the Kozarac area. This man, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, also states that Serbian soldiers claimed that the dead were the "soldiers of Alija Izetbegović". One of the Serbian soldiers reportedly stated that the truck had come from Logor Keraterm and that it contained approximately 200 dead bodies. The truck was green with a yellow car cover over the truck body. At the time, there were allegedly also many other dead bodies in the Kozarac area. Non-Serbs took part in digging graves along the road, the bodies were covered with a thin layer of soil between every layer of bodies.

502. The dead camp inmates from Logor Keraterm were usually removed by truck. There is said to be a mass grave near the location called "Bajr", the former brickyard, in the immediate vicinity of Logor Keraterm. A non-Serb reports that according to camp guards, seriously wounded prisoners from the camp were also buried there without anyone having bothered to kill them first. The mass grave may be covered by construction material from Stari Grad which by then had been completely destroyed.

503. Prisoners from Logor Omarska were sometimes said to be exchanged at
Gradiška, but may have been executed in the village of Gradina (nearby Omarska) instead. The bodies of the latter groups may have been disposed of in that same area.

504. There are numerous reports of individual graves and graves for small groups of prisoners outside both Omarska and Trnopolje concentration camps - not the least in nearby fields and meadows. Logor Keraterm was in the urban area where that kind of dumping of the dead may both have been less feasible and also less desirable from a Serbian point of view. Logor Omarska had more of an isolated location. Logor Trnopolje was in a predominantly Muslim area. Both these latter camps had open land in their vicinity. Sometimes the graves were dug by camp inmates, sometimes small excavators were used. Some dead bodies may have been discarded in abandoned mine shafts, both in the Omarska and the Ljubija areas. Even larger numbers of dead bodies may have been dumped in open pits, especially in the Tomašica and Ljubija area, but possibly also in the environs of Omarska. Rudnika Ljubija is primarily an open pit mine with huge excavated areas. The dead bodies may have been covered with some kind of acid solution previously used by and available from the mining company - for the bodies to decompose more quickly and to reduce the stench. There are no reports of the use of chloride lime. Each pit used was reportedly filled with soil. Rumours will have it that bodies from Logor Omarska on occasion were thrown into two lakes not very far from the camp, where a certain species of fresh water fish was feeding on the corpses; these allegations remain unconfirmed.

505. Information also suggests that pre-existing burial grounds, such as the Orthodox cemetery in Omarska, were used to inter dead camp inmates. The same is said to have been the case for a relatively new graveyard on a height in or near Prijedor town. (For more information regarding disposal of the dead, see Annex X, Mass Graves.)

IX. THE GENERAL SITUATION FOR THE NON-SERBIAN POPULATION

506. The following report was made by a rapporteur mission from the CSCE. On 31 August 1992, the mission met with Dr. Milomir Stakić, the SDS mayor of Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, and visited the "Open Reception Centre at Trnopolje". The mission reports:

Dr. Stakić: "In the first free elections since the Second World War the Muslim party won the election and were in power for one and a half years, and they took the opportunity it gave them to arm the most extreme parts of the Muslim population.

This preparation had reached a culminating point at the end of April, beginning of May, when these armed groups put up barricades, and when they started shameful murders of the army of Bosanska Krajina and the police.

As a result the army and police cleared the barricades when they left Prijedor on the road to Banja Luka. And as soon as they left the city the army and police were attacked and three police and soldiers were killed.

In spite of our invitation to their representatives, religious leaders and well known citizens they did not come to talk to us.

And why have I mentioned the religious leaders? When we went to search the homes of the religious leaders we found US made shotguns which in the US are forbidden for hunting.

There were fighting and destruction, especially Karasec [Kozarac], a suburb to Prijedor, and several people were captured. We have called them to free the women and children and let them
go. They put the women and the children in the front lines and followed with their weapons. The police and army accepted these women and children and put them in buses and took them to safe havens.

In the course of the next few days army and police captured several thousand people and put them in Trnopolje to protect them from the fighting with the extremists. That is how it was started as a collective centre.

With the help of the ICRC we have transported some of the inmates to 7 but there are still some left and we have evacuated those who want to leave this part of the country.

But we have also Muslims and Croatians in the camp who want to remain, around 10,000. They have normal identification papers for our police. They are not accused of anything and most of them are living in their homes but some are in the camp. A minority wants to go to Croatia and a majority wants to go to Western Europe.

We have had more than ten contacts with UNHCR where they have offices and tomorrow there is a delegation of UNHCR coming here and will discuss the future of those who want to go to Europe. Most of them have families in Western Europe and wish to leave this part of the country for fear of war.

We have certainly heard about Omarska where the people were caught with weapons, where 45 investigators interrogated the prison people and as a result 1,300 were transferred to the camp at Manjača and others either freed or transferred to the open camp here exclusively because their homes have been destroyed so they have to go somewhere.

With the help of local Red Cross and local economy and thanks to international help from ICRC we are trying to give them the minimum food and medicine. Those who are more ill go to the hospital here.

I welcome the arrivals of delegations who have come before you an hope there will be more help from outside. And we appeal to you to help us evacuate those who wish to go to these foreign countries to ensure safe passage to their destinations.

We are very grateful to you that you have sent the other mission to the Croatian side because we have Serbs who have been there for a year. And we would like to make it possible with help of you, UNPROFOR and ICRC to get them back."

**COMMENT:** Dr. Stakić was asked what specific help he wanted, with food and medicine.

**Dr. Stakić:** "Medicines first, food second."

**COMMENT:** Dr. Stakić was asked what he thought about the long term future.

**[Dr. Stakić:]** "I would like to say that we agree with the results of the London Conference. We see in these documents that have been accepted in London the possibility of ending the war . . . That makes us all suffer, and because I am the mayor of all citizens of Prijedor.

Neither Croats nor Muslims left this territory nor do we have the intention of kicking them out. There are some who hold appointments in the town and some are in the forces.

But the future is not clear because there is no electricity and the war is on. The communal government which just met had on the agenda food and heating for the winter, and Mr. Kovacic is
Mr. Kovacic: "Usually we have the problem of feeding and healing all the population. If we do not have electricity, fuel and food, not only will we continue fighting but we will all become cannibals. We are trying to solve our problems as we can but trying to solve them for all the nationalities.

The situation with electricity is complicated because some parts have the generating power and others have the distribution. We are on 10% of power and industry is on 20% of normal production. I am appealing to propose that the energy blockade should stop.

The main problem is that the Muslims wage their war with electricity. The result is that no one has electricity and the CSCE can do something about it. It is much more important to have electricity than butter.

There are theories about food corridors. No fool will shoot at food aid. Another thing is to ask the Croats and Muslims to deblock Banja Luka airport because the airport works but we cannot use the airspace."

COMMENT: He was asked if the airport was used by the military.

Dr. Stakić: "There is equal treatment for all, some Muslim areas have not been touched by war. We support your ideas about negotiations and our representative Mr. Karadžić is ready to negotiate."

Mr. ? Member of the Regional Government: "You said that you could not imagine these three peoples not living together, was that in Bosnia and Hercegovina or Yugoslavia?"

COMMENT: "Bosnia and Hercegovina."

Mr. ? Member of the Regional Government: "In that case there is a lack of information. Bosnia and Hercegovina is the same as Yugoslavia. Europe accepted Slovenia, but does not look at 1.5 million Serbs in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Europe has recognized Bosnia and Hercegovina at the request of its president, who only represents 43% of the population.

Europe should know that dealings with Bosnia and Hercegovina, that part of Bosnia and Hercegovina is only a small part and what happened in Yugoslavia happens here.

The Serbs very probably accepted the cohabitation of three communities if it had not been for the declaration. The Islamic declaration made on the formation of an Islamic state in 1986 and which was incorporated into the political programme.

And the demographers have made projections that in less than 22 years the Muslims will be a majority of over 50%. And the Serbs, who are the oldest people, have no wish to find themselves in the situation of a minority."

COMMENT: Although the Muslims already had a majority in the
elections.

Mr. Kovacic: "We have a problem with the exchange of prisoners. We appeal to you that in talks with Mr. Izetbegović you raise problems of exchange because the Muslim side will not accept exchange of prisoners."

Dr. Stakić: "When we proposed the exchange of prisoners of war we were told that these people were not Muslims and to get Serbs back they ask flour and guns, following the law of Jihad."

COMMENT: At this point we were shown what was claimed to be Muslim currency. We were unable to take a photocopy because there was no electricity, however I asked for one.

The point was made that prisoners of war exchanges were important, and they were asked if people who were exchanged would be allowed back to their original villages.

Mr. ? Member of the Regional Government: "We have released a certain number of prisoners from the camp who were from here and who still are around but in proposing an exchange we take a risk because we know as soon as they go back they will be mobilized and fight against us. We have already had experience of this."

Dr. Stakić: "Kozarac is still not a safe place because the extremists still come back and shoot and yesterday we had two casualties and they were killed and set on fire. These groups have withdrawn to the Kozara Mountain and they come into town and do things and although we have soldiers and patrols they cannot solve it. Experts in this sort of thing have come and they say it could last 6 to 12 months. Hitler had 10,000 troops and in four years he did not get rid of the fighters there. When we insist on not calling it [Trnopolje] a camp it is because the Serbs from here know very well what a concentration camp is, particularly on the other side."

Mr. ? Member of the Regional Government: "Insisting on the idea of an exchange of prisoners of war because quite a few of them when released try to go to other countries. There would be less people leaving Bosnia and Hercegovina if there was an orderly exchange of prisoners of war."

General impressions: The version of the events that led to the opening of Trnopolje that we were given by the Mayor was in stark contrast to that given by the people we spoke to in the camp.

Conclusions: The authorities insist that they are acting in the best interest of all the people in their area, and that they have no desire to get rid of the Muslim population, however this just does not match what they are actually doing. Against this background it is very hard to draw conclusions based on what is said. The conclusions to be drawn from what we have seen is that the Muslim population is not wanted, and is being systematically kicked out by whatever method is available.

507. According to an interview of Simo Drlica (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor):

Vujakovic: "What conditions should be met and what would have to
happen for the Opština police to do its job as it should be?"

**Drljača:** "What would have to be done in order that the SJB [the Public Security Service, see Chapter V.A. supra] should work as it should? As long as there is a war, one should know who is a soldier and who is not. The common phrase that we are all soldiers is very dangerous, and it happens that a uniform is worn by sick people, criminals and others, and the same goes for the police. Besides the SJB also other state institutions have to function: the Inspection, the Prosecutor's office and the Primary court. It is very difficult to explain to the citizens that the majority of murderers in Prijedor have been taken and examined, but that they now defend themselves in liberty."

**Vujakovic:** "At one occasion you stated to Radio Prijedor that you should be replaced because due to peace in the house you had not told all that you know. What is it that you have not told?"

**Drljača:** "I know that many Serbs had their Muslim or Croatian [personal enemy] and that many succeed, through different channels, to get notorious Ustašas out from Omarska, later to boast of having killed them. And now these people send messages from abroad. I know that many have, legally or illegally, transferred their firms to Germany, and now they beat their breasts claiming to be great Serbs. I know that no war in history has passed without robbery (also this one), that the myth about the Serbs has been destroyed. I know that some of my policemen transported for money Muslims and Croats to the border, and the only thing I did was to kick them out of the police. I know that we did not succeed efficiently to prevent robbery of property (as was the case in every town in Republika Srpska), because this is common practice. When the war is over, if the authorities demand it, we will take it back. I know that we need not take it now, for if we take it and give it back, these other people will just disperse it and take it away.

I know that a bloody war is right in front of us and that is why I still only know this."

**Vujakovic:** "Will you now, as a vice minister and with your good knowledge of local affairs, 'open your cards' and go to the end in revealing the illegal things that you have evidence about?"

**Drljača:** "The moment we have built a society with civil rights, we will reveal much (at present) unknown things. It will be enough for our state to proclaim all kinds of war profiteering illegal, and that the state instruments (police, prosecutor, court) will be well paid for their job."

508. During the two months of the Serbian military campaign - from late May to late July 1992 - all the main clusters of non-Serbian habitations were visited (see Chapter VII. supra). Targeted in the military operation were the non-Serbs as such - their persons and their bonds to the district. The military crusade was the single most dramatic component of the "ethnic cleansing" process after the Serbs took power. But, the "ethnic cleansing" was not finished with the major military operations. On the contrary, there were also other modi operandi aimed at achieving the "ethnic cleansing" - these were methods applied both in tandem with and after the military operations, involving in part new Serbian cohorts. To understand the rigour of the new Serbian order, as perceived by the non-Serbs, it is necessary to
recognize the interrelation between the different means of the "ethnic cleansing" and the interaction between the Serbs involved on the different levels and in the different operations.

A. Evictions

509. Given the way the Serbs focused on weapons prior to taking power and immediately after that, many non-Serbs believed that after their homes and habitations had been ransacked for arms the situation would be normalized. Thenceforth, they would be permitted to move around freely again, and their homes would be respected, they thought. Little did they foresee the Pandora’s box of disasters which the "ethnic cleansing" would actually become.

510. To remove the non-Serbs from the district, the Serbs targeted both the non-Serbs themselves and all that made them feel at home in the area. The general social accord that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family and home was no longer applied by Serbs via-à-vis non-Serbs.

511. Homes of non-Serbs were searched, pillaged and/or more or less destroyed. It seemed as if the non-Serbs could be evicted at the behest of almost any Serb. Initially, the perpetrators were military or paramilitary personnel and/or police or people seen to cooperate directly with them. Later, attacks on non-Serbs seemed to become a free-for-all - for the common purpose of "ethnic cleansing".

512. The evictions had several implications. The practical consequences were immediate as the evicted persons thereby became homeless. For a majority, this meant that they had to seek shelter with people they knew as there were not many other alternatives. Unless the evicted were deported at the same time, they could not just leave the district for somewhere else later. Sooner or later, most of the evicted people were probably simultaneously deported. In the meantime, many of them found temporary shelter with relatives or friends.

513. To be evicted did not have only practical implications related to basic material needs, it also had other tangible and emotional consequences. For most people who find certain aspects of the society at large difficult to relate to, street violence being one example, their homes are where these persons may retreat. When both one's person and home is targeted, the threat to person may be perceived as ubiquitous and even more so when one is also prevented from leaving the area temporarily or even permanently on one's own initiative.

514. Evictions, sometimes repeated evictions for the same people, became a harsh and influential messenger between the Serbs and the non-Serbs conveying the central idea that the non-Serbs were no longer to consider themselves at home in the district. For many people, the physical existence of a home per se, next to family relations and social networks, ties them strongly to the geographical location of the home.

515. For many, the actual eviction did not merely result in them having to seek alternative housing, but they were actually at the same time evicted from their immediate community, such was the case when the Kozarac area, the non-Serbian villages on the left bank of the Sana River, and entire suburbs of Prijedor town were purged. These evicted people were simultaneously exiled from their social networks and social settings as such, even their outer cultural frame of reference was disrupted.
B. Persecution of individuals

516. Already prior to the military attacks on the different non-Serbian habitations, prominent members of the non-Serbian groups were seized and "disappeared" into detention. Soon the existence of the newly opened concentration camps, Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm, became common knowledge, but most people still knew little more about the camps. Also during the military attacks, specific individuals of high social rank or otherwise regarded as leaders were singled out for execution or, at least at first, incarceration in the concentration camps. Other non-Serbs in high positions were arrested later, in their homes or wherever they were caught sight of, to have the same destination not to say destiny as the other non-Serbian leaders.

517. A renowned Muslim recounts:

"In early June 1992, he was walking on a street in Prijedor town as a private car stopped and three or four military men jumped out and took him with them in the car to the military barracks near the airport. There he was left in the car for about ten minutes before he was taken to Keraterm. In Keraterm - or actually in an office just across the street from the camp, an office used in relation to road repairs - he was kept an eye on by a guard as he was waiting. A Muslim colleague of his was also brought in. A Serbian inspector together with a judge, and another man questioned them. [The three Serbs are identified, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.] The Serbs then let the Muslims go without having mistreated them.

In the building where he lived there were 74 flats in addition to his, the residents were from all the three different ethnic groups. At this time all Serbian males were in uniform and carrying weapons. A watch routine was arranged so that the residents had to take turn to sit in front of the building and note down who was coming and who was going.

On 24 June 1992, he was on duty in front of the building, a Mercedes with his neighbour [an identified Serb political leader whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] stopped in front of him, and he was taken to the police station in Cele. There he was detained with seven other men [whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons] - one of the seven, a cafe owner from Prijedor town, was later killed in Logor Omarska. At 22.40 hours that same evening they were beaten with batons, and the people maltreating them were swearing at them calling them Ustaša devils. Thence they were transported to Logor Omarska, stopping several times on the way."

518. As long as Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm were still open, one or more buses of new captives arrived to these camps almost daily, also on days when there were no major military operations.

519. Family members of the "disappeared" or arrested leaders were vulnerable without their heads of family around, and as the "stigma" given to the head of the family by the Serbs also reflected on the rest of the family. Moreover, many were desperately unwilling to leave the district whatever other difficulties they faced, as they were afraid to give up whatever chance which could possibly arise to safeguard the well-being or at least the life of the head of the family.
520. Later, when Logor Omarska and Logor Keraterm had been closed, some former detainees, who eventually were released, were searched by, inter alia, the intervention unit of an identified commander, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, and killed (see Chapter XII.A. infra).

C. The non-Serbs as de facto outlaws

521. The core of the "ethnic cleansing" policy was a general climate in which all non-Serbs as such, not merely individuals in their personal capacity, were targeted. Everyone who was not a Serb was as such ostracized, and could at any time be subjected to persecution. Never knowing when severe difficulties would arise and their character was in itself an ordeal for many non-Serbs.

522. After the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, the non-Serbs lost their general legal protection. The existing court system with judges and lawyers stopped functioning. Tentatively the court system was rebuilt with Serbs, but obviously only with people who were prepared to compromise, to say the least, and tolerate a reign of no justice for more than half of the population of Opština Prijedor - the non-Serbs. The entire police structure was immediately replaced by a pre-organized fully Serbian police organization. Non-Serbs could be harassed or subjected to just any kind of persecution for the sole reason that they were not Serbs. The situation was aggravated already when the first disappearances and arrests of leading non-Serbs started, and became extreme when the main Serbian military operations commenced.

523. As prominent non-Serbian citizens were targeted first and the majority of them were men, the lawlessness for those left at liberty, more or less temporarily, plagued the more unprotected segments of the non-Serbian society in particular: the young, the old, and not the least women of all ages. There was no longer any respect for non-Serbian property rights, and worse, there was not even any respect for the personal integrity and dignity of the non-Serbs, not even for their lives. Not only military or police, but other civil servants and any private individual or group of such - be it neighbours or former competitors of any kind - could do as they pleased knowing that they would de facto have impunity. For thefts, harassment, threats, sexual and other abuses, even killings, there was no prospect of any punishment for the perpetrators. Rapes under these circumstances were probably as frequent as the nights, but happened also often in broad daylight. Bodily and mental harm to the immediate victims and their next of kin became elements of the "ethnic cleansing" policy. The more or less overt message was always the same: There was to be no decent living and no room at all for non-Serbs in the district.

524. On occasion, the persecution even took the shape of small-scale military attacks on non-Serbian homes and massacres of many, if not all, their inhabitants.

D. A climate conducive to the departure of non-Serbs

525. After the major Serbian military operations in late May and early June 1992, non-Serbs started to depart or rather flee Opština Prijedor on "their own initiative". For some it was the consequence of having had to seek temporary shelter elsewhere as their habitations and homes were attacked. Other groups had been targets of other kinds of persecutions. Some only left after they (or one or more family members) were released from a concentration camp. As the mene tekel was crystal clear, some left as a preventive measure.

526. Those leaving on "their own initiative" normally departed by road,
buying tickets on Serbian-provided buses and trucks out. This transport was frequently not any safer than the transport for those deported by road (see Chapter X.C. infra). Often there was simply no distinction made between non-Serbs leaving Opština Prijedor of their own volition and the deportees. One member of the Krizni Stab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, who was engaged in the local Red Cross (his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), allegedly had people pay DEM 50 per person to be transported in Red Cross vehicles towards Travnik.

527. The Serbian leaders even organized an Office for Population Resettlement and Property Exchange where people who had not yet been deported and who "wanted" to leave were to register their property as available for a Serbian family, before they joined a convoy out. The non-Serbs wanting to leave also had to sign forms entitled "requests of voluntary emigration for economic reasons". According to an interview of Simo Drljača, there were more than 20,000 visas, guarantees and requests for voluntary emigration for economic reasons signed (see Chapter X.D. infra). 36

528. "Exit-visas" for non-Serbs were a stock-in-trade at the time. Relatives of prisoners who had been incarcerated in Logor Keraterm or Logor Omarska sometimes tried to approach the police station in Prijedor town. Instead of gaining information concerning the whereabouts of their family members, they were in some cases told that it could possibly be an alternative to opt for buying an "exit-visa" for the family at large.

529. People who got, or rather paid to get, their "exit-visas" had simultaneously their names deleted from the census. Thenceforth, they were literally and practically non-existent as citizens. For more details about the situation for the non-Serbs who obtained "exit visas", see Chapter X.D. infra.

X. DEPORTATIONS

530. A key to understanding the nature of the conflict in Opština Prijedor is to recognize that the non-Serbian population was not fleeing from a war in the district. Their departure was not a side effect of an armed conflict. Conversely, their removal was exactly what the Serbs used military might to achieve. The aim of the entire operation was the "ethnic cleansing" of Opština Prijedor, i.e. to remove the non-Serbs so that the population which would continue to live on in the district would be almost exclusively Serbian. One consequence of this is that the classification "deportees" is more correct than "refugees" for the vast number of non-Serbs who de facto left Opština Prijedor. "Deportees" here meaning people with a particularly distinct need for protection in addition to what is characteristic for refugees at large.

531. The events in Opština Prijedor are unfortunately no aberration in this respect. The "ethnic cleansing" is the core of the Serbian military operations in BiH. It may even be argued, as some observers do, that the events in Sarajevo - where there is a more traditional theatre of war with all its horrors - are staged, in part at least, to take away international attention from the eradication of entire ethnic groups in areas where there has not even been any real war, only tremendous abuse of military power - such as in Opština Prijedor. Similarly, to some extent, the destruction of cultural heritage in the Croatian city of Dubrovnik diverted international attention. With an aura of history and fame both Sarajevo and Dubrovnik kindle media attention easily. At the same time, both cities were flourishing multi-cultural centres, and as such a thorn in the flesh of those aspiring after mono-ethnic power bases.
A. From Logor Trnopolje and other detention areas

532. Most of the deportations from Opština Prijedor were staged from Logor Trnopolje, from which they started the last week of May 1992 – the very first period when non-Serbian children, women, and elderly men were rounded up in the district. Later, more improvised detention facilities, such as the stadium in the suburb Tukovi in Prijedor town, also became staging areas for deportations. Some non-Serbs were even loaded on buses and trucks for deportation straight from their home areas in the wake of the military assaults on these areas (see Chapters VII.B., VII.C. and VII.D. supra).

B. Deportations by rail

533. Large groups of deportees were sent off on trains to Muslim and Croatian held areas in central BiH. The destination for the trains was primarily Zenica. At least one group of deportees was let off the train in Doboj, from where the deportees were ushered ahead on foot in the direction of Tuzla.

534. Frequently, the deportees were cramped into cattle wagons having at best only barred windows high up on the walls of the wagons. The passengers were not provided with water or food, and they had no access to toilets. They sometimes had to endure such constraints for periods from two to five days before reaching Zenica. There was little fresh air during the transports. It was mid-summer and generally very hot in the daytime. Even when trains stopped for some time, the deportees were deprived of any opportunity to leave the trains. Some babies, small children, elderly, and sick people did not survive the railway transport. Even to remove the dead bodies from the cattle wagons or to have them removed was not permitted.

535. When the Serbian police chief of Banja Luka, Stojan Zupljanin, was later asked by a visitor about the cattle car transports, he explained that there had merely been a certain number of citizens who had expressed a wish to move to central BiH. For these people, the Public Security Centre in Banja Luka (see Chapter V.B. supra) and the Public Security Service in Prijedor (see Chapter V.A. supra) arranged the mentioned "safe transportation for them". Not to allow the passengers food, water, access to toilets, etc., was "just a means of security". The trains (cattle wagons among them) were all that could be provided under conditions of war – the railway authorities had asked everywhere for better facilities. Stojan Zupljanin concluded by stating that none of the passengers had said that they would not go if they were not provided with passenger wagons – "Anything is better than to walk."

536. A Muslim political leader in Banja Luka apparently saw it differently. Calling on 9 July 1992, he said:

"Please try to come here. There is a lot of killing. They are shipping Muslim people through Banja Luka in cattle cars. Last night there were 25 train wagons for cattle crowded with women, old people and children. They were so frightened. You could see their hands through the openings. We were not allowed to come close. Can you imagine that? It's like Jews being sent to Auschwitz. In the name of humanity, please come."

C. Deportations by road

537. Large-scale deportations on buses and trucks took place from the very beginning. A few were taken the shorter and relatively safer way to Bosanska Gradiška on the Croatian border. The majority by far were deported on buses
and trucks down through the desolate and mountainous area of the Vlašić Mountain towards Travnik in central BiH. The last leg of this trip the deportees had to finish on foot. Their first destination on the road to Travnik was Turbe, the first larger populated area on the other side of the front line - outside Serbian control that is. From the place where the deportees were dumped from the trucks and buses, they had to walk almost 30 kilometres across the front line to reach Turbe. United Nations military personnel, having passed through the same area later, recount that especially the last part of the journey - in the area where the deportees had to start walking - the United Nations military men had an eerie feeling. Along the narrow road high up on the mountainside, personal papers, such as passports, were strewn on the roadside as were children's clothing and women's underwear. The United Nations military personnel interpreted this to mean that the deportees had been deprived of whatever little bundles of private belongings they still possessed.

538. Some deportees allegedly were singled out and killed on the roadside. Their dead bodies were thrown off the road and down along the mountainside. Moreover, Serbian soldiers were shooting in the air above the deportees as they started walking, and parts of the terrain, which the deportees had to walk through, were mined.

539. It is with reference to such deportations from northern BiH at large that the ICRC in its position paper of August 1992 regarding The Establishment of Protected Zones for Endangered Civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina wrote that:

"Forced and unprotected massive transfers of the population to central Bosnia-Herzegovina are totally unacceptable and cannot go on. Too many civilians, while forced to cross the front lines on foot, have already been killed either in the crossfire of combatants, as there is no cease-fire, or deliberately by snipers."

540. Sometimes the trucks used for deportations were closed army trucks having many of the disadvantages as the cattle cars on the railway. Some deportees reportedly did not have the physical strength to sustain life under such conditions. Also the latter reached their final destination on the roadside - normally in the area where the survivors had to start walking.

541. Deportations by buses and trucks were under the supervision of the intervention units as used by the Serbian military (see Chapter V.C. supra). The soldiers from the intervention units were reportedly no more benevolent or lenient towards the deportees than they were in carrying out other of their functions. Concerning the mass-killings on the Vlašić Mountain, see Chapter XII.D. infra.

542. Ordinary and paramilitary soldiers participated in arranging the deportations. Reportedly, it happened several times that a soldier grabbed a non-Serbian child and forced a pistol into the child's mouth or held a knife against its throat. Simultaneously a plastic bag was thrown into the truck with deportees and an amount of money was demanded lest the child be executed. No child is said to have been killed under such circumstances; but the menace was a means of terror and extortion. Reported are also a variety of other crimes allegedly committed by these soldiers.

D. Property rights and re-entry to Opština Prijedor

543. From the very inception of the Srpske Opštine Prijedor, looting of non-Serbian property was a problem. In a sense, it commenced already when the
Serbs started impounding weapons legally held by non-Serbs. This was not a confiscation, i.e. it was not authorized by the lawfully elected authorities and it did not augment the State coffers. Pillaging on a large scale followed in the wake of the military attacks on non-Serbian homes. As the people were forced to flee their homes and real estate, everything left behind was considered bounty by the attackers and other Serbs. As those forced to leave their homes rarely brought with them more than they could carry with them or rather on them, there were complete homes and hitherto productive and fully functioning communities to be plundered.

544. An article in Kozarski Vjesnik relates a statement made by Bogdan Delić (the new chief of the Serbian police in Prijedor) at a meeting in the district assembly:

"Delić said that 'approximately 50,000 residents of other nationalities had lived in this district, and their assets were unofficially estimated at several billions DEM. Some of the assets were destroyed during military operations, but at large they were preserved - although only for a short period of time. By various machinations, the whims of individual members of the local police, army and civilian authorities, and the governing political party - the largest part of the . . . "preserved assets" disappeared. . . . While carrying out their tasks at their stations and in the field, military and civilian police and citizens confiscated large quantities of goods, motor vehicles [e.g. the Kozarac area alone had some 4,700 private cars], cab units, trucks, agricultural vehicles, and various technical equipment and other devices, and handed them over to the units that the above-mentioned governmental bodies established for this particular purpose (Keraterm, TZS, Velepromet, and other storehouses). It may be stated with certainty that those storehouses have been emptied in a short time, and that the greater part of the resources have either been transferred to Serbia through private agents, or have been expropriated by private individuals.'"

545. Furthermore, a large-scale transfer of machinery, industrial equipment, cars, etc. soon started from Opština Prijedor as such. Reportedly, even most of the machinery of significant value from Rudnika Ljubija were removed for use in Serbia so that the mining company now is non-operational. Similarly, the main equipment from other factories and plants in the Opština was allegedly relocated out of the area. The consequence of this is that Prijedor has been left with hardly any on-going industrial production as the cornerstone production units of the local economy have been made non-operational. This means a lack of income-generating possibilities for the Opština as such. Although the main workforce in the depleted industries may have been non-Serbian, this draining of material resources will have longer term consequences also for the Serbian population. An article in Kozarski Vjesnik addresses how "war profiteers sacked Prijedor . . . on the model of the Sicilian mafia." The article cites a leader from the Serbian Democratic Union - the National Front, inter alia, saying that:

"tens of electric motors, assembly lines and other valuable objects have disappeared from the workshops of the Ljubija mine and other Prijedor enterprises. . . . We must ask ourselves how these enterprises are to continue their work once the situation settles down. 6,000 heads of cattle have been stolen and transferred to Srpska Mitrovica and Šid [both in Serbia proper]. . . . large quantities of sawn lumber from the Kozarac saw-
mill have been taken across the Republic's borders under mysterious circumstances, while the Kozara forest has been mercilessly destroyed. Somebody will have to answer for the disappearance of certain gang mills and other equipment from the local saw-mills."

546. The Serbs have unilaterally taken over all communal property in Opština Prijedor whether it still remains in the district or has been brought out of it to other areas. The communal property belonged, as always, to the community at large - a community in which the Serbs had made up approximately 42.5 per cent of the total population before the upheavals. Non-Serbs as well as Serbs had built up the communal property and contributed to it together.

547. The Serbian authorities have been issuing so-called "exit-visas". These visas were provided only after the adult non-Serbian person who "wanted" to leave Opština Prijedor, had filled in a form to the effect that the person renounced all personal property rights and transferred them to the Serbs. The person was never to return to the area. By signing this document, the person would become "stateless" (or rather with no rights to remain in this or other Serbian-controlled areas). After having signed, the person normally had 14 days to leave the area. Sometimes, there was no way of getting out of the area within that time limit, but the non-Serb was none the less bound by his or her pledges. Bribes were needed at every level and, moreover, an entry-visa to be admitted into Croatia. Even though extensions to stay were granted temporarily, individuals were hunted when their time expired. Whether "exit-visas" are still available is unclear (see Chapter XIII.G. infra).

548. In this context, it is noted that the "Agreement on the Release and Transfer of Prisoners" of 1 October 1992 contains, inter alia, the following provision:

"Article 11 Validity of documents
(1) Any document, including a document renouncing or transferring property rights, assets or claims, signed by a prisoner who is to be released or transferred has no legal validity and does not in any way affect that prisoner's rights or obligations.
(2) Paragraph (1) is also applicable to documents signed by civilians to be transferred to an area other than their area of former residence."

549. The Agreement was initiated by the ICRC and accepted among others by Mr. D. Kalinic, "Representative of Mr. Radovan Karadžić, President of the Serbian Democratic Party", Mr. M. Popadic, "Liaison Officer of the Serbian Democratic Party", and Mr. A. Kurjak, "Representative of the Party of Democratic Action".

550. In April 1993, Simo Driljača claimed that the Serbs had issued a total of more than 20,000 "exit-visas" for non-Serbs from Opština Prijedor. In the interview printed in Kozarski Vjesnik, Simo Driljača stated that:

"What enormous task was undertaken in the administrative-legal service [by the Public Security Service, the SJB, see Chapter V.A. supra] is seen from the fact that departure was orderly registered for more than 20,000 citizens of Muslim and Croatian nationality, due to emigration [or removal]. When German TV came in order to prove that we force Muslims and Croats to leave, we presented them with more than 20,000 visas, guarantees and requests for voluntary emigration for economic reasons."

551. The visa material may provide highly interesting information about the
people leaving - names, family relationships, sex, age, residence in Opština Prijedor, time of departure, etc. This information ought to be compared with the updated census of the population in the district or even the telephone directory as existing prior to the disruption. Together these sources may contribute an informative overview of the demographic changes in Opština Prijedor following the Serbian takeover in April 1992 - also concerning non-Serbs not registered for "emigration".

X. DESTRUCTION OF CULTURE

552. There is no real distinction in biological terms among the three main "ethnic" groups - the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims - in Opština Prijedor and in BiH at large. Differences among the groups are primarily related to culture and religion. This is probably one reason why the various expressions of culture - religion included - became an explicit target for the Serbian military campaign.

553. The cultural heritage and the expressions of a flourishing culture give people a strong sense of attachment also to a specific geographical area. By erasing the cultural frame, the Serbs further estranged the non-Serbs from the district.

A. Material destruction of cultural property

554. In Prijedor town, the following five mosques - and all objects and buildings belonging to them such as mausoleums and religious schools, etc. - were destroyed:

(a) the mosque in the centre of the town in Maršala Tita Street;
(b) the mosque in Stari Grad;
(c) the mosque in Muharema Suljanovića Street, the suburb of Zagrad;
(d) the mosque in the suburb of Donja Puharska; and
(e) the mosque in the suburb of Gornja Puharska.

555. It is said that in the Kozarac area all 16 mosques have been destroyed.

556. It is actually claimed that not a single mosque, or other Muslim religious building in the whole of Opština Prijedor has been spared and remains intact. Most religious constructions are not only damaged, but reduced to rubble. The sacral edifices were allegedly not desecrated, damaged and destroyed for any military purpose nor as a side-effect of the military operations as such. Conversely, most of the destruction was due to later separate operations of dynamiting. At least on one occasion, some non-Serbs and Serbs concerned alerted the local Serbian police that a mosque in Prijedor seemed to be in the process of being dynamited. The police reportedly refused to take any action and even stated that the police were not opposed to the destruction in progress.

557. Also, other buildings and habitations considered as typically Muslim have been demolished. The Old Town in Prijedor town, Stari Grad, was one such area with strong Muslim architectural influence. After the Serbian forces purged the area, Stari Grad was levelled almost completely, including a number of new houses which had been erected according to Muslim traditions (see Chapter VII.C. supra).

558. The Catholic churches and religious buildings in Opština Prijedor listed below have allegedly been destroyed and damaged as follows:
(a) the parish church in Prijedor (built in 1896) was destroyed on 29 August 1992;
(b) Kozarac church, affiliated with the Prijedor Parish, was heavily damaged in June 1992;
(c) the parish church in Ljubija was burnt down and heavily damaged in June 1992;
(d) the pastoral centre in Ljubija was damaged and looted in the period between July and August 1992;
(e) Briševno church, affiliated with the Stara Rijeka Parish, was burnt down in July 1992;
(f) the Sunday school hall and rectory in Briševno was burnt down in July 1992;
(g) the parish church in Šurkovac was destroyed in March 1993;
(h) the pastoral centre in Šurkovac was heavily damaged in the period between July and December 1992 and sustained further damage in the period between January and March 1993;
(i) Tomašica church, affiliated with the Sasina Parish, was destroyed in November 1992;
(j) Donja Ravska church, affiliated with the Ravska Parish, was destroyed in July 1992.

559. The sacral institutions were allegedly desecrated, destroyed and damaged for no military purpose and not in connection with any military activity as such.

560. A Serbian official in Banja Luka, who later was asked about the destruction of mosques and churches, responded that a number of such buildings had been misused as convenient places for battle. Being tall and of solid construction, mosques and churches were suitable for snipers to shoot from. "From that point on", these buildings "cease to have sacred importance", he added. Obviously, every building fitting a sniper has not been razed in Opština Prijedor. On the contrary, there is no report of any general communal or Serbian construction in the district which was levelled to prevent snipers from misusing it.

561. According to an article printed by the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia (i.e. Serbia proper), not a single Serbian sacred object has been destroyed or damaged in Opština Prijedor. The map, which is attached to the article, shows destruction and damage related to Eparchy seats, monasteries, religious service objects (cathedrals, parish churches and chapels) and parish seats, and other church objects.

562. Save for buildings not specific to the non-Serbian traditions - especially in Prijedor town - most of the non-Serbian homes and habitations have been severely damaged, if not completely destroyed. Large-scale devastation is the case in the Kozarac area (see Chapter VII.B. supra) and in the villages and hamlets on the left bank of the Sana River (see Chapter VII.D. supra). Heavily damaged are not only the variety of architectural expressions, but also the outer frame for the sociological and anthropological expressions of the pluralistic culture in the district.

563. The material destruction of non-Serbian cultural property has obviously had implications for both spiritual and other immaterial aspects of the same culture. This in addition to the fact that the main bearers of the traditions - the different non-Serbian groups and their leaders, religious leaders, and artists among them - having been exterminated or deported, leaves limited traces of the living non-Serbian cultures in Opština Prijedor. The non-
Serbian cultures, with religious and secular aspects, have furthermore been ostracized and targeted as such for dismantling also through the persecution of the remaining non-Serbs in the area (see Chapter IX.C. supra). The non-Serbs still living in the district have more than enough with securing their physical integrity (see Chapter XIII.G. infra) that they should not also provoke antagonism by trying to revive in public their non-Serbian cultural characteristics - despised as these are by the Serbs in power. By exiling non-Serbian cultural expressions to the private domain of a, in every sense, deprived and marginal population, the non-Serbian cultures as such are almost totally ruined in the district.

564. The destruction of the broad platform of the multi-ethnic culture in Opština Prijedor makes an impact not only on the non-Serbian aspects of this culture, but on the local cultural situation as such. Being Serbian in Opština Prijedor - in interaction with the non-Serbian majority population - was probably quite different from being Serbian in an all Serbian environment. It takes little imagination to foresee that the devastation of large parts of the local culture in combination with the violence utilized to accomplish the destruction, will create, in part, a cultural vacuum in an overall situation which is dominated by negative and destructive forces. This is undoubtedly a threat also to what was known to be the Serbian culture in Opština Prijedor with its "Kozara brotherhood".

565. Traditional names, which were used in the multi-ethnic society but which under the Serbian regime are considered inappropriate, have been or are to be altered to satisfy "the wish of the Serbian people". The pre-fix "Bosnian" is deleted.

566. In general, there is a strong Serbification not only aimed at excluding everything non-Serbian but also at eliminating anything specific for the Bosnian Serbs, to make the latter group homogeneous with the Serbs in Serbia. One thing is that now the Latin alphabet has been replaced by the Cyrillic script. Problems arise, however, when even, as now, the Bosnian Serbian written language (the Jekavian dialect) is ostracized, and replaced by the written Serbian language used in Serbia (the Ekavian dialect). The latter has made even the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade, the incarnation of Serbdom, protest what they consider to be cultural linguistic destruction. There are also other signs of harmonization which means replacing anything genuine or distinctively Bosnian with what is main-stream Serbian.

XII. FINALIZING THE MAIN PHASE OF THE CATASTROPHE

567. The main purpose of the Serbian manoeuvres in Opština Prijedor was "ethnic cleansing" of the non-Serbs to secure a homogeneous Serbian district. If the Serbs could achieve their objective of "ethnic cleansing", it already looked as if that would be rewarded by the international community. A pure or almost pure Serbian population appeared to be the precondition for Serbian territorial supremacy. What was new was that it seemed as if an internationally recognized State - here BiH - could be divided up along ethnic lines when at the same time very little, if any, attention was paid to the means used to make the population in the respective areas homogeneous. Peace proposals along such lines were soon to be made by peace negotiators appointed, inter alia, by the United Nations. How can one of the most basic concerns of the United Nations - to liberate mankind from the odious scourge of genocide (see the Preamble to the 1948 Genocide Convention and Part Three, Chapter II. infra) - be achieved, when it de facto may be remunerated by the United Nations?

568. The main phase of the "ethnic cleansing" in Opština Prijedor came close
to a natural completion as the principal non-Serbian habitations had been wiped out and most of the non-Serbs exterminated or deported. Left of importance were primarily the concentration camp inmates in Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. supra) and Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra). These were the leaders of the non-Serbian community. Although their numbers had been much depleted already, even their limited continued presence could possibly still promote a return to the area of non-Serbs and be conducive to claims to this end.

569. During the first year of conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the international community primarily reacted with a combination of inertia and appeasement - keeping its distance from what was considered merely a civil war and "a blood feud" grown "out of age-old animosities". Under these overall circumstances, the power change in Opština Prijedor was initially not taken much notice of internationally. Naturally, one may say. There was not even war in the district, and Opština Prijedor was not the only district in the former Yugoslavia producing deportees.

570. Little by little, however, the story of the non-Serbs, arriving especially in central BiH, reached the international community. At first, it was the aid agencies - organs of the United Nations among them - which received the testimonies, personal accounts of agony, and allegations of massive violations of international humanitarian law. At the same time, or probably even earlier, the different foreign intelligence entities operating in the region knew essentially what was happening. Finally, the charges reached the media. On 2 August 1992, the New York tabloid Newsday printed a report by journalist Roy Gutman headlined "The Death Camps of Bosnia". The reports were based on eyewitness accounts. One former detainee told of routine daily slaughter in Logor Omarska. The newspaper article made an immediate impact in the Western world. This was the time when the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadžić, told visitors that:

"The Serbian side energetically denies the existence of camps for civilians anywhere in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are some prisons for war prisoners established according to law and which the Serbian side always offered for exchange."

571. Within days, the first foreign television crew asked access to Logor Omarska, and by mid-September 1992 some 360 reporters had visited Serbian-controlled BiH. The media attention was de facto life-saving.

A. Closing of the concentration camps

572. Ahead of schedule, the Serbian leaders hastened to clean up and close down both Logor Omarska (see Chapter VIII.A. supra) and Logor Keraterm (see Chapter VIII.B. supra), as especially Logor Omarska became a focus of world attention. Also, Logor Trnopolje (see Chapter VIII.C. supra) improved image-wise in this washing-of-hands-operation. As writes journalist Ed Vulliamy:

"Four days after our visit to Trnopolje, the fence came down and the authorities had painted a sign above the entrance in English, for the benefit of the descending television circus, reading: 'Trnopolje Open Reception Centre'. But the armed guards and the beatings and the atrocious conditions continued."

573. The concentration camp first emptied was Logor Keraterm. From there, all the prisoners were ostensibly taken to Logor Omarska or Logor Trnopolje. The young and the old were almost all taken to Logor Trnopolje, the rest were
divided between Logor Omarska and Logor Trnopolje. Those immediately recognized as more important were taken to Logor Omarska.

574. As concerns Logor Omarska, on 6 August 1992, 1,360 camp inmates were transferred to Logor Manjača (in the Banja Luka area), 700 prisoners - the younger and the older ones - were transported to Logor Trnopolje, and 175 men were locked up in the garage in Logor Omarska. Prior to the transfer of male prisoners to Logor Trnopolje, 31 female prisoners were sent there from Logor Omarska. Five female prisoners remained detained in "their" rooms above the "canteen" in Logor Omarska. The same night - the night of 7 August 1992 - beds for the first time arrived at Logor Omarska.

575. On 5 August 1992, a last bus with captives from outside came to Logor Omarska, but these prisoners were moved that very same night. Allegedly, they would be used as farm labour in the area of Banja Luka. Later, it was stated that these people had been taken to a camp named Topola to which the ICRC had no access. These prisoners were former inhabitants of villages on the left bank of the Sana River, for example, from Rizvanovići. At least one of the men from this group may at present be kept in a detention centre - probably a mine - at Aleksinac in Serbia. It is also reported that a former detainee from Logor Keraterm died in the camp in Aleksinac.

576. On 22 August 1992, the male prisoners still remaining in Logor Omarska were taken to Logor Manjača. On 23 August 1992, two women (whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) were taken to Logor Trnopolje. The three remaining women (whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) have not been heard from since, and other female former detainees in Logor Omarska believe that the three are dead.

577. The two women transferred from Logor Omarska on 23 August 1992 were detained in Logor Trnopolje together with two women from Trnopolje village. After being registered by the ICRC, they were allowed to move more freely around in Logor Trnopolje. The other women, who had been relocated from Logor Omarska to Logor Trnopolje earlier, were never officially registered as concentration camp inmates by the ICRC.

578. As Logor Trnopolje was exposed to international attention and its appearance improved, and especially as evacuations out of the camp by international agencies started, there were non-Serbs finding life at liberty in Opština Prijedor so difficult, not to say dangerous, that they, on their own initiative, out of lack of better options, tried to move into Logor Trnopolje. Some even paid the guards to be accepted as inmates in the camp. It may, of course, be speculated that what they really wanted was third country resettlement. In most cases, that is likely to be theory only, given that at the time the non-Serbian inhabitants in Opština Prijedor as such and as a whole had well-founded fear of persecution. Still the Serbian regime in Logor Trnopolje included severe abuses of camp inmates. But hiding among the other inmates, detention in the concentration camp may have been perceived as a safer option than venturing out on one's own.

579. Quoting a woman who had come "voluntarily" to Logor Trnopolje from the village of Trnopolje, Ed Vuilliamy wrote:

"The conditions are terrible [in Logor Trnopolje], but it is a little safer. There was terrible shooting and bombing in the village, and we had no food. Here, we have no idea what status we have. We are refugees, but there are guards; and barbed wire. But it is safer than at home."
580. On the other hand, some of the former Omarska and Keraterm detainees were released from Logor Trnopolje, and returned to Prijedor town or sought shelter there as other non-Serbian habitations were virtually non-existent in the Opština at the time. These returnees were especially people who still had family members in the district, or who wanted to check if that was the case before they would consider leaving Opština Prijedor.

581. One identified and especially ill-reputed Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), belonged to a so-called intervention unit, the kind of units used to trace and capture potential camp inmates (see Chapter V.C. supra). After prisoners had been released from the concentration camps, he and his unit traced and killed some of the former Omarska inmates in Prijedor town. Eight others, who allegedly killed former concentration camp inmates and other non-Serbs, are also identified but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

B. Exchange of prisoners or extermination?

582. On 28 July 1992, an exchange of prisoners was to take place. It was to involve 41 male prisoners and two female prisoners from Logor Omarska - the women's names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. They were to be exchanged for other prisoners in Bihać. All were to wear uniforms and Green Berets (Muslim military outfits that is) and to be provided with weapons. It was a bus marked Bihać, and "Šešelj" was written on it. Sitting in the bus were men with huge beards and uniforms; they were wearing fur hats with Serbian emblems. The day after, as a female camp inmate was serving food, a Serbian military cursed the mothers of the prisoners and asked who could say that Kozarac had not been attacked by the "Green Berets", i.e. the Muslims! None of the prisoners who were taken out, ostensibly for exchange, have reportedly ever been seen again.

583. Vojislav Šešelj is the self-proclaimed leader of the Ćetniks, and as a politician he runs the Serbian Radical Party. He is occasionally referred to as the Red Duke. One hallmark of his Ćetniks is uncombed long hair and flowing black beard.

584. According to the information gathered, no one taken out of Logor Omarska or Logor Keraterm to be supposedly exchanged have ever been seen or heard from again.

585. According to journalist Ed Vulliamy, he was told about four different categories of prisoners in Logor Omarska when visiting it in August 1992 - at the time when the camp still had some inmates:

"Then there is a fourth category: 'Hostages?' answers Mrs. Balban [who translated for the Serbian regime in Logor Omarska], 'of course we have hostages, people for exchange. We have been offering them since the beginning of the war, but the other side does not want to trade.'" 45

586. On 4 August 1992, two buses arrived with prisoners from Logor Keraterm, as Keraterm was being closed. It was the most "dangerous" prisoners who were transferred to Logor Omarska. The next day, at about 11:30 p.m. all these prisoners and one prisoner from Logor Omarska (an ear nose and throat specialist from Prijedor, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, who was held in particularly high esteem by his fellow non-Serbs) were taken out to an unknown destination. A prisoner, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons, later told a
fellow prisoner that another man, a Serb, had approached him boasting that he had killed the medical doctor, and that all the other prisoners as well had been killed on 5 August 1992 at Lušći Palanka in the area of Sanski Most. Apparently, none of these prisoners have been heard from again.

587. The Serbs had their codes, it is claimed. When they said that prisoners were to be taken to Gradiška for exchange, they would allegedly be taken to nearby Gradina to be executed.

588. If in Opština Prijedor people ever were rounded up for the sole immediate purpose of exchanging them - to serve as "the currency of war" as the expression is in the vernacular - is unknown. Obviously, round-ups for detention and/or deportation also served the ultimate goal of having the non-Serbs leaving the area.

C. Transfer of prisoners to Logor Manjača

589. On 6 August 1992, as Logor Omarska was to close, all the prisoners were called forward. The name of one former employee of Radio Prijedor (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) was not on the list. After one hour it was, however, arranged that he too was included on the list. From this event, it was understood that someone had helped him by having had his name removed from the record of detainees earlier. This was how he had been spared from ever being called forward for interrogation in the concentration camp. In retrospect, camp inmates think that the Serbs intended, however, to kill him during the transport from Logor Omarska.

590. When convened, on 6 August 1992, the camp inmates thought that they were to be transferred to Trnopolje. But the prisoners understood that this was not the case as 100 persons were squeezed into each bus. What started was the transfer to Logor Manjača in the area of Banja Luka. Some prisoners had to lay down under the seats in the buses. The prisoners sitting on the seats were to sit three prisoners on each two seats. The employee of Radio Prijedor was ordered to sit in front on the left side behind the driver. All prisoners had to bend down their heads. The employee of Radio Prijedor was the previously mentioned (see Chapter XII.A. supra), identified and especially ill-reputed Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), who belonged to a so-called intervention unit.

591. On 6 August 1992, it was still very hot. The Serbs had turned on the heat in the buses and kept all windows shut. Shots were fired, and Serbs along the roadside were throwing bottles and stones at the buses. The distance between Logor Omarska and Logor Manjača is some 60-70 kilometres, the bus ride none the less lasted from about 1:00 p.m. until about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. Save for water given to one prisoner (an author whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) as a pretext for beating him, the prisoners were not given any water during the trip. The employee of Radio Prijedor fell asleep. As the bus had stopped, he woke up hearing something that ruptured and someone crying out in agony like a child. Later, he learned that the sounds probably had come from a fellow prisoner (the victim's name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) who after torture was killed as he was gored from below on a sword. At the same moment, the employee of Radio Prijedor was hit in his neck (maybe with the handle of a spade). A scream came from his stomach, and as a reaction, he bounced to his feet trembling uncontrollably. Then, he sat down again.

592. Afterwards, the especially ill-reputed Serb from the intervention unit boasted that there was a Serb who manufactured a special baton for his
comrades to use to handle non-Serbs.

593. After being seated for about 10 minutes, a Serbian military person came to call the employee of Radio Prijedor to leave the bus. Outside five identified prisoners had been mistreated and had had their throats slashed (the victims' names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons). As he came out, he found himself surrounded by some eight or nine Serbs beating him. He could no longer sense pain, but he knew that as soon as a prisoner was on his knees that prisoner's throat would be slashed. All of a sudden, he ran towards the bus, where he was stopped by a knife in its sheath pressed into his stomach. Possibly because of the scream he had made when he first was hit in his neck, the commander of Logor Manjača had come out to stop the ill-treatment.

594. Back in the bus, the employee of Radio Prijedor realized that it was the collar of his jacket which had protected his neck. He was soaking wet with blood. He had a wound in his forehead, one behind the left ear, and one on his chin/mouth; some teeth had been beaten out. Utterly fearful of what could happen if he ventured outside of the bus again, he urinated in his trousers.

595. The next day the prisoners were thrown out on a field and called forward by name. The first they called for was already dead. Then, an identified Serbian guard, a former policeman, now retired (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), stabbed one other prisoner in his stomach and cut the prisoner's head from the side of the neck.

D. Executions on the Vlašić Mountain

596. One member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor, who was engaged in the local Red Cross (his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), allegedly had people pay DEM 50 per person to be transported in Red Cross vehicles towards Travnik. Non-Serbs in four such buses were allegedly among those liquidated at the Vlašić Mountain.

597. Primo June 1992, the ICRC listed the misuse of the Red Cross emblem as one main obstacle to humanitarian activities in BiH. The misuse was, according to the ICRC, one of several factors causing insecurity for everyone - the local population included.

598. On 21 August 1992, a convoy of vehicles with people leaving Prijedor for Travnik stopped by Logor Trnopolje and prisoners from the camp could freely enter the buses. More prisoners wanted to join the convoy than there was space for in the buses. One elderly woman warned prisoners against going, saying that she had "heard horrible things". When the convoy reached the Vlašić Mountain the prisoners from Trnopolje were separated from the people from Prijedor. The prisoners - men only - were cramped into two buses, conceivably 100 men in each bus. The total number was probably no less than 250. Nearby a mountain top, perhaps called Koricanske Stijene (or Kocinske Stjen), the prisoners had to leave the buses next to a cliff above the Ukrina (or Ugljenika) River. The prisoners were lined up in two rows and ordered to kneel down and face the river. It was several hundred metres down to the river. The cliff as such was very steep, but there was also a slope next to it. There was a house on the other side of the valley. It is not far from Skender Vakuf - where some military or paramilitary Serbs had entered the buses.

599. A firing squad of some 15 Serbian soldiers started shooting the prisoners, of whom a limited few jumped off the mountain before being shot. One of the survivors hid himself laying some 50 or 60 metres down the slope,
under the body of one other man who was already dead. Serbian soldiers were also throwing grenades down the slope from above. Some soldiers even came down the slope to see to it that all the prisoners were dead. The next day, dead bodies were piled up and put on fire by Serbs in camouflage uniforms. One of the soldiers was wearing a badge with a white eagle on his cap.

600. The river, which is reportedly also known as Ugar, is a relatively small stream and there was a small mill there.

601. The leader of the soldiers was the previously mentioned (see Chapter XII.A. supra) identified and especially ill-reputed Serb (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) who belonged to a so-called intervention unit. Another soldier is also identified, but his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons. Other people have identified the latter as a member of the Serbian Red Cross working in Logor Trnopolje, who once had boasted that he had blown up a Muslim with a bomb.

602. Reports suggest that another group of prisoners from Logor Trnopolje may have been executed in a similar manner on the Vlašić Mountain on 24 August 1992. Whether this is the time when the prisoners were brought to the cliff in four buses and executed with the assistance also of five White Eagles (Beli Orlovi), is not clear. On the latter occasion, an estimated 250-300 men were killed.

603. It is suggested in the reports that it may have been a member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor who was the camp director in Logor Trnopolje (his name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons), who had organized the massacres. Mostly Muslims were executed on the Vlašić Mountain, but also Croats.

E. Evacuation by international agencies

604. On 1 October 1992, the two women transferred from Logor Omarska and detained in Logor Trnopolje were released and joined the first convoy to Karlovac (in Croatia).

605. In early October 1992, the ICRC evacuated some 1,500 concentration camp inmates - mainly men - from Logor Trnopolje. Later a limited number of non-Serbian detainees were exchanged for Serbs from other areas. The first group of prisoners evacuated from Logor Trnopolje left the camp on 1 October 1992. In November 1992, the ICRC was able to evacuate also the group of prisoners who had been moved to Logor Manjaša after Logor Keraterm and Logor Omarska had been closed down.

606. The evacuated came to Karlovac in Croatia, wherefrom they were resettled, inter alia, in Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

607. In August 1992, the spokesperson of the UNHCR in the organization's headquarters in Geneva, Silvana Foa, announced that "We will not be accomplices to the despicable policy of ethnic cleansing." Accepting the haunted people from BiH into Croatia for the UNHCR to find third country resettlement for them from there, could, of course, at first glance be construed as the UNHCR doing "the dirty job" on behalf of the Serbs as the Serbian ambition was precisely to get rid of the non-Serbs.

608. On second thought, the UNHCR changed its view. In my opinion, it is
morally and ethically indisputable that the international agencies having evacuated and resettled people in need cannot be criticized for that. Every human being has the inherent right to life. The sole responsibility for the "ethnic cleansing" remains with those who made it impossible for the people to remain in Opština Prijedor and those who let that happen. The agencies ameliorated acute suffering and ought not to be accused of having "cleansed" or drained the area of non-Serbs even if some non-Serbs, then not targeted themselves, took the opportunity to leave with the evacuations. The overall situation was ominous and remained so for all non-Serbs, that is the heart of the problem. If any castigation is due, it is for those individuals in international organizations who directly or indirectly concealed the truth and thereby facilitated the perpetuation of the crimes.

609. In late 1993, Vreme reportedly quoted Lyndall Sax, the Belgrade spokesperson of the UNHCR, as follows:

"From my point of view, it is better to help with the removals. The people should be enabled to live where they want to live. They should not be forced to stay if they do not feel themselves safe. In any case, it is better to keep people alive than do nothing in order to avoid accusations of ethnic cleansing."

XIII. THE SUBSEQUENT OVERALL SITUATION

610. After the main phase of the catastrophe was over, a sinister system to prompt an ever higher degree of ethnic homogeneity has continued to prevail. The means applied range from the use of brute force to sophisticated bureaucratic regulations.

611. On 17 February 1993, "A dramatic cry for help by the [Catholic] Bishop and priests of the Banja Luka diocese" was issued. Opština Prijedor is part of the Banja Luka diocese. After "subjugation over the past ten months to totally unlawful deprivation of our [the Catholics and other non Serbs'] human rights" the situation was considered dramatic and rapidly deteriorating. Massacres and torture being the most grievous crimes, the following was also complained of:

(a) the ongoing planned ethnic cleansing;
(b) the sacking of a vast number from their employment causing total existential damage for the affected people, especially for those living in the urban areas;
(c) the forceful mobilization of Catholics to fight against their own and other nationals;
(d) the exclusion of the Catholics from the political decision-making of their country including matters of their faith;
(e) the destruction of churches and church buildings, and other sacrilege acts;
(f) the inability for adult men to move freely; and
(g) the lack of health care and exclusion from hospital care.

612. Despite the Catholic church having been present in the region for seventeen centuries, some of the Catholic parishes had already at that time been totally emptied of their Catholic populace.

613. According to the interview of Simo Drljača (chief of the Serbian secret police in Prijedor and member of the Krizni Štab Srpske Opštine Prijedor), Drljača ascertained that:

"Due to the actions of war, the participation of the authorized
workers and their preventive-repressive activity had a much weaker intensity than during the years before. Thus were submitted 622 cases of criminal persecution. At check points were controlled 61,290 cars and 72,550 passengers. Due to suspicion that they originate from criminal acts, 19 motor vehicles were confiscated and a large number of things, and all this was orderly handed over to the Opština commission and stored in the firms Velepromet or Bosnamontaza. About the later fate of the confiscated things and cars, evidence may be given by the legal authorities of the Opština organs.

In the past period were registered 792 criminal acts: 776 from the general criminal code and 16 economic criminal acts. The cleared up criminal acts were committed by 261 person (220 adults and 31 under age), and 22 returnees were registered. Of all 792 registered criminal acts, 250 of them were totally cleared up, while 442 criminal acts remained uncleared (due to unknown identity of the perpetrators).

A typical activity of the SJB [the Public Security Service, see Chapter V.A. supral and its operative workers was fighting illegal trade with foreign currency. 25 cases of currency criminality were raised against 31 persons. Besides 28 smugglers of food taken from Agrokomerc - the food was handed over to the Opština and stored in Velepromet - [arrested], the following was confiscated and deposited at the Agriprom bank of Banja Luka, Prijedor branch: 1,032,150 dinars, DEM 10,580, ATS 9,720, ITL 2,000, CHF 32, BEF 200, USD 400, and in the coffers of the CSB Banja Luka 3,011,730 dinars RS [Republika Srpska, i.e. the Serbian Republic], 129,700 dinars RSK [Republika Srpske Krajine i.e. the Republic of Serbian Krajina], DEM 7,900, ATS 4,400, FRF 500, CHF 410, USD 290, and in the National Bank of Banja Luka large quantities of gold and jewellery.

On the territory of Prijedor, the SJB has registered 58 murders, the victims of which were 23 Serbs, 9 Croats and 20 Muslims, and in 6 cases the victims are unknown. 31 of these cases were totally cleared up by the SJB, and 18 cases were handed over to the prosecutor in Prijedor, 13 cases to the military authorities, 6 cases put ad acta, and 22 cases are still under investigation. Most of these criminal acts were committed while military actions were taking place in the areas where they were committed. Officials of the SJB intervened 1,097 times due to different causes (disturbance of public order).

In spite of the documented work done by the workers of the SJB Prijedor, it is normal that more could have been done and better. I am satisfied that I leave behind workers - professionals who know how to do their job, they should just be allowed to do it. Political conditions and war normally hinder professionals from doing their job properly. Also among the police there were profiteers, thieves and cowards, an indicative sign is that so far 130 have been fired."

614. On 31 October 1992, the BBC reported that representatives of the Serbian enclaves in BiH and Croatia had met and agreed to establish a common currency and common armed forces. This is not a very surprising move to be taken by units in the same federal State. There are also other signs of harmonization not to say preparations for future unification. The official rubber stamps used by the Serbs in BiH display the revitalized old Serbian coat of arms, and the flag is that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. From the point of view of the Bosnian Serbs, they constitute one of the units of the FRY, although this probably for reasons of convenience and international political
pressure has been downplayed by the latter. In general, there is strong pressure to establish a new, exclusively Serbian and conform social order in the district (see Chapter XI.B. supra).

A. Violence

615. As concerns violence befalling non-Serbs at the hands of Serbs, the overall picture is that incidents of torture, rape and summary executions still occur. Beatings, general harassment and intimidation have reportedly shown an exponential increase. The local Serbian leadership disclaim responsibility normally, and accuse "totally uncontrolled elements" of the misdeeds, or drunk soldiers on their way home from the war, or intoxicated locals.

616. The ensuing upsurge in crimes which follows a general breakdown in law and order does not qualify as persecution. A general breakdown in law and order may, however, be a premeditated instrument - a situation carefully orchestrated to hide the true nature of the evil. Thus, it should not be accepted at face value that the perpetrators are merely uncontrolled elements, especially not when these elements target almost exclusively non-Serbs who are otherwise discriminated against and persecuted. Unwillingness to chasten, prosecute, and punish "uncontrolled elements" may be another indication that these elements in reality are but a useful tool for the implementation of a policy of persecution.

617. As violence against non-Serbs was and is conducive to the overall ambition of the Serbian regime, and neither in the past have lead to or at the present leads to prosecution, it may be concluded that this kind of violence at best has been and remains tolerated. It may even have been kindled not to say carefully orchestrated.

B. Evictions

618. Still there may be a few Catholics (i.e. Croats) living in the Kozarac area, but no Muslims. Only one street in the town is intact. The Serbian administration for some time reportedly made futile efforts to have Serbs move into the area.

619. Along the main road Prijedor - Banja Luka, in the Kozarac area, for a distance of more than 10 kilometres, almost every house has been destroyed. Many houses were hit in the heavy artillery barrage against the area in May 1992. Later, each house was looted and apparently blown up from the inside - destroying especially the inside and the roof (see Chapter VII.B. supra). This means that the entire area now is more or less a ghost area, and the housing needs major repair before being re-inhabited on a permanent basis.

620. Most of the blown-up houses along the main road have been marked with an X with a circle around it painted in blue. Just after the Serbian military destruction of Kozarac, it was reported that the same sign was painted on the houses in Kozarac with the following colour code: yellow meaning "to be inhabited", blue indicating "to be rebuilt", and red signifying "to be destroyed".

621. The former non-Serbian habitations on the left bank of the Sana River (see Chapters VII.A. and VII.D. supra) reportedly remains mainly depopulated as well.

622. More recently, the main evictions took place in Prijedor town, where
non-Serbs were evicted to give room - or better housing - to Serbs. Some non-Serbs have been evicted several times; first from their villages to Prijedor town, thence from bigger flats to smaller flats, and finally to nothing. There is information that non-Serbs have been murdered in their own homes by Serbs interested primarily in taking over the housing facilities.

C. No legal protection

623. Numerous reports relate to violence and abuses committed by paramilitary or irregular military units or armed bandits. Local Serbian authorities time and again emphasize that these groups are not under their command or control. However, the said groups are only uncontrolled in that they do not attack Serbs without facing charges and trials. On several occasions, it has been reported that Serbian police, when called upon during and after incidents where the victims are non-Serbs, have done nothing to stop the perpetrators or to secure any evidence. The police have only told the victims that they must understand that there is no protection for non-Serbs in the Serbian-controlled community and that they had better leave it as soon as possible. Sometimes the perpetrators are said to be Serbian policemen. Whether premeditated or tacitly tolerated, the Serbian leaders de facto accept the activities of the groups as an instrument to further some overall Serbian ambitions. The same is reportedly the case when individual Serbs commit crimes against non-Serbs.

624. It is a basic principle that the law shall prohibit discrimination and guarantee all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, religion, political or other opinion. Never the less, not even the courts have reportedly seen it as their obligation to seek justice for the non-Serbs. There seems in other words to be no legal protection which can be obtained by the non-Serbs. This is so not only when they have been subjected to violent crimes, but also when non-Serbs are denied their basic rights as citizens, for example, when they are evicted, dismissed from their work, and/or enrolled for working obligation in disregard of the rules for such labour.

625. Other civil services are also being denied the non-Serbs. Of particular significance, is that they are denied hospital services and other medical services. In this respect, as well, the non-Serbs are without any recourse to a legal system which will help enforce their civil rights.

D. Forced labour

626. The non-Serbs remaining in Opština Prijedor are, in general, not permitted to return to their former occupations. Many - probably almost all able-bodied men - are, however, conscripted to work for the Serbian army to dig trenches on the front lines and to transport live ammunition, for example. Other non-Serbian conscripts work for the civilian Serbian authorities - engaged in cleaning and electrical repair in particular (the latter allegedly with no consideration taken of whether or not the person in case is actually trained to handle this kind of work). The latter is in disregard of Article 5 in the "Decision on Organization and Carrying out of Working Obligation for Defence Matters" which regulates that:

"Working obligation subjects must be assigned on duties and tasks in accordance with their psycho-physical abilities, professional qualifications and necessities of the work and production."

627. The regulations are possibly applied differently to Serbs and non-Serbs. There are no age limits in the regulations for people subjected to working
obligation. The working obligation seems to be an added burden on the non-Serbs as it is reportedly frequently combined with harassment and other kinds of abuse.

628. If a person deserts the forced labour, repercussions are likely to befall not only the individual himself, but also that person's relatives.

629. As a general rule, pensions have been terminated for non-Serbs, with exceptions such as for relatives of some of those doing forced labour.

D. Continued detention?

630. There are allegations of the following new prison camps in Opština Prijedor:
(a) Lisina: north north-east of the village of Lamovita, next to the television transmitter on the Kozara Mountain;
(b) Orlovci: in the village of Orlovci; and
(c) Gumara: a rubber plant in Prijedor. This camp is said to be for Serbs who refuse to wage war against the non-Serbs.

631. It is unknown when the camps have been or if they still are operational.

632. Whether non-Serbian prisoners continue to be incarcerated on the estate of the mine in Ljubija and in the Prijedor suburb of Puharska is also not known. Unconfirmed rumours will have it that some tunnels used to cultivate mushrooms, and also the tunnel between the football stadium and the dressing rooms, both in Ljubija, are used to imprison non-Serbs.

F. Reprisals

633. A Serb named Dušan, alias Dule, Tadić has been mentioned several times in this analysis (see Chapters III.E., VII.B. and VIII.A. supra). He is from Kozarac where he was the owner of cafe Nippon. He is about 40-years old, approximately 180 centimeters tall, with black hair, and trained in karate (holder of a black belt). When the Serbs took power on 30 April 1992, Dušan Tadić was reportedly president of the SDS at Kozarac. He was a reserve policeman. He was reportedly a highly active participant in the ensuing violence after the bombardment of the Kozarac area came to a halt (see Chapter VII.B. supra). He is said to have been engaged in mishandling, torturing and killing prisoners in Logor Omarska, where he allegedly, inter alia, forced one prisoner to bite off the testicles of other prisoners who died subsequently.

634. On 12 February 1994, Dušan Tadić was arrested in Germany and has subsequently been transferred to the ICTFY for trial. Immediately after the arrest of Dušan Tadić, a wave of violence against non-Serbs was reported from Opština Prijedor. It was speculated that this was in reprisal for the arrest, or rather for any efforts to follow up on the events in the district with criminal cases against alleged Serbian perpetrators.

635. Without capitulating to speculations and fear, it ought to be considered on the level of the United Nations and with reference to the upcoming work of the ICTFY if reprisals against non-Serbs still in the district could become a serious problem if only those in inferior positions are held responsible and the rest of the apparat is left in place. Unless the ICTFY attempts to bring superiors to justice for their alleged crimes, they may use the criminal action against underlings as just another reason for abusing non-Serbs - although all available information indicates that they need no pretexts for terror of any kind. For potential witnesses, such theoretical, more than
practical, linkage may, however, be a strong emotional constraint which ought not to be underestimated. Considering the amount of solid information and other sources of evidence already available about the events in Opština Prijedor, justice is unlikely to suffer if the international community first aims at prosecuting responsible key leaders (whether or not they will be made available to the court) and thence alleged perpetrators of less significance.

G. Total evacuation of the non-Serbs?

636. From the very beginning when the violence in Opština Prijedor commenced, Serbian people in the district have been stating that they want an ethnically clean Greater Serbia.

637. The Herald Tribune reported that:

"Two Muslim villages and a Gypsy one near Prijedor, with a collective population of nearly 1,000 people, have approached the UNHCR [the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] office in Banja Luka to request evacuation." 47

638. The last days of March 1994 became a time with a number of reported killings:

(a) On 25 March 1994: three identified non-Serbs from Prijedor went missing.
(b) On 27 March 1994: two identified non-Serbs from Prijedor were killed on working obligations for the Serbs.
(c) During the three days 29, 30 and 31 March 1994, 19 identified non-Serbs from Prijedor were killed. Most of the people killed were couples and other immediate family members.
(d) The next day, on 1 April 1994: also an identified non-Serb, a 25-year old young man, died from the injuries he sustained the previous day when his parents were killed.

The victims' names are not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons.

639. There were other suspected murders as well but the supposed places of murder could not be accessed at the time. Later, it is estimated by people in the district that a total of 47 non-Serbs may have been killed in Opština Prijedor during the last days of March 1994. Among them were reportedly a group who had to dig their own grave before they were shot and buried near the cattle marked at Urije in Prijedor town.

640. From 29 to 31 March 1994, 20 houses of non-Serbs in Prijedor were bombed and/or burned. One more house inhabited by non-Serbs in Prijedor faced a similar fate on 4 April 1994.

641. These crimes were reportedly committed, in part, by Serbian police officers in uniform. It was rumoured that the violence was mass revenge killings after six Serbian police officers from Prijedor had been killed in Bihać in the first week of February 1994 (apparently the policemen were trapped and attacked when the front line suddenly was withdrawn). The Bihać pocket is outside of the Serbian-controlled areas in north-western BiH and not at all connected to Opština Prijedor.

642. At the time, all telephone lines were cut for the minorities, who approached the ICRC and asked that all remaining minority members in Opština Prijedor be evacuated, asserting, "If we stay here, we will all be killed". 
643. The international community, considering the situation "simply disastrous", intervened with the local Serbian leaders. The Serbian police chief admitted that there were problems, but claimed that the events were part of a conspiracy by the non-Serbs to slander the Serbs. He ascertained that the Serbs would not stop non-Serbs from leaving the area. Another Serbian local leader concluded that the three nationalities (the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims) could no longer live together in peace and that there had to be territorial separation.

644. The President of the ICRC later, on 11 April 1994, in Belgrade held talks even with Slobodan Milošević the President of the FRY to have the abuses stopped. Intervention by the ICRC to have permission to evacuate all non-Serbs remaining in Opština Prijedor who want to leave has, for different reasons of lack of cooperation and safety, not yet yielded any practical results.

645. The ICRC related the following in its 1994 report on BiH:

"The plight of civilian minority groups in northern Bosnia is a source of grave concern to the ICRC, which has made repeated representations on the subject to the relevant authorities, especially after a deterioration of the situation in the town of Sipovo, south of Banja Luka, in early March. Despite the guarantees about the safety of minorities given to the ICRC by the highest authorities, about 20 civilians belonging to minority groups were killed in Prijedor on 29 and 30 March. This compelled the ICRC to consider evacuating all those who so wished, as a last resort to save their lives.

The ICRC has therefore requested to be allowed to transfer, in satisfactory conditions of security, all those wishing to be evacuated. After an initial favourable response from the Bosnian Serb authorities, conditions were imposed on the ICRC that rendered the evacuation unfeasible.

The ICRC is continuing its representation to the Bosnian Serb authorities, asking them to take urgent practical measures to guarantee the safety of Muslims and Croats in the region and to convince these minorities that they can remain safely in their homes. At the same time, the ICRC is pursuing its efforts to deploy delegations in Prijedor and facilitate the transfer of persons wishing to leave the town."

XIV. ENDNOTE

646. An identified Serbian violinist (whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality or prosecutorial reasons) had been awarded several international prizes for his music. He was reportedly killed in Prijedor by fellow Serbs after he, when they all were sitting in a coffee bar, had told them that he disapproved of their brutality towards non-Serbs.

647. Serbian inhabitants in Omarska village held a protest meeting against the existence of Logor Omarska.

648. From the village of Omarska, Serbian women approached Logor Omarska to give food to the camp inmates, and to demand their release. Serbian women even tried to stage a demonstration against Logor Omarska in Prijedor town in front of the town hall and the police centre (next to the town hall).

649. Serbs were among those alerting the Serbian police of imminent destruction of cultural property in Prijedor, although to no avail.
650. There is no question that there were many Serbian individuals in Opština Prijedor who had mercy for non-Serbs, protecting and assisting them as best they could - at great risk to their own security. The Serbian leaders did not tolerate any such "collaboration". Serbs found to have assisted any non-Serbs were severely punished, and some Serbs even paid with their lives for their mercy.

Part Three
THE LAW

651. The following discussion of the applicable law is also found in the Final Report of the Commission of Experts.49

I. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

A. The Statute of the ICTFY

652. Article 5 of the statute of the ICTFY affirms the competence of the ICTFY to prosecute persons committing "crimes against humanity", which are defined as specified acts "committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population", such as national, political, ethnic, racial or religious groups.

653. The definition of crimes against humanity in Article 5 of the Statute codifies accepted principles of international law applicable erga omnes. As ascertained by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, there are "elementary dictates of humanity" to be recognized under all circumstances. The United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 95 (I) of 11 December 1946 affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgement of the Tribunal.50

654. The Nuremberg application of "crimes against humanity" was a response to the shortcoming in international law that many crimes committed during World War II could not technically be regarded as war crimes stricto sensu on account of one or several elements, which were of a different nature. "Crimes against humanity" was, therefore, conceived to redress crimes of an equally serious character and on a vast scale, organized and systematic, and most ruthlessly carried out.

B. Armed conflict

655. Crimes against humanity apply to all contexts. They are not, therefore, confined to situations of international armed conflict, but also apply to all armed conflicts including internal ones - civil wars and insurrection - and whatever casus mixtus may arise in between internal and international armed conflict. Thus, it includes all armed conflict, whether they are of an international or non-international character. However, not every act committed by force of arms is an armed conflict; a genuine armed conflict has to be distinguished from a mere act of banditry or an unorganized and short-lived insurrection. Crimes against humanity are also no longer dependant on their linkage to crimes against peace or war crimes.

656. Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute of the ICTFY address "Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949" and "Violations of the laws and customs of war". Article 5, which concerns crimes against humanity, contains minimum provisions which must be respected, a fortiori, whether or not Articles 2 or 3
are applicable to a specific conflict.

C. Protected persons

657. Article 5 of the Statute of the ICTFY protects "any civilian population", which undoubtedly includes the whole of the population of the area afflicted by the armed conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion. Refugees are not different from other civilians, and as such are protected within the meaning of "civilian population". "Civilian population" is used in this context in contradistinction to combatants or members of armed forces.

658. It seems obvious that Article 5 applies first and foremost to civilians, meaning people who are not combatants. This, however, should not lead to any quick conclusions concerning people who at one particular point in time did bear arms. One practical example: in the former Yugoslavia, large-scale arbitrary killings were one of the hallmarks of attacks by a given group. Information about such arbitrary killings was then used by the same group to instill fear and demand total subjugation of the other group in other areas as well. Many of the most barbarous onslights on villages started with heavy artillery bombardments followed by the villages being stormed by infantry in tandem, while paramilitary groups sought the inhabitants in each and every house. A head of family who under such circumstances tries to protect his family gun-in-hand does not thereby lose his status as a civilian. Maybe the same is the case for the sole policeman or local defence guard doing the same, even if they joined hands to try to prevent the cataclysm. Information of the overall circumstances is relevant for the interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its purpose. Under such circumstances, the distinction between improvised self-defence and actual military defence may be subtle, but none the less important. This is no less so when the legitimate authorities in the area - as part and parcel of an overall plan of destruction - had previously been given an ultimatum to arm all the local defence guards.

659. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg stated the following concerning crimes against humanity and the importance of the overall circumstances:

"The defendant contends that stealing the personal property of Jews and other concentration camp inmates is not a crime against humanity. But under the circumstances which we have here related [emphasis added], this plea is and must be rejected. What was done was done pursuant to a government policy, and the thefts were part of a program of extermination and were one of its objectives. It would be a strange doctrine indeed, if, where part of the plan and one of the objectives of murder was to obtain the property of the victim, even to the extent of using the hair from his head and the gold of his mouth, he who knowingly took part in disposing of the loot must be exonerated and held not guilty as a participant in the murder plan. Without doubt all such acts are crimes against humanity and he who participates or plays a consenting part therein is guilty of a crime against humanity."\(^{51}\)

660. It is significant to note that Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Part II "Humane treatment", addresses "Fundamental guarantees" in article 4 and includes in the protected group "all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities".
D. Acts constituting crimes against humanity

661. The different acts constituting crimes against humanity are enumerated in article 5 of the statute of the ICTFY, such acts are: "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts". "Other inhumane acts" covers serious crimes of a nature similar to the other crimes cited. It is not equally obvious if the eiusdem generis principle of interpretation will rule out a wider interpretation. It is necessary to ascertain that the acts included in the concept of "crimes against humanity" correspond to what is already considered international customary law.

662. In the context of crimes against humanity, it is relevant to observe the same kind of prohibited acts listed in common article 3 (relevant to conflicts not of an international character) in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and in Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions, are mere codification of elementary dictates of humanity. Article 3 prohibits "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; taking of hostages; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; and the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituent court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples". Protocol II, Part II, article 4 bans "violence to the life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder, as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishment; taking of hostages; acts of terrorism; outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assaults; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms; pillage; and threats to commit any of the foregoing acts". The former Yugoslavia signed Protocol II on 11 June 1979 and ratified it that same day, without reservations, declarations or objections.

663. Crimes against humanity are not confined to situations where there exists an "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethничal, racial or religious group, as such", which are preconditions for genocide. Crimes against humanity are, however, very serious international violations "directed against" the protected persons, in contradistinction to a fate befalling them merely as a side-effect, for example, of a military operation dictated by military necessity.

E. Widespread and systematic

664. Isolated acts constituting offences, such as extra-judicial executions or other common crimes punishable under municipal law, do not qualify as crimes against humanity by themselves. The acts must be part of a policy of persecution or discrimination. In addition, the acts must be carried out in a systematic way or by means of mass action. Thus, the number of victims and perpetrators are characteristically high. Because the perpetrators have a common plan containing the elements described above, they need not resort to the same means or acts against their victims. It is the systematic process of victimization against the protected group which is essential. For example, a number of interviewees reported that some persons had been crucified, but it is not necessary that all victims of the protected group be crucified or that this particular "inhumane act" be recognized in and of itself to be part of crimes against humanity. It is the overall context of large-scale victimization carried out as part of a common plan or design which goes to the element of systematicity.
665. It should be noted that the ensuing upsurge in crimes that follows a general breakdown of law and order does not qualify as crimes against humanity. However, a general breakdown in law and order may be a premeditated instrument, a situation carefully orchestrated to hide the true nature of the intended harm. Thus, it should not be accepted at face value that the perpetrators are merely uncontrolled elements, especially not if these elements target almost exclusively groups also otherwise discriminated against and persecuted. Unwillingness to manage, prosecute and punish "uncontrolled elements" may be another indication that these elements are, in reality, but a useful tool for the implementation of a policy of crimes against humanity.

666. Crimes against humanity may also amount to extermination of national, ethnic, racial, religious or other groups, whether or not the intent which makes such crimes punishable as genocide can be proven. They may also, through "inhumane acts", amount to large-scale human degradation. The scale and nature of such crimes become of special significance and of concern to the international community because of the abhorrent character of the overall policy, the means employed to carry out the policy, and the number of victims it produces.

II. GENOCIDE

A. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

667. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that "genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world", and as the United Nations recognized that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity".\textsuperscript{52}

668. The Convention was manifestly adopted for humanitarian and civilizing purposes. Its objectives are to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and to affirm and emphasize the most elementary principles of humanity and morality. In view of the rights involved, the legal obligations to refrain from genocide are recognized as erga omnes.

669. When the Convention was drafted, it was already envisaged that it would apply not only to then existing forms of genocide, but also "to any method that might be evolved in the future with a view to destroying the physical existence of a group".\textsuperscript{53} As emphasized in the Preamble to the Convention, genocide has marred "all periods of history", and it is this very tragic recognition that gives the concept its historical evolutionary nature.

670. The Convention must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, in their context, and in the light of its object and purpose. Moreover, the text of the Convention should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every word. No word or provision may be disregarded or treated as superfluous, unless this is absolutely necessary to give effect to the terms read as a whole.\textsuperscript{54}

671. Genocide is a crime under international law regardless of "whether committed in time of peace or in time of war" (see article I). Thus, irrespective of the context in which it occurs (for example, peace time, internal strife, international armed conflict or whatever the general overall situation) genocide is a punishable international crime.

672. The acts specified in the Convention must be "committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such" (see article II).

B. The extent of destruction of a group

673. Destruction of a group "in whole or in part" does not mean that the group in its entirety must be exterminated. The words "in whole or in part" were inserted in the text to make it clear that it is not necessary to aim at killing all the members of the group.

674. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur, B. Whitaker:

"'In part' would seem to imply a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or else a significant section of a group such as its leadership. . . . considerations of both proportionate scale and of total numbers are relevant."55

675. If essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it could also amount to genocide. Such leadership includes political and administrative leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders and others - the totality per se may be a strong indication of genocide regardless of the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack on the leadership must be viewed in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the group. If a group has its leadership exterminated, and at the same time or in the wake of that, has a relatively large number of the members of the group killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example, deported on a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit consistent with its purpose. Similarly, the extermination of a group's law-enforcement and military personnel may be a significant section of a group in that it renders the group at large defenceless against other abuses of a similar or other nature, particularly if the leadership is being eliminated as well. Thus, the intent to destroy the fabric of a society through the extermination of its leadership, when accompanied by other acts of elimination of a segment of society, can also be deemed genocide.

C. The groups protected

676. "National, ethnical, racial or religious groups" are all protected. The different groups relevant to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia - the Serbs, the Croats, the Muslims, the Gypsies, and others - all have status as ethnic groups, and may, at least in part, be characterized by religion, ethnicity, and nationality. It is not a condition that the victim group be a minority, it might as well be a numerical majority.

677. If there are several or more than one victim groups, and each group as such is protected, it may be within the spirit and purpose of the Convention to consider all the victim groups as a larger entity. The case being, for example, that there is evidence that group A wants to destroy in whole or in part groups B, C and D, or rather everyone who does not belong to the "national, ethnical, racial or religious" group A. In a sense, group A has defined a pluralistic non-A group using national, ethnical, racial and religious criteria for the definition. It seems relevant to analyse the fate of the non-A group along similar lines as if the non-A group had been homogenous. This is important if, for example, group B and to a lesser degree
group C have provided the non-A group with all its leaders. Group D, on the other hand, has a more marginal role in the non-A group community because of its small numbers or other reasons. Genocide, "an odious scourge" which the Convention intends "to liberate mankind from" (see the Preamble to the Convention), would as a legal concept be a weak or even useless instrument if the overall circumstances of mixed groups were not covered. The core of this reasoning is that in one-against-everyone else-cases the question of a significant number or a significant section of the group must be answered with reference to all the target groups as a larger whole.

D. Intent

678. It is the element of intent to destroy a designated group in whole or in part, which makes crimes of mass murder and crimes against humanity qualify as genocide. To be genocide within the meaning of the Convention, the crimes against a number of individuals must be directed at their collectivity or at them in their collective character or capacity. This can be deduced from the words "as such" stated in article II of the Convention (see para. 638 supra). In most countries, penal codes do not regard motives, rather only intent, as the subjective or mental constituent element of a crime. Motive and intent may be closely linked, but motive is not mentioned in the Convention. The necessary element of intent may be inferred from sufficient facts. In certain cases, there will be evidence of actions or omissions of such a degree of criminal negligence or recklessness that the defendant may reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his or her conduct, which goes to the establishment of intent, but not necessarily motive.

E. Acts constituting the crime of genocide

679. The different acts constituting the crime of genocide are enumerated in article II of the Convention, such acts are: "killing members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group". Each of these categories of acts can constitute the crime of genocide, as could any combination of these acts.

F. Punishable acts

680. Article III of the Convention lists the punishable acts as being: "genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct or public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and complicity in genocide". This enumeration indicates how far the crime needs to have advanced before it becomes punishable. For example, an attempt will suffice. Secondly, it describes what kind of involvement in an actual genocide may result in penal responsibility under the Convention. Thus, criminal responsibility extends to those involved in incitement, conspiracy and attempt, as well as individuals actually executing the specific acts prohibited by the Convention. Political masterminds or propaganda people are no less responsible than the individuals who perform the actual carnage. There are, therefore, several legal bases for criminal responsibility for individuals who engage in or are part of the various aspects of genocide.
G. Culpability

681. It is explicitly stated in the Convention that people who have committed genocide shall be punished whether they are "constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals" (see article IV). Public officials include both civilian and military personnel and everyone who holds (or held) a public office - be it legislative, administrative or judicial. To meet the aims of the Convention, people in the said categories must be treated equally irrespective of their de jure or de facto positions as decision makers. As individuals, they are subject to prosecution like any other individual violator. They cannot hide behind any shield of immunity. The legal and moral responsibilities are the same and the need to prevent genocide no less clear because of the position of the violator.

H. The Statute of the ICTFY

682. The statute of the ICTFY, article 4, affirms the competence of the ICTFY to prosecute persons committing genocide. The definition of genocide in Article 4 of the Statute is identical to the provisions of the Genocide Convention.
Notes


2. Siniša Vujaković’s Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

3. Id.


9. Siniša Vujaković’s Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).


12. Siniša Vujaković’s Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

13. Id.


15. Siniša Vujaković’s Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

16. See "Dragan Janjetović - Janjac, leader of 'Manijakosi' was buried in Svodna on Sunday", Kozarski Vjesnik, 3 September 1993.


19. Siniša Vujaković’s Interview of Simo Drljača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

20. Interview of Colonel Milan Milivojević, Vreme (the original is written in the Serbian language).
Notes (continued)

21. Interview of a Serbian Association of War Veterans, *Vreme*, 6 December 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

22. Id.

23. *Vreme*, 15 November 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).


29. Siniša Vujaković's Interview of Simo Drljača, *Kozarski Vjesnik*, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).


32. Id. at 101-02.

33. Id. at 103.

34. Siniša Vujaković's Interview of Simo Drljača, *Kozarski Vjesnik*, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

35. Id.

36. Id.


38. *Kozarski Vjesnik*, 2 July 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

39. *Kozarski Vjesnik*, 16 July 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).

40. Id.

41. Siniša Vujaković's Interview of Simo Drljača, *Kozarski Vjesnik*, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).
Notes (continued)

42. "Serbian sacred objects in the territories of former Yugoslav republics which have been destroyed or damaged during the war 1991-93", Serbia, No. 23, 22 March 1993.


45. Id. at 103.

46. Siniša Vujaković's Interview of Simo Držača, Kozarski Vjesnik, 9 April 1993 (the original is written in the Serbian language).


51. U.S. von Weizsaecker (Ministries Case), 14 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 at 611 (1949) (The Green Series). See also International Military Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg, reported in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (1949).

52. General Assembly resolution 260 (III) of 9 December 1948, annex, second and third preambular paragraphs.

53. From a statement made by Mr. Morozov, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 19 April 1948 during the debate in the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide (E/AC.25/SR.12).


FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VI, PART I
STUDY OF THE BATTLE AND SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

Under the Direction of:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

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I. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A. Methodology

1. The Study of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo presents a daily chronology documenting events in the city from 5 April 1992 to 28 February 1994. The chronology is based on incidents reported in the database, source materials and media reports. It details, insofar as information is available: daily combat and shelling activity; specific identified targets hit; known damage to targets; sniping activity; and total casualties reported. The chronology also contains a narrative of daily military activities and narratives of local and international events relating to the battle and siege. The purpose of the chronology is to describe the events and consequences of the battle and siege of Sarajevo and to evaluate apparent patterns of violations of humanitarian law. Where facts, figures or accounts of events have differed in the reports reviewed, all the conflicting versions are recorded in the chronology.

2. To present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during the siege, a number of sources were utilized to prepare the chronology. Daily, weekly and monthly reports from UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) were incorporated where available, to record the number of shells fired into the city, as well as to develop a greater understanding of the events as witnessed by the military observers on the ground. UNPROFOR orders of battle were also reviewed and included to identify the command structure of the forces in and around the city.1 In many instances, information was obtained through specialized UNPROFOR and other UN reports, containing details on the numbers of relief flights into the city, the status of utilities and attempted utility repairs, specific crater analyses after serious shelling incidents, and other significant events. In addition to UNPROFOR reports, valuable information was gathered from local sources and incorporated into the chronology. In particular, cumulative statistical reports and reports on daily, weekly, and monthly casualties in the city were obtained from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Institute of Public Health Bulletins. Other valuable information was submitted by the BiH government and was incorporated into the chronology. This information included reports on property destruction in the city and photographs of destroyed structures submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission in Sarajevo. Photographs and videotapes obtained independently by the United Nations Commission of Experts were also utilized. These materials confirmed the widespread structural and property damage in the city.

3. To supplement the above information, an on-line international media search was conducted to locate relevant press accounts pertaining to the events in Sarajevo. This search resulted in nearly 12,000 pages of information which was put into source files and incorporated into the chronology. These media sources were cross-checked and verified against one another. Where accounts differed, both sides were recorded. Local media sources such as the Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency and Vreme, as well as Sarajevo Television and Radio were consulted. This media-based information played an especially important part in the chronology, particularly during the first few months of the siege when UNPROFOR and other sources of information had not yet begun their efforts to record relevant data in the city. Additional information was also gathered pertaining to relevant negotiations and political events. In particular, the staff of the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) prepared a separate chronology of the negotiations which was incorporated into the chronology on the battle and siege of Sarajevo. The chronology of the negotiations drew much of its information from reports of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, a Carnegie Endowment Special Publication prepared on the negotiations, 2 and press reports.
4. In conjunction with the preparation of the chronology, many hours of video footage were viewed. This film was gathered and archived by IHRLI, with the assistance of Linden Productions. The footage viewed ranged from local home video to western media reports providing details on the many events and venues featured in the chronology. To accurately identify and locate targets in the city and to verify reports in the chronology, a number of informal interviews were also held with individuals who had been in Sarajevo during the siege. This provided an excellent opportunity to hear detailed first-hand accounts of the siege. Since the individuals interviewed were native Sarajevans, the meetings also served to identify specific targets in the city, as well as many of the sites pictured in photos received.

5. Once a draft of the chronology was completed, a team of analysts was assembled to examine the information contained therein. One analyst, for example, was assigned the task of collecting all of the Information in the chronology pertaining to specific targets shelled in the city. Working with this information he prepared a map identifying the specific locations of shelled targets reported in the chronology. Other analysts also:

   (a) prepared a list of the most frequently hit targets in the city;  
   (b) prepared a table of frequency of shelling, by dividing the city into designated areas and determining the most frequently shelled areas;  
   (c) accumulated and identified photographs picturing targets shelled in the city.

6. Statistical analysts then examined the numerical data contained in the chronology. As part of their effort, statistical charts were prepared recording:

   (a) total daily shelling activity in the city;  
   (b) daily numbers of persons killed;  
   (c) daily numbers of persons wounded;  
   (d) combined reported shelling activity and casualties by day and by week.

In preparing this statistical information, only reports in the chronology with daily totals (e.g. total number of persons killed on a given day, or total number of shells fired) were included. This methodology was utilized to prevent incomplete data from being factored into the daily averages computed.

7. After an initial review of the statistics and the other data in the chronology, it became apparent that a possible connection existed between the increase and decrease in shelling activity and related political events such as negotiations, meetings, preparations for negotiations, the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local leaders, and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. The relevance of this connection is that it establishes a possible link between military and political activities or objectives. With this fact in mind, a graph was created to track significant local and international events contained in the chronology with the level of shelling in Sarajevo. The political events included in this graph are as follows:

   (a) international peace conferences involving the former Yugoslavia;  
   (b) statements by parties to the conflict; and
(c) statements made by other countries or international organizations relating to the former Yugoslavia. 15/

B. Brief description and history of the city

8. Sarajevo, the capital of BiH, is located in central BiH in the Miljacka River valley. It is a long and narrow city (occupying 2,049 square kilometers) surrounded by hills and mountains. 16/ The 1991 census indicates that before the siege the city and its surrounding areas had a population of 525,980. There are estimates that prior to the siege the population in the city proper was 435,000. The current estimates of the number of persons living in Sarajevo range between 300,000 and 380,000 residents.

9. The history of Sarajevo dates back to the Roman conquest of the area. Slavs later colonized the area and erected a castle in the southeast of the city. The city's name is derived from the Turkish word 'Seraglio' (palace in the fields). This name was given to the region by the Turks in the early 15th century after the capture of the castle that the Slavs had erected. The city has been a cultural, religious and commercial centre since the 15th century. In 1878 Sarajevo was assigned to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin. On 28 June 1914, a student, Gavrilo Princip, assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife on what now is the site of the Princip Bridge. The assassination set into motion the events leading to World War I.

10. Sarajevo contains an architectural blend of 3 major influences: the old Oriental heart of the city, the turn of the century Viennese city around it, and the contemporary high-rise apartment buildings and industrial facilities through its outskirts. The Old Town was built by the Turks and contains ancient structures and objects of cultural importance. Its centre, the medieval square known as Baščaršija (Market Square) serves as its marketplace. The city also has a very comprehensive modern tram and mass transit system. In addition to its many orthodox churches, Sarajevo has numerous mosques.

11. Sarajevo became the focus of world attention as host of the 1984 Olympic Games. Prior to the siege, it was a cosmopolitan city where persons of different religions lived and worked together. 17/ Inter-marriages between the ethnic groups were not uncommon. According to the 1991 census, the city's multi-ethnic population distribution prior to the siege was as follows: Muslims 49.3 per cent; Serbs 29.9 per cent; Croats 6.6 per cent; Yugoslavs 10.7 per cent. Jews and other groups made up the remaining 3.5 per cent of the population. Observers have noted that in the beginning of the siege many of Sarajevo's Serbs fled the city. According to reports, some joined the Bosnian Serb army. Others relocated to Serb-held areas in the outlying districts. There are estimates that 40,000 Serbs remain in government-held parts of the city. According to reports, the city's 400 year-old Jewish community numbered 14,000 before World War II and 1,400 before the current conflict. It has been reported that as a result of evacuations and casualties, only a few hundred Jews remain.

C. Summary of the battle and siege

12. The battle and siege of Sarajevo began on 5 April 1992, the eve of European Community recognition of BiH as an independent state. On that date, thousands of persons took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Parliament building and other buildings reportedly seized by Serb forces. Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the crowd. One protestor was confirmed dead. Since that date, the siege and relentless bombardment from the hills surrounding
Sarajevo has taken a tremendous physical toll on the city and its inhabitants.

13. Since the beginning of the siege it is estimated that nearly 10,000 persons have been killed or are missing in the city. This total includes over 1,500 children. An additional 56,000 persons have been wounded, including nearly 15,000 children. It has been estimated that over the course of the siege the city has hit been hit by an average of approximately 329 shell impacts per day, with a high of 3,777 shell impacts on 22 July 1993. This shellfire has caused extensive damage to the city's structures, including civilian and cultural property. The BiH Government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent were reported seriously damaged, 64 per cent partially damaged and 10 per cent slightly damaged. The Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education concluded that most of the buildings in the city had been damaged to a greater or lesser degree and that 35,000 dwellings had been destroyed through September 1993.

D. Civilian casualties

14. The chronology contains cumulative casualty reports submitted by the BiH Institute for Public Health. 18/ It also contains casualty reports from UNPROFOR and other sources. According to the BiH Institute reports, as of 15 November 1993, 9,539 persons had either been killed, died of malnutrition or from the cold, or were missing in the city. This total included 1,525 children. Additionally, 55,801 persons had been wounded, including 14,538 children. 19/

15. Based on the chronology's sources of information, a large number of Sarajevans have been killed and wounded with regularity throughout the siege.

(a) The chronology contains reports on 315 days where the total numbers of persons killed was documented. 20/ On those days a total of 2,474 persons were reported killed, totaling an average of approximately eight killed in the city per day.

(b) The chronology also contains reports on 306 days on which the total number of persons wounded was documented. 21/ On those days, a total of 13,472 persons were reported wounded, totaling an average of approximately 44 wounded per day.

It should be noted that actual daily casualty numbers in Sarajevo are probably higher than those reported in the chronology. This is because the varied centralized city casualty counts relied upon may not include many victims who are taken to district morgues and clinics.

16. The siege has not spared any sector of Sarajevo's population. UNICEF reported that of the estimated 65,000 to 80,000 children in the city: at least 40 per cent had been directly shot at by snipers; 51 per cent had seen someone killed; 39 per cent had seen one or more family members killed; 19 per cent had witnessed a massacre; 48 per cent had their home occupied by someone else; 73 per cent have had their home attacked or shelled; and 89 per cent had lived in underground shelters. It is probable that the psychological trauma suffered during the siege will bear heavily on the lives of these children in the years to come. 22/

17. As a result of the high number of casualties and the wartime conditions present, makeshift cemeteries appear throughout Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. Parks, athletic fields, and other open spaces have been utilized as graveyards. 23/ One such site is the sports complex built for the 1984 Winter
Olympics.

18. The siege has also had a profound effect on the psyche and future of the city's population. The BiH Government has reported a soaring suicide rate by Sarajevans, a near doubling of abortions and a 50 per cent drop in births since the siege began.

E. Structural and property damage and destruction

19. The structural and property damage in Sarajevo as a result of the siege includes specifically protected targets such as hospitals and medical complexes, medical facilities (including ambulances) and medical personnel, as well as cultural property. Furthermore, there have been attacks upon civilian property which are not justified by military necessity and are equally prohibited. The BiH government has estimated that shelling has destroyed over 10,000 apartments and damaged over 100,000 others. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent have been reported as seriously damaged, 64 per cent as partially damaged and 10 per cent as slightly damaged. In its report, the Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education commented on the structural damage in the city. The Committee stated:

"... [I]t is plain that Sarajevo has suffered badly at the hands of its attackers. Apart from the obvious human cost in the continued suffering and difficulties of day to day living, there has been serious damage to the urban fabric. The infrastructure (drainage, electricity, telephone services, etc.) is badly damaged. Most buildings are damaged significantly and probably all buildings are damaged to a greater or lesser degree (broken glass etc.). Some buildings have been completely destroyed including ancient monuments (such as the Library) and including a number of modern steel framed buildings (such as the Unis Building) which in some cases have simply collapsed. 35,000 dwellings are also assessed to have been destroyed during the past year."  

20. The chronology documents the widespread structural and property damage and destruction of the city. The following list is only illustrative and does not distinguish on a legal basis between specifically protected targets and others. The targets shelled and documented in the chronology include:

(a) hospitals and medical complexes: the Koševno Hospital; the Military Hospital (a.k.a. French Hospital); the Jezero Hospital; and the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation.

(b) media and communication centres: the Oslobodjenje buildings; the radio and television administration buildings; the main post office; the television tower; and the PTT building.

(c) civilian and industrial targets: the electric tram depot; the town hall; the Hotel Bristol; the tobacco factory; the public transportation network; university buildings; the market place/bazaar area (the Old Town/Bašćaršija); the Hotel Europa; the Lion, Jewish, and other cemeteries in and around the city; Olympic sites; the Bosna Hotel; the Islamic Theological School; the main library; the Gazi Husref Begova Mosque; the Olympic Museum; the Klas Šarko and Velepeka Building (flour mill, main bakery); the Holiday Inn Hotel; the National Museum; the candy factory; the People's Bank; the Veterinary College; Moriça Han; the Tvornica Armatura (factory); the Elektroprivreda building; and Skenderija.

(d) Government buildings: the Presidency building; the Parliament; and the Sarajevo Courthouse.
(e) military and United Nations centres: the airport; UNHCR facilities; the Lukavica Barracks; UNPROFOR headquarters; the Halilovici Barracks (a.k.a. UNPROFOR "Camp Beaver"); the Bistrik Camp (UNPROFOR); and the former Maršal Tito Barracks.

21. Shelled quarters of the city and suburban areas documented in the chronology include: Oteš; Azići; Stup; Ilidža; Butmir; Nedžarići; Dobrinja; Mojmilo; Novi Grad; Buča Potok; Hrasno; Grbavica; Novo Sarajevo; Baščaršija; Bistrik; Stari Grad; Igman, Trebevići and Žvč Mountains; Čengić Vila; Pofalići; Vasin Han; Rajlovac; Vraca; Marijin Dvor; Doglodi; Bjelave; Vratnik; Velešići; Dolac Malta; Štupsko Brdo; Katorac (upper); Katorac (lower); Kasindol Street; pero Kosorić Square; Darovalaca Krvi Street; Vase Miškina Street; Vojničko Polje; Alipašino Polje.

F. Structure and location of forces in and around the city 28/

1. The defensive forces

22. Since the beginning of the siege, the First Corps Sarajevo has served as the BiH defensive force in and around Sarajevo. Most assessments characterize the First Corps Sarajevo as superior to the besieging forces in infantry numbers, but clearly deficient in its firepower. It has been estimated that there are as many as 70,000 soldiers in the BiH forces committed to the defence of the city. More conservative estimates range in the area of 25,000 to 30,000. The First Corps Sarajevo headquarters is located in Sarajevo and was originally commanded by Mustafa Hajrulahović. The most recent commander was Vahid Karavelić. Observers have noted that a recent reorganization of the First Corps has lead to better command and control of the forces.

23. At the beginning of the siege, a score of men with criminal backgrounds formed groups to defend the city. Among these men were Musan Topalović (a.k.a. Čaço) and Ramiz Delalić (a.k.a. Čelo). Čaço, a 29 year-old former musician ultimately commanded the BiH army's 10th Mountain Brigade. Čelo commanded the Ninth Brigade. Both men reportedly controlled gangs operating on the Bosnian Serb siege line, bringing truckloads of contraband over the bridges across the Miljacka River separating Grbavica from the city centre. On 26 October 1993, the BiH government initiated a crackdown against these commanders, surrounding their headquarters in separate stand-offs. Čaço was killed during the course of his capture and Čelo was reported to have given himself up.

24. The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) and the First Corps forces fought together in defence of the city throughout much of the siege despite opposing one another in Mostar and in other parts of BiH. The HVO had an estimated 2,000 soldiers deployed in Sarajevo, in an area on the Miljacka River facing the Serbian-held districts of Kovači, Grbavica and Hrasno which had reportedly not seen as much heavy fighting as other fronts. In late September 1993 there were reports that Bosnian Serb forces held their fire along these sections of the front defended by the HVO and that the forces traded cigarettes and food across the Miljacka. On 10 November 1993, several groups of HVO troops were marched under BiH army guard and the HVO barracks were occupied by BiH army troops. The HVO commander, Slavko Zelić, was subsequently arrested. The BiH army thereafter announced that it was disbanding the HVO in Sarajevo and accused some of its members of "actively cooperating" with BSA forces around the city, jeopardizing its defences. The BiH army then invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the First Corps.
2. The besieging forces

25. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the Bosnian Serb force of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) which has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. It is the successor of the same unit of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which occupied the same position until May 1992. There are indications that early in the siege the JNA was involved in the fighting in Sarajevo. Bosnian officials frequently charged that JNA tanks joined Bosnian Serb forces in barrages, and that the JNA provided the Bosnian Serb forces with logistical support and protection. In late April 1992, the BiH government ordered the withdrawal of all JNA forces from its soil. The Belgrade government announced that it would withdraw from BiH, troops who were not residents of the Republic. Since most of the JNA troops in BiH were Serbs of Bosnian nationality, this withdrawal policy reportedly had little effect. Some 80,000 Yugoslav soldiers were thereafter transferred with their equipment to the Territorial Defence Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SRBiH).

26. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps headquarters are located in the hills overlooking the city at Lukavica. The Corps was originally commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipić and was most recently commanded by Major General Stanislav Galić. The command structure has for the most part remained the same throughout the siege. While the defensive forces seem to have numerical superiority in their infantry troops, the besieging forces have firepower superiority. Reports estimate that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps numbers some 13,000 troops which are formed into eight brigades directly surrounding the city. A possible explanation for the shifting of firing sites from the mountainous areas surrounding Sarajevo may be that artillery personnel move from one emplacement to the other. Another explanation for this phenomenon could be the pattern of delivery of munitions. There are, however, no apparent munitions shortages.

27. Although the BSA forces surrounding the city have superior firepower, it has been observed that it is unlikely that they could effectively take control of the city. This observation is based, in part, on the fact that the BiH forces have more fighters. In addition, controlling the city and its numerous buildings and streets could prove an overwhelming task for the BSA forces. The BSA forces have therefore concentrated their efforts on weakening the city through constant bombardment from the surrounding hills.

G. Location and nature of artillery of the besieging forces

28. Many reports in the chronology generally describe shelling as coming from gunners in the hills surrounding the city. Far fewer pinpoint specific areas from which the shelling has originated. Reports of the besieging artillery and other heavy-to-medium weapons employed in the attacks vary from 600 to 1,100 pieces, but no verified account is available. These estimates do not include a large number of tanks. Some of the weapons are in fixed emplacements such as bunkers in the wooded hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo and its suburbs. Because of the dense foliage, the emplacements are hard to detect from the air, particularly in the summer. Although the bunkers are difficult to see from the roads above or below the emplacements, it is possible to detect some of them. It is, however, very difficult to determine whether the bunkers contain artillery pieces, mortars or machine-guns, or have only snipers with small arms. From their hillside vantage points the besieging forces have a commanding view of the city. It is thus likely that they know which targets they are hitting with their artillery fire.
H. Nature and frequency of shelling by the besieging forces

29. The nature of the shelling observed in Sarajevo takes several forms: 1) specific targeting; 2) indiscriminate shelling; and 3) random shelling. With respect to specific targeting, a question arises as to whether or not a target is a protected target which makes the shelling a war crime. Indiscriminate shelling does not target a specific object, but by virtue of not discriminating or distinguishing between targets, it constitutes a war crime if within the area selected for shelling there are protected targets. Lastly, random shelling may include indiscriminate shelling as well as specific targeting, but the manner in which it is executed is not selective. Random shelling, can be methodical and systematic. If it includes protected targets it is a war crime.

30. Protected targets, whether objects or persons, are specifically identified in the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. They are also established in the customary law of armed conflict and in the 1907 Hague Convention on the Regulation of Armed Conflict. In addition, the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in Times of War also applies. Both the conventional and customary law of armed conflict provide for specific prohibitions but also for what may be termed as circumstances exonerating from war crimes responsibility (but only with respect to certain types of violations). These exonerating conditions are: proportionality in responding to enemy fire; military necessity; and reprisals. Since this study does not go into the question of individual criminal responsibility with respect to specific incidents, the analysis shall not cover the legal questions raised above. However, from a macro-analysis perspective, it is clear that, irrespective of whether a given instance establishes or not the individual responsibility of those who performed the act, the totality of the circumstances described in this report evidence command responsibility.

31. UNPROFOR and city officials have indicated that shelling of the city ranges from about 200 to 300 impacts on what they refer to as a quiet day to 800 to 1,000 shell impacts on an active day. The chronology confirms that the city has been relentlessly shelled over the course of the siege.

(a) On the 196 days in the chronology where a total shelling count was available, Sarajevo was hit by 64,490 shells, totaling an average of approximately 329 shell impacts on the city per day. The range of shelling activity on these days varied from a low of two shell impacts on 17 and 18 May 1993 and 24 August 1993, to a high of 3,777 shell impacts on 22 July 1993.

32. Observers have noted that UNPROFOR shelling reports in many cases record only a fraction of actual shelling activity. This is due in part to the logistical difficulties encountered by the UNPROFOR contingent during the siege. Therefore, it should be assumed that Sarajevo has been hit by a greater number of shells than that which has been recorded by observers.

1. Systematic shelling of specific targets by the besieging forces

33. The majority of shells counted on most days are usually directed towards BiH-controlled areas of the city suggesting a strategy to hit those areas. An examination of the range of destruction reveals a system of specific targeting as evidenced by the severe damage to almost all mosques, Catholic churches and major commercial buildings and facilities in the centre of the city.

34. The following targets have been documented in the chronology as being among the most frequently targeted sites in the city: the Sarajevo radio
and television stations; the Oslobodjenje Newspaper building which is still in operation; the public transportation system; the Holiday Inn Hotel (which is the base of many foreign journalists); the Presidency and Parliament buildings; the main city brewery; the flour mill; the main bakery; the Olympic complex; the Post Telegraph and Telephone building; the industrial area of Alipašin Most near the railway station and main television tower; the Jewish cemetery; the Lion cemetery; the city airport; the tobacco factory; the Dobrinja apartment complex; the central district; Baščaršija (the old quarter of mosques); the Stari Grad section; New Sarajevo; the main thoroughfare on Maršal Tito Street; and the shopping district at Vase Miškina.

35. The chronology confirms that certain areas of the city have been systematically shelled throughout the course of the siege. For example, the city centre has consistently been the most often targeted area, with shelling attacks reported in that particular area of the city on 240 days. Also heavily shelled were the airport area and southwestern suburbs (shelling attacks reported on 158 days) and the Old Town area (shelling attacks reported on 113 days).

36. Systematic targeting can be inferred from the shelling of hospitals and in particular the Sarajevo University Clinical Centre Koševo which has constantly been under shell and sniper fire. The Koševo complex has reportedly been shelled at least 264 times since the siege began, killing staff and patients alike. An examination of the sheer number of shells and the high percentage of direct hits on the complex indicates an intent by the besieging forces to hit this civilian target. Moreover, much of the shelling from the surrounding hillsides has taken place at midday, the time when the hospital is busiest with visitors. It is therefore obvious that the besieging forces have knowledge of the patterns of operation of this facility. Despite extensive damage, a shortage of electricity, water and necessary equipment, the Koševo Hospital is by necessity still in operation.

2. Patterns of random shelling by the besieging forces

37. A review of the incidents in the chronology also indicates a random process of shelling throughout the civilian areas of the city. The shelling which occurs at different times of the day without any particular pattern or target has a terror-inspiring effect on the civilian population. It is particularly telling that deaths, injuries and destruction have occurred in various parts of the city and in such presumably well-known civilian settings as schools, markets, streets, parks, football and athletic fields, cemeteries, hospitals, and even bread, water and relief lines in the city.

38. It is noteworthy that shell fire increases at night and often continues into the early morning hours. This may be attributable to the fact that many of those engaged in the shelling and sniping are working in the fields and at other jobs during the daytime hours. Observers have also noted that the shelling by the besiegers is generally lower during the week than on weekends. At times, night shellings are observed to follow a systematic directional pattern as if the same artillery pieces are simply changing their range. At other times, the shelling comes from different locations. A pattern of heavy shelling into the city has been observed to have occurred after reports of early morning small-arms fire. This suggests that the besieging forces have used heavy shelling of the city as a means to respond to efforts by the defending forces to break the siege.

39. Most of the besieging forces firing from the hills surrounding Sarajevo are drawn from people who once lived in the city or who still live in the surrounding areas. There could, therefore, be a connection between the
targeting of sites and the patterns of city life known to the besiegers. There have also been indications that "informants" within the city notify gunners in the hills of potential targets on certain days. For example, a child was killed in November 1992 after a mortar shell exploded as people were leaving a show in the city. Subsequent notifications of performances and exhibitions in the city have been more discreet in order to avoid the attention of the BSA artillery.

I. Sniping attacks by the besieging forces

40. Unlike artillery, mortar and tank shellings where accuracy may or may not be precise, and where the shelling may or may not be deliberate targeting, sniping is both deliberate and precise. It is a war crime when sniping is purposefully directed toward civilian targets. Sniping attacks by the forces in and around the city display an intent to hit civilian and non-combatant targets. These shootings appear to lack military purpose or justification. Skilled marksmen often kill their targets with a single shot to the head or heart, and it is clear that they have exercised the specific intent to hit obvious civilian targets with no other purpose than to cause death or serious bodily injury. In many cases snipers with a clear view from high rise buildings and the surrounding hillsides have targeted the most vulnerable of civilians, including: children (even infants); persons carrying heavy plastic containers filled with water; persons in queues; pedestrians at intersections; and rescuers attempting to come to the aid of sniping and shelling victims.

41. Snipers have been reported in positions throughout the city and have been known to travel in teams. In numerous incidents documented in the chronology, sniper fire has been directed towards ambulance drivers, fire fighters, relief workers and others attempting to secure those wounded in attacks. There have also been numerous sniping attacks on UN and UNPROFOR personnel and facilities near the airport, observation posts and barracks.

J. Link between shelling activity by the besieging forces and political events

42. Heavy shelling of the city has occurred on numerous occasions prior to and during the various peace conferences, suggesting a political objective or link to the attacks. There is an apparent correlation between the increase and decrease of shell fire in connection with political events such as: negotiations; meetings; the preparation for negotiations; the hardening or softening of public positions by international and local political leaders; and changes and potential changes of positions by certain governments. The relevance of this is that it establishes a link between military and political activities or objectives. This fact also has a bearing on the interpretation of the rules of armed conflict with respect to proportionality and military necessity as mentioned above. It is also relevant to the establishment of senior command responsibility as well as the responsibility of political leaders who may have been involved in the decision-making process related to the shelling activity.

43. The following are examples of reports appearing in the chronology which indicate a possible link between the shelling attacks in Sarajevo and political events:

(a) On 23 August 1992, mortar shells hit Sarajevo for the fourth day with both sides accusing each other of trying to seize the initiative ahead of the coming peace talks in London. Twenty-two persons were reported killed and 100 injured on this day.
(b) On 14 September 1992, the BiH Presidency announced that it would not go to the following Friday's peace talks in Geneva. The announcement, reported on Sarajevo Radio, was met by a sharp upsurge of mid-morning shelling which shattered a two-day lull in the city. At least 20 people were reported killed and wounded in the first two hours of the attacks which began at 10:00 a.m.

(c) On 17 September 1992, fierce fighting was reported in Sarajevo on the eve of new peace talks as BSA gunners reportedly shelled the city with heavy weapon-fire. An artillery duel took place in the downtown area as the BiH delegation left for renewed peace talks in Geneva. Shelling and street fighting in the city lasted until about midnight in what Sarajevo radio called Sarajevo's "worst day of hell." More than 400 shells were fired by 4:00 p.m., mostly on BiH positions. 49/

(d) On 29 October 1992, the day after the new constitutional proposals for BiH were released (the Vance-Owen Plan), Sarajevo was hit with what was described as the worst shelling in two weeks with dozens of shells hitting the Old Town area. Heavy shellfire and high numbers of casualties were reported in the days to follow, including 749 shells, 31 people reported killed and 118 wounded in the 24 hour period ending at 5:00 p.m. on 31 October 1992.

(e) On 11 January 1993, 1300 incoming shells hit the city on the day of the resumption of the Geneva Peace talks. On 27 January, 1,500 shells hit the city during the peace talks.

(f) On 17-22 March 1993, a high level of shelling activity was reported during the peace negotiations. On 17 March, the city was hit with 962 shells (mostly around the Presidency) as the peace conference resumed in New York. During peace negotiations on 18 March, BSA forces reportedly launched the heaviest barrage in months against the city. However, no shelling numbers were reported. Thereafter, BiH President Izetbegović temporarily pulled out of the peace talks, stating that he could not be involved as long as BSA forces continued their attacks. On 19 March, artillery and mortar fire resulted in one of the heaviest tolls in a year, killing 25 and wounding 76. A high level of shelling continued and intensified fighting was reported on 21 March as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić warned that if the UN Security Council authorized the use of military means to enforce a no-fly zone over BiH, his delegation could pull out of peace talks. Observers in the city counted 2,398 shells hitting the city on that day. On 22 March, UNPROFOR Commander Colonel Marcel Valentin called on the BSA forces to account for the shelling of civilian targets. He said that it was "quite obvious" that the Bosnian Serbs were trying to gain territory before signing a peace agreement being negotiated in New York.

(g) On 13 April 1993, one person was killed and 35 people were injured in an hour-long artillery assault after planned peace talks with BiH army commanders collapsed.

(h) On 2 May 1993, following news from Athens that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had signed a peace plan, the first shells were fired into the city from surrounding mountainsides at 7:45 p.m. According to hospital sources, five people were killed.

(i) On 22 May 1993, the day marking BiH's first anniversary of admission to the United Nations, BSA forces reportedly hit the city with artillery fire, killing at least nine persons and wounding more than 100 others. BSA and BiH forces blamed each other for beginning the artillery duel shortly before noon. A hospital official characterized the day as the worst in many weeks.
(j) On 17 July 1993 the BiH Presidency announced that it had agreed in principle to take part in the next round of peace talks in Geneva scheduled for the following week. BiH troop movements continued and it was reported that BSA forces launched a major offensive in the region of the Igman mountains with 2,000 shells hitting BiH positions outside the city.

(k) On 18 July 1993, BiH President Izetbegović ruled out attending renewed peace talks in Geneva unless BSA forces stopped offensives. On 21 July 1993, Sarajevo suffered what was described as "the heaviest shelling in weeks." However, no shelling numbers were reported. On that day United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher ruled out US military action or other direct intervention to prevent BSA forces from capturing Sarajevo. Commentators noted that those remarks may have removed any fears that Bosnian Serb leaders may have had about whether taking Sarajevo or other UN declared "safe areas" would draw military retaliation from the United States. On 22 July 1993, UNPROFOR recorded a siege-high 3,777 BSA fired shells in a 16 hour period. BiH President Izetbegović reiterated his earlier position that he would not attend the peace talks while fighting continued.

(l) On 24 July 1993, UNPROFOR reported that the BiH-controlled area of Žuč was hit by over 3,000 shells in a renewed Serbian offensive apparently seeking a breakthrough that could bring parts of the city under BSA control. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that BiH President Izetbegović must accept the partition of BiH into 3 ethnic states or BSA forces would settle the question on the battlefield. Karadžić said that peace talks should be postponed for months because negotiating would be pointless.

(m) On 27 July 1993 all 3 of the factions held a rare joint meeting. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that "[t]his is the last chance for an honest peace." Sarajevo was reported to have been hit by 2,390 shells on this day. On 28 July, shelling in the Žuč area reportedly eased as the peace talks in Geneva took a positive turn when leaders of the 3 factions met without mediators for the first time.

(n) On 29 September 1993, four to five mortar shells hit downtown Sarajevo in the afternoon just minutes after the radio announced rejection by parliament of the latest Geneva peace plan. This was reported to be the first mortaring of the city centre by BSA forces in several weeks. There had been reports in the days preceding the vote rejecting the peace plan that BSA commanders warned that they would respond to a rejection of the plan by "flattening" Sarajevo and by renewing offensives elsewhere.

(o) On 7 October 1993, shelling and sniping activity reportedly increased after BiH President Izetbegović stated that he could never accept the latest peace plan that would have divided BiH into 3 ethnic mini-states. Sarajevo which had reportedly enjoyed relative quiet in recent days, experienced increased shelling and sniping activity. The UN described the situation in the city as "unstable," with shelling around the airport and small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire in the city. No shelling totals were reported on this day.

(p) On 28 November 1993, BSA shellfire reportedly killed five people in the city on the eve of a new round of peace talks. An artillery barrage on the city reportedly came as BiH President Izetbegović left for Geneva. Moments earlier, Izetbegović told reporters, "If the Serb side does not return territories, sanctions should be tightened and not lifted."

(q) On 21 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1,500 artillery shells. This shelling attack occurred as BiH officials in Geneva considered whether to accept a new Serb-Croat map for BiH. In the
evening, a BiH spokesman said that the new map was "totally unacceptable."

(s) On 22 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1744 shells. This shelling occurred as the warring factions met in Brussels and agreed to a cease fire in time for Christmas.

(t) On 23 December 1993 the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1309 artillery shells. This shelling activity occurred as peace talks in Brussels ended without a settlement, with the parties agreeing to meet again on 15 January.

(u) On 4 January 1994, the city was reportedly hit by a total of 868 shells. This shelling occurred as BiH and Croatian leaders held talks in Vienna.

(v) On 5 January 1994, the city was reportedly hit by a total of 1,409 shells. This shelling occurred as BiH and Croatian leaders held a second day of talks in Vienna. On 6 January 1994, Sarajevo was reportedly hit by a total of 732 shells as BiH President Izetbegović demanded that the UN Security Council stop the shelling of the city. On 7 January the city was reportedly hit by a total of 906 shells. This continued bombardment prompted the UN Security Council to condemn the bombardment of the city.

K. The blockade of humanitarian aid

44. The blockade of humanitarian aid has been used as an important tool in the siege. Such interference with humanitarian aid which endangers the lives and well being of civilians is a war crime. Four hundred thirty thousand people are estimated to be dependent on food aid in Sarajevo and its surrounding areas. 50/ Not only has the blockade of aid contributed to the demoralization of the civilian population, but it has adversely affected its physical health. 51/ A shortage of food has led to a malnutrition rate described by UNHCR as being on par with that of the poorer developing nations. A shortage of fuel has resulted in the shutdown of the city's bakery, the water pumping station and other essential services. In addition, hospitals have been without power and have had to function without lights, x-ray machines, monitors, or proper anesthetics.

45. Unlike other enclaves in BiH which depend on overland convoys, the international humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo's United Nations controlled airport has helped to bring most supplies into the city. On 12 October 1994, the UNHCR announced that the Sarajevo airlift was in its 467th day, overtaking the 462 days of the Berlin airlift between June 1948 and September 1949. 52/ On 18 January 1994, UN officials reported that 7,272 flights had brought in 81,948 tons of aid into Sarajevo via the humanitarian airlift. However, due to airport closings and airlift suspensions caused by shelling and sniping attacks in the area, this effort is often suspended. 53/

46. The chronology documents the fact that the airport area has been one of the most often shelled areas of the city. 54/ This activity suggests a possible correlation between the high level of shelling in the airport area and an intent to blockade humanitarian aid. 55/ It can be argued that while the besieging forces are blockading overland humanitarian aid throughout BiH, they are accomplishing the same result in Sarajevo by shelling the airport area, forcing the suspension of the humanitarian airlift.

47. Over land, the city is surrounded by BSA forces and entry requires passing through numerous BSA checkpoints. The besieging forces have continued to use aid as a weapon in the siege. During late November 1993, the commanders
on the BiH-Serb border reportedly delayed trucks carrying winter supplies to Sarajevo such as plastic sheeting and shoes in defiance of an aid-delivery accord signed at the beginning of the month. On 25 December 1993 a convoy carrying beans, mattresses, and 60 tons of diesel fuel arrived in the city. However, the United Nations reported that the trucks were initially held up by BSA forces who tried to divert the convoy onto an impassable route.

L. The use of utilities as a weapon of war

48. Throughout the siege, the destruction of electric, gas, phone line and water facilities has been used as a weapon against the inhabitants of the city. Both the defenders and the besiegers have often accused each other of using these utilities as weapons of war. UN and local attempts to repair damaged lines and pumping stations have often been rebuffed with shell and sniper fire, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. For example, it had been reported that by March 1993, 18 of the city's water repair technicians had been killed while trying to repair damaged pipes.

49. The city's drinking water depends on power to the main pumping station. Power lines have frequently been cut by fighting or by forces using the utilities as weapons against civilians. The besieging forces have on several occasions reportedly turned off the city's main water supply and have refused to permit work crews to repair and replenish necessary water purification systems. The water cut-off has led to long queues outside water sources in the city. These long lines have attracted sniper and shellfire from the besieging forces on several occasions and have resulted in the deaths of many civilians. Civilians are also vulnerable to sniper fire as they are forced to carry containers filled with water obtained from the few remaining water sources. These heavy containers are frequently carried for miles by hand, or carted on bicycles, baby carriages, and shopping carts.

50. Winter conditions put the city's residents in danger of starving or freezing to death. Because of a shortage of heating fuel, many of the city's trees have been cut down and used as firewood. Residents have also been forced to burn books, furniture, and any other materials gathered burn to provide themselves with heat.

M. Concluding observations

51. On 5 February 1994, at least 68 persons were killed and 200 others were wounded in the shelling of a market in the Sarajevo city centre. In reaction to that attack, NATO issued an ultimatum on 9 February giving BSA forces 10 days, beginning on 11 February, to withdraw their heavy weapons from a designated exclusion zone or face heavy airstrikes. Very little progress was made until 17 February when Russia announced that it was sending a contingent of 400 troops to the city and persuaded BSA forces to comply with the NATO ultimatum. On 20 February, NATO declared that there had been virtual compliance with its ultimatum and that there was no need for airstrikes at that stage. Since that date, artillery fire has substantially decreased in Sarajevo.

52. Based on the events reported over the course of the siege, any military personnel who has engaged in unlawful sniping or shelling activity is individually responsible if he knew that such acts would cause the death or injury of innocent civilians, the destruction of protected targets, or the destruction of public and civilian property which had no apparent military purpose and for which there was no valid military necessity.
53. On the basis of the conduct observed from April 1992 to February 1994, it is apparent that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the BSA and its commanders are responsible for a great deal of the widespread destruction in Sarajevo. It is also apparent that the command structure knew, or should have known, that they were attacking civilian targets. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the BSA has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. Given the magnitude of the shelling over the course of the siege, the logistics required to re-arm the besieging forces, and the continuous attacks on civilian targets, the commanders of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps should be held accountable for the extensive destruction to private and public property, and for the resulting loss of civilian lives.
Appendix I

Sarajevo Maps

SARAJEVO TARGETS OF SHELLING WITH ACCOMPANYING KEY: original map source, Defense Mapping Agency. Targets identified on this map appear in II below.

SARAJEVO NORTHERN VIEW: source, Sarajevo Project for the Protection of the Environment.

SARAJEVO AND VICINITY: source, United States Government.
SARAJEVO TARGETS OF SHELLING WITH ACCOMPANYING KEY:
original map source, Defense Mapping Agency.
Targets identified on this map appear in II below.
Key to Sarajevo Targets of Shelling

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<td>4. UNPROFOR headquarters</td>
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<td>6. Marshal Tito barracks</td>
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<td>2. (former) Military hospital = French Hosp.</td>
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<td>4. Institute for Physical Therapy &amp; Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>2. Town hall</td>
<td>18. Olympic Museum</td>
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<td>3. Hotel Bristol</td>
<td>19. Klas Saric &amp; Velupelaru Building; flour mill, main bakery</td>
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<td>4. Tobacco factory</td>
<td>20. Holiday Inn</td>
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<td>5. Electricity</td>
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<td>6. Public transport network</td>
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<td>12. Victor Stolac prison</td>
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SARAJEVO NORTHERN VIEW: source, Sarajevo
Project for the Protection of the Environment
SARAJEVO: Northern view.
Source: Sarajevo Project for the Protection of the Human Environment
SARAJEVO AND VICINITY: source, United States Government
Appendix 2

STATISTICS

TOTAL DAILY SHELLING ACTIVITY REPORTED
DAILY CASUALTY TOTALS REPORTED: NUMBER KILLED
DAILY CASUALTY TOTALS REPORTED: NUMBER WOUNDED
WEEKLY CASUALTIES: SOURCE, BiH Institute for Public Health
REPORTED SHELLING ACTIVITY AND CASUALTIES BY DAY
REPORTED SHELLING ACTIVITY AND CASUALTIES BY WEEK
SARAJEVO SHELLING AND CASUALTIES: RELATIONSHIP TO POLITICAL EVENTS
### IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo

**Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported**

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These numbers contain only those days in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo for which total numbers of casualties were reported. Casualties from individual incidents are not included. For actual cumulative totals of numbers of persons killed, see "Weekly Casualties — Source: BiH Institute for Public Health." (Table).

* These numbers contain only those days in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo for which total numbers of casualties were reported. Casualties from individual incidents are not included. For actual cumulative totals of numbers of persons killed, see "Weekly Casualties — Source: BiH Institute for Public Health." (Table).
## IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo
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Total Wounded: 13,472

* These numbers represent only those days in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo for which total numbers of casualties were reported. Casualties from individual incidents are not included. For actual cumulative totals of numbers of persons wounded, see "Weekly Casualties - Source: Institute for Public Health." (Table).
## Sarajevo Weekly Casualties -- Source: BIH Institute for Public Health

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bulletin Date</th>
<th>Killed or Missing</th>
<th>Total Wounded</th>
<th>Heavily Wounded</th>
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* Inconsistent data

** Differences computed from consecutive cumulative numbers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bulletin Date</th>
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<th>Total Wounded</th>
<th>Heavily Wounded</th>
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* Inconsistent data

** Differences computed from consecutive cumulative numbers
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<th>Heavily Wounded</th>
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** Differences computed from consecutive cumulative numbers.
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** Differences computed from consecutive cumulative numbers
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

Number Killed  Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:  
Reported Shelling Activity 
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo  

Date - 1992  
7/28  7/29  7/30  7/31  8/4  
Number Wounded  
Number Killed  

Shelling Activity  
350  300  250  200  150  100  50  0  
7/23  7/25  7/26  7/28  7/29  7/30  7/31  8/4
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
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Date - 1992

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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992

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- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1992/93

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/10 1/11 1/12 1/13 1/14

(1300)
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

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IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

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Date - 1993
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- **Shelling Activity**
- **Number Killed**
- **Number Wounded**
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology: Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

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- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993

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Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1993/94

Number Killed

Number Wounded

Shelling Activity

350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

12/24 12/25 12/26 12/27 12/28 12/29 12/31 1/1 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6

(880) (1409) (732)
(700)
(680)
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1994

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1994

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Day in Sarajevo

Date - 1994

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology: Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1992

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1992/93

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:  
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1993

Shelling Activity Number Killed Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Reported Shelling Activity
and Casualties by Week in Sarajevo

End of Week - 1993

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1992

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology: Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

- International Conference
- Statement by Involved Party
- Statement by Another Country

Date - 1992
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

- ▲ International Conference
- ▲ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

- ▲ International Conference
- △ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country

6/22, 6/26, 6/27, 6/29, 6/30, 7/1, 7/2, 7/7, 7/8, 7/10, 7/13, 7/15, 7/16
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

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International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1992

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
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- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

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- Statement by Anelial Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

International Conference ▲ Statement by Involved Party ▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

[Graph with data points and annotations]
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1992

- International Conference
- Statement by Involved Party
- Statement by Anghar Connolly
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

![Graph showing shelling activity, number killed, and number wounded over dates from November 22 to December 5, 1992. Key: International Conference, Statement by Involved Party, Statement by Another Country.](image-url)
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:

IHRLI Chronology:

Relationship to Political Events
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

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- International Conference
- Statement by Involved Party
- Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events

[Graph showing shelling activity, number killed, and number wounded over dates in 1993, with markers for international conferences, statements by involved parties, and statements by another country.]
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Diagram:
- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Dates:
- 3/20
- 3/21
- 3/22
- 3/23
- 3/24
- 3/25
- 3/26
- 3/27
- 3/28
- 3/31
- 4/1
- 4/2

Annotations:
- ▲ International Conference
- ▲ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1993

△ International Conference  △ Statement by Involved Party  ▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

![Bar Chart]

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

- International Conference
- Statement by Involved Party
- Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

[Graph showing dates and corresponding data for shelling activity, number killed, and number wounded with markers for international conferences and statements by involved parties and another country.]
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

- ▲ International Conference
- ▲ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country

Number of Casualties:
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

- 6/22
- 7/3
- 7/4
- 7/9
- 7/10
- 7/12
- 7/14
- 7/15
- 7/16

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

- International Conference
- ▲ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

[Diagram showing shelling activity, number killed, and number wounded over dates in 1993]

- International Conference
- Statement by involved party
- Statement by another country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

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Legend:
- ▲ International Conference
- ▲ Statement by Involved Party
- ▼ Statement by Another Country

Date - 1993
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Shelling Activity  Number Killed  Number Wounded

Date - 1993

International Conference  Statement by Involved Party  Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1993/94
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

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Date - 1994

- ▲: International Conference
- ▲: Statement by Involved Party
- ▼: Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1994

▲ International Conference
▲ Statement by Involved Party
▼ Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Date - 1994

International Conference
Statement by Involved Party
Statement by Another Country
IHRLI Chronology:
Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties:
Relationship to Political Events

Legend:
- Shelling Activity
- Number Killed
- Number Wounded

Graph:
- Date: 1994
- Events:
  - International Conference
  - Statement by Involved Party
  - Statement by Another Country
Appendix 3

Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas
Key to IERLII Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Ilidza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energoinvest Building, Bridge on Main Route to Sarajevo, Ilidza, Institute for Physical Therapy &amp; Rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Western Area</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stup, Otas, Azici, Doglodi, Stupsko Brdo</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Rajlovac</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rajlovac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Alipasino Polje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oslobodenja, Halilovic Barracks, Alipasino Polje, Alipasin Most, Candy Factory, Tvrnica Armatura (factory), Radio &amp; TV Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Airport Area, Southwestern Suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airport, Butmir, Dobrinja, Mostilo, Medzari, Vatoren, Kasindol Street, Dobrinja soccer game shelling, Waterline in Dobrinja, Vojniko Polje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Novi Grad Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electric Tran. Depot, Novi Grad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Cengic Vila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Klas Sarko &amp; Velepekara building, Krasno, Town Hall, Cengic Vila, Hotel Bristol, Cengic Vila, Veterinary College, Pero Kosevic Square, Elektroprivreda Building, Flour Mill of Sarajevo, Main Bakery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Buca Potok Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buca Potok</td>
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<td>I</td>
<td>Dolac Malta Area</td>
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<td>Dolac Malta</td>
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<td>J</td>
<td>Northern Suburbs/Quarters</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TV Tower, Pofalici, Velesici, Vogošća, Hum Hill</td>
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<td>K</td>
<td>Kosevo Area</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jezero Hospital, Kosevo Hospital, Olympic Sites, Olympic Complex, Olympic Center, Lion Cemetery, Sarajevo Zoo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Northeast Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vretnik, Vasin Han</td>
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</table>
Area M  Old Town
Bascarsija, Bazaar, Market, Islamic Theological School, Library, Gazi Husrev Begova Mosque, Nadzijaka Mosque, Old Town. Telephone & Post, Hotel Europa, Morica Han People’s Bank. Waterline Outside the City Brewery, Viktor Busanj Prison, Vase Miskina

Area N  Bjelave Area
Bjelave

Area O  City Center, Downtown Area
Downtown, City Center, Novo Sarajevo, Parliament Building, Presidency Building, Government Building Area, Railway Station, TV Main Transmission Facility, Marshal Tito Street, Oslobodjaja, Tobacco Factory, Holiday Inn, Old Jewish Cemetery, Marshal Tito Barracks, University, Otoka District, Peoples Museum, Vrbanja Bridge, Veterinary College, Marijin Dvor Neighborhood, Barovalaca Kurvi Street, Electricity & Water Transmission, Courthouse of Sarajevo, Skenderja, Public Transportation Network

Area P  Grbavica
Grbavica

UN Sites
UNEP Headquarters, UNPROFOR, UN vehicles, UN planes

Area R  Vraca Area
Vraca

Area S  Southeast
Bistrik, Stari Grad, Trbevic Mountain

Area T  Lukavica
Lukavica

Area  Non Localized Targets *
Unidentified Muslim Suburbs, Center of Social Work, Krasnita, Unidentified Churches, Unidentified Synagogues, Pale, Sokolovic Kolonija, Breka, Mount Igman, Zuc Hill, Western Parts of Sarajevo, Colomy, Donjek, Unidentified Civilian Vehicles, Outskirts of Sarajevo, Unidentified Public Kitchen, Unidentified Shopping Center, Kolonija, Vakavica, Unidentified City Factory, Children’s Embassy Schoolyard, Cetijanska Street, Vojvoda Putnik, Ilijas, Visoko, Hadzici, Hrasno, Mey 1. School, Gorni Kotorac

* These sites have been reported and were either not identified with particularity, or are located in outlying sections of the city, which do not appear on the attached map.
### IHRLI Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo

#### FREQUENCY OF SHELLING IN SARAJEVO AREAS 1992

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<th>Area B</th>
<th>Area C</th>
<th>Area D</th>
<th>Area E</th>
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FREQUENCY OF SHELLING IN AREAS OF SARAJEVO 1993

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### IHRI I Chronology of the Battle/Siege of Sarajevo

#### FREQUENCY OF SHELLING IN SARAJEVO AREAS 1994

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- **Zec Hill:**
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- **Parliament:**
  - (1993): 11.01.; 14.01.; 25.01.; 09.02.; 30.05.; 21.07.

- **Klas Sarko & Velepekara:**
  - (1992): 17.05.; 09.06.; 06.08.; 12.08.; 31.08.; 07.09.

- **Oslobodenje**
  - (1992): 18.05.; 10.06.; 20.06.; 08.07.; 22.08.; 24.08.

- **Hospitals:**
  - (1993): 24.01.; 05.02.; 19.04.; 30.05.

- **Mosques:**
  - (1992): 22.04.; 11.05.; 29.05.; 07.06. (50 mosques were hit); 11.06.

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Appendix 5

REPORTS OF SHELLING OF RELIGIOUS
AND CULTURAL STRUCTURES IN SARAJEVO

A. Bosnian Muslim Structures Damaged by Shelling

The following Sarajevo Islamic structures have been reported by the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia Hercegovina as damaged or destroyed by shelling.\(^1\) The information provided by the State Commission is listed below. It should be noted that while the State Commission provides an extensive list of the buildings damaged, very little detail is provided as to when and how these structures were damaged or destroyed. It is clear in most cases that the reported damage was the result of the shelling of combatants, but is not alleged specifically which forces or individuals was responsible for the shelling which resulted in damage and destruction to these structures listed:

The list of damaged and destroyed building in Sarajevo provided by the State Commission is as follows:

1. The Imperial mosque in Sarajevo, constructed in 1565 and restored two years ago, was heavily damaged. Monumental tombstones and nishans around the mosque were also heavily damaged and some of them completely destroyed.

2. The Gazi-Husrev Bey library (known for its manuscripts), was shelled ("by the aggressor") several times and heavily damaged.

3. Gazi Husrev-Bey mosque, built in 1530 was heavily damaged, especially the dome and minaret. It was hit by more than 60 shells.

4. The Gazi Husrev-Bey Turbeh was heavily damaged.

5. The Murate Bey Turbeh was heavily damaged.

6. The Ali Pasha mosque, constructed in 1560 was heavily damaged, especially the dome.

7. Havadza Durak mosque (Bashcharshi) in Sarajevo (16th century) was damaged by many shells.

8. Gazi-Husrev Bey hanikah was substantially damaged.

9. The Kursunlija Medrese built in 1537 was damaged by several grenades.

10. The Faculty of Islamic science and the Gazi Husrev Bey Medrese were heavily damaged.

11. Cekrcina mosque, built in 1526, suffered substantial damage as well as other buildings in the center of the Old Town.

12. Fehrhat-Bey mosque (Terhadija), built in 1561, was damaged by shelling.

13. Hadzi-Osman Mesdzid (Tabacki), built in 1591, was completely burnt down.

14. Cobanijsa mosque was damaged.

15. Dzino-zade mosque (Dzanic's mosque) at Asikovac in Sarajevo, built in the 17th century was hit by several shells.

16. Dajanli Hadzi-Ibrahim mosque at Gorica, Sarajevo, dating from the 17th century, was damaged at the beginning of the aggression against Sarajevo.

17. Hadzi-Sinan Tekky in Sarajevo, one of the spiritual and intellectual centers of Sarajevo was substantially damaged.

18. Gazgani Hadzi-Ali Mesdzid at Sirokaca, Sarajevo, dating from 1561, was damaged in the artillery attack in the residential zone of the Old Town.

19. The nishans in the Bey mosque were damaged. The nishans of Reis-ul-Uloms Causevic were also damaged.

20. The Seikh Magribi mosque (Magribija) is Sarajevo, constructed in the 15th century, is one of the most significant Islamic objects in architecture. The mosque and its minaret were destroyed at the end of May, 1992.

21. IvaKov Hadzi-Mehmed Mesdzid (1528 and 1540) in Sarajevo was destroyed on June 12, 1992.
22. Ijdidzik Sinan Mosque at Sirokaca constructed before 1562 was destroyed during shelling of Sarajevo on May 19, and May 20, 1992.

23. The mosque at Grivici (Hadzici near Sarajevo) was destroyed and many nishans were damaged.

24. The mosque in Hrasno (Sarajevo) was damaged in several places. It was damaged before the war by an explosive device.

25. The Sheriat Law School in Sarajevo (1887) was damaged, especially the atrium and facade designed in the Moorish style.

26. The Sarac Ali mosque at Vrbanjusa, Sarajevo, built in 1892/3, was exposed to artillery fire several times.

27. The new mosque at Kobilja Glava in Sarajevo with characteristic minaret was destroyed by twenty tank shells and a large number of grenades on September 2, 1992.

28. The mosque in Svrake near Vogosca (Sarajevo) was destroyed on May 2, 1992.

29. The mosque in Ugorsko (Vogosca near Sarajevo) was shelled several times. The heaviest shelling occurred on September 1, 1992 when it was destroyed.

30. The mosque in Sokolje (Sarajevo) was shelled by various weapons several times.

31. The mosque in Buljakov Potok, Sarajevo, was substantially damaged.

32. The mosque in Brijescce in Sarajevo, opened in 1991, was destroyed.

33. The new domed mosque in Butmir, Sarajevo, was severely damaged.

34. The new mosque in Kotorac near Sarajevo was set on fire by "Chetniks".

35. The Sheikh Feruh Mosque (Abdesthana) in Sarajevo, built in 1541, was heavily damaged by grenades.

36. Hadzi Idris-aqa Topalovic Mosque (Lubo Mosque) in Sarajevo, built in 1525, was heavily damaged.

37. Sinan Voivoda Hatun Mosque at Vratnik-Mejdan in Sarajevo, 1552, known as "under the walnut mosque" was damaged.

38. Kasap-zade Mosque at Vratnik (Sarajevo) was damaged.
39. Mokrica Hadzi Sinan Mesdzid at Vratnik (Sarajevo) was damaged.

40. Hadzi-Ibrahim Kasapovic Mesdzid at Vratnik (Sarajevo), dating from the 16th century, was shelled.

41. The mosque at Svrakino Selo (Sarajevo) was heavily damaged.

42. The mosque at Konatin (Sarajevo) was damaged.

43. Kulin Bali’ mosque (Cakalusa) in Sarajevo was severely damaged at the end of August, 1992.

44. Clock Tower near Bey mosque (Sarajevo) was severely damaged.

45. The mosque at Nedzarici (Sarajevo) was severely damaged.

46. The mosque at Kovaci (Sarajevo) was heavily damaged.

47. The newly built mosque at Sokolovic Kolonija (Sarajevo) was destroyed.

48. The mosque at Breka (Sarajevo) was completely destroyed.

49. The Residence of Reis-ul-Ululema was severely damaged as well as the whole building of Riyaset of the Islamic Community on August 29, 1992.

50. Vakuf apartments in the building of Riyaset of the Islamic Community (Sarajevo) were damaged by tank shells.

51. The Mesnihat of the Islamic Community (Sarajevo) was shelled by five grenades.

52. The building of the Islamic Community (Sarajevo) was damaged.

53. The building of Gazi Husrev Bey Vakuf in Sarajevo was damaged.

54. Gazi Husrev Bey Mekteb in Sarajevo was severely damaged. One of the officials in this Vakuf was killed and two were wounded.

55. In Sarajevo more than 100 Vakuf buildings were damaged out of which 1/3 were completely destroyed. Flats of Imam, professors in the Gazi-Husrev Bey Medrese and at the Faculty of Islamic Community as well as officials in other institutions to the Islamic Community were heavily damaged.
B. Church Buildings Damaged by Shelling

The following Church complexes in Sarajevo have been reported by the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as being damaged or destroyed by shelling. While these reports identify the structures damaged, little or no information is provided as to the date of damage or to who is responsible.

1. The Cathedral - built in 1889 - windows and stained glass windows heavily damaged; copper roof riddled with shots; stone facade damaged by shell fragments.

2. The Church of St. Cyril and Method - built in 1896 - windows broken and dome and wall directly hit by shells.

3. Building of the Vrhbosna Theological Seminary - built in 1893 - windows broken and facade damaged by shells falling in its vicinity. The roof above library hit directly by shell.

4. The Church of the Queen of Rosary at Banjski Brijeg - built in 1910 in Baroque style - roof directly hit by several shells.

5. St. Vincent's Church - built in 1883 - directly hit by several shells and almost completely destroyed. Three paintings by Gabrije Jurljic and church organ destroyed. Alter and the interior of the church heavily damaged. Repair of the destroyed roof was not possible under the conditions.

6. St. Joseph's Church at Marijin Dvor - built in 1938 - roof of the church directly hit by several shells and heavily damaged. Stained-glass windows painted by Latkovic, clock and bell in the tower as well as the church door and facade damaged.

7. The Monastery and Church of St. Anthony at Bistrik - built in 1912-4 - both church and monastery damaged by shelling.

8. The Church of Mary's Assumption at Stup - built in 1890-2 - hit by shells and completely burned.

9. St. Ignatius Parochial Center at Grbavica - established in 1979 - windows broken and facade damaged by detonations and infantry weapons. It is located in the area occupied by the Serbian Army.

10. The Franciscan Theology Building in Medzarici - built in 1968 - the "aggressor" occupied both house and property.

11. The Covenant of the Franciscan Sisters of the Herzegovinian Province in Capajeva Street - roof and apartments on the upper floor damaged by shell.

12. The Convent of Sisters Servants of Infant Jesus in Prijedorska Street - hit by shells, causing total evacuation.

13. The Ordinariate of Vrhbosna Archbishopric - built in 1895 - roof and facade damaged and windows broken by shell which fell in the yard.

14. The Cathedral Parochial home - the first floor hit and heavily damaged by shell fired from multi-rocket launcher.

15. The Parochial Church of Holy Trinity in Novo Sarajevo - directly hit by several shells; parochial home also heavily damaged.

16. The Parochial residence at Marijin Dvor - heavily damaged by shells falling in its vicinity.

17. The newly built Provincial home of Sisters Servants of Infant Jesus on Ljublianska Street - occupied.

18. Convent of Sisters of Mercy on Dobrinjska Street in Ilidza - burnt down.
II. CHRONOLOGY OF THE BATTLE AND SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

A. April 1992

1. 5/4/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After thousands of protestors took to the streets, fierce shooting from heavy machineguns and automatic weapons were heard in all parts of the city, accompanied by explosions. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.


Description of Damage: Bullet shattered windows in a number of unidentified downtown buildings. Source(s): Reuters Press Report.


Casualties: A doctor at the Sarajevo hospital and police officials said at least seven people were killed Sunday (three in pre-dawn police station attacks) and 10 were injured. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

54. Tensions escalated on the eve of a meeting by European Community Ministers who were expected to announce the recognition of BiH as an independent state. Fighting broke out after the expiration of a 2:00 p.m. deadline set by Serbian leaders for cancellation of a full mobilization of the Republic’s Territorial Defence and police reserve forces dominated by Croats and Muslims. The mobilization order was issued Saturday by President Alija Izetbegović.

55. After the deadline passed, thousands of people were reported to have taken to the streets in spontaneous peace marches as government-run Sarajevo television began issuing appeals for ethnic amity. The largest body of demonstrators headed towards the Republic's Assembly building, and hundreds began moving toward several buildings that had been seized by armed Serbs. The crowd chanted "put down your arms". Unidentified gunmen were then reported to have fired into the air to discourage the crowd from crossing the bridge, but then fired into the crowd. A Yugoslav journalist reported that he saw "two men and a woman fall on the bridge". One protestor was confirmed dead, but there was no independent confirmation of who started the shooting.

56. Croatian radio said that explosions rocked Sarajevo and that the JNA had captured the airport late in the day. "Shortly after 23:00, a true war flared up again in Sarajevo", said Croatian radio, monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation. "Fierce shooting from heavy machineguns and automatic weapons started ringing out from every part of the city . . . and explosions have also been rocking the city", it said. Low flying MiG-21 war jets of the JNA flew over Sarajevo in apparent attempts to discourage the fighting between Serbian "militiamen against Muslim and Croat police and paramilitary fighters". Grenade explosions and machinegun fire could be heard during the day in a number of neighbourhoods. Several armoured cars manned by Muslim police were seen on the streets. Bullet-shattered windows were observed in a number of downtown buildings.
(b) Local reported events

57. The government announced a curfew from 10:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. 66/

58. Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović and Miljenko Brkić of the Croatian Democratic Union reportedly agreed to a total cease-fire in the republic. Also in attendance at the talks in a Sarajevo TV studio were JNA Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac and EC monitor Antonio Santos. 67/

2. 6/4/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery fire was reported all around the airport. The centre of the city and the main television tower was shelled. Daylong firefights reportedly eased in an evening downpour of rain. Source: United Press International; Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Bazaar District; Unidentified homes and shops in the Old Town District; the Main Television Tower; the Centre for Social Work. Source(s): The New York Times, United Press International, Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Not specified.

Sniping Activity: Suspected Serb snipers fired on peace demonstrators in front of the parliament, wounding from 13 to 15 people. The sniping was reported to have originated from the Holiday Inn. Source(s): United Press International, Reuters.

Casualties: At least 11 killed, 100 wounded since Sunday. Source(s): United Press International and Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

59. Fierce fighting enveloped Sarajevo early Monday with a battle for control of its airport. Government radio and television reported artillery fire all around the airport and described attacks on several barracks of the JNA, but did not identify the combatants on either side. 68/

60. Serbs shelled the Muslim heart of Sarajevo as ethnic battles continued and doctors at city hospitals and state-run Sarajevo Television said that at least 11 people had been killed and about 100 wounded in clashes since Sunday in Sarajevo. They believed that there were many more casualties which they could not confirm. For a second time in as many days, suspected Serbian snipers fired several times on thousands of peace demonstrators in front of the Parliament. Reports on the wounded ranged from 13 to 15 people. 69/

61. Gunfire was reported to have come from the Serb-controlled Holiday Inn, the headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party. Thousands of protesters were reported to have charged the building and smashed windows. Some who entered the building to search for snipers threw several grenades in the lobby. They smashed open doors and led away at least three people. Suspected Serb snipers fired again about an hour later, injuring at least one person. Muslim militiamen then took control of the hotel. 70/

62. It was also reported by state-run media, witnesses and the EC monitoring mission office in Sarajevo that Serbian police seized the Interior Ministry police training centre in downtown Sarajevo and held an unknown number of cadets and teachers hostage. Armed Serbs were also reported to have looted
the Interior Ministry's police commando training centre, setting it on fire. 71/

63. Selim Hadibajri, the mayor of the Bazaar District, an area comprised of cobblestone streets with mosques, shops and restaurants, reported that the area was hit repeatedly by Serb mortar and artillery shells that morning. Mortar shells were reported to have hit the city's main television tower in the afternoon. 72/

64. Day long firefights continued between Muslim paramilitaries, Croatian paramilitaries, and the Republic's security forces, against Serbian police and irregulars, but eased in a heavy evening downpour of rain. The JNA said its troops intervened to halt several clashes in Sarajevo and that it used tanks to secure the city airport after intense fighting around the facility. Muslim residents, however, stated that the JNA joined Serbian irregulars on two outlying hillsides in launching rocket, mortar and artillery strikes, that damaged homes and shops in the historic Muslim-dominated Old Town and nearby areas. Muslims were reported to have returned small-arms fire. 73/

65. The Centre for Social Work Sarajevo was shelled on this day, according to a report from the Government of BiH. 74/

(b) Local reported events

66. In a session of the Presidency of BiH, a state of emergency was declared in Sarajevo. 75/

(c) International reported events

67. The European Community in Luxembourg recognized BiH as an independent State. 76/ Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović stated, "I welcome this decision but it is not necessary to go into euphoria. A shadow was thrown over this by what happened today". Acting Yugoslav foreign minister Milivoje Maksi told Tanjug news agency, "we warned the EC that this premature step could only worsen the atmosphere in Bosnia-Hercegovina and embolden those who are not interested in agreement". 77/

3. 7/4/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported tense in the evening with sporadic gunfire. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.


Description of Damage: Not specified.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported to have struck the Parliament building. Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: Two killed overnight, five killed in the fighting in the police academy over the weekend. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

68. Street corners were reported to have been guarded by men and boys
wearing berets and lugging automatic rifles. Sniper fire was reported to have struck the Parliament building. 78/

69. Sarajevo radio said that two more people died overnight in Sarajevo, but that one had accidently shot himself. Officials reported that five people were killed in fighting in and around the Sarajevo police academy over the weekend. 79/

70. The city remained tense Tuesday night with sporadic gunfire heard in the empty streets.

(b) Local reported events

71. Two Bosnian Serbs, Nikola Koljević and Biljana Plavši, resigned from the collective Bosnian Presidency. They left to assume leadership positions in their own self-proclaimed, independent republic. 80/

(c) International reported events

72. The United States recognized the independence of Croatia, Slovenia, and BiH within their pre-war borders. The Bush Administration said it would also lift economic sanctions against BiH, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia, but would not do so for Serbia and Montenegro. 81/

4. 8/4/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bombardment of the city began at 5:30 p.m. and lasted almost two hours, hitting the Old Town. Fierce fighting and explosions were reported throughout the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Old Town alleyways and unidentified buildings; Sarajevo Television Station; Centre for Social Work. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Windows shattered and cars damaged in Old Town. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire reported in the new section of the city; "Sniper alert" declared in the old section of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: At least six dead, seven injured. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

73. Bombardment of the city reportedly began at 5:30 p.m., lasting almost two hours. Shells were reported to have crashed into the alleyways and buildings of the historic predominantly Muslim old city, shattering windows and damaging cars as residents retreated to their basements. The muzzle flashes of Serb-manned artillery could be seen in three different positions on hillsides around the Serb-stronghold of Pale to the east of Sarajevo. 82/

74. Bosnian Interior Ministry official Avdo Hebib told a news conference that he got a telephone call from a senior JNA general warning that the
bombardment was to take place. Hebib said the general passed on a message from Serbian Democratic Party chief Radovan Karadžić saying "The city will be bombed from Pale unless police release the personal bodyguard of Nikola Koljević", one of two Serbs who resigned from the collective presidency on Tuesday. According to Hebib, the bodyguard was arrested as a sniper.  

75. Sarajevo Television broadcast an interview with Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the JNA in BiH, who denied that the Army was involved in any of the fighting. "This has nothing to do with the army", Kukanjac stated, adding that the army "will protect the people".  

76. Fierce fighting was reported and the sounds of automatic weapons, rockets and explosions were heard in many parts of the city. Sniper fire centered in the new section of the city according to Sarajevo television. The fighting was reported to have begun after 10:00 p.m. when the curfew came into effect and continued past midnight. Sarajevo TV reported that mortar rounds were fired at the station and that fighting was underway around the main television transmission tower.  

77. Local residents also reported fighting around Army barracks in the same area. Sarajevo TV reported heavy sniper fire and appealed for an end to the shooting. There were no reported casualties.  

78. Sporadic gun battles and "Serbian sniper shots" left at least six people dead and seven injured in and around Sarajevo, according to a police spokesman. Municipal officials later announced a "sniper alert" in the old section of the city.  

79. The Centre for Social Work Sarajevo was shelled on this day, according to a report from the Government of BiH.  

(b) Local reported events  

80. The Bosnian Government announced "an impending war emergency" and urged the various ethnic militias to come together to combat the JNA and Serb militias.  

5. 9/4/92 (Thursday)  

(a) Military activity  

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified  

Targets Hit: Not specified  

Description of Damage: Not specified  

Sniping Activity: Not specified  

Casualties: Thirty-one killed in the fighting "in the last few days".  

Source(s): Reuters.  

Narrative of Events:  

81. Ejup Ganić, a Muslim member of the collective presidency said that Serbian forces in the hills around Sarajevo threatened to renew bombardments with JNA-supplied artillery unless three suspected Serbian snipers were released by police.  

82. Reuters reported that 31 people had died in the fighting in Sarajevo in
the last few days. 91/ (b) International reported events

83. A round of EC-sponsored peace talks were held in Brussels. 92/ Cyrus
Vance stated that US and EC recognition of BiH had damaged the peace process.
He stated that UN troops would not be deployed as peacekeepers. 93/

6. 10/4/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: At 5:30 a.m., an intense bombardment of the New
Sarajevo area was reported. Firing was renewed at 1:00 p.m. and at 2:00 p.m.
the Sarajevo Television transmission station was hit. Source(s): United Press
International; Reuters; The Washington Post.

Targets Hit: New Sarajevo Area (Police Station); Sarajevo Television Main
Transmission Facility; Pensioner's Home housing peacekeepers. Source(s):

Description of Damage: Police station reported on fire; Main Transmission
Facility damaged, forcing Sarajevo Television off the air for 10 minutes.

Sniping Activity: Sniping was directed towards firefighters at the scene of
the burning police station in New Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press
International; Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

84. It was reported that at about 5:30 a.m, Serbian gunners began intense
two hour mortar and heavy machinegun fire at the New Sarajevo area of the
city, targeting a police station. The artillery and mortar fire was said to
have come from nearby hills. Sarajevo Television showed fire fighters, sent
to extinguish the burning police station, running for cover from Serbian
sniper rounds. 94/

85. Serbian "gunners" renewed firing at about 1:00 p.m.. At 2:00 p.m.
Sarajevo Television went off the air for about 10 minutes as shells hit the
main power supply of its main transmission station, according to a technician
at the facility. An unnamed military spokesman later stated that a "renegade
tank unit" had participated in the barrages "without orders". 95/ The United
Nations reported that machinegun fire struck a pensioner's home where peace-
keeping personnel were being quartered. 96/

7. 11/4/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting reportedly eased in the city.
Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

86. Fighting was reported to have eased around the city after EC special envoy Jose Cutilheiro's arrival in the city to meet with leaders of the main national parties. 97/

87. Sarajevo Radio reported that a "Serbian defence force" warned that if certain facilities, including hospitals and police station in Serb-claimed areas of Sarajevo were not surrendered, intensified bombardments would be unleashed on the city. The Serbs also reportedly stated that if Muslims carried out their threat to dynamite the Drina River Dam, they would "raze to the ground" Sarajevo's Muslim-dominated old quarter. 98/

(b) Local reported events

88. A cease-fire agreement taking effect at midnight, was brokered by the European Community and signed by Muslim, Serb and Croat leaders in the city. 99/

8. 12/4/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

89. No reported incidents.

(b) International reported events

90. Mr. Cutilheiro and Mr. Vance reportedly negotiated a cease-fire between the warring factions. However, it was reported that Vance still refused to support the deployment of UN troops in BiH. 100/

9. 13/4/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Firefights erupted at 6:15 a.m. and continued throughout the day in varying intensity. Source(s): United Press International.
Targets Hit: Main terminal at Airport. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Stray bullets hit airport terminal. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

91. Firefights erupted at about 6:15 a.m. when police moved to dismantle barricades erected in violation of the cease-fire by Serbian gunmen in the Mojmilo and Dobrinja neighbourhoods of the city. The fighting, in which Serbian units fired mortars and anti-tank rockets, continued in varying intensity throughout the day. Sarajevo airport was forced to close when stray bullets hit the main terminal where hundreds of refugees were waiting for evacuation flights. 101/

92. Just after 5:00 p.m., a lone JNA MiG-21 jet fighter passed over the city and shattered the sound barrier in a massive boom that shook buildings and caused residents to panic. A military spokesman later said the fighter was "on a routine flight at 11,000 feet and there was no reason for anyone to get upset. This was not directed to create any kind of panic". 102/

10. 14/4/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy explosions were reported in the late afternoon. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One civilian killed, two police officers injured. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

93. The city was reported to be quiet ahead of a visit by UN envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community monitors. 103/

94. Sarajevo radio said that one civilian was killed and two police officers were injured in clashes with Serbian "guerrillas" in the city, where heavy explosions were heard during the late afternoon. 104/

(b) Local reported events

95. United Nations officials in Sarajevo said that an estimated 132,000 people had fled their homes--some to other parts of BiH, others into neighbouring Croatia and Serbia. The Yugoslav government had also reportedly airlifted thousands of people in military cargo aeroplanes from Sarajevo to Belgrade and to the capital of Montenegro. 105/
96. The United States reportedly threatened to expel Yugoslavia from the CSCE unless it terminated its assault on BiH. 106/

11. 15/4/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight, shelling was reported and gun battles and artillery fire was reported during the day. Source(s): United Press International; New York Times; Government of BiH.

Targets Hit: Street cars, bus depots and parking lots. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Twenty-four buses and 14 street cars were damaged by overnight shelling. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three killed, several wounded. Source(s): Reuters

Narrative of Events: JNA units were reported to have taken up new positions in the city's suburbs. Army leaders asserted that the units were deployed to create a buffer zone between Serb and Muslim forces. 107/

97. Overnight, Serbian irregulars shelled the city's streetcar and bus depots and parking lots damaging 24 buses and 14 streetcars. 108/ It was reported that Serbian units holding hills overlooking the city fired intermittent mortar and small-arms fire that put the municipal tram system out of service. 109/

98. Gun battles and artillery fire were reported. 110/

99. Two UN officials were abducted by gunmen near Sarajevo, but were later released. 111/

100. Police said that three people were killed and several wounded in modern housing estates, including one built as the games village for the 1984 Olympics. However the police believed that some of the fighting was between rival gangs of looters. 112/

(b) Local reported events

101. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was quoted in a Belgrade newspaper as saying that Serbs will "liberate" Sarajevo, "either with an agreement or by some other means". 113/

12. 16/4/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intensified shelling and machinegun fire was reported after Cyrus Vance's departure from the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

102. Intensified shelling and machinegun fire erupted after Vance's departure that evening for Zagreb. 114/

13. 17/4/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight battles were reported near the utility company and the Old Town was shelled. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Muslim quarter of the city. Source(s): The New York Times

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

104. Overnight battles broke out near Sarajevo's electric utility company and Serb mortar fire pounded the Muslim quarter. 116/

(b) Local reported events

105. The New York Times described the streets of Sarajevo as "a maze of barricades, checkpoints and tank traps", as Serbian nationalist leaders called for the partitioning of the city as the starting point for the division of the entire Republic. 117/

106. The JNA command in BiH said that political leaders had lost control of well-armed paramilitary forces, which it said totaled 150,000 in the Republic. "In the crisis areas, especially in Sarajevo, they are terrorizing people, looting and destroying property and spread fear, tension and panic among citizens", the army said in a statement. 118/

(c) International reported event

107. The CSCE warned Yugoslavia to end its "clear, gross, and uncorrected violation" of the CSCE rules for membership. 119/
14. 18/4/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported in the area near the electric tram depot. Fighting also reported near Vogoša. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Area near the Main Electric Tram Depot; other locations on the public transportation network. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Two killed and many reported injured near the Tram Depot. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Between six and seven people were killed in the last 24 hours; Another report stated that five security personnel were killed and 20 wounded in clashes which spread to a nearby Volkswagen plant (Vogoša). Source(s): Reuters, New York Times, Sarajevo Television; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

108. At least two people were killed by mortar rounds that Serbian gunners fired around Sarajevo's main electric tram depot, next to Sarajevo Television and Radio headquarters. UN officials whose offices were several blocks from the depot, located one mile from the centre of the city, said that they saw many people injured. The barrage came after Sarajevo Radio officials rejected an ultimatum from Serbian "guerrillas" to shut down transmissions. 120/

109. A report from the Government of BiH stated that the main location of the Sarajevo public transportation network, and others in the city, were shelled on this day. 121/

110. Sarajevo radio reported six people killed in Sarajevo (including the attack on the tram depot). 122/ Sarajevo television reported that seven people had been killed in the city in the last 24 hours. 123/

111. Fighting was also reported in the Sarajevo suburb of Vogoša, where members of the Republic's security forces fought back an assault on an ammunition factory by the JNA. Kemal Muftić, an aide to BiH's President, Alija Izetbegović said that at least five security personnel were killed and 20 other people wounded in the clashes which spread to a nearby Volkswagen automobile assembly plant. 124/

(b) Local reported events

112. A US relief mission operation began at 12:20 p.m. when a US Air Force Hercules transport aeroplane touched down at Butmir Airport and unloaded logistics personnel. JNA tanks and troops armed with machineguns and rocket propelled grenades imposed tight security around the arrival area and other parts of the airport. At about 2:10 p.m. a C-141 Starlifter aircraft arrived with two US diplomats and began unloading 20 tons of surplus military field rations and blankets. 125/
15. 19/4/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Unidentified areas of the city were hit by shells and mortars. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Unspecified parts of the city. Source(s): Reuters

**Description of Damage:** Not specified. Source(s): Reuters

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

113. Sarajevo radio said that parts of the city were attacked with shells and mortars. 126/

(b) International reported events

114. A European Community special envoy, Colin Doyle, condemned the decision by Serbs to shell Sarajevo on Saturday night during the visit by senior American official, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ralph R. Johnson. 127/

16. 20/4/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** One Yugoslav soldier killed, two wounded. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

115. In the afternoon, one Yugoslav soldier was killed and two persons were wounded (one of them a soldier), when an unidentified gunman entered a cafe and fired a volley from his automatic rifle. 128/

116. Muslim paramilitary units stormed a JNA ammunition depot outside Sarajevo. 129/

(b) International reported events

117. US State Department officials said that Secretary of State Baker was considering cutting off ties with Yugoslavia. 130/
17. 21/4/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** At least nine shells hit the Sarajevo Television Station and shells hit throughout central Sarajevo. Source(s): The New York Times.

**Targets Hit:** Sarajevo Radio and Television Headquarters; Telephone Switching Centre; Areas throughout central Sarajevo; Unnamed hospital in Sarajevo; Hotel housing 60 EC monitors in Ilidža. Source(s): The New York Times; Helsinki Watch.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Six killed, 26 injured. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

118. Serbian shellfire, bullets and rockets hit the Sarajevo Radio and Television headquarters, which was a target of nearly daily barrages. At least nine mortar shells hit the Sarajevo television station which remained on the air throughout the day. Witnesses stated that they could hear the shouts of Serbian gunmen entrenched about 1,600 feet from the building. 131/

119. The attacks were reported from at least a dozen positions held by Serbian irregulars. Mortar shells fired from the hillsides exploded throughout central Sarajevo, including on the Radio and Television building and the telephone switching centre. 132/

120. A hospital in Sarajevo and a hotel housing 60 European Community monitors in Ilidža, about two miles west of the city limits, were among the targets of shelling and machinegun fire. 133/

121. Sarajevo radio said that at least six people were killed. Doctor's at the city's main trauma unit reported 26 people injured and that many were in critical condition. Officials said that the casualty toll was believed to be higher. Ambulances were unable to reach many areas because of sniper fire and shelling that set ablaze a downtown office building. The attacks, which occurred across the city, began at 5:00 a.m. while residents still slept. The attacks were called the fiercest to date. 134/

122. Fighting waned in the late afternoon, but heavy shelling resumed at about 8:00 p.m. 135/

(b) Local reported events

123. Captain Tomas Jarnehed, Commander of the Swedish army unit guarding the Radio and Television building, alleged that the JNA had used aeroplanes intended to evacuate military dependents to transport Serbian irregulars into Sarajevo. 136/

18. 22/4/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Ilidža was hit by machinegun, rocket and mortar
fire. As dusk fell, downtown Sarajevo was hit with intense artillery, mortar and machinegun fire. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Western area of Ilidža; the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation (Ilidža); Downtown area of Sarajevo; area near the Presidency building and an unidentified structure housing several relief agencies; area near the main telephone microwave facility; "one of the city's mosques", a 450 year-old library; an Islamic theological school and an unnamed Serbian landmark. Source(s): United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Swedish UNPROFOR soldiers were fired upon while trying to rescue more than 60 patients and staff at the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation (Ilidža). Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** Estimated that "at least 20 dead lying on the streets" and eight wounded outside the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation (Ilidža); one journalist wounded. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

124. The western Ilidža area reportedly witnessed the day's fiercest clashes with security forces exchanging machinegun, mortar and rocket fire with Serbian Democratic Party gunmen and "renegade Serbian Police". 137/

125. Shellfire ignited a fire at the Institute for Physical Therapy and Rehabilitation. The Swedish army security unit of the UN headquarters building responded by attempting to rescue more than 60 patients and staff. The UN stated that the Swedes were fired upon until the Serbian police chief of Ilidža came out and appealed to the gunmen to hold their fire. A UN spokesman stated that the Swedes picked up eight wounded. He quoted the head of the contingent, Captain Tomas Jarnehed as saying that he had seen "at least 20 dead lying on the streets". 138/

126. A MiG-29 jet JNA aircraft reportedly flew over the city in seven low-level passes in an apparent bid to dissuade fighting. 139/

127. As dusk fell, hillside Serbian forces unleashed intense artillery, mortar and machinegun fire into downtown areas of the city. 140/

128. Shells hit near the presidency building and a structure housing the offices of several international relief agencies. Red and white tracer rounds were sighted on streets near the main telephone microwave facility amid exploding shells and gunfire. 141/

129. Shrapnel from the shelling reportedly damaged one of the oldest of the city's 100-plus mosques, a 450 year-old library, an Islamic theological school and an unnamed Serbian landmark. 142/

130. Robert Colliers, a Zimbabwean-born cameraman from the London-based Visnews television agency, was wounded in the arm while covering fighting around the Bosna Hotel. 143/

(b) **Local reported events**

131. Government and EC officials said there were no indications that the JNA was involved as a cohesive force in the fighting. But senior government officials charged that JNA tanks joined Serbian guerrillas in barrages and
that the Yugoslav military also was providing the guerrillas with logistical support and protection. "The army gives all logistics to the Serbs and steps in at crucial moments," said Ejup Ganić, a Muslim member of the Republic's collective Presidency. 144/

132. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić reportedly claimed that he did not seek a union with Serbia, but rather a separate state. 145/

19. 23/4/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy fighting was reported on the outskirts of the city. After 10:00 p.m., the Old Town area was bombarded and artillery and machinegun fire was reported near the airport. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Olympic Museum; Old Baščaršija Section of Sarajevo. Source(s): New York Times.


Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

133. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers and snipers in flak jackets ringed Sarajevo's otherwise closed airport as Lord Carrington, chairman of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, and EC President Joao de Deus Pinheiro arrived. 146/ The warring sides agreed to abide by a cease-fire after talks with the EC officials. 147/

134. Within hours after the accord was signed, there were reports of heavy fighting in the outskirts of Sarajevo and along the fringes of the Republic. In a suburb of Sarajevo, small-arms and mortar fire erupted between local Serbs and Muslims. News services reported that a number of stray rounds whizzed by the hotel in central Sarajevo where the EC delegation was staying. 148/

135. Sarajevo radio reported fighting in Dobrinja, the journalists' village at the 1984 Winter Olympic games, and said the Olympic Museum was set on fire. The old Baščaršija region in the city centre was also damaged according to witnesses. 149/

136. After the 10:00 p.m. nightly curfew, reporters in the city said that Serb gunners in the mountains overlooking the city resumed artillery bombardment of the old Muslim quarter and that sustained bursts of artillery and machinegun fire could be heard from the area of the airport. 150/

(b) Local reported events

137. Lord Carrington and Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro reportedly negotiated a cease-fire signed by BiH President Izetbegović, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić, and Bosnian Croat representative Franjo Boras. 151/
(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight shelling was reported. At 7:00 a.m. there was a halt to the machinegun, artillery and mortar fire in Ilidža and on the edge of the airport. The rest of the day was relatively peaceful. Source(s): United Press International

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A paramedic was shot dead in Ilidža while trying to retrieve a wounded person. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

138. Sarajevo enjoyed a relatively peaceful day after all-night battles that erupted on the fringes of the city only hours after Muslims, Croats and Serbs signed an EC-brokered declaration reaffirming their support for a 12 April cease-fire accord. 152/

139. There was a 7:00 a.m. halt to the machinegun, artillery and mortar clashes that occurred between Muslim and Serbian-held neighbourhoods in the western suburb of Ilidža and at the edge of the nearby JNA-controlled city airport. 153/

140. A JNA officer confirmed that two tanks joined in shelling Muslim positions, saying that "artillery fire was opened on us". 154/

141. A police official reported that a paramedic was shot dead when his ambulance rushed to the area to retrieve a wounded person. 155/

142. Tensions remained high in Ilidža's Muslim dominated Butmir, Sokolovii and Gornji Kotorac areas after they were cordoned off by Serbian "guerrillas" who demanded that the Muslims surrender arms, Sarajevo Television reported. 156/

143. A Yugoslav armoured personnel carrier guarded the main approach to the Serb-controlled centre of Ilidža, and several tanks and armoured cars were deployed around a hotel housing EC monitors and foreign correspondents. 157/

(b) Local reported events

144. An EC official said that the Serbians denied an EC observer team access to Gornji Kotorac, and that several Muslim residents were seen leaving the area, apparently having been forced to abandon their homes. 158/

21. 25/4/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as being quiet throughout the day, despite the previous night of shooting. Shelling resumed in the evening. Source(s): Washington Post, Government of BiH.
Targets Hit: Museum of the XIV Winter Olympics. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Fire destroyed the entire interior of the Museum of the XIV Winter Olympics. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

145. Sarajevo was reported quiet throughout the day after a night of shooting between the warring factions. The Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency said that Serb militia had taken over a Muslim suburb without a fight. Although journalists were prevented from viewing the area, it was reported that a stream of Muslim refugees were seen heading away from the area. 159/

146. Sarajevo radio announced at 7:00 p.m. that the day had passed without any shooting in the city. 160/

147. However, at 8:30 p.m., according to a report, the Museum of the XIV Winter Olympics was hit by shelling. The ensuing flames destroyed the entire interior, the roof construction and the majority of displays. No one was injured. 161/

(b) Local reported events

148. The cantonization of the city appeared to be gaining momentum as several hundred residents, most of them women and children, took advantage of the lull in the fighting by getting on buses and leaving the capital. Many apartment buildings were reported empty. There were reported estimates that 20 to 30 per cent of the city's population had fled in the past two weeks. There were also thousands who moved to new neighbourhoods. Serbs had claimed the north side of the city for themselves and had asserted pressure on Muslims and Croats who lived there to move elsewhere. 162/

149. Road transport south from Sarajevo remained blocked. 163/

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22. 26/4/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as mostly peaceful except for occasional sniper fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Two people were reportedly killed by sniper fire. Source(s): Sarajevo Radio, United Press International.

Casualties: Four killed. Source(s): Sarajevo Radio, United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

150. The situation in Sarajevo was mostly peaceful except for occasional
sniper fire that killed two people, according to Sarajevo Radio. 164/

151. At least two people were killed at night in a shooting incident outside the headquarters of the JNA's Second Military District, officials said. The incident began when gunmen fired on the building from a passing car. JNA officials said the car came by a second time and sentries opened fire, killing the two occupants. But police said that the sentries mistakenly fired on a different automobile. 165/

23. 27/4/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After a three day truce, artillery and machinegun fire was reported in suburbs on the edge of the city. The city centre was reported to be quiet. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: "Three Muslim suburbs on the edge of the city" (shells originated from Ilidža district); Centre for Social Work. Source(s): The New York Times; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Not specified. Source(s): The New York Times; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One report estimated that 500 people had been injured in the Muslim suburbs of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

152. Shelling began after BiH ordered federal Yugoslav troops off its territory. Serb forces in Sarajevo opened up with artillery and heavy machineguns, shattering a three-day truce. Serbian irregulars shelled three Muslim suburbs on the edge of the city. The Serbs said that they had been fired on first, but witnesses saw only outgoing fire from the Serb-held south-western Ilidža district. The centre of Sarajevo remained quiet. 166/

153. The Centre for Social Work Sarajevo was shelled on this day, according to a report from the Government of BiH. 167/

154. Reuters reported that an estimated 500 people in the Muslim suburbs of Sarajevo, had been injured in the two days of fighting. Journalists were prevented from viewing the area. Refugees from Donji Kotorac said that more than half of the area's homes had been destroyed in heavy shelling. 168/

(b) Local reported events

155. Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the establishment of a new truncated Yugoslav nation. In an accompanying declaration to their Constitution, leaders said the new nation, to be called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, "has no territorial claims" on neighbouring republics. 169/

156. The BiH Presidency formally demanded the withdrawal of the JNA, but Serb generals claimed that they were entitled to remain in BiH's Serb-dominated areas. 170/

157. Heavily armed Serbs were reported to have manned roadblocks on the
outskirts of the city, stopping nearly all deliveries of food, according to Fabrizio Hochschild of UNHCR. 171/

24. 28/4/92 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

158. No reported incidents.

25. 29/4/92 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The Old Town area was hit in the evening by repeated mortar and machinegun fire. Intense artillery and mortar fire began in the evening and continued until near midnight. Neighbourhoods were reportedly shelled from dusk to dawn. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch; United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Baščaršija area and other parts of the Old Town. Source(s): The Washington Post; United Press International; Radio Sarajevo.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least two killed and 15 wounded. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; The Washington Post; United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

159. After several days of respite from attacks, Sarajevo's historic Muslim dominated old city was hit in the evening by repeated mortar and machinegun fire from Serbian guerilla positions on surrounding hills. 172/ Intense artillery and mortar fire began in the evening and reportedly continued near midnight. 173/

160. Muslim neighbourhoods were reportedly bombarded from dusk to dawn by "local Serb insurgents and paramilitary units operating from Serbia". According to Mirsad Tokaca, a Sarajevo police spokesman, the bombardment began at 8:00 p.m. on Wednesday and continued until about 2:00 a.m. Thursday. It was reported that these forces were equipped with heavy mortars and field guns supplied by the JNA. Local officials said that at least two persons were killed and 15 were injured. 174/

161. According to Radio Sarajevo, shells hit the streets of the Baščaršija,
the centuries-old Turkish-built centre of the city, and other parts of the old town. JNA tanks deployed at the suburban Butmir airport reportedly participated in the shelling. A JNA spokesman said troops at the airport were first attacked by the city's security forces. 175/

(b) Local reported events

162. The shelling of Sarajevo and Mostar followed what "appeared to be a false report by state-run media in Serbia" that BiH defence forces had been ordered to launch "combat actions" against army bases in the Republic. BiH officials denied issuing such an order. 176/

(c) International reported events

163. All three delegations at the peace conference in Lisbon showed their support for the arrival of UNPROFOR in the republic, saying that this would be of considerable importance for the preservation of peace. 177/

164. The UN and EC announced that it would dispatch a senior official to BiH to examine the feasibility of peacekeeper deployment. 178/

26. 30/4/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

165. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

166. The city's electric tram services were restored after workmen repaired overhead power cables destroyed by shelling. 179/

(c) International reported events

167. The CSCE granted membership to BiH. 180/
B. May 1992

1. 1/5/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight shelling of the city was reported. Tank fire was reported in suburbs near the airport. Gun battles were reported near the city centre. Shelling was also reported in the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Old Town area; "Suburbs near the airport". Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least 13 people were killed. Source(s): Helsinki Watch.

Narrative of Events:

168. Sarajevo and Croatian radio reported an overnight artillery attack on Sarajevo. Radovan Karadžić denied charges of Serbian shelling and said that the Muslims had been shelling their own people in Sarajevo. 181

169. News reports said JNA tanks had fired on several heavily populated suburbs near the airport after reportedly coming under fire. Later, gun battles erupted in the city centre around an unidentified neighbourhood controlled by Serbs. Shells were also reported to be falling on the city's predominantly Muslim old quarter. 182

170. At least 13 people were reported killed in Sarajevo. 183

(b) International reported events

171. The European Community announced that it was suspending peace talks between the factions in BiH because Serbia had failed to withdraw artillery blockades around Sarajevo. 184

2. 2/5/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Old Town was shelled in the morning, a major artillery attack began at 1:00 p.m., and fighting continued well into the night. Source(s): New York Times; Government of BiH.

Targets Hit: Area near Old Town; "Main business and shopping district"; Maršal Tito Street; Sarajevo Radio-Television building; Public transportation network (main location and other locations throughout the city); Centre for Social Work; "Skenderija" Olympic Centre. Source(s): New York Times; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Maršal Tito Street was filled with broken glass, roof tiles and concrete. Government buildings were reported ablaze. The Centre for Social Work suffered serious damage. Source(s): New York Times; Government of BiH.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Civilian numbers not reported; at least three JNA soldiers killed and six wounded. Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

172. Fighting erupted in the morning after Serb mortar shells began falling near the city's old Muslim quarter. A major artillery attack began soon after 1:00 P.M. and fighting continued well into the night. Mortar and tank shells were fired for hours directly into the main business and shopping district. The city's main thoroughfare, Maršal Tito Street, was filled with broken glass, roof tiles and concrete. Street battles raged around the sports hall used for the figure skating competition in the 1984 Olympic Games. Hundreds of people walking in the downtown area were caught in the streets when the attack began. They ran for shelter into bars, basements and entrance halls. The shelling subsided somewhat after two officials of the BiH Presidency, engaged in a live televised debate with JNA officials (on Sarajevo television), and agreed to a cease-fire and allowed UN peace-keeping forces to collect the dead and wounded. 185/

173. The fighting pitted army tanks and armoured personnel carriers backing the Serbs against heavily armed militiamen fighting for the Muslim and Croat populations. At dusk, with the fighting continuing, reporters on the scene described blazing government buildings, bodies of fighters and civilians lying on the street for hours after the fighting began, artillery and mortar shells coming from the hills, and of close-range fighting in the narrow alleys of the Baščaršija district in the heart of the old Muslim city. 186/

174. According to a report from the Government of BiH the Radio-Television Sarajevo building was shelled. 187/ The Sarajevo public transportation network was also shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city. 188/ The Centre for Social Work Sarajevo, and the Olympic centre "Skenderija" were also shelled on this day. The Centre for Social Work Sarajevo has suffered serious damage and cannot be occupied without extensive repairs. 189/

175. The JNA's regional commander, General Milutin Kukanjac, said that BiH forces provoked the JNA attack by assaulting an army installation in the downtown area and later firing on a convoy, killing at least three soldiers and wounding six others. General Kukanjac stated that "the Yugoslav National Army in no way provoked this attack, it was clearly planned in advance". BiH officials, however, said that JNA troops inside the downtown installation opened fire without provocation on a city bus full of civilians. Neither of the two stories were confirmed. The JNA said that all of its installations in the Sarajevo area came under attack. 190/

(b) Local reported events

176. The JNA reportedly held BiH President Alija Izetbegović at the Lukavica barracks outside Sarajevo after capturing him when he arrived at Sarajevo airport from the EC-mediated peace talks in Lisbon. 191/

3. 3/5/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting continued until early into the day.
Fighting was said to have subsided in the early hours. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Main Post Office; the Baščaršija area; the Gazi Husref Begova Mosque; Maršal Tito Street. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Main Post Office was reported in flames; All of the windows in the Baščaršija area were reportedly broken; The Gazi Husref Begova Mosque was hit twice by cannon fire--a chunk was blown out of the base of its minaret, and gravestones in the nearby cemetery were chipped by shrapnel; buildings along Maršal Tito Street had huge holes blown in them. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Snipers reportedly prevented ambulances from reaching large numbers of dead and wounded in the city. Source(s): New York Times.

**Casualties:** Ten reported killed as of the morning; At least 15 JNA soldiers were reportedly killed in weekend street warfare; two JNA soldiers and two colonels were reportedly killed in an ambush. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

**Narrative of Events:**

177. Fighting between Serbian forces and BiH fighters continued into early Sunday despite an attempt at a cease-fire by the European Community. Serb forces were said to have launched mortar shells into Sarajevo from nearby hills despite a truce agreed to on Saturday night by the Serb-led JNA and Muslim and Croat forces. Sarajevo radio, monitored by the British Broadcasting Corporation, reported that artillery fire had died down by early Sunday. At least 10 people were known to have been killed in Sarajevo. 192/

178. A reported tank and artillery battle in the centre of the city lasted from Saturday afternoon to early Monday. Damaged and destroyed buildings included the main post office, a structure dating from the Austro-Hungarian empire, which was in flames. All of the windows were reportedly broken in the Baščaršija, the medieval part of the city. The Gazi Husref Begova Mosque, the oldest in the Balkans, built in 1531, was hit twice by cannon fire and a chunk was blown out of the base of its minaret. Gravestones in the nearby cemetery were chipped by shrapnel. Buildings all along Maršal Tito Street had huge holes blown into them. 193/

179. Witnesses said that at least 15 JNA soldiers were killed in weekend street warfare between the factions in the centre of the city. 194/ The charred bodies of 10 JNA soldiers and several civilians lay all day on a main street across the Miljacka River from the ice rink used for the 1984 Olympics. Sniper fire prevented ambulance crews from reaching large numbers of the dead and wounded. 195/

180. BiH forces reportedly ambushed a JNA convoy traveling in Sarajevo after the JNA released President Izetbegović, who had been detained on Saturday. European Community representative Colin Doyle, who negotiated the exchange of Izetbegović for 500 troops and their commander, General Milutin Kukanjac, said that he was told that several soldiers were killed in the ambush after some trucks in the convoy were seized after leaving a command post blockaded by the Bosnians. The victims were described as being "killed, stripped naked". At least two soldiers and two colonels were reported killed. 196/

(b) **Local reported events**

181. Fighting subsided in the early hours as the JNA prepared to release the
detained president of BiH, Alija Izetbegović. The Tanjug news agency quoted the Yugoslav Defence Ministry as saying that Izetbegović would be handed over during the morning to an official of the UN peace-keeping forces and an EC peace monitor. The army said it detained Izetbegović for his own safety at Sarajevo airport as fighting continued between federal forces and Muslim and Croat forces. Tanjug and Sarajevo radio said that the bombardment of the city died down in the early hours of Sunday and that the city centre was calm again by dawn. 197/

4. 4/5/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery fire was reported throughout the city. Heavy shelling resumed in the city with tanks, artillery and mortar fire. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo Television transmission tower; Area of Trebevi Mountain. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: Shelling of Sarajevo Television transmission tower forced the station off the air. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Four JNA soldiers killed and 15 wounded in prior day's ambush. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

182. Artillery fire was heard throughout the city as the JNA demanded the release of soldiers captured in the prior day's ambush by BiH forces. European Community envoy Doyle said that the army was threatening to kill a detained bodyguard of BiH President Alija Izetbegović (Narudin Imamovic), if the soldiers were not freed. Over 100 men were believed to have been seized in Sunday's ambush. The ambush violated a safe conduct negotiated by Doyle and General John MacKenzie, a representative of the UN peacekeepers. The military hospital in Sarajevo said that it had received 15 wounded soldiers and the bodies of four others killed. 198/

183. Early in the day, the 156 Yugoslav soldiers captured by BiH defence forces were freed and led to safety by UN monitors. 199/

184. Shortly afterward, heavy shelling resumed in the city with tanks, artillery and mortars. Sarajevo television went briefly off the air after its transmission tower was hit by a shell. 200/ At the same time, pro-BiH militiamen with rifles and shoulder-launched rockets darted door to door through apartment blocks and fired into the Serb-occupied hills north and south of town. 201/

185. In the afternoon, JNA jet fighters made at least four sorties over the city. Radio reports said two MiG-29's rocketed targets on Trebevi Mountain, overlooking Sarajevo's old quarter. 202/

186. Muslim and Croat territorial defence units surrounded the Viktor Bubanj army barracks, just hours before UN envoy Marrack Goulding was to arrive in Sarajevo on a peace mission. Fighting intensified in the evening. 203/
(b) Local reported events

187. Belgrade announced that it in 15 days it would pull federal soldiers who were citizens of FRY out of BiH. Reuters observed that most of the federal troops in BiH were Serbs of Bosnian nationality, thus making this act of little impact. 204/

188. BiH President Izetbegović formally requested foreign military intervention in an evening news conference due to unending and persistent aggression on BiH. 205/

5. 5/5/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy fighting was reported between Serb, Croat and Muslim militiamen in the city. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Entourage of EC envoy shelled. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

189. Sarajevo Radio said that the city's streets were littered with corpses and that many buildings were ablaze after fierce overnight fighting between Muslims and Serbs. 206/

190. Heavy fighting in and around Sarajevo among Serb, Croat and Muslim militiamen delayed a meeting between UN envoy Marrack Goulding and BiH officials for six hours, and when he finally arrived, his entourage came under a mortar attack. No one was injured. 207/

(b) Local reported events

191. The British Broadcasting Corporation reported that EC peace monitors began a partial withdrawal of non-essential members at dawn. 208/

192. In the evening, the EC special envoy to BiH negotiated a 24 hour truce to allow for an exchange of prisoners, collection of dead, distribution of medicine and the establishment of a telephone hot-line between the army and the BiH leadership. Reports indicated that the cease-fire was widely violated. 209/

6. 6/5/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic explosions and sniper activity were reported but the cease-fire was for the most part, largely respected. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Snipers fired around UN envoy Marrack Goulding and BiH President Alija Izetbegović as they inspected damage to the medieval sector of Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Western photographers counted 70 bodies, including those of 14 soldiers at a hospital morgue. Two unidentified morgues reported that they had at least 115 bodies, the product of shelling that started on Saturday. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

193. A cease-fire called to halt heavy fighting, held in the city during the night, as political leaders prepared for more peace talks. Only sporadic firing was reported in the centre of the city. 210/

194. Snipers fired bullets around UN envoy Marrack Goulding and BiH President Alija Izetbegović as they inspected damage to the medieval sector of Sarajevo. The two men drove off quickly to safety as UN soldiers took cover behind their vehicles. Commenting on the city's damage, Goulding stated, "I could understand if military targets were being attacked but this does seem to be random shelling of a largely civilian area". 211/

195. Despite sporadic explosions and sniper activity, the cease-fire was largely respected. Both sides used the lull to recover bodies of the dead lying in the streets. Western photographers counted 70 bodies, including those of 14 soldiers at a hospital morgue. Two unidentified morgues reported that they had at least 115 bodies, the product of intense shelling by Serb forces that started Saturday 212/

7. 7/5/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An artillery barrage in Ilidža was reported. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

196. Fighting broke out in the evening, ending a lull in clashes between Serb and BiH forces. The fighting continued after midnight and into Friday morning but witnesses contacted by telephone said that the centre of the city was relatively quiet. 213/

197. Antonio Santos, head of the EC delegation in Sarajevo reported a serious artillery barrage in the Ilidža suburb. 214/
(b) Local reported events

198. Negotiations were reportedly held on the peaceful withdrawal of the JNA. 215/

8. 8/5/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported across the city and a large number of casualties were reported in Hrasnica. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Unspecified large number of casualties. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

199. Fighting between Muslims and Serbs was reported across the city. Local radio reports stated that many people had been killed or wounded. Sarajevo radio appealed to ambulance teams to go to the suburb of Hrasnica to treat a large number of casualties. 216/

(b) Local reported events

200. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević carried out a massive and unprecedented purge of the JNA, firing the defence minister and 37 other senior generals and admirals. The New York Times reported that command had been turned over to officers who were known to be hard-line Serbian nationalists and firm supporters of Milošević. 217/ The forced retirement was announced of Colonel General Blagoje Adi, the 56 year-old officer who was the Acting Defence Minister and Chief of the Army's general staff in overall operational control of the army throughout the fighting in the three republics. The announcement from the Yugoslav Federal Presidency also said that Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, the commander of the Second Army District, and his deputy, Major General Milan Aksentijević, headquartered in Sarajevo, had been relieved of their duties. 218/

9. 9/5/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling resumed in the Ilidža area. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Ilidža area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

201. Shelling reportedly resumed in the Ilidža area south-west of Sarajevo following reports of widespread fighting across the Republic. 219/

10. 10/5/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported to have died down in the city as Serb forces were said to have seized the western suburbs. Source(s): Washington Post; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Serbian forces were reported to be shooting into cars from high-rise buildings overlooking a highway. Source(s): The Washington Post.

Casualties: Seventeen corpses were reported at the morgue at the emergency medical centre. Source(s): The Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

202. Serbian forces were reported to have seized the western suburbs, periodically shooting into cars from high-rise buildings overlooking a highway. 220/

203. Fighting was reported to have died down in the city. 221/

204. The Washington Post reported 17 corpses at the morgue at the emergency medical centre. 222/

(b) Local reported events

205. General Ratko Mladic was named the commander of the federal army forces at Sarajevo. 223/

206. The New York Times reported that weeks of fighting and the halting of regular food deliveries had emptied shops in Sarajevo, and that throughout the city, people line up on street corners to buy bread from delivery trucks. 224/ Serbian forces were reported to have prevented relief deliveries. 225/

207. The Muslim high school was reported closed for the first time in 453 years and was being used as a centre for 400 elderly people and families with young children. 226/

11. 11/5/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Attacks were reported on the city overnight and a heavy Serb artillery and mortar barrage was reported during the day. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Presidency Building; unidentified mosque in Butmir. Source(s):
**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least four killed overnight; at least 28 killed during the day. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

**Narrative of Events:**

208. Sarajevo officials said that at least four people were killed in attacks on the city overnight. Several shells landed near the presidency building and a new attack began after dawn. 227/

209. Serb forces used heavy mortars, field guns and rocket launchers from the grounds of an unidentified Ilidža hotel used by EC monitors in an attack on besieged Butmir. Colm Doyle, special envoy of EC peace negotiator Lord Carrington, stated that this was the first time that he had heard "such rockets" used around Sarajevo. The shelling was reportedly directed at a mosque in the Muslim village of Butmir which had been cut off for three weeks. The EC said it planned to try to get food to Butmir and nearby Sokolovii and Hrasnica, both which were isolated by heavy fighting. 228/

210. It was reported that at least 28 more people were killed in a JNA artillery and mortar barrage on Sarajevo during the day. 229/

(b) **Local reported events**

211. The Washington Post reported that international agencies based in Sarajevo were on the verge of pulling out of the city. "The risks are almost intolerable", said a UN spokesman. He added that "criminality and anarchy" were increasing daily. 230/ Unidentified Serbian militiamen reportedly stopped two UN jeeps carrying armed members of the UN peace-keeping mission at a roadblock and stole their weapons and their vehicles. Over the weekend, Serb forces seized two trucks belonging to the International Committee of the Red Cross which had announced tentative plans to leave the city. 231/

(c) **International reported events**

212. EC foreign ministers decided to recall their ambassadors from Belgrade for consultations and to seek the suspension of Yugoslavia from the CSCE. "The killings and expulsion of populations--the siege and the systematic shelling of Sarajevo, the holding of Sarajevo airport preventing safe passage of humanitarian relief from the ICRC, are actions deserving universal condemnation", a statement said. It also urged the reopening of Sarajevo airport under conditions of safety to allow the distribution of humanitarian aid. 232/

12. **12/5/92 (Tuesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The Dobrinja area and Sarajevo Television were hit by shellfire. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Sarajevo Television building (two missiles); Sarajevo Television
tower (hit seven times by tank fire); the Dobrinja District. Source(s): The New York Times; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Serious damage caused by two missiles striking the Sarajevo Television building. Source(s): The New York Times; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

213. Belgrade-based Tanjug reported that Sarajevo television said that two guided missiles slammed into its building causing serious damage but no casualties. Another report stated that the building's television tower was hit seven times by tank fire. 233/

214. Sarajevo Radio reported that Serb forces fired shells into the Dobrinja district of Sarajevo and that three people had been killed in the city. 234/

(b) Local reported events

215. European Commission headquarters in Zagreb announced that it was withdrawing the last 12 EC monitors from Sarajevo because the situation in the city had deteriorated. 235/

(c) International reported events

216. The European Community reportedly pulled its ambassadors out of Yugoslavia. The United States reportedly recalled Yugoslav Ambassador Zimmerman and the CSCE prohibited Yugoslavia's representative from participating in a discussion on the war. 236/

13. 13/5/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was mostly stilled after a cease-fire went into effect at 6:00 a.m.. There was sporadic gunfire reported from the surrounding hillsides. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: The Sarajevo public transportation network was shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Reuters reported that doctors at Sarajevo's main casualty hospital estimated that they had received an average of five to 15 wounded sniper victims each day. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

217. A Serb self-imposed cease-fire brought relative peace to the city. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali urged the withdrawal of the UN command headquarters' staff in the city. 237/
218. Artillery, mortar and rocket fire in Sarajevo was mostly stilled after the cease-fire went into effect at 6:00 a.m. The calm was broken only sporadically thereafter by gunfire from Serbian positions in the hills above the city. 238/

219. The Sarajevo public transportation network was shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city according to a report submitted by the Government of BiH. 239/

(b) Local reported events

220. Reuters reported that doctors at Sarajevo's main casualty hospital estimated that they had received an average of five to 15 wounded sniper victims each day. 240/

(c) International reported events

221. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 752, calling for Yugoslavia to cease its interference in BiH and to start demobilizing its troops stationed there. 241/

222. At the recommendation of United Nations Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Goulding, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that a BiH peace effort was "not feasible", given the brutal pitch of the fighting. He warned that the peace plan was being jeopardized by the Croatian Serbs' refusal to demobilize and also ordered UN troops to withdraw from their base in Sarajevo. 242/

14. 14/5/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling of the city began just before 7:00 a.m. Fighting spread across the city, affecting whole neighbourhoods with gun battles reported to be the heaviest since the siege began. Shelling was reported throughout the city and suburbs. Source(s): United Press International; Helsinki Watch; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Area close to the Presidency; the apartment blocks and town house settlements of Dobrinja, Mojmilo, Sokolović Kolonija, Donji Kotorac, Butmir and Hrasnica; the Bosna Hotel (Ilidža); the UN headquarters; the Rainbow Hotel (occupied by UN peacekeepers); the Sarajevo public transportation network at its main location and at others throughout the city. Source(s): United Press International; Helsinki Watch; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Columns of smoke were reported in Mojmilo; Several mortar rounds hit the Bosna Hotel, tearing chunks out of at least one balcony; the UN headquarters were hit by five mortar rounds and 12 UN trucks were destroyed. Source(s): United Press International; Helsinki Watch; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: One bullet was fired into the office of BiH President Izetbegović. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Forty Bosnian Muslims were reported wounded or killed during the day. Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

223. Canadian Army General Lewis McKenzie, commander of the Sarajevo headquarters of the UN peace-keeping operation in Croatia said that it appeared that fighting began in Sarajevo when the city's security forces tried at about 5:00 a.m. to break through the Serbian encirclement at the Serb-held western suburb of Ilidža. 243/ "We saw an attack coming into Ilidža from the west. Our impression was that the Muslims were trying to move into that location", he said, adding that the security forces appeared to have captured half of the suburb. He said that in retaliation, Serb-dominated JNA forces began shelling Sarajevo just before 7:00 a.m.. 244/ Government officials had been warning for days that their security forces were becoming increasingly desperate with the Serbian siege, and that they planned to break out of Sarajevo to reach food and medical stockpiles in the Muslim-held town of Visoko. 245/

224. The fighting spread across the city, affecting whole neighbourhoods. Gun battles were reported to be the heaviest since the siege began. Interior Ministry officials said that Serbian guerrillas and JNA troops unleashed shellfire from hilltops into the capital and that mortar rounds landed close to the presidency building. They said the fighting and barrages were fiercest in the densely populated apartment block and town house settlements of Dobrinja, Mojmilo, Šokolović Kolonija, Donji Kotorac, Butmir and Hrasnica, all located near Ilidža and the JNA-controlled Sarajevo airport. 246/

225. Sarajevo television showed fires burning around the city and broadcast footage of clashes for the control of Dobrinja, with security forces and Serbian guerrillas trading gunfire between apartment blocks. A Muslim Slav woman reached by the UPI by telephone in Dobrinja, which had been surrounded for almost two weeks by Serbian forces, reported similar clashes in nearby Mojmilo. "We can see columns of smoke pouring out of Mojmilo and shells are coming down in the apartment blocks around us. Several cars are burning in our parking lot", she said, adding that Serbian guerrillas cut electricity to the area in the morning. 247/

226. Fierce fighting trapped foreign journalists in the Bosna Hotel in the western suburb of Ilidža, which had been the headquarters of the European Community monitoring mission before it withdrew earlier in the week for security reasons. Several mortar rounds slammed into the hotel, tearing chunks out of the balcony of the room used as an editing studio by the British Broadcasting Corporation. No one was reported injured. The Bosna Hotel was reported as one of several hotels in a hot springs complex that had been used as bases by fighters of the JNA supported Serbian Democratic Party. Serbian fighters entrenched around the complex responded to incoming fire with mortar, artillery and heavy machinegun blasts into nearby Sokolovii Kolonija. A Serbian statement declared Ilidža "a war zone", banned foreign reporters from filming fighting or military equipment, and warned that travel into the city was risky. 248/

227. There was also heavy fighting around the JNA's Viktor Bubanj barracks in New Sarajevo near the UN headquarters about two miles from the city centre. The barracks were reported to be one of the several military bases in Sarajevo that the JNA had failed to abandon after agreeing to withdraw from the city. 249/

228. The Washington Post reported that "artillery fire from Serbian forces ringing the city rained down on nearly every neighborhood". The UN headquarters were hit by five mortar rounds and 12 UN trucks were destroyed by the Serb shelling. Mortar rounds slammed into the Rainbow Hotel occupied by UN peacekeepers, trapping 250 of them in a basement shelter. The UN said that it
would withdraw its 300 personnel for security reasons. Casualties were uncounted because ambulances could not travel across lines of fire. 250/

229. The Sarajevo public transportation network was shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city, according to a report submitted by the Government of BiH. 251/

230. Sarajevo radio reported that in the early evening a Serbian sniper bullet smashed through the window of BiH President Alija Izetbegović's downtown office while he was inside. No one was reported injured. 252/

231. Sarajevo Radio reported 40 Bosnian Muslims wounded or killed during Thursday's fighting which ended at about midnight. 253/

15. 15/5/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as calm early as the forces regrouped. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

232. Sarajevo was reported as calm early as Serb and Muslim forces regrouped after a day of tank and artillery battles. 254/

16. 16/5/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Street fighting, heavy artillery and tank shelling was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least seven killed, 84 wounded received at Koševu Hospital. Source(s): Reuters, New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

233. A convoy of 200 United Nations peacekeepers left Sarajevo amid reported shelling and street fighting in the city. About 150 soldiers and unarmed military observers were scheduled to remain behind. 255/

234. Street fighting, heavy artillery and tank shelling prompted Radio Belgrade to call Sarajevo "a city of fire". At least seven people were
reported killed. 256/ Mufid Lazić, Chief Surgeon at the Koševno Hospital, said that 84 wounded were received. 257/

17. 17/5/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Muslim-populated districts on the outskirts of the city were reportedly shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings (suppliers of flour, bread, etc.); "Muslim-populated districts on the outskirts of the city". Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Government of BiH; Reuters.

Description of Damage: One journalist killed in shelling of Dobrinja. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Government of BiH; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One journalist killed, one journalist wounded; six killed. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

235. A second convoy of 80 UN peacekeepers pulled out of the city (leaving approximately 120 UN soldiers in Sarajevo), just hours before shoot-outs flared out around the Maršal Tito army barracks in the city's centre. One policeman was reported killed. 258/

236. Jordi Pujol Puente, a 25 year-old photographer for Spain's daily Avui was killed by an exploding mortar shell in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja. David Brauchli, a photographer for the Associated Press was wounded by shrapnel in the head, arm and groin. 259/

237. The Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings were shelled on this day. Klas-Šarko and Velepekara were the only suppliers of essential foodstuffs (flour, bread, dough, and pastries) for the city after the siege began on 5 April 1992. 260/

238. Serbs were reported to have shelled Muslim-populated districts on the outskirts of the medieval city. Rival gunmen were also reported to have fought house-to-house battles. Witnesses said the dead lay in the streets but ambulances were unable to reach them. 261/ Six people were reported killed in the fighting. 262/

(b) Local reported events

239. Sarajevo journalists said that the weekend bombardment and street-to-street fighting appeared to have cut the capital in two, isolating its Muslim-held suburbs. 263/

18. 18/5/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The downtown area of the city was reported shelled. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: ICRC convoy; area near the Oslobodjenje building; Downtown Sarajevo. Source(s): Associated Press; United States Government; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Two ICRC workers wounded and one killed in shelling of convoy, 4.5 tons of medicine was destroyed. Source(s): Associated Press; United States Government; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two ICRC workers wounded, one killed. Source(s): Associated Press; United States Government.

Narrative of Events:

240. Residents in the Dobrinja district west of Sarajevo said that Yugoslav fighter jets flew low over the area but had not attacked. 264/

241. Sarajevo journalists said Serb forces had ordered local people to evacuate the district of Grbavica, west of Sarajevo, in what appeared to be a consolidation of their positions near the centre of the city. 265/

242. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Serbian forces attacked an ICRC convoy carrying food and medical relief as it entered Sarajevo. Two ICRC staff members were wounded (Ivan Lali and Roland Sidler) and one (Frederic Maurice), was killed (he died in Sarajevo Hospital the next day). The attack also reportedly destroyed 4.5 tons of medicine. 266/

243. Sarajevo radio reported shells and tracer bullets falling near the headquarters of Oslobodjenje, the main Bosnian newspaper publishing company. Downtown Sarajevo was also reported shelled. 267/

(b) Local reported events

244. Serb, Muslim and Croat leaders agreed to a UN brokered 21 day cease-fire in Sarajevo during which Yugoslav federal forces were to withdraw from BiH, but fresh shelling erupted in the evening shortly after the truce. 268/

19. 19/5/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery, mortar and small-arms fire intensified in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

245. The BiH presidency said that Yugoslav federal troops were pinned down in their two main city barracks by Muslim and Croat shooting, preventing phased evacuations agreed to in the latest cease-fire agreement reached on Monday. 269/
246. In the evening, Serbian gunmen halted a column of about 1,000 cars, 20 buses and 10 vans in the suburb of Ilidža as refugees attempted to leave Sarajevo for Split. Approximately 5,000 civilians were reportedly taken hostage. 270/

247. Artillery, mortar and small-arms fire intensified in the city. Sarajevo police said that Serb gunmen ordered residents of several Muslim districts to leave their apartments in order to solidify Serb emplacements in the city. 271/

(b) Local reported events

248. Representatives of Bosnian Muslims and Croats reportedly agreed to form a confederation with the neighbouring Republic of Croatia. 272/

249. Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev met with Slobodan Milošević on a four day peace mission in Yugoslavia, agreeing that the crisis must be resolved in a peaceful manner. 273/

250. The UNHCR reported that 1.2 million people (one quarter of BiH's pre-war population), had become refugees in the course of the war. 274/

20. 20/5/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

251. Late in the afternoon, two armoured vehicles belonging to the United Nations peace-keeping force in Sarajevo were turned back by Serbian gunmen at a roadblock when the peacekeepers tried to enter Ilidža. According to Sarajevo and UN officials, they came under artillery fire on their return to their headquarters a few miles away. 275/

(b) Local reported events

252. The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross said that Monday's attack on clearly marked Red Cross vehicles appeared to have been deliberate. The organization temporarily withdrew its eight staffers from Sarajevo. 276/

253. Serbian leaders said that they would not release the 5,000 women, children and elderly people being held until the BiH government lifted blockades of JNA barracks and met other conditions. 277/
(c) **International reported events**

254. Signalling a more active stance, the Bush Administration prohibited the Yugoslav National Airline from landing on US soil. 278/

21. **21/5/92 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sporadic artillery and gunfire was reported around the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Olympic Complex "Zetra" (used by humanitarian organizations). Source(s): Government of BiH.

**Description of Damage:** Three to four shells hit and set ablaze the Olympic Complex "Zetra". Source(s): Government of BiH.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Three killed overnight. Source(s): Red Cross; Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

255. At 11:55 a.m., according to a report from the Government of BiH, three to four shells fell on the roof of the large auditorium of the Olympic complex "Zetra". The building was subject to infantry fire even as firefighters and volunteers tried to extinguish the blaze. The building was being used by humanitarian organizations (including Doctors Without Borders, UNHCR, and Caritas), and as a shelter for refugees. 279/

256. There was sporadic artillery and gunfire reported around Sarajevo and Red Cross sources in the city said that three people were killed overnight. 280/

(b) **Local reported events**

257. UN officials reported that the 5,000 Bosnian refugees held hostage for two days by Serb gunmen were released after a deal was made between BiH's Presidency and the JNA. The refugees then left Ilidža and set out for Split. Fabrizio Hochschild of the UNHCR said that the Serbs released the group in exchange for safe passage for the JNA out of its Sarajevo barracks. 281/

258. There was no indication when the JNA troops would be allowed to leave. 282/

22. **22/5/92 (Friday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was bombarded overnight and sniper and machinegun fire was reported in the morning. The main railway station was shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** City bombarded overnight; the main railway station. Source(s): Reuters.
Description of Damage: Two unidentified buildings were ablaze. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Sniping activity was reported in the morning. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

259. Sniper and machine gun fire reportedly filled the streets of the city in the morning. The violence followed a mobilization order for Bosnian Serbs issued by General Ratko Mladić, the JNA officer commanding the forces of Serbian Republic of BiH. Journalists at Sarajevo radio said that the city had been bombarded by mortar and artillery fire overnight and that two buildings were ablaze. 283/

260. The Tanjug news agency reported that the JNA would leave its four barracks in Sarajevo over the weekend. Federal soldiers and cadets pinned down in their bases would be guaranteed safe passage out of the city under the accord reached with BiH's Presidency. 284/

261. Sarajevo police said that shortly after the accord was signed, artillery batteries in the army's huge Maršal Tito Barracks shelled the city's main railway station. 285/

(b) International reported events

262. The United Nations General Assembly formally admitted BiH, Croatia and Slovenia. 286/

263. US Secretary of State Baker announced that Yugoslavia's consulates in New York and San Francisco would be closed and its military attaches expelled from Washington. He described the situation in the Balkans as a "humanitarian nightmare". 287/

23. 23/5/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as quiet until the afternoon when machinegun fire hit the suburbs. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

264. The city was quiet until the afternoon when machinegun fire raked the suburbs. 288/
b) **Local reported events**

265. BiH military commander Colonel Vehbija Karić accused the JNA of ignoring a promise to start evacuating its remaining troops from four barracks in the city. The army's withdrawal was scheduled to have started at 8:00 a.m. and was to have been completed by Sunday evening under the agreement between the BiH government and senior officers. 289/

24. 24/5/92 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Overnight artillery fire and street fighting was reported. The city was described as relatively calm during the day. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Several buildings in the centre and old part of the city were reportedly on fire after Saturday's shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

266. A relatively calm Sarajevo was poised for withdrawal of JNA troops after overnight artillery fire and street fighting. Tanjug reported that several buildings in the centre and the old part of the city were on fire after Saturday night's shelling. Bosnian Serb authorities accused the Muslims and Croats of shelling buildings and then cutting off water in those parts of town to keep fire fighters from putting them out. 290/

(b) **Local reported events**

267. The JNA evacuated one of the garrisons in the city without incident. About 300 soldiers and Serb irregulars withdrew in a column of trucks and armoured vehicles, including one tank, to a town two and a half miles outside of Sarajevo. Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces entrenched along the route fired their weapons skyward, but did not shoot at the soldiers. An army official said that the troops had begun leaving a second garrison and that the operation would be continued on Monday. 291/

(c) **International reported events**

268. At the "Lisbon Conference", US Secretary of State Baker reprimanded his European cohorts for not forcefully confronting the war in the former Yugoslavia. He said that "anyone who is looking for reasons not to act, or arguing somehow that action in the face of this kind of nightmare is not warranted at this time ... is on the wrong wave-length". He recommended Chapter Seven sanctions, saying "before we consider force, we ought to exhaust all of the political, diplomatic, and economic remedies that might be at hand". 292/
25.  25/5/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was only sporadic shooting reported in the districts of Hrasno and Grbavica in what was described as one of the quietest days since the hostilities broke out. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One killed. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

269. There was only occasional shooting in the Sarajevo districts of Grbavica and Hrasno on one of the quietest days since the hostilities broke out. One person was reported killed in the city over the last 24 hours. 293/

(b) Local reported events

270. Sarajevo authorities refused to allow the blockaded JNA troops to leave their barracks because they said that the army reneged on a deal to surrender weapons. BiH Presidency officials and army commanders met to try to solve the dispute, and set a timetable for the men and their families to leave the three remaining garrisons. The talks bogged down in the evening but the city remained quiet. 294/

271. Sarajevo authorities decided to ration food and to issue coupons for scarce milk, flour, salt, rice and sugar. 295/

(c) International reported events

272. Russia established diplomatic relations with Croatia and Slovenia. 296/

26.  26/5/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling of the city was reported. Source(s): Reuters

Targets Hit: Main maternity ward. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One explosion smashed into the upper stories of the city's main maternity ward. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

273. Sporadic shelling was reported. One explosion smashed into the upper
stories of the city's main maternity ward. No injuries were reported as patients, 130 mothers and 70 infants, were evacuated to the basement before the building took its worst hits. 297/

(b) Local reported events

274. Serb militia forces agreed to reopen the city's airport to aeroplanes bringing humanitarian aid to the city's remaining citizens. The agreement was brokered by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Terms of the agreement called for the airport to reopen at 6:00 a.m. Wednesday during a cease-fire between Serb forces and BiH-government units. 298/

27. 27/5/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Three shells struck near a bread line on Vase Miškina Street. Thereafter, BiH forces ambushed an army convoy. Shooting broke out late in the day in many parts of the city, including the airport area. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters; Save the Humanity; World Serbian Community.

Targets Hit: Three shells hit a bread line near the covered market on Vase Miškina Street (a block from the Catholic cathedral). Source(s): New York Times; Save the Humanity.

Description of Damage: Sixteen people were killed in the Vase Miskina bread line shelling and the estimates of wounded ranged from 70 to 160. Source(s): New York Times; Save the Humanity.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sixteen people were killed in the Vase Miskina bread line shelling and the estimates of wounded ranged from 70 to 160; one unidentified soldier was killed in a later ambush. Source(s): New York Times; Save the Humanity; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

275. In the worst single attack on civilians since the fighting began, at approximately 10:00 a.m., at least 16 people waiting in a line to buy bread were killed, and more than 100 others were wounded when mortar shells struck a crowded market in the city. It appeared that the attack in which three mortar shells fell near a group of Serbs, Croats and Muslims waiting in line at a market to buy bread, was launched by Serbian units in the hills south of Sarajevo. 299/ About 12 hours before this mortar attack, artillery shells were also apparently fired from the same southern hills where Serbian gunners had set up batteries, hitting the main maternity hospital near Sarajevo's centre. Last week, Serbian gunners in the same hills (which were the site for the sledding events in the 1984 Olympics), launched rockets at a convoy of Red Cross vehicles, killing the organizations chief representative in BiH and an employee. 300/

276. The evening television reports showed bodies lying near the covered market on Vase Miskina Street, a block from the city's Catholic cathedral. The television showed severely wounded people, some with severed limbs, waiting for assistance that was delayed when ambulance crews attempting to reach the scene came under sniper fire. 301/
277. Boška Milutinović, Vlatko Tanasković (a math teacher), Srečko Siklić, and Ramiz Alić were among the people waiting in the bread line on Vase Miškina Street, near the shoe shop "Planika" when a mortar shell hit the street. Milutinović's leg was broken and he suffered two wounds from shell fragments. Tanasković and Siklić were killed. Milutinović stated that he saw Ali's leg in a pool of blood but that there was no indication of whether he survived. Milutinović stated that there were no troops or military facilities on the street--only the bread line and other civilians in the street. 302/

278. According to Dr. Faris Goran-Kapetanovi, a Sarajevo surgeon: from 9:50 to 12:00, 80 heavily wounded people, all unarmed civilians, came into the hospital from Vase Miškina Street. Included among these injuries were limb, head, neck and organ wounds. That day the hospital saw 107 patients, 95 per cent of whom were civilians. 303/

279. Colonel Jovan Divjak, the Serbian officer and deputy commander of BiH's defence force, said that 16 people were killed and 70 wounded. Sarajevo Radio said local officials put the number of wounded at 160. 304/

280. Serbian sources acknowledged that the bread line was shelled but claimed that the attack was caused by Muslim Croatian forces. 305/

281. After the bread line attack, Muslims ambushed an army convoy vacating a garrison, killing one soldier and commandeering 82 trucks. 306/

282. Shooting broke out late in the day, continuing through the night in many parts of the city including the airport and army barracks. "There are many dead. There are explosions everywhere", Sarajevo radio editor Zoran Pirovi said as battles raged earlier in the night. 307/

(b) Local reported events

283. The BiH Government allegedly taped a conversation between a JNA general and two Serbian colonels over Serbian radio frequencies. It was reported that General Ratko Mladić instructed two Serbian colonels (identified only by the Muslim code names "Mustafa" and "Zijo") to attack residential areas of Sarajevo with heavy artillery. The report stated that Mladić was probably speaking from the Lukavica military barracks, in the south-west suburbs of Sarajevo, to "Zijo" in Vraca, a hilly suburb to the south of Sarajevo, and to "Mustafa" on Borje Mountain to the north-east of the city. Specifically, it is alleged that in the recording Colonel "Zijo" argued that artillery attacks should be directed towards areas with fewer Serbian residents. Mladić allegedly disregarded the colonel's comment and ordered his troops to bomb the Velešići and Pofalići residential areas of Sarajevo. With regard to Velešići, Mladić ordered his troops to "burn it all". Mladić also ordered his troops to attack civilian targets with the heaviest shells in the Serbian forces' armory, namely 155 millimetre howitzer shells instead of the lighter 82-millimetre and 120 millimetre shells. 308/

(c) International reported events

284. The European Community imposed a trade embargo against Yugoslavia. EC representatives encouraged the UN Security Council to launch its own financial and oil embargo. 309/

285. At a NATO meeting, US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that military intervention was not being considered "at present". 310/
28. 28/5/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fierce fighting was reported in the city during the morning. An artillery barrage was reported in the city at 10:30 p.m.. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

286. Fierce fighting was reported in the city during the morning. 311/

287. Sarajevo radio reported that Serb forces fired surface to surface missiles at Sarajevo. Explosions of artillery shells were also reported in the city. The barrage reportedly began at 10:30 p.m.. 312/

(b) Local reported events

288. The Serbian Orthodox Church announced that it had split with the Serbian Government over "communist tyranny" and the "fratricidal" war in BiH. 313/

(c) International reported events

289. The White House stated that the United States planned to provide $9 million in aid to BiH's refugees. 314/

29. 29/5/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A night-long artillery barrage was reported on the city which included the reported use of multiple rocket launchers. Street battles were reported until just before dawn. A day long barrage was also reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area; the Presidency building; two unidentified mosques; dozens of houses, stores and office buildings; a tobacco factory, the 1984 Olympic Skating Arena; the main radio and television broadcast centre. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Three workers were wounded in the shelling of the Presidency Building; Fires ignited by the shelling damaged several unidentified office towers, a tobacco factory and the skating arena used during the 1984 Olympics; 10 shells were reported to have hit the main television broadcast centre. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Nine people killed overnight. Source(s): Croatia Radio; Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

290. Serb irregulars unleashed a night-long barrage of fire on the city. BiH officials said Serb forces used multiple rocket launchers for the first time. Sarajevo radio quoted a Serb officer, and former JNA member as saying that Serbs had also fired surface-to-surface missiles. This could not be confirmed. Serb combatants fought in street battles with Muslim and Croat fighters until just before dawn. 315/

291. The Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported that early Friday, "fierce bursts of fire and shell explosions [were] everywhere", especially in the medieval quarter. Street fighting between Serb and BiH defence forces also erupted in Dobrinja, and near the airport according to Tanjug. Shells also struck the Presidential Building, wounding three workers. 316/

292. Croatia radio said that nine people were killed overnight, but there was no independent confirmation. 317/

293. The main attack began at midnight Thursday and lasted about four hours. Bombardment damage also included two mosques, dozens of houses, stores and office buildings, including the Presidency building. Fires ignited by the shells damaged several office towers, a tobacco factory and the skating arena used during the 1984 Olympics. Ten shells were also reported to have hit the main radio and television broadcast centre, which had been hit many times before. Officials linked the bombardment with the continuing blockade of the Maršal Tito Barracks by pro-Government forces. 318/

294. A day long barrage left several parts of the city in flames, knocked out electricity and water supplies and was described by both Serbian and Bosnian media as the fiercest of the two-month battle of Sarajevo. 319/

295. City residents received a warning to return to shelters at about 3:30 p.m.. The warning came after the commander of the army of the Bosnian Serbs, General Ratko Mladić, told the Sarajevo Government that his forces would level the capital if militiamen did not allow the JNA troops to leave their barracks in Sarajevo with their weapons. 320/

(b) International reported events

296. Turkish President Turgut Ozal pledged Turkish troops to any NATO or UN force that would intervene on behalf of BiH. 321/

30. 30/5/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city came under renewed shelling attacks and street fighting was reported in Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Smoke could be seen rising from several apartment buildings in the Dobrinja area. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least two killed. Source(s): Reuters.
**Narrative of Events:**

297. Sarajevo came under renewed attack as Serb forces shelled the city with mortars. At least two people were believed killed and street fighting broke out in Dobrinja, an outlying part of the city. Street battles were also reported. Smoke could be seen rising from several apartment buildings in the Dobrinja area.  

298. It was reported by the Tanjug new agency that commanders of Serb irregulars ordered a halt to attacks late in the day.  

(b) **International reported events**

299. The UN Security Council voted for trade sanctions against Yugoslavia. UN Security Council Resolution 757 for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro passed by a vote of 13 to zero. Russian President Yeltsin gave the sanctions his support. Like its predecessor, Resolution 752, this resolution demanded that "outside" forces stop interfering in the conflict in BiH. It ordered Croat troops out of BiH; it required Serbs to stop forcing non-Serbs out of their homes; it called for all "irregular forces" in BiH to be disbanded; it placed a ban on exports (except for food and medicine) to and foreign investment in Yugoslavia; it froze Yugoslavia's foreign assets; it reduced the number of diplomatic personnel in Yugoslavia; and it restricted Yugoslavia's participation in international sporting, science, and cultural activities. Shipments of goods through Yugoslavia were still permitted. 

300. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel downplayed talks of military action, saying "we should expect the sanctions to have an effect".  

301. US President George Bush implemented a freeze on Yugoslav assets in the United States. 

31. **31/5/92 (Sunday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serb forces reportedly shelled the city early, but the shelling and other fighting subsided just before daybreak. Source(s): Reuters. 

**Targets Hit:** There was heavy shelling in the city overnight in unidentified parts of the city. The shelling continued early in the day. Source(s): Reuters. 

**Description of Damage:** Not specified 

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified 

**Casualties:** Not specified 

**Narrative of Events:**

302. Serb forces shelled the city early Sunday, but the shelling and other fighting subsided just before daybreak according to Sarajevo radio. "There was mortar and heavy cannon shelling overnight on parts of the city from Serb batteries in the hills, for a short time heavy, and at least 10 people were wounded", radio editor Zoran Pirović said. He said that territorial defence forces had exchanged fire with 800 JNA troops holed up in the Maršal Tito
barracks in the centre of town. Isolated street fighting was reported as well before the lull. 328/

(b) Local reported events

303. The United Nations brokered a cease-fire between the warring sides in Sarajevo. UN and BiH officials said that Serb and Muslim-Croat forces agreed to the cease-fire, to take place on Monday at 6:00 p.m.. The cease-fire agreement provided for evacuation of the JNA barracks in the city centre. 329/

304. Slobodan Milošević dismissed the prior day's UN resolution as the price worth paying for "supporting Serbs outside of Serbia". He also dismissed as "ridiculous", allegations that his country had been the aggressor in BiH. 330/

C. June 1992

1. 1/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified


Description of Damage: First floor of apartment building in Dobrinja gutted by a tank shell. Source(s): Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Snipers fired at people trying to leave and enter apartment building in Dobrinja. Source(s): Washington Post.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

305. Mario Susko, a Professor of American literature in Dobrinja, stated that there were two JNA tanks outside his building, that the first floor of his building was gutted by a tank shell, and that snipers shot at anyone trying to leave or enter the building. 331/

(b) Local reported events

306. The UN brokered cease-fire was reportedly broken after two hours. UN-imposed sanctions took effect. 332/

307. The Washington Post reported that since 1 May no food had been allowed into the suburb of Dobrinja (a cluster of buildings constructed for the 1984 Olympic games) which had been sealed off by Serb militia forces as part of their effort to partition Sarajevo. 333/

2. 2/6/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: A UN escorted convoy carrying dried milk, baby formula and other
foods towards Dobrinja was attacked by machine gun fire. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch.

**Description of Damage:** Driver of relief convoy killed, between two and three people wounded. Supplies and vehicles of convoy were stolen. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Driver of relief convoy killed and two to three others wounded. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch.

**Narrative of Events:**

308. An unidentified Yugoslav broadcast appealed to all Serbs fighting in BiH to reopen Sarajevo airport to humanitarian flights (an apparent concession to mounting UN pressure), and to stop shelling Sarajevo and other cities. 334/

309. Just hours later, a UN escorted convoy carrying dried milk, baby formula and other foods toward Dobrinja was reportedly attacked by machine gun fire from Serb militiamen who subsequently took the food. The driver of one of two buses in the convoy was killed and a passenger was seriously wounded. UN officials reported that Serbian forces later drove off with the two wounded people, the supplies and the convoy's vehicles. The convoy had been organized by a Sarajevo charity (Children's Embassy), and all forces in the area had been notified and had guaranteed the convoy's safe passage. 335/

(b) **Local reported events**

310. The New York Times reported that a key to the battle for Sarajevo was the newly cut Serb-controlled "war road" connecting Ilidža to the main Serbian military barracks at Lukavica, five miles to the south, and beyond and up through the mountains ringing Sarajevo to the south. On the spurs off this road, on the heights that overlook the city, were numerous Serbian mortar and recoilless cannon positions that had been used to shell the old Muslim quarter in the heart of Sarajevo, causing heavy casualties and destroying many of the city's historic landmarks, including several ancient mosques. The New York Times reported that because Ilidža was at the end of the Serbian supply line running all the way to Belgrade 250 miles away, and because it abutted Sarajevo's Butmir airport, also under Serbian control, the battle to keep the Muslim forces from overrunning Ilidža had become, in effect, the battle to keep a Serbian foothold in the city. In that, the airport was seen as crucial. Although closed and under constant Muslim sniper fire, it had become a key bargaining chip for the Serbs, who were under United Nations pressure to allow its reopening to international relief flights that would carry a needed supply of food and medicine to the civilians trapped in the city by fighting. 336/

(c) **International reported events**

311. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that Britain would be "very reluctant" to send soldiers to BiH to force peace upon warring parties. 337/
3. 3/6/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
312. No reported incidents.

4. 4/6/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Dobrinja was reportedly shelled early in the day by Serb forces. Butmir was similarly shelled overnight. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: Dobrinja and Butmir Districts. Source(s): Reuters.
Description of Damage: Not specified. Source(s): Reuters.
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
313. Serb tanks and artillery early in the day bombed the Dobrinja district where 40,000 civilians were reported to have been trapped with little food or medicine for weeks. According to Sarajevo radio, Serb shelling of the city from positions in surrounding forested hills was intense for about three hours and then became sporadic before stopping at dawn. Batteries at Sarajevo's Serb-held airport unleashed barrages overnight at the mainly Muslim District of Butmir where it was reported that the situation resembled Dobrinja. 338/

(b) International reported events

314. NATO foreign ministers decided to broaden the scope of its mandate with peace-keeping duties. 339/

5. 5/6/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
315. No reported incidents.

(b) International reported events

316. United States President George Bush signed an Executive Order to block trade with Serbia and Montenegro. 340/

6. 6/6/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sustained bombardment was reported. Shelling came from Trebevi Mountain and included 120 millimetre artillery shells, 82 millimetre mortars and volleys from multiple rocket launchers. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: A UN supply truck carrying blankets; JNA Maršal Tito barracks; the Main Telephone Building; "nearly all sections of the city". Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Reuters; Washington Post.

Description of Damage: Three killed and two wounded in area near the shelled Maršal Tito barracks; Telephone lines were knocked out over night after the shelling of the main telephone building. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Reuters; Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
317. A UN supply truck carrying blankets was struck by mortar fire outside a Sarajevo warehouse. There were no deaths or injuries. 341/

318. It was reported that the 734 Yugoslav officers, cadets and dependents confined in the Maršal Tito barracks were permitted to evacuate in an 80-vehicle convoy. After they left, Serbian gunners shelled the barracks, killing two men and a boy in a passing car and severely wounding two women.

319. The most sustained bombardment since the siege began was reported. The New York Times reported that for more than 24 hours, "every few minutes, 120 millimetre artillery shells, 82 millimetre mortars and volleys from multiple rocket launchers poured down from the slopes of the 5,345 foot Trebevi Mountain overlooking the city", and that "nobody appears to have any estimate of the number killed and wounded. But the figure must be high". 342/

320. Serb tanks and artillery in the hills were reported to have fired shells into nearly all sections of the city as street fighting broke out in some neighbourhoods. Many of the last telephone lines were knocked out overnight when shells hit the main telephone building. 343/
(b) Local reported events

321. The Washington Post reported that starvation was beginning to become a concern in Sarajevo. The severity of food shortages in Sarajevo varied by neighbourhood. In the Old Town centre, there were still warehouse reserves of flour for bread and pasta. But several suburban neighbourhoods surrounded by Serb forces had not received food deliveries for up to six weeks.

7. 7/6/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city had been shelled continuously for 48 hours, reportedly with 155 millimetre howitzers, 120 millimetre mortars, 104 millimetre tank cannons and 132 millimetre multiple-rocket launchers. It was reported that a total of 4,000 tons of high explosives had been fired into the city. Source(s): New York Times; Oslobodjenje.

Targets Hit: Central District and Baščaršija; 50 of the city's 80 mosques including Tabački Mesdjid (dating back to 1450); The Moriča Han (15th century Turkish inn stop); the Islamic Theological Faculty (15th century structure); the main synagogue and Roman Catholic cathedral; the main broadcasting centre; the National Library (formerly City Hall); the main Serbian Orthodox Centre; the sites of the 1984 Olympics, including the Olympic Museum. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: In the Central District and Baščaršija, apartment buildings and remnants of commercial districts were hit and fires could be seen blazing in all directions; 50 of the city's 80 mosques had been damaged or destroyed, including the oldest in the Balkans, Tabački Mesdjid, dating back to 1450; the Moriča Han, a 15th century Turkish inn stop for caravans, and the Islamic Theological Faculty, also from the 15th century were damaged; the main synagogue and the Roman Catholic cathedral had also been hit, though lightly damaged; the main broadcasting centre and its transmitter had been repeatedly shelled but repairs kept the radio and television on the air; the National Library, formerly the City Hall, was extensively damaged by a shell that pierced its glass dome; the main Serbian Orthodox Centre was extensively damaged; the sites linked to the 1984 Olympics came under fire and two cupolas on the former US Consulate building which served as the Olympic Museum were destroyed. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

322. The city to date had been shelled continuously for 48 hours. The New York Times reported that although some of the gunnery appeared to be aimed at military targets, most of the rounds landed in densely populated parts of the city. The sections of the city which suffered the most included the central district and Baščaršija, an old quarter of mosques, narrow alleyways and wooden-font workshops and boutiques. The casualty toll had risen sharply, particularly during this weekend when Serbian gunners began their barrage. Every minute or two, shells slammed into apartment buildings and the remnants of commercial districts. From a vantage point in the old town, fires blazed in all directions.

323. The Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje quoted JNA officers who had defected
to the BiH side as saying that weapons being used in the weekend barrage included 155 millimetre howitzers, 120 millimetre mortars, 104 millimetre tank cannon and 132 millimetre multiple-rocket launchers. The paper said that a total of 4,000 tons of high explosives had been fired into the city, some coming from a former JNA barracks at Han Pijesak, 20 miles east of Sarajevo.

324. The New York Times reported that destruction had reached every quarter of the city, and almost every landmark. Fifty of the city's 80 mosques had been damaged or destroyed, including the oldest in the Balkans, Tabaciski Mesdjid, dating back to 1450. The Morica Han, a 15th century Turkish inn stop for caravans, and the Islamic Theological Faculty, also from the 15th century were damaged. The main synagogue and the Roman Catholic cathedral had also been hit, though only lightly damaged. The main broadcasting centre and its transmitter had been repeatedly shelled but repairs kept the radio and television on the air.

325. The National Library, formerly the City Hall, was extensively damaged by a shell that pierced its glass dome. The main Serbian Orthodox Centre had also been extensively damaged.

326. The sites linked to the 1984 Olympics had also come under fire. Two cupolas were destroyed atop the former US Consulate building, a neo-classical structure on a rise above the city centre which served as the Olympic museum.

8. 8/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Seventy hours of shelling continued with an intensity reportedly exceeding the weekend attacks. As many as 30 shells a minute were reported hitting the central district. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The city medical director reported 20 killed and 344 wounded but reporters counted at least 25 dead and 200 wounded in a single hospital. "Many dead and wounded" were reported in combat in the Vraca district. Heavy casualties were reported in combat near Butmir airport. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

327. Seventy-two hours of bombing continued in Sarajevo. The shelling resumed after a brief lull before dawn and hospitals were reported overwhelmed with dead and wounded. For more than 12 hours, heavy guns in the hills overlooking Sarajevo attacked densely populated areas with an intensity reportedly exceeding the weekend attacks. In many areas water supplies had run out or were critically low, apparently because Serbs had switched off the pumps over the weekend that fed most of Sarajevo's water from Serb-controlled suburban areas such as Ilidza, west of the city. Shells blasted residential buildings, government complexes and historical landmarks in the heart of the
city in what appeared to be random fashion, with volleys consisting of as many as 30 shells a minute hitting the central district. 351/

328. It was reported that a medical supply plant was hit, dealing a major blow to a medical system already suffering from critically low reserves of anesthetics and medicines. 352/

329. The city's medical director, Dr. Bakir Nakaš, said the casualty toll at hospitals, not including areas too dangerous for ambulances to reach, showed that at least 20 had died and 344 were wounded in the day's shelling. 353/ Reporters counted at least 25 dead and 200 wounded in a single hospital. 354/

330. Word filtered through the city that heavy close-range fighting had broken out in Vraca, a hillside suburb on the south bank of the river running through the city. Apparently seeking to drive down into the city and then north across central Sarajevo, Serbs clashed at close quarters with BiH forces. 355/

331. "The territorial defence forces have managed to gain several positions in the hills of Vraca district, a very important Serb stronghold", Sarajevo radio editor Zoran Piroli said. Serb artillery and rocket batteries on Vraca's wooded slopes had played a pivotal role in the prolonged bombardment of Sarajevo. Monday's advance into Vraca left many dead and wounded, reported BiH radio and television, quoting a witness. It also reported that territorial defenders dislodged Serb artillery units in the U hill district and in the outlying suburb of Mojmilo. The BiH flag, was raised on Vraca and Mojmilo. 356/

332. SRNA, the Serb news agency, denied losing Vraca or Mojmilo. "Muslim forces, after carrying out the frontal attacks, had enormous losses in manpower and Serbian fighters successfully defended their positions", SRNA said. 357/

333. In Dobrinja, near Butmir airport in the south-west part of the city, BiH forces that had been surrounded by Serbian fighters for three weeks tried to break free in clashes that brought heavy casualties. The outcome of both battles remained unclear at dusk. 358/

334. Serb irregulars acknowledged a major Muslim-Croat counter-attack but said that they had beaten it back. It was impossible to independently confirm the outcome of the clashes, but Muslim and Croat resistance stiffened with the use of heavy weaponry apparently abandoned by evacuating Yugoslav forces. 359/

(b) International reported events

335. The UN Security Council directed the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 758, to expand the 14,000 member UN peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia by at least 1,100 to reopen the airport in Sarajevo to permit aid shipments. 360/

9. 9/6/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian artillery reportedly continued to hit the city. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: An unidentified Muslim-controlled hill near the city centre;
unidentified apartment buildings; the Holiday Inn; the railway station; an unidentified mosque and two unidentified churches; hundreds of unidentified houses and shops; the Klas-Šarko and Velepekar buildings (the only suppliers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread). Source(s): New York Times; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

336. Serbian artillery continued to pound Sarajevo, hitting still more apartment buildings, the Holiday Inn, the railway station, a mosque and two churches, as well as hundreds of houses and shops. 361/ The Klas-Šarko and Velepekar buildings (the city's only suppliers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread) were also shelled, according to a report submitted by the Government of BiH. 362/ 

337. According to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Gray, a UN military observer from New Zealand, a JNA jet dropped a cluster bomb on a Muslim-controlled hill near the city centre. It was reported that Serb forces in BiH had no aircraft capable of such an attack. 363/

(b) Local reported events

338. Radovan Karadžić informed UNPROFOR representative Colonel John Wilson in a letter that the Serb side was ready to negotiate in the presence of UNPROFOR. 364/

339. The New York Times reported that seized documents published in Sarajevo's two surviving newspapers suggested that as early as last September Serbian leaders had a detailed plan for the ethnic partition of the city. 365/

10. 10/6/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces reportedly resumed the shelling of residential areas of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Oslobodjenje building; University residence halls; unidentified residential districts; United Nations convoy (near Mojmilo). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One person was injured in the UN convoy attack; Oslobodjenje and the University residence halls took massive hits. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: A car carrying a Spanish and French reporter was hit by sniper fire. The car swerved and crashed, injuring both reporters. Source(s): Washington Post.

Casualties: One person injured in UN convoy attack; two reporters injured in sniping attack on car. Source(s): Reuters; Washington Post.
Narrative of Events:

340. Serb military forces commanding the heights overlooking the city resumed bombarding residential districts. Sarajevo radio said that buildings housing Sarajevo's main daily newspaper and university residence halls took massive hits. 366/

341. A United Nations convoy was attacked on the outskirts of the city as other UN peace-keeping officers arrived to determine how to open the city's airport. Sarajevo radio reported that the UN convoy was attacked after it left central Sarajevo to meet another UN convoy with arriving peacekeepers and that one person was injured. Sarajevo radio said the UN vehicles were attacked as the incoming UN convoy led by senior peacekeeper General Lewis Mackenzie neared the city limits in the late afternoon. The radio reported that the convoy, lead by Colonel John Wilson, set out to receive Mackenzie and his 41 vehicle convoy, but did not get far. The radio said that the convoy was attacked near the south-western suburb of Mojmilo, which was contested territory. 367/

342. A car carrying Alfonso Rojo of the Spanish daily El Mundo and George Gobet of Agence France-Presse came under heavy sniper fire. It swerved and crashed. Rojo broke his arm and Gobet broke a vertebra in his neck. 368/

(b) Local reported events

343. UNPROFOR Chief of Staff Brigadier General Lewis MacKenzie left for Sarajevo to oversee the operation of deadlocking the city's airport at Butmir. 369/

11. 11/6/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Continued shelling of the city was reported. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

344. The New York Times reported: "The gunners today were hitting targets seemingly at random, blasting apartment buildings, churches and mosques". 370/

(b) Local reported events

345. It was reported that "for a week, there had been no fresh supplies of bread, and Serbian forces moved earlier in the week to cut off the pumps that supply water to much of the city. . . . Almost all districts in the city, excepting those on the periphery that are Serbian-held, lost electrical power". 371/
12. 12/6/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A major firefight was reported near the Holiday Inn. Defence forces reportedly mounted a counter-offensive. The Old Town was reported shelled. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Civilian districts in the older part of the city closest to the guns on the Vraca slopes; the area near the Presidency Building. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: At least 12 people were killed by barrages against civilian districts in the older part of the city. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified


Narrative of Events:

346. A major fire fight erupted in the afternoon near the Holiday Inn. 372/347. Defenders mounted a counter-offensive, using one of two captured 1960's vintage tanks to fire across the Miljacka River from a park beside the Presidency, the site of the Government headquarters, and following up with an infantry assault across the river and into Serbian held territory in the districts of Grbavica and Vraca. At nightfall they had advanced several hundred yards into the Serbian strongholds and were threatening the last Serbian dugouts in the Vraca heights, around the burnt-out shell of a hotel built for the Olympic Games. 373/

348. It was reported that at least 12 people were killed by Serbian artillery barrages against civilian districts in the older part of the city, closest to the guns on the Vraca slopes. Shells were reported to have exploded less than 100 yards from the Government headquarters in central Sarajevo. 374/

13. 13/6/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Continued shelling was reported, rising in intensity towards dusk in response to faltering efforts by BiH fighters to break through siege line on the hillside of Vraca to the south. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

349. The shelling continued, rising in intensity towards dusk in response to faltering efforts by BiH fighters to break through the Serbian siege lines on the hillside of Vraca, on the southern side of the city about a mile from the
centre. A counter-attack launched by BiH defence forces on Friday to try to break through a strategic Serbian artillery post in the Vraca hills stalled and Colonel Stjepan Šiber, a deputy commander of the defence forces said that predictions the Serbian position would be taken had proven false. 375/

(b) Local reported events

350. The Washington Post reported that US Government analysts commenting on the threat of relief flights said that Sarajevo's airfield, about one-half mile south-west of the city centre, sat in a topographical bowl at 1,708 feet above sea level, encircled by 3,000 to 4,000 foot hills. Commanding the valley from those hills were an estimated 50 to 100 pieces of heavy artillery, including 105 millimetre and 155 millimetre howitzers and 122 millimetre multiple-rocket launchers, along with 100 to 200 lighter mortars. Because the airfield had only a single 8,530-foot runway and unloading facilities were limited, cargo aeroplanes would sit vulnerably on the tarmac for substantial periods of time. Before they could land, incoming aircraft potentially would face a gauntlet of SA-6 and shoulder-fired SA-7 surface-to-air missiles believed to be in the hands of nearby Serb forces. The Serbs also controlled numerous antiaircraft guns of 20 millimetres to 30 millimetres. 376/

351. About five tons of relief food and medicine arrived in Sarajevo by road in the evening, with another 95 tons of French aid waiting 30 miles outside for Serbian clearance. 377/

14. 14/6/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling was reported early with firing resuming by mid-afternoon. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Nine reported killed over the weekend. Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

352. After a night of rocket attacks and street fighting, Sarajevo was relatively quiet although Serb fighters shelled the city sporadically and street battles flared in the Grbavica area. After 10 days of continuous fighting, people returned to the streets of Sarajevo, but by mid-afternoon, the firing had resumed. Sarajevo radio said that nine people had been killed in the city over the weekend. 378/

(b) Local reported events

353. UN officers held meetings with Serb commanders on the removal of antiaircraft guns and missile systems to a distance of at least six miles from the airport. Serb and BiH leaders signed a deal nine days prior committing themselves to giving the UN sole control of Sarajevo airport. 379/
354. The warring sides signed a new cease-fire agreement to silence their guns at 6:00 a.m. Monday. The new cease-fire was intended to help end a Serb blockade of Sarajevo airport and to hand it over to the UN forces to enable emergency aid to be delivered to civilians trapped in the city with little food, water, or electricity. 

355. A Sarajevo newspaper published a detailed article listing 74 locations in the city where Serbian forces had positioned three-man commando teams allegedly trained in the use of snipers' weapons. The report, said to be based on interrogations of captured snipers, said the units had been given a month's training by the Serbian-controlled JNA and a base at Glasinačko Polje, in the mountains east of Sarajevo.

15. 15/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Despite a cease-fire, scattered shellfire was reported from the hills into the city. By mid-afternoon, the volume of Serbian fire was reported to have returned almost to the level of recent weeks. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: At least six people across Sarajevo were hit by sniper fire in the first hours of the cease-fire. Three of those were killed. One of the victims, Džemal Velić, was killed at the intersection of Radomira Putnika and Branimira osia streets. Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: Six people hit by sniper fire (three killed) Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events: Despite the cease-fire, there was scattered shellfire from the hills into Sarajevo. At least six people across Sarajevo were hit by sniper bullets in the first hours of the cease-fire, three of them fatally. One of the victims, Džemal Velić, was killed at the intersection of Radomira Putnika and Branimira osia streets, within the sightlines of the hillsides on the city's southern side. By mid-afternoon, the volume of Serbian fire was reported to have returned almost to the level of recent weeks.

(b) Local reported events

356. Dobrica osi assumed the Yugoslav Presidency.

357. The Croatian and BiH Presidencies released a joint statement calling for cooperation and coordination "against the common enemy".

16. 16/6/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The cease-fire reportedly held and the city was described as quiet during the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One reporter was killed and one was wounded by shrapnel from a Serbian tank shell. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Two people were reported killed and at least 10 wounded by persistent sniper fire after the truce took effect at 6:00 a.m. on Monday. Source(s): Reuters, Sarajevo Radio.

Casualties: Two people were reported killed and at least 10 wounded by persistent sniper fire after the truce took effect at 6:00 a.m. on Monday; one reporter killed, one wounded in Dobrinja; 48 Bosnian Muslims were reportedly kidnapped from the Dobroševići and Ahatovići suburbs by Serbian militia members and subsequently killed in Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio; United Press International; ISHR British Section.

Narrative of Events:

358. The cease-fire stabilized early in the day, boosting UN preparations for an aid- airlift to civilians. "The truce is really holding. This was the quietest night we've had since the war began", Sarajevo radio editor Zoran Piškarić said 24 hours after the cease-fire came into effect. 359.

359. Sarajevo radio said that two people were killed and at least 10 wounded by persistent sniper fire after the truce took effect at 6:00 a.m. Monday. 360.

360. Forty-eight Bosnian Muslims were reportedly kidnapped from the Dobroševići and Ahatovići suburbs of Sarajevo by Serbian militia members. They were reportedly taken to the Serb-held suburb of Ilidža where they were killed. 361.

361. At 2:00 p.m., Ivo Standeker and Jana Schneider, both journalists, were hit by shrapnel from a Serbian tank shell in the Dobrinja suburb of Sarajevo. Adnan Abdul Razak, a spokesman for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo stated that the two wounded journalists were then kidnapped by unidentified Serbian paramilitaries as they were rushed to a hospital 10 kilometres away. The two wounded journalists were ultimately taken to Pale, about 35 kilometres away for medical treatment where Standeker died. The kidnapping caused an eight hour delay in treatment. 362.

(b) Local reported events

362. The BiH Government announced a formal military alliance with Croatia as a means of fighting back against Serbian forces that had seized two-thirds of the country. 363.

17. 17/6/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Tank and artillery fire was reported in Dobrinja for more than 12 hours in what was described as one of the biggest Serb offensives against the town. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

363. At 3:30 a.m., Serb forces mounted one of their biggest offensives against Dobrinja. According to residents, Serbian forces attacked the suburb from all sides and then entered in tanks and armoured personnel carriers and seized about 150 men before withdrawing under defenders' fire. Reports said that the tanks and artillery fired for more than 12 hours. Witnesses reported that the captured men were unarmed civilians, who were taken to detention camps behind Serbian lines. 390/

(b) International reported events

364. At an Islamic Conference Organization session, BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić appealed for military intervention. 391/

18. 18/6/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

365. No reported events.

(b) Local reported events

366. The Washington Post reported that in the western suburb of Dobrinja, sealed off residents were eating grass to avoid starvation. 392/

367. The Washington Post also reported that in the last two weeks up to 50 people a day had been buried in city parks, as the few inner-city cemeteries were already filled with the newly dead. 393/

19. 19/6/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Serb offensive continued on Dobrinja. There was a resumption of artillery and mortar attacks on the city with shelling continuing into the evening. Source(s): Washington Post; Government of BiH; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Civilian districts throughout the city; the Sarajevo public transportation network at its main location and others throughout the city; the BiH Presidency; the area near the military headquarters of the city's
defence forces; the Old Town section. Source(s): New York Times; The Government of BiH; Washington Post.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Six people killed and 58 wounded by mid-afternoon. Source(s): Washington Post; BiH Health Ministry.

**Narrative of Events:**

368. Serb forces controlling the hills around the city were reported to have advanced and planted their flag in a corner of the fiercely contested western suburb of Dobrinja, where thousands of residents had been sealed off for two months and where many were reported to be starving. Control of Dobrinja had become the strategic key to a Serb plan to take control of a long slice of Sarajevo, south of the Miljacka River cutting through the heart of the city. "The attack is very big. It is a total attack from every side", said Major Dervo Harbinja, a deputy commander of the BiH forces. The commander said Serb forces used tanks and four types of heavy artillery to assault Dobrinja where about 35,000 people lived in a complex of apartment buildings built for the 1984 Olympics. The suburb lies near the city's airport, which the UN was attempting to open for emergency relief flights. Both the Serb and BiH sides had agreed to demilitarize the airport area over the coming days. Western military analysts said that Serb forces were rushing to take control of Dobrinja before they had to pull back their guns and place them under UN supervision. 394/369. The Serbian attack was part of a broader offensive that blasted away the last remnants of the cease-fire declared on Monday. There was a resumption of Serbian artillery and mortar attacks on civilian districts throughout Sarajevo. 395/370. The Sarajevo public transportation network was shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city, according to a report submitted by the Government of BiH. 396/

371. Serb gunners attacked the city with an artillery barrage. A BiH commander reported that the city was under "total attack" from every side. Residents hid in shelters, the BiH President's office was hit by mortar shells, and heavy artillery crashed around the military headquarters of the city's defence forces. Civilian neighbourhoods in the Old Town section were subjected to the heaviest shelling in a week. Six people were confirmed killed and 58 wounded in the city by mid-afternoon, according to the BiH Health Ministry. Heavy shelling continued into the evening. 397/

(b) **Local reported events**

372. The Serb offensive in Dobrinja came a day after Serbian and BiH sides signed an agreement to move antiaircraft guns at least 1.9 miles from the airport and to cluster all the artillery in the Sarajevo area in locations where they could be monitored by UN observers. 398/
20. 20/6/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The BiH Presidency issued a formal declaration of war. The western end of the city and the area near the Presidency were shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Convoy of UN peacekeepers less than a quarter mile from UNPROFOR headquarters; UNPROFOR vehicles near the main airport terminal; Western end of the city; BiH Presidency building; the Oslobodjenje building. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch.

Description of Damage: Three Canadian UN reconnaissance officers were injured when their jeep was hit by a mortar shell while traveling in an 18 vehicle convoy; a number of UN vehicles were damaged near the main airport terminal; three shells hit the BiH Presidency Building, injuring seven people; the Oslobodjenje building caught fire after shelling. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch.

Sniping Activity: Serbian forces fired on fire crews who arrived to extinguish the blaze at the Oslobodjenje building, killing one fireman and wounding 11. Source(s): Helsinki Watch.

Casualties: Three Canadian UN reconnaissance officers were injured by a mortar shell; seven people were injured in the shelling of the BiH Presidency Building; one fireman was killed and 11 others were injured by Serbian gunfire while trying to extinguish the blaze at the Oslobodjenje building; 23 people were reported killed and 97 wounded in Sarajevo since Friday. Source(s): Washington Post; Helsinki Watch; United Press International; BiH Crisis Committee.

Narrative of Events:

373. A convoy of UN peacekeepers that included the commander of UN forces in the city took a direct hit from a mortar shell during intense fighting in the western suburbs. Three Canadian UN reconnaissance officers were injured, one seriously, when their jeep was struck by a mortar shell less than a quarter mile from the headquarters of the UN peace-keeping forces. They were traveling in a convoy of 18 vehicles that was withdrawing at midday from the closed Sarajevo airport, which the UN had been trying unsuccessfully to reopen to fly aid into the city. There was also reported large-calibre machine-gun fire outside the UN headquarters. 399/

374. General Lewis MacKenzie said that BiH militiamen had fired on Serbian infantry and tanks dug in on either side of the main airport terminal and around the runway, and that "a number of our vehicles had been struck". "The Serbs have fired their tanks from positions directly in front of the airport terminal, thereby giving the impression that we are shielding them from retaliation", he said. "We have witnessed both sides initiating exchanges of fire. This is clearly unacceptable". 400/

375. While the western end of Sarajevo was being shelled, the BiH President's office in the centre came under heavy fire. At least three shells hit the building in the afternoon, injuring seven people. 401/

376. Serbian forces reportedly also fired incendiary shells at a 12 story building of the Sarajevo-based daily newspaper Oslobodjenje. The building caught fire and when fire crews arrived to extinguish the blaze, the Serbian forces fired on them, killing one fireman and wounding 11. 402/
377. The Republic's crisis committee announced that at least 23 people were killed and 97 others were wounded in Sarajevo since Friday. 403/

(b) Local reported events

378. The BiH Presidency issued a formal declaration of war. The move had little effect on the fighting but gave the government constitutional power to mobilize all men between the ages of 18 and 60 for military service. 404/

21. 21/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

379. In the morning, eight new burials at Kovači park were under way when Serbian gunners, less than 2,000 yards away, opened fire on the mourners with anti-aircraft guns. The burial parties scattered into a nearby tunnel. When the guns fell silent, the burials continued. 405/

(b) Local reported events

380. Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban established what he called the "Croatian Union of Herzeg-Bosna". It was unclear whether his actions were sponsored by Zagreb. 406/

381. The Washington Post reported that two weeks before this date, reporters visiting the Kovači park on a hillside above Sarajevo's old Muslim quarter counted 185 new graves, all dug since the Sarajevo battle began on 5 April. On 21 June there were 155 more graves, stretching 80 yards up the hill. A man who helped oversee the burials, Mehmed Numanović, said that the graves were for men killed "with honour" in the Sarajevo fighting and that other fighters judged to be less distinguished were buried elsewhere. Since many of the cemeteries are located on the hillsides, within sniper range, residents had buried their dead in the grassy fore-courts of apartment blocks, or in scrub ground beside city streets. One of the largest sites was the Koševo soccer stadium, about a mile north of the city centre, where there were hundreds of new graves, mostly of civilians killed in the fighting. 407/

22. 22/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: At 11:00 a.m. Serb forces reportedly launched an artillery attack on the city. Source(s): New York Times.
Targets Hit: People's Bank; Maršal Tito Street; City centre; narrow streets. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; New York Times.

Description of Damage: One mortar fell in front of the People's Bank and in quick succession, five others fell in a broad ring around the first target; one mortar exploded in front of a bus on Maršal Tito street and others exploded in narrow streets, none more than 300 yards from the others; at least six shells hit in the city centre; according to hospital officials, specialized mortars killed three persons and wounded 40, with the rest of the day's casualty toll resulting from shelling throughout mainly civilian districts. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Nineteen civilians killed, 87 wounded. Source(s): Helsinki Watch.

Narrative of Events:

382. At 11:00, Serbs reportedly launched a mortar attack on the city, killing 19 civilians and wounding 87. The New York Times reported that Radovan Karadžić was shown on Serbian television peering at Sarajevo through field glasses and congratulating the gunners.

383. The first mortar shell fell in front of the People's Bank and, in quick succession, five other mortar shells fell in a broad ring around the first target. A mortar exploded in front of a bus on Maršal Tito street, and others exploded in narrow streets, none more than 300 yards from the others. At least six shells hit in the city centre which was full of civilians who had emerged from their shelters to take advantage of a lull in the fighting. According to hospital officials, the shells, said to have come from specialized mortars designed for use against enemy infantry, killed three persons and wounded 40, with the rest of the day's toll resulting from shelling throughout mainly civilian districts.

(b) International reported events

384. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), suspended Yugoslavia's membership.

23. 23/6/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: The public transportation network, including its main location and others throughout the city. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

385. The Sarajevo public transportation network reported shelling of its main location and others throughout the city, according to a report from the
Government of BiH. 412/

(b) Local reported events

386. The Washington Post reported that according to BiH officials, Croat forces had moved German-made artillery within range of Serb tanks and heavy guns that had been shelling the city. The Croats began sporadic shelling of the Serb militia command centre in the mountains outside Sarajevo several days ago according to a government official. One official stated that the Croats were equipped with self-propelled 205 millimetre Messerschmitt field guns. He said that 150 of the howitzers, mounted on tracked vehicles and aimed by computerized targeting systems, were purchased in Germany four months prior and had made their way to BiH. 413/

24. 24/6/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian artillery, tank and mortar fire was reported in the city. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Ambulance hit 172 times by unidentified Serbian machine gun machine fire, wounding its three occupants. The ambulance attack was witnessed by a Norwegian journalist, Morten Hvaal. Source(s): Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: A UN convoy and representatives from the relief group Medicins Sans Frontieres came under repeated unidentified sniper fire on the outskirts of the city. One bullet shattered the windows of the Jeep in which four doctors were traveling and two doctors were wounded. Source(s): Tanjug Yugoslav News Agency.

Casualties: Two doctors wounded in attack on Medicins Sans Frontieres' convoy. Source(s): Tanjug Yugoslav News Agency.

Narrative of Events:

387. The day was marked by volleys of Serbian artillery, tank and mortar fire. 414/

388. A UN convoy and representatives of the relief group Medicins Sans Frontieres came under repeated unidentified sniper fire on the outskirts of Sarajevo. One bullet shattered the windows of the Jeep in which four doctors were traveling and two doctors were wounded. 415/

389. An ambulance was hit 172 times by unidentified Serbian machine gun fire. The driver was shot in the thigh, a severely wounded man on a stretcher was hit several times and a medic was wounded. Morten Hvaal, a Norwegian journalist was inside of the ambulance at the time of the attack. 416/

(b) International reported events

390. Speaking before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Baker recommended that the Yugoslav consulate in Chicago be closed, Serbs and Montenegrins be banned from international organizations, and
Belgrade's ambassadorial recognition be rejected. 417/

25. 25/6/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Unidentified vehicle. Source(s): Washington Post.

Description of Damage: One doctor killed and two nurses wounded from anti-aircraft fire on unidentified medical vehicle. Source(s): Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One doctor killed and two nurses wounded. Source(s): Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

391. A doctor was killed and two nurses were seriously injured after troops opened fire with anti-aircraft weapons on a medical vehicle. 418/

26. 26/6/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported in Dobrinja, followed by the shelling of residential buildings. After midnight the city centre was hit by shellfire. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Apartment buildings in Dobrinja; Centre of Sarajevo; the Children's Ward of Jezero Hospital. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: Unidentified apartment buildings were destroyed in Dobrinja. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date 1,320 people had been killed in Sarajevo, 70 per cent of whom were civilians. 419/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

392. The latest effort by United Nations commanders to start relief flights to Sarajevo airport broke down as Serbian forces used tanks and artillery to attack civilian buildings in Dobrinja. The BiH Government admitted that the fighting began when a Government commando force mounted a predawn raid on Serbian positions on the edge of Dobrinja. In the battle that followed, the Serbian forces opened fire on several apartment buildings with artillery and tanks, destroying some of them with repeated bombardments. 420/

393. Shortly after midnight, Serbian shells began to hit the centre of the city. 421/

394. The children's ward of Jezero Hospital was reported bombarded by artillery fire and rockets. 422/
(b) International reported events

395. The United Nations Security Council gave Serbian forces 48 hours to stop fighting in Sarajevo and put their heavy weapons under United Nations control. Diplomats said failure to comply could lead to some kind of military action. 423/

396. According to Radio Free Europe, US national security leaders convened for the first major policy meeting on the conflict. 424/

27. 27/6/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb shellfire continued with sporadic artillery fire, with the intensity levels diminishing. The attacks on Dobrinja continued but at a lower intensity level. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

397. Serbian forces continued to shell Sarajevo with sporadic artillery fire a day after the UN Security Council issued an ultimatum to halt the fighting and place Serbian heavy guns under UN control within 48 hours. But the intensity of the firing reportedly diminished. The Serbian attacks on the Dobrinja continued, but at a lower intensity level. 425/

(b) International reported events

398. EC foreign ministers declared that force may be used if necessary to deliver relief. They also decided to recognize Macedonia if it changed its name. 426/

28. 28/6/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported near the airport. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: BiH sniping activity reported against Serb troops in the airport area. Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

399. BiH government officials said that most of the Serbian combatants had pulled out of Dobrinja. 427/

400. French President Francois Mitterand visited Sarajevo for six hours. Before he could board his helicopter, he had to wait for a 20 minute gun battle to end between Serbian militiamen and BiH government forces. Three Serbs were wounded in the fighting before Mitterand's departure. 428/ Serbian tanks moved into the airport territory and started firing at BiH snipers who had wounded the Serbs at the terminal. 429/ 401. Gunfire was heard from various parts of the city after Mitterand left. 430/

(b) Local reported events

402. French President Francois Mitterand visited Sarajevo for six hours. During the visit, BiH President Izetbegović informed him of the existence of detention camps. 431/

403. In Belgrade, 100,000 people reportedly gathered to call for the removal of Serbian President Milošević. The Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch was said to be a participant. 432/

29. 29/6/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian bombardments continued throughout the day, with artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft fire hitting civilian targets. Small-arms fire from BiH troops defending Dobrinja prompted Serbian forces near the airport to begin firing at Dobrinja apartment buildings. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja apartment buildings; Western reporters close to the airport; two ambulances. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.

Description of Damage: five reporters were wounded by Serbian fire near the airport; two ambulances came under Serbian machine-gun fire that killed all six occupants. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Five reporters wounded; six people killed in attack on ambulance; In a cumulative report, it was reported that at least five people were killed and 40 wounded. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

404. United Nations troops took control of Sarajevo airport in a development described by UN officials as a major move towards ending the 12 week siege. Within two hours a French military transport aircraft landed at the airfield with 10 tons of relief supplies. The transition to UN control of the airport began when Serbian units, facing a deadline from the Security Council, withdrew from the airport. Acting on the news that the pullout was underway, the Security Council voted unanimously to send 850 UN peace-keeping troops to the airport. 433/
405. The fragility of the situation remained. Small-arms fire from BiH troops defending Dobrinja prompted Serbian armoured carriers to move into positions near the airport terminal and to begin firing once again at the Dobrinja apartment buildings. The Serbian attacks lasted for several hours in full view of UN personnel waiting to take control of the airport. Close to the airport, other Serbian forces opened fire several times on Western reporters, inflicting serious leg wounds to Jean Hatzfield of Liberation of Paris and causing lesser wounds to four other journalists. 434/

406. Two ambulances came under Serbian machine-gun fire that killed all six occupants. 435/

407. Serbian bombardment continued throughout the day, with artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft fire continuing to hit civilian targets. At least five people were killed and 40 wounded. 436/

(b) Local reported events

408. Thirty-four UN peacekeepers seized control of the Sarajevo airport. Relief arrived at the airport for the first time in nearly three months. 437/

(c) International reported events

409. The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to send 850 UN peace-keeping troops to the Sarajevo airport. 438/

30. 30/6/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported to have declined sharply since the weekend, but sniper fire was reported as worsening. Sporadic but highly destructive bombardment was reported from artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft fire striking civilian buildings throughout the centre of the city. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: One UN armoured personnel carrier was hit by gunfire at the airport; numerous civilian buildings throughout the centre of the city. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Four military observers were slightly wounded by shell fragments and broken glass when UN armoured personnel carrier was hit by gunfire at the airport. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: A UN three-man group monitoring Serbian gunnery positions, came under sniper fire from territory held by the BiH Government in Dobrinja; Sniper fire was reported as worsening since the weekend. Source(s): New York Times.


Narrative of Events:

410. A French government effort to utilize transport aircraft to deliver aid was suspended as gunfire erupted at Sarajevo airport. A machine-gun and mortar shootout across the airport runway between withdrawing Serb militiamen and BiH government forces stranded half of the more than 30 tons of food,
medicine and water that arrived aboard at least four French military aircraft. Three UN trucks loaded with food were trapped by the firefight, a UN armoured personnel carrier was hit by gunfire, and four military observers were slightly wounded by shell fragments and broken glass. Major General MacKenzie said that most of the firing was coming from BiH government positions as Serb militia forces had nearly completed a withdrawal of their anti-aircraft and artillery batteries from the airport. 439/

411. In a move that ran parallel to the opening of the airport, the UN force continued with the deployment of 30 officers to serve as monitors at Serbian gunnery positions within the range of the airport. But this effort was stalled when one of the three-man groups, riding in an armoured personnel carrier, came under sniper fire from territory held by the BiH Government in Dobrinja. 440/

412. Shelling of Sarajevo was reported to have declined sharply since the weekend, but sniper fire was reported as worsening. 441/ Sporadic but highly destructive bombardment was reported from artillery, mortar and anti-aircraft fire striking numerous civilian buildings throughout the centre of the city. 442/

(b) Local reported events

413. A convoy of trucks belonging to UNHCR drove from the airport into the city with the first 15 tons of food, water, milk and medicine delivered by air as part of the humanitarian airlift to the city. The supplies were taken to a warehouse in the Skenderija district in the south-central area of the city. 443/

(c) International reported events

414. UN Security Council Resolution 761 called for the dispatch of "additional elements" of peacekeepers to Sarajevo. One thousand Canadian UNPROFOR troops were to be sent from Croatia to Sarajevo to assist in humanitarian aid deliveries and to help secure Sarajevo airport. 444/

415. Secretary of Defense Cheney said that if the UN authorized it, the United States was prepared to use air force and navy combat aeroplanes to protect relief missions in BiH. He ruled out the use of US ground forces in the conflict. 445/

D. July 1992

1. 1/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces were reported to have withdrawn from the airport area which was to be placed under UN control. The situation in Sarajevo itself was reported as volatile as sporadic fighting continued throughout the city. Source(s): Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

416. Despite Monday's dispatch of UN troops from Croatia to take control of the Sarajevo airport, Sarajevo itself remained volatile as sporadic fighting continued throughout the city. Serbian forces were reported to have withdrawn from the Sarajevo airfield, and they were also reported to have taken their large artillery weapons with them. Muslim forces had likewise been persuaded to reduce their fire in the airport area. 446/

417. One hundred twenty-five French marines arrived at the airport and 1,000 members of the Canadian Mechanized Infantry and 80 armoured vehicles were scheduled to arrive on 2 July. These Canadian infantry forces were scheduled to be replaced within three weeks by combined UN peace-keeping forces from France, the Ukraine and Egypt. 447/

(b) Local reported events

418. The first UN relief supplies reached Sarajevo airport and local relief workers distributed 15 tons of food to 1,500 Muslim refugees and food and medical supplies also reached Koševco Hospital. 448/

(c) International reported events

419. US Defense Secretary, Richard B. Cheney, stated that the Bush administration was prepared to commit air and naval combat forces to escort and protect relief convoys into Sarajevo. 449/

2. 2/7/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military Activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH and Serbian forces continued to exchange artillery fire around the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

420. Following a series of delays that kept a Canadian mechanized infantry battalion stranded for three days on its 250 mile journey from Croatia, the Canadian battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michel Jones, fought its way through a Serb roadblock 74 miles north-west of Sarajevo and deployed 40 of its 80 armoured vehicles around the perimeter of the Sarajevo airport. The airport was then declared ready for up to eight incoming relief flights a day. "The airport is now transformed. This is a military operation now", said Captain Raymond Hauben, commander of the United Nations peace-keeping forces at the airport. Asked what would happen if the warring sides opened fire on them, he said: "Anybody who shoots at us now won't live long. The time for these games is over". 450/
421. An UNPROFOR spokesman said that BiH and Serbs continued to exchange artillery fire around the airport as 60 UN observers awaited the Canadians. 451/

(b) **Local reported events**

422. Yugoslavia Prime Minister elect, Milan Panić, left the US to assume his leadership role and carry out his self-proclaimed "peace mission". 452/

423. Two flights arrived on this day for a total of 12 flights in the last three days and in total 60 tons of relief supplies had arrived so far. 453/

424. The first food supplies reached Sarajevo. The BiH Government called for Western military intervention to prevent Serbia from carving out "ethnically pure" areas in the republic. 454/

(c) **International reported events**

425. Four British Hercules relief aeroplanes left England for Zagreb to participate in the UN relief effort in Sarajevo. 455/

3. **3/7/92 (Friday)**

(a) **Military Activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Continued fighting was reported in the city, particularly in the area of Grbavica. Heavy machine-gun fire was reported in the western suburbs and sniper fire and occasional tank shells were reported in and around the city. Source(s): Washington Post, Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Vicinity of the town hall, to the rear of the Presidency; Sarajevo Zoo. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Three to four shells fell in the vicinity of the town hall, immediately to the rear of the Presidency; three tank shells struck near the Sarajevo Zoo, killing seven Muslims picnicking nearby, including three children. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Seven Bosnian Muslims picnicking near the Sarajevo Zoo (including three children) were killed when a tank opened fire from a distance of 1200 yards; The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 1359 people had been killed in Sarajevo to date. 456/ Source(s): Reuters; The BiH Health Ministry.

**Narrative of Events:**

426. UN military monitors had been permitted at about 10 sites where Serb guns were within firing range of the airport, but Serb officials stated that they would continue to shell the city itself while sparing the airport. 457/

427. Despite the arrival in Sarajevo of Europe's chief peace broker, Lord Carrington, no progress towards a political settlement was made. This stalemate was blamed in part by the BiH President's refusal to negotiate until all Serb heavy artillery and tanks were put under UN control and a republic-
wide cease-fire held for at least seven days. \[458\] Shortly before Lord Carrington's arrival in an armoured convoy, three to four mortar shells fell in the vicinity of the town hall, immediately to the rear of the Presidential Building. There were no reports of any injuries. \[459\]

428. Continued fighting was reported in the city, particularly in the area of Grbavica. According to Slovenia tourist Milo Zdravić, age 39 non-Serb residents of the area had been forced at gun point into labour gangs. \[460\]

429. Heavy machine-gun fire was reported in the western suburbs bordering the Sarajevo airport. \[461\]

430. Sarajevo TV reported Serb sniper fire and occasional tank shells. Three tank shells were reported to have struck near the Sarajevo Zoo. This shelling killed seven Muslims picnicking nearby, including three children who had been climbing a cherry tree. \[462\] The news agency of BiH said that the children were killed at the village of Kobilja Glava on the outskirts of Sarajevo when a tank opened fire from a distance of 1,200 yards. \[463\]

(b) Local reported events

431. EC chief negotiator Lord Carrington visited Sarajevo. \[464\]

432. Ten cargo aeroplanes, including the first US and British aeroplanes, brought 100 tons of food, medical supplies and warehouse equipment to Sarajevo. \[465\]

433. UN peacekeepers in Croatia identified at least four "reported concentration camps" in northern BiH. The International Committee of the Red Cross was assigned to investigate. \[466\]

4. 4/7/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The heaviest fighting for many days erupted in the city overnight, shortly before midnight as heavy artillery rounds hit Dobrinja. The firing appeared to hit closer to the city after midnight. The fighting was reportedly confined to Dobrinja until about 3:00 a.m., and then spread in intensity to Grbavica. Sounds of heavy shells were heard until 8:00 a.m. Serb forces reportedly exchanged mortar and small-arms fire with BiH forces in the evening and the Old Town came under heavy mortar fire overnight. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: UN relief distribution site in the downtown area; Dobrinja area; area near the Holiday Inn; a house located 100 yards from an aircraft hangar at the airport; the Old Town area. Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: A rocket smashed into a house approximately 100 yards from an aircraft hangar at the airport. Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Four children killed and four others injured in "general assault" by Serb fighters in the western suburbs near the city airport; two Canadian UN soldiers were slightly injured by ricocheting bullets in Dobrinja. Source(s):
Narrative of Events:

434. Another 10 relief flights reached the Sarajevo airport while the city itself continued to be subjected to sniper fire and artillery and rocket attacks, including one on a UN relief distribution site in the downtown area. 467/

435. The heaviest fighting for many days erupted in the city, shortly before midnight, as heavy artillery rounds crashed into the western suburb of Dobrinja and red tracer fire was seen coming from Serbian positions in the hills surrounding the city. The firing appeared to come closer to the centre of the city shortly after midnight with heavy firing close to the Holiday Inn Hotel where the UN forces were lodged. The fighting erupted after Lord Carrington of Britain, the chief European Community negotiator, left the city saying he was dispirited by the lack of progress in talks with the leaders of the warring factions. 468/

436. Explosions could be seen and constant firing could be heard from the western suburb of the city near the airport which had recently been secured by Canadian peace-keeping troops. The fighting then moved closer to the city's downtown as gunners opened fire from the hills and the city's defenders fired back. 469/

437. The heavy overnight fighting in the city died down in the morning, raising hopes that UN relief flights into Sarajevo would continue as scheduled. The fighting of the prior evening, confined until 3:00 a.m. to the Dobrinja district, later spread towards the centre of the city, gaining in intensity in the suburb of Grbavica as dawn broke. The sounds of heavy shells and anti-aircraft fire were reportedly heard until 8:00 a.m.. It was reported by the United Nations that the city centre seemed to have escaped heavy damage and the headquarters of the UN peacekeepers in the central post office was not threatened at any point. 470/ UN officials decided that relief flights into the city would continue after the fierce overnight fighting died down. 471/

438. Artillery exchanges were reported to have intensified early in the western suburbs near the city airport. BiH radio said that a "general assault" by Serb fighters had been repulsed, leaving four children dead and four others wounded. BiH radio also said that Serb militiamen had forced Muslims from their homes in the Grbavica district, located near the airport. 472/

439. At the airport, a rocket smashed into a house approximately 100 yards from an aircraft hanger just minutes before a British relief flight landed. 473/

440. UN spokesman Fred Eckhard reported that two Canadian UN soldiers were slightly injured by ricocheting bullets in Dobrinja. 474/

441. Serb forces reportedly exchanged mortar and small-arms fire with the city's defenders in the evening. "The night was definitely quieter than Friday but that only means that heavy artillery was not used", Sarajevo radio editor Zoran Pišolić said. Small-arms fire was heard throughout the city from late evening into the morning, but no heavy shells were reported. The old part of the city came under mortar fire for several hours overnight, and fires could be seen in Dobrinja. Anti-aircraft fire and heavy machine-guns were also heard in the districts of Marijin Dvor, Hrasno and Mojmilo. 475/
5. 5/7/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Automatic weapons and occasional mortar blasts were reported early in the day but the firing was not as intense as the previous night. Source(s): Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Area near the airport where UN peace-keeping forces were unloading relief supplies; unspecified areas in the city. Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Three people were injured by Serbian sniper fire while driving on the road into the city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Three people were injured by sniper fire; BiH's Crisis Committee reported that 1,359 people had been killed in Sarajevo alone since the fighting started. The committee put the toll in the Republic as a whole at 7,561 dead and more than 27,000 wounded. 476/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

442. Another 14 relief flights arrived in Sarajevo airport carrying 110 tons of supplies, but as UN peace-keeping forces were unloading these supplies they were occasionally subjected to bursts of automatic weapon fire and nearby shelling. 477/

443. Automatic weapons and occasional mortar blasts were reported early in the day but the firing was not as intense as the previous night. 478/
Sporadic artillery, mortar and small-arms fire hit the city as the Commander of UNPROFOR, General Satish Nambiar, visited the city. 479/

444. Three people were reportedly injured by Serbian sniper fire while driving on the road into the city centre. 480/

(b) Local reported events

445. According to Radio Sarajevo, Croats proclaimed a state of their own in BiH. The radio said that nationalists proclaimed a separate "Croatian State of Herceg-Bosna" in south-western BiH, with Mostar as its capital. 481/

446. UNPROFOR General Satish Nambiar, visited the city on his first tour of inspection since the airport was reopened. During his visit Nambiar met BiH President Alija Izetbegović, Serbian leader Radovan Karadžić and Serbian General Ratko Mladić. Speaking afterwards he told UNPROFOR commander General Lewis MacKenzie that the situation was "fragile" and "precarious". 482/

6. 6/7/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic mortar blasts and automatic gunfire were reported in the city through the night and shooting was heard in the Dobrinja district near the airfield. Mortar, light artillery and sniper attacks continued from the suburbs west of the airport, especially the
Dobrinja district. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Holiday Inn; Old Town area; the Parliament building. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Serb snipers were reported to be firing on the city from buildings and hillside vantage points. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

447. Sporadic mortar blasts and automatic gunfire was reported in the city through the night and shooting was heard in the Dobrinja district near the airfield. 483/

448. Mortar, light artillery and sniper attacks continued from the suburbs west of the airport, especially the Dobrinja district. Serb snipers, from buildings and hillside vantage points, maintained fire on the city itself and witnesses reported heavy fighting in the morning. A nurse at the main hospital stated that there had been "casualties, as there are every day", but did not reveal the numbers of killed and wounded. 484/ Mortar fire was reported as hitting the old Muslim quarter, and the Parliament Building. 485/ Several rooms of the Holiday Inn were reportedly struck by mortar fire. 486/

(b) **Local reported events**

449. Russia became the latest country to join the airlift on Sunday. It sent two Antonov-124 cargo aeroplanes with fire fighting equipment for the city. UNHCR official Peter Kessler said that some 50,000 people were being provided with food in Sarajevo, "and the number is going up steadily". 487/

450. Reuters reported that the Holiday Inn management was only renting rooms on the east and west side of the building due to mortar and shell destruction on the other sides. 488/

(c) **International reported events**

451. US National Security advisor Brent Scowcroft stated that land relief convoys were likely to be needed given the volume of supplies needed, and that the US was willing to provide air cover if needed. 489/

7. **7/7/92 (Tuesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fifteen tank rounds hit the area around the Holiday Inn. Firing extended east toward the city centre. The fighting eased later. Heavy artillery and light weapon fire was heard late in the evening in and around the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** American C-130 cargo jet; the area near the Holiday Inn; the area extending east toward the city centre and the Presidency building. Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Description of Damage: American C-130 cargo jet hit by small-arms fire, slightly injuring one serviceman; 15 tank rounds hit the area around the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: It was reported that sniper fire had doubled in intensity in the city centre since Monday. Agence France Presse noted that snipers' single shots were sometimes followed by bursts of machine-gun fire from BiH police or militiamen shooting at targets. 490/ According to UN sources, French UNPROFOR soldiers twice returned fire in the past few days when their armoured personnel carriers became the targets of snipers on the road from the airport to the city centre. 491/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Casualties: One American serviceman was slightly injured. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

452. A Pentagon spokesman said that a US serviceman aboard an American C-130 cargo jet was slightly injured by debris projected by small-arms fire at Sarajevo airport during the day. 492/

453. It was reported that 15 tank rounds hit the area around the Holiday Inn Hotel, home of most of the international press corps, and that firing extended east toward the city centre and the Presidency building. Fighting eased later and UNPROFOR armoured personnel carriers began patrolling the city centre.

454. The battle erupted after BiH President Alija Izetbegović assured the UNPROFOR commander, General Lewis MacKenzie, that BiH forces had no intent of breaking out of the city to link up with Croatian troops to the west. The combat was reported to be the worst since the warring parties agreed to a partial cease-fire last month to allow an international airlift of emergency aid to begin. 493/

455. Heavy artillery fire and light weapon fire was heard late in the evening in and around the city. The fighting was reported only hours after the G-7 leaders expressed support for possible military action. There was speculation that a heavy barrage of mortar fire originated from BiH forces seeking to break out of the city's siege. The night sky was lit up by flares fired to help BiH troops in their attack. 494/

(b) Local reported events

456. Amid heavy mortar fire, BiH President Alija Izetbegović left for his scheduled meeting with President Bush in Helsinki where he was planning on seeking arms and ammunition for the continued defence of Sarajevo. 495/

457. UN observers oversaw an exchange of 36 Serbian prisoners for the same number of Muslims in the city. Ten Serbs, however, refused to return to the zone held by their militia, demanding instead to stay in the city centre where many Serbs still lived among Bosnian Muslims. Their request was granted. 496/

458. The UN airlift delivered 145 tons of food and medical supplies but officials stated that at least 200 tons were needed on a daily basis. 497/

459. The International Committee of the Red Cross returned to Sarajevo to resume its attempts to gain access to alleged detention centres. 498/

460. The Macedonian Government under Nikola Kljusev resigned over its failure to win unconditional recognition of independence. 499/
(c) International reported events

461. The Group of Seven world leaders issued a strong warning that would back military intervention if needed to insure that aid reached Sarajevo. 500/

8. 8/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Some of the fiercest fighting was reported overnight and throughout the day and night. The overnight fighting died down in the city as dawn broke. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Oslobodjenje building; a number of unidentified buildings in the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: The Oslobodjenje building and a number of other buildings in the city centre were reported ablaze. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported that in the last 24 hours, 11 people had been killed in Sarajevo, and 41 were wounded. 501/ Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio.

Narrative of Events:

462. Some of the fiercest fighting was reported to have occurred late Tuesday night and throughout the day and night on Wednesday, just hours after the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, completed her tour of Sarajevo. 502/

463. The overnight fighting in Sarajevo died down in the centre of the city as dawn broke, but a number of buildings were ablaze, including the headquarters of the newspaper, Oslobodjenje. 503/

(b) Local reported events

464. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said in an interview with the New York Times that he would ask US President George Bush for arms and ammunition to prevent mass killing of civilians if Serb forces overrun the city. "I'm afraid the population would be subjected to a terrible slaughter as a revenge for their 100 or 200 days of resistance", he said. 504/

465. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, after meeting with representatives of the warring factions stated: "The airlift is not the solution, far from the solution. So far, there have been 84 flights and more than 900 tons of supplies, . . . but the main emphasis must be on land convoys. Sarajevo is not the only place that needs assistance". 505/

(c) International reported events

466. The CSCE suspended Yugoslavia for three months, accusing the rump state of aggression against its neighbours. 506/
9. 9/7/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: At 10:00 p.m. on Wednesday, Serbian forces advanced under heavy mortar and rocket fire to several points along the Miljacka River, but at 1:00 a.m., the offensive had been beaten back (though shelling continued overnight). Heavy fighting continued in the afternoon and resumed at approximately 4:00 p.m. between the UN headquarters and the airport. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: UN armoured personnel carrier, 200 metres from the UNPROFOR headquarters; an unidentified large building between UN headquarters and the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A UN armoured personnel carrier was reportedly hit by carbine or assault rifle bullets; an unidentified large building between UN headquarters and the airport was reportedly ablaze. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Constant sniping, small-arms fire and occasional mortar rounds were reported in the morning. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

467. At 10:00 p.m. on Wednesday night, Serbian infantry forces advanced under heavy mortar and rocket fire to several points along the Miljacka River, which runs through the city centre. By 1:00 a.m. Thursday, the offensive had been beaten back but the shelling continued throughout the night. 507/

468. Fighting in Sarajevo eased in the morning to comparative normality, which included constant sniping, small-arms fire and occasional mortar rounds. 508/

469. Heavy fighting erupted again in the afternoon after a three-hour lull and two UN convoys came under fire. The convoys came under fire around midday less than 200 metres from the UN peace-keeping forces headquarters. One armoured car was hit, apparently by carbine or assault rifle bullets. 509/

470. Armed clashes between Serbs and BiH forces resumed at approximately 4:00 p.m. between the UN headquarters and Sarajevo airport. Within minutes of the resumption, the fighting appeared to be very heavy. A large building was reported to be ablaze. Fighting was also reported further east near the city centre with shelling, mortar, and small-arms fire reported. 510/

(b) International reported events

471. US President Bush rejected BiH President Izetbegović’s plea for direct military intervention, but he did repeat a call for a combined international effort to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. Both Italy and France promised to increase their participation. France announced that it had sent an additional 700 troops and a squadron of helicopter gun-ships to protect the relief corridors within Sarajevo. But UN Commander Major General MacKenzie recommended delaying their immediate use because of heavy ground fighting. 511/

472. BiH President Izetbegović urged for Western military action at the CSCE
summit in Helsinki. He recommended that the West place troops on the BiH-Serbia border in order to prevent Serbia from supplying arms to its "brothers" in BiH. 512/

473. There were reports of a gathering international momentum for a naval blockade of Serbia and Montenegro and for the opening of a land corridor, by force if necessary. 513/

10. 10/7/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Occasional gunfire was reported in the city as the sides exchanged artillery and machine-gun fire overnight. Fighting was also reported in Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Canadian UNPROFOR barracks (former Yugoslav army's Halilović barracks located in Vitkovac, 400 metres north of the UNPROFOR Sarajevo headquarters); the Holiday Inn; the city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: The Canadian UNPROFOR barracks was hit by three mortar rounds at around 7:40 p.m.. One mortar round exploded in a building used as a quartermaster's store, while the two others fell on the car park, causing damage but no injuries; three mortars hit the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo Radio reported that one person died in street battles in the Dobrinja district and one other was killed in the shelling of the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

474. Only occasional gunfire was reported in the city after Serbs and Muslim and Croat fighters exchanged artillery and machine-gun fire during the night. 514/

475. Two Canadian members of the UN peace-keeping force were wounded early Saturday as fighting flared around the airport. The two UN "blue berets" stationed at Sarajevo airport were hit by small-arms fire around 2:00 a.m.. They were not seriously injured and there were no plans to evacuate them. The attack came after three mortar rounds hit a barracks used by the Canadian members of UNPROFOR. The bombardment of the former Yugoslav army's Halilović barracks occurred at around 7:30 p.m. One mortar round exploded in a building used as a quartermaster's store, while the two others fell on the car park, causing damage but no injuries. The barracks were located in Vitkovac, 400 metres north of the UN force's headquarters in Sarajevo. 515/

476. Three mortars hit the Holiday Inn. Radio Sarajevo reported that one person died in street battles in the Dobrinja district and another person was killed in the shelling of the city centre. 516/

(b) Local reported events

477. Relief flights increased to up to 18 flights a day, bringing in more than 200 tons of supplies per day. 517/
(c) **International reported events**

478. International pressure on Serbia to end the fighting was stepped up at the CSCE. The 51 member countries condemned Serbia and demanded an immediate end to the fighting. 518/

479. In Helsinki, the Western European Union defence alliance agreed to send a naval flotilla with air support to patrol the Otranto Strait off the Yugoslav coast and said that experts would study ways to open a land corridor to get aid to Sarajevo. 519/

11. 11/7/92 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo came under renewed heavy bombardment after three days of relative calm. Dobrinja reportedly was hit by more than 100 shells overnight. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The city and the hospital; Dobrinja area; the Parliament building; a UN armoured personnel carrier at a point halfway between the UN headquarters and the BiH Presidency Building. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio; New York Times.

**Description of Damage:** The Parliament building was hit and set afire, but was quickly extinguished; a rocket propelled grenade fired from the Serb occupied hillside position narrowly missed a UN armoured personnel carrier halfway between the UN headquarters and the BiH Presidency Building. When the UN soldiers emerged from the damaged vehicle they came under fire from machine-guns and anti-aircraft weapons which killed two to three civilians and wounded three others. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio; New York Times.

**Sniping Activity:** Despite the relative calm in the city, snipers reportedly killed at least three people looking for food. 520/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** The Muslim and Croat crisis headquarters reported two people killed and numerous others wounded in the overnight fighting 521/; two to three civilians were killed and three others were wounded after an attack on a UN armoured personnel carrier at a point halfway between the UN headquarters and the BiH Presidency Building; three people were killed by snipers while looking for food; the BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 1420 people had been killed and 8040 people had been wounded in Sarajevo to date. 522/ Source(s): New York Times; Reuters; BiH Public Health Ministry.

**Narrative of Events:**

480. Overnight, Serb forces on the Trebević mountain overlooking Sarajevo shelled the city and hit the hospital, Zoran Pirotić, Sarajevo radio director said. He also said that "the brunt of the artillery attack was sustained, as usual, by Dobrinja, where more than 100 shells fell until dawn". The BiH parliament building was also hit and set afire but the fire was quickly extinguished, Pirotić said. 523/

481. As dawn broke, the fighting and shelling reportedly eased. 524/

482. Sarajevo came under renewed heavy bombardment after three days of relative quiet. 525/

483. A rocket propelled grenade fired from the Serb occupied hillside
position narrowly missed a United Nations' armoured personnel carrier at a point half way between the UN headquarters and the BiH Presidency building. When the UN soldiers emerged from the damaged vehicle they came under fire from machine-gun and anti-aircraft weapons. Two or three civilians were killed and three more were wounded. President Izetbegović had been expected to arrive in the city at the same time in a similar UN vehicle. 526/

(b) Local reported events

484. BiH President Izetbegović returned to Sarajevo in the afternoon aboard a Western relief flight following his Thursday meeting in Helsinki with President Bush. Upon his arrival he was greeted by angry demands from Muslim fighters that he release scarce stocks of ammunition for an attempt to break through to Goražde. 527/

485. Nineteen aeroplanes, the most in one day, brought 179 tons of emergency supplies to the airport and an agreement was signed to let UN peace-keeping troops guard a road corridor from the airport to the city, UN officials said. The agreement allowed UN peace-keeping forces to guard the corridor to protect trucks entering the city with aid. 528/

486. UN spokesman Fred Eckhard said that the warring sides agreed to a three-hour cease-fire beginning at 8:00 a.m. Sunday in the Dobrinja district to allow the first big delivery of aid to the area where 30,000 people were reportedly trapped. 529/

12. 12/7/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling was reported, but there were no fierce battles. Sniping was said to be a major problem. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio.

Targets Hit: Some central areas; Hrasnica area. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio; BiH Crisis Headquarters.

Description of Damage: In Hrasnica, four children were reported killed and two seriously wounded in a mortar attack. Source(s): Reuters; Sarajevo Radio; BiH Crisis Headquarters.

Sniping Activity: Constant sniper and small-arms fire was reported in Dobrinja; a French relief aeroplane suffered minor damage to its engine and fuselage from small-arms fire, probably from a sniper rifle. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

Casualties: In Hrasnica, four children were killed and two seriously wounded in a mortar attack. Source(s): Reuters; BiH Crisis Headquarters.

Narrative of Events:

487. UN relief trucks crossed a no-man's land to the cut-off Muslim suburb of Dobrinja where 35,000 civilians were under siege. The UN trucks were allowed a five hour truce during which they delivered 108 tons of food and medical supplies. When the truce expired the suburb was once again isolated by constant sniper and small-arms fire. 530/

488. A French relief aeroplane suffered minor damage from small-arms fire. A
UN official stated that someone had been shooting at incoming aircraft and the French aeroplane took three small-arms shots, probably from a sniper rifle. The damage was not reported as serious, with one bullet striking behind the engine and two going through the fuselage. 531/

489. Sarajevo radio reported sporadic shelling of some central areas but said that there were no fierce battles. "It was a quieter night. The main problem is now snipers", a Sarajevo journalist said. 532/

490. Radio Sarajevo reporters said that heavy shelling by Serb forces was preventing ambulances from reaching dead and wounded in the streets. 533/

491. The BiH crisis headquarters reported that in Hrasnica, a Sarajevo suburb, four children were reported killed and two seriously wounded in a mortar attack. 534/

(b) Local reported events

492. Over 150 flights had reached Sarajevo over the last 10 days bringing in a total of 1,700 tons of aid. 535/

(c) International reported events

493. The United Nations Security Council authorized 500 more peacekeepers to speed up the relief effort. 536/ UN Security Council Resolution 764 authorized the dispatch of 500 more peacekeepers to Sarajevo (from 1,100 to 1,600) to help keep the airport open for the influx of relief supplies. 537/

13. 13/7/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The outskirts of the city including Dobrinja was shelled on Sunday evening and died down after midnight. A mortar bombardment was reported near the UN headquarters in the city. Sporadic automatic weapons and mortar fire continued throughout the day. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Four power transmission lines reportedly dynamited by Serb forces; area outside the UNPROFOR Headquarters hit by 13 mortars; the outskirts of the city, including the Dobrinja District; the Serb-held Lukavica barracks. Source(s): New York Times, Helsinki Watch; Reuters; SRNA.

Description of Damage: The dynamiting of four power transmission lines idled the pumps providing the city with water; the mortar attack of UNPROFOR Headquarters killed a teenager and wounded at least four in the street outside. Source(s): New York Times, Helsinki Watch; Reuters; SRNA.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One killed, and at least four wounded in the mortar attack on UNPROFOR Headquarters; reports estimated that between eight to 10 people were killed and 32 wounded in attacks; it was also estimated that at least 25 people had been killed since Saturday with dozens more severely wounded. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.
**Narrative of Events:**

494. Serbian forces marked the 100th day of the Sarajevo siege by dynamiting four power transmission lines and knocking out power to the city, idling the pumps providing the city with its water. Morale was described as being at its lowest point. 538/ Emergency power was restored to some public buildings by generators, but fuel for these generators was reported to be in short supply. 539/

495. A mortar bombardment shook the headquarters of the UN force in Sarajevo and the UN said that the blasts killed a teenager and wounded at least four in the street outside. Thirteen mortars reportedly landed outside the headquarters within four minutes. According to UN spokesman Mik Magnusson, "[m]ortars have landed in the street and the parking lot adjacent to the building before . . . but never anything like this". 540/

496. Calm returned to the city after heavy artillery shelling killed eight people. According to Sarajevo radio, the outskirts of the city, including the district of Dobrinja, were shelled on Sunday evening and everything died down after midnight. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said that the large Serb-held Lukavica barracks outside the city came under artillery attack at 6:00 a.m.. 541/

497. It was reported that sporadic automatic weapons exchanges and mortar fire continued throughout the day and authorities said that 10 people had been killed and 32 wounded. 542/

498. The recent increase in artillery, mortar and rocket bombardments reportedly killed at least 25 people since Saturday and severely wounded dozens more. 543/

**Local reported events**

499. Many city residents were reported to be living on a diet consisting only of bread, pasta and a thin gruel made of water and wild greens from the hillsides. 544/

500. The relay station on Trebević Mountain that carried telephone connections beyond Sarajevo was reportedly switched off by Serbian forces. 545/

501. Henrik Nordentoft, an official of the UNHCR, coordinating the airlift stated that "[t]he main problem now is getting food out from four warehouses at Sarajevo to the people on the ground. We have identified 102 communities which need help and 70 to 80 have been covered. We have been unable to reach the others so far because of the danger from snipers". 546/

**14. 14/7/92 (Tuesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported calm most of the day following heavy bombardments on Monday. As night fell, the bombardment began again with heavy artillery, mortar and rocket attacks. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

**Targets Hit:** Area near the UN headquarters; the Baščaršija area. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Nearly continuous sniper fire was reported around the airport with a Canadian sharpshooter fatally shooting a Serb sniper who had slightly wounded another Canadian soldier. Source(s): Washington Post.

Casualties: One Serb sniper was killed and one Canadian soldier was wounded in exchanges between snipers and Canadian forces near the airport. Source(s): Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

502. Croat forces appeared to be advancing on the city. UN spokesman Mik Magnusson said that for the first time, Croat forces had moved up from the coast. "It is a fair assumption that they [Croats] are firing within six miles of Sarajevo", he said. 547/

503. Serbian forces reportedly were reinforced with new 155 millimetre howitzers from Serbia. 548/

504. UN officials expressed concern about the nearly continuous sniper fire around the airport. They revealed that a Canadian sharpshooter fatally shot a Serb sniper who had slightly wounded another Canadian soldier. 549/

505. Sarajevo was reported calm most of the day following heavy bombardments on Monday and 48 hours without electricity. 550/ Mortar bombs were reported to have fallen near the UN headquarters early in the day, but nobody was reported hurt. 551/

506. As night fell, the bombardment began again with heavy artillery, mortar and rocket attacks on the city centre area and on Baščaršija, the old Muslim Quarter along the Miljacka River. 552/

(b) Local reported events

507. Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić was confirmed and he promised to do all that he could to get the JNA's weapons out of BiH and to "bring order to Belgrade, Serbia, and Yugoslavia". 553/

508. A record 20 UN sponsored flights arrived at Sarajevo airport. 509. Electricity was restored to a few key buildings, but the majority of the population was without electricity and water. The State electric utility managed to restore 3 per cent of the city's normal electric use, but this was directed to army headquarters, hospitals and telephone switching centres. Water pumps were also turned on to these key buildings for at least few hours each day. 554/

510. It was also reported that many of the Serbian telephone lines had been knocked out by the power outage since they shared a common Sarajevo switching centre. 555/

511. All attempts to reach the four damaged power lines at Vogošća failed when repair crews, accompanied by UN officials, were turned back by Serbian commanders. 556/
15. 15/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces reportedly shelled the city centre and suburbs early in the morning and again in the afternoon. Sniper fire was described as intense. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping activity was described as intense: A French aid worker was shot and wounded by a sniper; an eight year-old boy was hit by sniper fire while crossing a bridge by the River Miljacka, and efforts to rescue him resulted in additional sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: One French aid worker was wounded by sniper fire; an eight year-old boy was hit by sniper fire (condition not specified); the Sarajevo Crisis Centre reported 13 dead and 72 wounded in the city as sniper fire and shelling hit Sarajevo's streets on Wednesday; an incomplete toll on the fighting in the city said that 32 people had been killed and 130 wounded between midday Tuesday and the same time Wednesday. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

512. Serb forces shelled the city centre and suburbs early in the morning and again in the afternoon. A French aid worker was shot and wounded by a sniper. Residents described the sniper fire in the city as intense. 559/

513. In one reported sniping incident, an eight year-old boy was found on the embankment near one of the bridges crossing the River Miljacka. Attempts by passers-by to drag the boy behind a low wall failed as snipers opened fire on them too. It was reported at one hospital that some 15 people were shot by snipers on Sunday alone. 560/

(b) International reported events

514. A new round of peace talks began in London under Lord Carrington. 561/

515. President Bush and other world leaders conferred at two separate summit meetings. 562/

516. Western military experts stated that air attacks on Serbian artillery positions in the hills around Sarajevo would be severely limited without an accompanying ground force. 563/

16. 16/7/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bombardment of the city continued until the late evening. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Unidentified market. Source(s): Reuters.
Description of Damage: One person was killed, and seven others were wounded in a mortar attack on an unidentified market. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One person killed, seven wounded in a mortar bomb attack on a busy market. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

517. A mortar bomb reportedly hit a busy market, killing one person and wounding seven others. Police originally reported two deaths in the latest of several mortar attacks on the market during the week. 564/

518. Sarajevo radio reported that Serbian forces kept up the bombardment of the city until late in the evening. 565/

(b) Local reported events

519. UN relief trucks once again managed to get through to Muslims trapped in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja. 566/

520. The NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, stationed in the Adriatic, began patrolling the region to ensure compliance with UN economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. 567/

(c) International reported events

521. Leaders of BiH's warring factions held a second day of European Community-sponsored peace talks, still failing to sit down face to face. Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutileiro began a second round of talks in the afternoon with BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić, who said Wednesday that he rejected any direct talks with "war criminal" Radovan Karadžić unless Serb heavy guns in Sarajevo were placed under UN control. 568/

17. 17/7/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sources reported a three-hour bombardment of the city's old quarter and an area near the television station. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Maršal Tito Street (a few hundred yards from the BiH Presidency); city's old quarter; the area near the television station. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: At least four people were seriously wounded by a shell which landed on Maršal Tito Street; houses were reported afire after a three hour bombardment of the city's old quarter and an area near the television station. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported around the main cross roads in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: At least four people were seriously wounded by a shell which landed on Maršal Tito Street. Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

522. An artillery shell slammed into a Sarajevo street, just a few hundred yards from where British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was conferring with BiH President Alija Izetbegović. At least four people were seriously hurt in the blast. The shell, believed to have been fired by Serb forces, landed on Maršal Tito Street a few hundred yards from the BiH Presidency building. Sniper fire was also reported around the main cross roads in the city as Hurd arrived with 17 tons of relief supplies. 569/

523. Serb shelling and mortar fire set houses afire early in the day during a three hour bombardment of the city's old quarter and an area near the television station. 570/

(b) Local reported events

524. Major General Lewis Mackenzie asked to be relieved of his UN command of the peace-keeping forces in Sarajevo because of a series of death threats against him. His efforts to keep in touch with all of the warring factions had reportedly cost him the confidence of some groups. 571/ Major General MacKenzie also accused all sides of cheating, saying that they had heavy guns that they had not declared. 572/

(c) International reported events

525. In London, after three days of talks, the three sides to the conflict signed a two week cease-fire agreement which was to take effect at 6:00 p.m. on Sunday, 19 July. The agreement included a promise to place all heavy weapons including artillery guns, mortars and rocket-launchers under United Nations supervision throughout BiH. 573/

526. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was reportedly opposed to this agreement as it placed too much responsibility on UN forces and would take three months and 1100 men to enforce. He later stated that such actions would draw UN forces into a "new Vietnam". 574/

527. In speaking to reporters in Sarajevo, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd ruled out any direct Western military action to save the city and he specifically singled out the United States as one of the countries that had decided not to take military action. 575/

18. 18/7/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The evening shelling was quieter than most during the week. Sporadic small-arms and automatic weapons fire were heard in the centre of New Sarajevo, with the last shots heard at about 7:00 a.m.
Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Central Old Town and Dobrinja fell under several mortar attacks.
Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

528. Gunfire gradually fell silent during Friday night and through Saturday, 24 hours before the deadline for a two-week cease-fire at 6:00 p.m. Sunday. 576/

529. "The night was quieter than most this week. There were mortar exchanges and small-arms fire, but nothing as heavy as we were getting used to", said Zoran Babić, a Sarajevo radio editor. "There has been a letdown in fighting, but it nevertheless persists. So it's too early to talk about a cease-fire, in which all want to believe in, but few really do". Describing the overnight exchanges of fire, UN spokesman Mik Magnusson said: "A little noisy, but not too bad". The central Old Town and the Dobrinja district fell under several mortar attacks, Babić said. There was sporadic small-arms and automatic weapons fire in the centre of new Sarajevo (a modern residential complex, most of which was completed for the 1984 Winter Olympics Games). The last shots were heard at 7:00 a.m. in the city centre near the line separating the warring factions. 577/

(b) Local reported events

530. A convoy of 183 sick and handicapped children was evacuated from the city by a French humanitarian agency. The children, mainly 10 to 14 year-olds, were accompanied by their mothers to hospitals in Split, Croatia and Milan, Italy. 578/

(c) International reported events

531. US Pentagon officials announced that any attack on Serbian troops to rescue Sarajevo would only toughen the Serb resolve. 579/

19. 19/7/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The warring factions exchanged fire overnight, but shelling tapered off in the morning, just hours before a cease-fire was to come into force. Twenty minutes before the cease-fire, 29 mortar shells struck near the UN Headquarters where negotiations were taking place. Sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire continued several hours after the cease-fire was to begin. Heavy fighting was reported in the evening. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; New York Times.

Targets Hit: A French C-130 Hercules was struck by two bullets as it landed; the radio and television building; the Koševsko Brdo district (in the north of the city); 29 mortar shells exploded 250 yards from the UN Headquarters (cutting short a meeting there between Panić and Izetbegović). Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Snipers were reported as active in the morning. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 1,467 people had been
killed and 8,355 had been wounded in Sarajevo to date. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health Bulletin.

Narrative of Events:

532. Sources close to BiH territorial defence forces said that fighting had broken out in the past few nights between armed paramilitary groups, most notably those of Juka Prazina, or Robin Hood as he is known to locals. 581/

533. A French C-130 Hercules was hit by two bullets as it landed, but the UN reported that nobody was hurt. 582/

534. The warring factions exchanged fire overnight, but shelling tapered off in the morning, hours before a cease-fire was to come into force. Sarajevo radio journalist Jasna Dui said that Dobrinja was hardest hit in the fighting. The television and radio building a few miles from the city centre was attacked in the shelling which started at around midnight and eased at around dawn. Artillery shelling and shooting were reported particularly in the district of Koševsko Brdo in the north of the city. Snipers were reported as still active in the morning. There was no immediate word on casualties. 583/

535. Sporadic mortar and machine-gun fire continued several hours after the cease-fire was to begin. Some reports were received suggesting that the truce had failed to take hold immediately in the places where the fighting had been most intense. 584/

536. The meeting between Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Panić and BiH President Izetbegović was cut short by a barrage of 29 mortars that exploded 250 yards from the UN Building where they were meeting. The meeting occurred just 20 minutes before the cease-fire was to take effect. 585/

537. Heavy fighting was reported in the evening. 586/

(b) Local reported events

538. New Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić flew to Sarajevo and met BiH President Alija Izetbegović for almost three hours at UN military headquarters. Panić said that he offered to start peace talks immediately with BiH leaders to end the conflict, saying Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs were ready to end "this stupid, unbelievable, unconscionable war". He said that Bosnian Serbs would put heavy weapons under control of the United Nations around both the besieged town of Goražde and Sarajevo itself. 587/ Izetbegović told reporters that Panić appeared "insufficiently informed" on what was happening in BiH and that he doubted the Prime Minister could deliver on his promises to rein in the Serb irregulars. 588/

20. 20/7/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A heavy mortar barrage exploded near the airport just hours after a new cease-fire had begun. This bombardment coincided with reported Serb shelling elsewhere in the city. Source(s): Washington Post.

Targets Hit: The airport area, including an airport hangar; the Presidency Building; a narrow street near the old military hospital, near a bakery in the city centre; the Old Town area. Source(s): Washington Post; Reuters; New York Times.
Description of Damage: A heavy mortar barrage exploded around the airport, injuring two Canadian soldiers and destroying an airport hangar; three mortar rounds hit the Presidency Building, causing at least 10 casualties (local radio said that five people were killed); one mortar shell struck near a narrow street near the old military hospital, near a bakery in the city centre, killing two and wounding 12; four were killed by a mortar round in the Old Town; two people were killed near the military hospital. Source(s): Washington Post; Reuters; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: two Canadian soldiers were wounded by shrapnel from airport shelling; at least 10 unspecified casualties (local radio reported five dead) after the shelling of the Presidency Building; two people were killed and 12 were wounded from the shelling near the old military hospital; Sarajevo Hospital reported 15 killed and more than 100 others injured from the day's shelling; another report counted 12 people killed (including four killed by a mortar round in the Old Town, two near the military hospital and five women in a mini-van). Source(s): Washington Post; Reuters; New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

539. UN officials halted their two week relief airlift when a heavy mortar barrage exploded around the airport just hours after the new cease-fire had begun. Among the casualties were two Canadian soldiers who were struck by shrapnel. An airport hanger was also destroyed by mortar fire. The airport bombardment coincided with heavy Serb shelling elsewhere in the city. 589/

540. UN spokesman Francois Giuliani said that three mortar rounds landed on the Presidency Building, causing at least 10 casualties, but that it was not yet clear whether anyone was killed. 590/ Local radio said that five people were killed. 591/

541. According to figures compiled by Sarajevo hospitals, the most recent Serbian shelling killed 15 people and wounded more than 100 others. One mortar shell struck a narrow street near the old military hospital shortly before noon, killing two people and wounding 12. 592/ Another report stated that at least 12 people were killed in the city, among those were: four killed in the old town, two near a military hospital, and five women in a mini-van. 593/

(b) Local reported events

542. "Because of the proximity of the shelling to the airport and the fact that splinters from the shells are flying across the airfield, flights have been suspended", said Major Andrew Venus, a spokesman for the British UNPROFOR contingent. 594/

(c) International reported events

543. Opposing Yugoslav membership in international bodies, the EC Arbitration Commission said that the new Yugoslavia "cannot be accepted as the sole successor". 595/
21. 21/7/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported on UN targets. Sporadic artillery, machine-gun and small-arms fire preceded heavy fighting that broke out at 11:30 p.m. in several of the city's suburbs, with fighting and artillery duels continuing until 4:00 a.m.. Four hundred explosions hit west of the airport. Slight shelling and gunfire were reported in the city centre overnight. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo airport; relief vehicle at airport; UNHCR food storage site and vehicles at airport; UNPROFOR "Tall Mike" installation post; the area west of the airport; the Halilović barracks ("Beaver Camp", housing Canadian UN forces north-east of the airport); the city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Sarajevo airport was closed because of shelling; several UNHCR vehicles were damaged at the airport and the hangar where UNHCR stored its food supplies was hit between two and 12 times by mortar fire; shrapnel from mortar rounds damaged the antenna of a "Tall Mike" radar installation used by Ukrainian UN troops to determine the origin of artillery fire; 400 explosions, most notably from 155 millimetre cannons landed in points west of the airport; other 120 and 82 millimetre mortar shells hit the Halilović barracks (a.k.a. "Beaver Camp"), where Canadian UN forces were housed three kilometres north-east of the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

544. Sarajevo airport was closed amid mortar and machine-gun fire but reopened for humanitarian flights 80 minutes later. UNHCR spokesman Ron Redmond stated that the closure was ordered by Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie after a mortar round landed near a UN control post. Before the closure order, six flights bringing humanitarian aid had arrived in the city during the morning—one each from France, Britain, Canada, Germany, Belgium and Spain. 596/ Annick Roulet, a UNHCR spokeswoman, stated that the round of shelling began at 10:00 a.m. and damaged several vehicles involved in the unloading of relief supplies. The hangar where the UNHCR stored its food supplies and had its offices was hit twice by the mortar fire and 19 UNHCR staff sought refuge in a bunker. Two cars belonging to UNHCR were also hit. 597/

545. Pilots continued to dodge bullets and shrapnel when the airlift was resumed. Some of the worst fighting in three weeks broke out west of the city late Tuesday night and early Wednesday. 598/

546. Shrapnel from mortar rounds reportedly damaged the antenna of a "Tall Mike" radar installation used by Ukrainian UN troops to determine the origin of artillery fire. UNPROFOR spokesman Mik Magnusson said that he believed the installation could have been the target. 12 mortar rounds fired at the same time hit the nearby airport hangar used by staff of the UNHCR. Magnusson stated that "blue berets" had pinpointed the path of the mortar rounds that damaged the "Tall Mike", but had been unable to determine which side fired them. 599/
547. Sporadic artillery, machine-gun and small-arms fire preceded heavy fighting that broke out at 11:30 p.m. in several of the city's suburbs, including Ilidža, Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja and Stup among others, with fighting and artillery duels continuing until 4:00 a.m. A UN source said that 400 explosions, most notably from 155 millimetre cannons, landed in points west of the airport. Other 120 and 82 millimetre mortar shells fell on the Halilović barracks (a.k.a. "Beaver Camp"), where Canadian UN forces were housed. No casualties were reported. Only slight shelling and gunfire were reported in the city centre overnight, and a relative calm prevailed there early on Wednesday. 600/

(b) Local reported events

548. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the outgoing commander of UNPROFOR, criticized all parties to the conflict. He accused them of mortaring their own positions in order to create the impression that they were being fired upon. He also stated that these same combatants were breaking the international rules of war by setting up mortars beside hospitals, artillery units beside schools, and by retaliating to military attacks by hitting civilian targets. 601/

22. 22/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: It was reported that overnight there was heavy fighting with artillery and mortars. At mid-afternoon the city was reported as "unusually calm". Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

549. Sporadic sniping and machine-gun fire persisted in the city after a night of heavy fighting with artillery and mortars. Fighting between Muslims and Serbs erupted near the airport after midnight. The battles lasted for more than two hours before tapering off into sporadic exchanges. 602/

550. Sarajevo radio reported at mid-afternoon that the city was "unusually calm". 603/

(b) Local reported events

551. UNPROFOR said that humanitarian aid flights were arriving normally at the airport. A total of 215 tons of food on 15 aircraft was delivered to Sarajevo as the airlift continued. 604/

552. UN officials made a last minute decision to cancel a flight scheduled to carry 27 BiH athletes to the Olympic games in Barcelona. They stated that the delegation must be cut to the two registered athletes, and eight others, before they would allow the aeroplane to leave. 605/
23. 23/7/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A police spokesman in the city said there was scattered mortar and machine-gun fire overnight, but overall, "it was the calmest night since Sunday". Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: CNN camera crew vehicle; unidentified public kitchen; a crowded suburban street in Hrasnica. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: A car carrying a CNN camera crew came under close range fire, seriously wounding a camera operator and slightly wounding a correspondent. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One report counted four people killed in the previous 24 hours ending at midday; another report counted at least five people killed in the city and 30 wounded, including two members of a CNN camera crew. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

553. A police spokesman in the city said that there was scattered mortar and machine-gun fire overnight, but overall, "it was the calmest night since Sunday". Despite the relative calm, four people were reported killed in the previous 24 hours reported shortly after midday. It was reported that on most previous days, about 20 people were reported killed in the city. 606/

554. Mortar attacks and exchanges of automatic weapons fire killed at least five people in the city and wounded more than 30, including members of a CNN camera crew. A car carrying a CNN crew from a local television station came under fire, apparently from close range. A camera operator, Margaret Moth was hit in the face and neck and CNN described her injuries as life-threatening. Correspondent Mark Dulmage was slightly wounded in the face and in one arm by bullet fragments. 607/

555. Mortar shells reportedly slammed into a public kitchen and a crowded suburban street in the south-western district of Hrasnica. 608/

(b) Local reported events

556. BiH President Alija Izetbegović, declared that if the international community did not come to their rescue, his country would join forces with neighbouring Croatia. But senior BiH officials conceded that they were not sure whether the Croats should be regarded as allies or enemies. 609/

557. A relative lull in the fighting allowed the UN to bring its humanitarian aid airlift to Sarajevo back to near-normal levels after interruptions Monday and Tuesday. UNHCR was attempting to fly in an average of 200 tons of food and medicine a day into Sarajevo. 610/

558. Fighting continued in Sarajevo as Major General MacKenzie again criticized the parties to the conflict, stating that the Muslims were breaking the cease-fire as much as anyone else, if not more. 611/
24. 24/7/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The worst fighting in several days was reported with intense battles between the warring factions in districts around the city. Exploding shells were heard at daybreak with battles resuming later in the morning and in the evening. Source(s): Reuters, Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Northern part of the city, mainly Koševo. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

559. In the worst fighting in several days, intense battles between the warring factions could be heard in districts around the city. The heaviest fighting, with the sky lit up with tracers and exploding shells was at daybreak. After tapering off, the battles resumed later in the morning. 612/

560. There was reported artillery fire and street fighting in the northern part of the city, mainly Koševo, site of the stadium and skating rink from the 1984 winter Olympic games. 613/

561. After a day of sporadic fighting, violent combat reportedly broke out in the districts near the Presidential building in the city just before 8:00 p.m.. 614/

(b) Local reported events

562. Two humanitarian aid flights reportedly landed at Sarajevo's airport early in the day. 615/

563. The entire 30 member BiH Olympic delegation, with the help of two aircraft chartered by the International Olympic Committee, circumvented the UN blockade and flew out of Sarajevo on its way to Barcelona. BiH won emergency recognition from the International Olympic Committee on Thursday. 616/

25. 25/7/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The UN reported that the day's activity included mostly small-arms fire, mainly from the west end of the city, but not much artillery activity. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja apartment settlement, Hrasno Hill and the central Grbavica neighbourhood; area close to the Presidency building. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: At least six people were wounded by a Serb-fired mortar round that exploded close to the Presidency building; several mortar shells hit Dobrinja. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least three killed and 23 wounded in fighting overnight; at least six people wounded during the day near the Presidency building. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

564. At least three people were killed and 23 wounded in artillery fire and fighting overnight in several areas of the city, including the western Dobrinja apartment settlement, Hrasno Hill and the central Grbavica neighbourhood. 617/

565. Sporadic shellfire and small-arms clashes hit Sarajevo during the day, with at least six people injured by a Serb-fired mortar round that exploded close to the downtown Presidency building. 618/

566. Residents reported sporadic exchanges of machine-gun fire in the centre of the city and several mortar bombs smashed into the district of Dobrinja. 619/

567. UN spokesman Mik Magnusson said that mostly infantry fighting broke out in the city late in the day and that the airport came under small-arms fire. "So far it's being relatively noisy, but mostly small-arms fire, mainly from the west end of the city. Artillery was not having a busy night", he said. 620/

(b) Local reported events

568. There were continued reports circulating that BiH President Izetbegović's talks in Zagreb with Croatian President Tudjman, suggested that the BiH army headquarters in Sarajevo might be moved closer to Croatia. Croatian officials were reported to have demanded that BiH hand over 17 senior officers who were accused of have having taken part (while still officers in the Yugoslav Army) in attacks that devastated Vukovar and several other populations centres in Croatia last year. 621/

569. A UN directed convoy from Sarajevo heading towards Goražde was stuck overnight in a mine field. Two of the convoy trucks were destroyed when they struck mines. A recovery team of 27 men was dispatched from UN headquarters in Sarajevo. 622/

26. 26/7/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting continued in the city and artillery shells and mortars hit buildings in Novo Sarajevo, the city centre, Butmir and Dobrinja. The fighting subsided shortly after daybreak in most places but sporadic sniper and machine-gun fire was reported. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Unidentified Catholic church and post office in the Novo Sarajevo area; central Sarajevo; the Dobrinja District. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: A spokesman for the BiH military said that a Catholic church and a post office were damaged by shell fire in the Novo Sarajevo area.
Sniping Activity: After daybreak sporadic sniper and machine-gun fire could be still be heard in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: It was reported that of those killed over the weekend, eight died while lining up for humanitarian aid. At least four people were killed and 18 wounded overnight. BiH officials said that 23 people had been killed in the past 24 hours in Sarajevo. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 1,511 people had been killed and 8,622 had been wounded in Sarajevo to date. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

570. At least four people were killed and 18 wounded in overnight clashes in the city. Serbian gunners positioned in the hills fired tank, mortar and anti-aircraft fire overnight, leaving dead and wounded and rendering considerable damage to structures in the city. A spokesman for the BiH military stated that a Catholic church and a post office were damaged by the shellfire in the Novo Sarajevo neighbourhood. Sporadic infantry battles were reported near the Butmir airport.

571. Artillery shells and mortars reportedly hit buildings in central Sarajevo and the Muslim Dobrinja district. There were no immediate casualty figures. Fighting subsided shortly after daybreak in most places but sporadic sniper and machine-gun fire could still be heard in Sarajevo.

(b) Local reported events

572. Fighting continued in Sarajevo as Major General MacKenzie prepared to enter his final week of command. He continued to criticize the difficulty of his mission and stated that it would take a 10 year tour of duty to complete his mandate.

573. The United States flew in its 41st flight since the airlift began on 3 July 1992. The airlift included more than 400 flights, delivering 4500 tons of food, medicine and other relief supplies.

27. 27/7/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The U.N described a "generally quiet night" with "some moderate action in the old part of the city north to the Olympic Stadium". Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Several mortar shells crashed into the Dobrinja district. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

574. Residents of Sarajevo reported sporadic overnight exchanges of machine-gun fire in the centre of the city. Several mortar shells crashed into the district of Dobrinja. 631/

575. UN spokesman Mik Magnusson described "a generally quiet night". "There was some moderate action in the old part of the city north to the Olympic Stadium", Magnuson said. 632/

(b) Local reported events

576. The Commander of UNPROFOR, Indian Army General Satish Nambiar, was in Sarajevo for talks with government officials on the status of the UN-supervised airlift of humanitarian aid. 633/

577. A 282-member unit of a French army battalion assigned to protect the airport arrived at about 1:30 a.m. A total of 406 French soldiers had arrived in Sarajevo by Monday, along with 18 Egyptians and 38 Ukrainians. They were part of a contingent of 1,500 troops that were replacing a 1,100 soldier Canadian army detachment that was temporarily transferred to Sarajevo for the airlift protection operation from peace-keeping duties in Croatia. The new contingent at the airport was scheduled to consist of 400 soldiers from Egypt, 400 from the Ukraine and 700 from France. The Canadians were to begin returning to Croatia on Tuesday. 634/

578. Nineteen cargo aeroplanes carrying 229.7 tons of food and medicine arrived in Sarajevo. 635/

(c) International reported events

579. UN talks reopened under EC negotiator Cutilheiro. 636/

28. 28/7/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An estimated 30 shells hit the city centre early in the day and an estimated 50 shells hit the Dobrinja area. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Areas in Hrasno; an estimated 50 shells hit Dobrinja which was shelled twice during the night; the Holiday Inn; an estimated 30 shells hit the city centre early in the day. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; New York Times.


Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least one person was killed and 23 others were wounded in fighting around the city since midnight Monday, according to police and news reports. 637/ Later local media reports said that five people had been killed during attacks with another 40 wounded. 638/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

580. Artillery and small-arms fire were exchanged overnight in the district of Hrasno and again on Tuesday morning, according to Sarajevo radio editor Zoran Pirolić. Dobrinja was also shelled twice during the night. "It was not such a bad night, nothing to be alarmed about, and certainly not as bad as we are used to", Pirolić said. 639/

581. Residents reported that an estimated 30 shells rocked Sarajevo's city centre early in the day, several hours after a two hour battle on the north side of the downtown area. An estimated 50 shells also fell on the Dobrinja suburb, near the airport. The police reported that about 20 people were wounded and some were killed, but no exact figures were provided. 640/

582. Three mortar shells were reported to have hit the upper floors of the Holiday Inn. 641/

(b) Local reported events

583. A UN truck convoy, designed to test the efficacy of land based operations, left the Croatian port of Split en-route to Sarajevo and was expected to reach Serb militia lines surrounding the city sometime Wednesday. The 21 truck convoy carried food and emergency medical supplies. It was accompanied by 370 Ukrainian UN peace-keeping troops. It stopped for the night about 50 miles from Sarajevo, near the town of Novi Travnik. 642/

(c) International reported events

584. The leaders of BiH's three warring factions met in London for EC-mediated talks (the 10th round), but the BiH Foreign Minister Silajdžić rejected the EC proposal for cantonization. 643/

585. BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić refused to negotiate a new constitution for BiH while the Republic's streets were "strewn with bodies". And he called for a Nuremberg-style trial for war crimes for Serb leaders who he said were responsible for atrocities in the war in the former Yugoslav republic. Speaking as the EC-brokered talks entered a second day in London, Silajdžić told a news conference that: "[w]e have refused to be shelled and starved into any kind of political agreement". Serb delegate member Nikola Koljević said after Serb leader Radovan Karadžić met the EC negotiator late Monday: "I am optimistic because it's a fresh approach and an approach which implies that we are going to meet the other parties, not just bilaterally, but face-to-face".

586. BiH President Izetbegović plead with UN officials to exclude BiH from the arms embargo to enable his country to defend itself. 644/

29. 29/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb gunners reportedly shelled the Old Town and Dobrinja during the night. The bombardment commenced after midnight and followed constant mortar attacks on Tuesday. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Old Town area; Dobrinja area. Source(s): United Press International.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: City residents faced sporadic sniper fire beginning at dawn. The BiH news agency warned the city's residents that Serbian snipers had fitted silencers to their guns and it urged anyone who ventured outdoors to be extremely cautious. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Casualties: At least five people were reported killed and 84 wounded during the artillery battles. One Canadian UNPROFOR soldier was lightly wounded at the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

587. Serb gunners reportedly shelled the Old Town and the Suburb of Dobrinja during the night, a radio journalist said. The bombardment commenced after midnight. It followed constant mortar attacks on Tuesday. There were no immediate reports of casualties. Serbian and BiH forces reportedly engaged in infantry clashes overnight and into the day, firing occasional mortar and artillery rounds into the city, police said. A UN spokesman said that the fighting was not as heavy as it was on Tuesday. A Canadian soldier was lightly grazed by a bullet at the airport.

(b) Local reported events

588. The largest convoy of humanitarian aid organized for the city's residents arrived in Sarajevo as intermittent fighting and shelling flared. An UNPROFOR detachment of Canadian troops, with seven armoured personnel carriers, was dispatched from Sarajevo to escort the convoy through Serbian-held territory back into the city from the Croat-controlled town of Kiseljajk about 12 miles away. UN officials said that the convoy marked the beginning of efforts to establish a permanent corridor into the city and phase out the more expensive international humanitarian airlift that commenced a month before after Serbian forces relinquished control of Sarajevo airport to UN troops.

589. An Italian aircraft evacuated to Vienna a 13 year-old, Enis Hasei, suffering serious facial and chest injuries following a mortar attack on 13 July.

(c) International reported events

590. In London, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Milan Panić, confirmed reports of Serbian concentration camps. Panić also met for about 45 minutes with British Prime Minister John Major. Panić said afterwards that they had produced new proposals for inclusion in a new federal constitution for BiH.

591. UNHCR held an emergency conference to discuss the plight of refugees in the former Yugoslavia. There were reportedly 598,000 refugees in Croatia; 70,000 in Slovenia; 1.3 million in BiH; 382,500 in Serbia; 48,500 in Montenegro; and 69,000 in the UNPAs. UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogato warned that, without a prompt response, "we may find ourselves stranded with an open-ended relief program and a massive permanent refugee problem in the heart of Europe."
30. 30/7/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The airport was hit three times during shelling that lasted into the morning. A camp occupied by a battalion of Canadian troops was also hit. At least 115 mortar rounds hit the Serb-held suburb of Nedžarići. Stup was also heavily bombarded. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo airport; camp occupied by Canadian UNPROFOR troops; the suburb of Nedžarići; the suburb of Stup; the Old Town; Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sarajevo radio warned residents to be aware of snipers firing from high-rise buildings. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: At least one person was killed and six other people injured in fighting in and around the city according to a police spokesman. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

592. In the early hours of the morning, Sarajevo was hit by some of the heaviest shelling in weeks. The bombardment followed the failure of the European Community to launch constitutional peace talks in London. The shelling's intensity caused many residents to seek shelter in basement bunkers. Serbian gunners entrenched in the hilltops shelled the city with tank, mortars and anti-aircraft machine-guns. The SDP (Serbian Democratic Party) military command, in a statement released over the Serbia-based Tanjug news agency, accused defence forces of launching an "all-out attack" with heavy artillery and infantry on Serbian positions in Sarajevo. The Serbs repulsed the assault, the statement said. The fighting eased after dawn. But Sarajevo radio said that intermittent shelling and sporadic fighting continued both in the downtown area and on the outskirts of town. The radio warned residents to be aware of snipers firing from high-rise buildings.

593. UN spokesmen said that the airport was hit three times during shelling lasting into the morning. A camp occupied by a battalion of Canadian troops was also hit. At least 115 mortar rounds hit the Serb-held suburb of Nedžarići. Stup, which had a mixed population of Serbs and Croats was also heavily bombarded: (Stup had been used by Serbs and Croats as an escape route from the city). Artillery fire from Serb gun batteries positioned in the hills surrounding the city hit the Old Town and the Muslim district of Dobrinja.

(b) Local reported events

594. It was reported that the new UN Ukrainian peacekeepers had established a position atop Hill 689. From this location they hoped to utilize new horizon-scanning equipment and techniques expected to pinpoint the source of mortar and artillery fire coming from the hillsides surrounding Sarajevo.

595. UN sources said that hostile fire from BiH and Serbian positions had forced a United Nations radar battery in the city to abandon its monitoring mission four times in less than two weeks. The Soviet-made radar unit was intended to identify artillery and mortars fired in violation of the UN-
monitored Sarajevo cease-fire. The unit was dug in on a hilltop between BiH and Serbian lines north-west of the city. 662/

(c) International reported events

596. The United Nations was reportedly working on a plan to evacuate approximately 220 foreign nationals trapped in the city. These individuals included 20 Westerners, and a large contingent of medical students from the Middle East. "Strictly speaking, the evacuation might be outside our mandate", said an unnamed UN official. "But we have told the (Bosnian) Presidency and foreign embassies we would find it difficult to turn down a coordinated request", he said. The BiH government had used Sarajevo radio, television and local newspapers to advise foreign nationals to register for evacuation. 663/

31. 31/7/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo suffered its heaviest day of daylight mortar bombardments in several weeks. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Presidency building; Parliament; unidentified shopping areas; the airport; a water line at an unidentified refugee centre; a Sarajevo University campus residence for foreign students. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A mortar which exploded outside the Presidency building killed two people; one person was killed while waiting in line for water at a refugee centre; several people reportedly were killed in blasts in the shopping district; among the wounded were two foreign medical students whose campus housing at Sarajevo University was hit by a shell. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A mortar which exploded outside the Presidency killed two people; one person was killed while waiting in line for water at a refugee centre; several people reportedly were killed in blasts in the shopping district; among the wounded were two foreign medical students whose campus housing at Sarajevo University was hit by a shell; five Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldiers were wounded by Serbian gunfire directed towards BiH rifle positions set up 30 yards away. After two days of fighting, it was reported that at least 24 BiH soldiers had been killed and more than 100 had been wounded. The Sarajevo crisis centre stated that 11 people were killed in shelling during the 24 hours since noon Thursday. BiH medical sources said that at least eight people had been killed and 71 wounded over the past 24 hours. 664/ According to a report the following day, the day's shelling left up to 15 dead and 50 injured. 665/ Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

597. Sarajevo suffered its heaviest day of daylight mortar bombardments for several weeks as a chain of explosions shook the Presidency building, parliament and shopping streets. The fighting also forced UN peacekeepers to close the Sarajevo airport for several hours. 666/ The airport was closed at 9:20 a.m. Friday, after a shell exploded there, and reopened at 12:45. Twenty aircraft carrying humanitarian aid landed soon afterwards. 667/
598. A mortar which exploded without warning outside the Presidential offices killed two people. Another person was killed while waiting in line for water at a refugee centre. Several others were reported to have died in blasts in the shopping district where crowds were out in the sunshine after a second successive night of heavy shelling. 668/

599. Among the wounded were two medical students from Sarajevo University who were killed when a shell hit a campus residence for foreign students. 669/

600. It was reported that the recent shelling was due to a two pronged BiH government attack on Serbian lines which was made in hope of extending its control to the northern hills centring on the settlement of Hononj. Such a breakout would have put BiH forces in a position to drive further north towards Vogošća, where they hoped to join up with Croatian forces. 670/

601. Despite early signs of success, after two days of fighting, it appeared that the attack had failed. One senior officer stated that at least 24 BiH soldiers had been killed and more than 100 wounded. 671/

602. It was also reported by UN officials that five of its Ukrainian peace-keeping soldiers were wounded when they were attacked by a Serbian forces. The Serbian forces were reported to have been returning the fire of a BiH rifle platoon that had set up a firing position 30 yards from the UN radar position on a hill north of the city. This was the highest casualty toll for the United Nations forces to date. 672/

603. The UN force later protested to the BiH leadership because two recoilless rifles were firing 15 metres from the Ukrainian position attracting Serb attacks. UNPROFOR's spokesman Mik Magnusson said that "it is cowardly and it is against the rules" to set up heavy weapons within 500 metres of UN positions. Mortars were also pointed 200 metres from a UN observation post, he said. The BiH Defence Minister rejected these accusations, saying that the UN was taking the side of the Serbs. UNPROFOR also protested to the Serbians, saying that they returned fire knowing full well that they might hit UN positions, according to the UN spokesman. 673/

E. August 1992

1. 1/8/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After a relatively quiet day, intensive shelling began again at dusk. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.


Description of Damage: A bus carrying 50 children out of the city was attacked by alleged Serbian machine-guns, within 500 yards of the UN headquarters in western Sarajevo, killing two children. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: More recent reports from Košev Hospital indicated that at least 40 people were killed in Friday's shelling (the highest single day total to date). 674/ A group of military officials who arrived at the Sarajevo morgue in the afternoon indicated that 100-150 BiH fighters had been killed in the
recent offensive, and that many bodies were still lying in the hills. Two children (Vedrana Glavaš and Roki Sulejmanović) were killed in the machine-gun attack on a bus carrying them out of the city. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

604. After the military offensive by the BiH Government failed to break the Serbian siege of Sarajevo, its troops fell back towards the city. The BiH troops were reported to have made only modest gains at a devastating cost to themselves. More recent reports from Roševo hospital indicated that at least 40 people were killed as the result of random Serbian shelling on Friday. This was reported to be the highest single day total to date. 676/

605. After a relatively quiet day, intensive shelling began again at dusk. According to Sarajevo television a bus carrying 50 children out of the city was attacked by Serbian machine-guns, reportedly within 500 yards of the UN headquarters in western Sarajevo. Two children, Vedrana Glavaš and Roki Sulejmanović, were reported killed. 677/

(b) Local reported events

606. General Lewis MacKenzie, the commander of the UN Protection Force in Sarajevo, ending his tour of duty, said as he departed that the situation in the city was worse than when he had arrived two months before. Colonel Armel Davout, was named as the interim head of the forces until the naming of MacKenzie's replacement. 678/

2. 2/8/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Journalists reported steady shelling for the fourth successive night. 679/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: UNPROFOR Headquarters (the former main telecommunications centre). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Shrapnel pierced the headquarters of the UNPROFOR forces (the former main telecommunications centre). Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Tanjug said that Muslim fighters had killed 150 Serb soldiers and civilians in the last three days. BiH officials said that 24 Muslim fighters had been killed Friday but the hospitals said that the morgues were filled with corpses and that the toll was much higher. 680/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date, 1569 people had been killed and 9,333 had been wounded in Sarajevo. 681/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

607. Muslim and Serb forces traded conflicting claims of military successes around the city Saturday. Each accused the other of launching offensives and each claimed to have beaten back attacks. The Serb military said it inflicted defeats on attacking BiH units, the most severe in the area of Ilidža, according to Tanjug. A Sarajevo newspaper and Tanjug quoted Muslim commanders
as saying that they had "liberated" the town of Trnovo 18 miles south of Sarajevo and made advances against Serb forces at other points around the city. Tanjug said Serb sources denied Trnovo had been captured. In Sarajevo, Bosnian Muslims said that the besieging Serbs had mounted a comprehensive attack on the city, using artillery as a prelude to infantry advances, but had been blocked and even beaten back at some points. Tanjug said that Muslim fighters had killed 150 Serb soldiers and civilians during the last three days. BiH officials said that 24 Muslim fighters had been killed Friday, but spokespersons for local hospitals reported that the morgues were filled with corpses and that the toll was much higher. 682/

608. Shrapnel from a mortar explosion pierced the headquarters of the UN peace-keeping forces in Sarajevo early in the day. The mortar exploded in the air over the UN compound in the headquarters of Sarajevo's former main telecommunications centre. No casualties were reported. 683/

(b) Local reported events

609. Croatia reelected Franjo Tudjman with 57 per cent of the vote. 684/

610. The 500th humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo was reported by the United Nations. 685/

611. Following Saturday's attack on the bus carrying 50 children, the surviving children continued their journey only to be stopped again by Serbian forces. Nine children were prevented from continuing because they had Serbian names. These nine children were taken off the bus and sent to the suburb of Iliđa, an area controlled by Serbs. A UN official, Mik Magnusson, placed a large share of the blame on the BiH government for allowing an unescorted and unmarked vehicle to proceed alone at a time of day, and along a route, where sniper fire was common. He went so far as to call such actions "criminal negligence". 686/

3. 3/8/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Gunfire subsided by daybreak in the city.
Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

612. In the city, gunfire had subsided by daybreak, the Tanjug news agency reported. The districts of Ilijaš, Rajlovac and Vogošća were worst hit, the agency added. According to Tanjug, Serbian radio in BiH claimed the fighting was due to a Muslim offensive in the city. 687/
(b) Local reported events

613. Radovan Karadžić said that it was "obvious that the Muslim side is leading a general offensive against Serbian positions in Sarajevo, but also in the north and centre of Bosnia and Hercegovina", the Tanjug Agency said.

614. BiH President Izetbegović sent a letter of appeal to the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo and allow BiH "to achieve the right to individual and collective self-defence" guaranteed in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

(c) International reported events

615. The International Committee of the Red Cross pressed for access to Serb-run detention camps.

616. US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher confirmed that the US had evidence of camps in BiH.

4. 4/8/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city centre was shelled with multiple rockets shortly after 8:00 a.m. from Mount Trebević to the east. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: City centre; Sarajevo airport; the Lion Cemetery. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Relief operations were suspended for 72 hours after the shelling of Sarajevo airport; two mortar bombs hit the Lion Cemetery within 100 yards of a funeral party mourning the deaths of the two children killed on Sunday. Shrapnel scattered throughout the cemetery, injuring Ruža Glavaš, the grandmother of one of the dead children. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH authorities said that 18 people had been killed and 56 injured in fighting in Sarajevo in the previous 24 hours. Four persons were killed and at least 20 wounded in overnight artillery exchanges. Twenty-five persons were reported killed during the daytime as the bombardments continued unabated. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

617. Four persons were killed and at least 20 wounded in overnight artillery exchanges. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., the city centre was shelled with multiple rockets from Mount Trebević to the east.

618. Chief of Staff Sefer Halilović was quoted as saying that "conditions are right for a counter-offensive". According to the communiqué from Halilovic read over the radio, Croatian-Muslim forces in the morning repelled Serbian assaults in the suburbs of Hrasnica, Sokolović Kolonija, Dobrinja, Mojmilo and Alipašino Polje.
619. Shelling halted humanitarian flights three times during the day, and
beginning at 6:00 p.m. local time, UN relief operations were suspended for 72
hours. The attacks jeopardized the safety of both UN personnel and aircraft,
as well as the security of the humanitarian supplies being flown into the
city. During the 72 hour suspension, the deputy commanders of UNPROFOR in
Yugoslavia, Major General Phillipe Morillon of France, was scheduled to travel
to Sarajevo to assess the situation. "After 72 hours, and in light of General
Morillon's report, a decision will be taken with regard to the future of the
operation", the UN said. A statement issued in New York in the name of UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali condemned the shelling of Sarajevo airport,
which he said appeared to be deliberate. 696/

620. Mortars were reported to have hit a Sarajevo cemetery during funerals
for the two children killed on Sunday. The grandmother of one of the dead
children, Ruža Glavaš, was reported to have been seriously injured.
Journalists said that two mortar bombs exploded within 100 yards of the graves
in what appeared to be a deliberate attack to coincide with the funerals.
Mourners, including staff and children from the orphanage of the dead
children, scrambled for shelter between grave stones and shrapnel scattered
around the Lion Cemetery. The first mortar bomb struck 100 yards away from
the grave. Ruža Glavaš was hit by a second blast only a few minutes later as the
group attempted to escape the cemetery. A lump of shrapnel cut a fist-sized
hole in the upper part of her right arm. Journalists took her to the nearby
Koševo Hospital where doctors said her arm might have to be amputated. 697/

621. Biljana Plavšić, a former Serbian member of the BiH Presidency, denied
that the cemetery was attacked by Serbs. "We condemn any such attacks", she
said. "Each of our soldiers on the front lines is horrified and condemns such
attacks". 698/

(b) Local reported events

622. Sarajevo UNPROFOR Commander MacKenzie said that too much attention was
being paid to Sarajevo and not enough to the rest of the country. He listed
UNPROFOR goals in Sarajevo: cease-fire; centralization of all weapons under UN
observation; the creation of secure corridors; and the opening of Sarajevo
airport. UNPROFOR had carried out the last step but not the first three. He
said that BiH President Izetbegović would only speak with Belgrade and JNA
representatives, not with Bosnian Serbs. 699/

623. Tanjug news agency quoted a Radio Sarajevo call for every armed group or
individual still not enrolled to report to the armed forces command in order
to "liberate definitively" the city. 700/

624. UN forces again accused BiH forces of setting up gun batteries near UN
positions, putting the lives of the UN forces in danger. Bosnian Serbs
accused the UN peacekeepers of favouring the defence forces by failing to
supervise Muslim and Croat units' artillery while monitoring only Serbian gun
emplacements. 701/

625. Most of Sarajevo was reportedly without water. BiH radio and television
reported that Serb forces had cut off the water supply from a reservoir in the
outlying district of Ilidža which was under Serb control. 702/

626. The 40 orphans evacuated from Sarajevo arrived at the Zerbst airport
near Magdeburg, Germany. The BiH and German governments agreed that the
orphans would return to Sarajevo when it was safe and that they would not be
adopted by German families. But an official of the regional labour ministry
of Sachsen-Anhalt who organized the evacuation said that the orphans could
"remain in German orphanages for several years", if the war continued. The two parliamentary deputies from Sachsen-Anhalt who organized the evacuation were heavily criticized in Germany for failing to properly plan the operation which was not protected by United Nations peacekeepers. 703/

627. A bus of Jews from Sarajevo left with 50 people aboard. They had reportedly been guaranteed passage through Serb-held territory. But in Stup, the last town before the Serbian lines, an old woman and a young woman were forced off the bus because they were Muslims. The woman was married to a Jew and the man was related to a Jewish family. 704/

(c) International reported events

628. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali condemned the shelling of Sarajevo airport and suspended relief deliveries. A US sponsored UN Security Council resolution also condemned the use of detention camps. 705/

629. The US State Department back-tracked its statement of the previous day, as Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles reported no "substantial information" on camps. 706/

630. The International Committee of the Red Cross visited 10 prison and detention camps and reported blatant human rights violations by all sides. 707/

631. Russia recognized Macedonia as an independent state. 708/

5. 5/8/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intense fighting continued from dawn along a line which crossed Sarajevo from north to south. The centre of the city had come under heavy mortar fire. 709/ Journalists reported the heaviest bombardment in two weeks. 710/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo airport; an apartment complex next to the Holiday Inn; the lower slope and ridge of Trebević mountain; "Camp Beaver". Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Description of Damage: A mortar attack on an apartment complex next to the Holiday Inn killed one man and wounded four others; Egyptian UNPROFOR troops at "Camp Beaver" came under fire again and a fire broke out at their camp. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: UN officials also reported one of its soldiers killed and six badly injured during the fighting of the prior few days; 711/ one man was killed and four others wounded after a mortar attack on an apartment complex next to the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

632. The Sarajevo airport remained closed because of continued shelling from Serbian artillery and mortars, including a mortar attack on an apartment complex next to the Holiday Inn in which one man was killed and four others injured. It was also reported that UN troops had been caught in cross-fire as
one of the fiercest battles in Sarajevo continued. 712/633. Journalists reported the heaviest bombardment in two weeks, saying that multiple rocket launchers fired in the morning continuously for about 20 minutes and mortar, rocket and artillery fire persisted for an hour. The fighting began after a lull of several hours due to a heavy thunderstorm. The worst fighting was on Trebević mountain, a forest-clad ridge high above the city. Rockets could be heard streaming into the ridge, with some mortar hits on the lower slope and an occasional burst of artillery shells. Part of the forest was reported on fire. 713/

634. Egyptian troops in the UN contingent at "Camp Beaver", who spent most of Tuesday in their bunkers because of the firing around the UN headquarters and airport, came under fire again. A fire broke out in their camp, but it was put out before midnight after UN officials negotiated a cease-fire. 714/

(b) Local reported events

635. UN forces threatened to leave Sarajevo if the fighting continued. 715/

636. The main water supply to Sarajevo had been cut when two pumping stations were damaged, according to a UN spokesman. People carrying cans and buckets were lined up in the morning, trying to stock up on water from buildings which still had a supply. 716/

6. 6/8/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Journalists reported a quiet night after heavy shelling. Later shelling was reported near the Presidency building and near UNPROFOR headquarters. Fighting was reported between the forces near the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Area outside the Presidency building; UNPROFOR Headquarters; the Klas-Šarko and Velepeka buildings. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Ten people were wounded when an artillery shell landed outside the BiH Presidency building; UNPROFOR Headquarters was hit by three 120 millimetre mortar shells in two hours, with one shell landing in a vacant shower stall at the ground level, another hitting the building's north facade (destroying a room and damaging two rooms, and four armoured personnel carriers). One French soldier and three others were wounded. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Ten people were wounded when an artillery shell landed outside the BiH Presidency; One French soldier and three others were wounded in the shelling of UNPROFOR Headquarters. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

637. Journalists reported a quiet night after several days of heavy fighting. 717/

638. Three people were critically wounded early in the day when an artillery
shell landed outside the BiH President's office. The three were among 10 people wounded in the shelling.  

639. According to a UN spokesman, Sarajevo airport was caught in a cross-fire, just hours after NATO members agreed to the possible use of force to ensure that relief aid reached trapped residents of Sarajevo. The fighting throughout the city was reported to be the heaviest since the UN suspended relief flights on Tuesday. Sarajevo's airport and the UN headquarters came under fire in an exchange between Muslim and Croat forces and Serbs.  

640. It was reported that UNPROFOR headquarters, not far from the airport, was hit later by mortar and sniper fire. One French soldier was seriously wounded. "It was a deliberate attack", UN spokesman Mik Magnusson said. The headquarters took three 120 millimetre mortar bomb hits in about two hours, he added. The first shot hit at 10:20 p.m.. "One shot was a ranging round, the other two direct hits on the building", he said. Apart from the French soldier, three persons were slightly hurt, Magnusson said. One shell landed in a vacant shower stall at the ground level of the UN headquarters, UN spokesman Mik Magnusson said. Another hit the north facade of the building, "devastating a room just vacated by Ukrainian police who had gone to the quarter to have a smoke". An adjacent room was badly damaged. A sleeping room for UNPROFOR civilian police and four armoured personnel carriers were also damaged.  

641. Also shelled today were the Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings (the city's only providers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread), according to a report from the Government of BiH.  

(b) Local reported events  

642. UN peacekeepers threatened to pull out of Sarajevo. "There comes a time when we have to assess the situation. I guess that time comes now", said UN spokesman Mik Magnusson. "We cannot go on indefinitely. If the level of violence continues, it will seriously endanger us doing our mission".  

643. It was reported that French General, Philippe Morillon arrived in Sarajevo to talk to Serbian and BiH government officials about reestablishing a cease-fire to allow the relief airlift to continue.  

644. Water was gradually restored in some sectors of the city after a day of almost total shortage. But, Sarajevo was reportedly getting less than 50 per cent of the water it needed, according to Salem Kerovi, the man in charge of the city's water system. Serbian technicians in Ilidža told UN officials that seven of the 16 pumps supplying 90 per cent of the city were not working. The UN inspected one pump which was out of service and found no evidence that it had been damaged by shelling. Sarajevo authorities accused Serbian forces of seeking to deprive the city of water. UN official, Major Brian Jackson noted that "it's in everybody's interest to repair [the water system]. It's a common resource". But using water as a weapon and then accusing the other side of doing the same was not a new development, according to Mik Magnusson, spokesman for UNPROFOR.  

645. In Sarajevo, government officials permitted correspondents into the former Viktor Bubanj detention centre, Sarajevo's main prison, where Serbs had charged that 250 prisoners were being tortured. Two detainees were questioned at random by Agence France Presse and did not complain of any ill-treatment.  

646. Radio Sarajevo reported that the thermal power station in Ugljević had
been turned into a concentration camp holding 7000 Bosnian Muslims, but an Agence France Presse correspondent found no sign of such a camp. It was reported that: "empty and silent in the blistering heat, with piles of scrap metal and wadding typical of any factory floor, the plant and its spruce lawns showed no evidence of the transit of crowds of prisoners". 729/

(c) International reported events

647. British Prime Minister John Major reaffirmed his opposition to any force to end the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and rejected opposition criticism that Britain was "sitting on its hands". On Wednesday, Major's predecessor, Margaret Thatcher called for weapons and military assistance to be sent to BiH to prevent "an even greater catastrophe". Accusing the Serbs of waging "a communist war of aggression", Thatcher said that events in BiH were "reminiscent of the worst crimes of the Nazis". Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd spoke out against the military option, stating that "it is not clear to me that you can stop snipers, or people firing mortars of the kind we have seen in Sarajevo by air action". 730/

648. United States President George Bush urged the UN Security Council to authorize the use of all necessary measures to ensure relief delivery; to establish diplomatic ties with Slovenia, Croatia and BiH; to dispatch monitors to prevent spill-over into neighbouring territory; and to increase its coordination with NATO. He also demanded that humanitarian agencies be allowed entry into camps but ruled out using force to free prisoners. British and French officials called Bush's statement a hasty and ill-prepared reaction to political concerns in the US. 731/

649. The United States said that it would ask countries to collect "war crimes" data and to seek to tighten sanctions against Serbia, and called for an extraordinary session of the UN Human Rights Commission. 732/

650. The shelling of Sarajevo prompted the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee to urge adoption of a UN resolution authorizing the use of force, and it called on President Bush to seek an emergency Security Council meeting to consider that issue. 733/ President Bush said that the United States would establish full diplomatic relations with Slovenia, Croatia and BiH. Bush also said that he had urged Secretary of State James Baker to push for the UN Security Council to adopt a resolution to allow the use of military force if needed to make sure that humanitarian aid shipments got through to Sarajevo. 734/

651. The European Community issued a statement demanding "immediate and unconditional access" to all camps and detention centres in BiH. 735/

7. 7/8/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A mortar attack on a UN barracks was reported in the early evening shortly before an intense artillery bombardment of three Muslim-held suburbs. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Unidentified UNPROFOR barracks; three unidentified Muslim-held suburbs; the Maršal Tito barracks. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Seven Ukrainian soldiers were wounded in an early evening mortar attack on their barracks; an intense artillery bombardment of
three Muslim-held suburbs reportedly killed 10 people and wounded 30 others. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Seven Ukrainian soldiers were wounded in an early evening mortar attack on their barracks; an intense artillery bombardment of three Muslim-held suburbs reportedly killed 10 people and wounded 30 others. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

652. Seven Ukrainian soldiers were wounded in a mortar bomb attack on a barracks occupied by UN peace-keeping forces in Sarajevo. The attack was mounted in the early evening shortly before an intense artillery bombardment of three Muslim-held suburbs in which 10 people were reportedly killed and 30 were wounded. The Maršal Tito barracks in an exposed area of Sarajevo, was hit 15 minutes after General Morillon said that Muslim and Serb forces had agreed to the opening of Sarajevo airport to humanitarian flights. 736/

(b) **Local reported events**

653. General Philippe Morillon during a press conference, stated that he would not identify who fired the three artillery rounds which hit the UN headquarters on Thursday night. "I have the agreement from both sides that those responsible for this attack will be prosecuted in martial court", he said. Several officers at the UN headquarters reportedly believed that the attack was by BiH artillery from outside the range of the airport and for the reestablishment of water supplies to Sarajevo. 737/

654. UNHCR said that it was unlikely that the Sarajevo airport would reopen Saturday for relief flights. All relief flights were scheduled and coordinated from UNHCR's headquarters in Geneva by a group of senior military officers from a number of different countries, working in tandem with UN forces based at Sarajevo airport. UNHCR spokesman Ron Redmond said, "the chances of re-opening the airport Saturday looks pretty slim", But he added, "crews are still on standby--we are pleading with all the parties to put an end to this senseless violence so we can resume flights". 738/

655. General Phillipe Morillon said that Muslim and Serb forces had agreed to allow the reopening of the city's airport to humanitarian flights. The airport, closed earlier in the week because of fighting, was due to reopen Saturday for 23 relief flights. 739/

(c) **International reported events**

656. The EC added Slovenia to its list of aid-recipients in the former Yugoslavia. 740/

8. 8/8/92 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fighting reportedly began to lessen in the city. Source(s): Washington Post.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

657. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

658. As the fighting started to lessen in Sarajevo, the airport was reopened and more than 20 flights arrived without incident. 741/

(c) International reported events

659. In Brussels, EC and NATO countries showed mounting solidarity for a plan to provide armed cover for aid deliveries to BiH. Diplomatic sources at NATO headquarters said that the plan provided for armed support of aid to Sarajevo via an overland "humanitarian corridor" and by taking control of the airport. NATO countries were given until Monday to confirm the agreement. If confirmed, NATO military officials would then prepare the details. 742/

9. 9/8/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as "comparatively quiet", but there were reports that BiH forces shelled the airport and that three Muslim-held suburbs were lightly shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: City airport; three unidentified Muslim suburbs. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least one person was killed and three others wounded in the evening shelling of three unidentified Muslim suburbs. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

660. Journalists in Sarajevo said that the city was comparatively quiet. But a Tanjug report claimed that Muslim fighters shelled the city's airport. Fighting was also reported between Croatian forces and Muslims at Kiseljak to the west of the city. 743/

661. Three Muslim suburbs were lightly shelled in the evening in attacks which left at least one dead and three wounded. 744/

(b) Local reported events

662. Bosnian Serb leaders promised to let the Red Cross enter and even help to run detention centres. But visitors to camps in the Serb-controlled
regions of BiH said that there was evidence that hundreds of Muslim and Croat prisoners were being hurriedly transferred from the most notorious sites before inspections could be made. 745/

663. Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", threatened Western Europe with terrorist attacks if it should intervene militarily in BiH. 746/

10. 10/8/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that, to date, 1682 people had been killed in Sarajevo (12 per cent of whom were children). 747/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

664. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

665. Local officials warned that the city was running out of bread and called upon Western leaders to speed up efforts to establish a protected land supply route. It was also reported that Sarajevo's sole operating bakery had only enough flour for two more weeks. 748/

(c) International reported events

666. The United States, Britain and France reached an agreement on a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military force if the Serb militia opposed the international delivery of aid to Sarajevo. 749/

11. 11/8/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Continued fighting was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Five residents were reported killed and 60 injured in continued fighting. 750/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

667. Five residents were reported killed and 60 injured in continued fighting. 751/

(b) Local reported events

668. While all sides waited for a UN vote on military intervention to insure safe delivery of relief aid, Serb and BiH officials signed a private agreement allowing 300 women and children to evacuate Sarajevo. 752/

669. Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić stated that Western military intervention could lead to a disastrous guerilla war. Bosnian Serb leader echoed this sentiment by warning that a "bloody big mess" would arise. He called instead for the three parties to "sit down and make peace" and said, "we now control 70 per cent of the land, but we claim only 64 per cent as ours. 753/

(c) International reported events

670. The United States Senate adopted a resolution, 74 to 22, endorsing the use of force to ensure that aid was delivered to the beleaguered people of BiH. In related testimony to the Senate, General Barry McCaffrey, senior aid to General Colin L. Powell, stated that a field army of 400,000 troops would be needed to impose a cease-fire in the disputed territory. 754/

12. 12/8/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight shelling was reported in the city. The Old Town was reported to have been heavily bombarded before midnight. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city's main pedestrian precinct (Old Town); the Klas-Šarko and Velepekar buildings. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Six people were wounded on the City's main pedestrian precinct during heavy bombardment of the Old Town before midnight. In the morning, the street was reported littered with tree branches, power lines and masonry. Source(s): Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two people killed and at least 15 wounded in overnight shelling (including six wounded on the main pedestrian precinct). Source(s): Government of BiH.

Narrative of Events:

671. Two people were reported killed and at least 15 wounded in overnight shelling of the city, hours before the convoy of women and children was due to depart. Journalists said that six people were wounded on Sarajevo's main pedestrian precinct during heavy bombardment of the old town before midnight. By morning the street was reported littered with tree branches, power lines and masonry brought down by the shelling.

672. The Klas-Šarko and Velepekar buildings (the city's only providers of
essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread) were also shelled on this day, according to a report from the Government of BiH. 755/

(b) Local reported events

673. UN forces escorted more than 300 women and children out of Sarajevo. Two UN personnel carriers one ahead and one behind, escorted the group safely through Serbian checkpoints. A second evacuation was expected during the next few days. 756/ The evacuation, which was one of the largest transfers out of Sarajevo, was arranged by an agreement signed by a Serbian liaison officer to the UN mission, a representative of the BiH presidency and the Children's Embassy, a charity group. 757/

13. 13/8/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Vase Miškina (the main shopping street in Old Town); the Dobrinja District; Vogošća; Stup; Central Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Some houses were damaged in Stup but Radio Sarajevo gave no further details. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Snipers opened fire on a UN convoy taking Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić into Sarajevo. The Prime Minister was unhurt, but an ABC television producer, David Kaplan, was hit in the back and died at UN headquarters. Source(s): New York Times; Washington Post; Reuters.

Casualties: ABC television producer David Kaplan, was killed by sniper fire; press reports said that at least three people were killed by shells in central Sarajevo. 758/ Source(s): New York Times, Washington Post, Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

674. Overnight, several mortar shells fell on Vase Miškina, the main shopping street in the old town, but no casualties were reported. There was light shelling of the Dobrinja district, some infantry activity in Hrasno, and the Muslim section Vogošća was shelled by Serb forces from Polinja, Radio Sarajevo said. The mainly Croat populated district of Stup was hit by anti-aircraft guns and mortar bombs. Some houses were damaged, but Radio Sarajevo gave no further details. 759/

675. Snipers opened fire on a UN convoy taking Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić into Sarajevo. The Prime Minister was unhurt, but an ABC television producer, David Kaplan (who was in an accompanying vehicle), was hit in the back by shrapnel and died at UN headquarters. It was reported that Kaplan had turned down the offer of a flak jacket for the drive from the airport along "sniper alley". He was believed to be the first American killed in Sarajevo, but the 30th journalist killed during the last year. Panić, clearly distressed, said: "Criminals killed him . . . Terrorists killed him . . . These are crippled people mentally". 760/
(b) **Local reported events**

676. The convoy of some 300 women and children evacuated from Sarajevo arrived in Split after a journey during which the buses were shelled, the Croatian news agency Hina reported. An official accompanying the convoy of four buses, Enver Šerko, said that it came under shelling after leaving the city on Wednesday. The convoy had a UN escort after an earlier attempt to evacuate a busload of children last month resulted in two children being killed by sniper fire. According to UN peace-keeping forces in Sarajevo, about 180 of the women and children were heading for Austria, and 80 others were going to Delnice, on the Slovenian coast. The remainder reportedly stayed in Split. 761/

(c) **International reported events**

677. The UN Security Council voted to allow the use of military force if necessary to insure that relief supplies reached civilians in Sarajevo and other parts of BiH. Security Council Resolution 770 allowed for "all necessary measures" to be taken to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The resolution also required that international humanitarian organizations gain unlimited access to camps and detention centres in BiH. BiH Ambassador to the UN Muhamed Sacirbey described the measure as "the minimum [required] to appease public opinion". 763/

678. Resolution 771 was also passed, pertaining to war crimes. The Security Council condemned "ethnic cleansing" and promised to punish war criminals. 764/

679. Yugoslavia recognized independent Slovenia. 765/

14. 14/8/92 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fresh artillery and mortar attacks hit the outskirts of the city overnight. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Outskirts of Sarajevo; Ilidža; Lukavica; Grbavica; Vraca. Source(s): Reuters (quoting Tanjug).

**Description of Damage:** One Serbian soldier wounded in a mortar attack in Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters (quoting Tanjug).

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** One Serbian soldier was wounded in a mortar attack in Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters (quoting Tanjug).

**Narrative of Events:**

680. Fresh artillery and mortar attacks hit the outskirts of Sarajevo overnight. The Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency said that one Serb fighter was wounded in a mortar attack in Ilidža. It also reported artillery attacks against nearby Lukavica, Grbavica and Vraca, quoting Serb sources who blamed Muslim forces for the fighting. 766/
(b) Local reported events

681. UNPROFOR rejected suggestions in the BiH media that it was indirectly responsible for the death of US journalist David Kaplan. Sarajevo radio and television said that BiH authorities had not even been informed that this "illegal" visit was being organized and that this "negligence" caused the death of the ABC journalist. "Of course we know better. The Bosnian authorities were informed of the visit", said UNPROFOR spokesman Adnan Abd-Elrazek. 767/

682. Officials of the Children's Embassy, a Sarajevo relief agency, announced in the evening that they had secured agreement between the warring ethnic groups to evacuate 800 mostly Serb women and children from the city Tuesday. The director of the agency, Duško Tomi, stated that about 65 per cent of the next batch of evacuees would be children and that 85 per cent per cent of the total group would be Serbian. 768/

(c) International reported events

683. The UN Commission on Human Rights appointed Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia. 769/

684. The EC welcomed the prior day's UN Security Council resolution to approve the use of force if necessary to deliver humanitarian aid. However, the resolution was criticized in some circles for its vague wording, and few countries appeared prepared to commit forces. 770/

15. 15/8/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

685. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

686. Radovan Karadžić told reporters that he could guarantee safe passage for humanitarian aid convoys from Belgrade to Sarajevo, but warned of possible attacks on other land routes. "We can guarantee a permanent convoy from Belgrade to Sarajevo . . . . This is all pro-Serbian territory, no checkpoints", Karadžić said. He said that the risk of shelling meant that security could be guaranteed for only the last 20 miles into Sarajevo on the route from Croatia's Adriatic port of Split. Karadžić said that it was risky to have sections of a supply route controlled by different factions because one side could shell a convoy once it had left its territory in order to discredit those in charge of security in the area of the attack. Karadžić was
speaking after discussions with Portuguese ambassador Jose Cutileiro, the European Community official in charge of peace talks between the leaders of BiH's warring factions. Karadžić said the talks were a failure because BiH President Alija Izetbegović had boycotted them. 771/

687. A convoy of UN relief trucks left Sarajevo for Goražde. The convoy was accompanied by three Ukrainian-manned armoured personnel carriers and carried 46 tons of supplies. After 10 hours it reached Goražde. On its return trip the convoy was forced to stop because of mined roads and bridges. 772/

16. 16/8/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as relatively quiet over the past two days. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Radio Sarajevo reported that one person was killed and two were wounded in fighting. 773/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

688. Fighting was reported in many parts of BiH but local journalists reported that Sarajevo had been relatively quiet for the past two days. 774/

17. 17/8/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported after an overnight attempt by Serbian infantry to push into the Vogošća suburb. Serb artillery was reported to have hit the suburbs overnight. Mortar fire hit the city throughout the afternoon in a series of attacks. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Suburbs of Mojmilo, Butmir, Sokolović Kolonija and Dobrinja (shelled overnight); series of afternoon mortar attacks in the city; a single artillery shell hit a main street in the city centre, followed by two other shells (both resulting in injuries and deaths); the Hotel Europa. Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times; Reuters.

Description of Damage: A single artillery shell fired into a main street in the city centre killed one person and wounded 22 others. Several minutes later, two other shells left six people wounded. Four mortar shells hit the six story Hotel Europa which housed an estimated 800 refugees, setting it ablaze and killing two to five people and injuring eight to 15 others. After three hours the hotel was still ablaze. Another mortar bomb exploded near the hotel one hour after the attack. Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: At least eight people were reportedly killed during a series of afternoon mortar attacks in the city; a single artillery shell fired into a main street in the city centre killed one person and wounded 22 others. Several minutes later, two other shells left six people wounded; two to five people were killed and eight to 15 others wounded in the shelling of the Europa Hotel. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that seven people had been killed and 44 wounded on this day. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

689. Radio Sarajevo said that fighting continued Monday after a failed attempt overnight by Serbian infantry to push into the Vogošća suburb, in which Serbs sustained "heavy losses". Serbian artillery overnight also pounded the suburbs of Mojmilo, Butmir, Sokolović Kolonija and Dobrinja, the radio said.

690. Mortar fire hit the city throughout the afternoon in a series of attacks in which at least eight people were reportedly killed.

691. A single artillery shell fired into a main street in the city centre killed one person and wounded 22 others, doctors and witnesses said. Several minutes later, two other shells left six people wounded.

692. In another incident not included in the above casualty totals, four mortar shells crashed into the six-story Hotel Europa, which housed an estimated 800 refugees, setting it ablaze and killing at least two people and injuring 15 others. Later reports detailed five people killed and eight others injured, with four of the dead being refugees and one a policeman taking part in the rescue operations. Gunmen reportedly prevented people from returning to the building to save their belongings, according to witnesses. Police and firefighters said that they had evacuated everyone from the lower floors but did not know whether anyone might still be trapped on the upper floors. After three hours, the hotel was still ablaze. Another mortar bomb exploded near the hotel one hour after the attack, injuring one policeman and two British journalists, witnesses said.

693. The Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug said that Serb sources carried out the attack on the Europa Hotel in retaliation for a Muslim artillery assault on the Bosnian Serbs' headquarters in Pale. Tanjug said that Muslims fired more than 100 shells on Pale, hitting a hospital and a nursery school, but Bosnian Serb deputy foreign minister Todor Dutina said the attack was not on such a large scale. "There was an attack, yes, but as far as I know it did not involve so many bombs", he said. Tanjug said that the Serbs gave the Muslims a warning to stop, then opened fire on the old town in Sarajevo when the warning went unheeded.

694. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić denied that his forces were involved, stating: "I can categorically claim Bosnian Serbs had nothing to do with the attack on the hotel". "We have launched a swift investigation to determine who is behind this false report".

(b) Local reported events

695. General Ratko Mladić threatened to shoot down UN relief-supply aeroplanes, which he said had dropped arms to BiH forces. Mladić's threat came amid reports of renewed heavy fighting between Serbs and BiH forces in and around Sarajevo and other parts of the country. Mladić said that on Sunday an unmarked Hercules cargo aeroplane dropped off arms at the Sarajevo
suburbs of Igman and Bjelašnica, which were held by Croatian and Muslim forces. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said that Sunday's alleged arms air-drop was the third that UN relief aeroplanes had made. 784/

696. Incoming aid flights were still averaging 20 a day, each carrying 12 and a half tons of food and supplies. 785/

(c) International reported events

697. A senior UN official, Jose-Maria Mendiluce, warned that 200,000 to 300,000 people could die in the winter if relief agencies did not inoculate children and step up deliveries of food and clothing. He also stated that the Sarajevo airlift was meeting only a small fraction of total needs.

18. 18/8/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fierce fighting was reported in and around the city and BiH forces were reported to have attacked Serb positions around the airport during the evening. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The Sarajevo airport runway. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Radio Sarajevo reported that in the past 48 hours, about 20 people were reported killed and 100 wounded. 786/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 12 people were killed and 90 others were wounded on this day. 787/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

698. There were reports that Muslim forces attacked Serb positions around the airport during the evening and that several mortars fell on the runway. 788/ Fighting in Sarajevo, and its suburbs, and Goražde left "many dead", Radio Sarajevo said.

(b) Local reported events

699. The UNHCR suspended all aid flights into Sarajevo after a British relief aeroplane was threatened, but the airport remained open for non-aid flights, including one scheduled to bring in General Satish Nambiar, the head of the UN peace-keeping forces in Yugoslavia. From the reports received, an unknown force apparently twice "locked on" the aircraft with a type of radar equipment designed to target objects for attack. The crew also thought that they were fired upon by a 20 millimetre anti-aircraft cannon. 789/

700. Officials from the "Children's Embassy", a local charity, said that 960 persons were on a convoy of buses and cars which left the centre of the city just after 10:00 a.m. United Nations armoured personnel carriers escorted the convoy out of the city. "Our lists show 22 per cent of the people are non-Serbs, including both Muslims and Croats", said a spokesperson from the group. She said that about 70 per cent of those leaving were children. The Children's Embassy remained a controversial group in Sarajevo, with the
group's critics charging that evacuating noncombatants, especially Serbs, only emboldened the Serbian forces laying siege to the city. 790/

(c) International reported events

701. Britain pledged to dispatch 1800 soldiers to BiH for humanitarian aid operations. 791/

19. 19/8/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting continued near the airport and heavy shelling was reported in the suburbs. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo airport (overnight); Serbian positions at Nedžarići, Ilidža, Rajlovac and Lukavica (overnight); suburbs of Stari Grad, Vratnik and Sokolović Kolonija. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Officials and media reports stated that fighting left more than 20 dead and 200 wounded. 792/ BiH authorities said that during the past 24 hours, 12 people had been killed and 90 wounded in Sarajevo. 793/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 10 people had been killed and 67 injured in Sarajevo. 794/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

702. Sarajevo airport remained closed to aid flights for the second day as continued fighting around BiH left more than 20 dead and some 200 wounded, according to officials and media reports. The Bosnian-Serb news agency SRNA claimed that Muslim troops fired on Sarajevo airport overnight. 795/

703. Belgrade news agency Tanjug said that Serbian positions at Nedžarići, Ilidža, Rajlovac and Lukavica around Sarajevo were bombarded overnight leaving two dead and five wounded. 796/

704. BiH authorities said that during the past 24 hours, 12 people had been killed and 90 wounded in Sarajevo. Radio Sarajevo said that some of the casualties in the city came from Serbian shelling of the suburbs of Stari Grad, Vratnik and Sokolović Kolonija. Fighting was also reported to have continued in the suburbs of Hrasnica and Stup. 797/

(b) Local reported events

705. BiH authorities signed an agreement on United Nations control of heavy weaponry in Sarajevo. The agreement, ratified Tuesday by Bosnian Serbs, allowed for the regrouping under UN supervision of all tanks, artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns, according to Colonel Stjepan Siber, the BiH Army's Deputy Chief of Staff. Siber said that he had demanded that the United Nations begin its supervision on the Serbian side. A similar agreement concluded in June was never implemented. 798/
706. The commander of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, Indian General Satish Nambiar, arrived in Sarajevo from Zagreb and held talks with BiH President Alija Izetbegović. Nambiar was also to make a "routine inspection" of the airport and meet other local political leaders. 799/ 

20. 20/8/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The day's shelling was described as the heaviest in a month. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area between the Holiday Inn and the Maršal Tito army barracks; the Koševô Hospital; the Office of the BiH government. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Grenades and mortar bombs struck between the Holiday Inn and the Maršal Tito army barracks and about 24 rocket-propelled grenades exploded within an hour, some 100 yards from the hotel. A nearby building was set ablaze by the shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: A Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldier was killed by sniper fire earlier in the day. The soldier was hit by a bullet in the head and one in the heart as he was walking across the courtyard of the Maršal Tito barracks in the city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: One Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldier; a local crisis centre said that in the 24 hours to noon, 11 people were killed and 55 wounded in Sarajevo. 800/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

707. Radio Sarajevo reported fighting between troops in the Nedžarići suburb where BiH forces attempted to break the blockade of the city. An air alert was declared in the morning in the city after shelling Wednesday evening in the suburbs of Dobrinja, Sokolović Kolonija, Butmir and Stup. 801/ 

708. Sarajevo suffered its heaviest bombardment in a month. Grenades and mortar bombs struck between the Holiday Inn and the Maršal Tito army barracks and about 24 rocket-propelled grenades exploded within an hour, some 100 yards from the hotel. A nearby building was set ablaze by shelling. 802/ 

709. A Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldier was killed by a sniper earlier in the day, the second Ukrainian to die in the city during the conflict. 803/ The soldier, wearing a bullet-proof jacket, was hit by a bullet in the head and one in the heart as he was walking across the courtyard of the Maršal Tito barracks in the city centre. The soldier was the 12th UNPROFOR member to have died in the former Yugoslavia. 804/

710. Buildings hit by shelling, apparently from Serb gun batteries in retaliation for Muslim sniping, included the Koševô Hospital and the office of the BiH government. The fighting began at 8:00 p.m. Thursday. Street clashes between Muslim and Serb fighters were reported in the suburbs of Hrasno and Nedžarići.

(b) Local reported events

711. Sarajevo airport resumed receiving relief flights after a two-day halt
caused by a threat to aircraft from nearby gun positions. The Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency said that 26 aid flights landed after the airport reopened. 805/

c) International reported events

712. Italy announced its readiness to supply between 1,000 to 1,500 troops to help with "border controls or the protection of humanitarian aid convoys". Italian Minister of Defence, Salvo Ando made the announcement in an interview published by the Milan daily Corriere della Sera in which he called for better coordination between countries offering troops. 806/

713. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel met with his French counterpart, Roland Dumas, at Hechingen, south-west Germany, for what officials described as a bid to fine-tune Franco-German positions on Yugoslavia. 807/

714. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the Organization of the Islamic Conference called for a special session of the UN General Assembly to discuss ways of ending the bloodshed in BiH. OIC Secretary-General Hamic Algabid said it was "imperative to take urgently all necessary steps to end the Serbian aggression" against BiH and "end the terrible sufferings being endured by its peace loving people". 808/

715. The Vatican and BiH decided to establish diplomatic relations, the Vatican's press department announced. 809/

21. 21/8/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy shelling was reported in the city and continued fighting was reported in Vogošća. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: An unidentified crowded market in the city; Koševo Hospital; downtown Sarajevo, including the BiH government building and the central market; the vicinity of the Holiday Inn Hotel; the Maršal Tito barracks. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Two persons were killed and 13 others were injured when several artillery shells fell on a crowded market in central Sarajevo between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m.; mortar bombs hit downtown Sarajevo killing four people in heavy bombardment; five mortar bombs landed between the BiH government building which was set ablaze in fighting on Thursday and the central market. Four people were killed and 23 others wounded; the east end of the large former Yugoslav army Maršal Tito barracks occupied by the Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingent was again on fire (but it was reported that this site sustained no artillery fire). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two persons were killed and 13 others were injured when several artillery shells fell on a crowded market in central Sarajevo between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m; mortar bombs hit downtown Sarajevo killing four people in heavy bombardment; five mortar bombs landed between the BiH government building which was set ablaze in fighting on Thursday, and the central market; four people were killed and 23 others wounded. According to the medical crisis centre in Sarajevo, in the 24 hours from midday Thursday, 10 people were
killed and 80 were injured in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

716. Sarajevo radio quoted a local doctor and reported that two persons were killed and 13 others were injured when several artillery shells fell on a crowded market in central Sarajevo. "Shells fell between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. when the market was packed with people", said Jadranka Brko, a wounded survivor whose husband was killed by the bombardment.

717. Shells were also fired at the Koševo Hospital.

718. mortar bombs hit downtown Sarajevo killing four people in heavy bombardment. Five mortar bombs landed between the BiH government building which was set ablaze in fighting on Thursday, and the central market. Four people were killed and 23 others were wounded, 12 of them seriously, hospital sources reported. Shells fell in the vicinity of the Holiday Inn Hotel in the downtown area again in the evening, local journalists said. The east end of the large former Yugoslav army Maršal Tito barracks, occupied by the Ukrainian UNPROFOR contingent was again on fire. Local reporters said that the barracks sustained no hostile artillery fire and the cause of the blaze seemed unclear.

719. Radio Sarajevo said that Serbs besieging the city had been "using all arms at their disposal" to shell the city, and that fighting was continuing Friday in the Vogosća suburb. Television in Belgrade said that BiH forces shelled Serb positions surrounding Sarajevo in a vain attempt to break the siege.

(b) Local reported events

720. Sarajevo was reported to be in the grip of a power blackout with bread shortages after fierce artillery bombardment and street fighting, journalists said.

721. A senior UN military source in Sarajevo said that a BiH gunman shot dead the Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldier on Thursday. The trajectory of the fatal round was flat, indicating that it could only have been fired from the foyer or from inside the barracks where the soldier died, the UN officer said. The peace-keeping forces were suspected by both warring factions of siding with the other, and at the slightest suspicion were made to pay for their "unfaithfulness", an officer said. Others also suspect BiH forces of trying to provoke a Western military intervention by targeting the UN forces.

722. Outside the UN headquarters in Sarajevo, Serb forces exchanged hostages with their Muslim-Croat adversaries. The two sides swapped 51 Serbs, including three women, for 50 Muslims and Croats, including six women.

(c) International reported events

723. As the Foreign Office in London announced that all of the parties invited to the Wednesday talks, including Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, had accepted the invitation to attend, the parliament of the rump Yugoslavia was divided on how it should be represented. Some deputies urged staying away from the peace conference "in order to avoid seeing Serbia humiliated". On Thursday, the new federation's President Dobrica Cosic said he would not attend the conference if he was not invited as the head of
Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia was not recognized by the international community). Delegates to the London Conference were to sit behind placards carrying individuals' names rather than those of countries, a Foreign Office spokesman said. The Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Milan Panić, told the Belgrade parliament that the London conference could "mark a turning point" in the crisis. Panić proposed that Yugoslavia recognize the international borders of Croatia and BiH. This drew strong criticism from the second party in parliament, the extreme-right Serb Radical Party who said that Panić's suggestion was "an unpardonable political error".

Acting US Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, stated that the upcoming scheduled Yugoslav conference was likely to make only limited gains. He also expressed grave concern that the fighting might spread into new areas.

22. 22/8/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intensive shelling was reported in the city. The Old Town and Ilidža were hit by 83 mortar shells overnight. Overnight shelling was reported in Dobrinja and mortar fire hit Stup and Vogošća. Street fighting was also reported in the Hrastno district. Mortar fire was reported near the airport at midmorning. Shells also hit the UNPROFOR headquarters. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Ilidža (overnight); Dobrinja, Stup, Vogošća (overnight); Sarajevo airport runway and vicinity (midmorning shelling); Old Town; the Oslobodjenje building; the Koševo Hospital; UN Headquarters (afternoon). Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: According to Radio Belgrade, BiH forces fired on the airport and the runway was hit by shell fire as an aeroplane was taking off; shelling was heavy in the Old Town centre and set ablaze the building of the BiH newspaper Oslobodjenje; the Koševo Hospital was hit several times but there was no word on casualties; three shells hit the UNPROFOR headquarters, causing little damage. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Serb sources reported that Ilidža was hit by 83 mortar shells overnight which killed one Serb fighter and wounded one other; at least five people were reported wounded by overnight shelling in Dobrinja; two British Royal Engineers were wounded by shrapnel in the hills above the district of Ilidža and two French soldiers were treated for minor wounds as a result of mortar fire on the UN headquarters in the afternoon; at the former military hospital, doctors reported a heavy flow of casualties from Stupsko Brdo, where BiH forces had been attacking Serb forces since Friday evening. The main Sarajevo hospital admitted 51 injured and a doctor reported that two civilians and one soldier were dead on arrival. According to the medical crisis centre for BiH, 19 people had been killed and 124 injured in Sarajevo over the past 24 hours. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

725. BiH government sources suggested that they might launch an offensive in a bid to break out of Sarajevo with the help of Croat forces. Serb sources played down the possibility but said that they were attacked during the night at several points. Ilidža was hit by 83 mortar shells which killed one Serb
fighter and wounded another, they said. The Serb officer in charge at Ilidža said: "We could fight harder but our politicians tell us only to defend ourselves". 825/

726. Intensive shelling hit Sarajevo and forced many of its residents into underground shelters throughout the night as Serbs and Muslims waged street battles, local journalists said. 826/

727. At least five people were wounded by overnight shelling in Dobrinja and mortar bombs fell in the suburbs of Stup and Vogošća. Street fighting flared in the Hrasno district. 827/

728. UNPROFOR said that the airport was closed for a half hour in the midmorning because of mortar fire in the vicinity. Artillery could also be heard. 828/ According to Radio Belgrade, BiH forces fired on the airport and the runway was hit by shell fire at the moment when an aeroplane was taking off. 829/

729. Doctors at the Koševo Hospital, which suspended operations and was running on its last drops of fuel for its power generators, reported three dead and 40 wounded "in the past five hours", mostly from the fighting in Ilidža. 830/

730. Shelling was heavy in the Old Town centre and set ablaze the building of the Bosnian newspaper Oslobodjenje. The Koševo Hospital, damaged in earlier bouts of fighting, was hit again several times but there was no word on casualties. 831/

731. Two British Royal Engineers were wounded by shrapnel in the hills above the Serb district of Ilidža, and two French soldiers were treated for minor wounds as a result of mortar fire on the UN headquarters earlier in the afternoon, UN officials said. 832/

732. Three shells hit the UNPROFOR headquarters, forcing evacuation of personnel but causing little damage. 833/

(b) Local reported events

733. In his first press conference, the new head of UNPROFOR, General Hasen al Abdel Razik urged the warring factions to respect the presence of UN peacekeepers, saying, "We don't have anything to defend ourselves with. So please, don't make us a target". The head of the Egyptian brigade, who took the UNPROFOR command on Thursday, said that he was in contact with BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Serbian forces around Sarajevo and that he had received assurances from both groups that the mission of the UN peacekeepers would be respected. 834/

734. The London Independent newspaper reported that UN officials believed that Muslim fighters in BiH might have staged some "Serb" attacks on Sarajevo in a ploy aimed at winning international sympathy. The Independent said that secret reports circulating at the United Nations suggested that the defenders of Sarajevo might have carried out attacks designed to look like the work of Bosnian Serbs. These included the bombing of a bread line in May which killed at least sixteen people and explosions at a cemetery 4 August where orphan victims of the war were being buried. 835/
(c) **International reported events**

735. It was reported that the latest flare-up in Sarajevo and most of BiH dimmed hopes for a peace breakthrough at the international conference on Yugoslavia scheduled to open in London on Wednesday. 836/

736. Russia said that it would support tough measures by the UN Security Council to protect UN peace-keeping forces in the former Yugoslavia, a Foreign Ministry statement said. It said it was seriously concerned by reports that two members of the Ukrainian battalion serving in Sarajevo had been killed and eight wounded. 837/

23. 23/8/92 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** At least 50 shells hit the city centre overnight. Mortars pounded Sarajevo for the fourth day of fighting with both sides accusing the other of trying to seize the initiative ahead of the coming peace talks in London. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** City centre (overnight); BiH forces were reported to have shelled all positions in southern Sarajevo lying between Lukavica and Vogošća (areas reported to have been attacked in artillery bombardments prior to a ground assault were Nedžarići, Vavarić, Iliđa and Vogošća); the Sarajevo airport; unidentified student dormitory on the edge of the city; 12 shells reportedly exploded close to the Parliament building. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Overnight shelling led to several outbreaks of fire and at least 50 shells were reported to have hit the city centre; the UN closed the airport for much of the day because of mortar and artillery crossfire which wounded one British Royal Engineer; two foreign students died when a shell smashed into their dormitory on the edge of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Medical sources cited by Sarajevo radio said that 19 people were hospitalized overnight and that heavy shelling killed five people and wounded nine others 838/; one British Royal Engineer was wounded by mortar fire on the airport road; two foreign students died when a shell smashed into their dormitory on the edge of the city. Sixteen bodies were taken to the main Koševko Hospital in the city between 7:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Ratko Mirković from the morgue reported. During the past 36 hours, 38 people reportedly were killed. Ambulances continued to bring more injured to Koševko: 75 at last count. 839/ In another account, it was reported that mortars and artillery fire killed more than 30 people in the city. 840/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 22 people were killed and 100 were injured in Sarajevo on this day. 841/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

737. Explosions could be heard near Dobrinja, Sarajevo radio said. The radio said that the overnight shelling led to several outbreaks of fire, and that at least 50 shells hit the city centre. Medical sources cited by the radio said that 19 people were hospitalized overnight. 842/
738. Heavy shelling overnight killed five people and wounded nine others, Sarajevo radio reported, while BiH forces continued attacking Serbian positions around the city. Tanjug said that BiH forces shelled all Serb positions in southern Sarajevo lying between Lukavica and Vogošća. BiH forces reportedly attacked the Nedžarići, Vakavić, Ilidža and Rajlovac suburbs in what Tanjug's sources said were "artillery bombardments prior to a ground assault". The sources said a general offensive by BiH forces on Serb positions in and around Sarajevo continued into its third day. The sources accused BiH forces of having mortared the UN headquarters on Saturday. 843/

739. Mortars pounded Sarajevo for the fourth day of heavy fighting, with both sidesaccusing the other of trying to seize the initiative ahead of the coming peace talks in London. "The Četnik [Serb] military forces started a general offensive against Bosnia-Hercegovina around Sarajevo. This is most probably because we are headed into the London conference", President Izetbegović told reporters. "We can say that this offensive has failed", he added. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA made a similar accusation against BiH forces and Croats defending the city. It said that Serb positions in10 Sarajevo suburbs had been severely bombed, and accused the Muslims of deploying an artillery battery near UN headquarters to provoke a response to what looked like a Serbian attack on the United Nations. SRNA later said that a cease-fire had been declared in the afternoon. 844/

740. The United Nations closed the airport for much of the day because of mortar and artillery crossfire. 845/

741. One British Royal Engineer serving the United Nations was wounded by mortar fire on the airport road, the third member of his regiment to be hurt. 846/

742. Two foreign students died when a shell smashed into their dormitory on the edge of the city. Syrian student Mowaffak Soufi said: "We got up to leave the room for a safer place but there was an explosion before we could get out. A girl died here on these stairs and one of my friends in the room had no arms or legs. Even his head was missing". 847/

743. A dozen bombs reportedly exploded close to the Presidential building. 848/

(b) Local reported events

744. Radio Sarajevo said that as a "security measure" bread would not be on sale during the day. 849/

745. A fixture of normal city life, the local beer factory, reported that it had stopped production for the first time in 128 years. According to its manager, Ferid Pasović, the main production line had been destroyed by repeated mortar and artillery attacks. Holes in tanks had been patched, but computerized components were destroyed, the roof damaged, and windows smashed. 850/

(c) International reported events

746. United States officials said that they had located no evidence to support allegations that Serb forces were systematically killing prisoners at detention camps in BiH. 851/
24. 24/8/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH forces reportedly tried to break through the Sarajevo siege (although the attack appeared to be a failure) as Serbian artillery hit the city's main buildings. Just two days before the start of the London peace talks, fighting between BiH and Serb forces gained ferocity as the day wore on, with warring factions apparently trying to consolidate territory. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city's main buildings; Sarajevo airport; the Holiday Inn; an unidentified city factory; Koševo Hospital; the Oslobodjenje building; unidentified Serb-held positions. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Early in the day Sarajevo airport was closed after it was hit by mortar fire; mortars hit the city around the Holiday Inn--two mortars hit the building directly, sending glass into the lobby; smoke could be seen rising from the direction of a city factory; a shell reportedly hit the Koševo hospital, killing one more and wounding four, Jovo Vranik, the Hospital spokesman said; five Bosnian journalists were injured when the offices of the daily Oslobodjenje were hit by a dozen shells; Tanjug news agency said that in the 24 hours preceding noon, about 20 soldiers and civilians, including women and children, were killed in the bombardment of Serb-held positions. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Thirty-two people died and 131 were injured in the fighting overnight, official forces said, taking the total to 81 dead since BiH forces began their offensive on Saturday; a shell reportedly hit the Koševo hospital, killing one more and wounding four, Jovo Vranik, the Hospital spokesman said; five Bosnian journalists were injured when the offices of the daily Oslobodjenje were hit by a dozen shells; Tanjug news agency said that in the 24 hours preceding noon, about 20 soldiers and civilians, including women and children, were killed in the bombardment of Serb-held positions. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

747. BiH forces reportedly tried to break through the Sarajevo siege although the attack appeared to be a failure as Serbian artillery hit the city's main buildings. The information service of the Sarajevo security centre said that the past 24 hours had been "the hardest since war broke out". The hundreds of fighters sent to attack Iliđa, the Serb-held suburb, "cannot blink an eye" under the intense artillery bombing, said a young man who had just returned from the front.

748. Early in the day, UN peacekeepers closed Sarajevo airport after it was hit by mortar fire. It later reopened and several relief aeroplanes were able to land.

749. Fighting between BiH and Serb forces gained ferocity as the day wore on, with warring factions apparently trying to consolidate territory just two days before the start of the London peace talks.

750. Mortars hit the city around the Holiday Inn. Two hit the building directly, sending glass into its lobby. There were no reports of casualties. Smoke could be seen rising from the direction of a city factory. Electricity and water supplies were also cut in the city.
751. Improvised ambulances could be seen rushing back and forth from the Koševo Hospital where, by the middle of the afternoon, 27 bodies lay. A shell reportedly hit the hospital, killing one and wounding four, Jovo Vranik, the Hospital spokesman said. 860

752. The Paris based Reporters Sans Frontieres said that five Bosnian journalists were injured when the offices of the daily Oslobodjenje were hit by a dozen shells. "Five journalists working for Oslobodjenje or one of the three private reviews sharing the offices were wounded in this bombardment. Everything indicates that the Bosnian daily was the direct target of this bombardment", Reporters Sans Frontieres said. "From the beginning of the conflict, this newspaper was one of the few media in Bosnia-Hercegovina that attempted to distribute independent information". The group said that Oslobodjenje had already been shelled a number of times and one of its journalists had died and several others were wounded. It was also said that the editorial staff of Sarajevo radio and television, along with some of their children, were living in their offices and had not been paid for three months. "A total of 300 people have taken refuge in the offices. The journalists and their families, including children, lack food and medicines, and remain within reach of the guns", it said. 861

753. Kika urovi, a reporter for Radio France International's Serbo-Croatian service was wounded and hospitalized. 862
754. Street gun battles were reported in the Ilidža district near the airport. An armoured train in which BiH fighters tried to enter the suburb on Saturday night was reportedly destroyed by Serb forces. 863

755. The Belgrade based Tanjug news agency said that 1700 artillery shells had fallen on Serb-held positions in the 24 hours up to noon. About 20 soldiers and civilians, including women and children, were killed in the bombardment, Tanjug said. The report could not be independently verified. 864

(b) Local reported events

756. UN officials announced that former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the special UN investigator probing human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia, visited the city. 865

757. Serbian forces renewed their claims that aeroplanes flying in food and medicine to Sarajevo were "deviating" from their flight paths to areas controlled by BiH forces in the mountains. The Serbian radio at Pale, which broadcasted the accusation, said that the aeroplanes were dropping weapons to Muslim fighters. 866

(c) International reported events

758. Lord Carrington resigned as the EC envoy to the EC-UN sponsored peace negotiations. 867

759. The UN General Assembly met in a special session to discuss the situation in BiH. The meeting was held at the request of the 47 Muslim countries comprising the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At the meeting, Muslim countries mobilized to denounce the Belgrade government as the aggressor in the former Yugoslavia and pledged support for the "terrorized inhabitants" of BiH. 868

760. It was announced that the United States, Britain and France had decided
to shelve plans for a massive allied military operation to deliver humanitarian aid in BiH and that they instead would leave control of the relief effort under UN authority. This decision was made despite the 13 August Security Council resolution authorizing the use of "all measures necessary" to deliver food and medicine to BiH's civilians. 869/

761. US President Bush approved a measure to provide duty-free trade for all of the former Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Montenegro. He also authorized the release of $12 million from the US Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to support those displaced in BiH, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. 870/

762. The US opened embassies in Ljubljana and Zagreb. 871/

763. US Department of State Yugoslav Desk Officer George Kenney resigned over what he called an "ineffective" and "counter-productive" response to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia. 872/

25. 25/8/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: During the night Serb and Muslim forces reportedly fought in the Old Town and Koševo district, but there was no repeat of heavy bombardment. Mortar and artillery fire hit the city in the evening as BiH and Serb fighters met head-on near the city-centre. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo's National Library Building was hit by a shell at 9:30 p.m. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: It was reported that 82 people in all were killed in the recent offensive, according to BiH sources. 873/ Sarajevo's crisis centre said that 28 people were killed and 127 wounded in the 24 hours up to midnight Tuesday. "It was a very heavy, very hot night for casualties", said Dr. Faris Goran Kapetanović. Koševo Hospital, with negligible water and power supplies, treated the 80 wounded between 10:00 a.m. Tuesday and 8:00 a.m. Wednesday (double the usual number of casualties). 874/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

764. BiH forces reportedly abandoned their attack of the last few days and Serb forces in Iliđa said that the Muslim forces had been fooled by their own propaganda into believing their weekend bid to lift the siege would be easy, after Sarajevo television reported that "Iliđa was now Muslim". It was reported that despite the battle, Iliđa's houses and shops, which remained open, bore little trace of fighting. 875/

765. Apart from some fighting in two districts, Sarajevo spent what local reporters described as a relatively quiet night. During the night Serb and Muslim forces reportedly fought in the Old Town and Koševo district, but there was no repeat of heavy bombardment. The evening sky was lit up by flames from fires at five different places in the western side of the capital, one of them being the high-rise newspaper publishing house, Osiobodjenje. 876/
766. Early in the day, BBC TV correspondent Martin Bell was hit in the groin by shrapnel during a mortar attack in Sarajevo. The explosion occurred as he was filming a mortar attack. 877/

767. A German transportation aeroplane was hit by gunfire leaving Sarajevo for Zagreb, later landing safely. 878/

768. Mortar and artillery fire hit the city in the evening as BiH and Serb fighters met head-on near the city centre. Clashes were reported particularly heavy near the central Jewish cemetery. 879/

769. Sarajevo's National Library Building, was hit by a shell at 9:30 p.m. 880/

(b) Local reported events

770. Authorities in the city announced a 48 hour curfew from 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday in an attempt to minimize civilian casualties. 881/

c) International reported events

771. On the eve of the London talks, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the Security Council to take tougher action to end the war in BiH, including direct military action. The vote, led by Islamic states, followed two days of an outpouring of support for BiH during a debate that featured more than 60 speakers. It was the first time the General Assembly had dealt with the Yugoslav crisis. 882/

26. 26/8/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Military sources said that Serb artillery batteries and BiH mortars traded fire between 1:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., with tanks, long-range artillery, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft batteries. 883/ Mortar attacks and gunfire resumed at dawn. Fighting appeared to ease as the day wore on, but the city continued to be hit by isolated explosions and sniper fire. 884/ "This was the worst shelling since the start of the war", said Nedžad Imamović, a resident of the Medresse district of Sarajevo's old quarter. He said that 15 shells hit in one hour within a radius of 100 metres of each other. An UNPROFOR officer stationed in the city since early July said he had never seen such "a massive night attack across the whole city". 885/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Pale and Rajlovac suburbs; University Library, Vijećnica (Town Hall); the former military hospital. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Washington Post; Reuters; the Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: Sarajevo's National Library building was still ablaze after Tuesday's shelling; the shelling of the University Library reportedly touched off fires which destroyed many of the 3,000,000 volumes contained within the building; a nurse was killed and several other personnel were wounded after a direct artillery hit on the former military hospital. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Washington Post; Reuters; the Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Isolated sniper fire was reported during the day. Source(s):
Casualties: A nurse was killed and several other personnel were wounded after the former military hospital took a direct artillery hit. The hospital had received at least four dead-on-arrival victims from the night's fighting and Košević Hospital got at least 15 more (that toll was described as only partial). A later report stated that six people had been killed in Sarajevo on this day. The BiH Health Ministry reported that 14 persons were killed and 126 injured in Sarajevo in the preceding 24 hours.

Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

772. The Serbian suburbs of Pale and Rajlovac were reportedly shelled as Serb forces pushed back a BiH infantry attack in Grbavica, Radio Belgrade reported.

773. Sarajevo's National Library building, hit by a shell on Tuesday evening, was still ablaze in the morning. Firefighters hampered by failing water pressure were unable to save the four-story Moorish style building constructed under the Austrians. Mortar shells were also reported to have hit the University Library, Vijećnica (Town Hall). This shelling reportedly touched off fires which destroyed many of the 3,000,000 volumes contained within the building.

774. Fires reportedly raged out of control through the Old Town Hall. Volunteers, in an effort to save ancient manuscripts and books from the Hall, defied a 48 hour curfew imposed Tuesday afternoon and formed a human chain to carry buckets of water into the burning building.

775. Patients in the former military hospital were reportedly rushed to safety after the building took a direct artillery hit. A nurse was killed and several other personnel were wounded in the explosion, said building guard Mehmet Begović. The hospital had earlier received at least four dead-on-arrival victims from the night's fighting and Košević Hospital got at least 15 more (that toll was described as only partial).

(b) International reported events

776. Delegates from some 40 countries and organizations gathered in London for the peace conference led by the European Community and the United Nations, including representatives from former Yugoslavia's warring factions, the United States, Russia, China and countries neighbouring Yugoslavia. Its intention was to mark a point of departure after repeated failed attempts by the European Community to mediate a solution to the conflict between rival Serbian, Croatian and Muslim factions in the former Yugoslavia. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and British Prime Minister John Major, in his capacity as president of the European Community, chaired Wednesday's conference, scheduled to run through Friday. At the conference's end, former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, together with Lord Carrington's successor from the EC, would continue the debate at a UN-EC steering committee in Geneva.

777. In London, acting US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger said the peace conference would order further punitive action against Serbia because of the shelling of Sarajevo. "The people on the ground, obviously in this case the Serbs, are intent on establishing as good a position on the ground prior to the meeting of the conference, and it's an outrage", Eagleburger told reporters.
778. British Prime Minister John Major opened the conference with a warning to all parties, particularly the Serbs, of what they could expect unless they cooperated in efforts to end the bloodshed. "Parties who stand in the way of agreement can expect even tougher sanctions, even more rigorously policed", he said. "No trade. No aid. No international recognition of role. Economic, cultural, political and diplomatic isolation". 896/

779. Serbian President Milošević agreed in principle to the precepts of the Conference but claimed to have little control over Bosnian Serb nationalists. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić for his part denied that his forces had anything to do with the assault on Sarajevo. 897/

780. In Washington, US President George Bush added to the pressure on Serbia by granting most favoured nation status to all former Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Montenegro. 898/

27. 27/8/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic artillery and gunfire continued to hit the city, although without the intensity of the last week. 899/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Bus or bread line in the Čengić Vila district; the area near the Maršal Tito Barracks; four mortar shells hit the UNPROFOR compound (one hit the second floor and three landed outside). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Nine people were killed and 20 others wounded in the shelling of a bus or bread line in the Čengić Vila district; four people were wounded in a mortar attack near the Maršal Tito Barracks. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Nine people were killed and 20 others wounded in the shelling of a bus or bread line in the Čengić Vila district; four people were wounded in a mortar attack near the Maršal Tito Barracks. In the 24 hours to noon Thursday, not including the mortar attack in Čengić Vila, 12 people were reported killed and 80 were wounded. 900/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

781. A mortar attack killed nine people in a residential area of the city as BiH and Serbian forces ignored pleas for peace at the London conference. Conflicting accounts of the attack in the Čengić Vila district said that the people had been lining up either for a bus or for bread. A nearby hospital said that seven people died instantly in the attack, and two more were dead on arrival. More than 20 people were wounded in the attack. Four people were also wounded in a mortar attack near the city's Maršal Tito Barracks. 901/

782. In another attack, four mortar shells struck the UNPROFOR compound. One hit the second floor of the building, which used to be the city's main post office, and three landed outside. There were no reported casualties. 902/

783. Sporadic artillery and gunfire continued to hit the city, although without the intensity of the last week. 903/

784. The Tanjug news agency in Belgrade attributed the day's relative calm to the fact that the BiH forces holding the city had given up a push to break the
siege by Serbian gunners in the surrounding hills. 904/

(c) International reported events

785. UN officials at the London conference announced that an agreement had been reached to beef up UN forces in BiH to protect humanitarian missions to accompany international observers to the Serbian and Montenegrin borders to monitor implementation of UN sanctions imposed last May. But analysts said the results of the London conference promised to be inconclusive in that the main protagonists, BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, went little beyond past, unfulfilled promises of conciliation. "If the West pressed Mr. Izetbegović to sit at the negotiating table", the war in BiH "could end within days", Karadžić said in an interview with the Greek weekly Ena. Izetbegović, in an interview with the Paris daily Le Figaro, refused to engage in dialogue or agree to a cease-fire "as long as the (Serbian) aggression continues". 905/

28. 28/8/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Despite Thursday's agreement in London, Serbian forces surrounding Sarajevo began some of the most intense bombardment to date. Hundreds of rounds from tank cannons and 155 millimetre howitzers were reportedly fired from Serb held positions in the hills and mountains surrounding Sarajevo. 906/ Source(s): Washington Post.

Targets Hit: A veterinary college; an ironworks; a museum; the government's main office building; scores of apartment buildings; the former military hospital. Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Damage was suffered by shelling to a veterinary college, an ironworks, a museum, the government's main office building and scores of apartment buildings. Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: It was reported that two dead from the day's shelling were taken to the Koševo Hospital and a victim died of his wounds there, according to medical sources. Another 26 people had reportedly been admitted to the Koševo facility since early Friday, a doctor at the hospital, Goran Kapetanović said. 907/ At least five people, including two children, were killed and 10 others were wounded in the district of Stari Grad while shelling killed five and wounded 34 in the Dobrinja district near the airport. 908/ Within the last 24 hours 19 people had been reported killed and 145 wounded in Sarajevo. 909/ At least three people were killed and 12 wounded in the city on Friday according to authorities. 910/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Washington Post.

Narrative of Events:

786. The shelling damaged a veterinary college, an ironworks, a museum, the government's main office building and scores of apartment buildings. Fires burned across the city late into Thursday night. At midday Friday even more fires were started by the continued shelling. 911/

787. Mortar shells also reportedly hit the former military hospital.
Reporters said that they could hear incoming shells near the hospital, a sector held by Bosnian Muslim forces and the riposte of the opposing side a few moments later. 912/

788. Radio Sarajevo reported fierce artillery duels and infantry clashes late Thursday and early Friday in the Vogošća suburb of Sarajevo. 913/

(b) International reported events

789. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić welcomed the outcome of the London Conference but said that Bosnian Muslims needed to take the lead in observing any cease-fire. "We can't stop (the fighting) because we are not the ones who initiate it", he said in an interview with BBC radio. "If they stop, if they respect the ceasefire, we'll respect it". 914/

790. Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić said in London that he would demand the resignation of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević if he did not respect the peace conference agreement. "Now I want to put him (Milošević) on public notice", Panić said. "What counts is not the word, but the deed. The peace proposal is now the official peace plan for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I expect Mr. Milošević to comply—or else. If the President of Serbia indeed fails to fulfil his pledge, then I will feel that it is my duty to demand that he resign". 915/

791. The US lifted its sanctions against Slovenia which had been in effect since December 1991. 916/

29. 29/8/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was a let up in the fighting of the past two days, but random mortar shells continued to hit the city. 917/ Source(s): Washington Post

Targets Hit: Hrasno and nearby districts (overnight); the BiH presidency building; an UNPROFOR armoured vehicle in Nedžarići. Source(s): Reuters; Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Three United Nations soldiers were wounded and a Serbian officer killed by mortar fire which struck their armoured vehicle. Source(s): Reuters; Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three United Nations soldiers were wounded and a Serbian officer killed by mortar fire which struck their armoured vehicle. The Health Ministry reported that in the city, 22 people were killed and 162 injured during the last 24 hours. 918/ In another report, the medical crisis centre said that 20 people had been killed and 153 injured in the past 24 hours in the city. 919/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

792. Radio Sarajevo said that BiH forces had succeeded in their attempt to pierce the Serbian siege of the city. It said that soldiers had broken through Serbian lines at Čekrčić, near Ilijaš, 25 kilometres north of the city. This report was not confirmed by independent sources, however, and was denied by
the Serbs. The Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug said that intense fighting continued in the area. BiH forces also reportedly tried to break through the Serbian stronghold in the Ilidža suburb to the west of Sarajevo, but Serbian forces "managed to hold their positions", the Serbian agency SRNA reported. 920/

793. Sarajevo was reported early as generally quiet after a night of heavy bombardment. Fighting reportedly raged before midnight, as tank, mortar and heavy machine-gun fire poured into Hrasno and nearby districts. Fighting was also reported in Dobrinja. 921/

794. There was a let up in the fighting of the past two days, but random mortar shells continued to hit the city, including one that struck the BiH Presidency building. 922/

795. It was reported that three United Nations soldiers were wounded and a Serbian officer killed by mortar fire as fighting continued in and around the city. The Serbian officer died and three French UNPROFOR soldiers were wounded while on patrol with an armoured car in the suburb of Nedžarići near the airport, the officer in charge of the French detachment of UN forces in Zagreb, Colonel Christian Xuereb, said. The Serb, a liaison officer with the forces besieging Sarajevo, was killed instantly by a rocket launched from behind BiH lines 100 metres away. The incident may have been a result of bad communications between the UN forces, the Serbs and BiH forces, informed sources said. UN officials declined to comment on a suggestion that a UN officer failed to tell the fighting forces that a UNPROFOR armoured vehicle was arriving in the area. 923/

(b) Local reported events

796. The BiH government's deputy commander, Colonel Jovan Divjak, stated that BiH forces had decided to continue their costly offensive to break through Serb lines encircling the city, even though such an effort would be slow and cost many lives. He also noted that while recent attempts to break out had failed, Muslim forces from Zenica had advanced to within seven miles of Sarajevo. He also complained about the lack of Croatian military assistance in breaking the Sarajevo siege even though there were reported to be thousands of Croatian Defence Force soldiers less than 20 miles away.

797. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić accused BiH forces of trying to destroy the latest international initiative to restore peace by attacking Serb positions around Sarajevo. "Muslim forces in Sarajevo have launched a crazed onslaught, shelling Serb positions, Sarajevo town itself and sniping against civilians", he said in a statement. He appealed to British Prime Minister John Major, co-chairman of the London peace talks to urge BiH President Alija Izetbegović to restrain his forces. 924/

798. It was reported that to date, the Sarajevo Fire Department had seen four of its men killed and 28 wounded by snipers and mortars since the war began. According to its commander, Kenan Slinić: "Our casualties are 10 per cent higher than the army's". According to Slinić, Sarajevo had 250 serious fires in the five months of the city's siege, 160 of them "events we normally would see only once in a decade". It was reported that the City of Innsbruck had donated uniforms and hoses to Sarajevo, but that the UN refused to allow them to be delivered, saying that they did not qualify as humanitarian aid. The central fire station, built in 1912, was also serving as a refugee centre. Firemen whose own houses had been destroyed had brought their wives and children to live with them in the brick building. 925/
(c) International reported events

799. Marrack Goulding was due to leave London for Sarajevo to begin locating weapons that Serb forces pledged, at the London peace conference, to put under UN supervision. 926/

30. 30/8/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After reported heavy fighting overnight in Ilidža, street fighting was reported in at least four suburbs as intense heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire broke out at 5:30 a.m. north and west of the Holiday Inn. Shelling was reported in the city. Fierce fighting was reported to the north in Vogošća where BiH forces pressed an offensive. Heavy fighting was also reported in Ilijaš and Dobrinja. Shelling continued in the city throughout the day which included a shell hitting a crowded market causing many civilian casualties. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo Radio and Television building; the Holiday Inn; the city centre; a crowded market in the suburb of Alipašino Polje. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Washington Post.

Description of Damage: A 120 millimetre tank shell crashed through the window of a second story room of the downtown Holiday Inn at about 6:00 a.m., but did not explode; at approximately noon a howitzer shell hit in a crowded market in the suburb of Alipašino Polje, killing 15 people and injuring at least 31 others. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At approximately noon a howitzer shell hit in a crowded market in the suburb of Alipašino Polje, killing 15 people and injuring at least 31 others. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date, 1,954 people had been killed, 11,649 had been severely wounded, 14,600 had been lightly wounded and 6,600 people were missing in Sarajevo. 927/ Source(s): Washington Post; Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

800. BiH and Serb forces fought gunbattles in the city during the morning. Journalists with Sarajevo radio reported street fighting in at least four suburbs and intense heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire broke out at 5:30 a.m. north and west of the Holiday Inn. The radio and television centre was among the buildings hit. 928/ A 120 millimetre tank shell crashed through the window of a second story room of the downtown Holiday Inn at about 6:00 a.m. but did not explode. 929/

801. Fierce fighting reportedly raged to the north of the city in the Serbian controlled industrial suburb of Vogošća, where BiH forces pressed an offensive to cut a land corridor out of the city. Sustained automatic weapons fire, rockets and artillery could be heard in downtown Sarajevo from the direction of Vogošća. Heavy fighting was also reported in the Serbian-held town of Ilijaš, about 15 kilometres further north as BiH forces tried to encircle the town. BiH sources said the capture of Ilijaš would figure heavily in the land corridor campaign which radio Sarajevo termed "an unstoppable offensive". Fierce exchanges were also reported in Dobrinja. 930/
802. The clashes followed reports of heavy fighting Saturday evening in the Serb-held suburb of Iliđža and mortar on the centre of the city. Serbs accused BiH forces of launching an offensive against Iliđža Saturday to try to link up with Muslim districts. 931

803. Shelling continued in Sarajevo throughout the day. At approximately noon, a howitzer shell landed in a crowded market, killing 15 people and injuring at least 31 others. This was reported to be the highest death toll for a single shell since 27 May when 20 persons were killed in a bread line. 932

804. Sarajevo television said that the shell hit in the suburb of Alipašino Polje west of the city shortly before noon. Television crews at the scene quoted witnesses as saying that the shell exploded in the heart of the suburban outdoor marketplace as housewives with children and elderly shoppers tried to stock up on fresh fruits and vegetables rarely available since the siege began. 933

(b) **Local reported events**

805. It was reported that an unnamed Western source said that aeroplanes flying in humanitarian aid to Sarajevo had dropped weapons and other military equipment to BiH forces. The source said that an Iranian aeroplane landed about 10 days prior to today's date, at Sarajevo airport and was unloaded by BiH forces who did not allow UNPROFOR at the airport to approach the aircraft. 934

31. 31/8/92 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo was unusually quiet early in the day. "We can't remember a day like this. But it could change at any time. Maybe the gunmen are taking a rest or maybe it is just too hot", said Sena Softi, a doctor at a hospital which treated three people for gunshot wounds on Monday. 935

**Targets Hit:** Dobrinja; the Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings; a cemetery near the northern perimeter of the city near a hospital and the city morgue. **Source(s):** Agence France Presse; Government of BiH.

**Description of Damage:** At least one person was killed and more than 20 others wounded late in the day when an artillery shell exploded in Dobrinja; four people, including one journalist were wounded when an artillery shell hit a cemetery near the northern perimeter of the city near a hospital and the city morgue. **Source(s):** Agence France Presse; Government of BiH.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least one person was killed and more than 20 others wounded late in the day when an artillery shell exploded in Dobrinja; four people, including one journalist were wounded when an artillery shell hit a cemetery near the northern perimeter of the city near a hospital and the city morgue. **Source(s):** Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

806. Sarajevo was unusually quiet early in the day. "We can't remember a day like this. But it could change at any time. Maybe the gunmen are taking a rest
or maybe it is just too hot", said Sena Softić, a doctor at a hospital which treated three people for gunshot wounds on Monday.  

806. At least one person was killed and more than 20 others were wounded late in the day when an artillery shell exploded in Dobrinja, Sarajevo television said.  

807. Also shelled were the Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings (the city's only providers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread), according to a report from the Government of BiH.  

808. Four people, including one journalist, were wounded, none critically, when an artillery shell hit a cemetery during the funeral of a BiH soldier. It was reported that funerals at the cemetery, located near the northern perimeter of the city near a hospital and the city morgue, had been a favourite target of Serb gunners in the hills surrounding the city.  

(b) Local reported events  

809. In Belgrade, allies of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević introduced a parliamentary motion of no-confidence in Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić. The move by 68 legislators of the Socialist and Radical Parties controlling the federal parliament followed public rebukes to Milošević from Panić at the peace talks in London last week.  

810. BiH President Alija Izetbegović stated that the BiH government would not attend continued peace talks in Geneva until the shelling of Sarajevo had stopped.  

811. It was reported that six of every 10 buildings in Sarajevo had been damaged by shellfire and that the broken down water system had continued to make residents sick. Izumi Nakamitsu, the acting head of the Sarajevo office of UNHCR, stated that unless there was a political settlement soon the coming winter would be a disaster. Local radio warned residents to start boiling their drinking water, after a sharp rise in gastric ailments.  

(c) International reported events  

812. Britain's Lord Owen, who had taken over as the chief European Community negotiator on the crisis, held talks in Portugal at the start of a round of the European capitals. Lord Owen said in London that there could be no quick solutions to BiH's war. "I don't think you can set yourself deadlines or talk in terms of immediate cease-fires. I think it's going to have to be a patient building process", he told reporters. When asked for his reaction to Sunday's mortar attack on the Sarajevo market, Owen said, "There are going to be, hour by hour, day by day, terrible atrocities in the former Yugoslav territory and as far as possible I am not going to comment on individual ones. Our job is to get this peace process underway".  

813. Conferees in London last week approved a resolution requiring that UN officials be notified within 96 hours of the positions of all artillery and mortars as a first step towards neutralizing the armed conflict. British Prime Minister John Major hailed the resolution as one of the principal accomplishments of the talks, but there was no apparent agreement over when the four-day period would begin. British sources said that it remained to be worked out and US officials expressed concern that BiH would drop out of peace
talks if the operations did not begin soon, sources said. "We have to be concerned about the 96-hour issue and the fact that the Bosnians can walk out from the negotiations if we don't find a solution", said a US source speaking on condition of anonymity. 946/

F. September 1992

1. 1/9/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting erupted just after midnight with small-arms fire and grew at about 5:00 a.m. into major clashes that varied in intensity throughout the day in the Dobrinja, Nedžarići and Hrasno areas. Shelling was reported in several areas, hitting targets in and around the city. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Lukavica; Butmir; the Dobrinja apartment complex; a used tire warehouse in Alipašin Most near the railway station and the main television tower; the area adjacent to the Marshal Tito barracks; fuel depot at "Camp Beaver". Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: One mortar round scored a direct hit at 10:00 a.m. on a used tire warehouse used by a rubber factory in the industrial area of Alipašin Most near the railway station and television tower, sending thick black clouds smoke over the city; two French and one Egyptian UNPROFOR officer and one local firefighter were seriously wounded in a mortar attack late in the day on a fuel depot at "Camp Beaver". Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: A young man walking along a street in the Alipašin Most area suffered multiple gunshot wounds to his chest. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Dr. Haris Smajkić, the chief of the BiH Health Crisis Committee said that at least 13 people were killed and 190 others wounded in Sarajevo during the 24 hour period that began at 1:00 p.m. on Monday. The doctor, who on Monday expressed fears of looming epidemics, said that 55 new cases of gastroenteritis were detected since the day before, bringing the total to 665, while 11 more outbreaks of Hepatitis A were found for a total of 124. 947/ At least two people were reported killed and 28 wounded when a shell exploded in the Dobrinja apartment complex. 948/ Two French and one Egyptian UNPROFOR officer and one local firefighter were seriously wounded in a mortar attack late in the day on a fuel depot at "Camp Beaver". 949/ Sarajevo Television said that the toll from the day's fighting was at least eight dead and a large but undetermined number of injured. 950/ A report the next day counted 15 dead and over 100 wounded. 951/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

814. The fighting in Sarajevo erupted just after midnight Monday with small arms fire, and grew at about 5:00 a.m. into major clashes that varied in intensity throughout the day in the Dobrinja, Nedžarići and Hrasno areas. One report quoted a "knowledgeable source" as saying that the BiH forces manning artillery on Igman Mountain, "really hammered" the Serbian stronghold of Lukavica, a former Yugoslav army base near the airport. Serbian artillery
responded with shellfire into BiH positions, including Butmir. It was reported that fierce fighting had been witnessed since the BiH forces launched an offensive 11 days ago to break the siege imposed by Serbian forces. The offensive was reportedly aimed at securing a highway running up the Bosna River Valley from Sarajevo to Visoko, a town about 10 miles to the north-west, where large stocks of food and ammunition were reportedly stored. BiH and Croatian forces loyal to the BiH government had reportedly been pushing in from Visoko and nearby Zenica in a bid to link up with those fighting from inside the city. 952/

815. Sarajevo radio said that at least two people (a 55 year-old man and an 11 year-old girl) were killed and 28 wounded when a shell exploded as residents ran for shelter in the Dobrinja apartment complex. 953/

816. One mortar round scored a direct hit at 10:00 a.m., on a used tire warehouse used by a rubber factory in the industrial area known as Alipašin Most near the railway station and main television tower, sending thick clouds of black smoke over the city. Fire trucks raced to the area but were repulsed by sustained artillery fire from the surrounding hills, and the fire burned unabated. 954/

817. Another shell was seen exploding adjacent to the Maršal Tito barracks which housed the BiH forces and the Ukrainian UNPROFOR forces. Tracer rounds from multiple rocket launchers were seen leaving BiH positions within the city perimeter towards the Serbian positions where the artillery shell was believed to have originated. 955/

818. A young man walking along a street in the Alipašin Most area suffered multiple gunshot wounds to his chest. Police pressed a passing journalist into taking the man to the French hospital, but he died in the car. 956/

819. A UN spokesman said that two French and one Egyptian officer of UNPROFOR and one local firefighter were seriously wounded in a mortar attack late in the day. Two other French soldiers were reported to have suffered less serious injuries. The attack occurred on a fuel depot at Camp Beaver, the former Yugoslav army barracks that served as the headquarters of the 400-member Egyptian army contingent of UNPROFOR. 957/

2. 2/9/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported as relatively quiet after fierce fighting and artillery duels on the western fringes as defence forces tried to break the siege. BiH infantry attacks were reported on Serbian positions in the Jewish Cemetery and the Grbavica housing complex. Heavy shelling was reported on the UNPROFOR headquarters at about 1:00 a.m. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Ilidža, Nedžarići and Kasindol Street; the western fringes of the city; the area close to the UN headquarters. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Witnesses said that the area around the UN compound was hit by shells at a rate of one a minute, lasting for about 40 minutes, forcing personnel to evacuate to the basement. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

820. The Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported from Pale that BiH forces began renewed infantry attacks against Serbian positions in the Jewish Cemetery in downtown Sarajevo, where the front line partitioned the city. The Jewish Cemetery neighbourhood and the nearby Grbavica housing complex in New Sarajevo were reported to be the targets of attacks on Tuesday night from Vrbanja, Hrasno and the Viktor Bubanj barracks, Tanjug said. The Serb military command told Tanjug that all attacks were repulsed without casualties. The situation calmed down after midnight Tuesday when also intermittent artillery provocations stopped at Ilidža, Nedžarići and Kasindol Street, it said.

821. The city was reported as relatively quiet after fierce fighting and artillery duels occurred in its western fringes as defence forces tried to break the Serb siege. At about 1:00 a.m., numerous shells were reported to have crashed close to the UN headquarters building, forcing personnel to evacuate to the basement. "We were down for about an hour or more", UNPROFOR spokesman Fred Eckhard said. "They seemed to be pretty close and around the perimeter. It is hard to see what they were aimed at, unless they wanted to keep us from sleeping". Witnesses said that the area around the compound was hit by shells at the rate of one a minute, lasting for about 40 minutes.

(b) Local reported events

822. In Belgrade, Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić, facing a no-confidence vote in the federal parliament, rejected accusations from his opponents that he had sold out Serbia at the London talks. In a question and answer appearance on Belgrade television, Panić said: "I will never relinquish an inch of Yugoslav territory".

823. Radovan Karadžić promised to place all large-calibre weapons in the Sarajevo area under immediate UN supervision. The declaration applied to all artillery, tanks and mortars with a calibre of 82 millimetre or larger. The agreement, reached in London, would allow UN observers to monitor each declared weapon, counting both the number of shells it fired and the number fired at it. No intervention was allowed. Observers in the city said the agreement had two notable weak points: 1) No terms were yet in place to monitor weapons on the BiH side; and 2) Large caches of undeclared Serbian weapons were believed to be hidden in the hills.

824. The Norwegian Foreign Minister Torvald Stoltenberg visited the city, met with BiH President Izetbegović and promised $20 million in aid.

825. The Washington Post interviewed a Serb militiaman named Dragiša in his bunker in the hills above Sarajevo. The bunker on the edge of the forest about 1,000 yards from Sarajevo had a clear view of the Sarajevo Holiday Inn. Dragiša was armed with a .50 calibre machine-gun, and others in the bunker were armed with automatic rifles. In the presence of the reporter, one militia man began firing from the bunker to the beat of a popular tune.
3. 3/9/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city had one of its quietest nights in weeks. Police in the city said that the only overnight incident had been a brief round of machine-gun fire in the suburbs in which seven people were wounded. 967/ Machine-gun and small arms fire was reported around the city. 968/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Seven people were wounded in the suburbs in a brief overnight round of machine-gun fire. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

826. An Italian relief mission crew comprised of Marco Betti, Cesare Buttaglieri, Guliano Velardi, and Marco Riglicaco were killed when their G-222 aircraft, carrying five tons of blankets to Sarajevo on a UN relief mission, was shot down by up to three ground to air missiles. 969/ "Four rescue helicopters which scrambled from the US ship Iwo Jima in the Adriatic reached the crash area and some time after that attracted small arms fire which caused them to terminate their mission", Peter Kessler, spokesman for UNHCR in Zagreb told Reuters. The aeroplane was the first aircraft to crash since an international airlift to Sarajevo, began in early July. The 1,000th aeroplane load of relief supplies landed in the city on Wednesday. 970/

827. UN airlifts were suspended. 971/

828. The city had one of its quietest nights in weeks. Police in the city said that the only overnight incident had been a brief round of machine-gun fire in the suburbs in which seven people were wounded. 972/ Machine-gun and small arms fire was reported around the city. 973/

(b) Local reported events

829. A Bosnian Muslim delegation which was to represent the Sarajevo government at the Geneva conference left for Geneva. The delegation included Hajrudin Somun, the republican adviser for foreign policy issues, and Kasim Trnka, a member of the experts' group. The delegation had announced that it would advocate the rejection of any negotiations as long as attacks of towns in BiH were underway and that there would be "no negotiations with war criminals". 974/

830. Marrack Goulding, the chief of UN peace-keeping operations, held a news conference to sharply criticize the attacks on UN soldiers. "It is an intolerable situation", Goulding said. "But the alternative is that we withdraw, and that means that the parties are left to fight it out". "If it goes on for too long, at too high a level of casualties, the countries that contributed troops will not be prepared to tolerate casualties above a certain level", he said. After the news conference, Goulding held talks with President Izetbegović. Goulding was also to travel to a Serbian artillery and logistics stronghold at a former Yugoslav army base in the western suburb of Lukavica for a meeting with Serbian leader Radovan Karadžić. Goulding said that he had
no indications that Karadžić had begun implementing the accord announced Wednesday to immediately begin concentrating heavy weapons in 11 locations around Sarajevo. Goulding cautioned against expecting a quick end to the shelling of Sarajevo, saying that UN military monitors could only observe the use of the weapons and that he believed Serbian forces had "a lot of stuff hidden on the hills that we do not know about yet". 975/

831. The BiH government and international aid agencies warned of the dangers of the coming winter. "If there is no political settlement, then the winter is going to be a disaster", said Izumi Nakamitsu, of UNHCR. "You are going to see starvation deaths and exposure deaths", said Peter Kessler, a UNHCR spokesman. Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kreševljaković said that he would recommend that the City Council create an agency to arrange for tens of thousands of children and elderly people to be evacuated voluntarily from the capital during the winter months. 976/

(c) International reported events

832. In Geneva, Britain's Lord Owen and UN special envoy Cyrus Vance, co-chairmen of the new peace process based in Geneva, met to set up a framework for tackling key aspects of the Yugoslav crisis. The actual conference, which followed the talks in London last week, started later in the day. 977/

4. 4/9/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery blasts and heavy machine-gun fire escalated sharply in the south-western sector of the city around the suburb of Ilidža, where Serbian and BiH strongholds were in close proximity. Sniper fire and heavy machine-gun fire increased in intensity throughout, and grey smoke could be seen from the hills. 978/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The south-western side of the city around the suburb of Ilidža. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire increased in intensity throughout the day. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

833. Artillery blasts and heavy machine-gun fire escalated sharply in the south-western sector of the city around the suburb of Ilidža, where Serbian and BiH strongholds were in close proximity. Sniper fire and heavy machine-gun fire increased in intensity throughout, and grey smoke could be seen from the hills. 979/

(b) Local reported events

834. Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg arrived in Belgrade for a one-day visit as part of his fact-finding mission and meets with Slobodan Milošević. 980/
(c) **International reported events**

835. The peace conference co-chairmen attended a UNHCR follow-up committee meeting. They met with the working group chairmen, ICRC, UNHCR, UN Under-Secretary-General Goulding and other groups from 4-6 September. From 4-16 September seven meetings of the Working Group on Confidence and Security Building Measures were held. 981/

5. 5/9/92 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Fifteen rounds of sniper fire was reportedly directed towards the UN supply warehouse. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

836. Sylvana Foa, Geneva spokeswoman for UNHCR said that 15 rounds of sniper fire had been directed towards the UN supply warehouse in the city. 982/

(b) **Local reported events**

837. Serbian militia controlling the main water reservoir outside of Sarajevo were reported to be reducing water supplies to the city in "another attack on civilians", according to the deputy commander of the BiH forces. 983/

6. 6/9/92 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Mortar shells destroyed a truck at a United Nations supply warehouse in the city, and UN officials said that it appeared the relief effort was being deliberately targeted. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** The depot area of a United Nations warehouse. Source(s): Agence France Press; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Seven mortars hit the depot area of a United Nations supply warehouse in the city and destroyed a truck. Source(s): Agence France Press; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified
Narrative of Events:

838. Mortar shells destroyed a truck at a United Nations supply warehouse in the city and UN officials said that it appeared the relief effort was being deliberately targeted. Seven mortars reportedly hit the depot area. Sylvana Foa, Geneva spokeswoman for UNHCR said: "Our people in Sarajevo say the centre appears to be the sole target of the first major shelling in the city in the last few days". Foa said that relief supplies in the city had dwindled rapidly after the two month-old airlift was suspended because of the shooting down of the Italian aeroplane.

(b) Local reported events

839. People carrying plastic containers and bottles filled the street looking for water after the water supply line was cut on early Saturday. Security forces said that there was no indication that Serb forces had sabotaged the water supplies. UNPROFOR experts were trying to find the break and repair it. People were also reportedly putting out bowls, buckets and cups on the streets to collect rain overnight.

840. Three days after the suspension of relief flights to Sarajevo, living conditions in the city were reported as getting steadily worse. The UNHCR reported that food reserves had been considerably depleted and that the city was without water and electricity. Of the 789 tons of food stocked in city depots Friday, only 112 tons remained, according to the UNHCR.

7. 7/9/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported between BiH and Serb forces, starting at 5:00 a.m. in the Hrasno and western Ilidža areas and persisted throughout the day. Areas in and around the city were also shelled. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area close to the UNPROFOR airport compound (one shell exploded inside the perimeter, about 200 yards from the rear of the terminal); the textile training school in the Dolac Malta area; the Klas-Šarko and Velepekar building; the area around Alipašin Most; an unidentified suburban street. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: An artillery shell exploded in a textile training school in the Dolac Malta area, near the city's main bakery, igniting a fire that forced police to divert traffic; a huge cloud of smoke appared over the city, originating from the Alipašin Most section; one person was killed and five wounded by a single tank shell that slammed into a suburban street. Source(s): United Press International; Government of BiH; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: The Washington Post reported that in the five months that Sarajevo had been under siege at least 1,954 people, mostly civilians, had been killed and another 25,000 had been wounded. The Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug said that two Serb soldiers were killed in the fighting. Local journalists said that one person was killed and five wounded by a single tank shell that slammed into a suburban street. BiH police said that a total of 13 people were killed in the 24 hours that ended at mid-day Monday. Health authorities reported a major increase in illnesses caused by the consumption of contaminated water, with the number of cases of gastroenteritis rising from 630 to 1,540 over the past seven days.

Source(s): Washington Post; Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

841. Fighting was reported between BiH and Serb forces, starting at 5:00 a.m. in the southern Hrasno and western Ilidža areas and persisted throughout the day.

842. Water supplies were restored to the city for three hours but were then cut off again when Muslim forces attacked Serb positions in Ilidža, UN officials said. "The water supply was cut by Serbs in Ilidža following Muslim action from Butmir", an official for the UNHCR stated. "Some 70 percent of the city is still without water", he said.

843. UNPROFOR was forced to suspend flights at Sarajevo airport because of the nearby fighting. Shells reportedly exploded close to the airport compound, and one exploded inside the perimeter, about 200 yards from the rear of the terminal. The clashes in Hrasno were reportedly sparked by an attempted incursion by Serbian forces, while the fighting in Ilidža marked the continuation of an ongoing offensive by BiH forces to break a supply corridor through Serbian lines.

844. An artillery shell exploded in a textile training school in the Dolac Malta area, near the city's main bakery, igniting a fire that forced police to divert traffic around the scene.

845. Also shelled were the Klas-Šarko and Velepekara buildings (the city's only providers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread), according to a report from the Government of BiH.

846. A huge cloud of smoke rose thousands of feet into the sky over the western half of the city. It appeared to be coming from a section called Alipašin Most, an industrial area near the UN headquarters and about a kilometre north of the airport.

(b) Local reported events

847. In Belgrade, the federal government of the rump Yugoslavia, strengthened by its defeat of a no-confidence motion from hard-liners and supporters of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, announced a team to go to Geneva which did not include the Serbian leader's supporters.

848. Local media in Sarajevo quoted the chief of the local Croat militia as saying that the BiH forces had until Monday to withdraw from Croatian-held territory. But an official for the Bosnian Croat army in Mostar, said that this applied only to the Stup area where relations deteriorated after Muslim forces moved into the Croat stronghold.
849. Despite renewed violence, Serbian forces controlling the city's main reservoir at Bacevo, on the western side of Ilidža, began restoring water supplies two days after shutting off the pumping operations. Water reportedly returned to the UNPROFOR headquarters and the western Dobrinja area. The restart of pumping operations came a day after a meeting between Serbian and BiH utility technicians brokered by UNPROFOR. But supplies appeared to have been restored to only a few areas of the city. The city's main hospital was reportedly without water. 1001/

(c) International reported events

850. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said that he believed the United Nations could resume relief flights to Sarajevo despite the crash of the Italian aid aeroplane last week. The Secretary-General said in Moscow: "I believe we are still able to send humanitarian assistance through Sarajevo airport, and furthermore we are using roads so that we can bring humanitarian assistance to the city". 1002/

851. A communique from the International Conference in Geneva called on the warring factions in BiH to surrender their heavy weapons to UN personnel by 12 September. 1003/

852. Experts from Serbia engaged in the group Conference on Yugoslavia announced that their work in those bodies had been terminated because the Yugoslav government had named its own representatives. The experts who had been participating were: Dr. Kosta Mihajlović, Dr. Smilja Avramov, Dr. Oskar Kovač, Dr. Ratko Marković, Dr. Milenko Kreho, Dr. Vladan Kutlešić, Dr. Dragana Ignjatović, and Mira Stavljanin. 1004/

8. 8/9/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fierce battles were fought with mortars and tanks around the airport overnight, but the fighting died down by dawn. The city was reported quiet by morning, with some sniper fire. Some shelling was reported in the city later in the day. At 7:40 p.m., a UN convoy drove into cross fire between BiH and Serbian forces, resulting in UNPROFOR casualties. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Associated Press; Washington Post; New York Times; UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo airport (overnight); a market opposite the Sarajevo television station. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: A mortar round struck a market opposite the Sarajevo television station, killing four people and wounding about 10. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was heard across the city during the morning hours. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Two French UN soldiers, Sergeant Frederic Vaudet and Corporal Eric Marot, were killed, and at least three were wounded by heavy machine-gun fire near the airport that lasted for at least five minutes. A mortar round struck a market opposite the Sarajevo television station, killing four people and wounding about 10. Officials said that by 4:00 p.m., nine people had been killed and 69 wounded in Sarajevo. 1005/ Source(s): Associated Press; New York Times; Washington Post; UNPROFOR Press Release; Reuters; Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

853. BiH and Serb forces fought fierce battles with mortars and tanks around Sarajevo's airport overnight but the fighting had died down by dawn. The city was largely quiet later in the morning, although sniper fire was heard across the city. 1006/

854. UN Officials reported that at 7:40 p.m., two French UN soldiers, Sergeant Frederic Vaudet and Corporal Eric Marot, who were part of a UN convoy near Sarajevo airport, had been killed, and at least three others were wounded by heavy machine-gun fire that lasted for at least five minutes. A UN report on the incident later confirmed that the convoy mistakenly drove into cross fire between Serbian and BiH forces. 1007/ SRNA, the Bosnian Serb news agency, said Serb forces had intercepted an order by the BiH command ordering its units to attack the convoy. The latest deaths brought to four the total number of "blue helmet" peacekeepers killed in Sarajevo. At least 48 others had been wounded. 1008/

855. A mortar round struck a market opposite the Sarajevo television station, killing four people and wounding about 10, witnesses said. 1009/

(b) Local reported events

856. The United Nations said there would be renewed contacts with the warring factions aimed at restoring water supplies to the city. The problem appeared to be power supplies to a pumping station near the battle lines outside the city. Engineers reportedly wanted guarantees that they would not be attacked if they attempted repairs. The UN said that it had drawn up a two week plan to restore electricity and water supplies gradually, but that there had not yet been an agreement among the warring factions. 1010/

857. It was reported that late in the day, officials managed to restore electricity to about 50% of the city, much of which had been without power for just over a month. 1011/

858. The five day-old suspension of the UN humanitarian relief airlift into Sarajevo had exhausted aid stocks, but the city was in no danger of running out of food, a UN official said. "It is not a catastrophe. It is a short-term shortfall and I believe that the people of Sarajevo have set aside a little stock in case something like this happens", said Dag Espeland, the UNHCR Logistics Chief in Sarajevo. Espeland said that UNHCR planned an expansion in truck convoys before the end of the week that could make up all but 20 tons of the 200 tons of food and medicines that had been provided each day by the international airlift. Espeland and local relief officials said that food supplies were not endangered by the UN airlift suspension, with the head of one state-run soup kitchen saying he had at least 10 days of reserves in stock. "We are not in a panic at all", said Hamid Pliska, the manager of the kitchen feeding 1,100 adults and children a day in the Bistrik neighbourhood of the old city. 1012/

859. Special emergency flights, which were supposed to fly in bottled oxygen badly needed in Sarajevo hospitals, were canceled. 1013/
9.  9/9/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Overnight shelling was reported in the suburbs near the old part of the city. Street fighting was reported in Stup.

*Source(s):* Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Breka and Bjelave suburbs (overnight); the Dolac Malta district. *Source(s):* Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

860. Sarajevo radio reported overnight shelling in the Breka and Bjelave suburbs near the old part of the city. Serb and Muslim forces fought with artillery in the Dolac Malta district. Street fighting was reported in Stup, a Croat-controlled suburb to the west of the city. 1014/

(b) Local reported events

861. The Egyptian general in charge of the UN peace mission in Sarajevo, Brigadeer General Hussein Abdel Razek, blamed BiH government militiamen for Tuesday's killing of two French soldiers. The government forces reportedly violated a cease-fire and opened fire in good light at short range on the convoy. 1015/ Another UN official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the point of attack and the direction from which the fire came left no doubt that it came from BiH-controlled territory adjacent to the airport runway. "The fire came from the left", he said. "Impossible that it could have come from the Serbs". The UN source described the attackers as "Bosnian gangs . . . local warlords not under the control of anybody. "It is my personal hypothesis that there was a political motivation", said the source. "The Bosnians were trying to prove that humanitarian aid to Sarajevo is not possible, and that the only answer to the conflict is a western military intervention against the Serbs". 1016/

(c) International reported events

862. The UN Security Council condemned aggression against UN personnel in Sarajevo and called upon Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to issue a report on the two recent attacks in the city. Boutros-Ghali said that he would issue the report after hearing from Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance, who were scheduled to visit the city on Thursday. 1017/

863. The peace conference co-chairmen met with UNPROFOR Commander General Namibl and the European observers, as well as with Croatian President Tudjman. 1018/ On 9-12 September it was reported that the co-chairmen visited Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade. Mr. Vance also visited Ljubljana en route to Geneva. 1019/
10. 10/9/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** There were clashes reported overnight in the early morning and around the city. Up to 200 shells reportedly fell on the Dobrinja district. Fierce fighting was reported in the city and Serb gunners sporadically shelled the city. Vance and Owen's arrival in the city coincided with fierce fighting in several areas of the city, with military sources reporting a major advance by BiH forces into the Serb-held stronghold of Nedžarići. The BiH government said that its troops attacked Serbian forces when they tried to move heavy weapons from a hill overlooking the downtown to avoid detection by UN monitors. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** An apartment block in Dobrinja; the roof of the Sarajevo television station. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Shelling reportedly left an apartment block ablaze and two killed and 16 wounded in Dobrinja. Up to 200 tank shells reportedly fell on the district. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Two people were killed and 16 wounded in shelling attacks on Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

864. There were clashes reported overnight and in the early morning around the city. Sarajevo radio said that fierce shelling left an apartment block ablaze in Dobrinja. Local journalists said that two people were killed and 16 wounded in the attacks on Dobrinja. Residents said that up to 200 tank shells fell on the district. 1020/

865. Vance and Owen's arrival in Sarajevo coincided with fierce fighting in several areas of the city, with military sources reporting a major advance by BiH forces into the Serb-held stronghold of Nedžarići. The sources said that the advance was marked by the raising of the Republic flag on a building in the suburb, a strategic point from which Serb fighters had been thwarting BiH attempts to break through their siege. 1021/

866. Serbian gunners persisted in sporadic shelling of the city and fired mortar rounds into the roof of the Sarajevo television building. 1022/

867. The BiH government said its troops attacked Serbian forces when they tried to move heavy weapons from a hill overlooking the downtown to the stronghold of Pale to avoid detection by UN military monitors. 1023/

(b) Local reported events

868. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen travelled to Sarajevo in an armoured convoy from Split earlier in the day. They arrived at the Presidency Building in downtown Sarajevo at 3:00 p.m. Heavy shelling and machine-gun fire could be heard in the western sectors of the city as Vance and Owen arrived. 1024/ After meeting with President Izetbegović, they travelled by UN armoured car convoy to the Serb-held suburb of Lukavica for talks with Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. 1025/
869. The leaders of the warring factions agreed to attend "continuous" talks next week in Geneva on ending the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the two international mediators said. Serbian leader Radovan Karadžić also agreed to consider a plan to place Sarajevo's water and electricity supplies under UN protection, the mediators said. UN envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community mediator David Owen, the co-chairmen of the Geneva peace conference, made the announcements at the end of a four-hour visit to the city. Vance said that "the most important" achievement of the visit was Izetbegović's agreement to lead a BiH delegation to peace talks with Karadžić and Croatian Democratic Union chief Mate Boban. The talks were set to open in Geneva on 18 September. 1026/

(c) International reported events

870. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced plans for an enlarged peace-keeping operation in Sarajevo made up of mainly Western Europeans. 1027/

871. The Bush Administration revealed that Serbian warplanes had been shadowing Western relief flights to Sarajevo, using them as cover for military action. 1028/

11. 11/9/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported in the early morning near the city centre, accompanied by sniper fire. Attacks were also reported in the Breka area, as well as fighting in the Old Town. Shellfire and small arms exchanges were reported from several fringe areas of the city, including the western suburbs of Nedžarići and Iliđa. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Hotel Bristol (early morning); an unidentified candy factory. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: In the early morning, several artillery rounds hit the already devastated Hotel Bristol near the city centre, setting it ablaze; shelling set a candy factory ablaze. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Alleged Serbian snipers entrenched on southern hillsides, including in the Jewish cemetery opposite the downtown area, fired repeated shots at pedestrians and cars. Snipers shot at civilians attending a cocktail party at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn to commemorate a Jewish anniversary. The snipers fired from the city's old Jewish cemetery where large gravestones had been uprooted to be used as cover. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Washington Post.

Casualties: Two people were killed in Serb attacks in the Breka district and four were wounded in fighting in the Hrid Old Town part of the city. 1029/ It was reported by the BiH Health Ministry that during the 24 hour period ending at 1:00 p.m., 12 people were killed and 58 others injured in Sarajevo. 1030/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Washington Post.
Narrative of Events:

872. In the early morning, several artillery rounds hit the already devastated Hotel Bristol near the city centre, setting it ablaze. Shelling also set a candy factory ablaze. Serbian snipers entrenched on southern hillsides, including in the Jewish cemetery opposite the downtown area, fired repeated shots at pedestrians and cars. 1031/

873. Snipers shot at civilians attending a cocktail party at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn to commemorate a Jewish anniversary. The snipers fired from the city's old Jewish cemetery where large gravestones had been uprooted to be used as cover. 1032/

874. Shellfire and small arms exchanges were heard from several fringe areas of the city, including the western suburbs of Nedžarići and Ilidža which had witnessed fierce fighting over the past several days. Mustafa Hajrulahović, the commander of the BiH forces, was quoted in a newspaper interview as saying that in some locations, his units were within 700 yards of punching through Serbian lines. "On all parts of Sarajevo's battle lines, we are on offensive actions", the former Yugoslav army officer told the daily Oslobodjenje newspaper. 1033/

(b) Local reported events

875. Water supplies were restored to about 50% of the city. Colonel Viktor Bezrouchenko, the Ukrainian army UNPROFOR Chief of Staff, said that a UN-accompanied team of local technicians went out in the morning to the reservoir at Bacevo, about five miles from the city centre to do the repairs. 1034/

(c) International reported events

876. US officials said that Serbian air-support for ground forces might necessitate the installation of a no-fly zone. 1035/

12. 12/9/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city passed one of its quietest nights (overnight) for months with only sporadic mortar and gunfire overnight, local radio said. At night, the city suffered heavy shelling, mortar and heavy machine-gun fire. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area directly in front of the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Several fires were reported in the south-western sectors of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported that in a 24 hour period between Friday night and Saturday, two people were killed and six were injured in Sarajevo. 1036/ Medical officials reported the first case of abdominal typhus in Sarajevo, an apparent result of people being crowded together in unsanitary conditions. 1037/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

877. The city passed one of its quietest nights for months with only sporadic mortar and gunfire overnight, local radio said. Close-range fighting was reported in the Pero Kosorić district. But there was no word of any clashes in the southern and western suburbs. Mortar fire hit across the city for a half an hour after dawn but journalists said it was impossible to tell which side was firing because of the mist. 1038/

878. Mortar, sniper and automatic weapons fire continued in Sarajevo as night fell but it was relatively light and random. 1039/

879. At night, the city suffered heavy shelling, mortar and heavy machine-gun fire. One shell exploded directly in front of the Holiday Inn. Flashes of artillery fire could be seen from surrounding hills and several fires were visible in the south-western sectors of the city. 1040/

(b) Local reported events

880. Serbian forces surrounding Sarajevo began placing heavy weapons under UN observation. Cedric Thornberry, a senior official in the UN Protection Force, said Serb forces had concentrated artillery batteries and other heavy weapons in 11 locations and that three to six monitors had been placed in each location. 1041/ The BiH forces had assembled some of their artillery for monitoring as well. "We are inspecting those in the same way we are the Serb side", Thornberry said. 1042/

881. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić stated that he hoped the monitoring of heavy weapons would lead to a permanent cease-fire. "We are willing to stop the fighting now and stay where we are and wait for a political solution, which should be reached very soon in Geneva", he said. He confirmed that he would himself lead the Bosnian Serb delegation to the Geneva peace talks on Friday. Karadžić also said that even if his forces were provoked they would not fire back. "If it is just a few shells we shall not respond, only if we come under heavy attack from the Muslims". 1043/

13. 13/9/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The UN monitoring of heavy weapons appeared to have an effect, with the city reportedly enjoying its second consecutive quiet night. It remained to be seen, however, whether this was due to restraint by Serb gunners or to the autumn mist concealing the city from the hills. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Downtown Sarajevo; Dobrinja housing complex; Mojmilo hill; Alipašino Polje. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Three were wounded by mortar fire in Alipašino Polje. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three children were wounded by mortar fire in Alipašino Polje. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date, 2,123 people had been killed, 12,789 had been heavily wounded, 15,050 had been lightly wounded and 6,654 were reported missing in Sarajevo. 1044/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of
Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

882. Sarajevo radio said that Serbian forces hit downtown Sarajevo with mortar and tank fire. It reported that Serbs had attacked the centre of Sarajevo from their hilltop positions including Trebević hill, firing from tanks, mortars and using anti-aircraft guns. There were also reported infantry clashes on the outskirts of the city, in Žlatište and the Jewish cemetery. The radio accused Serbian forces of firing from Serb-held Lukavica military base on the Dobrinja housing complex and from Nedžarići suburb on Mojmilo hill.

883. The UN monitoring of heavy weapons appeared to have an effect, with the city reportedly enjoying its second consecutive quiet night. It remained to be seen, however, whether this was due to restraint by Serb gunners or to the autumn mist concealing the city from the hills. Dobrinja was again under fire, but mainly by mortars, which were not included in the monitoring agreement.

884. Three children were wounded by mortar bombs in the Alipašino Polje suburb before midnight and there was light fire in the old city during the night.

(b) Local reported events

885. The Presidency of BiH sent a message to the peace talk co-chairmen, saying that aggression against BiH had continued, despite the deadline established by the London Conference, and that under such circumstances negotiations in Geneva or any other location would be of no use because the Presidency was not prepared to take part in them.

886. Late in the day, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić threatened to pull out of the coming peace talks in Geneva if the West imposed a "no-fly zone" over all of BiH. "To impose a blanket on flights across the whole territory is a direct involvement in the strategic balance in Bosnian and Hercegovina and is not justified by the pretext of securing the delivery of humanitarian aid", Karadžić said. European Community foreign ministers meeting in Britain confirmed that they intended to press the United Nations to mandate a no-fly zone.

887. UNPROFOR commander General Hussein Abdel Razek told a news conference that because of persisting fighting around Sarajevo airport, he did not believe the UN-supervised airlift of food and medicines should be restarted despite a 10 day old suspension. "I wish it could be resumed because we need it", he said. "But, frankly up until now, the situation is not safe enough to recommend that the airlift be resumed". Larry Hollingsworth, the UNHCR representative in Sarajevo said that it was imperative that the operation be restarted. The agency's main warehouse was empty, and an 18 truck convoy (among the largest yet mounted), arrived from Split with only about 150 tons of aid supplies, he said. "We still need it [the airlift]. We need a minimum of 180 tons per day and we're not bringing it in", Hollingsworth said.

888. UNPROFOR commander General Hussein Abdel Razek updated the results of the Saturday deadline for Serbian forces to put their heavy weaponry under UN supervision in Sarajevo and three other towns by noon Saturday. He said the supervision had started in Sarajevo, but that Serbian forces had failed to meet the deadline in Goražde, Bihać and Jajce. He said that in Sarajevo, UN observer teams had been deployed to monitor the Serbians' heavy weaponry in 10
of 11 locations, with the final position to be manned by the end of the day. He said that because UNPROFOR had only 40 trained military observers, he was having to use ordinary infantry soldiers to watch the weaponry. He also reiterated that he had insufficient means to confirm assurances he received Saturday from Serbian leader Radovan Karadžić that all Serbian heavy armaments had been collected in the 11 "concentration areas". Razek conceded that Serbian gunners under UN observation had still fired their weapons on civilian areas of Sarajevo. 1052/

889. French Lieutenant Colonel Armil Davout, deputy UNPROFOR commander, said that Serbian shellfire late Saturday was in response to an ongoing BiH attack against the Serb-held western suburb of Lukavica, on the western boundary of the airport. "The Serbs have no infantry to make a counter-attack. The only means for them is to shell. They shell into the town. That is unacceptable. They also shell the [Bosnian] soldiers", he said. Davout said that the BiH attack on Lukavica was still continuing. 1053/

14. 14/9/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The BiH Presidency announced that it would not go to next Friday's peace talks in Geneva because Serb forces had not lived up to their side of agreements made last week. The announcement, reported on Sarajevo radio, was met by a sharp upsurge of mid-morning firing which shattered a two-day lull in the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The Old Town; the City centre; the area near the Holiday Inn; the area near the UN headquarters; the "French" Hospital; the school yard at the Children's Embassy; the Hrasno district; the Dolac Malta apartment block neighbourhood on the northern side of the Miljacka river; the Marijin Dvor neighbourhood, including the Parliament building, government headquarters and two fire-gutted office towers. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Daylong salvoes of tank, cannon, mortar and rocket fire was reported, some of which set blazes less than 200 metres from the UN headquarters. At least 20 people were reported killed and wounded in the first two hours of the attacks which began at 10:00 a.m.; a BiH military source said Serbs hit the Hrasno neighbourhood with more than 60 shells. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: It was reported that the day's fighting resulted in at least 39 dead and more than 100 wounded. 1054/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 13 people were killed and 82 injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1055/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

890. Thousands of residents strolling to work and outside their homes enjoying the sunshine were caught by intense, daylong salvoes of tank, cannon, mortar and rocket fire, some of which set blazes in homes less than 200 metres from the UN headquarters. The attacks began at around 10:00 a.m.. At least 20 people were reported killed and 60 wounded in two hours. Mortar bombs were reported to have hit the old city, the city centre, and near the Holiday Inn. 1056/ Dr. Edo Jaganjac of the French Hospital said that the facility was
hit by anti-aircraft fire. A worker at the Children's Embassy, a refuge for displaced children in the city centre, said that a mortar bomb had landed in the school yard in front of it.

891. The shelling coincided with daylong clashes around the city and in its suburbs between Serb and BiH soldiers. The suburbs of Hrasno, Breka and Bjelava were also under fire, as was the Dobrinja area south-west of the city near the airport. An apartment complex at Pero Kosorić Square in Hrasno was set on fire.

892. A BiH military source said that Serbs had launched a tank-backed ground assault from their stronghold in the Grbavica section across the front into the BiH-held Hrasno neighbourhood after hitting it with more than 60 shells. A BiH military statement accused Serbian forces of launching an infantry attack on Hrasno. The statement said that Serbian tanks and anti-aircraft weapons based on Oreska Street blasted shellfire into BiH lines in Hrasno. One reporter observed the tank fire on Hrasno and into the Dolac Malta apartment block neighbourhood on the northern side of the Miljacka river.

893. The BiH statement said that Serb forces entrenched in the Jewish cemetery in the old city fired into the Marijin Dvor neighbourhood, hitting the Parliament building, government headquarters and two fire-gutted office towers. BiH military sources also said that Serb attackers were firing with heavy 82 millimetre mortars, automatic weapons and anti-aircraft cannon on many parts of the city.

894. Commenting on the above attacks, French Colonel Armel Davout, deputy UNPROFOR commander in the Sarajevo sector told a news conference that "I am obliged to say that all of the (Serbian) weapons are not concentrated". Davout said that UN military monitors reported firing into Sarajevo from Serbian heavy weapons that were deployed outside the so-called UN observed "concentration areas" and inside seven of the 11 zones.

895. At Tilava, a mountainous area south of Sarajevo, at least a dozen 122 millimetre Serbian artillery guns were employed in the field. The Serbian Commander, Captain Savo Simić, was observed by three United Nations officials but fired one volley in what he said was a response to an attack by BiH Government forces in the suburb of Ilidža.

896. The five-member BiH Presidency said that the western Sarajevo community of Doglodi, predominantly Croatian, had been overrun by Serbian tanks and that a large but unspecified number of persons had been killed and injured in what it termed a "massacre".

(b) Local reported events

897. The BiH Presidency announced that it would not go to next Friday's peace talks in Geneva because Serb forces had not lived up to their side of agreements made last week. The announcement, reported on Sarajevo radio, was met by a sharp upsurge of mid-morning firing which shattered a two-day lull in the city. The radio report said: "The Presidency of Bosnia-Hercegovina announces it will not go to Geneva because Karadžić did not live up to conditions".
(c) International reported events

898. In Geneva, a UN spokesman said Cyrus Vance, co-chairman of the Yugoslav peace talks, was shocked over the withdrawal of the BiH government from the negotiations and said that the meeting would go ahead. 1069/

899. Late in the day, the United Nations Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 776, authorizing an expanded peace-keeping force in BiH to protect convoys of food and medicine for civilians. The vote was 12 to zero with China, India and Zimbabwe sustaining on the resolution allowing the UN to increase the 1,500 troops in Sarajevo to as many as 7,500 deployed (with approximately 6,000 troops from NATO countries) throughout BiH. 1070/ China reportedly opposed an additional US-sponsored clause to allow UNPROFOR to use force. 1071/

15. 15/9/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as relatively calm in the early hours. Serb forces reportedly shelled Stup and attacked government positions near the airport. A column of Serb tanks reportedly razed houses in Azići. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Stup area; government positions around the airport; civilian targets in downtown Sarajevo. Source(s): Washington Post.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In 24 hours it was reported that nearly 30 Sarajevo residents had been killed and 170 wounded by Serb tank and artillery fire. 1072/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 28 people were killed and 170 were injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1073/ Source(s): Washington Post; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

900. The city was reported as relatively calm in the early hours. 1074/

901. Sarajevo radio said that Serb forces shelled the previously peaceful Croat dominated Stup suburb in apparent retaliation for attempts by Muslim gunmen to disarm local Serbs.

902. Using tank units that had been hidden from UN weapons monitors, Serb militia forces reportedly attacked BiH government positions near Sarajevo airport. A column of 10 Serb tanks razed houses in the government-held western suburb of Azići, while another 10 tanks in the Serb-controlled district south-west of the city pounded government positions around the airport as well as civilian targets in downtown Sarajevo. 1075/

(b) Local reported events

903. There were varying accounts of what had transpired in Sarajevo on Monday. Some sources said the BiH forces started the exchange by firing several shells at Serbian positions in the hills from howitzers hidden in basement ramps of the Olympic Stadium, only a few hundred metres from the
city's northern front. Another theory was that the shelling, accompanied by a tank-backed Serbian assault across a key front on the city's southern flank, was part of a greater design to cut the city in two and weaken BiH control. Sources in the city said that the suddenness of the shelling, accompanied by almost simultaneous air strikes to the north by aeroplanes from a Yugoslav Federal Air Force base in Banja Luka, pointed to a coordinated offensive. 1076/

(c) **International reported events**

904. Unnamed sources said that BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić would participate in the peace talks with Serbian and Croatian representatives in Geneva on 18 September. 1077/

16. **16/9/92 (Wednesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serb tanks were reportedly again in action against Stup while mortar fire also hit the Old Town and the Ciglana district. Muslim-held suburbs were reportedly hit by sporadic mortar fire at night. Muslim civilians were reportedly driven from their homes near Mt. Romanija. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Muslim suburbs (overnight); the Old Town and the Ciglana district; Stup. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 16 people were killed and 63 were injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1078/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

905. Sarajevo radio said that the Muslim suburbs were hit by sporadic mortar fire during the night. 1079/

906. Sarajevo radio said that mortar fire hit the Old Town and the Ciglana district, and Serb tanks had again been in action against the western suburb of Stup. 1080/

(c) **Local reported events**

907. The Assembly of the Serb Republic at a session in Bijeljina adopted a statement urging the authorities in Sarajevo to declare a cease-fire before the opening of the Geneva Conference on 18 September. The statement, carried by SRNA, a Bosnian Serb news agency, said that Serb forces would also be ordered to cease fire before the opening of the conference. 1081/

908. BiH reports said that Muslims were being driven from their homes around Mount Romanija near Sarajevo in fresh "ethnic cleansing" by Serbs. 1082/
909. A UNHCR official said that food for the city's population had dwindled to a three day's supply, consisting mainly of rice and flour. There was a serious shortage of protein in the form of canned meat, fish, powdered eggs and milk, he added. 1083/

910. A water department official said that a mortar bomb on Monday fractured the main water pipe supplying the city. "There's no water at all", a worker at the Old Town hospital said. "We're walking around with buckets trying to find some". 1084/

911. About 120 Jews, mainly women and children, left the city at dawn en route to Split, a spokesman for the Jewish community said. The spokesman said that everyone who was unlikely to survive the upcoming winter and the worsening conditions in Sarajevo were being evacuated. 1085/

912. A UNHCR issued report stated that the Italian relief aeroplane that crashed in BiH was downed by a missile, but did not say who fired the missile. 1086/

(c) International reported events

913. The peace conference co-chairmen met separately with Macedonian Minister for Internal Affairs, Frokovski and Ibrahim Rugova, leader of Kosovo Albanians. 1087/

17. 17/9/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and street fighting in the city lasted until midnight in what Sarajevo radio called Sarajevo's "worst day of hell". Artillery pounded the central Stari Grad and Centar districts, the Novo Sarajevo area, Novi Grad, Dobrinja and Vogošća to the north. 1088/ More than 400 shells were fired by 4:00 p.m.. Source(s): Reuters; Reuters (18/9/92 report).

Targets Hit: Apartment buildings and the television station in Alipašino Polje; UNPROFOR headquarters in Alipašino Polje (the Engineering building of the BiH Telecommunications Department); the Old Town; Hrasno; Mojmilo; the Alipašino Polje area; the Stup area; Dogladi; the Central Stari Grad and Centar Districts; the Novo Sarajevo area; Novi Grad; Dobrinja; and Vogošća. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: The UNPROFOR mission narrowly escaped casualties when two shells fired by unknown sources hit its headquarters in Alipašino Polje. A 30 millimetre anti-aircraft round exploded at about 11:00 a.m. in an empty room on the third floor of the Engineering building of the BiH Telecommunications Department. A 122 millimetre artillery round then crashed through the front of the largely glass building, exited through a fourth-floor rear window, and bounced down a fire escape and rolled into a parking lot without exploding. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Health Ministry reported that during the 24 hour period beginning at 1:00 p.m. Wednesday, at least nine people were killed and 60 others injured in Sarajevo. 1089/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

914. Fierce fighting was reported in Sarajevo on the eve of new peace talks and Serbian gunners reportedly shelled the city with heavy weapons hidden from UN scrutiny, UN officials and news reports said. According to reports, an artillery duel raged in downtown Sarajevo as the BiH delegation left for renewed peace talks in Geneva. The delegation, headed by BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžic, went overland to Split to catch a flight to Geneva. Their departure was delayed by pre-dawn shelling.

915. Infantry clashes and shelling commenced at about 6 a.m. in several neighbourhoods less than a mile from the downtown and in western suburbs that had been the focal point of an attempted advance by tank-backed Serbian forces. Grey clouds of dust and smoke from burning buildings could be seen over the Hrasno, Alipašino Polje and Nedžarići areas amid shellfire. It was reported that Serb shells scored direct hits on apartment buildings and the television station in Alipašino Polje.

916. The UNPROFOR Mission narrowly escaped casualties when two shells fired by unknown sources hit its headquarters in the western suburb of Alipašino Polje. A 30 millimetre anti-aircraft round exploded at about 11:00 a.m. in an empty room on the third floor of the Engineering building of the BiH Telecommunications Department, said New Zealand Colonel Richard Grey. A 122 millimetre artillery round then crashed through the front of the largely glass building, exited a fourth-floor rear window, bounced down a fire escape and rolled into a parking lot without exploding, said Grey. "There was a good chance there could have been some casualties had it exploded", said Grey, who noted that it was the fifth time a large calibre round had hit the building without detonating.

917. Sarajevo radio said that Serbian multiple-launch rockets and mortar rounds burst on the fringes of the old city, as well as in Hrasno, Mojmilo and Alipašino Polje.

918. UN sources also said that Serbian tanks hidden from UN monitoring, fired rounds at targets in Sarajevo's western, predominantly Croatian suburbs of Stup and Dogladi to support a Serbian armour-backed thrust. It was reported that the advance, which began Monday under the diversionary cover of a nine-hour-long bombardment of Sarajevo, appeared designed to reclaim land recently lost to BiH forces who were intent to break the Serbian siege of the city.

919. It was also reported that BiH defenders launched fresh attacks to try to break out toward Ilidža to the south-west.

920. Shelling and street fighting in the city lasted until midnight in what Sarajevo radio called Sarajevo's "worst day of hell". Artillery pounded the central Stari Grad and Centar districts, the Novo Sarajevo area, Novi Grad, Dobrinja and Vogošća to the north.

(b) Local reported events

921. In a statement released early in the day, BiH President Alija Izetbegović reversed the Presidency's decision on Monday to pull out of the Geneva talks. He said the decision had been "carefully reconsidered" and that it had been decided it would be "more useful" to go. He warned, however, that although the delegation would be present in Geneva, it would not participate in the talks unless the Serbian side honoured commitments it made at the London conference on Yugoslavia last week.
922. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić announced that the composition of
the Serb delegation to the Geneva Conference would be top level, including:
himself, Presidency member Dr. Nikola Koljević, Assembly Chairman Momčilo
Krajišnik, and Foreign Minister Dr. Aleksa Buha. 1099/

18. 18/9/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian forces launched a new thrust against BiH
lines on the northern fringe of Sarajevo less than an hour before the opening
of the new round of peace talks in Geneva. The Serbian attack out of the
Vogošća area coincided with Serbian shellfire into the city and a fifth day of
fierce battles on the city's western edge, which had been shrouded by black
smoke from a huge fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Vogošća area; the Kobilja Glava residential neighbourhood
bordering Vogošća; the Bistrik area of the old city; the Čengić Vila
residential area (shells struck a plastic newspaper kiosk and a warehouse);
the northern district of Buča Potok; the Alipašino Polje district. Source(s):
United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Residents of Kobilja Glava and the Bistrik district of
the old city said that many people had taken to their basements and one man
(Jamel Bečirević, a businessman living in Bistrik), said that several people
had been injured from shells originating from Trebević; in the Čengić Vila
residential area, shelling set a plastic kiosk aflame and an artillery round
hit a warehouse. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: It was reported that at least three people were killed and 10
wounded in artillery attacks in the northern district of Buča Potok while six
people were wounded in a bombardment of the Alipašino Polje district late in
the day. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 25 people were killed
and 185 were wounded in Sarajevo on this date. 1100/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH
Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

923. Serbian forces launched a new thrust against BiH lines on the northern
fringe of Sarajevo less than an hour before the opening of the new round of
peace talks in Geneva. The Serbian attack out of the Vogošća area coincided
with Serbian shellfire into the city and a fifth day of fierce battles on the
city's western edge, which had been shrouded by black smoke from a huge fire.
Sarajevo radio said that Serbian forces opened the attack at Vogošća at about
9:20 a.m., only 40 minutes before the scheduled start of the Geneva peace
conference. The attack was confirmed by UNPROFOR sources who added that the
Serbs continued to use heavy weapons retained outside 11 UN monitored sites.
The Serbian forces holding most of Vogošća reportedly launched their latest
attack under the cover of heavy fire from tanks, howitzers and mortars,
Sarajevo radio said. It said the thrust was directed against fringe areas of
the northern suburb captured in recent weeks by BiH troops fighting to break
the Serbian siege. In confirming the attack, UN sources said Serbian gunners
also unleashed artillery rounds into Kobilja Glava, a residential
neighbourhood bordering Vogošća and the Muslim-dominated old city. Residents
of Kobilja Glava and the Bistrik district of the old city contacted by
telephone said that many people had taken to their basements. "We are under
fire", said Jamel Bečirević, a businessman living in Bistrik. "Several people
have been injured". He said that much of the shelling came from Serbian guns deployed at Trebević, a hilltop where the bobsled run built for the 1984 Olympics is located. Serbian anti-aircraft shells were reported to have blasted into the Ćengić Vila residential area, setting a plastic newspaper kiosk aflame, and an artillery round slammed into a warehouse. 1101/

924. Fighting, meanwhile, persisted for a fifth day across the city's western suburbs of Ilidža, Stup, Oteš, and Dogladi. The UN said that both sides exchanged artillery fire but that more than 50% of the shelling since 7:00 a.m. was from Serbian heavy weapons hidden from UN monitoring. 1102/

925. It was reported that at least three people were killed and 10 wounded in artillery attacks in the northern district of Buča Potok, while six people were wounded in a bombardment of the Alipašino Polje district late in the day. 1103/

(b) International reported events

926. Leaders of the warring Yugoslav factions refused to sit at the same tables as officials began a new round of internationally mediated peace talks that were overshadowed by resumed shelling in Sarajevo. Speaking in advance of the fresh round of peace negotiations, UN envoy Cyrus Vance expressed little optimism that the bargaining could rapidly end the fighting. Other UN officials also cautioned against too much optimism. "Given the fact they won't even talk directly to each other, there doesn't seem a lot of hope", a senior UN negotiator who requested anonymity said before the meetings opened. "It looks like the Afghan talks all over again". 1104/ BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić told reporters that Karadžić and his team were "war criminals". 1105/

927. Radovan Karadžić said at a press conference after his first meeting with the co-chairmen that "the Muslims have the unrealistic objective of having all of Bosnia-Hercegovina to themselves", and proposed instead that BiH be partitioned into a "confederation" of three states, one for Serbs, one for Croats, and one for Muslims. 1106/

928. The United States accused Serbs of escalating their "unjustified" shelling of the city and stated that an effort to impose United Nations control of heavy weapons had failed. But State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said that there was no reason to abandon the UN move. Of the more than 400 mortar and artillery shells fired by 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, most were Serbian. BiH mortars fired back but were heavily outgunned. Noting that Sarajevo had suffered heavy shelling on Thursday and Friday, Boucher said that shelling was taking place both from sites where heavy weapons had been assembled under UN monitors and from undeclared sites. "It's clear to us that the Serbs have not concentrated all their heavy weapons despite their commitment to do so and they in fact have increased their indiscriminate, unjustified shelling of Sarajevo", he told reporters. 1107/

19. 19/9/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting reportedly eased around Sarajevo with clashes and shellfire flaring intermittently throughout the day, mainly around the western suburb of Stup and between the city's northern outskirts of Hotonj and the Serb-held town of Vogošća, Sarajevo radio and military officials said. However, the city centre reportedly suffered intense bombardment in the
evening. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** The area around Stup; the area between the northern outskirts of Hotonj and Vogošća; Hrasno; Nedžarići; Mojmilo; Dobrinja; the city centre (in the evening); the area beside Holiday Inn; the Parliament building; an old television tower in Pofalici (a hill in the northern part of the city where there were reported to be BiH artillery emplacements). Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Numerous homes were reportedly razed by Serb tank fire in Stup; Serb mortar attacks reportedly struck BiH positions in Hrasno, Nedžarići, Mojmilo and Dobrinja; the city centre reportedly suffered intense bombardment in the evening with shells landing at around 7:00 p.m. just beside the Holiday Inn. Five or six floors of the Parliament building were reportedly in flames after shelling at 5:00 p.m.. Several explosions were seen next to an old television tower in Pofalici (a hill in the northern part of the city), where it was reported that earlier in the day, Serb forces tried to wipe out BiH artillery emplacements. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 21 people were killed and 170 were wounded on this date in Sarajevo. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

929. Fighting reportedly eased around Sarajevo with clashes and shellfire flaring intermittently throughout the day, mainly around the western suburb of Stup and between the city's northern outskirts of Hotonj and the Serb-held town of Vogošća, Sarajevo radio and military officials said. But, a senior UNPROFOR official said that the violence was "at least 30 percent less" than the previous five days of assaults at Stup and along the Vogošća-Hotonj front. The drop in fighting coincided with accounts from refugees and local commanders that the Serbian thrusts forced BiH troops to retreat on both fronts. The reports contradicted official government statements that the Serbian assaults had been repelled.

930. Ahmed Rizvo, the BiH commander in Hotonj, said his units retreated at least 100 yards on Friday evening, abandoning to Serb fighters the topmost ridge of a strategic mountain. "The first line has been moved. Our defenders are now 150 to 200 metres back", said Hebib Sevko, 54 a Bosnian Muslim electrician from Stup. Sevko was among at least 1,460 men, women and children who fled by trucks, cars, buses and foot into Sarajevo shortly before midnight Friday after what they said was 27 hours of pointblank Serbian tank fire into their homes. "My home was totally destroyed. It was flattened", said Djuro Kuzman, 58, a Serb among refugees put up at an elementary school in the Alipašino Polje district of the city. Refugees said that at least 30 homes were systematically razed by Serbian tank fire that killed at least six people and wounded 15 others since Thursday. An evacuation was finally ordered, they said, when their pleas for assistance went unheeded by BiH military headquarters.

931. It was reported that Serb militia launched mortar attacks on BiH positions in Hrasno, Nedžarići, Mojmilo and Dobrinja, local journalists said.

932. The city centre reportedly suffered intense bombardment in the evening with shells landing at around 7:00 p.m. just beside the Holiday Inn. Five or
six floors of the parliament building were reportedly in flames, after shelling at 5:00 p.m. Several explosions were seen next to an old television tower in Pofalici (a hill in the northern part of the city), where it was reported that earlier in the day, Serb gunners tried to wipe out BiH artillery emplacements. 1112/

(b) Local reported events

933. Dag Espeland, a UNHCR logistics manager, said fighting in Ilidza, a Serb-held suburb bordering Stup, prevented a British humanitarian aid convoy from entering Sarajevo with food supplies. The convoy was forced to return to Vitez, Espeland said. He said that it was the third day that fighting had prevented aid trucks from delivering food to the city. 1113/

934. Over 300 people, many from a BiH special forces unit, attended a funeral in the morning at the Lion Cemetery where at least 10 Muslim soldiers killed during the last two days of fighting in Stup were buried. 1114/

(c) International reported events

935. In Geneva, representatives of the warring factions agreed to conditions for reopening Sarajevo airport and resumption of a UN relief airlift. As a result, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata said she was calling for resumption of the airlift suspended after an Italian relief aeroplane was shot down two weeks ago while approaching Sarajevo. However little other progress was reported. UN sources said that the warring factions still refused to speak to each other directly and the talks were being conducted by mediators shuttling back and forth between the delegations. 1115/

936. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic stated that Serbs and Croats could peacefully divide BiH, but that no pact was possible with the Muslim-led BiH Government. 1116/

937. Haris Silajdzic, head of the Bosnian Muslim negotiating team, stated that the tripartite talks in Geneva would soon become bilateral because a Muslim-Croatian coalition would be formed. He said that the delegation, in addition to two Muslims and two Serbs (Lazovic and Pejanovic), would include two Croats and that a special place would be reserved for Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban. Boban, however, categorically rejected such a possibility and stressed, rather, that two members of the Muslim delegation, Parliament Vice Chairman Mariofil Ljubic and Minister Miljenko Brkic, had joined the Croatian delegation. Boban was accompanied at the news conference by Ljubic and Brkic. 1117/

20. 20/9/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Occasional shelling and gunfire was heard around the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Stup; Hrasno; Vogošća; the Lion Cemetery in Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: At 11:30 a.m., mourners burying the bodies of 12 war victims scattered when two mortar shells exploded outside the Lion Cemetery. The mortars hit a road dividing the cemetery from the Koševko Hospital where
the wounded were taken. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 16 people were killed and 66 were wounded on this date in Sarajevo. The BiH Public Health Ministry also reported that to date 2,252 people had been killed, 13,059 had been heavily wounded, 15,576 had been lightly wounded and 7,120 were missing. Of these numbers 225 children had been killed, 3,264 had been heavily wounded, 3,894 had been lightly wounded and 712 were missing. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

938. Occasional shelling and gunfire was heard around the city. Unknown gunners reportedly fired machine-gun rounds towards a UN convoy travelling from the airport to UNPROFOR headquarters. No one was hit. Mortars reportedly hit the suburbs of Dobrinja and Stup and there were also sporadic exchanges in Hrasno and Vogošća, Sarajevo radio journalists reported. 1120

939. At 11:30 a.m., mourners burying the bodies of 12 war victims scattered when two mortar shells exploded outside the Lion Cemetery in Sarajevo. The mortars hit a road dividing the cemetery from the Koševo Hospital. The cemetery was screened by trees, but the presence of people was plainly visible from the surrounding hills. The wounded were evacuated to the Koševo Hospital, situated several hundred metres from the cemetery. 1122

(b) Local reported events

940. A UN aeroplane flew into Sarajevo airport at 11:20 a.m. to test conditions for resuming aid flights after a near three-week hiatus. The flight also heralded stepped-up planning for a boost in the 1,500 troop UNPROFOR, bringing in the French Deputy Commander Morillon of the contingent for talks with the warring factions on the expansion authorized last week by the UN Security Council. 1123

941. Electricity and water supplies to the city had still not been fully restored, Sarajevo radio reported. The radio said that water would be transported in water tanks to areas in short supply. It renewed an appeal to citizens to boil water before consumption in order to avoid disease. 1124

(c) International reported events

942. Yugoslav Ambassador Dragomir Djokić warned in a letter to the UN Security Council Chairman, that the recommendation to ban Yugoslavia from the General Assembly was a dangerous precedent which could threaten the peace talks and encourage those who advocated the war option. The letter stated that the recommendation was "a bad decision, politically unacceptable and legally unfounded". 1125

943. United States President Bush nominated Victor Jackovich, Mara M. Letica, and E. Allan Wendt as ambassadors to BiH, Croatia, and Slovenia respectively. The statement from the White House press office read, "With the nomination of ambassadors, the establishment of full diplomatic relations with those three states will be complete. The task of the ambassadors will be to foster the vital political, economic, and commercial partnership between the United States and those states, including the development of democratic and market economy-oriented reforms. 1126
21. 21/9/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy fighting hit the city, ending a one-day lull and cutting power to most of the city. Shellfire and infantry battles began at around 8:00 a.m. across the ridgelines and slopes of Žuč Mountain and around Vogošća, and raged throughout the day. Fighting also erupted around Stup. Serbian shellfire hit parts of the downtown, Mojmilo and Dobrinja. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Several neighbourhoods near the downtown; Hrasno; Mojmilo; Dobrinja. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: A 110-kilowatt feeder cable was allegedly destroyed by Serbian forces, but it was not clear whether this was caused by shelling or some other means. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The Health Ministry said that at least 22 people had been killed and 64 others injured in Sarajevo during the 24 hour period ending at 1:00 p.m. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

944. Heavy fighting hit the city, ending a one-day lull and cutting power to most of the city. Shellfire and infantry fights began at around 8:00 a.m. across the ridgelines and slopes of Žuč Mountain, which divided the northern verge of Sarajevo and Serb-held areas around the town of Vogošća, and raged throughout the day. UNPROFOR sources confirmed serious fighting along the front spanning Žuč mountain. Nirmin Silajdžić, a BiH officer in the front line suburb of Hotonj on the eastern edge of Žuč, said that Serbian gunners laid down intense artillery barrages in advance of a "wave" of infantry attacks, which he claimed were beaten back. Fighting and shellfire also flared in several neighbourhoods near the downtown. 1128/

945. Witnesses said that fighting then erupted around Stup to the west, which tank-backed Serbian units had been trying to capture for just over a week in an apparent attempt to consolidate their grip on the potentially weakest point in their blockade. 1129/

946. Explosions and gunfire marked the outbreak of clashes in Hrasno and Sarajevo radio said that Serbian shellfire hit parts of the downtown and the suburbs of Mojmilo and Dobrinja. 1130/

947. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., electricity was cut to most of the city. The BiH government blamed the disruption on the destruction of a 110-kilowatt feeder cable by Serbian forces bent on "using electricity . . . as a method of pressure against the citizens of Sarajevo". The allegation was made by Energy and Industry Minister Rusmir Mahmutčehajić in a letter to UN special envoy Cyrus Vance and European Community mediator Lord David Owen. Mahmutčehajić said that the alleged Serbian act violated an accord reached in Geneva on Sunday in which the warring factions agreed to safeguard electricity and water services. 1131/
(b) **International reported events**

948. The first round of talks of the Working Group in Geneva ended. Fred Eckhard, spokesman for the co-chairmen, said that the leaders of the three delegations, Karadžić, Silajdžić, and Boban, expressed a readiness to return when necessary. Talks were scheduled to resume at a lower level on 22 September with Nikola Koljević and Aleksa Buha representing the Bosnian Serbs. 1132/

949. BiH President Izetbegović attended the 47th session of the UN General Assembly and met with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in the first of a series of meetings with various statesmen attending the session. The two presidents stressed the need for future cooperation in light of intensified aggression against BiH. 1133/

22. 22/9/92 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fighting was reported to ease around Sarajevo with sporadic clashes and artillery fire reported after a day of fierce clashes on the western and northern edges of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Dobrinja; Stup; a Red Cross soup kitchen on Blagoje Parović Street (in the evening); Cetinjska Street (in the evening). Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Three people were killed and 28 wounded when a Serbian mortar shell hit a Red Cross soup kitchen on Blagoje Parović Street in the evening; at about the same time as the soup kitchen shelling, another mortar shell exploded at Cetinjska Street, wounding at least 17 people. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Three people were killed and 28 wounded when a Serbian mortar shell hit a Red Cross soup kitchen on Blagoje Parović Street in the evening; at about the same time as the soup kitchen shelling, another mortar shell exploded at Cetinjska Street, wounding at least 17 people. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

950. Fighting was reported to ease around Sarajevo with sporadic clashes and artillery fire reported after a day of fierce clashes on the western and northern edges of the city. 1134/ Sarajevo radio said that Serb forces shelled the suburb of Dobrinja and the mainly Croat quarter of Stup. 1135/ 951. Three people were killed and 28 were wounded from a Serbian mortar shell that slammed into a Red Cross soup kitchen on Blagoje Parović Street in the evening, Sarajevo radio reported. 1136/

952. At about the same time as the soup kitchen shelling, another mortar shell exploded at Cetinjska Street, wounding at least 17 people, Sarajevo radio said. 1137/
(b) Local reported events

953. General Phillipe Morillon of UNPROFOR stated that UN troops would be posted along corridors in BiH to ensure humanitarian aid deliveries under a major expansion of the force aimed at ending blockades of Sarajevo and other towns. He arrived in Sarajevo on 20 September to begin planning for a 6,000 troop expansion in the 1,500 member UN force authorized last week by the UN Security Council to ensure deliveries of humanitarian assistance. Morillon said that the first step would be to reopen a highway and railway line linking Sarajevo with Croatia's Adriatic port city of Split. As part of the plan, UN troops would "take control" of sections of the routes in Ilidža, a Serbian stronghold on the western edge of Sarajevo, to permit the free passage of goods and people in and out of the city. Many Sarajevo families had been reported to have run out of food because UNHCR truck convoys had been unable to make up the shortfall caused by the airlift suspension. The airlift, which carried an average of 200 tons of food and medicines daily, was suspended after a 3 September missile attack downed an Italian transport aeroplane, killing the four-man crew. 1138/

954. The UNHCR delayed plans to send the first flight with relief supplies into Sarajevo. UN officials said an aeroplane would be sent from Zagreb, but only to pick up Brigadero General Phillipe Morillon, the deputy commander of the UN peace-keeping forces who had been visiting Sarajevo. 1139/

955. Bosnian Serb forces offered to open 10 land corridors out of Sarajevo to enable civilians to leave the city. 1140/

(c) International reported events

956. At international peace talks in Geneva, the BiH government proposed a constitutional framework that would maintain BiH as a single state but decentralize power to Serb and Croat regions. The plan was rejected by the Serbs through Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. 1141/

957. In New York, BiH President Alija Izetbegović urged that the UN General Assembly either help his country or lift the arms embargo against it. "The present arms embargo ties our hands at a time when our country is being strangled", he said. "The international community cannot simultaneously sidestep its commitment to defend us and nullify our means of defense". 1142/

958. The United Nations General Assembly voted to expel Yugoslavia from its ranks and the United States called for Serbia to be investigated for alleged war crimes in BiH. The assembly voted by 127 to six with 26 abstentions to exclude a member for the first time in the 47 year history of the organization. Yugoslavia, comprising only of Serbia and Montenegro, would have to reapply for admission and would not be regarded as the successor state of the pre-war federation of six republics. The US submitted to the Assembly a list of what it said were credible allegations of war crimes committed by Serb forces armed by the Yugoslav army. It included killings, the torture of prisoners, destruction of property, deportations and the abuse of civilians in detention camps. The State Department also indicated that the United Nations should set up a commission to investigate the charges and prosecute offenders. 1143/

959. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić condemned the United Nations for barring Yugoslavia and announced that he "will no longer make one-sided concessions" in future peace negotiations (this was in reference to Serbian claims that they had complied with a London peace conference agreement to put heavy artillery under UNPROFOR supervision in several locations, including
Sarajevo). "The exclusion of Yugoslavia from the United Nations, as in the case of our exclusion from the CSCE, is just the continuation of international community pressure on the Serbian people", Karadžić told a news conference in Belgrade. 1144/

23. 23/9/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fierce overnight fighting eased after dawn to intermittent clashes and sniper fire and shelling of civilian areas. Shelling resumed in the afternoon with at least a dozen shells hitting the northern district of Pofalići. Serb and BiH forces clashed with artillery and mortar in Vogošća and other areas in and around the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The yard of the Tvornica Armatura factory, located near UNPROFOR headquarters on the western end of the city; the northern district of Pofalići; a tall residential building on the road leading west towards the airport; Vogošća; the Čengić Vila District; an apartment building in Hrasno. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: One local worker and two French soldiers with UNPROFOR were wounded by shrapnel from a mortar round that exploded as they were accompanying workmen trying to cut metal sheeting to repair a high-voltage transformer near the yard of the Tvornica Armatura factory; at least a dozen shells landed in the northern district of Pofalići; at least six shells hit a tall residential building on the road leading west towards the airport; seven people were injured in Dobrinja and 12 others wounded in the Čengić Vila district of the city; one apartment building was set ablaze by mortar fire in Hrasno. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Serbian sniper fire reported in the city after dawn. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: One local worker and two French soldiers with UNPROFOR were wounded by shrapnel from a mortar round that exploded as they were accompanying workmen trying to cut metal sheeting to repair a high-voltage transformer near the yard of the Tvornica Armatura factory; seven people were injured in Dobrinja and 12 others wounded in the Čengić Vila district of the city. The BiH Health Ministry said that at least 14 people had been killed and 89 others injured in the city during the 24 hour period that ended at 1:00 p.m. 1145/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

960. Fierce overnight fighting during which Serbian barrages of the city set several major fires, eased after dawn to intermittent clashes and Serbian sniper fire and shelling of civilian areas, police and news reports said. Skirmishes between BiH and Serbian lines along the city's northern front prevented a UN supervised team of civilian technicians from repairing an overhead cable carrying power to Sarajevo, UNPROFOR officials said. "We made a morning attempt and one in the afternoon. At both times there was fighting in that area, shelling and mortars, and we could not reach the line", said Razak. The BiH government charged that Serbian forces deliberately severed the line on Monday, depriving electricity to most of Sarajevo in violation of an agreement reached Sunday in Geneva on safeguarding utilities. 1146/
961. Two French soldiers with UNPROFOR were wounded by shrapnel from a mortar round that exploded as they were accompanying workmen trying to repair a high-voltage transformer station in the city, Sarajevo radio reported. The radio blamed Serbian units for firing the mortar round. 1147/ UNPROFOR officials said the mortar shell was believed to have been a stray round. It slammed into the yard of the Tvoronica Armatura factory, located near UNPROFOR headquarters on the western end of Sarajevo, as the two French soldiers and two local workers were cutting metal sheeting to protect the Sarajevo airport control tower, they said. Ukrainian Colonel Viktor Bezrouchenko, the UNPROFOR chief of operations, said one local worker was injured along with the French soldiers. The incident brought to at least 48 the number of UNPROFOR troops injured since May. Four others had been killed. 1148/

962. Shelling resumed in the afternoon in Sarajevo, with at least a dozen shells landing in the northern district of Pofalići. At least six shells hit a tall residential building on the road leading west towards the airport. 1149/

963. Serb militia and BiH forces clashed with artillery and mortar in Vogošća in the mountainous north of the city during the evening. Seven people were injured in the suburb of Dobrinja and 12 others wounded in the Čengić Vila district of the city. In Hrasno to the south, one apartment was set ablaze by mortar fire, local journalists said. 1150/

(b) Local reported events

964. Bosnian Muslims and Croats signed another agreement in which they pledged not to recognize gains and losses of property that resulted from the use of force. 1151/

965. A local spokesman for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo said that they planned to bring two flights per day into the city from Zagreb with UN replacement troops and supplies starting on Thursday. He added that they were not aid flights. 1152/

24. 24/9/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and sniper activity were reported in the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: A passenger car at an intersection near the Maršal Tito Barracks; a public bus near the same location; an UNPROFOR armoured vehicle in Azići. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: At noon a Serbian artillery round smashed into a passenger car as it crossed an intersection near the Maršal Tito barracks, killing the two occupants; another round scored a direct hit on a public bus close to the same location, killing at least one passenger and seriously wounding 15 others; at 4:00 p.m., a Canadian captain and six Egyptian soldiers were injured in Azići after the armoured personnel carrier in which they were riding either detonated a mine, or was hit by shelling. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: At noon a Serbian artillery round smashed into a passenger car as it crossed an intersection near the Maršal Tito barracks, killing the two occupants; another round scored a direct hit on a public bus close to the same location, killing at least one passenger and seriously wounding 15 others; at 4:00 p.m., a Canadian captain and six Egyptian soldiers were injured in Azići after the armoured personnel carrier in which they were riding either detonated a mine, or was hit by shelling. Sarajevo radio said that at least six people were killed and 37 others injured during the day from Serbian shelling and sniper fire in the city. 1153/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

966. Sarajevo radio and Dr. Sead Dezdarović, a surgeon at the French hospital, said a Serbian artillery round smashed at about noon into a passenger car as it crossed an intersection near the former Yugoslav army's Maršal Tito Barracks near the downtown, killing the two occupants. A short time later, Dr. Dezdarović reported that another round scored a direct hit on a public bus close to the same location, killing at least one passenger and seriously wounding 15 others. The car and bus were using a pot-holed back road that had become a major pedestrian and vehicular route into the city centre because much of it was shielded by high-rise buildings. 1154/

967. Seven UN soldiers sustained injuries when an explosion hit their armoured car. UNPROFOR officials said they were almost certain a land mine caused the explosion that wounded a Canadian captain and six Egyptian soldiers. BiH fighters, however, contended that the armoured personnel carrier in which the seven were riding was hit by a rocket launched by Serbian forces. "They fired a rocket from a house", said one BiH soldier, Rusmir Salihspahić. UNPROFOR officials and witnesses said the incident occurred at about 4:00 p.m. in Azići, on the western edge of the city as the armoured car was escorting a truck carrying two corpses to a pre-arranged body exchange between BiH and Serbian units. "The APC blew up in front of our eyes", said Eileen Kleinman, a photographer riding in an armoured Land Rover belonging to the BBC. "Everyone just abandoned their vehicles and ran for cover". She and other witnesses said that a firefight then erupted between BiH and Serbian units, as the personnel carrier blazed in the middle of the road. Another UNPROFOR armoured vehicle was dispatched to rescue the wounded and other Egyptian troops who were unhurt, and take them back to the UN headquarters. The vehicle was left in the road with the bodies inside it. 1155/

(b) Local reported events

968. Most of Sarajevo was without electricity or water for its fourth consecutive day with repairmen being prevented from fixing high-voltage cables because of shelling. 1156/

969. UNHCR logistics chief Dag Espeland said that a Swiss company had offered to lease the UNHCR three giant Ilyushin-76 cargo aeroplanes of the Russian airline, Aeroflot, to deliver food and medicine. He said the cost would be a relatively cheap $2 million per month, and that the three aircraft could fly 150 tons of supplies into Sarajevo's airport per day. He said the aeroplanes would go a long way to making up for the loss of the humanitarian airlift. Espeland said that truck convoys from Split had managed to provide only a daily average of 44 tons of relief, compared to the 183 tons provided by the airlift. 1157/
25. 25/9/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After sporadic clashes overnight, fighting intensified in the morning with Serbian forces firing mortar and howitzer shells on downtown Sarajevo and the suburbs. 1158/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Downtown Sarajevo and the suburbs; an unidentified Sarajevo street; Vogošća; Stup. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Shortly after 9:00 a.m. a mortar shell killed a man and injured three others in a Sarajevo street; shelling of the city centre left two people dead and several wounded and there were reports of at least seven shells hitting the area. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Shortly after 9:00 a.m., a mortar shell killed a man in a Sarajevo street and injured three others, Sarajevo radio said. 1159/ Sarajevo radio reported that shelling of the city centre left two people dead and several wounded. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

970. After sporadic clashes overnight, fighting intensified in the morning with Serbian forces blasting mortar and howitzer shells on downtown Sarajevo and the suburbs. 1160/

971. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., a mortar shell killed a man in a Sarajevo street and injured three others, Sarajevo radio said. 1161/

972. Sarajevo radio reported that shelling of the city centre left two people dead and several wounded. There were reports of at least seven shells hitting the area. There were also reports of heavy fighting and shelling in the suburb of Vogošća and in the western suburb of Stup. 1162/

(b) Local reported events

973. The co-chairmen of the peace conference on 25-26 September visited Zagreb and Banja Luka to examine the humanitarian situation in the region. 1163/

974. A spokeswoman for UNPROFOR in Zagreb, Jeanny Peterson, denied reports that UN troops were planning to pull out of Sarajevo and said the force was searching out locations where the 6,000 peacekeepers due to arrive in BiH would be deployed. No withdrawal was "planned now or in the foreseeable future" she said. However the incoming troops "will not be confined to Sarajevo". 1164/

975. An estimated 80% of Sarajevo's 350,000 civilians were reported to be without power and running water. Local Serbian commanders were reported to have repeatedly refused to permit work crews from the water company into Serbian-held areas to repair pumps, clean filters, or replenish chlorine supplies. Without chlorine, engineers were hampered in their efforts to fight potential water-borne epidemics. 1165/
26. 26/9/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy overnight shelling was reported to have eased in the morning. There was intermittent shelling reported thereafter. Stup was periodically shelled and Dobrinja came under heavy fire. BiH military forces reported that Serb forces made an attempt to break through BiH lines with tanks at Ilijaš. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Kobilja Glava; the Dobrinja District; Mount Igman; Stup; Ilidža; Hrasno. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Two people were killed and one wounded by a tank shell which hit the hillside district of Kobilja Glava, on the north-eastern side of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire was heard around the Holiday Inn Hotel in the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Two people were killed and one wounded by a tank shell which hit the hillside district of Kobilja Glava, on the north-eastern side of the city. The BiH Health Ministry reported that in a 24 hour period ending at 1:00 p.m., at least 21 people were killed and 104 wounded in Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

976. Heavy overnight shelling was reported to have eased in the morning, with Sarajevo police reporting relative calm. "There was intermittent shelling coming from Serbian positions and Serbian snipers continued their activities", a police spokesman said.

977. Local journalists said that two people were killed and one was wounded by a tank shell which hit a hillside district, Kobilja Glava, on the north-eastern side of the city.

978. The southern suburb of Stup, held by Croats and Muslims, was periodically shelled by Serb forces.

979. The Dobrinja district to the south-west also came under heavy fire from mortars and shells.

980. BiH military sources said that Serbs made a vain attempt to break through BiH lines with the aid of tanks at Ilijaš to the north-west.

981. Sarajevo was blacked out in the evening with no power or running water, but artillery flashes were reported to have lit the sky to the south of Mount Igman, the BiH-held ridge dominating the southern skyline. Shellfire was also heard from the western suburbs of Stup and Ilidža where there had been heavy fighting between BiH army and Serb forces over the past two weeks. The southern suburb of Hrasno came under fire from what appeared to be Serb mortars and tanks during the night while sporadic automatic and sniper fire was heard around the Holiday Inn Hotel. This all occurred after what was characterized in one report as a "quiet day which gave Sarajevo residents the chance to scramble out of doors to collect firewood for the coming winter and to hunt for food".
(b) Local reported events

982. The New York Times reported that Biljana Plavšić, a professor of biology at the University of Sarajevo and one of three chief Serbian leaders, told the BBC last week that the Serbian aim was to seize "everything west of the Holiday Inn", which would give the Serbs control over half of Sarajevo. 1173/

27. 27/9/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Renewed clashes were reported along the airport road between Serb-held Ilidža and BiH lines at the western end of the city. Serb heavy artillery opened up early in the day on the suburb of Dobrinja and around Vogošća. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Vogošća. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The SRNA News Agency reported that 14 JNA soldiers were killed, dozens wounded and 171 captured when unidentified Muslim forces ambushed a column of JNA troops who were pulling out of Sarajevo under UNPROFOR escort. 1174/ The Washington Post reported that to date Serb forces had killed 2,100 city residents, injured more than 25,000 and damaged about 60% of the city's homes and apartments. 1175/ The BiH Health Ministry reported that in Sarajevo, at least 14 people had been killed and 71 others wounded during the 24 hour period that ended at 1:00 p.m.. 1176/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date, 2,349 people had been killed, 13,605 had been heavily wounded, 15,950 had been lightly wounded, and 7,150 people were missing in Sarajevo. Of these numbers, it was reported that 588 children had been killed, 3,401 had been heavily wounded, 3,798 had been lightly wounded and 730 were missing. 1177/ Source(s): Tanjug News Agency; Washington Post; United Press International; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

983. Serb heavy artillery opened up early in the day on the suburb of Dobrinja and around Vogošća to the north-west of the city. 1178/

(b) Local reported events

984. French General Phillipe Morillon met with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and won his agreement "in principle" for expanded road access into Sarajevo for humanitarian deliveries, a UN spokesman said. "I can arguably say that we have had progress in getting this into operational terms", spokesman Adnan Razek said after the meeting in Pale between Karadžić and French General Phillipe Morillon, deputy commander of UNPROFOR. Morillon planned to travel Monday to Belgrade to discuss the plan for improved road access to Sarajevo with Serbian leaders including President Milošević, Razek said. 1179/

985. Renewed clashes along the airport road between the Serb-held suburb of Ilidža and BiH lines at the western end of the city prompted General Morillon to cancel plans to visit the UN mission and drive by armoured car to his meeting with Radovan Karadžić in Pale. 1180/
986. UNHCR officials said three days of fighting in the area of the highway had prevented the transfer of aid from the agency warehouse at the airport into Sarajevo, which required an average of 220 tons of food daily. 1181/

28. 28/9/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Only small arms fire was heard in the city overnight but mortar and tank rounds began hitting the western areas during the morning. 1182/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Western areas of the city (in the morning); the cemetery in Boljakov Potok in the north-west part of the city (noon); unidentified street in western Sarajevo (1:00 p.m.); the area near the UN headquarters. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; New York Times.

**Description of Damage:** Five mourners were killed and more than 20 were wounded when a mortar bomb hit at noon at the cemetery at Boljakov Potok; six civilians were wounded at around 1:00 p.m. when a shell landed on a street in western Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; New York Times.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Five mourners were killed and more than 20 were wounded when a mortar bomb hit at noon at the cemetery at Boljakov Potok; six civilians were wounded at around 1:00 p.m. when a shell landed on a street in western Sarajevo. In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m., nine people were killed and 65 were wounded in Sarajevo, BiH officials said. The total did not include those among the 40 to 50 mourners attacked at about noon at the cemetery in Boljakov Potok in the north-west part of the city. 1183/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

987. Only small arms fire was heard in the city overnight but mortar and tank rounds began hitting the western areas during the morning. 1184/

988. BiH radio reported that three mourners were killed and more than 20 were wounded when a mortar bomb hit at around noon at a cemetery in Sarajevo. The radio blamed "Četniks" for firing the mortar at the cemetery at Boljakov Potok, near the Sarajevo television centre, but there was no proof of responsibility. It was later reported that two others died after being brought to hospitals. The shells reportedly fell just as the assembled mourners were awaiting burial of an elderly woman who had died of natural causes, said Bezdrob Muharem, who suffered shrapnel wounds to his back and leg. 1185/

989. Another six civilians were wounded at around 1:00 p.m. when a shell landed on a street in western Sarajevo. 1186/

990. Artillery shells fired from Serbian positions in Nedžarići fell a few hundred yards from the United Nations headquarters in Sarajevo. 1187/
(b) **Local reported events**

991. The co-chairmen of the peace conference visited Belgrade. Talks in Belgrade's Palace of the Federation between Yugoslav President Josić and the co-chairmen ended in the evening. Both sides indicated satisfaction with the talks and Lord Owen reported that specific progress was made on the issues of opening the Belgrade-Zagreb highway and constructing the Maslenica bridge in southern Croatia. 1189/

992. Sarajevo radio warned the inhabitants of the city to be ready for a new Serb offensive. The radio carried a message from the BiH military command, saying Serb forces were concentrated in Vogošća, Ilidža, Grbavica and were apparently poised for fresh assaults in those areas. (Vogošća to the north-west and Ilidža to the south-west of the city had been under heavy artillery attack in recent days, possibly as the prelude to an infantry assault. Grbavica, a suburb to the south-west, had also been the frequent scene of bitter fighting. BiH military sources said that the Serbs wanted to push north from there to cut the city in half). The radio also said that the BiH government had sent an official letter of protest to the United Nations in New York over the cutting off of water and power supplies to the city by the Serbs. 1190/

29. 29/9/92 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo was hit by artillery shells, mortar rounds and small arms fire amid dire warnings from the BiH military command of an imminent Serbian offensive. The city's worst attacks in weeks were reported with shelling activity intensifying at midday. Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Maršal Tito Street; the square near the Roman Catholic Cathedral; the Energoinvest Company building; the city centre (hit with particular intensity in the afternoon); Vogošća; the Old Town; Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Artillery shells and mortar rounds hit the main thoroughfare, Maršal Tito Street and the square near the Roman Catholic Cathedral just as residents were out scouring the shops for food. Several rockets fell at around 10:00 a.m. in and around the gutted downtown shopping district, hitting homes, shops and offices, killing three people and wounding at least 26 others. Rockets slammed into a building near the Magros clothing store and showered the pedestrian shopping mall with shrapnel and glass. Glass shards and pools of blood could be seen on an adjacent sidewalk just a few feet from the flower pots and a hand-lettered sign marking the sport were a mortar shell on a bread line on 27 May; the Energoinvest Company building was set afire by shelling; tank mortar and artillery attacks were reported in Vogošća with sporadic shelling reported on the old quarter and the suburb of Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Sniping Activity:** Snipers shot dead at least three people during the morning and prevented fire-fighters from extinguishing a blazing city centre skyscraper housing the Energoinvest Company which was set afire by shelling. 1191/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Casualties: Overnight bombardments in Sarajevo reportedly left 11 dead and 26 wounded, according to figures released by city hospitals and the morgue. Three people were killed and at least 26 others wounded in a shelling incident near Marsal Tito Street; snipers shot dead at least three people during the morning. Officials said that in the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m., 15 people were killed in Sarajevo and 90 were wounded. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

993. Sarajevo was hit by artillery shells, mortar rounds and small arms fire amid dire warnings from the BiH military command of an imminent Serbian offensive. "Fresh troops and heavy weapons have been deployed around the besieged city", a military spokesman said. The BiH government had been warning of a pre-winter offensive by Serbian forces since the weekend. BiH leader Ejup Ganić said in New York that tank movements around the strategic site of Grbavica, a good indicator of a major offensive, had increased six-fold and reinforcements from Serbia and Montenegro were approaching Visegrad, "burning and destroying everything in their path". In Sarajevo itself, the BiH military spokesman said Serbian troops were massing in their suburban strongholds of Ilidža, Kula and Lukavica, between the airport and the south-west of the city. Other key points reinforced over the weekend included Vogošća to the north and Grbavica, near the city centre but south of the Miljacka River bisecting the city from east to west.  

994. Overnight bombardments in Sarajevo reportedly left 11 dead and 26 wounded, according to figures released by city hospitals and the morgue.  

995. In the city's worst attack in weeks, artillery shells and mortar rounds reportedly hit the main thoroughfare, Marsal Tito Street, and the square near the Roman Catholic Cathedral just as residents were out scouring the shops for food. Several rockets fell around 10:00 a.m. in and around the gutted downtown shopping district, hitting homes, shops and offices, killing three people and wounding at least 26 others, officials said. Sevala Hasović, manager of the Magros clothing store, said she was at the shop when rockets slammed into a nearby building used by the BiH military and showered the pedestrian shopping mall with shrapnel and glass. "Me and a colleague, we were sitting inside and suddenly it exploded", Hasović said as she and several co-workers swept up glass and rubble. "Then we heard people screaming". Glass shards and pools of blood could be seen on an adjacent sidewalk just a few feet from the flower pots and a hand-lettered sign marking the spot where a mortar shell fell on 27 May, killing 18 people waiting in a bread line.  

996. Snipers shot dead at least three people during the morning and prevented fire-fighters from extinguishing a blazing city centre skyscraper housing the Energoinvest Company which was set afire by shelling.  

997. Shelling intensified midday in a variety of districts throughout the city, the centre in particular being shelled in the afternoon and hit with rapid-fire canons, machine-guns and assault rifles. BiH radio reported tank, mortar and artillery attacks in Vogošća to the north-west and there was sporadic shelling reported in the old quarter and in the suburb of Dobrinja.  

(b) Local reported events

998. The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) group of deputies, the strongest opposition party in the Yugoslav parliament, raised the question of the "constitutional competency" of Mrsić and Panić to negotiate on the state
border with Croatia. In a letter to the President of the Yugoslav parliament's Chamber of Citizens, Yugoslav Kostić, the party led by Vojislav Šešelj demanded that the question of Prevlaka be placed on the agenda of the 2 October session. The group claimed that Ponič and Panić were discussing the issue of the Yugoslav state border without the parliament's approval, and that the federal parliament was the only body "competent" to decide on changes of the country's borders. 1201/

999. French General Phillipe Morillon arrived in Sarajevo and travelled to nearby Pale for further talks with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić on opening a new aid supply corridor to the city. 1202/

1000. Salem Karović, chief of the city's water distribution system said that Serbs controlling the area around the city's main water supply at Bacevo turned off the supply to Sarajevo on Sunday night, in apparent violation of an agreement made one week earlier at the peace talks in Geneva. 1203/

1001. The city received its first delivery of humanitarian supplies in four days (some 80 metric tons carried in 12 trucks), but only after a showdown in which UN officials backed by French troops obtained the release of four Bosnian Muslim drivers and a local UN worker in an eight-truck convoy detained by Serbian militiamen. 1204/

1002. UNHCR warned that up to 400,000 people could die in the approaching winter in BiH. UNHCR spokeswoman Silvana Foa said: "We now have a situation where people are unable to return home, they are unable to seek asylum, they have nothing for the winter. We are going to see a lot of people die", she said, adding that the international community must provide emergency assistance. 1205/

(c) International reported events

1003. The co-chairmen of the peace conference met with BiH President Izetbegović in Geneva. 1206/ Izetbegović reported to have said that he had agreed to the demilitarization of Sarajevo. 1207/

1004. In Washington, Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said that US aircraft would soon resume relief flights to Sarajevo but that "precise details" must still be worked out. Diplomatic sources taking part in the Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia said in Geneva earlier that the airlift would be resumed in 24 to 48 hours. The UNHCR was still trying to obtain "commitments to get a secure corridor" from the warring parties in the country, Williams said. 1208/

30. 30/9/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials reported that in the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m., seven people were killed and 54 were wounded in Sarajevo. 1209/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1005. It was reported that Serb forces evicted up to 200 non-Serbs from their homes in a resumption of "ethnic cleansing" operations in Sarajevo, ordering them on short notice to vacate their homes and cross into BiH-controlled territory, UN and BiH officials said. A UN source said the Red Cross estimated 150 people were forced from their homes in Grbavica in the southern part of Sarajevo, while a BiH police source estimated 200 people were involved. 1210/

1006. Some of the family members taken to a police station after crossing by foot from the northern side of the Miljacka River said they were given 10 minute warnings to pack their belongings and leave. "It's happened a couple of times" previously but on a smaller scale, said Senada Kreso of the BiH International Press Centre, who said most of those expelled in the incident of "urban ethnic cleansing" were women and the elderly. 1211/

1007. It was reported that BiH officials said they knew no reason for the incident, but they speculated it might indicate that Serb militiamen were preparing for the start of the harsh Balkan winter. Those expelled from the area along the Serb front lines were mostly Bosnian Muslims. 1212/

(b) Local reported events

1008. UNPROFOR's Sarajevo commander Brigadier General Hussein Abdel Razek, met with Bosnian Serb leaders for several hours at their military headquarters in Lukavica to continue seeking agreements allowing for the restoration of electricity and water and protection for utility workers. 1213/

1009. The city's hospital reportedly ran out of diesel fuel needed for its electrical generator at about 1:00 p.m. and doctors were forced to perform surgery for a while under the light of a bulb connected to an automobile battery. A spokesman for UNPROFOR said that they later supplied the hospital with four to five tons of diesel fuel. 1214/

(c) International reported events

1010. Presidents Tudjman and 'osić met in Geneva under the auspices of the co-chairmen. 1215/

1011. Talks in Geneva ended with the signing of a joint settlement by Tudjman, 'osić and the co-chairmen. The statement assessed that it was necessary to normalize relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia through mutual recognition on the basis of the London Conference conclusions and declared that both countries would make possible the return of all refugees to their homes through emergency measures. The presidents also agreed among other issues, to solve all problems peacefully and refrain from ethnic cleansing. They agreed to meet again on 20 October in the presence of the co-chairmen. 1216/

G. October 1992

1. 1/10/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported as light as the city remained relatively quiet through much of the day until Serbian forces on the
hills overlooking the city launched two artillery attacks. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Sarajevo's two main hospitals reported that at least five people were killed and 105 injured during attacks. 1217/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**
1012. Fighting was reported as "light" in Sarajevo. The city remained relatively quiet through much of the day until Serbian militia forces on the hills overlooking the city launched two artillery attacks. One person was killed in the fighting and 59 others were wounded. 1218/

(b) Local reported events

1013. Serb forces reportedly evicted up to 500 non-Serbs from their homes in Sarajevo, ordering them (on short notice) to vacate their homes and cross into BiH controlled territory, often times under gunfire. 1219/ The Serbian soldiers directing the eviction reportedly stole jewelry and money from these people. Some of the soldiers reportedly wore the black jumpsuits and double-headed eagle badges of the paramilitary faction led by Željko Ražnjatović (Arkan). 1220/

(c) International reported events

1014. Mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen announced that the warring factions had agreed to talks on the demilitarization of Sarajevo. 1221/

1015. The United States announced that it would resume relief flights to Sarajevo on Saturday. 1222/

1016. President Bush decided to support a ban on Serbian combat flights over BiH. 1223/

2. 2/10/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Artillery attacks from Serbian forces in the hills overlooking Sarajevo continued. A reported Serbian infantry attack across the bridge at Vrbanja crossing the Miljacka was said to have been pushed back. Ground fighting was also reported in Stup and Hrasno. A machine-gun battle raged near the Holiday Inn. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
1017. Artillery attacks from Serbian forces in the hills overlooking Sarajevo continued. Tank shells, mortar rounds and grenades were fired on the city from Vogošća, a suburb behind the hills north of Sarajevo, and from Borija, a neighbourhood on a hill east of the city. 1224/

1018. Radio reports said Serbian forces attempted an infantry attack across the bridge at Vrbanja, crossing the Miljacka River running through central Sarajevo, but were pushed back by BiH defenders. 1225/

1019. Ground fighting was reported in BiH controlled Stup on the western fringe of Sarajevo. 1226/

1020. An intense machine-gun battle was fought around the Holiday Inn near central Sarajevo. There was also fighting in the Muslim held suburb of Hrasno as Moslem and Serb forces continued attacks on each other. 1227/

(b) Local reported events

1021. The New York Times reported that at least 150 Muslim women and teen-age girls who had crossed in Government-held areas of Sarajevo in recent weeks were said to be in advanced stages of pregnancy and had asserted that they became pregnant after being raped by Serbian nationalist fighters. They also said they had been imprisoned for months afterward in an attempt to keep them from having abortions. 1228/

3. 3/10/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was hit with sporadic shelling throughout the day, including anti-aircraft machine-gun and sniper fire. Artillery shells hit the neighbourhoods of Dolac Malta and Čengić Vila in the evening. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dolac Malta and Čengić Vila neighbourhoods (Friday evening).
Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Three people were killed and 15 others wounded (including six children) when artillery shells hit the residential neighbourhoods of Dolac Malta and Čengić Vila Friday evening. An apartment block in Čengić Vila was still burning on Saturday when the district was again hit by mortars. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported throughout the day. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Three people were killed and 15 others wounded (including six children) when artillery shells hit the residential neighbourhoods of Dolac Malta and Čengić Vila Friday evening; at least five people were injured by attacks in Oteš. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1022. At least five people were injured by the attacks in Oteš, in the southern part of the capital. 1229/

1023. In Sarajevo, three people were killed and 15 others wounded when artillery shells hit the residential neighbourhoods of Dolac Malta and Čengić Vila Friday evening. An apartment block in Čengić Vila was still burning on Saturday when the district was hit again by mortars. Six children were among the wounded. Ten year-old Saša Vojinović, a Serb, had his left leg blown off, while Muslim Ema Karoći, aged seven, had her spleen, a kidney and part of her intestine removed because of shrapnel wounds. 1230/

(b) Local reported events

1024. A US transport aeroplane made two deliveries of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo. 1231/

1025. The first ground relief convoy in three days (nine trucks) from Split reached Sarajevo. 1232/

1026. ICRC sources announced that the warring factions in BiH had agreed to release "unilaterally and unconditionally" by the end of the month all prisoners not charged with serious human rights violations. 1233/

4. 4/10/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling of Sarajevo by Serbian forces continued at around 10:30 a.m., including the sporadic artillery and tank bombardment of the city's Old Town section. BiH and Serb infantry forces fought with small arms in Hrasno, and shellfire was reported in Dobrinja, Vasin Han, Mojmilo and Stup. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Vasin Han; Mojmilo; Vojvoda Putnik; Stup; the Old Town section, the central part of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Four mortars fell on Vojvoda Putnik, wounding a number of people. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Snipers were active in the new part of the city, wounding at least one woman at Pero Kosorić square. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: One woman was wounded by sniper fire at Pero Kosorić square. In the last 24 hours four persons were killed and 57 wounded in Sarajevo. 1234/
Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1027. BiH and Serb infantry forces fought with small arms in Hrasno, a neighbourhood where there was nightly fighting. The positions of the two sides were separated in places by a single residential street. 1235/ Shellfire was reported in Dobrinja, Vasin Han and Mojmilo. Sarajevo radio reported that four mortars fell on Vojvoda Putnik street wounding a number of people. 1236/

1028. Shelling was reported in Stup, the western district flanking a main access route into the city. 1237/
1029. Shelling of Sarajevo by Serbian forces continued at around 10:30 a.m., including the sporadic artillery and tank bombardment of the city's Old Town section. Anti-aircraft machine-guns and artillery guns also shot sporadically from Sarajevo's Jewish cemetery and the Zlatište hill into the central part of the city. Snipers were also active in the new part of the city, wounding at least one woman at Pero Kosorić square. 1238/

(b) Local reported events

1030. Four UN sponsored relief flights landed in Sarajevo before poor weather conditions halted more arrivals. 1239/

5. 5/10/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic overnight shelling was reported throughout the city, particularly in the south-western area of Dobrinja. Serbian forces from Vraca in the south hills fired a barrage of artillery into the city in the morning that heavily damaged and set fire to numerous buildings. Shelling was also reported in Hrasno, Hum Hill and Vogošća. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Apartment buildings (some along Darovalaca Krvi Street); an electrical utility building (Elektroprivreda building); a television transmitter (on Hum Hill); south-western Dobrinja; downtown Sarajevo; the Old Town section; Pero Kosorčić Square; three apartment buildings and two office buildings (one belonging to the municipal administration) in the Hrasno district; the Holiday Inn; the Post Telegraph and Telephone building and a nearby tobacco factory; numerous houses adjacent to shelled office buildings; Vogošća; a water truck in Pofalići. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Serbian forces in the hills fired scores of artillery rounds that heavily damaged or set fire to apartment buildings, an electrical utility and television transmitter. Numerous apartment buildings along Darovalaca Krvi Street were bombarded and set on fire. The television transmitter on Hum Hill, took a direct hit. Between 50 and 100 injured people were brought to the Koševo hospital complex, mostly from the Old Town section and Pero Kosorčić Square which was bombarded. Thick black smoke poured from a downtown office of Elektroprivreda, the main electricity supplier; In the Hrasno district, shelling set fire to three apartment buildings and two office buildings (one belonging to the municipal administration). Workers inside the municipal building said that it was struck by two mortar rounds. The downtown Holiday Inn was hit at around 8:15 a.m. on the fifth floor facing toward Grbavica and set on fire. Rockets hit and set fire to the downtown offices of the Post Telegraph and Telephone building and a nearby tobacco factory. Houses around the offices hit in Sarajevo were also badly damaged and burning. At around 9:00 a.m., a water truck that brought water daily to Pofalići, in the north-central part of the city was directly hit while driving along a road. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire into the city began at around 7:00 a.m. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Between 50 and 100 injured were taken to the Koševo hospital complex, mostly from the centre of the Old Town section and Pero Kosorčić Square; Clinics in the Pero Kosorčić square neighbourhood reported they had received nine dead and 21 wounded by mid-afternoon—all of them civilians and
most of them victims of tank and sniper fire. 1240/ Source(s): United Press
International.

Narrative of Events:

1031. Serbian forces in the hills overlooking Sarajevo fired scores of
artillery rounds that heavily damaged or set fire to apartment buildings, an
electrical utility and a television transmitter. The attacks began with
sporadic overnight shelling throughout the city, particularly in the south-
western area of Dobrinja and escalated into a heavy downtown attack involving
grenades, mortars and tank fire. Between 50 and 100 injured people were
brought to the Koševo hospital complex, mostly from the centre of the Old Town
section and Pero Kosorić Square, a front-line area just south of the Miljacka
River. Thick black smoke poured from a downtown business office of
Elektroprivreda, BiH main electricity supplier. 1241/

1032. In the Hrasno district, shelling set fire to three apartment buildings
and two office buildings, one of them belonging to the municipal
administration. Workers inside said it was struck by two mortar rounds and
that the fire was started by phosphorus bullets fired from anti-aircraft
guns. 1242/

1033. Clinics in the Pero Kosorić square neighbourhood reported they had
received nine dead and 21 wounded by mid-afternoon, all of them civilians and
most of them victims of tank and sniper fire. 1243/

1034. The morning barrage on the capital came from Serbian-controlled areas of
Vraca, a hilly area in the southern part of the city, and nearby Ozrenska
Street, according to Sarajevo radio. Mortars, grenades and tank shells
repeatedly hit Pero Kosorić Square, killing and injuring an unknown number of
people, the radio said. The bombardment also hit numerous apartment buildings
along Darovalaca Krvi Street, setting them on fire. Sporadic sniper firing
into the city also began around 7:00 a.m., the radio reported. 1244/

1035. The downtown Holiday Inn, which housed many foreign journalists, was
also hit around 8:15 a.m. on the fifth floor facing toward Grbavica, and set
on fire. Two journalists working for the French television network TF-1 were
slightly injured by flying glass on the ground floor, said Amra Abadžić, a
translator for the Reuters news agency. 1245/

1036. Rockets hit and set fire to the downtown offices of the Post Telegraph
and Telephone building and a nearby tobacco factory, Sarajevo radio reported.
The attack on the telephone exchange building caused unknown damage but no
reported injuries, according to Enes Arnautović, general director of PTT in
Sarajevo. 1246/

1037. Houses around the offices hit in Sarajevo were also badly damaged and
burning, Sarajevo radio reported. The television transmitter on Hum Hill, to
the north of the city also took a direct hit, it said. Around 9:00 a.m., a
water truck that brought water daily to Pofalići, in the north-central part of
the city, was directly hit while driving along a road. Vogošća, a northern
suburb of Sarajevo also suffered a heavy grenade attack during the morning
Sarajevo radio reported. 1247/

(b) Local reported events

1038. Attacks followed a relatively quiet weekend and came one day before the
head of the newly formed UNPROFOR operation for BiH was due to visit Sarajevo
and meet again with Bosnian Serb leaders. Topics for the meeting were
expected to include the new headquarters for the UNPROFOR command. UNPROFOR officials were hoping to place it in Ilidža to help break a main bottleneck for humanitarian aid convoys reaching Sarajevo by land. 1248/

1039. Electricity and water supplies to Sarajevo, which had been out of commission between several days and several weeks across the city, remained out of commission despite continued efforts by UNPROFOR troops to accompany repair crews to damaged facilities. Sarajevo radio said that electricity had been restored to the city's main wellfield and pumping station in the Serbian-controlled western suburb of Bačevo, allowing service to be resumed in the adjacent Serbian-controlled city of Ilidža, but it said the lines serving Sarajevo remained badly damaged. Telephone service inside the city, which was partially disconnected two days prior because of a lack of fuel for electricity generators, was restored Monday, but it was reported that there was only enough diesel fuel to run the system for another two days. 1249/

1040. A 10 truck convoy organized by the UNHCR brought another 100 tons of food aid to Sarajevo, but workers were prevented by the heavy shelling from unloading, according to Marc Vachon, the UNHCR's chief of logistics at the Sarajevo airport. 1250/

(c) International reported events

1041. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić announced in Geneva that the Serb Republic of BiH categorically rejected the US proposal to the UN Security Council for an air-exclusion zone over BiH "except for humanitarian flights" and asserted that the proposal was an attempt to secure a strategic advantage for the Bosnian Muslim forces, which was not in accordance with the decisions of the London Conference. In a letter to the Security Council, Karadžić warned that the Serb side had no choice but to ignore any proposal for a ban on flights. In a statement to Tanjug, Karadžić also confirmed a warning that if the proposal to neutralize the flights passed, his side would abandon all negotiations within the International Conference on Yugoslavia and close down its mission in Geneva. 1251/

1042. The US Senate passed its foreign aid bill, which included $35 million for refugee assistance to the former Yugoslavia. 1252/

6. 6/10/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was sporadic shelling of Stari Grad and Dobrinja. The city was reportedly bombarded by Serbian forces. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Stari Grad area; Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Twenty-four people were reported killed and 133 others wounded in Sarajevo in the last 24 hours. 1253/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1043. There was sporadic shelling of Stari Grad, the district next to Sarajevo's Old Town, where the city's eastern front line was located. Shelling was also reported in Dobrinja. 1254/

1044. Serbian military sources said that BiH forces were amassing troops around Mount Igman, south of the city, possibly in preparation for a drive to reclaim parts of Sarajevo. 1255/

(b) International reported events

1045. The United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 780 to set up a war crimes commission to "examine grave breaches of international humanitarian law". It called on governments and organizations to collect data on suspected war crimes and submit it to the UN within 30 days. The resolution provided few details on the "Commission of Experts" to be created. 1256/

1046. Co-Chairman Vance met with the Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and BiH Government representatives in Geneva. 1257/

1047. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić told Tanjug reporters that the Bosnian Serb delegation had informed the organizers of the Geneva Conference that "the Serbian side has temporarily and voluntarily given up flying sorties on condition that the Muslims refrain from taking any further offensive action". 1258/

7. 7/10/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian artillery batteries stepped up their bombardment of Muslim neighbourhoods in the morning and the shelling of Hrasno continued. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Muslim neighbourhoods; Hrasno (including a group of four 21 story apartment buildings dominating the district); a civilian complex, Alipašino Polje, just across from UNPROFOR headquarters; Vogošća (including the road connecting it with Sarajevo); the area near the BiH Presidency building. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Serb forces fired repeatedly at a group of four 21 story apartment buildings dominating the district, using incendiary shells to start them afire. Two of the buildings were gutted and the other two destroyed above the 10th floors. At least 1,000 people were left homeless and 17 people were reported killed. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In Hrasno, the destruction of a group of four 21 story apartment buildings left 17 people dead and 1,000 people homeless. Source(s): New York Times.
Narrative of Events:

1048. Serbian artillery batteries surrounding Sarajevo stepped up their bombardment of Muslim neighbourhoods in what the government radio described as "one of the most hellish mornings since the beginning of the war". Heavy ground fighting was reported in several areas of the city, and the continued Serb shelling made it difficult to distribute supplies flown in since the resumption of the UN sponsored airlift. 1259/

1049. The shelling of Hrasno continued. Serb forces fired repeatedly at a group of four 21 story apartment buildings dominating the district, using incendiary shells to set them afire. Two of the buildings were gutted and the other two destroyed above the 10th floors. The Sarajevo fire department did not have the capabilities to pump water above the 10th story of buildings. At least 1,000 people were left homeless and 17 people were reported killed. 1260/

1050. A civilian apartment complex, Alipašino Polje, just across the street from UNPROFOR headquarters was shelled. 1261/

1051. Serbian forces based in Poljine shot artillery and tank fire into the northern suburb of Vogošća and onto the road connecting it with Sarajevo. 1262/

1052. Heavy 155 millimetre artillery shells and mortar bombs fell near the BiH Presidency building for over an hour. 1263/

(b) Local reported events

1053. The Mixed Military Working Group chaired by UNPROFOR General Morillon met in Sarajevo, but the BiH Government representatives failed to attend. 1264/

(c) International reported events

1054. BiH Foreign Minister Silajdžić questioned the relevance of the talks in Geneva and appealed to the Security Council for the London accords to be implemented and for BiH to be able to defend itself. 1265/

1055. The United States, Britain and France agreed to ban Serb warplanes over BiH. 1266/

8. 8/10/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The warring factions regrouped after three days of heavy fighting, but sporadic clashes were reported. Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: Two Egyptian UN soldiers were wounded when their headquarters came under mortar fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Sporadic clashes killed at least one and wounded 26. Two of the wounded included UN soldiers hit when their headquarters came under mortar fire. 1267/ At least 37 people were killed and 190 wounded in BiH in 24 hours of fighting that ended at 10:00 a.m., about one third of them in Sarajevo. 1268/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1056. Warring factions in Sarajevo regrouped after three days of heavy fighting, but sporadic clashes killed at least one and wounded 26, including two Egyptian UN soldiers who were hit when their headquarters came under mortar fire. 1269/

(b) Local reported events

1057. French General Phillipe Morillon, commander of UN forces, reached an agreement with Serb leaders to restore water, electricity and gas to parts of Sarajevo and ensure freedom of movement. 1270/

1058. None of the 11 scheduled UNHCR humanitarian aid delivery flights reached the city, although 24 trucks arrived with some 200 tons of food and other supplies. 1271/

9. 9/10/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was relatively quiet with sporadic fighting and intermittent shelling. 1272/ Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. 12 people were killed and 62 others wounded in Sarajevo. 1273/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1059. Sarajevo was relatively quiet with sporadic fighting and intermittent shelling. 1274/

(b) Local reported events

1060. Serbian and Croatian forces in BiH agreed to a cease-fire. 1275/

1061. Sir Donald Accession, special representative of the World Health Organization in Sarajevo, warned that the city's warehouses were empty. To keep the 380,000 people trapped there alive, he said, would require flying in 240 tons of food every day. Otherwise, "children will begin to die of starvation in about four weeks, [and] adults about four weeks later". 1276/
(c) International reported events

1062. The UN Security Council imposed a ban on military flights over BiH. UN Security Council Resolution 780 banned all combat flights over BiH, but it did not authorize military enforcement of the ban. 1277/

10. 10/10/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was bombarded. Some 1500 shells fell throughout the day around Ilijaš, just north of the city. 1278/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: A group of children in an unspecified section of Sarajevo; Ilijaš. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A mortar was fired into a crowd of children in Sarajevo, killing three and wounding 10. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A mortar from Serbian artillery was fired into a crowd of children in Sarajevo, killing three and wounding 10. At least two of the wounded had limbs amputated. One victim was a 16 year-old girl named Samra Kapetanović, the other two were a five year-old girl and a 10 year-old boy. At Košev hospital in Sarajevo, nine dead and 70 seriously wounded civilians had been received by the trauma unit. A total of 43 people were reported killed and 194 wounded by bombardment in two days; 1279/ one UN soldier was killed and three injured when their vehicle hit a landmine in Sarajevo. 1280/ Source(s): Helsinki Watch.

Narrative of Events:

1063. A mortar from Serbian artillery was fired into a crowd of children in Sarajevo, killing three and wounding 10. At least two of the wounded had limbs amputated. One victim was a 16 year-old girl named Samra Kapetanović, the other two were a five year-old girl and a 10 year-old boy. At Košev hospital in Sarajevo, nine dead and 70 seriously wounded civilians had been received by the trauma unit. A total of 43 people were reported killed and 194 wounded by bombardment in two days. 1281/

1064. One UN soldier was killed and three injured when their vehicle hit a landmine in Sarajevo. 1282/

1065. Some 1,500 shells fell throughout the day around Ilijaš, just north of Sarajevo. 1283/

(c) International reported events

1066. The peace conference co-chairmen, visited Moscow for talks with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. 1284/
11. 11/10/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: To date, more than 600 children had been killed in the six-month siege of Sarajevo, and nearly 800 children were listed as missing. 1285/ In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. six people were killed and 20 injured in Sarajevo. 1286/ Source(s): New York Times; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1067. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1068. Co-Chairman Cyrus Vance met with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. 1287/

12. 12/10/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: United Nations military peacekeepers carried through their promise to begin publishing statistics on the amount of artillery each side in Sarajevo was firing. The statistics made no distinction between military and civilian targets. The most recent daily UN artillery statements released reported for the 24 hour period from 5:00 p.m. Sunday to 5:00 p.m. Monday, listed 137 rounds hitting BiH controlled areas and 35 rounds hitting Serbian controlled areas. The cumulative total for the first six days of the report, dating back to 5:00 p.m. on 6 October listed 896 shells reaching BiH controlled territory and 273 shells reaching Serbian controlled territory. 1288/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Vogošća; Stup; an UNPROFOR flight descending into the city (target not hit). Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1069. The city remained relatively quiet, although there was some anti-aircraft fire in Vogošća, north of the city. Police attributed the lull to the presence in the city of General Phillipe Morillon. 1289/

1070. There was shelling all day in Stup on the outskirts of Sarajevo. 1290/
1071. An UNPROFOR flight into Sarajevo was fired on during its descent into the city. 1291/

(b) Local reported events

1072. A second meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group was held in Sarajevo, but again it was not attended by BiH Government representatives. 1292/

1073. Montenegro adopted a new constitution that officially made it part of FRY. 1293/

13. 13/10/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR's daily survey of arms fire in the Sarajevo area indicated that UN observers recorded a total of 21 rounds of large artillery fired onto Serbian-controlled areas and 91 rounds reaching BiH-controlled territory during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Tuesday. 1294/ Although there had been no major fighting in almost a week, sniper fire was reported throughout the city. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Sarajevo's power lines; the outskirts of the Old Town. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Mortar bombs destroyed Sarajevo's power lines just hours before electricity was to be restored. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Snipers were reported at various intersections in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1074. Mortar bombs destroyed Sarajevo's power lines just hours before electricity was to be restored. It was reported that 90% of the attempts to repair Sarajevo's electrical lines "have been aborted because of attacks on the technicians by one party or the other". 1295/

1075. It was reported that a United Nations passenger aeroplane was shot at on its approach to Sarajevo and a bullet went through the cockpit and almost hit the navigator. 1296/

1076. Although there had been no major fighting in almost a week, snipers retained their grip on intersections, small arms fire erupted without warning and mortar bombs sporadically hit the outskirts of the Old Town. 1297/

(b) Local reported events

1077. The Red Cross reported that the city's cemeteries were so full that bodies were being buried at the Olympic Stadium complex. 1298/
(c) **International reported events**

1078. At talks in Geneva, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić pledged to return Serbian aeroplanes to Yugoslav airfields under UN supervision. Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić agreed. 1299/

14. **14/10/92 (Wednesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR, in their daily survey, said that 11 rounds of large artillery were fired onto Serbian-controlled areas around Sarajevo and 41 rounds reached BiH-controlled areas during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Wednesday. 1300/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

1079. No reported incidents.

(b) **Local reported events**

1080. Natural gas supplies were restored to Sarajevo. 1301/

(c) **International reported events**

1081. Peace conference co-chairman Cyrus Vance briefed the UN Security Council on peace conference developments. 1302/

15. **15/10/92 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that 35 rounds of large artillery were observed falling onto Serbian-controlled areas around Sarajevo and three rounds were seen reaching BiH-controlled territory during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Thursday. These were reportedly the lowest numbers in the six-month siege. UNPROFOR also reported that despite almost daily clashes, the front lines in Sarajevo had not significantly changed in three months. 1303/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified
Narrative of Events:

1082. BiH forces barricaded the airport access road in violation of an agreement with UN peace-keeping forces, totally halting UN humanitarian aid deliveries in what was described as a defensive action to block a planned Serbian offensive. 1304/

16. 16/10/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR's daily survey stated that a total of 14 rounds of large artillery were observed falling onto Serbian-controlled areas around Sarajevo and 24 rounds were seen reaching BiH-controlled territory during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Friday. 1305/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Area near UN peacekeepers trying to restore electrical power and resume humanitarian aid deliveries. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

(b) Local reported events

1084. Serbian leader Radovan Karadžić met with Mrs. Ogata of the UNHCR, to discuss the refugee situation in BiH. 1307/

1085. Water services were restored. 1308/

(c) International reported events

1086. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Macedonian President, Gligorov, in Geneva. 1309/

1087. BiH Foreign Minister Silajdžić again called for the lifting of the UN arms embargo so that BiH could control itself against, "the insane, Bolshevik-turned-fascist regime" in Serbia. 1310/

1088. The European Council expressed outrage over the "savage breaches" of international law in the former Yugoslavia. In an effort to stave off a winter tragedy, the Council stated that it would increase the flow of food and medical aid. EC President Jacques Delors stated that $600 million would be needed between January and March. 1311/

1089. US President Bush signed a bill to end Yugoslavia's most favoured nation status. 1312/
17. 17/10/92 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR officials, in their daily survey, said that 70 rounds of large artillery were observed falling onto Serbian-controlled areas in Sarajevo and 65 rounds were observed reaching BiH-controlled territory during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Saturday. \[1313\]

**Source(s):** United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Apartment buildings in the north of Sarajevo. **Source(s):** United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sarajevo faced sporadic sniper fire throughout the day. **Source(s):** United Press International.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

1090. BiH forces ended a three-day standoff and accepted a UN plan to remove a blockade of the city's main airport access road in exchange for UN peacekeepers installing a retractable barricade to hold back Serbian tanks. \[1314\]

1091. Sarajevo faced sporadic grenade and sniper fire throughout the day, some of which hit apartment buildings in the north, as battles continued on the ground between BiH and Serbian forces along the western part of the city. \[1315\]

(c) **International reported events**

1092. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić. \[1316\]

18. 18/10/92 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** A daylong aggression was reported which included a fierce three hour artillery duel in Sarajevo and in the Hrasno area. **Source(s):** New York Times; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The city flour mill; the area near a water tanker truck; the French Hospital (four shells); the suburb of Hrasno, as well as the city centre and other outlying districts (during the morning and afternoon); the Sarajevo public transportation network at its main location and others throughout the city. **Source(s):** Helsinki Watch, New York Times; Reuters; the Government of BiH.

**Description of Damage:** A huge yellow cloud burst from the city flour mill after it was struck by Serbian shellfire. Officials said that essential machinery and a number of silos had been destroyed; a middle-aged woman was killed by a mortar fragment as she went to get water from a tanker truck; another report stated that during a three-hour artillery duel, 150 people were taken to city hospitals during the morning and afternoon (11 died on arrival
and six died later. Most of the shells, fired from the Serb-held Grbavica area, fell on the southern suburb of Hrasno, with the city centre and other outlying districts also hit. Source(s): Helsinki Watch, New York Times; Reuters; the Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Twenty people were reported killed and more than 130 hurt, including at least a dozen whose arms and legs had to be amputated as a result of wounds from exploding shells. The dead included a middle-aged woman hit by a mortar fragment as she went to get water from a tanker truck, and a 10 year-old boy who was hit while outside playing with friends. French Hospital officials said that all but two of the 56 casualties brought in were civilians; during a three-hour artillery duel, 150 people were taken to city hospitals during the morning and afternoon (11 died on arrival and six died later. Most of the shells, fired from the Serb-held Grbavica area, fell on the southern suburb of Hrasno, with the city centre and other outlying districts also hit. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1093. Serbian forces attacked the Sarajevo flour mill, reportedly leaving only enough flour for bread and pasta supplies for 36 hours. A huge yellow cloud—presumably grain and flour—burst from the mill after Serbian tank, anti-aircraft and artillery guns opened fire at targets across the city. Officials at the mill said that essential machinery and a number of silos had been destroyed. This was seen as a major blow to the city where many of the residents had survived for months on a diet consisting mostly of bread and pasta. 1317/

1094. The attack was part of a daylong aggression in which at least 20 people were reported killed and more than 130 hurt, including at least a dozen whose arms and legs had to be amputated as a result of wounds from exploding shells. The dead included a middle-aged woman hit by a mortar fragment as she went to get water from a tanker truck, and a 10 year-old boy who was hit while outside playing with friends. Four tank shells hit the French Hospital in the city centre (renamed recently in recognition of French medical supplies that had sustained the hospital through the siege). Hospital officials said that all but two of the 56 casualties brought in were civilians. 1318/

1095. A fierce, three-hour artillery duel in Sarajevo flooded hospitals with casualties. Doctors said almost 150 people were taken into the city's hospitals during the morning and afternoon. Eleven of them died on arrival, six died later. Most of the shells, fired from the Serb-held Grbavica area, fell on the southern suburb of Hrasno. But the city centre and other outlying districts were also hit. 1319/

1096. The Sarajevo public transportation network was shelled at its main location and at others throughout the city, according to a report from the Government of BiH. 1320/ The report stated that seven workers had been killed, and 25 wounded in shelling of the public transportation network since the beginning of hostilities in April 1992. It also stated that its buildings, and complete transportation infrastructure have been either damaged or destroyed along with 362 vehicles (83% of its transportation capacity). The extent of damage to the public transportation network was estimated at $58,542,000 US, and to the city's roads at $25,240,017 US. 1321/
(b) Local reported events

1097. Yugoslav President, Osić called for the immediate demilitarization of Sarajevo so that the city's trapped citizens could receive relief. 1322/

1098. UN peacekeepers succeeded in reopening the Sarajevo airport road. 1323/

(c) International reported events

1099. Peace conference co-chairman, Cyrus Vance, met with Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić, and then with Bosnian Serb, Nikola Koljević. 1324/

19. 19/10/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR officials, in their daily survey said that during the 24 hour period ending at 5:00 p.m. Monday, 57 rounds of heavy artillery fire fell onto BiH-controlled areas around Sarajevo, compared to 23 rounds reaching Serbian controlled areas. 1325/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Electricity and water transmission facilities; unspecified parts of Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Electricity and water service went off after 11:44 a.m. after hits on transmission facilities; dozens of people were injured from shelling in the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Serbian gunners shelled Sarajevo with artillery fire that wounded dozens of people. Doctors at the Koševo hospital complex treated at least 34 injured (22 civilians and 12 combatants). One patient died. 1326/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1100. Sarajevo had electricity and water from 8:46 p.m. Sunday until 11:44 Monday. These utilities were cut when transmission facilities were hit. 1327/

1101. Serbian gunners shelled Sarajevo with artillery fire that wounded dozens of people. Doctors at the Koševo hospital complex treated at least 34 injured (22 civilians and 12 combatants). One patient died. 1328/

(b) International reported events

1102. Presidents, Osić and Izetbegović met in Geneva under the auspices of the co-chairmen. 1329/

1103. President, Osić left the Palais des Nations at 8:00 p.m., on the advice of a doctor after five hours of negotiations to go to his hotel to rest. 1330/

1104. It was reported that the Bosnian Serbs informed the peace conference co-chairmen that all of their aeroplanes had been placed into hangars. 1331/
20. 20/10/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Event:

1105. At approximately 4:30 p.m., a small group of Serbian soldiers guarding Sarajevo's main airport road stopped two UN marked armoured personnel carriers and detained the city's top UN military officer for 10 minutes before allowing him to pass. At least 10 other UN vehicles also reported being stopped in a similar manner but were allowed to pass after showing identification through their windows. 1332/

1106. The main land route into Sarajevo was closed after shelling in Mostar. 1333/

(b) International reported events

1107. Presidents Tudjman and Osić held a second meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the co-chairmen. They reaffirmed their plan to reopen the highway running from Zagreb to Belgrade and indicated their hope to set up liaison offices. 1334/

21. 21/10/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR officials in their daily survey, said that 15 rounds of large artillery fire were observed falling onto Serbian-controlled territory around Sarajevo, and 33 rounds were seen reaching BiH-controlled territory during the 24 hour period ending at 5:00 p.m. Wednesday. 1335/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A French UNPROFOR soldier was shot and wounded by a sniper firing from BiH-controlled territory while escorting aid deliveries. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: A French UNPROFOR soldier was wounded by sniper fire. In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. three people were killed and 43 others were injured in Sarajevo. 1336/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1108. A French UNPROFOR soldier was shot and wounded by a sniper firing from BiH-controlled territory while the soldier was escorting aid deliveries in a Serbian-controlled section of Sarajevo. 1337/

(b) Local reported events

1109. Humanitarian aid flights to Sarajevo were suspended while the United Nations assessed security along the approach to the airport, cutting off all main aid routes. 1338/

(c) International reported events

1110. The peace conference co-chairmen met with President Izetbegović. Lord Owen met with Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić. 1339/

1111. President Izetbegović stated that Bosnian Muslims would take part in the UN-brokered negotiations on the demilitarization of Sarajevo. Representatives of the BiH armed forces would sit down at the same table with Croatian and Serbian army commanders to discuss technical issues, he said, but he continued to refuse direct negotiations with Serb political leaders. 1340/

22. 22/10/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported in the area near the airport runway. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, 21 people were killed and 38 others were injured in Sarajevo. 1341/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1112. In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, 21 people were killed and 38 others were injured in Sarajevo. 1342/

(b) Local reported events

1113. The UNHCR relief operation for Sarajevo itself remained seriously handicapped, with the land route cut off by the fighting in Vitez and around Mostar, and with all 11 aeroplanes reaching the Sarajevo airport after a 24 hour suspension due to reports of fighting near the runway. 1343/
(c) International reported events


23. 23/10/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that in the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Friday, 68 rounds of heavy artillery fell on BiH-controlled territory around Sarajevo and zero rounds reached Serbian-controlled territory. 1345/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Area close to the Lion cemetery; the Koševo Hospital (two mortar shells); the Souk Bunar residential district of the Old Town. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. Friday, three people were killed and 40 others were wounded in Sarajevo. 1346/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1115. A mortar round landed close to the Lion cemetery, which has been targeted by the Serbs while funerals were in progress. The Koševo Hospital nearby was hit with two mortar shells at the same time and another hit the Souk Bunar residential district of the Old Town. 1347/

(b) Local reported events

1116. Repair crews drawn from both sides in the Sarajevo siege worked together to restore electrical power to 70% of the city and running water to a still wider area. The repairs, which had begun three weeks earlier, started to bring electricity and water back to the city sporadically and in widely scattered areas in the previous week. But in the past 48 hours, as major transmission lines damaged in the fighting had been repaired, utilities denied to hospitals, private homes and many other places for weeks (and in some cases months) had been restored. 1348/

1117. A mixed military working group met for the first time with all three parties participating, chaired by General Morillon in Sarajevo. 1349/

24. 24/10/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that in the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Saturday, 53 rounds of heavy artillery fell on BiH-controlled territory around Sarajevo and zero rounds reached Serbian-controlled territory. Source(s): United Press International.
**Targets Hit:** Sarajevo throughout the night; the area to the west of UN troop headquarters; Stup; two unidentified western suburbs; Dobrinja; the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** A French UNPROFOR soldier guarding a delivery of humanitarian aid. Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Saturday, six people were killed and 42 others were wounded in Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1118. A French UNPROFOR soldier was shot while guarding a delivery of humanitarian aid. The soldier, who suffered only a minor leg wound, was hit by sniper fire only three days after a similar attack on a French soldier who was also escorting aid deliveries. 1351/

1119. Gunfire and mortar rounds hit Sarajevo throughout the night and into Saturday, just hours after the first face-to-face meeting between the military leaders of BiH's warring factions. Heavy machine-guns and mortars fell to the west of UN troop headquarters. There also appeared to be a renewed attack on Croat-held Stup. Two other western suburbs came under fire from Serb forces apparently trying to link up with units to the north of the city. There was sporadic fighting in the western suburb of Hrasno throughout the night and police reported machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire in Dobrinja, near the airport. Sporadic anti-aircraft cannon fire was also reported in Sarajevo's Old Town as well as machine-gun fire near parliament in the city centre. 1352/

(b) **Local reported events**

1120. Commanders of the three main factions met for the first time at the Sarajevo airport and discussed winter relief operations. 1353/

25. **25/10/92 (Sunday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR counted 148 rounds of large artillery falling onto BiH-controlled territory around Sarajevo during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Sunday and 41 rounds reaching Serbian-controlled territory. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Hrasno area (before dawn); the Old Town area (before dawn); Dobrinja; the UN checkpoint on the main access road to Sarajevo airport (10 rounds). Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Sunday, two people were killed and 27 others were injured in Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1121. Sarajevo remained relatively quiet overnight although sporadic machine-gun and anti-aircraft cannon fire could be heard from the southern Hrasno neighbourhood just before dawn. Sarajevo radio reported more of the same in the Old Town. Dobrinja was reportedly hit by incoming tank fire. 1356/1122. Approximately 10 rounds of artillery fell at 11:45 a.m. near the UN checkpoint on the main access road to Sarajevo airport, prompting UNPROFOR troops to retreat from the area for about 15 minutes. 1357/

(b) Local reported events

1123. Serb nationalists from Krajina reportedly blocked the reopening of the highway linking Belgrade and Zagreb. This was portrayed as a major setback for Prime Minister Panić who had hoped to improve relations between Croatia and Yugoslavia. 1358/

26. 26/10/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that a total of 43 heavy artillery rounds hit BiH-controlled areas around Sarajevo and seven hit Serbian controlled areas in the 24 hour period ending at 5:00 p.m. Monday. 1359/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Dobrinja apartment complex near the airport (morning); Stup (midday); a district near the UN headquarters. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: At least five people were wounded by a single mortar round in Dobrinja in the morning. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least five people were wounded by a single mortar round in Dobrinja in the morning. In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Monday, four people were killed in Sarajevo and 47 others were wounded. 1360/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1124. Sarajevo was relatively quiet overnight. However, Serbian forces in the hills unleashed a loud artillery barrage on the Dobrinja apartment complex near the airport in the morning. 1361/1125. Heavy shelling rocked Sarajevo’s western suburb of Stup around midday and mortar rounds fell on a district near the UN headquarters in the city, wounding five. The western suburb of Dobrinja was also a target for heavy fire during the morning. At least five people were wounded by a single mortar round, four of them seriously. 1362/
(b) Local reported events

1126. A UN official reported that relief flights into Sarajevo had been frequently targeted by anti-aircraft weapons, often forcing pilots to release flares as a precaution against ground fire. The official said that relief aeroplanes had been locked on by radar systems and also had been targeted by heat-seeking missiles. There had been nine to 10 flights a day since the airlift resumed. This was about half the number of flights before the 3 September incident involving the shooting down of an Italian relief aeroplane. 1363/

1127. The second full meeting of the mixed military working group was held in Sarajevo. 1364/

1128. A group of 700 Spanish soldiers joined UNPROFOR in Croatia. 1365/

27. 27/10/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The day was quiet in Sarajevo until 2:30 p.m. when a heavy barrage of artillery fire began falling in various sections of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Unidentified areas of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: One person was killed and three were injured by sniper fire on the front line in Pero Kosorić Square. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: At least six people were killed and 25 wounded in Sarajevo. One person was killed and three were injured by sniper fire on the front line in Pero Kosorić Square. 1366/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1129. The day was quiet in Sarajevo until 2:30 p.m. when a heavy barrage of artillery fire began falling in various sections of the city. At least six people were killed and 25 wounded. One person was killed and three were injured by sniper fire in the front line Pero Kosorić Square. 1367/

28. 28/10/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that during the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Wednesday, 56 rounds of heavy artillery reached BiH-controlled territory and 12 rounds reached Serbian-controlled territory. 1368/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m., seven people were killed in Sarajevo and 60 others were wounded. 1369/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1130. Sarajevo was relatively calm after moderately heavy Serbian artillery and infantry attacks Tuesday. 1370/

(b) Local reported events

1131. On 28-30 October the peace conference co-chairmen visited Belgrade, Zagreb, Priština, Tirana, Skopje and Podgorica. 1371/

(c) International reported events

1132. New constitutional proposals for BiH were released (the Vance-Owen Plan). The Serbian press reported that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that the proposed constitution essentially boiled down to the proposal of BiH President Izetbegović, and that he would study in depth to see if he could use anything from it in further work. 1372/

29. 29/10/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was hit with what was described as the worst shelling in two weeks with dozens of rounds falling on the old centre of the city. BiH forces reportedly turned back a tank and infantry attack close to the city centre. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area; the city centre; an unidentified apartment complex and cemetery. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Dozens of shell rounds fell on the old centre of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Thursday, six people were killed and 33 others were injured in Sarajevo. 1373/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1133. Sarajevo was hit with the worst shelling in two weeks, with dozens of rounds falling on the old centre of the city. Serb gunners in the surrounding hills began shelling the centre of the city in the morning, and tanks joined in the bombardment shortly before noon. An apartment complex and a cemetery were among the targets. BiH defenders turned back a tank and infantry attack close to the centre of the city. 1374/

(b) Local reported events

1134. Croatian President Tudjman urged Bosnian Muslims to accept ethnic partition. 1375/
30. 30/10/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1136. No incidents reported.

31. 31/10/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 433 mortar shells, 211 artillery rounds, and eight tank shells landed inside Sarajevo's defensive perimeter and that BiH forces responded with 75 mortar rounds and 22 artillery shells. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Presidency building; the area near the Koševı Hospital; residential districts on either side of the Miljacka river; the Old Town; UNPROFOR barracks housing the Egyptian battalion. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Reporters who toured city hospitals counted at least 14 dead and 120 wounded. Thirty-one people were reported dead and 118 wounded in the 24 hour period that ended at 5:00 p.m. Saturday. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1137. UNPROFOR reported that a cease-fire was shattered between 11:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., when the SARAJEVO CORPS shelled the Presidency building and followed with heavy infantry and armoured attacks from the south.

1138. Serbian heavy artillery began falling on Sarajevo around 10:40 a.m. Witnesses said shells exploded near Sarajevo's Koševı Hospital. Shells fell into residential districts on either side of the Miljacka river in the afternoon.

1139. The fighting, which had calmed down by afternoon, was heaviest in the districts of Hrasno and Grbavica west of the centre and around the burned-out Parliament building. Mortars also fell in the Old Town where people had crowded the streets on this unusually warm fall day. Reporters who toured city hospitals counted at least 14 dead and 120 wounded.

1140. Barracks occupied by the Egyptian battalion serving with UNPROFOR in
Sarajevo were hit as were the offices of the BiH Presidency. 1382/

(b) Local reported events

1141. In a speech before the Assembly of the Serbian Republic, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that the Serbian side found the concepts of common currency and army called for in the Vance-Owen Plan unacceptable and the criteria for the constitution of the provinces as proposed in the document was equally unacceptable. Nevertheless, he stressed that the document should not be entirely rejected, as it contained some positive things, (which he did not identify). Karadžić said that he supported continuation of the negotiations, but that the bottom line for Serbs was BiH as a confederation of three ethnic groups. 1383/

H. November 1992

1. 1/11/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intense machine-gun and mortar exchanges broke out around central Sarajevo around the Jewish cemetery in the evening. Airbursts and gun flashes were observed on Trebević mountain to the south-east. The shelling was described in one report as the heaviest in one month. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Central Sarajevo (evening). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One man was killed by shrapnel in the morning as sporadic firing into the city continued; 1384/ at least 20 people were reported killed and 100 wounded by tank and artillery fire. 1385/ Source(s): United Press International; New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

1142. Radio Sarajevo reported that one man was killed by shrapnel in the morning as sporadic firing into the city continued. 1386/

1143. Intense machine-gun and mortar exchanges broke out around central Sarajevo in the evening. Reporters said that fighting appeared to be concentrated around the Jewish cemetery south of the city which overlooked the burned-out parliament tower being used by snipers and machine-gunners. Air bursts and gun flashes on Trebević mountain were also witnessed to the south-east. 1387/ Air bursts and gun flashes on Trebević mountain were also witnessed to the south-east. 1388/

1144. Reuters reported the heaviest shelling of Sarajevo in a month this evening with at least 20 dead and 100 wounded by tank and artillery fire. 1389/

(b) Local reported events

1145. Dr. Bakir Nakaš, director of the State Hospital in the centre of
Sarajevo, estimated that 500 shells had hit the complex since fighting broke out in Sarajevo in April. Entire floors of the hospital were unusable. Direct hits had left wards without walls. Gaping holes in the side of the building left it open to the elements. There were nearly 200 patients in the hospital. Nakaš estimated that 250 amputations had been carried out in Sarajevo since the start of the fighting. 1390/

1146. Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb leaders met in Prijedor, BiH and reportedly agreed to join their territories politically, create a joint army and legal system, and take general steps toward the "unification of the whole Serbian nation". 1391/

2. 2/11/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Sarajevo radio reported that BiH troops repulsed an attempted Serbian assault on Mt. Igman. The city itself was described as relatively calm. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1147. Sarajevo radio reported that BiH troops repulsed an attempted Serbian assault on the strategic Igman mountain, 10 miles west of Sarajevo. The city itself was relatively calm. 1392/

1148. It was also reported that gunfire hit a former military hospital. 1393/

(b) Local reported events

1149. UN officials cited long delays of relief convoys at Serbian checkpoints while cargo was examined. They said the convoys often had to turn back and sometimes they came under fire. This was the case last month when Serbian forces attacked two convoys heading for Sarajevo from Mostar, 130 miles to the south. 1394/

1150. Serb nationalists led by Serbian President Milošević voted no-confidence in Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić in Yugoslavia's lower house. 1395/

3. 3/11/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively quiet, although there was some heavy shelling in the Old Town and Hrasno during the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Old Town; Hrasno. Source(s): Reuters.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A Spanish journalist was wounded by sniper fire while driving west from the city centre, to UNPROFOR headquarters, in a press-marked car. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: In the 24 hours ending at 10:00 a.m., 12 people were killed in Sarajevo and 35 others were wounded. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1151. Serbian reinforcements arrived outside Sarajevo.

1152. A Spanish journalist was wounded by sniper fire in Sarajevo. Gabriel Barcelo was hit in the knee while driving west from the city centre to the UNPROFOR headquarters in the afternoon. He was travelling in a press marked car.

1153. Sarajevo was relatively quiet, although there was some heavy shelling of the Old Town and the riverside suburb of Hrasno during the evening.

(b) International reported events

1154. BiH Government representatives walked out of talks with co-chairmen Vance and Owen, refusing to divide BiH into "ethnically pure" areas.

1155. The United States announced that it was donating an additional $21 million to relief organizations operating in the former Yugoslavia.

4. 4/11/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was sporadic shelling in the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Old Town; a cable-bearing pylon (used for electrical power) in the north-western part of the city. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A cable-bearing pylon in the north-western part of the city was destroyed by Serbian artillery fire, leaving the city without electricity. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1156. A US transport aeroplane was hit by small-arms fire at Sarajevo's airport. Fighting around the airport forced the five-person air crew to evacuate the aeroplane and take cover for about 30 minutes. The hit put a hole in the fuselage but there were no injuries.
1157. A cable-bearing pylon in the north-western part of the city was destroyed by Serbian artillery fire, leaving the city without electricity. 1403/

1158. There was only sporadic shelling in Sarajevo's historic Old Town. 1404/

(b) International reported events

1159. The peace conference co-chairmen presented the United Nations and the European Community with a report on their official tour of Belgrade, Priština, Skopje, Tirana, Podgorica, and Zagreb. In general it was described as not optimistic. The co-chairmen were especially indignant at the situation in Kosovo. They reported that on their visit to Priština, negotiations were hard and lasted for several hours, but yielded little hope for the opening even of elementary schools. 1405/

5. 5/11/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively quiet. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Unidentified sections of Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1160. Despite some sections of Sarajevo coming under anti-aircraft fire, the BiH capital was relatively quiet. 1406/

(b) Local reported events

1161. UNPROFOR reported in a press release that there was a lessening of bombardment in the city (except for some "bad days") and that it was focusing on the demilitarization of the area, the opening of two corridors out of the city, and the restoration of utilities. It was reported that water, gas and power had been restored to most of the city. As of Wednesday, it was reported that 1,338 humanitarian flights had landed at the city's airport, delivering an average of 150 metric tons a day since the flights began in early July. However, it was calculated that 240 tons a day of food was necessary just to keep the population alive, and that there were beginning signs of famine. It was further reported that at least 90 per cent of food for the city arrived on humanitarian flights, underlining the desperate need to access land routes to the city. 1407/

1162. The Washington Post reported that both Serb and Croat forces were restricting and delaying aid deliveries to Sarajevo. 1408/
(c) International reported events

1163. The peace conference co-chairmen met with BiH Foreign Minister Silajdžić, and Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžić and Koljević. 1409/

6. 6/11/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively calm despite small-arms and anti-aircraft fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The area where engineers were attempting to repair a power cable. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1164. A BiH military commander said that Serb forces may have been withdrawn from outside Sarajevo and sent to reinforce renewed Serb assaults on towns in north central BiH. 1410/

1165. Serb troops fired on teams of engineers dispatched to repair a power cable supplying the city. Two repair missions had to be abandoned, and a spokesman for UNPROFOR in the city said it would take another two days to restore power supplies. Sarajevo had been without electricity since Wednesday, when a cable-bearing pylon in the north-western part of the city was destroyed by Serb artillery. The city's phone service stopped operating in the morning because of the blackout. 1411/

1166. Despite sporadic small-arms and anti-aircraft fire around the city, Sarajevo was reported as relatively calm. 1412/

(b) Local reported events

1167. Two Red Cross convoys which were to take 5,000 non-combatants out of Sarajevo were cancelled after the BiH Government ordered all ablebodied men between 18 and 60 to remain in the city. 1413/

(c) International reported events

1168. Peace conference co-chairman Vance met with Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžić and Koljević. 1414/

1169. Peace conference co-chairman Owen defended the continued UN arms embargo, insisting that lifting it would be like "pouring oil on an already burning fire". 1415/
7. 7/11/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as calm with sporadic shelling and small-arms fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1170. Sarajevo was reportedly calm, with only sporadic shelling and small-arms fire exchanged between BiH army defenders and encircling Serbian troops. 1416/

(b) Local reported events

1171. Representatives of the three warring factions met for talks under UN auspices at Sarajevo airport in the morning, but failed to reach agreement on the safe passage of humanitarian convoys. Unexpected Serbian objections thwarted a hoped for agreement. 1417/

1172. The BiH Presidency announced a reversal of an earlier decision and gave permission for Red Cross convoys to begin evacuating some 6000 women, children and elderly residents from Sarajevo to Belgrade and Split. 1418/

1173. A makeshift convoy of about 200 people determined to escape from Sarajevo was turned back by a cordon of military police before reaching the outskirts of the city. The convoy consisted predominantly of Croatians whose homes in the western suburbs of Sarajevo were destroyed. Police said they acted to ensure the safety of convoy members who would have been in danger trying to cross Serb lines. 1419/

8. 8/11/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Two people were injured by sniper fire in the centre of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Two people were injured by sniper fire in the centre of the city and doctors at the state hospital reported that one person had been killed and seven wounded throughout the day. 1420/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1174. Two people were injured by sniper fire in the centre of the city and
doctors at the state hospital reported that one person had been killed and seven wounded throughout the day. 1421/

1175. UNPROFOR reported signs of dissention between BiH forces during the last two days. On this day, special units installed two check points on Demala Bijedia street and regular BiH army forces installed another check point on the same road using guns that were taken from front line positions. Inter-BiH fire-fighting had been reported at Čengić Vila. According to a report, the tension was caused by local special forces in Azići. Tensions subsequently decreased and guns were withdrawn. 1422/

(b) Local reported events

1176. Electricity was restored in Sarajevo after the city had been without it since the previous Wednesday. Both the city's phone services and its water supply had been interrupted as a result. 1423/

1177. A convoy of 10 trucks on its way to Sarajevo from Metković in Croatia, was forced to turn back due to clashes between the Serb and Croatian forces. 1424/

9. 9/11/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A Serb infantry attack was launched midmorning from lines in the Sarajevo city centre and there was sporadic shelling and anti-aircraft fire in the Old Town. Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The Sarajevo state hospital reported that two people had killed and 10 had been wounded. 1425/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that five people were killed and 27 were wounded. 1426/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 7,468 people had been killed or were missing in Sarajevo (of this number 2,782 of the killed had been received by health organizations), 44,677 had been wounded (out of this number, 12,000 were reported as heavily wounded). 1427/ Source(s): United Press International; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1178. A Serb infantry attack was launched midmorning from lines in the Sarajevo city centre and there was sporadic shelling and anti-aircraft fire in the Old Town. 1428/

(b) Local reported events

1179. UNPROFOR escorted two successful missions to finish repairs on Sarajevo's electric power lines. 1429/

1180. Water supplies had not yet been reconnected due to problems with one of the main pumps located west of the city in the Serb controlled district of
Bacevo. 1430/

1181. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić presented following new seven-point Serbian peace plan: (1) the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia completely withdraw from the former Republic of BiH; (2) the Muslim leadership annuls and withdraws the state of war declared against the Serbs; (3) all hostilities and offensive operations cease and the present front lines are recognized; (4) UNPROFOR observers are distributed along the front lines with units of all three warring factions; (5) direct negotiations among the warring factions are restored; (6) the forces in Sarajevo are separated and divided with joint patrols and joint control points; (7) and finally, all civilians who are held in cities against their will are immediately and unconditionally released. 1431/

10. 10/11/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic explosions and gunfire continued in the city centre and there were reports of continued Serbian shelling of the Hrasnica and Butmir suburbs. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city centre; Hrasnica; Butmir. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Three people were reported killed and seven others wounded by sniper fire in the city itself. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Thirty people were reported killed and seven others wounded by sniper fire in the city itself. 1432/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people had been killed and 42 wounded. 1433/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1182. Sporadic explosions and gunfire continued in the city centre as the Red Cross began a three-day evacuation of some 6000 women, children, sick and elderly residents from Sarajevo. But the largest operation of its kind was temporarily halted by Serb gunmen at the outskirts of the city who were awaiting the release of Serbian refugees. 1434/ This delay was caused in response to a refusal by Muslim bus drivers to enter Serbian territory because of a string of disappearances of Muslim bus drivers who entered that area. The convoy was finally released, but other Muslim residents awaiting departure were sent home. 1435/

1183. There were also reports of continued Serbian shelling of the Hrasnica and Butmir suburbs near the airport.

(b) Local reported events

1184. A new unconditional cease-fire agreement to go into effect as of midnight on 11 November was signed at Sarajevo airport. 1436/
(c) International reported events

1185. United Nations Security Council Resolution on humanitarian flights to BiH, was passed. 1437/

11. 11/11/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as generally quiet with sporadic anti-aircraft and sniper fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire was reported. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: For the first time in many weeks BiH officials said that they had no reports of any deaths in the 24 previous hours. However, 14 people were reported wounded. 1438/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1186. Sarajevo was generally quiet, although sporadic anti-aircraft and sniper fire was reported. 1439/

(b) Local reported events

1187. The city's water supply was reconnected after a week-long suspension. 1440/

1188. The future of the Red Cross refugee effort looked bleak after BiH radio reported that the BiH commander had halted convoys scheduled to leave because one of the drivers had reportedly been shot. 1441/

1189. After two days of waiting in freezing weather for buses, nearly 1000 people were forced to return to their homes when the planned evacuation collapsed in chaos. 1442/

(c) International reported events

1190. The peace conference co-chairmen addressed the UN Security Council in New York from 11-14 November. 1443/

12. 12/11/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A new truce took effect at midnight and only small-arms fire could be heard during the night. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that five people had been killed and 24 had been wounded. 1444/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Heath.

Narrative of Events:

1191. A new truce took effect at midnight, and only small-arms fire could be heard during the night. The heavy guns remained silent. 1445/

(b) Local reported events

1192. A new truce took effect at midnight. 1446/

1193. The evacuation of more refugees was kept on hold as the parties tried to reschedule new escorts and bus drivers. 1447/

13. 13/11/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The cease-fire reportedly broke down later in the day with new fighting and mortar rounds reported. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that one person had been killed and 12 wounded. 1448/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1194. Although the cease-fire appeared to be holding early in the day, some news sources stated that it seemed to have broken down later on as renewed fighting was reported in Sarajevo. Mortar rounds were also reported to have landed near a city hospital. 1449/

(b) Local reported events

1195. A convoy scheduled to take an additional 1,500 Serbian refugees to Belgrade was cancelled due to a shortage of buses. 1450/

1196. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in an interview with SRNA news agency stated that Croatian forces had repeatedly violated the cease-fire agreement in BiH, showing that to them the agreement reached is a "dead letter". He said that Croatia had proved to be an unreliable negotiator, which would seriously threaten future negotiations and open prospects for a large-scale war between the Serbs and Croats, but stressed that the Serbian side would observe the cease-fire agreement until threatened. He called on the international community to intervene by putting equal pressure on Croatia and by threatening to impose sanctions against it. 1451/
1197. The UN Security Council, under pressure from Muslim nations, debated lifting the arms embargo. Cyrus Vance stated, "it taxes credulity to suggest that lifting the arms embargo for only one of the parties is either feasible or desirable". 1452/

14. 14/11/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and small-arms fire flared up on the outskirts of Sarajevo in the afternoon. There were also reports of sporadic fighting within the city, but not with the intensity of previous weeks.

Target(s) Hit: The outskirts of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that one person had been killed and 10 wounded. 1453/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1198. UNPROFOR reported that air flights were stopped after a British UNHCR aircraft was locked on by an anti-aircraft radar in the area of Fojnica. Protests had been made to the parties and flights resumed the next day. 1454/

1199. Shelling and small-arms fire flared up on the outskirts of Sarajevo in the afternoon, leaving at least one person dead and 10 people wounded. There were also reports of sporadic fighting within the city itself, but it was reported not to be of the same intensity as that of the previous weeks. 1455/

(b) Local reported events

1200. The evacuation convoys were started again as 200 Jews, Serbs and Muslims fled the city in the late afternoon, despite increased BiH government objections to the evacuations. 1456/

(c) International reported events

1201. Peace conference co-chairman Vance met with Muhammed Sacirbey, Permanent Representative of BiH to the United Nations. 1457/

15. 15/11/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that small-arms and machine-gun fire and 18 rounds of artillery/mortar shells landed from 1:30 p.m. to 2:50 p.m. in different points in the city. A total of 116 artillery/mortar rounds were observed. This was described as average to the previous days after the cease-fire agreement. 1458/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Targets Hit: UNPROFOR staff headquarters (evening). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: In the evening, six machine-gun shells hit the UNPROFOR staff headquarters. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Heavy sniper fire was reported early in the day. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that five people were killed and 25 were wounded. 1459/ The BiH Public Health Ministry also reported that to date in Sarajevo, 7,509 people were reported killed or missing (of this number, 2,803 of the killed were recorded in health organizations), 44,826 were wounded, and 12,142 were heavily wounded. 1460/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1202. In Sarajevo, machine-gun, mortar and heavy sniper fire was reported early on in the day, but it was described as light in comparison to past weeks. However, by nightfall it had increased with six machine-gun shells hitting the UNPROFOR staff headquarters. They were believed to have been stray bullets. 1461/ 16. 16/11/92 (Monday)

(b) Local reported events

1203. Temperatures fell overnight as snow covered the ground. Many residents prepared for the coming winter as best they could since gas supplies had been cut. The electricity supply had also been intermittent due to renewed attacks to the power lines in Vogošća. 1462/ 1465/ Although UNPROFOR claimed that the cease-fire was holding, Sarajevo came under tank from Lukavica and Serb held areas in the western suburbs. Hrasnica and Sokolovići were also hit. Shelling in the city centre resumed, with a considerable amount of small-arms fire reported. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

1204. Two convoys of 1,200 evacuees left Sarajevo aboard 10 buses without incident. Seven hundred were headed for Belgrade and the remainder were destined for Kiseljak, 20 miles away. 1463/ UNPROFOR reported that it was escorting a convoy of 400 refugees which received small-arms fire when leaving Sarajevo on the way to Kiseljak. No casualties were reported. 1464/
Casualties: Hrasnica and Sokolovići in the south-western suburbs were hit by shelling, resulting in three deaths and an unknown number of injuries. BiH health officials said that one person had been killed and 27 wounded in Sarajevo during the preceding 24 hours. 1466/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1205. BiH television reported that Serb reinforcements from Pale and Mrkovići had begun to move into Serb held areas on the outskirts of Sarajevo. 1467/

1206. Although UN officials claimed that the cease-fire was holding, in the morning, Sarajevo came under tank fire from Lukavica and Serb held areas in the western suburbs. Hrasnica and Sokolovići in the south-western suburbs were hit, resulting in three deaths and an unknown number of injuries. 1468/

1207. Shelling of the city centre resumed in the mid-afternoon with a considerable amount of small-arms fire. 1469/

(b) Local reported events

1208. UNPROFOR reported that during Sunday night and Monday, 161 persons were stopped attempting to cross the airport. 1470/

1209. Sarajevo's refuse collectors launched comprehensive cleanup with the help of UNPROFOR soldiers. Sixty municipal trucks took part in the operation. Electricity workers repaired one damaged cable which substantially improved the city's power supply. 1471/

(c) International reported events

1210. The United Nations Security Council voted to impose a naval blockade for the first time, adding enforcement provisions to trade sanctions that were adopted against the Serbian government. Under UN Security Council Regulation 787, the NATO and WEU ships that had been patrolling the Adriatic and the Danube could stop and inspect vessels. 1472/

17. 17/11/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

1211. Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as generally calm. UNPROFOR reported that to noon, 34 shell rounds had fallen, mainly in Stup, Butmir and Dobrinja. The majority of fire was observed in the area of Balino. 1473/ Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Stup; Butmir; Dobrinja; the Old Town. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire was observed in the Old Town. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: BiH health officials reported that 17 people were wounded as a result of the days shelling. 1474/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

1212. Sarajevo was generally calm, with officials reporting sporadic outbreaks of sniper fire and several shells falling in the Muslim dominated Old Town. 1475/

(b) Local reported events

1213. As a result of severe weather conditions Sarajevo was left without electricity and water. Electric storms and winds of 100 miles per hour damaged numerous power lines. 1476/

1214. Approximately 1,000 people had been evacuated from Sarajevo in two days. 1477/

18. 18/11/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that between 11:00 a.m. and noon, Muslim forces carried out an infantry attack against Serb positions in the direction of Žuč. Five hundred soldiers were reportedly involved and 350 artillery impacts were observed in the area. Sarajevo radio said that the Dobrinja quarter was heavily shelled by Serb forces while SRNA reported artillery attacks on Serb headquarters including Ilidža. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Žuč area; the Dobrinja quarter; Ilidža. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1215. Sarajevo radio said that the city's Muslim Dobrinja quarter was heavily shelled by Serbs while SRNA reported Muslim artillery attacks on Serb quarters including Ilidža. 1478/

1216. UNPROFOR reported that between 11:00 a.m. and noon, Muslim forces carried out an infantry attack against Serb positions in the direction of Žuč. Five hundred soldiers were reportedly involved and 350 artillery impacts were observed in the area. An infantry attack was also reportedly launched against Serb positions in Ilidža from Oteš and Butmir. Both attacks were reportedly repelled by Serb forces and there were no changes in the front line. 1479/

(b) Local reported events

1217. Electricity supplies were restored to the city in the morning but there were frequent black-outs during the day. Water supplies were partially restored in the afternoon. Commentators suggested that the restoration of services had fuelled a growing feeling that the cease-fire was beginning to stimulate a return to some semblance of normality in the city. 1480/
1218. A six day clean-up of the city entered its third day as 60 municipal sanitation trucks proceeded with the task of removing huge piles of garbage which had accumulated on city streets. 1481/

19.  19/11/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity:  UNPROFOR reported fire activity as very light, with only four impacts reported, primarily on the northern edge of the city with the other area of activity around the airport. 1482/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area on the northern edge of the city; the area near the airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: According to the Tanjug news agency, three Serb fighters were killed and several were wounded. 1483/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1219. UNPROFOR reported that a convoy of Serb vehicles consisting of 18 tanks and 15 trucks with approximately 250 soldiers were observed close to the runway moving from Lukavica to the south. At 11:00 a.m., the convoy was at Vojkovici. According to Serb sources, this was a training exercise. 1484/

1220. UNPROFOR reported fire activity as very light. Four impacts were reported, primarily on the northern edge of the city with the other area of activity around the airport. 1485/

1221. Fighting was reported around Sarajevo where according to the Tanjug news agency, three Serb fighters were killed and several were wounded. 1486/

(b) Local reported events

1222. Electric power supplies to the city remained erratic as fresh snowfall fell on the outskirts of the city. Arfan Mesić, the chief of the state-run electric company said that two of the city's eight power sub-stations were working, leaving a shortfall of the city's needs. 1487/

1223. According to UNHCR, the malnutrition rate in Sarajevo was on a par with that of developing countries. "Most people have lost 5 to 10 kilos [10 to 20 pounds] since the siege began". 1488/

1224. French General Phillipe Morillon, UNPROFOR commander in BiH, acknowledged that despite eight days of relative calm in Sarajevo, the latest truce had failed to hold elsewhere. 1489/

(c) International reported events

1225. NATO reportedly agreed to enforce the UN blockade. 1490/
20. 20/11/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observed a total of 50 rounds of shell fire in the city area. Other reports described intense sniper fire in the city centre as Serb forces shelled Muslim and Croat sectors at night. Targets during the reported barrage were the Muslim districts of Dobrinja, Hrasno and Stup. Muslim areas of the city were described as heavily shelled in the afternoon. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja, Hrasno and Stup (overnight); the area near the BiH Parliament (overnight); Muslim areas of the city (afternoon); Stupsko Brdo. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Intense sniper fire was reported in central Sarajevo overnight. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1226. Intense sniper fire was reported in central Sarajevo as Serb gunners shelled Muslim and Croat sectors of the city during the night. The gunfire was particularly heavy around the BiH Parliament. The targets in an overnight barrage were the Muslim districts of Dobrinja and Hrasno, and Stup, which was mainly populated by Croatians. Muslim areas of the city were reported as heavily shelled by Serb gunners again during the afternoon. 1491/

1227. UNPROFOR observed a total of 50 rounds of shell fire in the city area. It also reported numerous violations occurring in the airport area. The overall level of fighting was described as light, with most of the fire received in the areas of Stup and Stupsko Brdo coming from the Nedžarići area. Two tanks were reported moved from Lukavica to Donji Kotorac and two anti-aircraft guns were moved from the airport settlement to Nedžarići. 1492/

(b) Local reported events

1228. Freezing temperatures were reported and power was disrupted because of a damaged electricity pylon. BiH authorities said that power was being reduced because of adjustment to installations in Serb-held territory and bad weather causing blackouts. 1493/

1229. Sixteen UNHCR flights brought 176 tons of food into Sarajevo. 1494/

1230. Reuters reported that since the siege of Sarajevo began, 20 of the elderly residents at the Nedžarići hospice had been killed by shells and sniper bullets, and that 30 shells had hit the hospice building. 1495/

21. 21/11/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported as sporadic and less than in previous days. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.
**Targets Hit:** The area near a UN protected utility crew; Stupsko Brdo; Stup; Nedžarići; Dobrinja. Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** A UN protected utility crew was forced to abandon a mission to repair an electricity installation when a mortar round exploded 70 to 100 yards from the group. Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** BiH health officials said that three people were killed and 31 wounded in Sarajevo during the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Saturday. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1231. A UN protected utility crew was forced to abandon a mission to repair an electricity installation when a mortar round exploded 70 to 100 yards from the group (there were no reported casualties). 1497/

1232. UNPROFOR reported less shelling than in the previous days. Different parts of the city received fire, especially Stupsko Brdo. Small-arms fire was heard through most parts of the city. There was scattered and sporadic mortar fire in the areas of Stup, Nedžarići and Dobrinja. 1498/

1233. Sporadic shelling was reported throughout the day. 1499/

(b) Local reported events

1234. Overnight temperatures plunged to 23 degrees Fahrenheit and electricity and water supplies in the city remained erratic. Utility officials said that full power could not be restored until repairs were carried out to installations damaged by fighting. A UN protected utility crew was forced to abandon a mission to repair an electricity installation when a mortar round exploded 70 to 100 yards from the group (there were no reported casualties). UNPROFOR said that from 1-15 November 28 UN escorted water, gas and electricity repair missions had been planned, but 10 were cancelled because of shelling and six because workers failed to turn up. Three UNPROFOR repair missions were dispatched on Saturday but utilities officials said that electricity service could not be restored to normal within the day. Water supplies remained well below normal because of power problems, and the city was without gas supplies. 1500/

22. 22/11/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Heavy bombing of the city ended nearly a week of "relative calm". The shelling was described in one report as a possible Serb reprisal for BiH gains on two Serb strongholds on the outskirts of the city in the last two days. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** The area near the BiH Presidency; western residential areas; the Old Town area. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper and machine-gun fire were reported throughout the night; several people were hit by sniper fire during the day. Source(s):
Casualties: At least one person was killed and the state hospital reported eight others wounded in a shelling attack near the BiH Presidency and in western residential areas that began at about 1:00 p.m. and ended two hours later. Later reports showed one person killed and up to 32 wounded including several people hit by sniper fire and a child injured by shrapnel in his home in the Old Town west of the city centre. 1501/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1235. Heavy bombing of the city ended nearly a week of "relative calm" with shelling near the BiH Presidency and in western residential areas. At least one person was killed, and the state hospital reported eight others wounded in the attack that began at about 1:00 p.m. before subsiding two hours later. 1502/ Sniper and machine-gun fire was also reported throughout the night. 1503/

1236. BiH forces were believed to have captured two Serb strongholds on the outskirts of Sarajevo in the last two days and today's bombardment was seen as a possible Serb reprisal. 1504/

(b) Local reported events

1237. NATO and WEU warships began enforcing the UN naval blockade on Serbia and Montenegro by patrolling the Adriatic. 1505/

1238. United Press International reported that despite constant shelling, the musical "Hair" was playing three times a week to standing room only audiences in the tiny auditorium of Sarajevo's city-centre chamber theatre. According to a co-director, the theatre had been shelled three times during rehearsals. Throughout Sarajevo, entertainment had been organized in hospitals, refugee centres, etc., but this was seen as dangerous after a child died and another was wounded when a mortar shell exploded as people were leaving a show (the name of the show and date of this attack was not specified). Thereafter, notification of performances were discreet in order to avoid the attention of Serb artillery. 1506/

23. 23/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors reported that 192 shells landed in BiH government controlled areas of the city while two shells landed in Serb controlled areas. "There was definitely increased shelling compared to the last few days", Canadian Commander Barry Frewer, spokesman for the UN command in BiH, acknowledged. He said that most of the previous day's fighting in Sarajevo had been monitored at the airport and in suburbs to the west of the city. 1507/ The Washington Post reported that "in the past 10 days, the Serb guns have gone oddly quiet. A cease-fire, most successful of the war, has drained some of the horror out of daily life. The average daily death toll has slipped from 12 to 3, as mortar and artillery positions have given way to the odd sniper's bullet". The Post noted, however, that "since last Thursday, the ambient level of machine-gun fire and sporadic shelling has increased. Yesterday, shells again started falling on apartment blocks". 1508/ Source(s): United Press International; Washington Post.
**Targets Hit:** The west of the city; the city centre (early morning). Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** A single mortar round fired into the city centre early in the morning injured two civilians. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire could be heard in the west of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** A single mortar round fired into the city centre early in the morning injured two civilians. Three people were killed and 35 were wounded in Sarajevo in the 24 hours ending at 10:00 a.m. Monday morning. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1239. Sporadic gunfire continued Monday in the city, following a major Serb shelling on Sunday afternoon.

1240. In the foggy morning on Monday, heavy artillery could be heard in the west of the city, as well as heavy machine-gun and sniper fire. Police reported sporadic machine-gun fire in the Old Town, the city centre, New Sarajevo and the Dobrinja suburb throughout the night. A single mortar round fired into the city centre early Monday morning injured two civilians.

(b) Local reported events

1241. Talks held Monday at the Sarajevo airport failed to make any progress on the demilitarization of the city, the main item on the agenda. It was reported that in a repetition of past practice, the Serb side failed to send a delegate of sufficient rank, effectively precluding substantive discussions. UN officials earlier said that the airport talks would be crucial in consolidating and expanding the cease-fire.

1242. It was reported that UN agencies did not send large quantities of heating oil into Sarajevo because Serb forces would not let them due to the fact that heating oil was considered a strategic commodity because it could be used as diesel fuel for trucks and tanks.

1243. It was reported that paramilitary groups in the city "have taken control of many aspects of life in the city, causing residents to speak of Sarajevo as 'gangster city'. Robberies of cars and other valuables had become common since a martial-law decree authorized army and police units to commandeering civilian property for war use".

24. 24/11/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The Old Town and Vogošća were shelled during the day and at night a heavy artillery attack was reported on the edge of the Old Town and in Hrasno and Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Old Town (day and evening); the outlying district of Vogošća; Hrasno (evening); Dobrinja (evening). Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** At least four people were reported killed and four
injured in the day's shelling. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least four people were reported killed and four injured. 1515/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1244. Sarajevo radio reported shelling in the Old Town and in the outlying district of Vogošća. During the night there was a heavy artillery attack reported on the edge of the Old Town as well as on the suburbs of Hrasno and Dobrinja. 1516/

(b)  **Local reported events**

1245. BiH President Alija Izetbegović held talks with Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., the highest ranking American politician to visit the city since the onset of the war. "At the very least, humanitarian aid should reach the starving people", he was quoted as telling Moynihan, who arrived in the afternoon and planned to tour the city on Wednesday. 1517/

1246. The UN international humanitarian airlift to the city resumed a day after it was suspended because of fighting on the perimeter of the city's airport. The number of flights was restricted to eight of a planned 20 because of fog, UN officials said. 1518/

25. 25/11/92 (Wednesday)

(a)  **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Following a day of more than average shelling, mortar and anti-aircraft fire was reported across the Old Town throughout the night; sporadic shelling could be heard mostly in the southern part of the city and; artillery to the west intensified during the afternoon. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** The Old Town; the southern section of the city; the western section of the city (afternoon); a French relief aeroplane. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** A French aeroplane bringing food to Sarajevo was hit by small-arms fire as it landed at the airport in the afternoon. One bullet went through the wing, but the craft was not seriously damaged. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** BiH health officials said that in the 24 hours to 10:00 a.m. Wednesday, six people were killed and 50 were wounded in Sarajevo. 1519/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1247. Mortar and anti-aircraft fire was reported across the city's Old Town throughout the night. Much of the fire appeared to come from Serb-held areas around the old Jewish cemetery. The nighttime bombardment followed a day of more than average shelling in the city. 1520/ Sporadic shelling could be
heard in Sarajevo, mostly in the southern part of the city. Artillery fire to the west intensified in the afternoon. 1521/

1248. A French aeroplane bringing food to Sarajevo was hit by small-arms fire as it landed at the city's airport in the afternoon. One bullet went through the wing of the aeroplane, but the craft was not seriously damaged, and was able to fly to the Port of Split. The incident prompted officials of the UNHCR to suspend the airlift for the remainder of the day. 1522/

(b) Local reported events

1249. It was reported that truck and air deliveries of food to Sarajevo in recent days had slightly exceeded the city's daily needs of 270 metric tons. It was also reported, however, that there was almost no food in UN warehouses in the city. 1523/

1250. A seven bus evacuation convoy of around 300 non-combatants bound for Belgrade left the city in the afternoon. The convoy was organized by a charity called the Children's Embassy. A twin convoy bound for Split was unable to leave as scheduled because the buses ferrying the first convoy out of Sarajevo did not return in time to make a second journey. 1524/

26. 26/11/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy mortar and machine-gun fire was described in one report, while the city was described as relatively calm in another. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.


Description of Damage: A seven year-old girl was reportedly killed and four more children injured when a shell exploded near the city centre. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: In Dobrinja, one person was killed and one injured in a sniper attack. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: A seven-year-old girl was reported killed and four more children injured in a shell explosion near the city centre. In the suburb of Dobrinja one person was killed and one injured in a sniper attack. 1525/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1251. There was heavy mortar and machine-gun fire in Sarajevo after a night of shooting which police said was concentrated on the Old Town and one of the western suburbs. 1526/

1252. According to Radio Sarajevo, the city itself was relatively calm, but a seven-year-old girl was reported killed and four more children injured in a shell explosion near the city centre. In the suburb of Dobrinja one person was killed and one injured in a sniper attack. 1527/
(b) Local reported events

1253. The first meeting at the highest army level between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb Republic took place in Sarajevo with Lieutenant Colonel-General Ratko Mladić, Commander of the Serb forces, and General Janko Bobetko, chief of the Croatian Army General Staff. Karadžić said that he expected them to reach an agreement on the withdrawal of the Croatian army from the area of the Serb Republic. 1528/

1254. An international airlift of aid to Sarajevo resumed in the morning after being interrupted when a French aeroplane was hit by a bullet on Wednesday. 1529/

1255. Two UN escorted electricity repair missions in the city had to be abandoned because of shooting near damaged installations. One repair mission was completed successfully in the suburb of Grdonj, where five previous repair missions had to be abandoned. 1530/

(c) International reported events

1256. Peace conference co-chairman Vance met with Professor Fritz Kalshoven, Chairman of the UN Commission of Experts. 1531/

27. 27/11/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic artillery fire was reported throughout the morning. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said that four people were killed and 24 wounded in the city. 1532/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1257. Sporadic artillery fire was heard throughout the morning in Sarajevo. 1533/

(b) Local reported events

1258. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić announced in a statement that a truce was signed in Sarajevo on Thursday by Bosnian Serb military commander General Ratko Mladić and the leader of the National Guard of the Republic of Croatia, General Janko Bobetko. The cease-fire was expected to take effect at midnight on Sunday. 1534/

1259. Electricity and telephone communications were restored to the city in the evening after a day-long power outage. Electricity officials said that power had been switched off at Serb-controlled utilities on the outskirts of Sarajevo. Water and gas supplies were also affected. 1535/
1260. President Milošević met with Elie Wiesel to discuss ways of ending the war in BiH. 1536/

(c) International reported events

1261. The peace conference co-chairmen met with UNPROFOR Deputy Commander Thornberry in Geneva. 1537/

28. 28/11/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A Serb artillery attack was reported in the morning. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Sarajevo suffered another electricity shortage caused by a Serbian artillery attack in the morning. 1538/ Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, one person was killed and 24 were wounded in the city. 1539/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1262. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

1263. Sarajevo suffered another electricity shortage caused by a Serbian artillery attack in the morning. 1540/

1264. Seventeen sick children were airlifted from Sarajevo to Paris in an aeroplane provided by the French government via UNHCR. 1541/

1265. On 28-29 November the peace conference co-chairmen had a private meeting with Croatian President Tudjman at Brioni. 1542/

(c) International reported events

1266. Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ilija Djukić sent a personal message to Hamid al-Ghabid, Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), stressing that additional arms for any of the warring sides would result in the further escalation of the war with unpredictable and far-reaching consequences. The ICO ministerial organization to which this message was sent was to meet in Jedda on 1-2 December to discuss the crisis in BiH as the main point of the agenda. 1543/
29. 29/11/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1267. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

1268. Subfreezing temperatures were reported in the city. BiH officials said that power outages were caused by damage to utilities in earlier Serbian bombardments and could not be repaired before Monday. 1544/

1269. Nobel laureate Elie Wiesel visited Sarajevo. He toured a prison and met with President Izetbegović, and members of the Jewish community. He later went to the Serbian stronghold of Pale where he met with Radovan Karadžić. 1545/

30. 30/11/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that since the cease-fire on 12 November shelling in Sarajevo had been concentrated away from the old city to the suburbs of Dobrinja, Butmir, Ilidža, Mojmilo, and Bistrik. It was reported that shelling had occurred at lower levels than before the cease-fire with the exception of 22 November when Serb forces heavily shelled BiH forces who attacked the area of the military airfield south of the main runway at the airport. 1546/ UN monitors reported 117 large caliber shells hitting BiH government-held territory in the city during the 24 hour period ending Sunday evening. Forty-six shells were seen hitting Serbian positions. 1547/

Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Viktor Bubanj Prison; the Old Town District; the Parliament building; the Dobrinja area; UNPROFOR headquarters (formerly the city’s main post office). Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A mortar attack on the Viktor Bubanj Prison killed three inmates and wounded five others during morning exercises; two people were wounded by anti-aircraft and cannon fire in the Old Town district and 10 to 15 mortar rounds hit the area around the Parliament building after midnight and more than 100 shells hit Dobrinja, wounding two civilians; in the morning, the UNPROFOR headquarters received a direct hit from an anti-aircraft shell which failed to explode. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that to date in Sarajevo, 7,579 people had been killed or were missing (out of that number, 2,839 had been recorded by health organizations), 45,179 had been wounded (out of that number 12,283 had been heavily wounded), 282 people had been infected with hepatitis and two people had suffered from typhus abdominalis. 1548/ A mortar attack on the Viktor Bubanj Prison killed three inmates and wounded five others; two people were wounded by anti-aircraft and cannon fire in the Old Town area; two civilians were wounded by shelling in Dobrinja. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people had been killed and 21 injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1549/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1270. The city was reported calm in the morning although a mortar attack on the Viktor Bubanj Prison, visited on Sunday by Elie Wiesel, killed three inmates and wounded five others during the prisoners' morning exercises. 1550/ There were also reports of people injured in the Old Town and outlying Dobrinja district. Sarajevo police reported two wounded in anti-aircraft and cannon fire in the Old Town district. They said that 10 to 15 mortar rounds hit the area around the Parliament building after midnight and more than 100 shells hit Dobrinja wounding two civilians. 1551/

(b) Local reported events

1271. A weekend shutdown of electricity and natural gas left the city without heating as temperatures dropped below freezing again. Two teams of engineers went out in the morning under armed escort to repair utilities damaged in fighting. 1552/

1272. UNPROFOR reported that during November over 3800 persons attempted to cross the airport between Butmir and Dobrinja. UNPROFOR commented that the general trend was for armed men to move from Butmir to Dobrinja while unarmed men moved from Dobrinja to Butmir. Movement was reported to have taken place at night, although there was some movement during foggy days. UNPROFOR also reported that during the month of November 49 UNPROFOR flights and 415 UNHCR flights had landed. 1553/

(c) International reported events

1273. The peace conference co-chairmen attended the Extraordinary Session of the Organization of the Islamic Foreign Ministers in Jedda on 30 November to 2 December. 1554/

I. December 1992

1. 1/12/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors recorded 330 Serbian artillery rounds exploding in the city, compared to zero BiH shells landing in the surrounding Serb-held areas. Tuesday’s fighting marked an upsurge in the combat, which had decreased in Sarajevo since a 12 November cease-fire, according to Mick Magnuson, an UNPROFOR civil affairs advisor. 1555/ Source(s): United Press International.
**Targets Hit:** A US C-130 Hercules Transport aeroplane; unidentified apartment blocks in Sarajevo; Dobrinja; New Sarajevo; Stupsko Brdo. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Small-arms fire hit a US C-130 Hercules transport aeroplane as it landed at the Sarajevo airport. No one was injured; Serbian forces shelled apartment blocks in several parts of Sarajevo, injuring at least four people. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Serbian forces shelled apartment blocks in several parts of Sarajevo, injuring at least four people. In the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m., three people were killed and 31 were wounded in Sarajevo. 1556/

**Narrative of Events:**

1274. Small-arms fire hit a US C-130 Hercules transport aeroplane as it landed at the Sarajevo airport. According to UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler, no one on the aeroplane was injured, and it was able to take off for its base in Germany. It was unknown who had fired, or whether the aeroplane was deliberately targeted. 1557/ The incident forced the suspension of the humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo after 10 of a scheduled 17 flights had landed. 1558/ 1275. Heavy artillery fire prevented a UNHCR humanitarian convoy from the Croatian border town of Metkovic from entering Sarajevo, and UNHCR trucks were unable to retrieve food and medicine stocks from the airport because of the fighting. 1559/ 1276. Serbian forces shelled apartment blocks in several parts of Sarajevo, injuring at least four people. 1560/ There was fighting in the south-western suburb of Dobrinja with artillery and machine-gun fire, and mortar attacks on New Sarajevo and Stupsko Brdo. 1561/

(b) **Local reported events**

1277. UN-sponsored talks opened Tuesday morning on establishing the demilitarization of Sarajevo, a day after negotiations failed to arrange an exchange of war prisoners. 1562/

(c) **International reported events**

1278. The Islamic Conference Organization called for military intervention in BiH and for the arming of Bosnian Muslims. 1563/

2. 2/12/92 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serb artillery bombarded Sarajevo and the outer districts of Oteš and Stup overnight. Much of the shellfire appeared to be directed at BiH military positions on the outskirts of the city. Battles were fought in the western suburb of Oteš during the day as Serb forces used mortars and heavy machine-guns to attack BiH defenders holed up in apartment buildings and farm houses. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.
Targets Hit: Oteš; Stup (overnight); government positions near the BiH Parliament. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International, BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that nine people had been killed and 74 injured on this day in Sarajevo. 1564/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1279. Serb artillery bombarded Sarajevo and the outer districts of Oteš and Stup throughout the night. BiH government positions near parliament were hit, and heavy machine-gun fire was reported in the inner Hrasno and Old Town areas. 1565/ Much of the Serbian tank and artillery fire overnight and Wednesday appeared to be directed at BiH military positions on the outskirts of the city. 1566/

1280. Battles were fought in the city's western suburb of Oteš during the day as Serb forces used mortars and heavy machine-guns to attack BiH defenders holed up in apartment buildings and farm houses. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said the fighting followed a Muslim attack on Serb positions nearby. 1567/ BiH military sources claimed that nine Serbian tanks were destroyed and three captured in BiH infantry operations. 1568/

(b) Local reported events

1281. Lance Corporal Brian Neilson, a Danish soldier serving with UNPROFOR was kidnapped Wednesday afternoon while jogging near the town of Kiseljak outside Sarajevo. He was held for more than seven hours by unidentified captors. Canadian Commander Barry Frewer, a spokesman for the UN command, said that UNPROFOR was considering the kidnapping an "isolated incident". 1569/

(c) International reported events

1282. US officials were reported as saying that Serbia was routinely violating the UN ban on flights over BiH and were consulting with European allies on a possible resolution to authorize the use of force to stop the flights. 1570/

3. 3/12/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: During the 24 hour period ending at midnight Thursday, UN military observers reported 1284 artillery and mortar shells fired by Serbian forces into BiH government-controlled areas. During the same time, they observed only 20 shells fired by the city's defenders. 1571/ The heaviest fighting occurred in Oteš where UN monitors unofficially counted 528 incoming shells between 2:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m.. During that time they observed only 20 shells fired by the city's defenders. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Oteš; Azići; Bare and other western suburbs near the road to the airport; Ilidža; Blažuj. Source(s): United Press International.
Description of Damage: The heaviest fighting occurred in Oteš where UN monitors unofficially counted 528 incoming shells between 2:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. Most of the 47 wounded and seven dead reported by city hospitals by early afternoon were from Oteš. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Most of the 47 wounded and seven dead reported by city hospitals by early afternoon were from Oteš. 1572/ The Sarajevo crisis centre reported 41 killed and 118 wounded in the past 24 hours, the highest daily toll for weeks. 1573/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 22 people had been killed and 47 injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1574/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1283. Serb artillery and mortar fire hit Muslim-held suburbs through the night into Thursday. Sarajevo radio reported Serb infantry attacks on Oteš, Azići, Bare, and other western suburbs near the road to the airport. 1575/ Heavy shelling was also reported in the suburbs of Ilidža and Blažuj, according to Tanjug, the official Yugoslav news agency. 1576/ The city's centre was relatively quiet. 1577/

1284. The heaviest fighting occurred in Oteš, where UN monitors unofficially counted 528 incoming artillery shells between 2:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. Most of the 47 wounded and seven dead reported by city hospitals by early afternoon were from Oteš. 1578/

1285. Soldiers from the Oteš front line reported a Serb breakthrough Thursday morning after they took three strategically-placed houses Wednesday which permitted them to fire directly onto BiH positions. Later in the day, BiH forces reportedly retook one of the houses and destroyed two Serbian armoured personnel carriers and a tank. BiH radio quoted local Croat commander Franjo Talijani as saying his men had repulsed a heavy infantry attack on the suburb. Talijani also said the task of defending Oteš was complicated by civilians trying to flee to neighbouring Stup who were unable to get through because of heavy shelling. 1579/

1286. A UN transport aeroplane carrying General Phillipe Morillon, commander of UNPROFOR in BiH, was struck by six bullets shortly after take-off from Sarajevo at 4:00 PM, causing minor damage to the Russian-made Antonov-12 aircraft. No one was injured and the aeroplane continued on to Zagreb. The UN suspended all flights related to peace-keeping operations for 48 hours. 1580/

(b) Local reported events

1287. Sarajevo airport also remained closed to relief flights Thursday, following Tuesday's shooting at a US relief aeroplane. The decision to keep the airport closed was reached by UNHCR in Geneva. 1581/

4. 4/12/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces continued their shelling of Sarajevo Friday. Staff at UN headquarters were forced to take shelter in the basement twice due to the intensity of the shelling. UN artillery monitors
reported that Serb forces fired at least 1,480 shells into parts of Sarajevo controlled by the BiH government. Just 30 shells were seen falling into Serbian positions. UN officials estimated that some 1,500 shells hit Oteš on Thursday and Friday, up from a daily average of 500 to 600 on Tuesday and Wednesday. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** The area to the rear and sides of Oteš (Stup, Nedžarići, Mojmilo, Dobrinja and Alipašin Most); the perimeter of the city in the north. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 10 people had been killed and 100 injured on this day in Sarajevo. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1288. UNPROFOR reported the heaviest shelling in some time. It was reported that the BiH forces may have tried attacking out of the west side of the city to gain control of the access route. The Serbs then responded with heavy shelling and then attacked Oteš with tanks. In doing so, UNPROFOR believed that they shelled the area to the rear and sides of Oteš (Stup, Nedžarići, Mojmilo, Dobrinja and Alipašin Most) which were held by Muslims. It was felt that they may have done this to prevent BiH from bringing forward reinforcements. It was noted that during the shelling the Serbs used the complete range of fuses available to them, i.e., air burst, delayed and point detonating. The Serbs were believed to have held a large portion of Oteš. There were also other reports of shelling on the perimeter of the city in the north. Source(s): United Press International.

1289. Another report described the continued battle for the suburb of Oteš, six miles from the city centre. BiH forces there armed with home-made anti-tank rockets held their ground against the Serbian thrust. UN officials estimated that some 1,500 shells hit Oteš on Thursday and Friday, up from a daily average of 500 to 600 on Tuesday and Wednesday. An estimated 2,000 civilians were trapped in the suburb by the fighting. Local officials said they had attempted to obtain UNPROFOR assistance to evacuate sick people and children from Oteš, but that no UNPROFOR personnel had visited the village since the assault on Oteš began Tuesday. The fighting forced an estimated 600 residents to flee Oteš on Friday.

5. 5/12/92 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The Sarajevo suburb of Oteš fell to the Serbian forces and for the first time in days, downtown Sarajevo came under heavy fire. Source(s): Washington Post; United Press International.
Targets Hit: Districts around Oteš including Stupsko Brdo, Stup and Azići; the Holiday Inn; a 21 story apartment building across the street from the Holiday Inn; the Old Town and the neighbourhoods between the Holiday Inn and the airport; the terminal building at the Sarajevo airport. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Description of Damage: The Holiday Inn was hit by tracer bullets which started a fire which was quickly extinguished; across the road from the hotel, a long burst by automatic weapons caused a fire in a 21 story apartment building; one of Sarajevo’s main hospitals reported receiving 20 injured people in the first half hour of shelling; a mortar round hit the terminal building at Sarajevo airport, slightly wounding two Portuguese UNPROFOR soldiers. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One of Sarajevo's main hospitals reported receiving 20 injured people in the first half hour of shelling of the city. 1590/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 11 people were killed and 131 were injured in Sarajevo on this day. 1591/ Source(s): United Press International; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1291. The Sarajevo suburb of Oteš fell to the Serbs Saturday, according to some reports, after Bosnian Muslim defenders ran out of ammunition. Serb tanks rolled into Oteš, which juts into the western outskirts of the city near the airport. Its fall gave the Serbs control of the western side of Sarajevo. The Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug said both sides sustained heavy casualties. 1592/ Bosnian Serb television showed Serb troops walking thorough part of Oteš. 1593/ BiH radio reported only that the defenders had withdrawn to a second line of defence and were being reinforced. 1593/

1292. The BiH army general staff said in a statement carried by radio that Oteš had been almost totally destroyed. UN officials said the BiH army had asked for help in evacuating 10,000 civilians from Oteš, but UNPROFOR could not assist them because of the heavy shelling. 1594/ Hundreds of civilians fleeing Oteš had to make their way along the river bank because the only road connecting Oteš with Sarajevo was cut by Serb artillery. An unknown number of civilians died when Serb artillery fire was directed towards the river. 1595/ UN officials estimated that 500 civilians remained trapped in the suburb. 1596/

1293. BiH radio reported sporadic Serb shelling of districts around Oteš, including Stupsko Brdo, Stup and Azići. 1597/

1294. UN military observers believed that the Serb offensive against Oteš was the most intense battle to date in the Sarajevo area. According to Colonel Richard Mole, a Briton heading the UN team of military observers in Sarajevo, Oteš had been the target of 1,500 rounds of artillery and tank fire Thursday and Friday. UN officials said that more than 100 civilians died in the siege of Oteš. 1598/

1295. For the first time in days, downtown Sarajevo came under heavy fire. The Holiday Inn was hit by tracer bullets, which started a fire. It was quickly extinguished. Across the road from the hotel, a long burst of automatic weapons caused a fire in a 21 story apartment building. 1599/ The Old Town and neighbourhoods between the Holiday Inn and the airport were also targets. One of Sarajevo’s main hospitals reported receiving 20 injured people in the first half hour of shelling. 1600/
1296. The top UN commander in Sarajevo, Brigadier-General Adnan Abdelrazek, Egyptian commander of 1,400 troops in and around the city, expressed his opinion that the warring parties should be warned that UN troops would be used to end the fighting and that those responsible for the bloodshed would be publicly tried. He conceded that there was no hope of securing observance of the 12 November cease-fire and that the UN mission was powerless to stop the carnage. Shortly after he spoke, a mortar round hit the terminal building at Sarajevo airport, slightly wounding two Portuguese police officers attached to the UN peace-keeping force. 1601/

(b) Local reported events

1297. The Sarajevo airport remained closed following attacks on a US relief aeroplane and a UN aeroplane carrying Major General Phillipe Morillon earlier in the week.

1298. Electricity was suspended Saturday afternoon after one of two cables supplying power to the city was damaged. 1602/

6. 6/12/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN military observers recorded 12 artillery rounds fired from BiH positions in the 24 hour period ending 10:30 p.m. Sunday, while 711 Serbian rounds fell on BiH-held areas. 1603/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Oteš; Hrasnica, Butmir, and Sokolovići on the western outskirts of the city; the BiH Presidency (five direct hits); the Koševno Hospital complex (30 shells). Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Description of Damage: The offices of the BiH Presidency received five direct hits in the afternoon; more than 30 shells landed in the Koševno hospital complex. One nurse was killed in the attack. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said that 26 people died and 108 were injured in Sarajevo during a 24 hour period ending 10:00 a.m. Sunday. But officials could not obtain a count from the suburb of Oteš. 1604/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1299. The town of Oteš, six miles from the centre of Sarajevo on the approach to the airport, was overrun and destroyed by Serbian forces. Heavy shelling was reported. 1605/ Combined Muslim and Croat forces established a new line of defence between Oteš and the nearby suburb of Stup 1606/

1300. The BiH army announced Sunday that it had captured the villages of Orlić and Živkočići, to the north-west of the city, leaving the single Serb stronghold of Žuč Hill in that sector. 1607/

1301. Heavy artillery barrages were reported in the suburbs of Hrasnica, Butmir and Sokolovići on the western outskirts of the city. Mortar and small-arms fire could be heard around the city all day. 1608/
1302. Shelling continued in Sarajevo. The offices of the BiH Presidency in downtown Sarajevo received five direct hits Sunday afternoon. More than 30 shells landed in the city’s Koševo hospital complex. One nurse was killed in the attack, according to Sarajevo radio. 1609/

(b) Local reported events

1303. Sarajevo was without telephone service on Sunday, and most of the city had no electricity.

1304. The humanitarian airlift into Sarajevo remained suspended because of security concerns. 1610/

1305. Three UNHCR land convoys were stopped before reaching the city. Fifteen trucks had to unload at the airport because the road into Sarajevo was judged unsafe, and two convoys from the Croatian port of Split had to stop at Kiseljak, 15 miles west of Sarajevo, because of heavy fighting. 1611/

1306. Vladimir Kalea, president of the Sarajevo taxi-drivers' association, appealed to fellow taxi-drivers around the world for financial assistance. Throughout the war, Sarajevo taxi-drivers had voluntarily transported the wounded, elderly, and sick. As of Sunday, an estimated 50 of the pre-war fleet of 2,500 cabs was still operating. An estimated 350 taxi drivers and truckers had been killed. 1612/

7. 7/12/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serb forces shelled BiH forces trying to break through Serb lines to the north of the city. Snipers were active and the main hospital was shelled in the city. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Targets Hit:** Sarajevo's main hospital (32 shells). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Snipers were active in Sarajevo Monday, driving most people off the streets. Cars were fired on near the Yugoslav army's former Maršal Tito Barracks. 1613/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that in Sarajevo to date, 7,694 people had been killed or were missing (of this number, 2,924 of the killed had been registered in health organizations), 45,691 had been wounded (13,086 were heavily wounded and 1,800 were listed as invalids). Of these numbers, 779 children were listed as killed or missing, 11,422 were listed as wounded (1,780 were heavily wounded), and 177 were listed as invalids. 1614/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1307. A BiH counter-attack was reported with heavy casualties. 1615/ Serb artillery pounded BiH forces trying to break through Serb lines to the north of the city. Sarajevo radio claimed that BiH troops to the north had pushed to the outskirts of the Serb-held suburb of Vogošća, where a major Serb ammunition factory was located. BiH troops in the south-west had captured
Bačević, where Sarajevo's main water wells were located. Other BiH advances were made at Žuč and Trebević, cutting off Iliđa from the Serb headquarters in Pale. But the Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug reported later that the Muslim offensives were pushed back. The reports could not be independently confirmed. 1616/

1308. It was reported by the BiH Health Ministry that 32 shells hit Sarajevo's main hospital. 1617/ Sylvana Foa, spokeswoman for UNHCR, said that UN equipment at the airport was hit by mortar shelling several times. 1618/

(b) Local reported events

1309. The UN-sponsored humanitarian airlift remained suspended. Sylvana Foa, spokeswoman for UNHCR, said that UN equipment at the airport was hit by mortar shelling several times. Water supplies and telephone service in the city were disrupted. 1619/

(c) International reported events

1310. The Yugoslav government described as "directly endorsing further escalation of the war conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina", the decision by the Turkish government to present the country's parliament with a proposal to send Turkish troops into BiH. 1620/

8. 8/12/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting continued on the boundaries of the city after BiH forces continued a two-day counter-offensive. The UNPROFOR headquarters was shelled. Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: Shellfire hit the UN mission at about 4:40 p.m., injuring one person and forcing staffers into the basement. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The city's medical crisis centre reported 21 dead and 116 wounded in Sarajevo in the 24 hours up to 10:00 a.m. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1311. Fighting continued on the boundaries of the city as the BiH forces continued a two-day-old counter-offensive to recapture strategic fringe areas from Serbian troops. The BiH army claimed to have captured Vidikovac Hill, on the northern end of the city. 1621/

1312. Shellfire hit the UN mission at about 4:40 p.m., injuring one person. Staffers rushed to the basement, where they remained for about 40 minutes. 1622/
(b) Local reported events

1313. Serbian tanks seized a checkpoint on the road to the airport and placed a container across the road, in violation of an airlift security agreement brokered by UNPROFOR officials on Monday. French troops providing security at the airport withdrew from the checkpoint earlier after being fired upon. The incident dashed hopes that the humanitarian airlift could be resumed immediately. Food stocks were depleted, with UN officials estimating a one-day supply remaining in airport warehouses. 1623/

1314. Sarajevo was again without water, electricity and telephone lines.

1315. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA announced an offer to permit anyone to leave Sarajevo unhindered. UN officials were skeptical, suggesting the move might be intended to head off growing pressure for foreign military involvement. 1624/

(c) International reported events

1316. BiH and Croatian delegations refused to sit at the same negotiating table with Serbians. 1625/

1317. On 8-9 December the peace conference co-chairmen attended separate high-level meetings on constitutional arrangements with the three different parties, chaired by Mr. Ahtisaari. 1626/

9. 9/12/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors recorded 439 shells fired by Serbian gunners, while BiH defenders fired six shells. 1627/ Serb artillery continued to bombard Muslim-held districts of the city. Source(s): United Press International; Washington Post.

Targets Hit: An unidentified bread line in one of the Muslim district of the city; Košev Hospital Complex (Psychiatric Unit); the area near the BiH Presidency building; BiH positions on Žuć Hill; the area near the city centre headquarters of the UN command; BiH-held villages to the north of Sarajevo. Source(s): Washington Post; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Five people were killed and dozens others wounded after a bread line was shelled in an unidentified Muslim district of the city; one patient was injured when the Košev Hospital Complex (Psychiatric Unit) was hit by shell fire. Source(s): Washington Post; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Civilians ran for cover as Serbian snipers fired into surrounding streets and near the state-run hospital (Košev). Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: BiH health officials said that 32 people were killed and 249 wounded in fighting around the republic in the 24 hour period up to 10:00 a.m. In Sarajevo, 24 people died and 174 were wounded. 1628/ Source(s): United Press International.
1318. Serb artillery continued to bombard Muslim districts of the city, killing five people standing in line for bread and wounding dozens of others. 1629/

1319. Civilians ran for cover in Sarajevo as Serbian snipers fired into surrounding streets and near the state-run hospital. Dr. Jovo Vranić, director of the emergency centre at Koševo Hospital Complex, said one patient was injured when the hospital’s psychiatric unit was hit by shell fire. He said 59 casualties had been treated at the hospital since 8:00 a.m. Wednesday, most of them for shrapnel wounds, and that between 70 and 80 shells had landed in the hospital complex since the weekend. Thirty-four people were treated for shrapnel and bullet wounds at the hospital, according to Dr. Ranko Čović of the hospital's emergency centre. 1630/

1320. Several shells exploded near the BiH Presidency building on the edge of the Old Town. Serbian multiple rocket launchers attacked BiH positions on Žuč Hill, in the north of Sarajevo, where BiH and Serbian troops were engaged in a struggle for control of strategic high ground. 1631/

1321. There were explosions near the city centre headquarters of the UN command for BiH. Serb artillery also fired down on BiH-held villages to the north of Sarajevo. 1632/

(b) Local reported events

1322. The road link between the city and the airport was reopened Wednesday morning when Serbian tanks withdrew from a checkpoint along the airport road, but the humanitarian airlift remained suspended. 1633/

1323. Electricity repair missions under UNPROFOR protection had to abandon their efforts because of shelling; the city remained without electricity for a fourth day. 1634/

1324. The Serbian Supreme Court ruled that Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić, the challenger, could run in Serbia's upcoming presidential election. 1635/

(c) International reported events

1325. In New York, the United Nations Security Council warned Serbian forces that it would consider taking "further measures" if they did not stop attacking Sarajevo and UN peace-keeping troops. The Council said in a statement that it was "particularly alarmed" at reports of Serbian pressure on the civilian population to leave Sarajevo and warned that "further aggravation" of the situation in and around the city would result in "grave consequences for the overall situation of that country". "If such attacks and actions continue, the Council will have to consider, as soon as possible, further measures against those who commit or support them to ensure the security of the UN Protection Force, its ability to fulfil its mandate and compliance by all parties with the Council's relevant resolutions", the statement said. 1636/
10. 10/12/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors reported reduced shelling in Sarajevo on Thursday, with 91 heavy rounds landing on Serbian positions and 35 heavy rounds fired into BiH-controlled areas. 

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Thirteen people were reported killed in the 24 hours up until Thursday morning.

Narrative of Events:
1326. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

1327. High-ranking military officers from five nations supplying aeroplanes for the Sarajevo airlift met in Zagreb and decided against resuming the operation. The airlift was suspended 1 December when a US cargo aeroplane was fired upon.

1328. Most homes were without electricity or water Thursday night as temperatures plunged.

11. 11/12/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors reported reduced shelling in the Sarajevo area.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
1329. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

1330. Sarajevo airport was scheduled to reopen Friday, but an UNPROFOR official said it remained closed due to poor weather conditions.

1331. Sarajevo had no electricity or telephone communications Friday; only a
small number of homes had water supplies. 1643/

1332. Two food convoys arrived in the city with 280 tons of food. 1644/

1333. Five hundred fifty peace activists made their way into Sarajevo, and were delayed by Serbian forces until each member of the group signed a document assuming responsibility for the risky trip. 1645/

(c) International reported events

1334. United States President-elect Clinton issued a statement calling for the US and its allies to do whatever it took to enforce the ban on Serbian flights over BiH. This was perceived by many as a critique of President Bush’s policy. 1646/

12. 12/12/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The northern part of Sarajevo was reported under heavy machine-gun fire early and small-arms fire was heaviest around the Serb-held territory in the centre of the city. In the evening, BiH positions around Vogošća came under small-arms fire and sporadic shelling. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Serb-held territory in the heart of the city; BiH positions around Vogošća; the area near General Morillon’s UN headquarters. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH government crisis centre in Sarajevo reported that the official number of dead during the war was now 17,622 in Muslim and Croat controlled areas, and 2,924 in Sarajevo. 1647/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1335. The northern portion of Sarajevo was reported under heavy machine-gun fire early Saturday and small-arms fire was heaviest around Serb-held territory in the heart of the city. During the night BiH positions around Vogošća, just north of Sarajevo, came under small-arms fire and sporadic shelling. 1648/

1336. Shells landed near General Phillipe Morillon's headquarters in the city. He told reporters he planned a new attempt to convince the warring parties to cease hostilities. 1649/

(b) Local reported events

1337. The city remained without electricity and telephone service and interrupted water service. 1650/

1338. BiH President Alija Izetbegović returned to Sarajevo aboard the first UN flight since the city airport was closed 4 December. 1651/
13. 13/12/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** After BiH forces reportedly gained control of Žuč hill, Serb artillery began pounding the area. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Žuč Hill. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

1339. UNPROFOR confirmed the BiH claim that they had wrested control of strategic Žuč hill north of the city from Serb forces. UNPROFOR sources said Serb artillery was pounding the hill commanding the northern approaches to the capital. 1652/

(b) Local reported events

1340. Senior officials of warring Muslim, Croat and Serb forces in BiH renewed a cease-fire (reportedly the 19th) Sunday and agreed in principle to open three corridors for the safe passage of civilians out of Sarajevo. The agreement was signed by Serbian General Milan Gvero, Colonel Stjepan Šiber of the predominantly Muslim Slav BiH army and Dario Kordić of the Croatian Defence Council. Shelling was audible throughout the cease-fire talks, and small-arms and machine-gun fire could be heard later. 1653/

1341. Sarajevo continued to be without power, fuel, running water or telephones. 1654/

14. 14/12/92 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Despite a new cease-fire agreement, shell fire was reported in the morning in the Old Town and western areas, as well as on Žuč Hill which was captured last week by BiH forces. Koševo Hospital was hit again. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Old Town; western areas of the city; Žuč Hill; the Koševo Hospital Complex; the area near the vehicle of Paddy Ashdown who was visiting British troops; the garden of UNPROFOR General Morillon's residence; three power substations. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Two direct hits were reported on the Koševo Hospital Complex; shellfire heavily damaged three substations supplying power to the mainwater pumping installations in the western suburb of Bačev. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire was reported in the streets of Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that seven people were
killed and 83 wounded in Sarajevo on this date. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1342. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo had been going through a period of consolidation. Near the western end of the runway, Oteš and Azići were in Serb hands. In the north, Žuč and Vis were in BiH hands. Serbs had gained a little ground near Betanija in the north of the old city. In the Dolovi, the BiH forces had pushed out to the south.

1343. Despite a new cease-fire agreement signed a day earlier, Sarajevo residents awoke to Serb shell-fire into the Old Town and western areas. Serbs also fired on Žuč Hill, a strategic mount on the city's northern edge captured by BiH forces last week, according to Sarajevo radio. Talks on implementing the day-old cease-fire foundered on a BiH demand for a withdrawal of Serb military weaponry at least 20 miles from the airport, so that it would be out of range of three proposed UN-protected corridors for civilian movement in and out of Sarajevo.

1344. At least three people were reported killed and 28 others wounded as Serbian snipers fired at those who ventured into the streets. Serbian artillery blasted civilian targets, scoring two direct hits on the Koševo hospital complex. A mortar bomb exploded near the vehicle of Paddy Ashdown, the British Liberal Democratic Party leader, who was visiting British troops protecting UN aid convoys.

1345. A UNPROFOR spokesman said shellfire heavily damaged three substations supplying power to the main water pumping installations in the western suburb of Bacevo.

(b) **Local reported events**

1346. Sarajevo went another day without electricity, as its two main hospitals exhausted fuel supplies for their generators. Serb commanders refused to allow relief donors to provide fuel to the city's residents because they regarded it as a strategic military material. UNPROFOR arranged an emergency shipment of 6,000 litres of fuel to the State Hospital from its own supplies, as UNHCR had depleted its stocks.

1347. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić reportedly told a news conference in Belgrade that the Assembly of the Serb Republic would endorse a declaration on ending the war in BiH at a session to be held on 17 December.

1348. Yugoslav President Čosić endorsed Prime Minister Panić in his bid to oust Serbian President Milošević in the coming election.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that seven people were killed and 108 wounded in Sarajevo. 1665/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1349. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that seven people were killed and 108 wounded in Sarajevo. 1666/

(b) Local reported events

1350. Colonel Stjepan Siber, the deputy commander of the main headquarters of the BiH forces said that he lodged sharp protests with UNPROFOR, stating that Serb forces refused to withdraw their heavy artillery weapons from within a 30 kilometre radius of Sarajevo airport. 1667/

1351. British Liberal Democratic Party leader Paddy Ashdown called for military intervention to prevent the fall of Sarajevo. Ashdown met with BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić, and was scheduled to meet with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. 1668/

(c) International reported events

1352. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stripped Yugoslavia of its membership and divided its $15 billion foreign debt among the successor states. 1669/

16. 16/12/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as quiet for a few hours, but fighting resumed in the afternoon. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: An unidentified residential district. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Three children were killed and one was wounded when a mortar hit an unidentified residential district. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Those entering the State Hospital facility had to run for cover from sniper volleys. 1670/ Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Three children were killed and one was wounded when a mortar hit an unidentified residential district. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that seven people were killed and 49 injured on this day in Sarajevo. 1671/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1353. The city was quiet for a few hours Wednesday, but fighting resumed in the afternoon. In one incident, three children were killed and one was wounded when a mortar hit a residential district. 1672/
(b) Local reported events

1354. A BiH government boycott of UN-sponsored talks endangered a plan to establish safe corridors for civilians in and out of Sarajevo, where residents endured another freezing day without electricity or water. Fog also crushed hopes that the UNHCR could resume the humanitarian airlift that was suspended 1 December after a small-arms attack on a US transport aeroplane. UN food supplies ran out.

1355. Conditions at the city's two main hospitals worsened. An emergency supply of fuel from UNPROFOR provided the State Hospital enough power to have minimal electricity for eight hours for six days. The facility was without heat and relied on a tanker truck for a daily ration of water. The area around the State Hospital was within sniper range of Serb-held Grbavica. Those entering the facility reportedly had to run for cover from sniper volleys.

1356. Doctors at Koševo hospital estimated that between 70 and 80 Serbian shells hit the centre's buildings during the previous week's fighting. Lack of electricity, heating and water, and depletion of medical supplies impaired hospital operations.

(c) International reported events

1357. US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger announced in Geneva the names of leaders "who directly controlled persons who committed war crimes and perhaps issued orders to carry out those crimes". He also called for the enforcement of the no-fly zone and the lifting of the arms embargo. He insisted that the West would "stand for nothing less than the restoration of the independent state of Bosnia-Hercegovina with its territory undivided and intact; the return of all refugees to their homes and villages; and, indeed, a day of reckoning for those found guilty of crimes against humanity".

17. 17/12/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as relatively quiet as heavy fog reduced shelling. Source(s): New York Times; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that three people were killed and 26 injured on this day in Sarajevo. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1358. Sarajevo was reported to be relatively quiet Thursday, as heavy fog reduced shelling in the city.
(b) Local reported events

1359. UN officials cancelled talks between the warring factions scheduled at Sarajevo airport when the BiH government boycotted for a third day. 1680/

1360. The telephone service remained out, and there was no power or running water. UN officials reported that 26 of the last 33 UN-escorted utility repair missions were cancelled, because fighting blocked efforts to restore essential services. 1681/

1361. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegović in Zagreb. Lord Owen met with Fikret Abdić, member of the BiH Presidency in Velika Kladuša (Biha pocket). 1682/

(c) International reported events

1362. NATO agreed to provide troops if the UN voted to enforce the ban on flights over BiH. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić warned that UN troops in BiH might be attacked if Western nations attempted to enforce the ban on flights. 1683/

18. 18/12/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Small-arms fire was reported near the airport and intermittent shelling was reported in central Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Central Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that six people were killed and 24 injured on this day in Sarajevo. 1684/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1363. Small-arms fire rang out from houses surrounding the airport as Lord David Owen landed in Sarajevo. Intermittent explosions could also be heard in central Sarajevo. 1685/

(b) Local reported events

1364. Lord Owen and General Morillon took an armoured car to the Presidency Building, where they held meetings with Vice President Ejup Ganić and Prime Minister Milorad Dodik and obtained their agreement to return to the talks, which resumed at 2:30 p.m. After addressing the talks, Owen travelled to the nearby stronghold of Lukavica for a meeting with Karadžić and his military chief, General Ratko Mladić. 1686/

1365. On 18-21 December Lord Owen visited Sarajevo, Kiseljak and Pale for talks with senior political and military leaders of the warring parties. 1687/
1366. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić was elected president of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina". 1688/

(c) International reported events

1367. In New York, the General Assembly decided to recommend that force be used to stop the fighting after 15 January unless the Yugoslav union of Serbia and Montenegro respected all relevant resolutions pertaining to the conflict. The General Assembly also called on the Security Council to exempt BiH from the arms embargo. 1689/

1368. The UN Security Council condemned Serb-run detention centres and mass rapes in BiH. 1690/

19. 19/12/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces shelled the Old Town and sporadic gunfire and other explosions hit other areas of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area; other areas of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Health Ministry reported that seven people were killed and 46 injured on this day in Sarajevo. 1691/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1369. Serb forces shelled Sarajevo's Old Town, and sporadic gunfire and other explosions rocked other areas of the city. 1692/

(b) Local reported events

1370. Lord Owen met with Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and with BiH President Alija Izetbegović. Owen told Karadžić that the indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo was a "disgrace" and could not be allowed to continue. Owen met with Karadžić in his stronghold of Pale, just east of Sarajevo, as gunners directed fresh bursts of mortar and anti-aircraft fire into the city. 1693/

1371. Later in the day, BiH, Serbian and Croatian negotiators met at Sarajevo airport for talks on reaffirming an unobserved 12 November truce and creating protected corridors for civilian movement in and out of the city. 1694/

20. 20/12/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Two UN monitors reported that 253 shells fell on Serbian positions around the city and 188 shells landed on BiH controlled
areas. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** The city centre and nearby areas. Source(s): United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that six people were killed and 25 injured in Sarajevo. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1372. Sarajevo residents spent a 13th day without electricity and a seventh without water as Serbian mortar and anti-aircraft gunners fired sporadically into the heart of the city and nearby areas. 1697/

(b) **Local reported events**

1373. Lord Owen met a third day with Serb leader Karadžić and announced that he would extend his mission in Sarajevo another day. A UN spokesman said that BiH second-in-command Colonel Stjepan Šiber, Bosnian Serb General Milan Gvero and Croatian Colonel Dario Kordić began detailed negotiations Sunday on the withdrawal of forces from around Sarajevo and the establishment of civilian corridors. 1698/

1374. Sarajevo residents spent a 13th day without electricity and a seventh without water as Serbian mortar and anti-aircraft gunners fired sporadically into the heart of the city and nearby areas. Irfan Durmić, chief of the Elektroprenos electricity supply company in Sarajevo, said repair teams were dispatched only twice in the past 13 days because of fighting near utility installations. 1699/

1375. Two UN flights into the city were cancelled because of bad weather. 1700/

1376. Voters in Yugoslavia reelected Serbian President Milošević with 56 per cent of the vote, though Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić (34 per cent) and the opposition alleged fraud and demanded a new election. 1701/

(c) **International reported events**

1377. United States President Bush and British Prime Minister Major released a joint statement calling for military enforcement of the no-fly zone. Intelligence reports reportedly claimed that Serbian aeroplanes had violated the UN measure over 200 times since October. 1702/

1378. US Secretary of State Eagleburger said that he "ran into an absolute stone wall" in discussions with European leaders on lifting the arms embargo. 1703/
21. 21/12/92 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fighting continued with anti-aircraft and heavy machine-gun fire in the centre of the city. The Bosnian Serb news agency reported that the fighting was worst in the west and north-western parts of the city. Sarajevo radio reported that Muslim and Croat forces pushed Serb fighters back 250 yards in an advance on Vogošća. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** The State hospital reported that one person was treated for sniper wounds. Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** BiH health officials said that nine people were killed in Sarajevo in the 24 hour period up to 10:00 a.m. Monday. Another 53 were wounded. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

1379. Fighting continued Monday, with anti-aircraft and heavy machine-gun fire in the centre of the city. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said that the fighting was worst in the west and north-western parts of the city. Muslim-controlled Sarajevo radio said Muslim and Croat forces pushed Serb fighters back 250 yards in an advance on Vogošća outside Sarajevo.

1380. Doctors at the State Hospital said Monday was quiet, with just 1 person treated for sniper wounds.

(b) **Local reported events**

1381. Lord Owen met with Serb leader Karadžić for three hours outside of Sarajevo Monday, then returned for more talks with BiH Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. Owen reported that Karadžić agreed to cooperate in restoring heat to Sarajevo's hospitals and agreed to a plan to evacuate 1,500 mainly sick people by Christmas.

1382. The humanitarian airlift resumed after a three-week suspension. A UNHCR spokesman said that only 12 of a planned 18 flights arrived at the Sarajevo airport due to bad weather.

22. 22/12/92 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UN monitors said 17 shells landed Tuesday in Serb-controlled areas, while 90 shells fell in BiH government-controlled areas. The Bosnian Serb news agency reported fighting in the suburbs and Sarajevo radio reported Serb artillery fire in the Vogošća area and mortar fire on Kobilja Glava. There was small-arms fire reported in the city centre. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** The Vogošća area; Kobilja Glava. Source(s): United Press International.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1383. Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA and BiH radio reported fighting in the suburbs of Sarajevo. There was sporadic small-arms fire in the centre of the city. Sarajevo Radio also reported Serb artillery fire in the Vogošća area north of the city and mortar fire on nearby Kobilja Glava.

(b) Local reported events

1384. UN-sponsored talks between commanders of the warring factions in Sarajevo continued. A spokesman for the UN command in BiH said that UN troops would be deployed in a buffer zone between BiH government and Serb troops outside the Sarajevo airport.

1385. The humanitarian airlift which had been resumed a day earlier continued, though hampered by poor weather. Only three flights made it into Sarajevo. The truck convoys also resumed, after being stopped for a week by fighting. 52 trucks arrived from the Croatian town of Metković and Belgrade with 600 tons of aid, the largest one-day UNHCR consignment to the city to date.

23. 23/12/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic artillery fire in the centre of the city escalated after dark. Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said three people were killed and 22 wounded in the 24 hour period ending 10:00 a.m. Wednesday. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1386. Sporadic artillery fire in the centre of Sarajevo escalated after dark.

(b) Local reported events

1387. UNHCR scheduled 18 humanitarian aid flights into Sarajevo carrying 180 tons of food and medicine. Seventeen aeroplanes arrived. Road convoys arrived from the Croatian border town of Metković and Belgrade with a total of 36 trucks. Total aid flown and brought in by truck on Wednesday amounted to 477 tons. Residents remained without electricity or running water. UN officials said a major supply of diesel fuel was delivered to Koševno hospital, fulfilling Lord Owen's promise to ensure the hospital would be adequately heated.
1388. UNHCR evacuated 15 wounded children and their relatives out of Sarajevo, and the BiH government agreed to allow a pre-Christmas evacuation of another 1,500 sick and wounded. UN officials also pressed BiH officials to return to the negotiating table. 1718/

24. 24/12/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN officers estimated that about 400 artillery, tank and mortar shells exploded in the city. 1719/ Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Vogošeća (evening); UN Headquarters (two shells); the western part of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: A British officer was slightly wounded as two mortar shells exploded in the compound of the UN command headquarters; eight casualties were admitted to the State Hospital, six of whom were wounded in a single explosion in the western part of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said three people were killed and 22 wounded in Sarajevo in the 24 hour period ending 10:00 a.m. Thursday. Eight casualties were admitted to the State Hospital, six of whom were wounded from a single explosion in the western part of the city. One was in serious condition. 1720/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1389. The escalation in fighting that began Wednesday night continued into Thursday. Serbian forces fired artillery rounds into the city; heavy machine-gun fire occurred around the Serb-held enclave of Grbavica in the centre of Sarajevo; the Serb-held northern suburb of Vogošeća came under artillery fire during the night. A British officer was slightly wounded as two mortar shells exploded in the compound of the UN command headquarters. 1721/

1390. Eight casualties were admitted to the State Hospital, six of whom were wounded from a single explosion in the western part of the city. One was in serious condition. 1722/

(b) Local reported events

1391. The Bosnian Muslim and Croat presidency in Sarajevo approved a reorganization of the government led by Prime Minister Mile Akmadić, a Croat. Croat representation in senior positions was strengthened, but the plan permitted Muslims to retain vital government posts. 1723/

1392. Because of a 16 day cut-off of electricity, Sarajevo residents had no heat, running water, or lights. The streets were busier than usual as people tried to find Christmas presents. 1724/

1393. Sarajevo's curfew was lifted to enable people to attend Christmas Eve midnight mass. 1725/
25. 25/12/92 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reportedly reduced on Christmas Day, but several large explosions hit the centre of Sarajevo in the morning. Source(s): Helsinki Watch Report; United Press International.

Targets Hit: The city centre; the Koševyo hospital compound. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1394. Shelling was reportedly reduced on Christmas Day.  

1395. Several large explosions rocked the centre of Sarajevo in the morning. Sarajevo radio said Serb-fired shells landed in the compound of the Koševyo hospital, near Morillon’s residence.

(b) Local reported events

1396. The UN commander in BiH (French General Phillipe Morillon) charged that he was deliberately targeted by two separate mortar attacks staged from territory in Sarajevo controlled by BiH troops. The first occurred Thursday when a mortar explosion smashed windows on the ground floor of his residence in central Sarajevo (slightly injuring a British soldier). The second attack came at 6:35 a.m. on this day when mortar shells exploded two yards from the main entrance to the building, a converted parliamentarians club set in a leafy compound near the offices of the BiH presidency.

1397. Shortly after noon, a bus filled with people suffering from various illnesses left Sarajevo. Safe-passage had been agreed with the Serbs on the outskirts of the city.

26. 26/12/92 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors said the level of artillery fire in the city decreased Saturday. Ten artillery rounds landed on parts of the city controlled by the BiH Government. By contrast, 99 shells landed on Serb-controlled areas. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

1398. There was little artillery or small-arms fire in the city during the day, though machine-gun exchanges around the Serb-held enclave of Grbavica in the centre of town erupted after dark. 1731/

(b) Local reported events

1399. Tanjug reported that the mixed military commissions of the warring factions met again in the Sarajevo airport to negotiate the opening of three humanitarian corridors from Sarajevo. 1732/

1400. Seventeen UNHCR flights landed at Sarajevo airport with 175 tons of aid. About 300 tons of food were brought in by land convos. 1733/

1401. Two scheduled electricity repair missions were cancelled when both Serbian and BiH authorities warned of heavy fighting in the areas where the repairs were to be made. 1734/

1402. Five hundred civilians fleeing Sarajevo were intercepted and turned back by UN forces. 1735/

1403. A New York Times Reporter visited Serbian gunners and reported:

"Anybody who stops and climbs atop the mud walls can see about what the Serbian gunners see, and it is an astonishing sight. Many of the guns are less than one thousand yards from high-rise buildings in the center of the city, and perhaps 500 to 1,000 feet above them . . . . it is plain, numbingly so, that the men firing the guns can see exactly what they are hitting. What this means is that the Serbian gun crews cannot have any doubt when their shells strike hospitals, schools, hotels and orphanages and cemeteries where families are burying their dead . . . ." 1736/

27. 27/12/92 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Mortar shells hit a residential area in the new part of the city in the morning and there were heavy machine-gun exchanges reported around Grbavica. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: An unidentified residential area in the newer part of the city (morning). Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1404. Three mortar shells exploded in a residential area in the newer part of the city in the morning and there were heavy machine-gun exchanges reported around the Serb-held neighbourhood of Grbavica in the centre of the city. 1737/
(b) **Local reported events**

1405. The temperature in the city dropped to minus 13 degrees Celsius (eight degrees Fahrenheit) in the morning with no progress reported on restoring electricity, gas and water supplies. UNPROFOR reported an estimated 25 day supply of water in the city. UNPROFOR was unable to supply insulating oil for transformers that channel electricity to the city's main pumping station. 1738/

(c) **International reported events**

1406. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegović and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva. 1739/

1407. The Geneva talks reportedly moved slowly as negotiators tried to persuade the warring factions to accept the "Vance-Owen Plan." The plan, which was drawn up on 27 October, called for the division of BiH into 10 largely autonomous provinces under a loosely organized central government. 1740/

28. 28/12/92 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that over the last two weeks, mortar and artillery fire had increased from Mt. Igman. UNPROFOR said that the level of fire from the BiH positions weighed the Serbian fire. There was also reported to have been a lot of vehicle movement on Mt. Igman during the week. 1741/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people had been killed and 35 wounded in Sarajevo on this day. 1742/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1408. No incidents reported.

(b) **Local reported events**

1409. Sarajevo began a third week without electricity which was cut by Serbian shellfire, and a second week without running water. An overnight blizzard was also reported. UNHCR provided 90 tons of fuel to the city on Sunday night to keep relief deliveries going, but city officials said that they might have to suspend supplies of aid to neighbourhoods clustered on the sides of the steep slopes of the valley because trucks were having trouble negotiating the narrow snow covered roads. The UNHCR reported record volumes of food being brought into the city, but estimated that 10 per cent to 20 per cent of the supplies had been diverted to the black market. 1743/
1410. A UNHCR spokesman said that at least 35 elderly patients of a nursing home situated close to the front lines on the western outskirts of the city had died over the past few months because of a lack of food and heat. "The mortality rate appears to be at least one person every two days", he said. 1744/

1411. The Washington Post reported that freezing people in the city had cut down trees in parks for firewood, and had stripped shelled buildings of anything that could be burned, "beams, flooring, roofing, wallpaper, foam insulation". 1745/

1412. Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić lost a no-confidence vote in the federal parliament. 1746/

(c) International reported events

1413. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and the peace conference co-chairmen, met with Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegović and Čosić. 1747/

29. 29/12/92 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sporadic artillery fire was directed to the city's Old Town, while heavier shell blasts crashed in southern neighbourhoods. Source(s): United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** A Danish UN armoured personnel carrier at the Sarajevo airport; the Old Town; southern neighbourhoods in the city; western parts of the city (evening); the area near the BiH Presidency building. Source(s): United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** A Danish UN armoured personnel carrier came under mortar fire near the Sarajevo airport. Eight rounds exploded around the vehicle, the closest approximately 20 yards away; one person was killed and one injured during an evening bombardment of the western part of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** One person was killed and one injured during an evening bombardment of the western part of the city, Sarajevo radio said. 1748/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that six people had been killed and 43 wounded in Sarajevo on this date. 1749/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1414. According to UN officials, a Danish UN armoured personnel carrier came under mortar fire near the Sarajevo airport. Eight rounds exploded around the vehicle, the closest approximately 20 yards away. There were no casualties. It was not known whether the mortar attack had been launched by BiH troops or Serbian forces. 1750/

1415. Sporadic artillery fire from hilltop Serbian positions was directed to the city's Old Town, while heavier shell blasts crashed in southern neighbourhoods. After dark, a succession of large-caliber shells exploded in
the district close to the BiH Presidency building. 1751/

(b) Local reported events

1416. UNHCR brought 344 tons of aid into the city by land and air. Twenty aid flights were scheduled to land on Wednesday, and 35 trucks were to deliver 280 tons of aid during the day. 1752/

1417. Power and water were still cut, with early morning temperatures of just 14 degrees. Aid workers reported that the old and weak were starting to die of the cold. 1753/

1418. Lord Owen met with Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Šušak in Zagreb. 1754/

30. 30/12/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic bursts of machine-gun and small-arms fire were heard from the Holiday Inn overnight, with occasional mortar bombs landing in the city centre and Old Town areas. West of the centre, BiH shelling of Ilidža was reported. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city centre; the Old Town; Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: At a home for the elderly in Nedžarići, a 78 year-old resident, Ilija Pejić Ović, was hit in the head by a sniper's bullet while chopping wood outside the front door. Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that six people had been killed and 37 injured in Sarajevo on this date. 1755/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1419. On the coldest morning of the winter (minus 11 degrees), BiH fighters gathered on the strategic Mount Igman overlooking the city from the south. 1756/ UN intelligence reports estimated that as many as 10,000 men of the Muslim-led BiH forces had amassed, and appeared to be preparing to attack Serbian-held suburbs that were a key to maintaining the siege. 1757/

1420. Sporadic bursts of machine-gun and small-arms fire were audible from the Holiday Inn overnight, with occasional mortar bombs landing in the central city and Old Town areas. 1758/

1421. West of the centre, Bosnian Serb forces reported renewed Muslim shelling of the suburb of Ilidža. 1759/

1422. The New York Times Reported that at the home for the elderly in Nedžarići, Gordana Simić, a 71 year-old resident died overnight, and Ilija Pejić Ović, 78 was hit in the head by a sniper's bullet while chopping wood outside the front door. He was the 17th resident to die from war wounds. 1760/
(b) Local reported events

1423. Sarajevo remained without running water or electricity and with little piped gas. 1761/
1424. Lord Owen met with President Milošević and Radovan Karadžić in Belgrade. 1762/
1425. Yugoslav Prime Minister Panić stated that he would not resign despite the no-confidence vote in the federal assembly. Panić was in the US trying to convince officials not to intervene militarily against Serb forces in BiH. 1763/

(c) International reported events

1426. British Foreign Secretary Hurd told the Daily Express that he "can imagine armed action" because of the "bloody-minded cruelty of the Serbs in Bosnia and the growing risk of a wider conflict". He warned that Serbia "should note this change" in his approach. 1764/

31. 31/12/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The BiH Government forces were again reported to be gathering on a mountain south-west of the city in a possible attempt to break the siege of the city. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people had been killed and eight injured in Sarajevo on this date. 1765/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1427. The Muslim-led forces of the BiH Government were again reported to be massing on a mountain south-west of the city in preparation for a possible attempt to break through the siege lines around the city. 1766/ UN military experts who had examined the situation concluded that the BiH offensive seemed likely to fail. But they also said that the Serbian forces may have been overextended. 1767/

(b) Local reported events

1428. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said at the Split airport that he was going to Sarajevo to express solidarity with the population of the city and its suffering and to wish the UNPROFOR units there a happy new year. 1768/
1429. Boutros-Ghali then paid a New Year's Eve visit to Sarajevo. He was met by protesters and a senior BiH official, Vice President Ejup Ganić. 1769/ The protesters shouted, "Ghali, Hitler; Ghali, fascist" when he appeared in front of the Presidency building after talks at the UNPROFOR headquarters. 1770/
1430. In a New Year's message to the citizens of BiH, President Izetbegović said that, "These negotiations were forced upon us, just as this war was forced upon us. We will not, however, accept peace being forced upon us". 1771/

1431. UNPROFOR reported that during the month of December there were over 6700 attempted airport crossings. UNPROFOR commented that this continued to place a heavy strain on the troops who had to intercept, disarm and send back those persons attempting to cross the airfield. It was also reported that during the month of December 24 UNPROFOR flights and 173 UNHCR flights had landed at the airport. 1772/

J. January 1993
1. 1/1/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intense fighting erupted in the streets with BiH and Serbian forces trading artillery, anti-aircraft and heavy machine-gun fire in close range battles on several fronts around the capital. Nearly constant mortar and artillery explosions and heavy gunfire could be heard from various parts of the city during the afternoon. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Various unidentified sections of Sarajevo. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three people were reported dead and 26 wounded by the city morgue and hospital. 1773/ The BiH Health Ministry Reported that two people were killed and 16 injured on this day. 1774/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1432. Intense fighting erupted in the streets with BiH forces and Serbs trading artillery, anti-aircraft and heavy machine-gun fire in close range battles on several fronts around the capital. Nearly constant mortar and artillery explosions and heavy gunfire could be heard from various parts of the city during the afternoon. There was no sign of tanks or armoured vehicles being used in the fighting which involved the Serb-held neighbourhoods of Grbavica, Vraca and Staro Brdo, and the BiH-controlled areas of Kovači, Skenderija and Čičin Han. The fighting eased in intensity with nightfall and the accompanying drop in temperature which by nightfall had already fallen to 12 degrees Fahrenheit. 1775/

(b) Local reported events

1433. The Secretary-General was jeered in Sarajevo after he arrived to press his appeal to the BiH Government not to open an offensive to break the Serbian siege of the city. 1776/
2.  2/1/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as generally quiet. UN monitors reported 32 large-caliber shells incoming on Serbian positions around the city and 10 mortar and five artillery rounds landing in BiH government-controlled parts of the city. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Hrasno hill; the edges of Stari Grad (early afternoon). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Three civilians were wounded by snipers in the previous 24 hours. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four people killed and 26 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Public Health Ministry.

Narrative of Events:

1434. The city was described as "generally quiet", with three civilians wounded by snipers in the previous 24 hours. Three shells hit Hrasno hill west of the centre and several others hit the edges of the central municipality of Stari Grad in the early afternoon. Sporadic small-arms, machine-gun and mortar fire could be heard overnight, but nothing sustained.

(b) International reported events

1435. The peace conference co-chairmen, on 2-4 January convened the Summit Meeting on Bosnia-Hercegovina in Geneva with representatives of the BiH Presidency, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, Croatia and Yugoslavia.

1436. Leaders of BiH's warring Muslims, Croats and Serbs met for their first face-to-face peace talks since fighting erupted nine months ago. The talks, between President Alija Izetbegović, Croat leader Mate Boban, and Radovan Karadžić were held in Geneva. Under a proposal to redraw the Republic, Sarajevo would be demilitarized and the new provinces would be "areas as geographically coherent as possible, taking into account ethnic, geographical, historical, communication, economic viability and other relevant factors".

1437. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that he would "stay as long as necessary" to achieve a peace settlement, but also refused to relinquish what he called "Serb lands" in BiH.

3.  3/1/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported light with sporadic artillery and small-arms fire in parts of the city during the day. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said that one person was killed and eight were wounded in Sarajevo in the 24 hour period that ended at 10:00 a.m. Sunday. 1785/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

1438. Fighting was reported light with sporadic artillery and small-arms fire in parts of the city during the day. 1786/

(b) Local reported events

1439. The city was covered with four inches of snow with temperatures ranging between 10 to 17 degrees Fahrenheit. 1787/

(c) International reported events

1440. Presidents Tudjman and Ćosić, and the two working groups for military and political affairs met. The plenary session of the peace conference started at 5:00 p.m.. 1788/

1441. BiH President Izetbegović and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić met and gave conflicting reports on the substance of their talks. This marked the first time that the pair had met since the war began. Vance reported that an agreement could only be reached on seven of the proposed provinces. The major obstacle was reportedly the Serb insistence on a separate Serb state within BiH. Izetbegović objected to some of the province boundaries. 1789/ 4/1/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH forces reportedly attacked again to try to join up Butmir and Azići. Supporting attacks occurred against Hadžići and Ilijaš. There were also attacks against Rajlovac and Vogošća. The Serb forces counter-attacked and pushed the Presidency forces further towards Stup Bridge. The Hadžići and Ilijaš attacks reportedly failed, while the Vogošća and Rajlovac attacks gained some ground. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry Bulletin reported one person killed and 15 wounded on this day. 1790/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1442. BiH forces attacked again to try and join up Butmir and Azići. Supporting attacks occurred against Hadžići and Ilijaš. There were also attacks against Rajlovac and Vogošća. The method of operation was very
similar to the first attack in December 1992. The Serbs counter-attacked and this time pushed the Presidency forces further towards Stup Bridge. The Hadžići and Ilijaš attacks failed. The Vogošća and Rajlovac attacks were successful and the Presidency captured some ground. 1791/

(b) International reported events

1443. Another round of the Geneva conference ended with only the Croatian delegation reportedly signing both the principles and the proposed map of BiH. President Izetbegović said that they had signed the papers, but not the map. Negotiations were scheduled to resume on 10 January. 1792/

5. 5/1/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two people were killed and 22 wounded on this day. 1793/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1444. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1445. The peace conference co-chairmen visited Belgrade and Zagreb to meet with Presidents Čosić, Milošević and Tudjman. 1794/

6. 6/1/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported quiet in the early hours as Serbs began preparing for the Orthodox Christmas. Fighting erupted late in the day and intense shelling was reported in the Novi Grad district with over 50 shells reported to have hit Stari Grad late in the afternoon and evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Novi Grad area; Stari Grad (over 50 shells reported in the afternoon and evening); the Hrasno district. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two people were killed and 20 wounded on this day. 1795/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public
Health.

Narrative of Events:

1446. The city had been quiet as Serbs began preparing to celebrate the Serb Orthodox Christmas. Sarajevo radio said heavy guns opened fire during the night around the Parliament building south-west of the city centre and that there was sporadic small-arms fire in the same area.\textsuperscript{1796}

1447. Sarajevo radio reported intense shelling of the Novi Grad district. Over 50 shells were reported to have fallen on Stari Grad late in the afternoon and evening. It said that the Hrasno district was shelled by mortars, tanks and anti-aircraft fire. Street fighting was also reported in the Dobrinja and Vojniko Polje districts.

(b) Local reported events

1448. Fighting occurred late in the day shortly after Yugoslav President Dobrica Ćosić warned Bosnian Serbs that "if the Serbs in Bosnia do not accept the stipulated constitutional principles of the new state of Bosnia, then--we are told directly--they will soon be the target of a war and missile attack by US and NATO troops".\textsuperscript{1797/1798}

1449. The co-chairmen reportedly tried to pressure Serbian President Milošević to do all that he could to convince Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić to accept the Vance-Owen Plan. Milošević responded, "Peace is in our vital interest. I will do everything in my power".\textsuperscript{1799/1800}

7. 7/1/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two people were killed and 25 wounded on this day.\textsuperscript{1800} Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1450. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1451. On 7 January UN officials prepared to evacuate the residents of the nursing home in Nedžarići. Of the home’s 302 residents at the start of the siege, 17 had died from sniper and mortar fire and 167 from exposure, lack of medicine or other causes.\textsuperscript{1801/1802}
8. 8/1/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that three people were killed and 28 wounded on this day. 1802/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1452. Hakija Turajlić one of the three deputy prime ministers of the BiH Government, was killed as he sat inside an armoured personnel carrier belonging to the French Marine Battalion assigned to the United Nations forces. The vehicle, bearing the UN flag and insignia, was halted about 200 yards from the Sarajevo airport exit gate by two Serbian tanks and a force of about 30 to 40 soldiers. A confrontation lasting one hour and 45 minutes ensued, which ended with a Serbian soldier thrusting his automatic weapon over French Officer, Colonel Parice Sartre, and firing at Turajlić through the vehicle's open rear door. The French soldiers did not return fire. General Morillon of the UN forces named the officer commanding the Serbian troops who carried out the killing as General Stanislav Galić. 1803/

(b) International reported events

1453. BiH Government officials announced that they would not return to peace talks until they were convinced that the Serbs supported peace. 1804/

1454. BiH President Izetbegović met with Bush and Clinton aides. 1805/

9. 9/1/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors said that 68 shells landed on Serbian positions around Sarajevo, compared to 172 shell explosions in BiH-controlled parts of the city. 1806/ Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: A French C-160 transport aeroplane carrying humanitarian aid was hit in the tail by small-arms fire at Sarajevo airport, but was not seriously damaged. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two people were killed and 34 wounded on this day. 1807/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1455. A French C-160 transport aeroplane carrying humanitarian aid was hit in the tail by small-arms fire as it landed at Sarajevo airport at 3:30 p.m. The aeroplane was not seriously damaged and no one was injured in the incident. 1808/

1456. The level of fighting following Hakija Turajlić's death showed a slight increase. UN monitors said that 68 shells landed on Serbian positions around Sarajevo, compared to 172 shell explosions in BiH-controlled parts of the city. 1809/

(b) International reported events

1457. BiH President Izetbegović said that his government had decided to "suspend" ongoing negotiations in Geneva to protest the killing of Hakija Turajlić. 1810/

1458. Yugoslav President Čosić condemned the killing of Hakija Turajlić. 1811/

10. 10/1/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city experienced a lull in the fighting. Sporadic firing was heard in the city overnight. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that two people were killed and six wounded on this day. 1812/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1459. The city experienced a lull in fighting as international mediators prepared for talks in Geneva. Only sporadic firing was heard in the city overnight. 1813/

(b) International reported events

1460. In Geneva, leaders of three warring factions met for another round of peace talks, but no progress was reported. The Bosnian Serb side apologized publicly at the talks for the killing of Turajlić by a Serbian soldier. 1814/

11. 11/1/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was stepped-up arms fire and shelling in the city, with heavy shelling beginning in the morning. UNPROFOR reported more
than 1300 incoming shells in the city. UNPROFOR reported that during
the past week the city was quiet for the most part, with a low level of
mortar/artillery shelling, which increased slightly towards the end of the
week. It was also noted that BiH forces launched attacks on several areas
outside of the city. The main areas concerned were in the northern part of
Sarajevo: Rajlovac, Žuč Mountain, Vogošća and Vasin Han. Ilidža, Butmir and
Lukavica also received some shelling. It was also reported that during
the week, BiH forces attacked Serb positions on Vogošća and Žuč Mountain, where
they had gained 300-600 metres of ground. BiH forces also attacked Ilijaš from
Visoko and Breza, but were repulsed by Serbs who kept Visoko under heavy
artillery fire over two days. Serbs were also attacked in Hadžići from Mount
Igman during 6-7 January. UNPROFOR commented that in spite of a concentration
of troops on Mt. Igman, no specific movements or activities had been detected
in Butmir, Sokolovići or Hrasnica, which could indicate any immediate action
against the city. UNPROFOR stated that it thought that the Serbs did not
believe that the BiH forces had the strength to capture Ilidža.

Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Parliament building; the Vrbanja bridge; the national museum;
buildings overlooking the Miljacka river. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one person killed and 26
wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1461. There were reports of stepped-up arms fire and shelling in the centre of
the city. Firing was reported at the Parliament building, the Vrbanja bridge,
the national museum and buildings overlooking the Miljacka river dividing
Serb and Muslim lines. Heavy firing in the city began in the early morning.
Three or four artillery rounds per minute, a high rate for recent weeks, could
be heard from the city centre, accompanied by mortar and machine-gun
fire.

Source(s): 

(b) Local reported events

1462. UNPROFOR reported that during the last week the number of people
attempting to cross the airport during the night continued to be very high
(over 300 increasing to 600 at the end of the week). UNPROFOR commented that
the reason for this could be found in the low levels of shelling at the
airport and also on the poor living conditions in the city after four weeks
without water or electricity.

Source(s): 

(c) International reported events

1463. Serbian President Milošević made his first appearance at the peace talks
in Geneva. The talks resumed after Serbs apologized for the
assassination of BiH's Deputy Prime Minister.
12. 12/1/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There were reports of increased small-arms fire and shelling in the centre of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people were killed and 50 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1464. There were reports of increased small-arms fire and shelling in the centre of the city. Fighting was active in Hrasno and in the Vrbanja bridge area behind the old parliament building, just west of the city centre.

(b) International reported events

1465. According to Tanjug, the co-chairmen met with Radovan Karadžić and members of the Yugoslav delegation at the Geneva Hotel 'Berg' in the morning and announced that they were no longer optimistic regarding the outcome of negotiations.

1466. According to Serbian press reports, after a two hour meeting late in the afternoon with the co-chairmen, Čosić, Milošević, Bulatović and Karadžić, the Yugoslav delegation issued the following statement:

"Proceeding from the interests of the Serbian people for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina, at the insistence of Presidents Čosić, Milošević and Bulatović, based primarily on the fact that the proposed principles guarantee full equality to the Serbian people, as well as the consensus of the three peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina . . . . Radovan Karadžić decided to agree with the proposed constitutional principles, provided that the Assembly of the Serbian Republic approves them within seven days".

1467. Observers speculated that Serbian President Milošević and Yugoslav President Čosić pressured Karadžić into acceptance. There were still disagreements over the plan's boundaries. Many in the West believed Karadžić's acceptance was only a tactical move designed to stave off Western attacks while Serb forces acquired more territory.

13. 13/1/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Anti-aircraft guns fired into the Old Town district throughout the night and shelling continued in Hrasno to the west. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: The Old Town; Hrasno. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The city’s crisis centre said that four people were killed and 54 wounded in the city in the past 24 hours. 1828/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that eight people were killed and 48 wounded on this day. 1829/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1468. Sarajevo radio said that anti-aircraft guns fired into the historic Old Town throughout the night and it reported continued shelling of the western suburb of Hrasno. 1830/

(b) Local reported events

1469. Bosnian Serb leaders were due back home to try to win approval for their acceptance of an international peace plan, but there was little sign of a let-up in fighting in BiH. 1831/

14. 14/1/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy tank and mortar fire hit the centre of the city, with the firing heaviest around midnight, as Serbs celebrated the Orthodox New Year. There was continuous small-arms, machine-gun, mortar and tank fire reported. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The city centre; the area between the Parliament tower in the city centre and the Hrasno area; the residential area near the Parliament building (Six mortar rounds between 3:20 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.); Hrasno and Hrasno Brdo (overnight); the Old Town (sporadically and in the afternoon) and Dobrinja (sporadically); a market close to the Sarajevo market close to the residence of French General Phillipe Morillon. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A woman was killed when a shell exploded at a market close to the Sarajevo residence of French General Phillipe Morillon. The Koševo Hospital admitted 22 casualties wounded by the shelling. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Four people were reported wounded by snipers in a residential district west of the Old Town. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: One six year-old girl was brought to the Koševo Hospital in the evening with shrapnel wounds, and died thereafter. A woman was killed when a shell exploded at a market close to the Sarajevo residence of French General Phillipe Morillon. The Koševo Hospital admitted 22 casualties wounded by the shelling. Four people were reported wounded by snipers in a residential district west of the Old Town and the Old Town itself came under artillery fire in the late afternoon. 1832/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that four people were killed, and 44 were wounded on this day. 1833/ Source(s): United Press International; BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1470. Heavy tank and mortar fire hit the centre of the city with the firing heaviest around midnight as Serbs celebrated the Orthodox New Year. Residents said on Thursday that there was continuous small-arms, machine-gun, mortar and tank fire between the destroyed Parliament tower in the centre of the city and the neighbourhood of Hrasno, about two kilometres west along the Miljacka river. BiH government forces and Serbs faced each other across narrow city streets in the area and several Serb tanks were stationed in Grbavica, a neighbourhood between the Parliament tower and Hrasno. Heavy mortar and machine-gun fire poured into the area behind the tower, where the Vrban bridge crossed the river. Sporadic shooting continued throughout the night and machine-gun and small-arms fire were still audible at dawn. 1834/

1471. Radio Sarajevo said that six mortar rounds fell on the residential area around the Parliament building between 3:20 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. It reported shelling on Hrasno and Hrasno Brdo overnight, and said the Old Town and Dobrinja were shelled sporadically. 1835/

1472. One six year-old girl was brought to the Koševo Hospital in the evening with shrapnel wounds, and died thereafter. A woman was killed when a shell exploded at a market close to the Sarajevo residence of French General Phillipe Morillon. The Koševo Hospital admitted 22 casualties wounded by the shelling. Four people were reported wounded by snipers in a residential district west of the Old Town and the Old Town itself came under artillery fire in the late afternoon. 1836/

(b) International reported events

1473. The EC foreign ministers issued Bosnian Serbs a six-day ultimatum. Either they accept the Vance-Owen Plan, said Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, or they would suffer complete economic and diplomatic isolation. 1837/

15. 15/1/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shells hit a crowd queuing for spring water outside a brewery, the Koševo Hospital and the area near the Presidency building. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: A wall, about five yards above a crowd queuing for spring water outside a city brewery; the Koševo Hospital Complex; the area near the Presidency building in the city centre. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: A single artillery shell killed seven people and wounded 18 as 300 people queued for spring water outside a city brewery. An artillery shell struck at about 1:45 p.m., into a wall about five yards above the crowd, releasing shrapnel. As the dead and wounded from the brewery attack were being carried into the Koševo emergency room, an artillery shell hit the clinic and destroyed several rooms. One woman was reported killed and four others injured in the morning when an artillery shell landed near the Presidency building in the city centre. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: A single artillery shell killed seven people and wounded 18 as they queued for spring water outside a brewery; one woman was reported killed and four others injured in the morning when an artillery shell landed near the Presidency building in the city centre. 1838/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that nine people were killed and 35 wounded on this day. 1839/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1474. A single artillery shell killed seven people and wounded 18 as they queued for spring water outside a brewery. Police and witnesses said that some 300 people were waiting behind the city brewery to fill containers from a natural spring amid a more than month-long disruption of the municipal water system. A Serbian artillery shell blasted at about 1:45 p.m., into a wall about five yards above the crowd, releasing shrapnel. With most males of military age serving in the BiH army, the vast majority of people who usually waited to collect water at distribution points were women and the elderly. 1840/

1475. Among those struck were an entire family. Asim Lačević and his wife were killed instantly. Their eight year-old son Berin was in critical condition with head and leg injuries, and their daughter Dalila received a serious chest wound. It was reported that lines of people, sometimes several hundred long, formed day and night as the spring-fed brewery, long closed for beer production, was the city's most popular spot for drawing water. 1841/

1476. As the dead and wounded from the brewery attack were being carried into the Koševo emergency room, an artillery shell hit the clinic and destroyed several rooms. There were no casualties in the attack. 1842/

(b) Local reported events

1477. Electricity was briefly reconnected in some areas of the city in the evening, but failed again after several hours. Municipal officials said they expected power to be restored some time on Saturday. It was reported that the city had been without electricity for more than a month. 1843/

16. 16/1/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city witnessed sporadic shellfire. UN monitors said that 54 artillery, 50 mortar and five tank shells landed on Serb-controlled positions around the city compared to 51 artillery, 174 mortar and 13 tanks shells landing on parts of the city controlled by the BiH government. 1844/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The Sarajevo airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: The Sarajevo airport was shelled from BiH positions in Hrasnica, injuring three French UNPROFOR soldiers. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Ministry of Public Health reported that 14 people were killed and 44 wounded on this day. 1845/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1478. Sarajevo airport was closed for just over 30 minutes because of fighting between Serbian and BiH forces on the road linking the facility with downtown Sarajevo. The road and the airport were reopened at about 3:30 p.m. The incident came several hours after French Health Minister Bernard Couchner arrived on a visit to review conditions in the city. 1846/

1479. UNPROFOR reported that the airport was shelled from the BiH positions in Hrasnica. Three French UNPROFOR soldiers were slightly injured. 1847/

1480. Sarajevo witnessed sporadic shellfire and small-arms exchanges. One man was reported killed and six people wounded in a single shell explosion in the Muslim-dominated Old Town. 1848/

(b) Local reported events

1481. Electricity and water were restored to some parts of the city. Engineers were scheduled to examine the city’s main water pumping station in Bacevo to the west of Sarajevo. 1849/

1482. French Health Minister Bernard Couchner arrived on a visit to review conditions in the city. 1850/

17. 17/1/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that during the past week there was a moderate level of shelling in the city, but in general, it was higher than the week before. Shelling was particularly high on 11 January with more than 1,300 incoming rounds reported. The number of people attempting to cross the airport was over 300 on most nights. UNPROFOR noted that BiH forces seemed to be employing a new tactic to help them cross the runway, i.e., as the APCs moved in to stop the detected individuals, they completely surrounded the vehicles, allowing others to cross during the confusion. UNPROFOR commented that the number of people attempting to cross the airport seemed to be related to the level of military activity in the city and particularly the airport. The level of shelling rose to some 1300 incoming rounds on 11 January and remained at over 300 through the week. In relation to this, UNPROFOR noted that the number of people attempting to cross the airport at the end of the weekend was over 500, which decreased to some 300 during the past week. 1851/ Sarajevo radio reported the shelling of the edge of the Old Town during the night and anti-aircraft machine-gun fire in the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The edge of the Old Town (in the evening); the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that three people were killed and 25 wounded on this day. 1852/ It also reported: 8,155 people killed, missing, or dead from cold or hunger; 47,573 wounded; and 14,285 heavily wounded in Sarajevo to date. 1853/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1483. Sarajevo Radio reported the shelling of the edge of the Old Town during the night and anti-aircraft machine-gun fire in the central city area. Machine-gun and small-arms fire was heard from Hrasno and Grbavica districts, where BiH government and Serb forces had been squared off. 1854/

(b) Local reported events

1484. Electricity came back on for some parts of the city and some telephone exchanges began to function after six weeks of work by UN and local repair crews, who were often under fire trying to fix substations and power lines. 1855/

1485. Sixteen UN sponsored aid flights were reported to have arrived at the city's airport during the day. 1856/

18. 18/1/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A "relative lull" in the fighting was reported in the city as fighting continued elsewhere in the Republic. 1857/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 18 wounded. No deaths were reported on this day. 1858/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1486. A "relative lull" in the fighting was reported in the city as fighting continued elsewhere in the Republic. 1859/

19. 19/1/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling of Sarajevo was reported while violence was reported elsewhere in the Republic. 1860/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that a monitoring officer had been shot by a sniper, resulting in minor injuries. Sniper fire also damaged a French 1861/ battalion truck near the airport. 1862/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one person killed and 16 wounded on this day. 1863/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1487. Sporadic shelling of Sarajevo was reported while violence was reported elsewhere in the Republic. 1864/

(b) Local reported events

1488. The Bosnian-Serb leadership met in Pale to vote whether to accept the principles of the Vance-Owen Plan. 1865/

1489. Electricity and water were reported to have been gradually returning to the city, with water queues starting to vanish in the western districts. 1866/

(c) International reported events

1490. The annual US State Department Human Rights Report described "ethnic cleansing" that "dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi times". It said that Muslim and Croat atrocities "pale in comparison" to those committed by Serbs, and it estimated that 25,000 people had died and 1.5 million (including half of the Muslim population) had become refugees as a result of the war in BiH. 1867/

20. 20/1/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four people killed and 27 wounded on this day. 1868/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1491. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1492. Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, the co-chairmen of the UN-EC sponsored peace talks in Geneva paid a one-day visit to the city to broker a truce agreement between the BiH President Alija Izetbegović and senior Croatian ministers.

1493. The Bosnian Serb parliament endorsed a set of constitutional principles for the future arrangements in BiH as proposed at the Geneva negotiations. At the session in Pale, at approximately 2:00, 55 deputies voted for the Geneva proposals, 15 voted against, and there was one abstention. 1869/

1494. Kemal Muftić, an adviser to BiH President Izetbegović, doubted that the Bosnian Serb Assembly's approval would translate into peace, because that would mean "the rejection of everything they have done . . . and they have
committed a lot of atrocities in the name of a concept they are now rejecting*. 1870/

21. 21/1/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN military observers said that they saw 157 shells fall on Muslim positions around the city, compared with eight falling on Serb sites. 1871/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Vogošća; Stup. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 22 wounded on this day. 1872/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1495. During the evening, machine-gun fire was reported on the edge of the Old Town, along with machine-gun fire and mortar bombs in the suburbs of Dobrinja near the airport and Vogošća, north-west of the city. Shelling was reported somewhat heavier in Stup, to the west of the city. 1873/

(b) Local reported events

1496. The World Health Organization announced that some 60 per cent of the housing in Sarajevo had been either damaged or destroyed in the war thus far. 1874/

22. 22/1/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy shelling of the Old Town area was reported in the morning as BiH forces were reported to have launched an artillery and infantry attack on Serb army positions on the road between Sarajevo and Pale. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: the Old Town (morning); Serb positions on the road between Sarajevo and Pale; Hrasno. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported as intensifying in parts of the city other than the Old Town section. 1875/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one person killed and nine wounded on this day. 1876/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1497. Tanjug news agency said that BiH fighters launched an artillery and infantry attack on Serb army positions on the road between Sarajevo and the Bosnian Serb headquarters at Pale. 1877/

1498. Radio Sarajevo reported heavy morning shelling of the old centre of the city.

(b) International reported events

1499. US Secretary of State Christopher stated that he doubted that the international mediation effort to end the fighting in BiH would succeed, because the atrocities had been "so horrible" and because the Bosnian Serbs had such a poor track record for keeping promises. 1878/

23. 23/1/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After an upsurge of fire in the southern suburbs on Friday evening, especially around Hrasno, it was quiet overnight, followed by intermittent light arms fire in the Hrasno-Grbavica sector. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Hrasno (overnight); the Hrasno-Grbavica sector (early morning). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Ministry of Public Health reported one person killed and 20 wounded on this day. 1879/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1500. After an upsurge of fire in the southern suburbs on Friday evening, especially around Hrasno, it was quiet overnight over most of the city. It was reported that only two shells hit Hrasno during the night, but early morning brought intermittent light arms fire in the Hrasno-Grbavica sector. 1880/

(b) International reported events

1501. The third round of the summit meeting on the peace plan was held. 1881/

24. 24/1/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was continuous overnight shelling of Dobrinja and anti-aircraft gunfire on the edge of the Old Town. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: Dobrinja (overnight); the edges of the Old Town; the area west of the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH health officials said that four people were killed and 27 were injured in Sarajevo in the 24 hour period ending at 10:00 a.m. 1882/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported: 8170 killed, missing, or dead from cold or hunger; 47,712 wounded; and 14,380 heavily wounded to date. 1883/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1502. There was continuous overnight shelling in the western suburb of Dobrinja. Anti-aircraft guns were reported to be firing on the edges of the Old Town, as well as small-arms fire in Hrasno, the BiH controlled suburb to the south-west. The morning began with occasional shots and explosions to the west of the city centre. 1884/ (b) International reported events

1503. International mediators in Geneva admitted that current fighting in Croatia had hindered progress in the peace talks, but said that Yugoslav President Čosić and Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić had promised not to interfere. Serbian President Milošević commented on the recent Croat attack, assailing: "masters of war" for "trying now, when peace is reachable, to burn a new war". The sharpest disagreements at the talks surrounded the three proposed provinces in eastern BiH along the Serbia-BiH border. 1885/ 25. 25/1/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR monitors observed that no rounds hit Serb-controlled areas, while 37 fell in parts of Sarajevo defended by the BiH Army. 1886/ UNPROFOR reported that during the past week, the level of shelling had decreased. The areas of concentrated shelling were: Butmir, Iliđa, Kasindolska, Nedžarići, Dobrinja, Kotorac and the airport. Some shelling was also reported at Koševo, Brajkova, Bistrik, the Presidency, Maršal Tito Barracks and Hrasno. 1887/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near the UNHCR warehouse in New Sarajevo; the Old Town area; the area near the Parliament building; the "backroad" behind housing blocks and warehouses. Source(s): Press Association.

Description of Damage: A shell explosion near the UNHCR warehouse in Sarajevo killed four people and injured several others; at 10:08 a.m. an 82 millimetre mortar shell landed on the "back road", a route twisting through housing blocks and warehouses from the centre of the city. Source(s): Press Association.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported five people killed and 23 wounded on this day. 1888/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1504. Serbian forces fired artillery, tank and anti-aircraft fire into the city during the morning. A shell explosion near the UN High Commission for Refugees warehouse in New Sarajevo killed four people and injured several others. One person was killed and another wounded in the Muslim-dominated Old Town. UN monitors reported exchanges of heavy machine-gun fire between Muslim and Serb forces. 1889/

1505. In the morning, a shell was reported to have landed near the city's Parliament building before daybreak. 1890/

1506. The day was described as clear and sunny, and at 10:00 a.m. despite the shelling, people walked through the streets to equip their children for schools that were to open for the first time since April. At 10:08 a.m. an 82 millimetre mortar shell landed on the "back road", a route twisting through housing blocks and warehouses from the centre of the city (the route was reportedly preferable to "snipers alley"). 1891/

(b) International reported events

1507. BiH President Izetbegović said that the peace talks had made no headway and that he might withdraw if there was no progress in the coming days. He told a news conference that the five-month-old talks had "betrayed" the principle of refusing to legitimize gains made by the ethnic cleansing campaign waged by Bosnian Serbs. "We are remaining at the negotiations as long as we see the conference may help calm the situation in BiH and we can achieve the aims we are talking about", he said. 1892/

1508. Progress was reported to have been made in Geneva on the Vance-Owen boundary disputes. Croats and Muslims claimed that they had agreed on the central region's borders north-west of Sarajevo. BiH President Izetbegović reportedly made a concession by renouncing his state's claims to a corridor running along the edges of the Republic to the north, south-east and south-west. 1893/

26. 26/1/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city passed a quiet night before shelling began around the edge of the Old Town at dawn and two detonations were heard in the Hrasno area. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The edge of the Old Town (dawn); the Hrasno area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and 31 wounded on this day. 1894/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1509. The city passed a quiet night before shelling began around the edge of the Old Town at dawn and two detonations were heard in the Hrasno area. 1895/
(b) **International reported events**

1510. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that a recent Croatian offensive had placed "the entire peace process in the region in jeopardy". He threatened to pull the UN's peacekeepers out of the region. Croat forces continued to attempt to recover land around Zadar.

27. 27/1/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that between 8:00 p.m. on Tuesday and noon Wednesday, 161 shells had fallen on government-controlled areas of the city, activity UNPROFOR described as "slightly heavier than normal". Later on Wednesday the shelling intensified into some of the heaviest in weeks. UN officials said that some 1,000 shells fell on government-controlled areas of the city in the 24 hours up to midnight on Wednesday, with around 100 shells falling on Serb areas. In a subsequent report, UNPROFOR reported that it observed some 1,500 incoming rounds, some of them falling around the airport, where a UNHCR representative was severely injured. Other shelling was reported over the eastern part of the city.

**Targets Hit:** A bridge located 200 metres from UNPROFOR headquarters; Dobrinja; Novi Grad; Novo Sarajevo; Mojmilo; Čengić Vila; Hrasno; Hrasno Brdo; Vogošća; the airport area. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** One 120 millimetre mortar round fired from Rajlovac landed by a bridge 200 metres from UNPROFOR headquarters, killing four people and injuring several others waiting outside the headquarters. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Four people were killed and several others injured in the shelling of the area outside UNPROFOR headquarters; two dead and four injured were brought to the Koševo Hospital after being caught in a heavy artillery attack; the city's two main hospitals reported treating at least 51 people for wounds. Doctors said that a number of those victims were children.

1901/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 53 wounded on this day.

1902/ 1512. The bombardment began at dawn when artillery, tanks and multiple-rocket launchers hit the New Town areas of Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo. Explosions could still be held in western Sarajevo in the early afternoon. Sarajevo radio reported heavy bombardment in the districts of Dobrinja, Mojmilo, Čengić
Vila, Hrasno, Hrasno Brdo and Vogošća starting early in the morning. 1903/

(b) International reported events

1513. The BiH Government said in Geneva that Sarajevo came under the "heaviest attack in the last four months" on Wednesday, and that "[i]f these attacks continue the delegation will have to consider leaving the Geneva conference". 1904/

28. 28/1/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 24 killed and 108 wounded on this day. 1905/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1514. No incidents reported.

29. 29/1/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo experienced a quiet night, with shelling resuming at dawn in the Old Town area and continuing throughout the day in several areas. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Old Town area of the city; other unidentified areas; an unidentified hospital. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One shell was reported to have hit an unidentified hospital and passed through several walls before landing in a ward without exploding. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported five killed and 25 wounded on this day. 1906/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1515. The city was reported to have enjoyed a quiet night, with shelling resuming at dawn in the Old Town area and continuing throughout the day in several areas. One shell was reported to have hit a hospital and passed through several walls before landing in a ward without exploding. 1907/
(b) Local reported events

1516. Agence France Presse reported that more than 500 civilians were buried at the football ground at Sarajevo where bleachers were once located, overlooking some 350 soldiers buried on the playing field. 1908/

(c) International reported events

1517. Peace conference co-chairmen Vance and Owen proposed that an interim, nine member council (with three representatives from each of the three main sides) rule BiH until free elections could be held. The group would assume control as soon as all three sides signed the Vance-Owen Plan and the Sarajevo Government would be set up along similar lines. BiH officials were reportedly unreceptive to this plan. 1909/

30. 30/1/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Shelling was reported in the Stari Grad area, near the Presidency building, the Koševi Hospital and the Ilidža area. A number of civilian casualties were reported. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Helsinki Watch; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Targets Hit:** The Stari Grad area; the area near the Presidency building; the Koševi Hospital; the Ilidža area. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Helsinki Watch.

**Description of Damage:** Two people were killed and 47 wounded in shelling which was particularly fierce in the Stari Grad area; at least six people were killed and 20 wounded in a major explosion near the Presidency building (all but two of these victims were civilian passers-by); Dr. Vladimir Belinski was decapitated when he was struck by a 40 millimetre anti-aircraft shell at the Koševi Hospital; two Bosnian Serb journalists were killed in a BiH artillery attack on Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Helsinki Watch.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Two people were killed and 47 wounded in shelling which was particularly fierce in the Stari Grad area; at least six people were killed and 20 wounded in a major explosion near the Presidency building (all but two of these victims were civilian passers-by); Dr. Vladimir Belinski was decapitated when he was struck by a 40 millimetre anti-aircraft shell at the Koševi Hospital; two Bosnian Serb journalists were killed in a BiH artillery attack on Ilidža. Twenty people were reported killed and 30 wounded in heavy shelling. 1910/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 48 wounded on this day. 1911/ Source(s): Reuters; New York Times; Helsinki Watch; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1518. Sarajevo radio reported that Saturday was "another hard and bloody day" for Sarajevo. Two people were killed and 47 wounded in shelling which was particularly fierce in the Stari Grad area, it said. 1912/

1519. One of the worst explosions hit near the Presidency, an old Austro-Hungarian building housing government offices. At least six people were killed and 20 wounded, all but two of them civilian passers-by. Five of the
wounded were reported as undergoing leg amputations. Others taken to Koševi Hospital had severe wounds to the head and body. 1913/

1520. Serbian forces shelled the city of Sarajevo, hitting civilian targets. Dr. Vladimir Belinki, a 58-year-old ophthalmology surgeon, was decapitated when he was struck by a 40 millimetre anti-aircraft shell fired from a Serbian battery on a nearby hill as he stepped out of an operating room at the Koševi Hospital into an unused room to inspect a leaking water pipe. 1914/

1521. Two Bosnian–Serb journalists, Miloš Vulović and Živko Filipović were killed in a Muslim artillery attack on the Sarajevo suburb of Ilidža, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug said. 1915/

(b) Local reported events

1522. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić told Reuters TV: "We are ready to hand over the city of Sarajevo to the United Nations as we have already handed over the airport of Sarajevo".

(c) International reported events

1523. It was reported that at a plenary session of the peace conference, Boban signed the entire three part package, Karadžić signed the Constitutional Principles and the Military package, while Izetbegović signed the Constitutional Principles and agreed to hold talks with UNPROFOR. 1916/

31. 31/1/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An intense artillery barrage was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: At least three people were killed by shelling and sniper fire, raising the weekend death toll to more than 20. 1917/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: At least three people were killed by shelling and sniper fire, raising the weekend death toll to more than 20. 1918/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 25 killed and 105 wounded on this day. 1919/ The BiH Health Ministry also reported that: 8,247 were killed, missing, or dead from cold or hunger, (of which 1,237 were children); 48,105 were wounded (of which 12,305 were children); and 2,189 heavily wounded (of which 2,189 were children). 1920/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1524. The New York Times reported that throughout the week BiH forces had been.
probing the Serbs' siege lines on Trebević mountain to the south; at Poljine and Šušić, overlooking the city centre from the north; and at Rajlovac, a district on the north-west where BiH forces set fire to a Serbian stronghold in an unused railway yard earlier in the week. Serbian forces, commanding most of the high ground were reported to have responded to attacks on their heavy-gun emplacements with intensive shelling of the city, without evident regard for targets. 1921/

1. An intense artillery barrage was reported in the city. 1922/

(b) Local reported events

2. In its monthly operational report, UNPROFOR reported that during January everybody in Sarajevo was waiting to hear the results of the Geneva conference, so there were no important changes in the general situation in Sarajevo. According to UNPROFOR, the most important event was the assassination of the BiH Deputy Prime Minister. A "yellow alert" had been promulgated for two days after the incident, but there was no heavy reaction from the BiH side. With regard to utilities, UNPROFOR reported: 1) gas pressure was high enough to provide energy to citizens; 2) the total water supply was up to 40 per cent of the needs; and 3) the electricity situation had improved since the beginning of the month, but remained critical. UNPROFOR reported the total number of people attempting to cross the airport at 10,989. 1923/

(c) International reported events

3. BiH President Alija Izetbegović told reporters that he would stay away from talks at the United Nations in New York intended to step up pressure on Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. "I am not going to go there. There is no reason for me to do it"; he said upon his return to Sarajevo from peace negotiations in Geneva. His decision appeared to negate statements by international peace mediator Lord Owen, who said he was confident that a peace deal was very near. 1924/

K. February 1993

1. 1/2/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported quieter with sporadic artillery and sniper fire. UNPROFOR reported that during the past week the level of shelling and military activity throughout Sarajevo was quite low with less than 100 observed incoming rounds on some days. There was a significant increase of shelling on 27 January with about 1,500 observed incoming rounds, some of them falling around the airport, where a UNHCR representative was badly injured and required medical evacuation. Most of the shelling was concentrated around the airport and surrounding area and over the eastern part of the city. UNPROFOR commented that this was apparently due to a Serb national holiday celebrating an historical character responsible for the unification of BiH. 1925/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 10 killed and 55 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

4. Sarajevo was quieter, with sporadic artillery and sniper fire reported after a weekend of heavy shelling.

(b) Local reported events

5. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that the Serbs had agreed to open corridors for humanitarian aid from Belgrade to Sarajevo, and Zagreb to Travnik, Tanjug reported.

6. UNPROFOR reported that during the past week the number of people attempting to cross the airport reached approximately 400 on most nights, a little higher than the previous week. The number of observed vehicle movements on Mt. Igman continued to be around 40, which seemed to represent activity similar to the previous reporting period.

(c) International reported events

7. With the reported collapse of the peace talks, EC foreign ministers discussed tightening sanctions. However, British Foreign Secretary Hurd said, "The Community is drawing up a range of possible sanctions, but I don't think anybody is talking about trying to apply them". Owen emphasized the need for pressure, not action, stating that "nothing should be done at the moment".

8. After meeting with Vance and Owen at the UN, US Secretary of State Christopher questioned the "feasibility" and "practicality" of the Vance-Owen Plan. At a press conference he said "we've been supportive of the process in the hope that both the parties would come into agreement on the process. That's as far as I'm prepared to go . . . ."

2. 2/2/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city reportedly experienced a generally quiet day.

Targets Hit: An 18 story residential tower in Grbavica; an unidentified funeral procession attended by some 300 people.

Description of Damage: The top five floors of an 18 story residential tower were reported ablaze in Grbavica; an unidentified funeral procession attended by some 30 people was shelled, killing one and wounding 20 others.

Sniping Activity: Firefighters were unable to reach an 18 story residential tower ablaze in Grbavica because of sniper fire.
Casualties: An unidentified funeral procession attended by some 30 people was shelled, killing one and wounding 20 others. The BiH Ministry of Public Health reported one killed and 28 wounded on this day. 1932/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

9. The city enjoyed a generally quiet day after heavy shelling over the weekend when it was hit by more than 500 shells. 1933/

10. The top five floors of an 18 story residential tower were reported ablaze in the city's Serb-held district of Grbavica. Fire-fighters were unable to get to the building quickly because of sniping. 1934/

11. The worst attack came when Serb gunners shelled a funeral procession attended by some 300 people. Local reporters said that one person was killed and 20 were wounded, 13 seriously. 1935/

(b) International reported events

12. Vance and Owen implored the US to outline its stance and its policy on BiH. Owen also encouraged President Clinton "to add credibility to the peace settlement by having some Americans on the ground". The negotiating duo refuted claims that talks had broken down and described the parties as "very close" to an accord. 1936/

13. EC ministers said that they would refrain from launching more sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro for fear that such a move would endanger the Vance-Owen peace process. 1937/

14. Representatives of Britain and France stated that they were opposed to lifting the arms embargo. 1938/

15. Despite BiH Government objections, the US supplied Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić with a visa so that he could attend peace talks in New York. The visa only permitted movement within 10 blocks of the UN 1939/

3. 3/2/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting in the day picked up after a brief mid-day lull. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Bosnian Muslim authorities said that eight people were killed (including Đeljo Rukić, a Croatian radio correspondent), and 34 were wounded in Sarajevo in the last 24 hours. 1940/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

16. Fighting in the city picked up after a brief mid-day lull during which visiting Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo met with BiH President Alija
Izetbegović. 1941/

(b) Local reported events

17. Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo met with BiH President Alija Izetbegović during the mid-day. 1942/

18. A meeting of the BiH Presidency and representatives of parliamentary parties confirmed that Silajdžić would represent BiH in the upcoming session of the UN Security Council. 1943/

(c) International reported events

19. Despite three days of pressure from Vance and Owen, the United States still shied away from endorsing the Vance-Owen Plan. White House Communications Director George Stephanopoulos stated that: "the President continues to support a diplomatic solution. He does not specifically embrace or reject the Vance Plan". 1944/

4. 4/2/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that for the second night in a row, a Serb sniper killed a Bosnian trying to slip across the Sarajevo airport runway. It was also reported that a French foreign legionnaire at the airport was wounded in the right hand by a sniper's bullet. 1945/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 23 wounded on this day. 1946/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

20. UNPROFOR reported that for the second night in a row, a Serb sniper killed a Bosnian trying to slip across the Sarajevo airport runway. It was also reported that a French foreign legionnaire at the airport was wounded in the right hand by a sniper's bullet. 1947/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 23 wounded on this day. 1948/

(b) Local reported events

21. UNPROFOR reported that the number of people caught while trying to cross the airport, by troops using night-vision binoculars and armoured personnel carriers equipped with search lights, rose over the past few months. The number of attempted crossing were: 3,843 in November, 6,717 in December, 10,989 in January and 1,500 in the first three days of February. 1949/

22. BiH President Izetbegović called for air-strikes, a "more speedy way" to end the conflict than the peace process in New York. "Regardless of what the
Security Council does", he said, "we will not accept the plan" because "it implies that genocide can be carried out and awarded". 1950/

23. Responding to the US decision to restrict Radovan Karadžić's movements in New York, Bosnian Serbs reportedly denied US journalists access to Serb-controlled territory in BiH. 1951/

(c) International reported events

24. Lord Owen stated that he believed that the Vance-Owen plan was the only option for the West. "I know the world, the Western world, the United States, Europe--for right or wrong--are not going to intervene", he said, "They're not going to do it and therefore we've got to get a settlement". 1952/

25. In contrast, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić encouraged the US to endorse the plan, stating, "this plan is not perfect, but we don't have anything better". Sending ground troops, he said, would bring "another Vietnam". 1953/

5. 5/2/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy shelling was reported. Artillery fire was reported in the Hrasno district and other areas. Source(s): Reuters; see also Reuters report on 6/2/93.

Targets Hit: The area near a small hospital in the Hrasnica area; the Hrasno district; Dobrinja; Novo Sarajevo; the city centre; Ilidža; Ilijaš; Grbavica. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported to have kept Sarajevo residents scurrying along freezing streets. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: SRNA reported that four people were killed and 24 wounded in the shelling of Serb districts. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 35 wounded on this day. 1954/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

26. UN troops were reported to have evacuated children from a small hospital near Sarajevo airport in Hrasnica, when the area came under mortar fire. 1955/

27. Sniper fire was reported to have kept Sarajevo residents scurrying along freezing streets and random artillery rounds were reported to have smashed into the Hrasno district. 1956/

28. Bosnian Serbs shelled the Sarajevo districts of Dobrinja, Novo Sarajevo and central parts of the town, Radio Sarajevo said. However, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA countercharged that Muslim shelling of Serb-held districts of Ilidža, Ilijaš and Grbavica killed four people (including a child), and wounded 24. 1957/
(c) **International reported events**

29. At UN headquarters in New York, mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen began separate talks with each warring faction in hopes of making progress before informal Security Council consultations on Monday. 1958/

30. Top US national security officials spent over two hours discussing US options in BiH. President Clinton refused to endorse the Vance-Owen Plan and opted for a new diplomatic initiative instead of military action. Clinton said that he "applauds" the UN-EC effort but was "reluctant to impose an agreement on the parties to which they do not agree". The Administration reportedly planned to pressure the Serb side to offer more land to the BiH Government. 1959/

6. 6/2/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city suffered only one outbreak of shelling overnight after being shelled heavily on Friday. UNPROFOR reported some artillery, mortar, heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire in areas near the airport but said that the city had generally been quiet. UN observers, who count about a third of the shell fire, counted 447 shells of all types and 131 fired by the BiH army. 1960/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Hospitals and the morgue reported two dead and 18 wounded. 1961/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 18 wounded. 1962/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

31. Sarajevo suffered only one outbreak of grenade blasts overnight after being shelled heavily on Friday. 1963/

(b) **Local reported events**

32. Serbian forces announced a unilateral cease-fire to start on the following day at 9:00 a.m., with talks to take place at 11:00 a.m. This was accepted by the BiH Government. 1964/

33. Relief flights to Sarajevo were suspended indefinitely after a German transport aeroplane was struck in the propeller by anti-aircraft fire. A crewman was injured in the incident, which caused the German aeroplane to return to Zagreb, Croatia. It was unclear who fired on the aeroplane as it was airborne outside of Zagreb. 1965/

(c) **International reported events**

34. Speaking from a military conference in Germany, US Secretary of Defense Aspin refuted press claims that President Clinton had ruled out military intervention. 1966/
7. 7/2/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A group of people standing in line for water were hit by a mortar bomb in the Gazin Han area. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: A water line in the Gazin Han area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Three people were killed and five others wounded when a mortar bomb hit a group waiting for water in the Gazin Han area. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Crisis Centre said that four people were killed and 23 wounded in Sarajevo in the past 24 hours. Those figures included the people hit while waiting for water. 1967/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 17 wounded for the day. 1968/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported, to date: 8,281 killed, missing or dead from cold, or hunger (of which 1,248 were children); 48,315 wounded (of which 12,357 were children); and 14,748 heavily wounded (of which 2,221 were children). 1969/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

35. Two women and a child were killed and five people were wounded when a mortar bomb hit a group waiting for water in the Gazin Han area. The mortar was fired from positions held by Serbs in the hills overlooking the city, according to Radio Sarajevo. Another person was wounded nearby by a second mortar bomb. 1970/

(b) International reported events

36. NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner said that force might be necessary to "remain credible" and to reinvigorate the peace process. 1971/

8. 8/2/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as relatively quiet. However, certain sections were hit by sporadic mortar, machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire. UNPROFOR reported that during the last week, shell-fire had been concentrated in the western (airport) area of the city and on the eastern Old Town. The most serious infantry fighting had been in Ned)arići and Dobrinja coupled with fighting over the rail yards at Rajlovac. BiH had reportedly built up forces on the north to control the north and west area of the city limits. The Serb forces had responded with a build-up of tanks and artillery. UNPROFOR noted that BiH appeared to want to control movement in the direction of Vogošća and Visoko. Infantry were also reported active in Dolina Kapa and Batanja, which was estimated to be an attempt to control road communications between Lukavica and the areas north of the city. The Serbs had shelled Grdonj and Koševo hospitals periodically. UNPROFOR reported that front lines had not been altered significantly. UN movements into the city had been hampered on several occasions by protesting Serb women and check points wishing to take parts of the loads from UNHCR vehicles. 1972/ Source(s):
Although relatively quiet, Sarajevo was hit by sporadic mortar, machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire. At noon, the Novi Grad (New Town) area was reported as being under heavy bombardments with mortar fire striking at least two other suburbs. BiH radio said the situation in Sarajevo was rapidly becoming worse as Serbs started shelling the areas of Novo Sarajevo, Vojniĕko Polje, Stari Grad and Dobrinja.

International relief flights to Sarajevo resumed after being halted for two days after a German aeroplane was hit with anti-aircraft fire. Reports said that four flights landed in the morning, with a total of 14 due during the day. The flights, ferrying supplies of food and medicine to Sarajevo, were coming from the Croatian port of Split and from US air bases in Germany.

Sarajevo marked its ninth anniversary of hosting the Winter Olympics.

Mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen briefed the UN Security Council on their peace plan for BiH. But the plan suffered a setback when Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić told the Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency that he would not accept a map which divided BiH into 10 semi-autonomous provinces along ethnic lines.

**9. 9/2/93 (Tuesday)**

**Military activity**


**Targets Hit:** Hrasno (two shells in the morning); Marin Dvor residential district near the Parliament and Holiday Inn; the Novo Sarajevo district (three shells); the Dobrinja district (several shells). Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** British reports put the number of Bosnian Muslims who had died in and around Sarajevo since November 1992 at 2,000 to 3,000. Source(s):
Narrative of Events:

41. According to Sarajevo Radio, two artillery shells hit the Hrasno district in the morning and Muslim forces returned a single round. Random shelling hit the city during the night, including the residential district of Marijin Dvor, close to Parliament and the Holiday Inn. Three shells landed in the Novo Sarajevo district. There was also small-arms fire during the night in the Novo Sarajevo district. Several shells were fired into the Dobrinja district.

42. Artillery duels and small-arms fire continued in the Drina River Basin, Sarajevo and a dozen other areas of BiH despite an order by the BiH Army's Chief of Staff, Sefer Halilovic, for an end to offensive operations to allow for repairs to electricity and water lines. International aid flights from Zagreb to Sarajevo were scheduled to resume on Wednesday.

(c) International reported events

43. At the United Nations in New York, mediators Cyrus Vance and David Owen briefed the Security Council on their efforts to bring peace to BiH. Diplomats said their peace plan, negotiated with the three warring factions since September, had little chance of further progress until the new Clinton administration in Washington announced its own policy on BiH. The Vance-Owen plan also suffered a setback yesterday when Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić rejected the map accompanying the plan.

44. The Clinton Administration reversed US policy by declaring its willingness (once all three sides accepted the Vance-Owen Plan) to put US troops on the ground as peacekeepers. On ABC News a senior official said that "no decisions on committing such forces and no commitments" have been made. However, he conceded that there had been a "general discussion of the need for enforcement of an agreement and a US willingness to participate in such enforcement".

10. 10/2/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported quiet during the morning despite sniper fire in the centre and Novo Sarajevo suburb. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The city was reported quiet during the morning despite sniper fire reported in the centre and Novo Sarajevo suburb. 1984/ Another report said that Sarajevo was quiet except for sniper fire reported in the centre and a northern district. 1985/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

45. The city was reported quiet during the morning with sniper fire reported
in the centre and Novo Sarajevo suburb. 1986/ Another report said that Sarajevo was quiet except for sniper fire reported in the centre and a northern district. 1987/

(b) **Local reported events**

46. UN mediators met with Serb and Muslim representatives for a second day, at the airport which was being used by relief flights to bring in food and medicine, in a bid to broker a cease-fire while electricity and water service repairs were carried out around the city. 1988/

(c) **International reported events**

47. In New York, Lord Owen met with the Ambassadors of Canada, New Zealand, Belgium and Venezuela. He later held talks with the US Secretary of State, and the head of UN Peace-keeping Operations, Marak Goulding. 1989/

48. The United States entered the international attempt to halt the bloodshed in the Balkans by naming Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew as special envoy to help broker a truce. Secretary of State Warren Christopher outlined a US initiative that included tougher sanctions against Serbia but stopped short of immediate US military participation, saying that American troops would only be used to enforce a peace accord. 1990/

49. US Secretary of State Christopher condemned Serbian "ethnic cleansing" as "mass murders, systematic beatings, the rapes of Muslims and others, prolonged shelling of innocents in Sarajevo and elsewhere, forced displacement of entire villages, [and] inhumane treatment of prisoners in detention camps". 1991/

11. **11/2/93 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city suffered one of its heaviest days of fighting in several weeks with Serb gunners shelling the Old Town area with heavy artillery. Shelling was also reported near the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Old Town area; an UNPROFOR armoured personnel carrier at the airport; the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Four French soldiers were injured when a mortar directly hit their armoured personnel carrier at the Sarajevo airport. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** An unidentified American freelance photographer working for Reuters was shot in the foot by a sniper as he drove west on the airport road, known locally as "snipers' alley". 1992/ The airport also was reported to have received heavy sniper fire since early in the morning. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Four French soldiers were injured when a mortar directly hit their armoured personnel carrier at Sarajevo airport. The BiH Crisis Centre said that in the past 24 hours, 10 people had been killed in Sarajevo. 1993/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

50. UN relief flights from Zagreb to Sarajevo were temporarily suspended in mid-afternoon because of heavy shelling at the airport, according to the UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler. 1994/

51. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali protested the launching today of a Muslim counter-offensive of shelling in a Sarajevo suburb. 1995/ Two French UN soldiers were wounded and UN humanitarian aid flights were suspended. New attacks on the Serb area of Ilija/a, near the city's airport, erupted after Secretary of State Christopher appealed to all sides on Wednesday to stop their heavy-weapons fire. 1996/

52. Sarajevo suffered one of its heaviest days of fighting in several weeks. Serb gunners hit the city's Old Town with heavy artillery. Muslims and Croats fought back with mortars, grenades and small-arms fire. The wave of fighting took place hours after the new Clinton administration in the United States threw its support behind the UN-European Community peace plan and said that it would help enforce any agreement with military strength. 1997/

53. Four French soldiers were injured when a mortar shell hit their armoured vehicle at Sarajevo airport. A Reuters reporter saw the shell hitting the armoured personnel carrier at 1:00 p.m. and an ambulance taking away the members of UNPROFOR. The airport had sustained heavy mortar, small-arms and sniper fire since early in the morning. The four were members of a French paratroop battalion protecting the airport which included two companies drawn from a Legion unit. A French army official said that two of the wounded soldiers were in serious condition and that one had already lost an arm. In accordance with Legion practices of shielding their men's identities, the army gave no personal information about the four or their nationalities. 1998/

(b) Local reported events

54. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali protested the launching today of a Muslim counter-offensive of shelling in a Sarajevo suburb. 1999/

55. To dramatize the plight of the Muslims in eastern BiH, the government announced today that it would prevent the UN distribution of humanitarian aid in Sarajevo, until relief supplies reached the eastern region of BiH. 2000/

(c) International reported events

56. Lord Owen held talks with Radovan Karadžić and the Greek special envoy. 2001/

57. Mr. Vance met with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ilija Djukić, while Lord Owen briefed EC Ambassadors. The co-chairmen also held bilateral meetings with Karadžić and Papoulias, Under-Secretary in the Greek Foreign Ministry. 2002/

58. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and his delegation left New York for home and agreed to return, if necessary, for further negotiations. 2003/

12. 12/2/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH forces attempting to break the siege of the city renewed an offensive at the western end of the city where commanders sought to punch through Serbian lines. Infantry attacks by BiH forces prompted heavy shelling of civilian districts of the city. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Unnamed civilian districts of the city; the airport area. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: While unloading relief trucks, five UN soldiers were struck by fragments from a mortar barrage which hit the Sarajevo airport. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: While unloading relief trucks, five UN soldiers serving with the UN peace-keeping force, were struck by fragments from a mortar barrage that hit the Sarajevo airport. 2005/ At least 20 people were reported killed or wounded on this day. 2006/ Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

60. BiH forces attempting to break the siege of Sarajevo renewed a probing offensive at the western end of the city, where BiH commanders sought to punch through Serbian lines towards BiH-held territory to the north and west. Infantry attacks by the BiH forces prompted heavy shelling of civilian districts of the city, with at least 20 people reported killed or wounded. Five UNPROFOR soldiers were struck by fragments from a mortar barrage that hit the Sarajevo airport as they were unloading relief trucks. 2007/

(b) Local reported events

61. The Sarajevo Government cautiously backed the US effort to help bring an end to the Balkan war, but residents of the besieged capital were disappointed that no military aid was in the offing. 2008/

62. The United Nations announced that it hoped to begin flying food into Sarajevo from Italy in a few days, replacing Zagreb as a safer main centre for its aid airlift. This announcement followed the 6 February incident when anti-aircraft artillery was launched at a German humanitarian flight. 2009/

(c) International reported events

63. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stated that his country intended to pursue an independent policy in the Balkans. 2010/

64. In Paris one of four French soldiers wounded in Sarajevo on Thursday died of his injuries, French military officials said today. The latest death brought the number of French military personnel killed in action or accidents in the former Yugoslavia to 12. 2011/
13. **13/2/93 (Saturday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** There was heavy shelling reported of civilian districts around the airport and UNPROFOR headquarters and fighting during the night in the Muslim quarter of Hrasno. More than 1,500 shell rounds were counted by UNPROFOR. Source(s): *New York Times*, UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Civilian districts around the airport; UNPROFOR headquarters.
Source(s): *New York Times*.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire was reported in Sarajevo. Source(s): *New York Times*.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

65. There was heavy shelling of civilian districts around Sarajevo airport and UNPROFOR HQ in the city and fighting during the night in the Muslim quarter of Hrasno. Sniping and shelling was reported in Sarajevo. 2012/UNPROFOR counted more than 1,500 shell rounds fired. 2013/

(b) **Local reported events**

66. French General Phillipe Morillon accused BiH troops of deliberately attacking the French Foreign Legion at Sarajevo airport. Morillon said that an investigation of the craters had proved the rounds were fired Thursday from the area of Butmir, a BiH-held suburb beyond the airport. He said he had lodged a strong protest with President Alija Izetbegović who had promised to investigate and charge the commander responsible. The attack came in the midst of a pitched battle between BiH army and Serb troops which included heavy shelling across the airport runway and infantry attacks with several BiH and Serb held suburbs around the airport. The fighting continued on Friday and Saturday, but it was unclear whether either side had gained any ground. 2014/

67. The boycott of humanitarian aid supplies by BiH's Muslim-led government forced UN peacekeepers to close Sarajevo airport Saturday because there was no more room to store incoming supplies. BiH authorities in Sarajevo had said that they would refuse aid for Sarajevo until UN relief convoys started getting emergency food and medical supplies through to 100,000 starving Muslims trapped by Serb forces in eastern BiH. 2015/

(c) **International reported events**

68. US Special Envoy Batholomew reported that his meeting in Moscow with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev had been "very, very positive". Russian leaders, however, reportedly promised to oppose tighter sanctions against Serbia. They also insisted that peace be attained by negotiation and not by force. 2016/
14. 14/2/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** BiH forces launched a reported artillery and infantry attack against the Ilidža district and Lukavica. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Lukavica. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported to date: 8,327 killed, missing, or dead from cold, or hunger (of which 1,268 were children); 48,557 wounded (of which 12,499 were children); and 14,894 heavily wounded (of which 2,294 were children). 2017/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

69. BiH government forces launched a heavy attack against Serbs in Sarajevo's Ilidža district, near the airport. Tanjug, reported that Muslim forces launched an artillery and infantry assault on the Sarajevo suburb of Lukavica. BiH government continued Sarajevo's UN aid boycott. 2018/

(b) Local reported events

70. Mr. Jose-Maria Mediluce of Spain flew to Sarajevo to deal with BiH's decision to halt all relief convoys headed for Sarajevo. 2019/

(c) International reported events

71. The UN countered BiH's refusal to accept relief supplies for Sarajevo by suspending all aid flights into the capital. The UN military command in Sarajevo and UN relief officials in Geneva said there was no point in risking the lives of international air crews to fly in food and medicine if the aid was not going to reach Sarajevo's 380,000 residents. 2020/

15. 15/2/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Heavy shelling was reported in the city, accompanied by heavy fighting in the outlying districts. BiH forces were reported to have maintained artillery fire throughout the day in Ilidža. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that from the 7 February cease-fire to 11 February shelling decreased within the area of the city. Shelling throughout the week was concentrated in the Butmir, Stup, Stup-Brdo, Nedarići, Mojmilo, Dobrinja, Ilidža, Lukavica, Rajlovac, Grdojić and Sedrenik areas. UNPROFOR reported that with little success, BiH forces continued their attempt to cut the ring road east of the city to restrict Serb movement. In the Rajlovac area fighting reportedly continued throughout the week. Serb artillery throughout the week sporadically shelled the whole city. The positioning of BiH mortars near the PTT building had continued to attract fire from the Serbs, putting its personnel at risk. On 11 February at 6:15 a.m., the cease-fire was broken by a large amount of mortar and artillery activity when the BiH army started to shell Ilidža from Igman mountain. The Serb forces
reacted by shelling the western part of the city. At approximately 1:15 p.m., the BiH forces attacked Ilidža from Stup and Butmir with infantry. The Serbs deployed tanks to the eastern part of the runway. UNPROFOR reported that there were some indications that up to 10 Serb tanks were deployed west of Ilidža to support Serb troops. It was believed that the BiH forces failed to take any ground. During the attack on Ilidža, UNPROFOR reported that the BiH forces deliberately targeted the French Battalion base. One mortar round was fired from Butmir which hit an APC injuring four soldiers, one of whom subsequently died. During the week there had been a relatively large number of "narrow escapes" for UN personnel: The UN checkpoint had been shelled and one UNMO vehicle suffered damage. UNPROFOR reported that it believed that the UN was being deliberately targeted in Sarajevo. 2021/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Unidentified parts of the city; Stup; Ažinji; Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that the Maršal Tito barracks was hit by sniper fire at 11:25 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. 2022/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** According to Bosnian Serb radio in Pale, BiH forces kept up artillery fire throughout the day on the Serb suburb of Ilidža. Five people, including three civilians were killed and several others were wounded, it said. 2023/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 70 wounded on this day. 2024/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

72. On this day, artillery shells hit Sarajevo, sometimes at the rate of one a minute as Serb tanks and infantry attacked BiH defenders in the strategic western suburbs of Stup and Ažinji. Stup and Ažinji were reported to be the last BiH-held suburbs west of the main highway linking Sarajevo with its airport. The towns would give Serb forces complete control of the vital road to the airport. It was speculated that the attacks on Stup and Ažinji were apparently a response to what UN observers and Serb officials described as a major BiH offensive against the Serb-held town of Ilidža. Ilidža, between the airport and Stup, had come under repeated mortar and infantry attacks from BiH forces. It was reported that if the BiH forces lost the two suburbs, it would be a defeat reminiscent of the Serbs' capture of Oteš, just west of Stup, in December. 2025/

73. Samir Ladzo, operations officer for BiH's 1st Brigade in Sarajevo said his troops had destroyed one Serb tank in the previous 24 hours. But he said the Serbs were using at least six other tanks along their Stup-Ažinji front. He said Serb forces had broken through the first line of defence around Ažinji Sunday night after a BiH unit pulled back under a tank assault. The Serb breakthrough forced the defenders in one sector to withdraw several hundred yards to an inadequate second line where soldiers had been trying tried to dig trenches deeper while under tank, artillery and mortar fire. Ladzo said that one of his men had been killed and three wounded since Sunday night. 2026/

74. According to Bosnian Serb radio in Pale, BiH forces kept up artillery fire throughout the day on the Serb suburb of Ilidža. Five people, including three civilians, were killed and several others were wounded, it said. 2027/
16. 16/2/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling and shooting was reported in the Old Town. Serb and BiH troops traded small-arms and machine-gun fire in the suburbs of Stup and Azići where there had been reported fighting over the past five days. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Old Town. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the Maršal Tito barracks was again hit by sniper fire. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported nine killed and 49 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

75. Serb and BiH troops traded small-arms and machine-gun fire in the western suburbs of Stup and Azići where there had been reported fighting over the past five days. 2030/

76. Sporadic shelling and shooting was reported in the city's Old Town. 2031/

(b) Local reported events

77. For the fifth day in a row the Muslim-led Sarajevo city council refused to distribute relief food to its citizens. UN officials criticized this decision because it increased the level of suffering. BiH government officials said that the suffering of their own people was the only weapon they had left to jolt the international community into action. 2032/

(c) International reported events

78. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that he expected the pressure on Serbs during talks in New York to continue. He said that the the Serbian delegation would propose that further talks be held in Geneva rather than New York, where he believed that the Serbian side was not on equal footing. 2033/

17. 17/2/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Battle for Stup and Azići was reported to be in its seventh day as west and central Sarajevo was shelled. The situation was reported as quiet overnight, but fighting picked up in the afternoon. Although Serb radio said that Stup fell on this day, BiH soldiers and ammunition were reportedly rushed through the town to the front throughout the day. Source(s): Press Association; Reuters.

Targets Hit: West and central portions of the city; the Koševo Hospital; the main bakery; the UNPROFOR Bistrik barracks; the UNPROFOR Tito barracks. Source(s): Reuters; Press Association; UNPROFOR.
Description of Damage: Two people were wounded when a shell hit an operating theatre at the Koševno Hospital; five shells were reported to have hit the city’s main bakery and there were reports that 1 person was killed. Source(s): Reuters; Press Association; UNPROFOR.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two people were wounded when a shell hit an operating theatre at the Koševno Hospital; five shells were reported to have hit the city’s main bakery and there were reports that one person was killed. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 51 wounded on this day. 2034/
Source(s): Reuters; Press Associations; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1603. The Battle for Stup and Azići, two Sarajevo suburbs on the western flank of the city’s vital airport road, was reported to be in its seventh day. BiH reports said that the situation was quiet overnight, but that heavy fighting picked up during the afternoon. Although Serb radio broadcast that Stup fell on this day, BiH soldiers and ammunition were reported as being rushed through the town to the front throughout the day. Local commanders said the situation in neighbouring Azići was difficult, but they vowed not to surrender the two towns. The BiH defence of Stup and Azići was reported as complicated by the enormous disparity of firepower between BiH forces and Serbs. Drawing upon stores of the former Yugoslav national army, the Serbs utilized tanks, heavy machine-guns and artillery in battle. Although Serb lines were within range of BiH artillery on nearby Igman mountain, the BiH forces had only a few tanks and not much ammunition. It was reported that their defence depended mainly upon fighters using small-arms and home-made anti-armour grenades. 2035/

1604. West and central Sarajevo were shelled and shells hit Sarajevo’s Koševno hospital and the main bakery. The hospital said that two people were wounded when a shell hit an operating theatre at the main hospital. Five shells were reported to have hit the bakery. Sarajevo radio said that one person was killed, but staff members at the plant said they did not know of any deaths. The bakery had stopped producing bread because it had run out of diesel fuel for its electricity generators. The fuel was provided as part of UN aid, but the bakery, along with the rest of Sarajevo, had refused to accept supplies from the UN until aid reached Muslims trapped in eastern BiH. 2036/

1605. UNPROFOR reported that two monitoring observation posts were evacuated after Serb forces threatened to shell them. It was also reported that the Bistrik and Marshal Tito barracks were hit by shells and mortars. 2037/

(b) Local reported events

1606. It was reported that the fighting in and around the city had cut electricity, gas and water mains. With midday temperatures hovering near freezing, General Phillipe Morillon, commander of the UN peacekeepers in BiH, called for a cease-fire so that utilities (which served both sides), could be repaired. The UN forces said that the BiH government and the Serbs had agreed in principle and were trying to work out details of a truce. 2038/

1607. Citing safety concerns, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata said land convoys and airdrops to Sarajevo would be stopped and all UN personnel would be withdrawn with the exception of a skeleton staff. 2039/ BiH President Alija Izetbegović reacted angrily to the suspension of aid to his Republic, accusing the UN of engaging in “blackmail of the rich against the poor”. 2040/
(c) International reported events

1608. US officials said that they were considering air-drop relief operations that they hoped would minimize the risks and maximize the effectiveness of aid deliveries. 2041/

18. 18/2/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The BiH army was reported to have attacked Iliđa and UNPROFOR closed the roads in the area as the fighting intensified with artillery barrages and infantry surges. Serb forces were reported to have continued their attack on the western gateway to the city and fighting was reported close to the airport and to the UNPROFOR headquarters. The city was reported to have had a relatively quiet night with occasional shellfire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Iliđa; the area near the UNPROFOR headquarters; the UNPROFOR French Battalion's vehicles; the Marshal Tito barracks. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: The UNPROFOR French Battalion was hit by two shell rounds which damaged some vehicles. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported seven killed and 77 wounded on this day. 2042/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1609. The BiH army was reported to have attacked the nearby Serb stronghold of Iliđa. UNPROFOR once again closed roads in the area as the fighting intensified with artillery barrages accompanied by infantry surges. Commander Freer of UNPROFOR said that BiH infantrymen attacked Iliđa in the morning as the army's gunners laid down artillery and mortar fire. 2043/

1610. Serb forces were reported to have continued their attack on the western gateway to the city. Fighting was reported close to the airport and the UNPROFOR headquarters located in the post and telegraph building where a spokesman said that contingency plans had been drawn to protect its personnel. It was reported that shells were coming in so close that personnel in the building, and around it, had to dive for cover. 2044/

1611. UNPROFOR reported that the French Battalion was hit by two rounds, possibly 120 millimetre artillery shells which damaged some vehicles. The Marshal Tito barracks were also hit by several mortar rounds. 2045/

1612. Sarajevo had a relatively quiet night with only reported occasional shells coming from Serb gunners on surrounding mountainsides. 2046/

(b) International reported events

1613. Tanjug reported that the Bosnian Serb delegation to the peace talks, including Radovan Karadžić, would not be going to New York for negotiations. The delegation wrote to the conference co-chairmen asking for the talks to be transferred back to Geneva. 2047/
1614. The Russian Parliament voted unanimously to ask the UN to lift sanctions against Serbia and levy them against Croatia. 2048/

19. 19/2/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Military observers reported 1,074 artillery rounds hitting BiH government positions in and around Sarajevo. Only 13 artillery rounds were observed hitting Serb positions. 2049/ Serb forces were reported as continuing to blast suburbs of key importance for control of the road to the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Unidentified suburbs near the airport; Mt. Igman; BiH government positions in and around Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Snipers were reported active in the Novo Sarajevo district. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 26 wounded on this day. 2050/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1615. Serb forces were reported as continuing to blast Sarajevo suburbs of key importance for control of the road to the city's airport. In the city, Sarajevo radio reported that heavy machine-gun exchanges were heard in the area around the Parliament and that snipers were active in the Novo Sarajevo district. 2051/

1616. At 7:00 p.m., UNPROFOR reported a major explosion on Mt. Igman resulting in a shock wave carrying as far as Sarajevo. 2052/

(b) **Local reported events**

1617. Red Cross officials said that Sarajevo soup kitchens would begin closing at the weekend because they were running out of food supplies. 2053/

(c) **International reported events**

1618. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali overruled the UNHCR’s Sadako Ogata, and ordered that suspended humanitarian aid be resumed as soon as possible. 2054/

20. 20/2/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Tanjug reported that Serb forces had pushed BiH forces back around the key suburbs of Stup and Azici. The main battle had been for a strategic stretch of open ground at Azici where defenders had attempted to hold trenches guarding the west entrance to the city. BiH soldiers armed with rifles and anti-tank weapons were reported under heavy fire from Serb tanks and anti-aircraft machine-guns flanking the BiH positions on three sides. BiH casualties were reportedly high. Source(s): Reuters; New York
Time.

Targets Hit: The Rajlovac area of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: The BiH army reportedly fired two wire guided anti-tank missiles in the Rajlovac area of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and 68 wounded on this day. 2053/ Last week, the BiH government said that it had the names of 8,327 people who had been killed in Sarajevo or were missing for more than three months, and another 63,451 who had been wounded. Health Ministry information suggested a soaring suicide rate, a near doubling of abortions, and a 50 percent drop in births. 2056/ Source(s): New York Times; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1619. Tanjug reported Serbs had pushed BiH forces back around the key Sarajevo suburbs of Stup and Azići, which commanded the road to the airport. 2057/

1620. The main battle had been for a strategic stretch of open ground at Azići, on the western end of the city where BiH defenders had attempted to hold trenches guarding the western entrance to the city. BiH soldiers armed with rifles and anti-tank weapons, were reported as heading out in twos and threes toward their trenches which were under heavy fire from Serb tanks and anti-aircraft machine-guns flanking the BiH positions on three sides. Casualties among the BiH forces reportedly ran close to 50 per cent. 2058/

1621. UNPROFOR reported that the BiH army fired two wire guided anti-tank missiles in the Rajlovac area of the city. UNPROFOR also commented that the BiH forces were believed to hold Red Arrow anti-tank missiles. 2032/

(b) Local reported events

1622. UNPROFOR reported that President Izetbegović called for a cease-fire at 6:00 p.m. 2060/

1623. Sarajevo was once again entirely without main-line electricity and running water as a result of a new round of brutal fighting on hills to the north-west, where the only transmission line still operating was cut last week by mortar shells. 2061/

21. 21/2/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling reportedly intensified near the middle of the day. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that Serb forces counter-attacked against Stup on 14 February and during six days of fighting had pushed the BiH forces back to their secondary lines of defence within Stup. There was a lull in the battle on 20 February. There were reports that two tanks and up to 20 APCs took part in the attack. The Serbs confirmed that they had two tanks destroyed in the fighting in Stup. During the attack, Serb artillery engaged the western end of the city. It was also believed that Serb forces may have manoeuvred up to 20 tanks in the Iliđa area. There were conflicting reports that these were MBTs but more likely T55s. The BiH forces
attacked Rajlovac and Vogošća during the week but with little or no success. Supporting fire for the BiH forces came from Visoko and from Mount Igman. There were also reports of an attack against Hadžići west of Sarajevo supported by artillery fire from Mount Igman. UNPROFOR commented that the attacks carried out by BiH forces and the counter-attack by the Serbs was almost identical to the situation during the week of 1 December. 2062/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported five killed and 30 wounded on this day. 2063/ It also reported to date: 8,373 killed, missing, or dead from cold, or hunger (of which 1,273 were children); 48,930 wounded (of which 12,619 were children); and 15,080 heavily wounded (of which 2,354 were children). 2064/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:
1624. Sarajevo radio said that Serb shelling of the city intensified near the middle of the day and that two women were killed. 2065/
(b) Local reported events
1625. The BiH Government called on the Sarajevo city council today to lift its boycott of humanitarian aid and declared a unilateral cease-fire to facilitate aid shipments. 2066/
1626. In the 11th day of their refusal to accept further UN food shipments until aid was provided to the starving towns in the east, residents of Serbbesieged Sarajevo welcomed a US airdrop proposal as a sign that Washington was finally moving to ease their suffering. 2067/
(c) International reported events
1627. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, issued a statement saying that her agency was resuming full operations in BiH after receiving assurances that the country’s warring factions would no longer block aid convoys or distribution. The statement said Ogata had agreed with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali that operations would restart "as soon as possible, perhaps as early as Monday". 2068/

22. 22/2/93 (Monday)
(a) Military activity
Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported nine killed and 31 wounded on this day. 2069/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1628. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1629. Momčilo Krajišnik, President of the Assembly, said that a delegation of Bosnian Serbs would attend the next New York round of talks. It was still uncertain, however, whether Radovan Karadžić would head this delegation. 2070/

1630. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that the US potential air-drop operations were not necessary because "there have been hundreds of convoys through Serb territory". UN Commander Morillon insisted that US air-drops were "unnecessary" and would only cause an "explosion". 2071/

(c) International reported events

1631. The UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 808, which assigned the Secretary-General the task of preparing a proposal establishing an international war crimes tribunal within 60 days. 2072/

23. 23/2/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: For the past three days fighting in the capital was reported to have been at its lowest level in weeks, with as few as 15 shells per day, compared with more than 1,000 on some days last week. 2073/ In the evening, Serb forces launched an artillery attack on the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area (evening); an unidentified mosque in the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Reports from the Old Town area said that at least five people were killed and 20 wounded in the day’s shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Reports from the Old Town area said that at least five people were killed and 20 wounded in the day’s shelling. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 18 wounded on this day. 2074/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1632. Serb forces launched an artillery attack in the evening on Sarajevo’s Old Town, with at least five shells hitting a mosque as Muslims gathered for evening prayers at the start of the holy month of Ramadan. Reports from the district said at least five people were killed and 20 wounded. 2075/
(b) Local reported events

1633. The BiH government announced a cease-fire in Sarajevo. 2076/

(c) International reported events

1634. At the White House, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali approved air-drop operations after receiving assurances that the US would coordinate operations with the UN. He also issued a joint statement with President Clinton calling on the warring factions to return to the peace table for negotiations. 2077/

24. 24/2/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling around Sarajevo was reported to have dropped in intensity following a unilateral cease-fire declared by the BiH government on Saturday. Serb forces were reported to have captured Azidi. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area near the Hadzija mosque; the areas near several mosques in Sarajevo. Source(s): Washington Post.

Description of Damage: A shell hit the home of Senadin Seta, age 32, at 4:50 p.m., injuring his wife and killing his two year-old daughter. The home was less than 100 yards from Sarajevo's Hadijska mosque. Source(s): Washington Post.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 12 wounded on this day. 2078/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1635. Serb forces were reported to have captured the key western suburb of Azidi. A Reuters television crew went into the suburb on Tuesday and found it "completely destroyed". Heavy fighting broke out nearly two weeks ago when the Serbs attacked the western suburbs. There was speculation that with the fall of Azidi fighting would be concentrated in Stup, its BiH-held neighbouring suburb. If the Serbs captured Stup the western entrance to Sarajevo would be wide open. The Serb attacks on Azidi and Stup followed a BiH government push against the Serb-held stronghold of Ilija. On some days, more than a thousand shells were reported to have fallen in the contested areas. The Serbs said that they captured Azidi without a single soldier killed and only a handful wounded. "We don't want to lose more soldiers, so we decided on a new tactic: we destroy a place before we occupy it", said Svetozar Guzina, deputy commander of the Serb forces in the area. 2079/

1636. A shell hit the home of Senadin Seta, age thirty-two at 4:50 p.m., injuring his wife and killing his two year-old daughter. The Seta family lived less than 100 yards from Sarajevo's Hadzija mosque. Bombs were reported to have landed near several other mosques at that time. 2080/

1637. Shelling around Sarajevo was reported to have dropped in intensity following a unilateral cease-fire declared by the BiH government on Saturday. This was reported to be the 19th such cease-fire. 2081/
(b) **Local reported events**

1638. In the evening, Radovan Karadžić said that he would head the Serb delegation at the New York talks and that the co-chairmen had given him strong assurances that the Muslim side would be headed by Izetbegović. 2082/ He said that he would participate in negotiations despite threats to start legal proceedings against him for having ordered the rape of Muslim women. 2083/

1639. A statement by the Yugoslav General Staff described "American interference" as increasingly drastic and unbearable. The statement described air-drops as part of a "ruthless imperial ultimatum". JNA officials said that US aeroplanes would inevitably draw fire and would serve as a convenient pretext for greater Western military intervention. They warned that "appropriate steps" would be taken in response. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić described the plan as a "highly uncalled for, very risky, and dangerous decision". 2084/

(c) **International reported events**

1640. Russia released an eight-point Balkan peace plan which included measures to tighten the arms embargo and toughen sanctions against Croatia. The initiative was designed to win support from Russian parliamentarians who believed too much blame had been placed on the Serbs. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that "it is impossible in this conflict to determine who is right and who is wrong". The plan noted the possibility that a Russian contingent would join the multinational force dispatched. 2085/

25. **25/2/93 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported to have intensified around Sarajevo, with the UN recording thirty-three rounds fired on Serb-held positions against 148 on BIH-held territory. 2086/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BIH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 11 wounded on this day. 2087/ Source(s): BIH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1641. No reported incidents.

(b) **International reported events**

1642. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Bosnian Croat leader Boban and BIH Prime Minister Ahmadžić to discuss implementation of the peace plan. 2088/

1643. President Clinton publicly announced upcoming air-drop operations. He said that they were "strictly for humanitarian purposes" and would be carried out "without regard to ethnic or religious affiliation". Bosnian Serb leaders reportedly instructed their troops not to fire on US aircraft. 2089/
26. 26/2/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity**: Sarajevo had been reported as relatively quiet in the morning, but in the afternoon the city suffered a heavy round of artillery bombardment. **Source(s)**: Reuters.

**Targets Hit**: The area near the Presidency (two shells); the vicinity of the Holiday Inn (four shells); the area near a water dispensing supplies to citizens; the Klas-Šarko and Velepaka buildings. **Source(s)**: Reuters; Government of BiH.

**Description of Damage**: Two shells landed near the Presidency building, setting a building on fire two blocks away, and four shells landed near the Holiday Inn Hotel during a lunchtime attack. Staff at two hospitals said that they received 13 casualties; one shell landed near a water tanker dispensing supplies to citizens. The tanker was holed by shrapnel from the blast. The Klas-Šarko and Velepaka buildings (the city's only providers of essential foodstuffs such as flour and bread) were also shelled, according to a report from the Government of BiH. Since the first attack on 17 May 1992, the buildings had sustained 27 direct hits from 53 projectiles launched against them. Damage inflicted on the buildings, equipment and vehicles had been serious. Seven retail outlets had also been attacked. One employee was killed due to shelling during this period and six were wounded, among them three drivers during a delivery to a retail outlet. **2090**/ **Source(s)**: Reuters; Government of BiH.

**Sniping Activity**: Not specified

**Casualties**: Staff at two hospitals said that they received 13 casualties from the lunchtime attack. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 10 wounded on this day. **2091**/ **Source(s)**: Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events**:

1644. Sarajevo had been reported as relatively quiet in the morning with occasional bursts of machine-gun and small-arms fire. **2092**/

1645. At least 13 people were wounded when six shells were fired into the city in the first heavy artillery bombardment of Sarajevo in nearly a week. Two shells landed near the Presidency Building, setting a building on fire two blocks away. Four shells landed in the vicinity of the Holiday Inn Hotel used by foreign journalists. One shell landed near a water tanker dispensing supplies to Sarajevo's citizens. In an attempt to fight the fire, residents used buckets to collect water from the leaking tanker, holed by shrapnel from the blast. **2093**/

(c) **International reported events**

1646. BiH President Izetbegović met with US Vice President Gore in the afternoon. Silajdžić was already in the US, and the rest of BiH delegation was expected. Mate Boban, head of the Croatian Delegation and Prime Minister Mihailo Akmacić, another member of the BiH delegation, arrived earlier. Akmacić sent a letter to US Senator Joseph Biden which denied the right of Izetbegović and Silajdžić to represent and speak in the name of all three ethnic communities of BiH. In response, Biden made it clear that he recognized Silajdžić as a representative of BiH and that he believed that Silajdžić had sought help for
27. 27/2/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN observers said that 24 shells landed on Serb-held areas of the city and 71 landed on BiH government-controlled territory. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near the Presidency building (the street between the Presidency and the International Press Centre); the area near the Holiday Inn (two shells overnight). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One man was killed and at least three other people were injured when a shell hit near the Presidency building in a street between the Presidency and the International Press Centre. The road was littered with shattered stonework from the Presidency and broken glass. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One man was killed and at least three other people were injured when a shell hit near the Presidency building in a street between the Presidency and the International Press Centre. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and thirty-one wounded on this day. 2095/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1647. One man was killed and at least three other people, including a young girl, were injured when a shell hit near the Presidency Building. The shell landed in a street between the Presidency and the International Press Centre. The road was littered with shattered stonework from the Presidency and broken glass. Snow and ice were blackened by the blast. Guards inside the Presidency Building said that the man had been killed outright by the blast. A doctor at Koševor hospital said that a young girl and an older couple had been hurt. 2096/

1648. Sarajevo radio said that two shells also fell overnight in the central district near the Holiday Inn Hotel.

(b) Local reported events

1649. Two US aeroplanes dropped one million leaflets over eastern BiH. The leaflets described impending food drops; they warned prospective recipients to take cover; and they implored soldiers not to fire at the aeroplanes. A radio operator in Goražde reported that many of the warning leaflets had landed 20 kilometres from the town. 2097/

(c) International reported events

1650. After meeting with US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Vice President Al Gore for well over an hour at the White House, BiH President Izetbegović said that US involvement "will give a new impulse" to negotiations down the road. 2098/
28. 28/2/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported in the Old Town area and in the outskirts of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area of the city; the outskirts of the city. Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: According to a report from the Government of BiH detailing damage to the Olympic Centre "Skenderija", 300 projectiles were launched against this building since the first attack on 2 May 1992, 149 of the highest calibre. Marko Starčević, a security guard in the building, was killed by shelling during this period. Most of the building (65 per cent to 70 per cent) has been damaged by shelling and the ensuing fires. Damage has been estimated at $8,360,000 US 2099/ Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire in the city outskirts was described as intense at times. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and 30 wounded on this day. 2100/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported to date: 8,414 killed, missing, or dead from cold, or hunger (of which 1,275 were children); 49,068 wounded (of which 12,703 were children); and 15,149 heavily wounded (of which 2,396 were children). 2101/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1651. Sarajevo radio said that shellfire killed one person and wounded another in the Old Town area of the city. It also said that shells landed in the city's outskirts and sniper fire was intense at times. 2102/

(b) Local reported events

1652. In its monthly operational report, UNPROFOR reported that it observed a significant increase in the number of rounds fired. On 10 February a solution was proposed to establish an agreement on utility repair missions. UNPROFOR characterized this agreement as a failure and noted that 46 repair missions had been planned, thirty-three completed, and 13 canceled (five for safety reasons, eight for technical reasons). With regard to airport crossings, UNPROFOR reported that during the last two weeks of the month (crediting the French Battalion), there were no casualties. UNPROFOR, however, noted an increased number of crossing attempts totalling 12,850. 2103/

L. March 1993

1. 1/3/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was shelled overnight and into the day. UNPROFOR reported in its weekly summary that the BiH unilaterl cease-fire at the beginning of the week did not hold, but that there was a marked decrease in shelling, mortaring and shooting. UNPROFOR noted that when the Serbs fired into the city, they used mortars for the majority of the time and not artillery. UNPROFOR reported that the BiH forces carried out a number of small attacks. First they attacked into Ilidža from Butmir and Sokolovac. On 25
February they attacked Azići from Stup. This resulted in an upturn in heavy fire from the Serbs. UNPROFOR reported that information had been received which indicated that the commanders of the 3rd and 4th Battalions which withdrew their forces from Stup in last week's battle had been executed for withdrawing without orders and contributing to the collapse of the BiH front line. UNPROFOR reported further that it believed that both sides had resupplied their front lines and were preparing for a new offensive. UNPROFOR commented that Sarajevo had been very quiet in comparison to previous weeks. Throughout the week, both sides appeared to have been firing mortars as opposed to heavy artillery, which according to UNPROFOR indicated that they required a resupply of artillery ammunition. 2104/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Stup (early morning); the city centre (three shells); the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 12 killed and thirty-six wounded on this day. 2105/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1653. According to Sarajevo radio, Sarajevo was shelled overnight as three US military cargo aeroplanes dropped emergency supplies into east BiH. The western suburb of Stup was bombarded for 30 minutes in the early hours of the morning. Three shells landed in the city centre and the Old Town area also came under fire. 2106/ UNPROFOR reported continued reinforcement of the Stup area by both sides. Presidency forces launched attacks against Vogošća which were repulsed. Serb pressure was exerted on the area of Gravica with tank fire and in Rožaje by artillery. 2107/

(b) Local reported events

1654. Three Hercules C-130 transport aeroplanes dropped more than 21 tons of relief supplies onto a besieged Muslim enclave north-east of Sarajevo early in the day but a BiH minister said the packages fell into Serb hands. "According to our information, all the packages fell at Cerska into Serb hands", BiH Deputy Prime Minister Zlatko Lagumdžija reported, stating that he had been briefed by UN officials and amateur radio operators in contact with the region. UN officials in Geneva said that the packages were destined for Cerska, north-east of Sarajevo whose 30,000 residents had been isolated and starving for months. The drops were the first of a US operation to provide aid to isolated Muslim, Serb and Croat enclaves in eastern BiH. 2108/

(c) International reported events

1655. The peace conference co-chairmen held bilateral meetings with Karadžić, Izetbegović and Bosnian Croat leader Boban. 2109/
2. 2/3/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Roševo, Alipasićno Polje and the Vogošća districts were reportedly shelled. UNPROFOR reported infantry fighting in the area north-east of Roševo. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The Roševo Hospital; a crowd lining up for water near the television station in the Alipasićno Polje district; the Vogošća district. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post; Reuters.

Description of Damage: An architect named Munira was killed while surveying mortar damage to Roševo Hospital. Eight others were injured. Her husband, Tajib, also an architect, had reportedly mapped 96 direct mortar hits on the hospital and 81 shells that landed near the building. Tajib and others working at the hospital had observed that shelling of the hospital increased around noon, during visiting hours 2110; a shell killed two people and wounded at least five when it exploded near a crowd lining up for water near the television station in the Alipasićno Polje district; a 12 year-old boy was killed when five mortar shells landed in Vogošća. Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: An architect named Munira was killed while surveying mortar damage to Roševo Hospital; a shell killed two people and wounded at least five when it exploded near a crowd lining up for water near the television station in the Alipasićno Polje district; a 12 year-old boy was killed when five mortar shells landed in Vogošća. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 10 people killed and 46 wounded on this day. 211a/ Source(s): Helsinki Watch; Washington Post; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Health.

Narrative of Events:

156. UNPROFOR reported infantry fighting in the area north-east of Roševo. 2112/

1567. An architect named Munira was killed while surveying mortar damage to Roševo Hospital. Eight others were injured. Her husband, Tajib, also an architect, had reportedly mapped 96 direct mortar hits on the hospital and 81 shells that landed near the building. Tajib and others working at the hospital had observed that shelling of the hospital increased around noon, during visiting hours. 2113/

1568. A shell killed two people and wounded at least five when it exploded near a crowd lining up for water in western Sarajevo. The shell exploded near the television station in the Alipasićno Polje district. 2114/

1569. A 12 year-old boy was killed when five mortar shells landed in Serb-held districts of Vogošća, just north of Sarajevo. 2115/

(b) Local reported events

1560. US aeroplanes dropped 19 tons of food and a half-ton of medical provisions over Žepa. Secretary of Defense Aspin and Joint Chiefs Chairman Powell termed the operation "successful", but several unnamed sources in the military and the US Government said that only a limited amount of the relief
supplies actually reached their targets. 2116/

(c) International reported events

1661. Angry over news of a Serb attack, President Alija Izetbegović entered peace talks for the first time since they moved to New York from Geneva, although he vowed to leave in a few days and let his foreign minister negotiate. "I am going to tell them that while we are talking, while we are negotiating, the Serbs launched a new offensive against the people in east BiH," he said. "The situation is very difficult and for us it's incompatible". Shortly afterward mediators Vance and Owen issued a statement deploiring heavy fighting in Cerlka and Srebrenica as the peace talks were underway. 2117/

1662. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Izetbegović, BiH Prime Minister Akmađžić and Bosnian Croat leader Boban to discuss Muslim/Croat relations in light of recent fighting. Lord Owen later met with Karadžić. 2118/

1663. Izetbegović stressed that he would not lead the BiH delegation in the talks, but that Silajdžić would. 2119/

3. 3/3/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was mostly quiet in the morning, but occasional small-arms fire overnight in Stup and sporadic shelling in Dobrinja were reported. It said that Serb forces tried unsuccessfully to break through BiH army lines on Trebevići. UNPROFOR reported attacks by BiH forces from Dobrinja towards Lukavica. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported seven killed and 41 wounded on this day. 2120/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1664. Sarajevo was reported as mostly quiet in the morning but Sarajevo radio reported occasional small-arms fire overnight in the Muslim-held suburb of Stup and said that there was sporadic Serb shelling of the Dobrinja district. It said that Serb commandos tried unsuccessfully to break through BiH army lines on Trebevići mountain to the north-east of the city. 2121/

1665. UNPROFOR reported attacks by BiH forces from Dobrinja towards Lukavica. 2122/

(c) International reported events

1666. In New York the United Nations Security Council announced that it would go into emergency session at 3:30 p.m. to discuss the fighting in eastern BiH where the European Community had accused Serb forces of committing atrocities. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Gali was reported earlier in the day as saying
that he was willing to use UN forces to implement a peace settlement. 2123/

1667. BiH President Izetbegović signed the Military Agreement for peace in
BiH. Lord Owen met with British Secretary of State, Douglas Hurd. The peace
conference co-chairmen held talks with Karadžić and Boban. 2124/

4. 4/3/92 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN observers recorded 39 artillery shells, 41
mortar shells, and 26 tank rounds landing on Serb controlled areas of
Sarajevo, and 116 artillery shells, 149 mortar shells and 22 tank rounds
landing on the BiH controlled areas of the city. 2125/ Source(s): United Press
International.

Targets Hit: A Canadian armoured personnel carrier in Visoko. Source(s):
United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Unidentified Serb snipers ambushed and killed Chantal
Godinot, a French woman with the Equilibre humanitarian organization and
wounded two Polish aid workers who were part of a humanitarian aid convoy
leaving Sarajevo. 2126/ UNPROFOR HQ BIH COMD APC's were reported to have fired
all available "smoke" to provide cover. 2127/ Source(s): United States
Government; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Unidentified Serb snipers ambushed and killed Chantal Godinot, a
French woman with the Equilibre humanitarian organization and wounded two
Polish aid workers who were part of a humanitarian aid convoy leaving
Sarajevo. 2128/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 24
wounded on this day. 2129/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1668. Canadian armoured personnel carrier was fired upon in Visoko, situated
about 12 miles north-west of Sarajevo. 2130/

(c) International reported events

1669. The Security Council asked UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to send
troops or observers into eastern BiH and demanded that the killings of
civilians there cease. It warned that "those guilty of crimes against
international humanitarian law would be held individually responsible by the
world community". The statement asked Boutros-Ghali to take immediate steps to
increase the presence of UN peacekeepers in eastern BiH but did not specify
what the troops were to do. 2131/

1670. The United Nations announced that the BiH government had signed a
military pact outlining a cease-fire and disengagement of forces in a future
peace settlement. The agreement by itself would not stop the war in BiH. But
spokesman Fred Eckhard said: "It brings us one step closer toward getting a
political agreement upon which a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities can
be based". 2132/

1671. The peace conference co-chairmen and the UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali met with Radovan Karadžić who continued to refuse to sign the complete
Peace Plan. They later met with Izetbegović, Boban and Churkin. 2132/

3. 5/3/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A decrease in fighting was reported around Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: A 16 truck humanitarian aid convoy organized by Serb, Catholic and Muslim charities (outside the Sarajevo airport area). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: A 16 truck humanitarian aid convoy was destroyed near the area outside the Sarajevo airport when four shells were fired by BiH forces. Four people were wounded. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 17 wounded on this day. 2134/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1672. A humanitarian aid convoy was destroyed when shells hit a 16 truck convoy outside the Sarajevo airport injuring four people. General Ratko Mladić, commander of the Serb forces in BiH ordered a ban on such convoys passing through Serb controlled areas until such time as their safety could be guaranteed. UN military observers at the airport later confirmed that the attack had been launched from Muslim positions in the city. "The Muslims opened fire with heavy machine-gun fire and there were at least four mortar rounds", said Dutch Captain Hans Kookj, deputy commander of the military observers in Sarajevo. He said that the convoy, organized by Serb, Catholic and Muslim charities, was not painted white and did not look like UN aid trucks. Firing began after the lead vehicle stalled, bringing the other trucks to a halt on the approach road to the airport. 2135/ Tom Squitieri, a reporter for USA Today was slightly wounded in the attack. 2136/

(b) Local reported events

1673. Despite the apparent decrease in fighting in Sarajevo, its residents faced below zero temperatures without electricity, gas or running water. 2137/

(c) International reported events

1674. At a news conference President Clinton defended the efficacy of US airdrops. He also said "we want to find ways to tighten the embargo and we are moving on that right now, even as we speak". He said that decisions would be announced very shortly. Yet Clinton also supplied three reasons for caution; fear of a quagmire; the need for British and French support; and the "not insignificant difficulty" of preserving warm ties with Russia. 2138/
6. 6/3/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Shelling was reported near the runway at the airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** The Sarajevo airport runway. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** A French UNPROFOR soldier was hit by shrapnel on the runway at the Sarajevo airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 10 wounded on this day. 2139/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1675. UNPROFOR reported that a French soldier was hit by shrapnel while on the runway at the Sarajevo airport. 2140/

(b) **Local reported events**

1676. US aeroplanes dropped 27 tons of relief on Srebrenica and Konjević in what appeared to be the most accurate operation to date. 2141/

(c) **International reported events**

1677. The peace talks were suspended without accord. BiH President Izetbegović returned to Sarajevo, but pledged to rejoin negotiations the next week "with the intention of moving the discussions forward to a successful conclusion." 2142/ Radovan Karadžić stated that the second round of the New York peace negotiations was over and that his delegation was going home without signing BiH’s provincial maps. 2143/

7. 7/3/93 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that the level of activity had abated since the Battle of Stup. Both the Serb and BiH forces were reportedly reinforcing and/or consolidating their positions. The level of artillery and mortar fire reportedly increased compared to the prior week, averaging 570 rounds per day. Main concentration areas were: Stup, Dobrinja, Butmir, Koševo, and the city centre. Tank fire incidents also increased, indicating Serb armour presence closer to the line of confrontation. UNPROFOR commented that the consolidation of the line in the Stup area and subsequent offensive action would depend on how quickly Serb armoured forces could be brought forward to influence the battle. Slippery roads had impeded the resupply and reinforcement of both sides, however, and the movement of Serb armour from Pale was directly attributable to their maintenance of the Pale road. Combat activity reportedly continued as both sides initiated local offensives. The scale of forces involved, and resulting casualties were not known. Heavy infantry fighting was reported between Butmir and Ilidža, as well as in Koševo. Serb forces reportedly repulsed an attack by BiH forces towards Vogošća. The latter was thought likely to relieve
pressure on Stupa by drawing Serb forces away while attempting to link with reported offensives by BiH forces at Vogošća from the Breza area. 2144/
Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 18 wounded on this day. It also reported to date: 8,454 killed, missing, or dead from cold, or hunger (of which 1,275 were children); 49,260 wounded (of which 12,751 were children); and 15,280 heavily wounded (of which 2,424 were children). 2145/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1678. No reported incidents.

(b) International reported events

1679. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asserted that if the current peace process did not result in the curtailment of the Bosnian Serb offensive, the
UN's member states, especially the US, must prepare to send troops to the region for a "major operation". Secretary of Defense Aspin was unsure whether the US would be willing to send such troops. Boutros-Ghali stated that if the Serbs signed the peace plan and then refused to withdraw "we will have to take the necessary measures". 2146/

s. 8/3/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 20 wounded on this day. 2147/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1680. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1681. Upon arriving in BiH after the New York talks, President Izetbegović declared, "I don't accept this [Vance-Owen] map, I have never accepted it". Yet BiH UN Ambassador Sadjibey said, "our President is definitely inclined to sign the peace agreement". Vance appealed to the international community to "get more pressure on the Serbs to move". 2148/
1682. A meeting planned between the head of UN forces in BiH and Bosnian Serb and BiH military leaders was canceled after BiH officials described such an encounter as pointless. Sources close to General Phillippe Morillon said that while the scheduled meeting, which had been aimed at securing a cease-fire in eastern BiH, would not take place, the General would travel to Pale to talk with Bosnian Serb military chief Ratko Mladić. BiH Vice President Ejup Gazić commented that there was "no reason" for the meeting proposed by Morillon of the rival military leaders. 2149/

1683. US aeroplanes dropped 46 tons of food and medicine in the eighth air-drop. 2150/

(c) International reported events

1684. EC foreign ministers unveiled a plan to toughen sanctions in several weeks if Bosnian Serbs did not sign the Vance-Owen plan. 2151/ 9. 9/3/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported in the western suburbs of Stup, Iliđa and Butmir. The airport was closed three times due to shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Sarajevo airport. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Sarajevo airport was closed three times due to shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 46 wounded on this day. 2152/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1685. Fighting was reported in Sarajevo, mainly in the western suburbs of Stup, Iliđa and Butmir and the road to the airport, which was closed three times Monday because of shelling. 2153/

(b) Local reported events

1686. UNCHR spokesman Ron Redmond in Geneva said that a total of 232 tons of food and 19 tons of medical supplies had been airdropped in the last nine nights with "increasing success". He said "a fairly sizeable proportion" of the crates were now being found by local residents. 2154/

1687. At the Sarajevo airport UNPROFOR sponsored a prisoner exchange between BiH forces and Serbs. Sixty-four Bosnian Serb prisoners, including four women and seven children, were exchanged for 57 Muslims, including one woman and one child. 2155/
(c) International reported events

1688. Detailing fresh reports of atrocities, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata said in New York that murder, torture, mutilation and rape were continuing in BiH as part of a deliberate policy of "ethnic cleansing". 2158/

1689. British and US representatives on the UN Security Council discussed measures to be taken if the Bosnian Serbs did not sign the Vance-Owen Plan. They proposed that the Council diplomatically and economically isolate the Serbs, enforce the no-fly zone, and possibly lift the arms embargo. Russia and China reportedly promised not to veto the proposal if Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić rejected the Vance-Owen Plan. 2157/

10. 10/3/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There were no reports of shelling during the night. Shelling and sniper fire were reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters; Washington Post; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: In Sarajevo there were no reports of shelling during the night though snipers were active in the morning firing into the centre of the city. 2152/ A few minutes past 4:00 p.m. sniper shots injured a man near the Holiday Inn in downtown Sarajevo. This incident was witnessed by Peter Maas of the Washington Post. 2156/ Source(s): Reuters; Washington Post.

Casualties: It was reported that shelling and sniper fire killed at least four people and wounded 20 in the city, hospital sources said. 2160/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 12 wounded on this day. 2162/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1690. In Sarajevo there were no reports of shelling during the night though snipers were active in the morning firing into the centre of the city. 2162/ A few minutes past 4:00 p.m. sniper shots injured a man near the Holiday Inn in downtown Sarajevo. This incident was witnessed by Peter Maas of the Washington Post. 2161/

(b) Local reported events

1691. BiH’s collective presidency was preparing to meet in Sarajevo for a crucial debate on whether to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan. There was speculation that at the meeting of the BiH leadership, President Alija Izetbegović (who supported the plan dividing BiH into 10 largely autonomous regions) would strive to build consensus among his nine Presidency colleagues. Opposition to the plan, strongest among elements of the BiH army, could coalesce around Vice-President Ejup Ganić, who argued that it rewarded Serb aggression. 2164/
(c) International reported events

1692. NATO officials clashed in Brussels over a US proposal to create a multinational force of 50,000 that would help implement the Vance-Owen Plan. French representatives opposed NATO command, insisting that peacekeepers remained under UN control. 2163/

11. 11/3/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported seven killed and 37 wounded on this day. 2166/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Health.

Narrative of Events:

1693. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1694. In Sarajevo, BiH leaders reported some progress in talks on the Vance-Owen plan. Vice-President Sjip Ganić said that some headway had been made: "We made a step forward", he told reporters. "There is consensus nobody will act to jeopardize the country's legal system. . . . We want one constitution, one currency, one legal system". Sources close to the talks said it had been agreed to attempt to convene a session of the BiH parliament Saturday or Sunday to debate the plan. 2167/

(c) International reported events

1695. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević rejected arguments from mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen that he should try to persuade the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept their peace plan. During talks in Paris, Milošević stressed that he had "only limited" input into the conflict in BiH. But Vance and Owen, speaking after a meeting and a dinner with Milošević and French President Francois Mitterrand declared that "great progress" had been made, pointing specifically to a warning delivered by Mitterrand to Milošević that Serbia would be the target of harsher international action unless the Bosnian Serbs agreed to the peace plan. Vance said "a small group of very senior people from the Bosnian Serbs" would travel to New York in the next five days "to see if we can make some progress and close the gap between us". 2168/

12. 12/3/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 30 wounded on this day. 2169/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:
1696. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events
1697. The BiH Leadership in Sarajevo attempted to convene Parliament to debate the international peace plan for BiH after the 10 member collective Presidency failed to reach final agreement in two days of talks on whether to sign it. 2170/

13. 13/3/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 98 shells landed on the Serbian controlled area of Sarajevo and 72 shells landed on BiH government controlled areas. 2171/ Source(s): United Press International.


Description of Damage: Three mortar bombs were fired at the Sarajevo courthouse in which a war crimes trial was being held and one mortar hit the building’s roof. Source(s): United States Government; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 47 wounded on this day. 2172/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:
1698. Serbian forces surrounding Sarajevo reportedly launched at least three mortar bombs at the Sarajevo courthouse in which a BiH war crimes trial was being conducted. One mortar struck the building’s roof. 2173/

(b) Local reported events
1699. Serb armoured cars and armed soldiers blocked the highway to prevent some 60 BiH Members of Parliament from coming into the city to attend a meeting on the Vance-Owen international peace plan. 2174/

1700. UNPROFOR reported that Serbs put in a temporary check point at the Y junction of Kasimbolia street and the road to the PTT building leading from the airport. The check point consisted of two tanks, one APC and 50 men. The check point held five Canadian Cougars for three hours and the convoy from the Presidency was stopped before arriving at the check point to prevent them from
going through the check point. The checkpoint was removed within 24 hours.
UNPROFOR later commented that the checkpoint may have been a hastily installed
to react to Serb intelligence of VIP movement in a similar fashion to when the
Serbs fatally shot the BiH Vice President, or it may have also been organized
to assert authority over the Canadians who had been patrolling in and out of

Sarajevo. 2175/ 

14. 14/3/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery bombardment continued throughout the
day along the front at Visoko, about 12 miles north-west of Sarajevo.
Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 35
wounded on this day. It also reported that 8,484 killed, missing, or dead
(of which 1,288 were children); 49,489 wounded (of which 12,797 were
children); and 15,443 heavily wounded (of which 2,450 were children). 2176/
Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1701. According to Sarajevo radio, artillery bombardment continued throughout
the day Sunday along the front at Visoko, about 12 miles north-west of
Sarajevo. 2177/ 

15. 15/3/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling activity: In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that
fighting within the city had decreased during the week. The main artillery and
mortar fire concentration was in north-east Rošev. Overall there had been a
decrease in fire compared to the prior month. Sniper fire within the city from
both sides had dramatically increased causing several casualties. The road
from the PTT building to the airport and the airport road to Ilidža had been
closed due to either shelling or small-arms fire regularly during the week.

The Serbs had canceled utility missions during the week and when missions did
take place, they were targeted in an effort to stop them. UNPROFOR reported
that Serbs continued to shoot persons crossing the airport by night. During
the week they killed seven and wounded eight others. The flow of crossings
were predominantly from Butmir to Dobrinja. UNPROFOR also reported that the
restructuring of the 1 Sarajevo Corps had continued during the week and would
probably be completed by 10 March. UNPROFOR commented that the low level of
fighting had coincided with the cease-fire and restructuring of the 1 Sarajevo
Corps, calling into question whether the cease-fire was of political origin,
or linked to the restructuring process. UNPROFOR was also of the opinion that
the restructured Corps Could give BiH a more powerful force with greater
command and control and that relationships between I Sarajevo Corps and forces
on Mt. Igram had improved. 2178/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A French aid worker was killed by a sniper. 2179/
Source(s): Washington Post.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 24 wounded. No deaths were reported on this day. 2180/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Health.

Narrative of Events:

1703. A French aid worker was killed by a sniper. 2181/

(c) International reported events

1703. Peace talks on the former Yugoslavia were to resume this week in New York. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić reportedly left his base in Pale, near Sarajevo for the talks, while BiH President Alija Izetbegović was also thought to be on his way. Izetbegović reportedly received the go-ahead on Sunday from other BiH leaders to conditionally accept the Geneva peace plan for BiH. 2182/

16. 16/3/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported in the city, including the area near an emergency hospital. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area near the visiting Dutch Defence Minister; an unidentified emergency room (two shells in the mid-afternoon).

Description of Damage: A mortar fell about 10 metres from visiting Dutch Defence Minister Relus (ter) Seek, injuring an Egyptian UNPROFOR soldier; two mortar bombs exploded in the forecourt of an unidentified Sarajevo emergency hospital in the mid-afternoon. Source(s): United States Government; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: An unidentified Sarajevo hospital was hit by sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The impact of a shell fired near the visiting Dutch Defence Minister injured an Egyptian UNPROFOR soldier; another shell killed two civilians nearby. 2183/ Sarajevo’s three main hospitals: the emergency, French, and Kosevo, treated 68 war-wounded, three of whom were reported to have died of injuries. 2184/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported five killed and 20 wounded on this day. 2185/ Source(s): United States Government; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1704. A Serb mortar fell about 10 metres from visiting Dutch Defence Minister Relus (ter) Seek in Sarajevo. The impact of the shell injured an Egyptian UNPROFOR soldier; another shell killed two civilians nearby. 2186/

1704. A Sarajevo emergency hospital was hit by mortar and sniper fire. Two mortar bombs exploded in the hospital forecourt in the mid-afternoon. The hospital was one that dispensed first-aid to the war-wounded before sending
them to one of Sarajevo’s main hospitals. 2187/

(b) Local reported events

1706. Croats in the BiH government publicly attacked a decision by the BiH leadership to give President Alija Izetbegović a free hand in peace talks. In a statement released in Zagreb, the Croats said that “decisions taken by the assembly on Sunday are not in line with the fundamental principles of the constitution of Bosnia, having been taken in the absence of representatives of the Croatian people”. It said the "organs of the Bosnian state are not empowered to set conditions without the agreement of representatives of the three constituent communities of Bosnia". It also attacked "unfounded declarations" which put the self-declared Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and the self-styled Serbian Republic of Bosnia, on the same footing, but did not mention names. Over the weekend Izetbegović said the Vance-Owen plan "ensures the survival of BiH, despite the attacks against it", and eliminated the two para-states on its territory: Herceg-Bosna and the Serb republic. BiH Prime Minister Mile Akmadžić, Defence Minister Božo Rajić and Miro Lasić, the Croat representative in the BiH presidency, had never visited Sarajevo during their tenure of office. 2188/

17. 17/3/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb and BiH forces were reportedly linked in fierce fighting near the airport. UNPROFOR spokesman Major Pepe Gallegos said that nearly 500 shells landed in the Muslim-held Butmir district and the Serb-held suburbs of Iliđa and Lukavica. Most of this took place between 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. 2189/ UNPROFOR spokesman Major José Gallegos announced that 962 shells had been fired on Sarajevo, mostly around the President’s office. 2190/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Butmir district; Iliđa; Lukavica; the airport; the area near the Presidency. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The local hospital reported five deaths and 21 wounded, but officials said the toll was likely to increase when victims of shelling in the outlying areas of Butmir and Iliđa were included. 2191/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 55 wounded on this day. 2192/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1707. Serb and BiH forces were locked in fierce fighting near the Sarajevo airport. UNPROFOR spokesman Major Pepe Gallegos said that nearly 500 shells landed in the Muslim-held Butmir district and the Serb-held suburbs of Iliđa and Lukavica. Most of this took place between 4:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. 2193/

1708. In Sarajevo, fighting continued throughout the day, with artillery and other weapons active in all parts of the city, flaring in the morning around the airport. The fighting was reported to have died down around the city after nightfall. 2194/
International reported events

1709. In New York, UN peace talks resumed. 2195/

1710. NATO approved a plan to dispatch over 50,000 peacekeepers to BiH once the three factions signed the Vance-Owen Plan. It was still undecided who would command the force. 2196/

18. 18/3/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serbian forces reportedly launched the heaviest artillery barrage in months against Sarajevo. The attack with artillery shells, mortar bombs and anti-aircraft shells hit the Muslim-held areas of Mojmilo, Čengić Vila, Buča Potok and Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Sarajevo courthouse where war crimes trials were being held (and the vicinity); Mojmilo; Čengić Vila; Buča Potok; Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; Helsinki Watch; Reuters.

Description of Damage: A shell hit the roof of the Sarajevo courthouse where two Serbs were being tried for war crimes and dozens of other shells were heard in the vicinity. Source(s): Reuters; Helsinki Watch; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A 15 year-old boy was killed and at least 55 people were wounded in the day’s bombardment, medical officials reported, adding that a number of wounded soldiers had not yet reached hospitals because of the fighting. 2197/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 38 wounded on this day. 2198/ Source(s); Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

(b) Local reported events

1711. Swedish General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, UNPROFOR Commander for the former Yugoslavia, met with BiH’s highest state and military officials during a visit to Sarajevo. He was received in the Presidency building by BiH Presidency members Ejup Ganić, Tatjana Ljulja Mijatović and Mirko Pejanović, General Staff Commander Sefer Bašić, and Deputy Commander of the General Staff of the BiH Army, Jovan Divjak. 2201/

1712. The New York Times reported that Serbian forces launched the heaviest artillery barrage in months against Sarajevo. 2200/ The artillery shells, mortar bombs and anti-aircraft cannon shells hit the areas of Mojmilo, Čengić Vila, Buča Potok, and Dobrinja, all Muslim-held residential areas. 2201/

1714. BiH Vice President Ganić reported a "full-scale attack" on Sarajevo and other targets in eastern BiH. The day’s assault was reported to be the worst since the new round of shelling began five days ago, and Ganić believed that the Bosnian Serb objective was to force the BiH Government to withdraw from the peace talks in New York. 2203/
(c) **International reported events**

1715. In New York, BiH President Alija Izetbegović temporarily pulled out of the peace talks, saying he could not be involved as long as the Serbs continued to their attacks in eastern BiH and Sarajevo. 2204/

1716. France reversed its position and joined the US in calling for military enforcement of the no-fly zone. 2205/

19. 12/3/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery and mortar fire resulted in one of the heaviest tolls in a year. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area near a British aircraft approaching Sarajevo airport. Source(s): United States Submission.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Artillery and mortar fire killed 13 persons and wounded 98 in Sarajevo, resulting in one of the heaviest tolls since the beginning of the war one year ago, hospital sources said here. Most of the wounded were in serious condition, a doctor from one city hospital said. 2206/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 25 killed and 76 wounded on this day. 2207/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1717. An anti-aircraft round fired by Serbian forces passed within 200 metres of a British aircraft as it approached the Sarajevo airport. UNPROFOR subsequently closed the airport to humanitarian aid flights. 2208/

(b) **Local reported events**

1718. General Lars-Erik Wahlgren, overall commander of the UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, flew to Sarajevo in an attempt to try to persuade Bosnian Serb military leaders at their headquarters to stop their drive towards Srebrenica. 2209/

1719. UN relief convoys, surrounded by armoured vehicles, reached Srebrenica where they were greeted by droves of civilians. In this, the first delivery since 10 December, the UN provided 68 tons of food and other supplies. UN BiH Commander Morillon oversaw the delivery from Zvornik, where the trucks had been stalled. 2210/

(c) **International reported events**

1720. The United States State Department announced that the US would double its air-drops over Srebrenica (at the request of the UNHCR). 2211/
20. 20/3/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An estimated 3,000 shells hit the suburb of Stup. BiH army sources denied that Stup had fallen to Serbian forces. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Stup. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Three major fires were reported burning during a massive Serb artillery assault on Stup. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: In Sarajevo, it was reported by the two main hospitals that five residents, one of whom was an 11 year-old girl, were killed and 62 wounded by Serb artillery bombardment. 2212/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 10 killed and 77 wounded on this day. 2213/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1721. Bosnian Serb gunners pounded the Sarajevo suburb of Stup. Refugees were reportedly fleeing the suburb with personal belongings. "The situation is horrible, there has been shelling all day", said 65 year-old Edhem Nezirović as he walked into Sarajevo from Stup. Three major fires were burning in Stup in the afternoon. 2214/

1722. BiH military sources reported that some 3,000 shells hit the suburb of Stup. But sources from the BiH army denied that Stup (known as the gateway to Sarajevo) had fallen to Serb forces. "Many houses are still burning but the situation began to calm down around 2100 GMT", a BiH army source said, adding that a fresh Serb assault was expected Sunday night. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA earlier quoted the commander of the "Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the Serb Army" as saying his men had taken Stup during a "powerful counter-attack" against troops of the mainly Muslim BiH army. The SRNA report said that the Serbs blew up a BiH army munitions depot in Stup and that BiH troops were retreating towards the city centre in "disorder and panic". 2215/

(b) Local reported events

1723. A UN official in Sarajevo who said that he feared an outbreak of typhus, cited damaged water pipes and contaminated supplies as likely sources of the potentially deadly disease. "We're seriously worried about an outbreak of typhus", said Phil Casey, a consultant to UNICEF. Casey said that ground-water contaminated by raw sewage was threatening to seep into the city's water distribution system. He noted that 12 cases of the hepatitis "A" infection (which closely tracks the outbreak of typhus), had been reported at the city orphanage. Casey said that 97 per cent of the city's water came from a single pumping station in Serb-held territory outside the city. Power for the station was reported to have been frequently interrupted when fighting destroyed electric sub-stations and transmission lines around the city. When the pumping station stopped pushing water, negative pressure was reportedly built up in the mains, sucking ground water into the system through the cracks in the pipes. This problem became exacerbated in the city by near-total lack of water treatment to improve quality. Casey said that about 60 per cent of the water in the city distribution system was lost before it reached taps because
of massive war damage and repair problems. It was also reported that 18 of the
city’s 50 water repair technicians had been killed while trying to repair
cracked or leaking pipes. Casey said that the men regularly worked under
artillery and sniper fire without flak jackets or protective helmets. When the
water system shut down after a city-wide power failure, as was the case this
weekend, residents queued at wells and springs to carry water home. Casey said
that as many as 20,000 people a day gathered water from a single well in the
city. 2216/

(c) International reported events

1724. In New York, it was announced that the United Nations Security Council
reached broad agreement on a resolution allowing NATO aircraft to shoot down
any aeroplane violating a no-fly ban over BiH. 2217/

21. 21/3/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intensified fighting was reported as Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadžić warned that if the UN Security Council
authorized the use of military means to enforce a no-fly zone over BiH, his
delation could pull out of peace talks. Observers around the city counted
2,398 shells hitting the city. Senior UN officers said that with only a
handful of observation posts around the city, Serbian forces could be firing
as many as two or three shells for every one counted (it was reported that 90
per cent of the shells appeared to be fired by Serbian positions). 2218/
Source(s): Agence France Presse; Helsinki Watch; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; the Old Town (eastern end); Stup; the Sarajevo airport.
Source(s): Agence France Presse; Helsinki Watch; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least 30 people were reported injured in Dobrinja. Sarajevo’s
major trauma clinics and morgue reported 95 people wounded and at least eight
dead. Most of the casualties were civilians from Sarajevo’s Old Town and
Dobrinja districts and soldiers from the embattled suburb of Stup. 2219/ The
BiH Public Health Ministry reported five killed and 81 wounded on this
day. 2220/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public
Health.

Narrative of Events:

1725. The city came under heavy artillery attack in the morning. Serb
artillery hit the Old Town area and the residential neighbourhood of Vrtnik
at dawn. There appeared to be few casualties since the streets were empty when
the shelling began. A former school, which had been turned into a refugee
centre, was among the buildings hit in Vrtnik. 2221/

1726. The BiH government-held neighbourhood of Dobrinja, flanking the airport
to the east, came under heavy shell attacks and doctors said that at least 30
people had been wounded there. 2222/

1727. BiH radio early reported a “general offensive” by Serb gunners against
the city, notably Stup, and advised all residents to shelter in basements. It
reported heavy shelling on the old town, at its eastern end. 2223/

1728. In Stup, artillery guns, mortars, tanks and anti-aircraft cannon resumed shelling at 4:30 a.m., and increased their firing at daybreak. 2224/ BiH government forces suffered casualties for the fifth day as a result of Serb tank and artillery attacks. Scores of BiH soldiers could be seen headed on foot into Stup at dusk to take up defensive positions. 2225/ Vahid Karavelić, deputy chief of the BiH defence forces in the Sarajevo region said on national radio that Serb forces had failed to gain territory in the offensive. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA claimed on Saturday that Serb forces had captured Stup. 2226/

1729. Witnesses also reported heavy shelling of the Sarajevo airport, apparently from BiH positions to the west of the runway. A German television correspondent who was at the airport in the morning said that people ran for cover in the terminal building. There were no immediate reports of injuries. UN officials said the road between the airport and Sarajevo had been closed at least once because of the shelling. 2227/

(b) International reported events

1730. Intensified fighting came as Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić warned in a television interview in New York that if the UN Security Council authorized the use of military means to enforce a no-fly zone over BiH his delegation could pull out of peace talks. "I do not know if we can stay at the conference or not. Our assembly could withdraw us from the conference", he said. A resolution authorizing military aeroplanes to enforce the six-month-old no-fly zone over BiH was expected to be voted on Monday. 2228/

1731. UN spokesman Fred Eckhard said in New York that the peace talks were at a dead end. 2229/

22. 22/3/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Reports indicated that bombardment from the surrounding mountains diminished somewhat in the morning compared to Sunday, but intensified during the afternoon. In its weekly summary UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo had been extremely turbulent. Sniper fire had been as high as it was in the last week and Serb commanders threatened to increase shell fire if the level of sniping by BiH forces did not cease. BiH forces carried out an attack against Iliđa from Butmir which resulted in a Serb counter-attack against Butmir from the east. The Serbs drove tanks into the area of Butmir but later in the week withdrew them to Donji Kotorac. UNPROFOR commented that the BiH attack allowed the Serbs the perfect excuse to carry out their attack by enabling them to accuse the BiH forces of being the aggressor. The Serbs also responded by attacking the Rajlovac and Stup areas. They managed to push the troops as far forward as the Stup bridge, but withdrew their men shortly afterwards. According to UNPROFOR, the attack in the Rajlovac area was partly successful. They had taken some ground but probably did not achieve their aim which UNPROFOR assessed to be the high ground dominating the Stup bridge. UNPROFOR was of the opinion that if they had achieved their goal, they could have given fire support to their attack on Stup and the Stup bridge and their secondary minor attacks against Močilo from Neđarići and against Hrasno from Grabovica. The attacks were all supported by high rates of fire from the Serb guns to the east and by support tanks. UNPROFOR commented that they did not know the final front line positions, but that it was likely the Serbs had
pushed forward into the Rajlovac area and undoubtedly the BiH forces would want to push them back. Therefore, UNPROFOR expected further fighting in the area. 2230/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: An unidentified school on the western approaches to the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping was reported in the city. It was reported that a 15 year-old girl was killed. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Eighteen children were wounded and one killed when a shell hit their school. 2231/ Two Sarajevo hospitals reported seven killed and 61 wounded in the day's shelling. A French soldier was flown out of Sarajevo after being shot in the arm. 2232/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 12 killed and 83 wounded on this day. 2232/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1732. According to hospitals, this cloudless spring day drew many Sarajevans outdoors despite heavy shelling and sniping, resulting in the wounding of many, mostly by shrapnel. It was reported that a 13 year-old girl was killed by a sniper and a 10 year-old boy was killed by shrapnel. The bombardment from the surrounding mountains reportedly diminished somewhat in the morning compared with Sunday, and then intensified during the afternoon. 2234/

1733. Peter Kessler, a UNCHR spokesman in Sarajevo said that BiH army tanks were firing from under a bridge in the suburb of Stup and that fighting had closed the airport road. "It sounds like the Battle of the Bulge out there", Kessler said. Correspondents who visited the area said the Serbs appeared to have made advances enabling them to fire directly on the western approaches to the city, making it more difficult to resupply BiH positions. At least three fires were burning along the line of confrontation as Serb forces tried to drive the BiH defenders east across the airport highway. 2235/

1734. A fierce tank battle raged in the western approaches to the city and BiH radio reported that 18 children were wounded and one killed when a shell hit their school. 2236/

(b) Local reported events

1735. UN Commander, Colonel Marcel Valentin, blamed the Serbs for the prior day's shelling on civilians. After nearly 2,400 shells were recorded and eight people were killed on Sunday, Valentin called on the Serbs to account for their shelling of civilian targets. He said that it was "quite obvious" that the Serbs were trying to gain territory before signing a peace agreement being negotiated in New York. 2237/

(c) International reported events

1736. At the Hague, it was announced that BiH had brought a case before the International Court of Justice, accusing the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro of genocide and other war crimes. 2238/
23. 23/3/93 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 11 killed and 96 wounded on this day. **2239**/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1737. No reported incidents.

(b) **International reported events**

1738. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić announced that he was staying in New York for the international peace talks on BiH just hours after it was announced he would leave. Lord David Owen said earlier that Karadžić would be flying home after it became clear that his position was still far apart from BiH’s Croats and Muslims. But Karadžić then announced he was not ready to leave and indicated he might go later in the week. “We don’t want to leave and be accused that we left the conference”, Karadžić told reporters. “We are ready to stay as long as it is necessary to make any kind of progress”. **2240**/

1739. The peace conference co-chairmen held talks with Izetbegović, Karadžić and Boban. **2241**/

1740. Lord Owen stressed that the Security Council must not delay enforcement of the no-fly zone and should push the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims to sign the peace plan. **2242**/

1741. For a second time, the Security Council postponed its vote on a resolution enforcing an air ban over BiH because of last-minute revisions to the document suggested by Russia. A new date was expected to be set for Wednesday or Thursday. **2243**/

24. 24/3/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intense Serb shelling was reported on this, the final day of Ramadan. The end of Ramadan, reportedly at 6:20 a.m., was marked by a hail of gunfire from the BiH side. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area in front of the Bristol Hotel (on the road to the airport). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A mortar exploded in front of the Bristol Hotel on the road to the airport, killing three people and wounding five. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: One report stated that four people were killed and 14 injured by Serb shelling, (including three people killed and five wounded at the Bristol Hotel). The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 23 wounded on this day. 2244/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1742. Four people were killed and 14 injured by Serb shelling of Sarajevo on the final day of Ramadan. A mortar exploded in front of the Bristol Hotel on the road to the airport, killing three people and wounding five. Serb fire was reportedly intense. The end of Ramadan, at 6:20 a.m, was marked by a hail of gunfire from the BiH side. 2245/

(b) International reported events:

1743. The peace conference co-chairmen held separate talks with Izetbegović, Karadžić, and Boban. They later met with Bartholomew and the Macedonian Deputy Prime Minister, Crvenkovski. 2246/

1744. The Security Council for the third day in a row canceled a planned vote to enforce its no-fly zone over BiH at the request of Russia. 2247/

1745. The German Assembly authorized participation in air drop operations. 2248/

25. 25/3/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity:

Combat and Shelling Activity: The French UNPROFOR command post reportedly came under automatic weapons fire from Dobrinja. Cedric Thornberry, deputy head of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia said that shelling in the Sarajevo siege during the first 11 months had been relatively light ("not much more than four an hour") compared to between 1,000 and 2,000 impacts a day over the past week. 2249/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Hospital sources said that two people died and 11 were wounded in Sarajevo. 2250/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 20 wounded on this day. 2251/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1746. A French UN command post in the city came under automatic weapons fire and two UN troops were slightly wounded by flying glass. The firing came from the Serb-held district of Dobrinja (the former Olympic village near the airport). 2252/
(b) Local reported events

1747. President Milošević received General Morillon in Belgrade to discuss current issues. He reportedly offered to host General Morillon and General Mladić, as well as representatives of all of the factions, to Belgrade to take part in talks. 2253/

(c) International reported events

1748. In New York, a member of the BiH delegation to the UN sponsored peace talks said that President Alija Izetbegović was prepared to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan, which was drawn up in Geneva but signed only by Croat representatives. For the first time since January all three parties agreed to sit at the same table and were scheduled to meet with mediators Vance and Owen. 2254/

1749. BiH President Izetbegović signed the Vance-Owen maps, the third and final section of the plan. This made the Bosnian Serbs the last hold-outs to the plan. Vance Owen spokesman Fred Eckhard stated that Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić had "reserved his position". 2255/

1750. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić called on the international community to lift the arms embargo on BiH imposed when it still formed part of Yugoslavia, saying that the move was the only alternative to a military intervention to end Serb aggression. "The international community can halt it, if it has the will", he told a conference in Sarajevo. The only solution to the conflict was "to give arms to the Bosnians or to launch a rapid intervention, though such a move is unlikely". He said that Sarajevo authorities had written to the UN Security Council, to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, to Geneva mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, and to the US and Russian envoys urging that the arms embargo be lifted. 2256/

26. 26/3/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 16 wounded on this day. No deaths were reported. 2257/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1751. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1752. General Philippe Morillon held talks with the military leader of the Bosnian Serbs in a bid to obtain a cease-fire in BiH. The negotiations included: Morillon, General Ratko Mladić, UNPROFOR Commander General Eric-Lars Wahlgren, UN Civilian Affairs chief Cedric Thornberry, UNHCR Special Envoy
Jose Maria Mendiluce, and the second in command of the Bosnian Serb military, Milan Gvero. 2258/

1753. The Bosnian Serbs threatened to fire upon relief aeroplanes if Germans participated in the air-drops. 2258/

(c) **International reported events**

1754. President Clinton invited BiH President Izetbegović to the White House to join in discussions with German Chancellor Kohl. Clinton said that he would wait several days before Serbian behaviour would force him to "up the ante". EC officials stated that the Serbs would suffer "total isolation" if they did not sign the Vance-Owen plan. 2260/

27. 27/3/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and six wounded on this day. 2261/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1755. No reported incidents.

(b) **Local reported events**

1756. BiH’s three warring factions said that they were prepared for a cease-fire to begin at noon on Sunday. The head of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Ratko Mladić, said he would observe the truce and the commander of the UN troops in BiH, General Philippe Morillon, said Bosnian Muslims and Croats would also comply. Morillon said he had assurances from BiH’s Muslim Vice-President, Ejup Ganić and Croat leader Mate Boban. "I have already received agreements from Dr. Ganić in Sarajevo and Mr. Boban for them to give the same directives to their own forces", Morillon said, adding that it could take some time before orders reached field units. The deal was struck after talks in Belgrade attended by Morillon, Mladić and the head of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, General Lars-Eric Wahlgren. Wahlgren said he would chair a meeting of the chiefs of the three armies at Sarajevo airport on 6 April to discuss how best to stop the fighting. 2262/

1757. The announcement of the cease-fire came as Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić arrived in Belgrade and threatened to pull out of the internationally-mediated peace talks in BiH. Karadžić told reporters: "First they satisfied the Croats, then the Muslims. Now they have to satisfy the Serbs". Karadžić had rejected the UN sponsored plan to split BiH into 10 semi-autonomous regions. The deal had been accepted by BiH’s Muslims and Croats. International pressure mounted on the Bosnian Serbs not to hold out against the proposals, as President Clinton said he would give the Serbs a few more days before considering more
stringent actions to bring them into line. Karadžić responded: "It doesn’t matter. Pressure can only unify the Serb people". 2261/

1758. Bosnian Serb forces turned back UN relief vehicles from Srebrenica. 2264/

(c) International reported events

1759. The French Air Force became the first to join the US air-drop effort when one of its aeroplanes delivered aid to Goražde. 2265/

28. 28/3/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The area near the Presidency building was shelled five minutes before a cease-fire took effect at noon. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area near the Presidency building (three shells hit five minutes before noon). Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Five minutes before noon, three shells fell near the Presidency building, killing a woman and injuring four other people. Other reports indicated that three people were killed and five others wounded in this incident. Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three shells fell near the Presidency building, killing a woman and injuring four other people. Other reports indicated that three people were killed and five others wounded in this incident. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two wounded. It reported no deaths. 2266/ It also reported to date: 8,565 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,304 were children); 50,106 wounded (of which 12,932 were children); and 15,759 heavily wounded (of which 2,519 were children). 2267/ Source(s): Washington Post; New York Times; Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1760. Five minutes before the noontime start of the UN-brokered truce, three shells fell near the Presidency building downtown, killing a woman and injuring four other people, two seriously. 2268/ Other reports on the incident stated that three people were killed and five wounded. 2269/

(b) Local reported events

1761. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that he and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman had agreed to set up a joint Croat and Muslim army in BiH. Izetbegović also extended slightly his deadline for the Bosnian Serbs to sign a peace plan which the Muslims and the Croats had already accepted. He said that if the Bosnian Serbs did not sign within 10 to 15 days, his own signature would be invalid. On Saturday evening Izetbegović had given a time limit of eight to 10 days. 2270/

1762. The cease-fire agreed to by the military leaders of the warring factions began at noon and appeared to be holding as night fell. The UN commander in
BiH, General Phillipe Morillon, who helped to negotiate the cease-fire, was quoted by Yugoslavia's Tanjug news agency as saying he was pleased with the compliance so far. 2271/

1763. A 20 truck UN convoy reached Srebrenica after 13 days of unsuccessful attempts. It brought over 200 tons of relief supplies. UN BiH Commander Morillon returned to Sarajevo after his two-week stay in Srebrenica. 2272/

29. 29/3/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The cease-fire held for a second day, but heavy gunfire broke out shortly before dusk in the western districts close to the airport. In its weekly summary UNPROFOR reported intense fighting continuing from the previous week. After Sunday, 21 March's record number of reported indirect fire (2,398 rounds), and apparently intensifying combat activity, strong Serb attacks with heavy artillery support continued on 22 March concentrating on Stup, Cetaš, Vratnik and Brashno-Grbavica. UNPROFOR stated that the Serb objective, the Stup Bridge, appeared to be within their grasp. The level of intensity in the fighting dropped dramatically for the remainder of the reporting period commencing 23 March with sporadic indirect fire and continued small-arms fire. The use of anti-aircraft artillery continued to be employed by BiH forces in a direct fire role. The level of indirect fire dropped from the record 2,398 rounds at the end of the previous Sunday to no rounds reported on Friday 26 March. UNPROFOR commented that the forced evacuation of Observation Post P5 restricted their ability to accurately report incoming indirect fire. Nevertheless, the reduced fire and combat activity was evident. UNPROFOR thought it likely that the combatants, particularly the Serbs, had temporarily exhausted themselves and it was also reported that they took heavy casualties, including armoured assets. The deteriorating weather conditions were also seen as contributory. 2272/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:
1764. The cease-fire held for the second day with only minor violations. 2274/
1765. Heavy gunfire broke out shortly before dusk in the contested western districts of Sarajevo, close to the airport. 2275/

(b) Local reported events

1766. UNPROFOR reported that the average number of people trying to cross the Sarajevo airport each night during the past week was around 500. According to UNPROFOR, this number decreased somewhat on 27 March probably due to the poor weather conditions. 2275/
1767. Croatian Prime Minister Ivko Šarić resigned. Croatian President Tuđman chose the head of the state-owned oil company as his next prime minister. 2277/

(c) International reported events

1768. In Washington, the United States said it would consult its allies about lifting the arms embargo against Bosnian Muslims unless Bosnian Serbs signed a peace accord which the Muslims and Croats had already endorsed. 2278/

1769. Newsweek magazine reported that the White House had asked the Pentagon to step up planning for possible air strikes against Serbian forces to induce Bosnian Serb leaders to accept the peace plan. 2279/

1770. Appearing with the Dutch Foreign Minister, US Secretary of State Christopher stated that he intended to revive discussions on enforcing the no-fly zone. 2280/

1771. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev described Russian troops as "overextended" within the former Soviet Union and thus unable to help enforce the Vance-Owen plan. 2281/

1772. A German Air Force aeroplane joined six US and one French aeroplane in air-drops. 2282/

30. 30/3/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The cease-fire reportedly was still holding, with a number of violations during the day. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Four people were reportedly wounded by sniper fire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Two people were killed near Sarajevo airport as they tried to head across the town toward Kiseljak, and four others were wounded by Serb sniper-fire, hospital sources said. 2283/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

1773. While the cease-fire held, officials described it as tenuous, with a number of violations reported during the day. 2284/

1774. Two people were killed near Sarajevo airport as they tried to head across the town toward Kiseljak, and four others were wounded by Serb sniper-fire, hospital sources said. 2285/

(b) Local reported events

1775. Because of the cease-fire, thousands of residents emerged from their homes and hiding places to walk through the streets. 2286/
1776. In Sarajevo, two Serb soldiers were sentenced to death by a military tribunal for genocide, including murders and rapes considered part of the Serbs' policy of driving Muslims out of their villages in BiH. The two were Borislav Herak, 22 who confessed to killing 23 people and raping 15 women, and Srećko Damjanović, who pleaded innocent to charges of killing four people and raping two women. 2287/

1777. The Times of London quoted Bosnian Serb leaders as saying that the Vance-Owen plan was not satisfactory because Muslims and Croats received most of BiH's natural and industrial resources. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin reportedly wanted to贝尔格莱德 to meet with Serb officials to support the Vance-Owen plan. 2288/

(c) International reported events

1778. The Clinton Administration refused to sign a Security Council endorsement of the Vance-Owen plan. Britain, France and Spain reportedly expressed disappointment. 2289/

31. 31/3/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: In its monthly operational report, UNPROFOR characterized March as alternating between tense days (at the beginning of the month and between 16 and 22 March) and periods of calm. Tons of registered rounds were reached with 2,400 "all nature impacts" on 21 March and a low of zero impacts on 28 March. UNPROFOR commented that it should be kept in mind that the evacuation of a very well situated observer's post, due to shelling, had considerably decreased its ability to observe activities. UNPROFOR noted that at last a cease-fire seemed to have been respected at the end of the month, but that this was perhaps due to the snow that had submerged Sarajevo. 2290/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1779. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

1780. UNPROFOR reported that decisions to cancel airlifts and difficulties on the roads due to the snow made Sarajevo an isolated city. UNPROFOR reported that 41 utility repair missions had been completed and 12 canceled (eight for safety reasons and four for technical reasons). UNPROFOR also reported 16,000 airport crossing attempts, with a low of 18 attempts on 17-18 March and a high of 1,071 on 27-28 March. 2291/

1781. Vitaly Churkin, Russian representative in the negotiating process on BiH arrived in Pale in the company of Gennadiy Shikin, Russian Ambassador to
Yugoslavia. Immediately upon their arrival, they met with: Radovan Karadžić; the President of the National Assembly, Momčilo Krajišnik; and the Vice President of the Serb Republic, Dr. Nikola Koljević. The main topic of the meeting was the resumption of peace negotiations. 2292/

(c) International reported events

1782. UN Security Council Resolution 816 authorized NATO troops to begin military enforcement of the no-fly zone on 7 April. The resolution did not provide for the bombing of ground targets. Bosnia Serb leader Karadžić threatened to drop out of the negotiations if the no-fly zone was enforced. 2293/

M. April 1993

1. 1/4/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN monitors reported that the Serb-held areas of Sarajevo were hit by three times as many shells as the BiH-controlled sectors of the city. 2294/ UNPROFOR registered 140 shell impacts on the city. 2295/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1783. No reported incidents.

(b) International reported events

1784. Cyrus Vance announced that he would resign as UN mediator in the "most difficult task I have ever seen". Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg was selected to replace him on 1 May. 2296/

1785. The British reportedly pledged between 50 and 100 jet fighters for enforcement of the no-fly zone. 2297/

1786. The BiH Government presented its case against Serbia before the International Court of Justice at the Hague. 2298/

2. 2/4/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 84 shell impacts on the city. 2299/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1787. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1788. The Parliament of the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Republic met to discuss an international peace plan to divide the country into 10 semiautonomous regions. Legislators of the Serbian Democratic Party voted to reject the plan which the Muslim and the Croats had accepted. 2300/

(c) International Reported Events

1789. The official announcement of Mr. Stoltenberg as successor to Mr. Vance was made. 2301/

3. 3/4/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 25 shell impacts on the city. 2302/ It was reported that the cease-fire broke down in a number of areas. There was a high level of sniping near the Presidency and high level of machine-gun fire near the airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A high level of sniping was reported near the Presidency building. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1790. Sarajevo radio announced that the cease-fire broke down in a number of areas, with a heavy shell exploding at 8:40 p.m and two more exploding at 9:40 p.m. 2303/ Commander Barry Frewer, the UNPROFOR spokesman, said that there had been a high level of sniping around the Presidency, and a high level of machine-gun fire near the airport settlements. 2304/

(b) Local reported events

1791. The Bosnian Serb Assembly formally voted to reject the Vance-Owen plan (68 to zero), calling for three "ethnically pure" provinces. Though Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić termed the plan "a good basis for agreement", one unidentified assemblyman declared, "We Serbs must militarily defeat our enemies and conquer the territories we need". 2305/
1792. The BiH army delegation today boycotted a UN-sponsored military committee meeting at the Sarajevo airport to discuss the opening of seven corridors within the city to facilitate free movement across battle lines. The city's military command issued a statement stating that the Serbs' intention was to move Serb residents out of Muslim areas to create "monolithic ethnic sectors". It also rejected any "partial solution" short of the complete demilitarization of the city, as called for in the UN peace plan, as well as the lifting of the Serb siege of Sarajevo. 2306/

c) International reported events

1793. Speaking at the Vancouver Summit, President Clinton promised to press for tougher UN sanctions. A New York Times report stated that nine months of sanctions had effectively crippled the Yugoslav economy, with inflation topping 250 per cent a month; industrial production seeing a decrease of 50 per cent; and 30 per cent of the population unemployed. 2307/

4. 4/4/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo radio reported that over 20 shells fell on New Sarajevo, a high-rise residential district to the west of the old city. 2308/ UNPROFOR registered 48 shell impacts on the city. 2309/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.


Description of Damage: Three persons were killed by mortar explosions, two of whom were children, who were at the time of the incident playing with about 30 others in a patch of open ground off of Olympic Avenue in the Mojmilo district. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: At least five civilians were killed by sniper fire, including one old man who was hit in the neck. 2310/ Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: A BiH government group calling itself the Medical Crisis Committee put out a weekly bulletin which the Swiss-based International Committee of the Red Cross considered broadly accurate. In its latest report, the BiH committee said that through March nearly 140,000 civilians across BiH were dead or missing in the war, including 8,565 people in Sarajevo. An additional 2,500 BiH soldiers had died in the siege of the BiH capital, BiH authorities said. The BiH committee estimated that 50,000 residents of the city had been wounded, nearly 16,000 of them seriously. 2311/ On this day, at least five civilians were killed by sniper fire, including one old man who was hit in the neck. Three people were killed by mortar explosions, two of whom were children playing with about 30 others in a patch of open ground off of Olympic Avenue in the Mojmilo district when the Serbian shell exploded. 2312/ Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

1794. Sarajevo radio said that over 20 shells fell on New Sarajevo, a high-rise residential district to the west of the old city. 2313/

1795. Three people were killed by mortar explosions, two of whom were children
playing with about 30 others in a patch of open ground off Olympic Avenue in the Mojmilo district when the Serbian shell exploded. 2314/

(b) Local reported events

1796. Relief flights to Sarajevo resumed after a two-week hiatus 2315/.

1797. BiH President Izetbegović stated that he would withdraw his signature from the Vance-Owen plan if Srebrenica fell. 2316/

1798. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić refused to dismiss the entire Vance-Owen process, but said that the Bosnian Serb Assembly had ruled out only "the elements of the peace plan which had not been adjusted yet". 2317/

(c) International Reported Events

1799. US Secretary of State Christopher criticized the Bosnian Serbs "for failing to grasp an opportunity for peace", but indicated that Karadžić's comments left "the door open" for further peace talks. He also said that he had discussed further sanctions with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. 2318/

5. 5/4/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 14 shell impacts on the city. 2319/ In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo as "remarkably quiet all week". The lull in combat activity was broken by sporadic shelling, small arms and machine-gun fire. UNPROFOR counted a total of 13 artillery and 41 mortar shells falling on the city and its environs during the reporting period. This represented less than a "normal" day of fire for Sarajevo. Shelling was concentrated on Rajlovac, Dobrinja, Grbavica and Grdovnj. Sporadic machine-gun fire was reported throughout the week, mainly concentrated between Dobrinja and the airport settlement. UNPROFOR reported snipers particularly active throughout the week, mainly in Rajlovac, Grbavica and Dobrinja. An average of 644 attempts were made to cross the airport between Dobrinja and Butmir each evening. Sniper fire killed four and wounded 14 persons, according to UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR commented that this was an exceptionally low level of activity in Sarajevo, particularly in light of recent large scale fighting in the Stup area. UNPROFOR noted very cold weather, deep snow and the cease-fire as possible factors. 2320/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Seven people died in an outbreak of shooting in Sarajevo which violated the cease-fire. 2321/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1800. Seven people died in an outbreak of shooting in Sarajevo which violated the cease-fire. 2322/
(c) International reported events

1801. Lord Owen attended a session in Luxembourg of the EC Foreign Affairs Council, which reaffirmed support for the Vance-Owen plan and for strengthening sanctions. 2323/

1802. The press group "Reporteurs sans Frontieres" led a French appeal to save Sarajevo's Oslobodjenje independent daily newspaper. Five members of the paper's staff had been killed during the regular shelling of the paper's headquarters. 2324/

1803. US Secretary of State Christopher reportedly warned that if the Bosnian Serbs did not come to the table ready to bargain for peace, the US would begin supplying arms to Bosnian Muslims. 2325/

6. 6/4/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 32 shell impacts on the city. 2326/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported. Source(s): New York Times.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1804. There was no general outbreak of hostilities, but the sporadic shelling and sniper fire that had accompanied the cease-fire in Sarajevo, most of it from Serbian guns, continued to make much of the city hazardous. 2327/

(b) Local reported events

1805. Sarajevo marked the first anniversary of the attack that most people regarded as the first volley of the war here, a burst of Serbian sniper fire from a third-floor window of the Holiday Inn that killed several people in a crowd demonstrating outside the BiH Parliament for peace and national unity. 2328/

1806. The United Nations failed to consolidate the fragile cease-fire in the war in BiH when face-to-face talks among military commanders of the three warring armies ran into deadlock over continuing Serbian attacks on the besieged Muslim enclave at Srebrenica. The talks at Sarajevo Airport were the first attempt at a high-level meeting of the opposing armies in weeks. The meeting quickly degenerated into an exchange of recriminations, over Srebrenica in particular, and it broke up after less than two hours without even broaching the agenda that United Nations commanders had drawn up. 2329/

1807. Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis landed in Belgrade where he was scheduled to meet with Serbian President Milošević and Yugoslav President Čosić. He reportedly urged the two leaders to endorse the Vance-Owen Plan. 2330/
1808. UNICEF said that all Bosnian children showed symptoms of trauma and appealed to the warring factions for peace. The UNICEF survey estimated that 40 per cent of the children in Sarajevo had been directly shot at by snipers, resulting in 3,000 deaths. The survey also said that 51 per cent of the children had seen someone killed in the war, 39 per cent had seen a family member or members killed, 19 per cent had witnessed a massacre, 48 per cent had their homes occupied by someone else, 72 per cent had their homes shelled or attacked, and 89 per cent lived in underground shelters, many for over six months. 2331/

7. 7/4/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 62 shell impacts on the city. 2332/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: A UN relief aircraft was hit by small-arms fire on the runway of the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The morgue reported that one person was killed by sniper fire. 2333/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: One person was reportedly killed by sniper fire; four civilians were reportedly killed and seven wounded while trying to cross the airport at night. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

1809. A UN relief aircraft was hit by small-arms fire on the runway of the Sarajevo airport. There were no injuries and the aeroplane returned as scheduled to Zagreb. However a UN officer said that four civilians were killed and seven wounded as they tried to leave Sarajevo by crossing the airport at night. 2334/

(b) Local reported events

1810. General Phillipe Morillon, UNPROFOR commander, left Sarajevo for Srebrenica after reports that the situation there was deteriorating. He left Sarajevo at 12:00 p.m. for a first stop in Pale. 2335/

(c) International reported events

1811. In Resolution 817, the UN admitted "The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" as a member. Because of Greek objections, the newly admitted state will have no flag. The UN General Assembly endorsed Macedonia’s membership on 8 April. 2336/

8. 8/4/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 65 shell impacts on the city. 2337/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
**Targets Hit:** Stup. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Snipers were active in Sarajevo early Thursday morning. Four people were wounded by sniper fire near the Sarajevo Holiday Inn, and residents were warned to beware of further sniping. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Four people were wounded by sniper fire near the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

1812. There was also some shelling in the western suburb of Stup. 2338/

(b) **Local reported events**

1813. Serbian soldiers, who were searching a UN truck which was carrying flour to a Muslim suburb of Sarajevo, discovered 5,000 rounds of machine-gun and assault rifle ammunition hidden in 48 boxes beneath the flour sacks. 2339/

1814. Serbian President Milošević received UNPROFOR Commander General Wahlgren and UNPROFOR head of Civilian Affairs Cedric Thornberry. The talks focused on "topical issues of importance for the implementation of tasks entrusted to UNPROFOR". 2340/

1815. UN BiH Commander Morillon was stopped about 15 miles from Srebrenica. Approximately 300 Serbian civilians surrounded his entourage and forced him to return to Tuzla. A Serbian general then reportedly landed in a helicopter and air-lifted Morillon from the scene. 2341/

1816. A UN military aeroplane carrying US Senator Joseph Biden to Sarajevo aborted its landing and returned to Zagreb due to the heavy tank and machine-gun fire around the airport. Biden had been scheduled to meet with President Alija Izetbegović, UNPROFOR chiefs and relief workers. 2342/

(c) **International reported events**

1817. In a letter to Vance and Owen, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić signaled his willingness to resume peace talks in Geneva. He refuted the perception that he was responsible for the collapse of the talks. 2343/

1818. NATO Secretary General Woerner announced that warplanes from France, the Netherlands, and the US were ready to enforce the no-fly zone. 2344/

9. **9/4/93 (Friday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR registered shell impacts on the city. 2345/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire was heard in Sarajevo throughout the
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1819. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1820. Commander of the Army of the Serb Republic in BiH, Ratko Mladić, met with UNPROFOR Commander Wahlgren and condemned the Bosnian Muslims for the violation of the agreed cease-fire and put forward a proposal to meet with the Commander of the BiH forces, Sefer Halilović on 12 April. 2347/

(c) International reported events

1821. Lord Owen told BBC that military force would likely be needed to win the Bosnian Serbs' acceptance of the Vance-Owen Plan. 2348/

1822. US Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate European Affairs Subcommittee, completed a five day visit to the former Yugoslavia and promised to return to the US to press for the lifting of the arms embargo and the selective bombing of Serbian artillery posts. 2349/

10. 10/4/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR registered 41 shell impacts on the city. 2350/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: One person was shot and wounded by sniper fire in Sarajevo. 2351/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: One person was wounded by sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1823. One person was shot and wounded by sniper fire in Sarajevo. 2352/

(b) Local reported events

1824. It was reported that the Serbian artillery bombardment of Sarajevo had been sharply reduced during the cease-fire. Individuals familiar with Western intelligence reports said that the lull has been used to build up stocks of ammunition at gun batteries overlooking the BiH capital and that Serbian military commanders had drawn up plans for a new attempt soon to seize strategic territory around Sarajevo airport. These sources said that an advance of only a few hundred yards around one critical highway overpass would put the Serbian forces in a position to mount a tank offensive into the heart of the city. 2353/
1825. In another setback for relief efforts, UN officials suspended aid flights to and from Sarajevo for four days after Serb forces moved anti-aircraft guns within range of the city's airport, said John McMillan, a spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. He said the decision partly reflected concern about a hostile Serb reaction to the UN's plan to enforce a no-fly zone over BiH with fighter aeroplanes from Monday. But UNPROFOR, which controlled Sarajevo's airport and was not consulted before the decision said its monitors had detected no unusual Serb build-up around the airport. 2354/

1826. Le Monde reported that UN BiH Commander Morillon was being withdrawn from his station. 2355/

1827. Folk singer Joan Baez arrived in Sarajevo to perform a pro-peace benefit concert and meet its citizens. 2356/

11. 11/4/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 46 shell impacts on the city. 2357/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1828. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1829. Bosnian Serb General Mladić told the Associated Press that a more active Western stance (represented by NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone), had "no chance" of precipitating a change in Serbian behaviour. 2358/

1830. Officials who supervised the airlift to Sarajevo Airport reported that they had only 10 days' stock of food remaining. When the airlift was suspended on Saturday, several United Nations officials conceded that the suspension helped in "stretching out" the limited supplies waiting at bases in Croatia, Germany and Italy. The official reason given for the airlift suspension was concerns about risks to the military transports carrying the supplies. 2359/

(c) International reported events

1831. Russia again urged the Security Council to postpone its vote on toughening sanctions against Yugoslavia. Its representatives argued that encouragement was more effective than punishment. 2360/

1832. The New York Times disclosed the findings of the group that US President Clinton sent to BiH in March. The 26 member group (drawn from the State Department, the US military, and USAID) recommended that the US consider
military intervention to create "safe havens", that it take steps to open Tuzla Airport, and that it dispatch AID doctors and Pentagon and AID logistics experts to the scene. 2361/

12. 12/4/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 74 shell impacts on the city. 2362/ Press accounts described hundreds of shells hitting the civilian districts within minutes of 2:00 p.m., the time set by the United Nations for NATO fighter aircraft to begin patrolling the skies over BiH, in support of the ban on flights by Serbian aircraft. 2363/ In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that the average number of incoming rounds for the week was 34 per day. Mortar impacts were reported mainly on Butmir, but also in the airport area. Sniper activity remained high during the whole week, especially from Butmir towards the airport area, and in the Stup area. On 8 April a UN truck was checked at the Serbian checkpoint of Ilidža and ammunition was found under the truck's removable pallet. UNPROFOR stated that a full investigation was on the way. UNPROFOR movements, however, were limited by Serb forces and convoys were blocked thereafter. 2364/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Hospitals reported dozens of casualties, including several requiring amputations, and said that at least 10 people had been killed. 2365/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 25 killed in Sarajevo in the last week. 2366/ It also reported 15,869 heavily wounded to date and that chemical weapons had been used 131 times in Sarajevo. 2367/ Source(s): New York Times; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1833. Serbian attacks began within minutes of 2:00 p.m., the time set by the United Nations for NATO fighter aircraft to begin patrolling the skies over BiH in support of the ban on flights by Serbian aircraft imposed by the United Nations. The United Nations' decision to enforce the ban on flights, which was initiated after more than 500 violations by Serbian military aircraft, had drawn warnings of retaliation by Serbian leaders, but they denied a relation with today's artillery attack.

1834. Hundreds of shells pounded civilian districts, creating terror among people who had been in the streets in the largest numbers in months. Hospitals reported dozens of casualties, including several requiring amputations, and said that at least 10 people had been killed. 2368/

(b) Local reported events

1835. Attacks began just as General Ratko Mladić, the Serbian nationalist military commander in BiH, concluded a meeting with United Nations generals at Sarajevo Airport. The meeting had been boycotted by the officer commanding the BiH Government forces defending Sarajevo, Srebrenica and other predominantly Muslim cities and towns. At the meeting, General Mladić again refused the United Nations' demand that an infantry company of 150 Canadian soldiers
serving with the United Nations force be allowed to cross Serbian lines and join the detachment of 14 soldiers currently stationed in Srebrenica. 2369/

1836. Reginald Bartholomew, the US special envoy for the former Yugoslavia arrived in Sarajevo. Bartholomew, appointed by President Clinton, visited the post and telegraph building, the UNPROFOR headquarters and UN relief agencies. He was due to visit the Koševo Hospital later in the day. 2370/

1837. UN officials said they had about two weeks of food supplies for some hard-pressed regions of the Republic and less than a week's supply for others. 2371/

(c) International reported events

1838. At the urging of Russia, the Security Council delayed a vote on tightening Yugoslav sanctions until after Russia's referendum on 25 April. 2372/

1839. Serbian attacks began within minutes of 2:00 p.m., the time set by the United Nations for NATO fighter aircraft to begin patrolling the skies over BiH in support of the ban on flights by Serbian aircraft imposed by the United Nations.

1840. The UN Security Council formally decided to postpone the vote on toughening sanctions until after the 25 April referendum in Russia. 2373/

13. 13/4/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Nine shells fell on the New Sarajevo district shortly before dawn. 2374/ In the central districts, an hour-long artillery assault was reported after the planned peace talks with government commanders collapsed. UNPROFOR recorded 72 shell impacts on the city. 2375/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** the New Sarajevo district (nine shells before dawn); the central districts of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** One person was killed and 35 people were injured in an hour-long artillery assault on the central districts of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

1841. In the central districts, one person was killed and 35 people were injured in an hour-long artillery assault which was commenced after the planned peace talks with government commanders collapsed. 2376/

1842. Nine shells fell on the New Sarajevo district shortly before dawn. 2377/
(b) **Local reported events**

1843. The planned peace talks with government commanders reportedly collapsed. 2378/

1844. The UN loudly condemned this week's Bosnian Serb offensive. Larry Hollingsworth, the top UN refugee official in Sarajevo, said that he hoped that the person who ordered the attack "burns in the hottest corner of hell" and that "their sleep is punctuated by the screams of children and the cries of their mothers". 2379/

(c) **International reported events**

1845. French Defence Minister François Leotard confirmed that UN BiH Commander Morillon was being recalled, but he denied that the move was performance-related. 2380/

1846. Representatives of the UN Security Council's five non-aligned countries—Venezuela, Cape Verde, Pakistan, Morocco, and Djibouti—said that they would press the Council to take an earlier vote on sanctions. 2381/

1847. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher publicly assailed Western nations for their handling of the war in BiH. She called for the lifting of the arms embargo and bombing Serb artillery points. She blamed the European Community for acting "a little like accomplices to a massacre". 2382/

1848. Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky told a group in Copenhagen that the "inability of Western Europe to deal with aggression carries a very bad message for the whole eastern half of the continent". The Hungarian UN Ambassador announced that Hungary opposed the postponement of tighter sanctions. 2383/

14. 14/4/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 74 shell impacts on the city. 2384/ The city was described as relatively quiet, apart from some small-arms fire and the occasional shellings of Stup. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Stup. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** There was some sniping in the New Sarajevo district. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** At least one person was killed and three were wounded as a result of the shelling and sniper fire. 2385/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

1849. Sarajevo was reported as relatively quiet, apart from some small-arms fire and the occasional shelling of Stup. There was also some sniping in the New Sarajevo district. 2386/
(b) Local reported events

1850. Aid flights resumed into Sarajevo amid warnings by UN officials that food was still running out in the rest of BiH. 2387/

1851. UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler said that 16 flights were due to fly into Sarajevo from the Croatian port of Split and Ancona in Italy. 2388/

(c) International reported events

1852. The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution condemning Serbian activity in BiH calling for Srebrenica to be made a safe area, and demanding that relief efforts be allowed to proceed unhindered. 2389/

1853. US Envoy Bartholomew stated that the US would urge that the arms embargo be lifted if the Bosnian Serbs did not soon sign the Vance-Owen Plan, adding, "The military and humanitarian horrors have to stop now". He believed that a Serb refusal would make Serbia a "pariah state", burdened by much tougher diplomatic and economic sanctions. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić called for direct talks between the parties. 2390/

15. 15/4/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 38 shell impacts on the city. 2391/ The city was reportedly bombarded by artillery, tank and anti-aircraft fire overnight. Source(s): UNPROFOR; New York Times.

Targets Hit: The area close to the Presidency; Skenderija; the airport area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: There was intense sniper fire around Sarajevo airport in the morning that killed two civilians and wounded five. 2392/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Sniper fire around the airport reportedly killed two civilians and wounded five others. 2393/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1854. Sarajevo was bombarded by artillery, tank and anti-aircraft fire overnight as Serbian gunners renewed their attack. 2394/

1855. The most concentrated shelling was observed close to the Presidency, Skenderija and the airport area. T-55 tank and anti-aircraft fire was directed from the Serbian side at the Presidency. 2395/

(b) Local reported events

1856. Croat forces fired more than 50 shells on Jablanica, a strategic crossroads town with a Muslim majority population on the main road between Sarajevo and the Croat-held city of Mostar. 2396/

1857. Bosnian Serb forces pushed to within 2,000 yards of Srebrenica's city
centre and BiH leaders started discussing the terms of a surrender that would allow Srebrenica's 60,000 trapped citizens to safely evacuate. 2397/

(b) International reported events

1858. BiH President Izetbegović left Zagreb for Norway to meet with Thorvald Stoltenberg in Oslo. 2398/

1859. In response to public demand, the Clinton Administration released the report recommending the creation of "safe havens" for Bosnian Muslims. The report also suggested that force "could have a beneficial impact in humanitarian terms". However, Secretary of State Christopher dismissed any suggestion that the US would intervene militarily to protect the besieged Muslims. He declared, "The use of American force is not the solution to the problem at the present time. It's not being contemplated”. 2399/

16. 16/4/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 107 shell impacts on the city. 2400/ The city reportedly came under intermittent shelling. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The city reportedly came under intermittent sniper fire by Serbian forces. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1860. Sarajevo came under intermittent shelling and sniper fire by Serb forces. 2401/

(b) International reported events

1861. United Nations Security Council Resolution 820 was passed, calling on Serbs to sign the Vance-Owen Plan and threatening the tightening of sanctions. 2402/

1862. Lord Owen discussed the humanitarian relief situation in Srebrenica with Milošević, but received no guarantees that Bosnian Serb blockades would be lifted. 2403/

1863. In New York, BiH Government representatives demanded that the UN Security Council respect Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, calling for the provision of force in defence of a UN member. The Security Council adopted Resolution 819, which was proposed by the Council's non-aligned nations to make Srebrenica a "safe area". Further advances by the Serbs was prohibited under the resolution and UN peacekeepers were to enter the area. However, the Security Council noted that a UN-assisted evacuation could be construed as "ethnic cleansing". 2404/
1864. US President Clinton stated that he was considering steps that "previously had been unacceptable". Claiming that only ground troops had been "ruled out". Clinton reiterated that all action would be taken with the support of US allies. US officials reportedly also informed their Russian counterparts that, if Srebrenica fell, the US would push for an immediate vote on toughening sanctions. 2405/

17. 17/4/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 31 shell impacts on the city. 2406/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

1865. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1866. The commander of the Serb forces attacking the eastern BiH town of Srebrenica reportedly agreed to a cease-fire during talks with the head of the BiH Army. After four hours of talks, they reached an agreement in principle on three points: a cease-fire from midnight; the evacuation by helicopter of some 400 wounded and sick; and the entry of a company of 130-150 Candadian UN soldiers into Srebrenica by 11:00 Sunday. 2407/

18. 18/4/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 53 shell impacts on the city. 2408/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** A line of people outside an unidentified relief office; an unidentified crowded Sarajevo street (possibly the same incident). Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** A mortar shell hit a line of people outside an unidentified relief office, killing four people and wounding seven others; in another reported incident (possibly the same incident), a mortar shell hit a crowded street, killing five people and wounding seven others. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** A mortar shell hit a line of people outside an unidentified relief office, killing four people and wounding seven others; in another
reported incident (possibly the same incident), a mortar shell hit a crowded street, killing five people and wounding seven others. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

1867. As Serbian civilians lined up outside a relief office for painted eggs for the Eastern Orthodox celebration of Easter, they were struck by a mortar shell that United Nations observers said apparently was fired from a Serbian gun position in the hills. Four people were killed and seven injured, including several children. 2409/

1868. A mortar bomb landed in a crowded Sarajevo street, killing five people and wounding seven others. 2410/

(b) **Local reported events**

1869. The cease-fire in Srebrenica reportedly held, as 130 Canadian peacekeepers reached the city centre. 2411/

(c) **International reported events**

1870. French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur announced that UN BiH Commander Morillon’s term had been extended. 2412/

1871. Yevgeny Ambartsumov, the head of a Russian parliamentary delegation in Sarajevo, pledged to urge Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadžić to sign the Vance-Owen plan. He also said that he would call for the immediate end to the shelling of Sarajevo. 2413/

19. 19/4/93 (Monday)

(a) **Military Activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 43 shell impacts on the city. 2414/ UNPROFOR reported in its weekly summary that the beginning of the week was characterized by sniper activity and some shelling near the Stup area and Nedžarići. The situation remained quiet until 12 April when artillery, mortar and small arms activity increased. There was shelling in the city, near the hospital and at the airport, totalling over 300 rounds. Sniping continued the whole week, especially throughout the airport area. On average, 150-200 people attempted to cross the airport each night. On 15 April the most concentrated shelling was observed close to the Presidency, Skenderija and the airport area; T-55 tank and anti-aircraft fire was directed from the Serbian side at the Presidency. Concentrations of Serb troops were reported on 16 April in Lukavica and Azići, confirming Stup and possibly Dobrinja as areas of interest to the Serbs. The movements of UNPROFOR were limited from 13 April and continued for the week. BiH troops continued to undergo a reorganization to enhance command structure. Many brigades had been amalgamated into larger units with the BiH army taking more control of all units. UNPROFOR commented that the end of the Srebrenica conflict "will possibly free more troops", making them available to reinforce the siege of Sarajevo. 2415/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified
Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that heavy sniping continued throughout the past week, especially in the airport area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 13 killed and 158 wounded in the last week. It also reported 8,617 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,321 were children), 50,458 wounded (of which 13,134 were children), and 15,965 heavily wounded (of which 2,650 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1872. Despite there being some small arms fire in the Old Town area of Sarajevo, the BiH radio reported that the city was relatively quiet. 2416/

(b) Local reported events

1873. Although helicopter evacuations of the sick and wounded of Srebrenica continued, BiH Army commanders halted overland transports. 2417/

(c) International reported events

1874. Members of a delegation of the Russian Parliament stated in Belgrade that the Security Council's imposition of tighter sanctions against Yugoslavia would be misguided. Yevgeny Ambartsumov, the Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, abruptly ended his meeting with Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Šešelj after Šešelj called for Russia to "rise and show its support for Serbia". 2418/

1875. In a report to Secretary of State Christopher, US Senator Biden faulted the US for "confusion and inertia". He made eight recommendations, which included: providing NATO military escorts for UN relief flights; militarizing the UNPROFOR; forcibly removing Serbian heavy weapons; closing all embassies in Belgrade; and sending a UN preemptive force to Macedonia. 2419/

20. 20/4/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 74 shell impacts on the city. 2420/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.


Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Surgeons at Koševko Hospital operated for 12 hours on dozens of casualties from exploding mortar, tank and anti-aircraft shells. Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

1876. In Sarajevo, where BiH and Serbian nationalist forces were observing a nationwide cease-fire, Serbian artillery again pounded civilian areas.
Surgeons at Koševo Hospital operated for 12 hours on dozens of casualties from exploding mortar, tank and anti-aircraft shells, including five that struck at noon in a tight ring on Maršal Tito Street, near the city centre. 2421/

(b) Local reported events

1877. In Srebrenica, BiH Army forces prevented UN troops from removing the town's wounded civilians for fear that the evacuation would lower the morale of those still fighting. 20422/

(c) International reported events

1878. US President Clinton met with top aides to discuss options in BiH. Secretary of State Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "there may be better options" than potential air-strikes, which might force suspension of relief operations. 2423/

21. 21/4/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 36 shell impacts on the city. 2424/ The city was reported as relatively quiet throughout the day despite small-arms fire during the night. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1879. Sarajevo was relatively quiet throughout the day despite the small-arms fire during the night. 2425/

(b) Local reported events

1880. Lord Owen, accompanied by Ambassadors Ahrens, Hall and Okun, met Croatian Defence Minister Šušak in Zagreb. Meetings were later held in Belgrade with Karadžić, General Mladić, and Presidents Ćosić and Milošević. 2426/

1881. UN officials claimed to have successfully disarmed Srebrenica's defenders, though it was unclear how thorough such disarmament had actually been. The UN's Canadian contingent was to be responsible for protecting the "safe havens". While UNPROFOR said that it could use force to protect itself and civilians, officials in New York insisted that the Canadian force had no mandate to defend civilians. 2427/

(c) International reported events

1882. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé threatened to pull 4,000 French
troops out of the former Yugoslavia if the arms embargo was lifted. He defended his country's stance by saying that arming the Bosnian Muslims "would tempt the Serbs, who are the best armed today, and the Croats, who have resumed their offensive in recent days, to liquidate the Muslim resistance before it gets better armed than it is at present". Juppé said that France was considering air attacks against the Serbs. 2428/

22. 22/4/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 39 shell impacts on the city. 2429/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

1883. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1884. Bosnian Serb militants reportedly called the UN's disarmament of Srebrenica's defenders "a farce" and threatened to resume their attack. 2430/

(c) International reported events

1885. Twelve top US State Department Balkan officials petitioned President Clinton to end what they called "Western capitulation to Serbian aggression". In addition, American UN Ambassador Albright sent the President a memo stressing the US "international responsibility" to act. She called for air strikes and the implementation of Security Council Resolution 770, which stipulated that "all necessary measures" should be taken to protect relief deliveries.

1886. Croatian President Tudjman met separately with US President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher and was expected to have talks with Vice President Gore before leaving Washington, D.C. 2431/

23. 23/4/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 15 shell impacts on the city. 2432/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified
Sniping Activity: Heavy sniping was reported throughout the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
1887. There was occasional shellfire and heavy sniping throughout Sarajevo.

(b) Local reported events
1888. Meeting in Belgrade, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić reportedly informed Lord Owen that if Serbian demands were not met, "then this plan is probably dead and we should start thinking about some better solution".

1889. A UN Security Council fact-finding team arrived in Zagreb.

(c) International reported events
1890. US President Clinton defended his BiH policy at a news conference. He described "ethnic cleansing" as "the kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree". He insisted on the need for multilateral action and said that he sympathized with France and Britain, who opposed a more forceful Western response because their troops were on the ground. Encouraged by recent consultations, Clinton contended, "We can reach agreement that goes beyond where we have been". He stressed the need for a "clearly defined objective" and added that the US should not become involved as a partisan in a war.

24. 24/4/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity
Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 92 shell impacts on the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
1891. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events
1892. BiH President Alija Izetbegović stated that the United Nations must be ready to use force against the Serbs and lift the arms embargo against his country if an international peace plan were to fail. He was speaking to reporters after a meeting with a six member fact-finding delegation from the UN Security Council. A group of demonstrators waited outside the BiH
Presidency for the delegation to emerge. The leader of the delegation, Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, shook hands with the protesters. The delegation was expected to leave Sarajevo from Kiseljak and Vitez in central BiH. Arria said that the group would visit Srebrenica on Sunday and then return for a second meeting with Izetbegović in Sarajevo. The other members of the delegation were: Ambassador Terence O’Brien of New Zealand, Ambassador Andre Erdos of Hungary, French deputy UN representative Herve Ladsous, Pakistani deputy representative Sher Afghan Khan, and Russian deputy representative Vasily Sidorov. Sarajevo had remained fairly quiet throughout the meeting.

1893. Despite Lord Owen's new proposal to link Serbian enclaves with a demilitarized strip of land, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić rejected the updated "anti-Serb" peace plan. Karadžić criticized the West for ignoring historic animosities and for trying to force peace upon the three parties. He asked, "Why are you pushing us together like a dog and a cat in the same box?" and insisted, "We can't live together."

1894. Talks continued with the Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžić, Krajšnik and General Mladić. In Zagreb, Lord Owen again met Croatian Defence Minister Šušak, and Bosnian Croat leader Boban. Presidents Izetbegović and Tudjman later joined the talks and signed a cease-fire agreement in Central BiH.

25. 25/4/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 194 shell impacts in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: A report from the Government of BiH described the victimization suffered by the population of Sarajevo from the beginning of hostilities to date. It stated that Sarajevo had been without electricity for 288 days; without water for 256 days; without telephone service for 196 days; and without gas for 21 days. It also stated that 2,564 apartments (3.68 per cent) of social housing were destroyed while 39,088 (56 per cent) were damaged. Among private apartments, 7,760 (9.72 per cent) were completely destroyed, and 62,000 (78 per cent) were damaged. Of the other buildings in the city, 23 per cent were seriously damaged, 64 per cent partially, and 10 per cent only slightly. The Government of BiH submitted another report detailing destruction due to shelling of medical buildings in Sarajevo since hostilities began in April 1992 to date. It said that a total of 1,503 shells were launched against the State Hospital, Emergency, the Student Polyclinic, the Clinical Centre, Health Centres across the city, and the Republic Institute for the Preservation of Health. Shelling resulted in 699 direct hits and 804 indirect hits. The majority of shells (1,100) were launched against the State Hospital. It was report that this shelling had inflicted serious damage to both buildings and equipment: 48 per cent of the area of the buildings had been destroyed, and approximately 40 per cent of equipment. In addition, the report stated that 26 health workers have been killed and 68 wounded since the beginning of hostilities. The report also included a description of damage inflicted on the Institute for Emergency Medical Help. The Institute was shelled from May 1992 to March 1993. It had 56 shells launched against it, with 30 direct hits, inflicting damage on 49 per cent of the building. Five health care workers were killed (two doctors, two medical technicians, and one driver), while 17 were wounded, two seriously. Source(s): Government of BiH.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
1895. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events
1896. In a letter to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Serbian President Milošević and Yugoslav President Ćosić described the Vance-Owen Plan as "an honourable peace" that would ensure "equality and freedom". 2444/

1897. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić said that his side might accept the Vance Owen Plan on conditional terms, "which would give us the right to implement it in accordance with the interests of the Serb nation". 2445/

(c) International reported events
1898. Lord Owen held talks with UNPROFOR Commander General Wahlgren to discuss the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. 2446/

1899. At a meeting of EC foreign ministers, only Germany supported lifting the arms embargo. The EC nations emphasized their commitment to tougher sanctions, and they promised to double the number of sanctions monitors. 2447/

26. 26/4/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 32 shell impacts in the city. 2448/ In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that the situation in the city remained extremely dangerous around the airport due to sniping activities and machine-gun fire. Sarajevo received an average of 50 shell impacts per day. Sporadic shelling and small arms fire were reported throughout the week in all areas. 2449/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that the situation in Sarajevo remained extremely dangerous around the airport because of the sniping activities and machine-gun fire. 2450/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 21 wounded on this day, 2451/ and 40 dead and 205 wounded in the last week. It also reported to date 8,657 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,329 were children), 50,663 wounded (of which 13,204 were children) and 16,075 heavily wounded (of which 2,716 were children). 2452/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:
1900. No incidents reported.
(b) Local reported events

1901. The Bosnian Serbs, meeting in Bijeljina, rejected the Vance-Owen Plan by a vote of 77 to nothing. 2453/

1902. Lord Owen claimed that Vance-Owen was supported by the Yugoslav, Serbian, and Montenegrin Presidents. With today's rejection, however, he said that "confrontation [with the Bosnian Serbs] is now inevitable". Unless cooperation was forthcoming, he predicted military measures "within the context of the UN Charter" will need to be taken. 2454/

1903. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić met with the UN Security Council delegation at the Belgrade airport. The delegation was also received by Croatian President Tudjman in Croatia. 2455/

(c) International reported events

1904. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman explained that China could not accept sanctions or military action in the former Yugoslavia. "We do not want the situation to deteriorate further", he said. 2456/

1905. US President Clinton signed an order to toughen UN sanctions and promised to articulate a "stronger [US] policy" in a few days. 2457/

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 71 shell impacts on the city. 2458/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: An exploding tank shell killed three children. 2459/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 24 wounded on this day. 2460/ Source(s): New York Times; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1906. In Sarajevo, an exploding tank shell killed three children. 2461/

(b) Local reported events

1907. A report on the situation in Sarajevo described the plight of the firefighters in the city. The firemen reportedly had no flak jackets and had refused BiH army protection on the basis that if they were surrounded by soldiers shooting back, it would only attract more fire on them. They also always used the inside stairs of burning buildings, because if they used those on the outside, they would easily be picked off by sniper fire. It was reported that 90 per cent of the fires in Sarajevo were started by shelling or incendiary rounds. At the beginning of the war the Serbs reportedly took 50 per cent of Sarajevo's fire fighting equipment, including trucks, hoses, radios, uniforms and boots. The brigade had tallied 1,250 fires since the
bombardments started. 2462/

(c) International reported events

1908. Speaking in London, Lord Owen said that the US must deploy forces on the ground if it wanted its recommendations to carry any weight. Owen also spoke out against lifting the arms embargo, citing the "intolerable pressure" it would put "on the Russian Federation to supply arms to the Serbs". 2463/

1909. Russian President Yeltsin warned Serbs that they should not expect Russian support if they continued to reject Vance-Owen. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev appealed to Yugoslav leaders to stop supplying the Bosnian Serbs and described the plan as the only "realistic" solution. 2464/

28. 28/4/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 176 shell impacts on the city. 2465/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported seven killed and 31 wounded on this day. 2466/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1910. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1911. Yugoslav President Čosić stated that toughened sanctions could bring "permanent war" to the Balkans. 2467/

(c) International reported events

1912. Meeting in Karachi, Pakistan, the Islamic Conference Organization agreed to provide BiH with $68 million in emergency aid. 2468/

1913. France threatened to withdraw its 5,500 soldiers from the former Yugoslavia if the UN did not clarify UNPROFOR's mandate. 2469/

29. 29/4/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 87 shell impacts on the city. 2470/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 10 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1914. Serb forces reportedly shelled Sarajevo with artillery.

(b) Local reported events

1915. The Serbian Assembly appealed to deputies of the Assembly of the Serb Republic of BiH to reexamine information and outstanding issues and reconsider their decision on the Vance-Owen Plan, bearing in mind interests of the entire Serbian nation. The appeal was contained in a letter sent by Serbian Assembly Speaker Zoran Lilić to the Serb Republic Assembly Speaker Momčilo Krajčišnik.

(c) International reported events

1916. The UN announced that the three factions would meet in Athens during the weekend for continued negotiations.

1917. UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said that the 7,000-strong force in BiH would have to be strengthened if the UN Security Council declared Sarajevo and other towns "safe areas."

30. 30/4/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 114 shell impacts on the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Stup. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH radio said seven children were killed in Serb shelling of residential areas of Sarajevo. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 28 wounded on this day. Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1918. Serb troops shelled Stup throughout the night.

1919. BiH radio said seven children were killed in Serb shelling of residential areas of Sarajevo.
(b) **Local reported events**

1920. Radovan Karadžić, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, said that he hoped for a breakthrough at a weekend summit in Athens to help end the year of civil war. Karadžić said that he would not sign the peace plan in Greece but expected guarantees which would persuade the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb Parliament to accept it at a special session on Wednesday. 2481/

1921. In its monthly operational report, UNPROFOR cited diplomatic discussions as taking on more importance than military activities, with no change noticed in the operational situation. UNPROFOR also reported the failure of high level meetings and the discovery of ammunition in a convoy as adding to the current tension. UNPROFOR reported that its vehicles and UNHCR vehicles were very often directly fired upon and confirmed 655 cease-fire violations (406 from the Serbian side and 249 from the BiH side). With regard to utility repair missions, 55 had been performed, 49 completed and six canceled (four for safety reasons or no will from the parties and two for technical reasons). For the first time in months there was a decrease in the number of airport crossings to 10,000 attempts. 2482/

(c) **International reported events**

1922. Cyrus Vance resigned as co-chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. 2483/

N. May 1993

1. 1/5/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 90 shell impacts on the city. 2484/ Tanjug reported a BiH mortar attack on Ilidža and other reports described shelling of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Ilidža; the area near the city's Roman Catholic cathedral; the open air market in the Old Town; a building beside the open air market. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Four people were killed and 10 wounded when a shell landed near the city's Roman Catholic cathedral. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Four people were killed and 10 wounded when a shell landed near the city's Roman Catholic cathedral. The BiH Crisis Centre said that eight people were killed and 60 wounded in Sarajevo in the past 24 hours. 2485/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and 42 wounded on this day. 2486/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1923. The Yugoslav news agency Tanjug said that Muslim forces launched a mortar attack on the Serb-held Ilidža district of Sarajevo. 2487/

1924. Sarajevo radio said that four people were killed and 10 wounded when a
shell landed near the city's cathedral. According to reports, many people were on the streets enjoying a warm spring day when a shell landed just in front of the Roman Catholic cathedral, built during the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire, wounding passersby and vendors. One of the wounded was an 11 year-old boy who was hit by shrapnel.

1925. Another shell was reported to have hit the open air market in the Old Town. Reports stated that one shell landed on the roof of a building beside the market apparently without causing casualties, while other shells landed nearby.

(b) International reported events

1926. Mr. Stoltenberg assumed his responsibilities as co-chairman of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia.

1927. The warring factions concluded their first session of peace talks in Athens, intended to head off Western military intervention in the Balkans. A week ago, Slobodan Milošević and his ally, Momir Bulatović of Montenegro, publicly broke ranks with their ethnic kin in BiH and told them that they should sign up for the entire Vance-Owen plan. Radovan Karadžić, the Bosnian Serb leader, said peace could come "within two weeks" if minor modifications were made to the plan. Both the Croatian leadership in BiH and the Muslim-led BiH Government had already accepted the plan. Also attending the Athens meeting with Milošević, Bulatović and the three BiH leaders was President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia.

1928. President Clinton decided in principle yesterday to commit airpower to try to end the fighting in BiH. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was sent to try to persuade European allies to go along with the strategy.

2. 2/5/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 33 shell impacts on the city. The city was described as quieter after heavy shelling on Saturday. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo had been relatively quiet. An average of 91 rounds per day were recorded. Areas of concentration were Švabino Brdo, Rastovi, Zabrdje, Stup and Kobilja. Sniping activity was reported to have continued. The French Battalion reported that the fighting was intense on 27 April between Stup, Nedžarići and Dobrinja. In addition, troop movement and ammunition resupply were noted near the Stup checkpoint. It was observed that a quantity of Serb heavy weapons were moved out of their previous locations to unknown destinations. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that sniping activity had continued. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported nine killed and 47 wounded on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.
Narrative of Events:

1929. Sarajevo was reported as quieter after heavy shelling on Saturday killed eight people. However, following the news from Athens that Radovan Karadžić had supported the peace plan, the first shells were fired into the city from surrounding mountainsides at 7:45 p.m. According to hospital sources, five people were killed.

(b) International reported events

1930. In Athens, Radovan Karadžić conditionally endorsed the Vance-Owen Plan. Bosnian Serb hard-liners warned the world not to expect their parliament to automatically endorse the UN-sponsored peace plan signed in Athens Sunday by their leader. Momčilo Krajišnik, President of the parliament which had twice rejected the plan dividing BiH into 10 ethnic cantons, told Bosnian Serb radio, "[t]his signature did not in any way mean actual acceptance of the agreement . . . I believe (it) must be reworked and cannot be accepted in the present form". Serbian President Slobodan Milošević told Belgrade television later: "I am convinced the parliament will accept the plan". The agreement reached in Greece still needed to be voted on by the Bosnian Serb parliament which was scheduled to meet in special session on Wednesday.

1931. US President Clinton reminded optimists that "other agreements in this protracted war have raised hopes but not changed behavior".

1932. French Foreign Minister Juppé implicitly criticized US policy when he stated that, "there is a division of tasks which I don't think is acceptable, that of having some flying in aeroplanes and dropping bombs, and others, the Europeans, especially the French, on the ground."

3. 3/5/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 80 shell impacts on the city. Serb gunners reportedly fired several shells into the city before dawn. It was also reported that they fired anti-aircraft guns into BiH positions. Some machine-gun and small-arms fire was also heard. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: An unidentified apartment block in the city; BiH army positions in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: An unidentified apartment block in the city was hit by Serb shellfire after dawn and was set afire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Hospitals reported one dead and 15 wounded in the early evening. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported eight killed and 32 wounded on this day. Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1933. Serb gunners on surrounding mountainsides fired several shells into Sarajevo shortly before dawn, setting an apartment block on fire. They also fired anti-aircraft guns at BiH army positions in the city. Some machine-gun
and small-arms fire could also be heard. 2506/

1934. Tracer bullets could be seen through the dark and gunners of the BiH Army were returning fire. 2507/

(b) International reported events

1935. Radovan Karadžić, in an interview with BBC radio, said he hoped his parliament would ratify the Vance-Owen plan. "I do hope parliament will approve it, but if it does not I will offer my resignation and they will select another representative who is going to be more radical", he said. 2508/1936. Serbian Renewal Movement leader Drašković said that he doubted that the Bosnian Serb assembly would accept Vance-Owen. He said, "We should now ask ourselves why the plan was not signed on 26 April at the previous session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, when such an action would have spared Serbia-Montenegro from sanctions". 2509/

1937. Western officials stated that a NATO force of around 50,000 might be dispatched to BiH. For the first time, US President Clinton publicly declared that the US planned to contribute peacekeepers. Clinton added, however, that, "I would not make any such decisions without a further consultation with the Congress and discussing it directly with the American people".

4. 4/5/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Occasional shelling was reported in the city and anti-aircraft and sniper fire could be heard. UNPROFOR recorded 37 shell impacts on the city. 2510/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported on this day. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Hospitals reported one civilian dead and several wounded. 2511/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 20 wounded on this day. 2512/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1938. Occasional shelling was reported in Sarajevo and anti-aircraft and sniper fire could be heard. Hospitals reported one civilian dead and several wounded. 2513/

(b) Local reported events

1939. UN commander, Lieutenant General Phillipe Morillon of France, threatened to use force to stop the bloodshed, a significant switch in UN strategy in the war. Morillon declared that with the factional leaders having accepted the UN-sponsored peace plan, he regarded local commanders who tried to block it as "warlords and pirates" against whom UN troops might move militarily. 2514/
(c) International reported events

1940. US Administration officials said that, whatever the outcome of the Bosnian Serbs' vote, no immediate action in BiH was expected. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, at a meeting in Paris, encountered more allied resistance to using military force in BiH. 2515/

1941. The Washington Post reported that NATO had drafted a plan for BiH with US Marines landing at key Adriatic ports and US Army paratroopers taking control of Sarajevo airport, followed quickly by deployment of roughly 12,000 combat troops from the 1st Armoured Division based in Germany, according to US military sources. 2516/

1942. US television networks reported that the Pentagon was preparing for possible military intervention in BiH, and had already sent US Special Forces there to check out potential targets for air attacks. 2517/

5. 5/5/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy bombardment was reported in the city from 11:00 a.m. until about 1:00 p.m. UNPROFOR recorded 66 shell impacts on the city. 2518/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near the Presidency; the area near the Maršal Tito Barracks where the Ukrainian UNPROFOR battalion was quartered; the western edge of the city; the city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The day's bombardment left a reported five people dead and 25 wounded. 2519/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 13 wounded on this day. 2520/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1943. Sarajevo came under heavy bombardment from surrounding Serb gunners shortly after 11:00 a.m. until about 1:00 p.m.. 2521/ Several shells struck close to the Presidency and others near the Maršal Tito Barracks where the Ukrainian UN battalion was quartered. Small arms fire could be heard near the Presidency, with pedestrians nearby running about. Incoming shells could be heard exploding around the western end of the city before midday. 2522/ The attacks lasted several hours, dying down almost completely in the afternoon. All fatalities were caused by mortar shells, hospital authorities said, adding that one of the dead was a doctor from the city hospital who was shopping in the centre of town. 2523/ The bombardment left a reported five people dead and 25 wounded. 2524/

(b) Local reported events

1944. Members of the Bosnian Serb parliament met in Pale to decide whether to accept the Vance-Owen plan for BiH. 2525/

1945. Declaring that "reasons no longer exist for further assistance in money,
fuel, and raw materials", the Serbian Government suspended all but humanitarian aid to Bosnian Serbs. It blamed Bosnian Serb leaders for the "asphyxiation" of Serbia's economy. Democratic Party leader Dragoljub Mišunović said that "Serbia will now become hostages of the Bosnian Serbs". Serbian Radical Party leader Šešelj pledged to continue supplying Bosnian Serb forces with assistance and volunteers. 2526/

1946. Canadian External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall visited the city to meet with officials at the start of the "most intense bombardment of the capital for more than a month". 2527/

(c) International reported events

1947. The New York Times quoted Western intelligence reports as estimating that the Bosnian Serbs had about 100 artillery pieces and a dozen tanks around Sarajevo. United Nations officials in Sarajevo said that the total was closer to 250. According to the New York Times, the heaviest concentration of artillery in the BiH war was in and around Sarajevo. "More than 100 Serbian heavy guns, and by some estimates, twice that, are nestled in the rugged terrain around the city and some would be prime targets for allied strikes", the Times stated. 2528/

1948. Russian President Yeltsin stated that Russian troops would join international peace-keeping operations in BiH if a settlement was reached. However, he did not endorse the US plan to intervene militarily if the peace process failed. 2529/

6. 6/5/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city came under the heaviest concentrated bombardment in days. For two hours, scores of artillery shells fell on the downtown and historic district, and tank rounds struck around the Holiday Inn. UNPROFOR recorded 36 shell impacts on the city. 2530/ Source(s): Washington Post; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The downtown area; the historic district; the area near the Holiday Inn; the road to the airport. Source(s): Washington Post.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Officials at the Koševo Hospital said two people died and 17 were wounded in the day's shelling. 2531/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported four killed and 25 wounded on this day. 2532/ Source(s): Washington Post; UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

1949. Agence France Presse reported that around Sarajevo, Serb gun emplacements had been pinpointed by UN troops on the ground, but that UNPROFOR officers said that the guns were mobile and could be moved quickly. 2533/

1950. Agence France Presse speculated that the "lull" in shelling in Sarajevo was due to the fact that gunners used the opportunity to replenish their ammunition supplies and position themselves for a massive bombardment of
Sarajevo in the event of any western attack. 2534/

1951. As the Bosnian Serb assembly met, Sarajevo came under the heaviest concentrated bombardment in days. For two hours, scores of artillery shells fell on the downtown and historic district, and tank rounds struck the area around the high-rise Holiday Inn on the road to the airport. Officials at the Koševo Hospital said two people died and 17 were wounded in the shelling. 2535/

(b) Local reported events

1952. An assembly of Bosnian Serb nationalist leaders sidestepped a decision on whether to accept the UN backed peace plan for the Republic, voting to put the plan to a referendum of the Serb population of BiH. The 51 to two vote followed 16 hours of debate on the issue and represented rejection of a plea by Serbian President Slobodan Milošević for the assembly to ratify the peace plan and thus accept deployment in BiH of tens of thousands of peace-keeping troops from the United States, and other NATO countries and Russia. The assembly never voted on the actual peace plan but only on the referendum. Yugoslav President Dobrica Ćosić declared that the assembly had made "the worst decision this nation has ever seen". 2536/

1953. The Governments of Serbia and federal Yugoslavia said that they would cut all but humanitarian aid to Bosnian Serbs, saying that they were angered by the Bosnian Serb parliament's rejection of the peace plan. 2537/

1954. UNICEF announced that the city's birth rate had fallen by two-thirds since the beginning of the siege. Before the war, the birth rate was an annual 13.82 per thousand, and in April of 1993 was estimated to be 4.59 births per thousand. 2538/

(c) International reported events

1955. Under Resolution 824, the UN Security Council declared Sarajevo and five other BiH communities and their surroundings as "safe areas" to protect them from further armed attacks. The Council called on Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units to withdraw from those areas to a distance from which they would not constitute a threat to the security of the inhabitants of the towns. The rejection of the peace plan by the Bosnian Serb parliament threw UN officials and the Security Council off balance. They had begun preparations for implementing the peace plan after expressing strong optimism that economic sanctions and threats of military actions would force its acceptance. 2539/

7. 7/5/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR recorded 47 shell impacts on the city. 2540/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** The main bridge connecting Sarajevo to eastern BiH. Source(s): Washington Post.

**Description of Damage:** Six hundred pounds of explosives were used to blast a 69 foot-wide gash into the main bridge connecting Sarajevo to eastern BiH. Source(s): Washington Post.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 14 wounded on this day. 2541/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1956. A predawn explosion on the main bridge connecting Sarajevo to eastern BiH capped a difficult 24 hours. The bridge was used by UN humanitarian convoys and military observers to travel into Serb-controlled territory and to the Muslim enclaves in the east. A UN report said unidentified forces used about 600 pounds of explosives to blast a 69 foot-wide gash into the bridge, which spanned a creek. The report said a road could be cut through the riverbed but the area had to be cleared of mines. The bridge was in the territory generally controlled by the Serbs. UN officers said that the Serbs were suspected of demolishing the overpass as a way of blocking more convoys of food and visits by military observers in eastern BiH. 2542/

8. 8/5/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 56 shell impacts on the city. 2543/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The airport area; the area near the airport building (six shells in the evening while negotiations were being held). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 20 wounded on this day. 2544/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1957. UN relief flights to the city were halted briefly after the airport was fired upon. UN peace-keeping forces at the airport went on alert after the morning shooting, but gave an all-clear signal later and the airlift resumed at 2:00 p.m. No casualties were reported. 2545/

1958. Six shells fell in the evening around the airport building where Bosnian Serb and BiH government army commanders were meeting for UN-mediated talks on the proposed demilitarization of the Muslim enclaves of Žepa and Goražde. It was reported that the negotiators fled to shelters during the attack, returning after 30 minutes. 2546/

(b) Local reported events

1959. BiH’s Serb and Muslim military leaders met at the Sarajevo airport. The two sides agreed to a nationwide cease-fire beginning Sunday. 2547/
9. 9/5/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as generally quiet overnight and small-arms fire was reported through the streets most of the day. UN officials reported fighting around the airport as the cease-fire came into force at midday. The shelling abated thereafter. UNPROFOR recorded 42 shell impacts on the city. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The UN Telecommunications Building (two shells). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 12 wounded on this day. It also reported 8,713 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,348 were children), and 51,002 wounded (of which 13,284 were children) in Sarajevo to date. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

1960. BiH radio said that Sarajevo was generally quiet overnight but UN sources said that two shells hit the UN Telecommunications Building. No one was reported hurt.

1961. Small-arms fire was reported through the streets much of the day. UN officials reported fighting around Sarajevo airport as the cease-fire came into force at midday. The shelling abated and did not appear to represent a definitive breach of the truce.

(b) Local reported events

1962. The latest cease-fire came into force at midday.

1963. Fierce fighting broke out in Mostar.

1964. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said he wanted President Clinton and other leaders to meet a Serb delegation that would explain why his parliament rejected the peace plan for BiH.

10. 10/5/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The cease-fire appeared to be generally holding around Sarajevo, with 12 artillery impacts recorded by UNPROFOR. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo remained relatively quiet. An average of 56 rounds per day were recorded. Sniper activity continued at a high level. The destruction of the bridge south of the airport and the new Serb check points on the road to Vogošća were seen as potential restrictions of movement when entering the city. A by-pass was opened on 9 May. Aggressive Serb behaviour towards UNPROFOR was noted. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: A report from the Government of BiH stated that 193 shells fell on Koševo Hospital complex, 11 on the Eye Clinic, and 26 on the Podhrastovi Clinic from 16 November 1992 to date. 2557/ Source(s): Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniping from the hills was reported on this date. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported sniper activity continued at a high level. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1965. The cease-fire appeared to be generally holding around Sarajevo with 12 artillery impacts recorded by UNPROFOR. 2558/ A single artillery shell fell on the city after midnight and the city centre was reported to be calm in the morning, apart from sporadic sniping from the hills. 2559/

(b) Local reported events

1966. About 15 cargo aeroplanes carrying international humanitarian relief were scheduled to land at the airport in Sarajevo. 2560/

(c) International reported events

1967. Western European governments rejected President Clinton's proposal to arm the BiH government and his threat to mount air strikes on BiH targets. The rejection, made at a meeting of European Community foreign ministers, underscored the sharp difference that existed between the US and Europe on policy in the Balkans. President Clinton said that no American troops would go into BiH unless they were part of an international peace-keeping force. 2561/

11. 11/5/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as calm with scattered small arms and machine-gun fire overnight. UNPROFOR recorded 12 shell impacts on the city. 2562/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near Ilidža. Source(s): Tanjug.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH radio said Serb forces had killed two Muslim soldiers and wounded three around the city. 2563/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1968. Sarajevo radio reported the city as calm. 2564/ There was, however, scattered small arms and machine-gun fire overnight. 2565/

1969. Belgrade-based Tanjug reported small arms fire and sporadic mortar shelling near the Serb-held Sarajevo district of Ilidža. 2566/
(b) **Local reported events**

1970. Serbian President Milošević urged Bosnian Serbs to cancel their referendum on Vance-Owen and instead come to Belgrade for a pan-Serbian convention. He stated, "Support for the Vance-Owen is the same as support for peace".  

(c) **International reported events**

1971. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated that he would not recognize the results of the upcoming Bosnian Serb referendum of the Vance-Owen Plan.  

12. **12/5/93 (Wednesday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** BiH radio reported scattered shelling and small arms fire in Sarajevo, with seven shells landing in the south-west part of the city. UNPROFOR recorded three shell impacts on the city.  

**Targets Hit:** The south-west part of the city.  

**Description of Damage:** Not specified  

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified  

**Casualties:** Not specified  

**Narrative of Events:**

1972. No incidents reported.  

(b) **Local reported events**

1973. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stated that Serbian President Milošević "has never interfered in our affairs, nor has he ever asked to decide on our behalf". He refuted Western claims that Milošević had unlimited influence on their decisions.  

1974. Serbian Radical Pary leader Šešelj threatened to mount a missile attack against Italy, Croatia, Austria, and any other nation that aided the West in air-strikes against Bosnian Serbs. He warned, "We have FF-22 missiles which can reach your country, but we will not target military compounds because their defence is prepared. In case we are attacked, we will fire at your civilian targets". He also claimed that not even one-third of Bosnian Serb manpower had yet been utilized in the war, and vowed to retaliate against air-strikes by attacking UN troops on the ground.  

13. **13/5/93 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported as quiet. UNPROFOR recorded seven shell impacts on the city.  

Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.
Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1975. Despite a general cease-fire theoretically in force in BiH, Sarajevo radio reported shelling in several locations in the Republic. In general, however, Sarajevo was said to be quiet. 2573/

(b) Local reported events

1976. UNPROFOR reported that a bridge 15 kilometres north of Mostar had been blown up. The destruction of the bridge, on the main road from Mostar to Sarajevo, was thought to seriously jeopardize the delivery of aid from the Adriatic coast to BiH, the UN sources added. 2574/

14. 14/5/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There were reports that the cease-fire had generally held around Sarajevo and that thousands of people were out in the streets of the old city. Only 10 shells were reported to have fallen in and around the city in the 48 hour period ending on Friday. According to UN military observers, this amount was the lowest toll in months. 2575/ Source(s): Washington Post.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: A report from the Association for Intercultural Activities and Heritage Rescue (AIASN) described damage done to the city's cultural/historic heritage. Among the buildings and monuments that had been destroyed by shelling were: the Post Office Building, the Church of Saint Vinka, the Museum of the Winter Olympics 1984, the Red Cross building, the Oriental Institute (along with its collection of valuable Oriental manuscripts and documents), the collection of the Library of Sarajevo, and other smaller specialized libraries. Those that had been damaged were: the Old Serbian Orthodox Church, and others, the City Museum and the World Museum (tombstones and rarities located around the museum, as well as certain collections had been either damaged or destroyed). It also stated that many of the buildings and monuments of the historic old quarter, Baščaršija, as well as all mosques in the city, including the most historic and beautiful Alipašin Mosque, and Magribija Mosque, had been either damaged or destroyed. 2576/ Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Hospitals reported that mortar and sniper fire killed three and injured four. 2577/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

1977. There were reports that the cease-fire had generally held around
Sarajevo and that thousands of people were out in the streets of the old city. Only 10 shells were reported to have fallen in and around the city in the past 48 hours, according to UN military observers. This was the lowest toll in months. "We are cautiously optimistic". said Commander Barry Frewer, chief spokesman of the UNPROFOR forces in the city. Small-arms fire and one shell landing were reported in the Dobrinja district near the airport.

(b) Local reported events

1978. At a meeting in Belgrade called by Serbian leaders and marked by insults and angry walkouts, three Serbian legislatures endorsed the Vance-Owen plan for BiH and urged the Bosnian Serbs to sign it. But a boycott of the meeting by Serbs from both BiH and Croatia raised questions whether the endorsement would have any effect. Bosnian Serb leaders, who had already rejected the plans three times, said that they would ignore the resolution and proceed with a referendum during the weekend which was expected to produce a resounding vote against the plan.

1979. After a warm day, the city plunged into darkness at night as a power outage cut all electricity. An official of the city electrical company blamed Croat fighters north of the city.

(c) International reported events

1980. US President Clinton endorsed the UN plan to place troops on the border between BiH and Serbia, but gave no sign that US troops would join the operation.

15. 15/5/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as quiet overnight except for sporadic small arms fire around the Old Town and a single shell in the New Sarajevo district. UNPROFOR recorded 13 shell impacts on the city.  Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The New Sarajevo district. Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: In a report from the Library of the City of Sarajevo, the findings of a colloquium called "The Destruction of the Cultural-Historical and Natural Heritage of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina 1992/1993" held on 6 and 7 April 1993 were reported. The report states that the University Library, Vijećnica (Town Hall) was assaulted by grenades a few times during the month of July 1992, and was completely destroyed, including all books, periodicals and equipment on 25 and 26 August 1992. The Library of the City of Sarajevo lost 150,000 of its collection of 250,000 works. The Cultural Centre Vratnik (Mustafe Dovadije 17), and the Cultural Centre Hrasno (Krndelja 30-b) were directly hit during the month of July 1992, and lost 30,000 publications. Libraries at the following addresses were damaged or destroyed between April and December 1992: Radićeva 7; V. Perića 1; Zrinjskog 2; Đure Salaja 17; D. Bijedića 66; Žrtava Fašizma 1. Also destroyed were the complete archives of the City of Sarajevo, and on 17 May 1992, the library of the Oriental Institute, containing over 222,000 documents from the 11th century. Fifty-six junior high schools, and 43 high schools, containing an average of 10,000 books each, were for the most part turned into military barracks. The books, according to the report, were most likely destroyed.
During the evacuation of the JNA, the Garrison Library was mined. Many volumes, however, were removed to other cities before this occurred. The library of the Maršal Tito barracks was shelled. In all, the city had lost more than four million books. Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1981. Sarajevo was reported as quiet overnight except for sporadic small arms fire around the Old Town and a single shell reported in the New Sarajevo district.

(b) Local reported events

1982. Tens of thousands of Bosnian Serbs voted in a two-day referendum on the international peace plan for BiH, and interviews with voters indicated strong opposition to the proposed division of the country among its three warring factions. In addition to being asked to pass judgment on the peace plan, the voters were asked to rule on whether the Bosnian Serb Republic, if preserved, should seek to join other states, raising the possibility of creating a "Greater Serbia" sought by Serb nationalists. It was reported that the Bosnian Serb leadership, which controlled most local radio and other news media, had urged voters to reject the peace plan. Polling stations in northern and eastern BiH all displayed maps showing how Serbs would be separated under the plan. At each site, slogans on the walls called for a "no" vote.

16. 16/5/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded two shell impacts on the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1983. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1984. Declaring the UN backed peace plan for BiH "dead" an hour after polls closed, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that the weekend referendum on the plan in Serb-held territory had ended a chance that his people would agree to live with BiH's Muslims and Croats in one state. Karadžić told a press conference in Pale that the only way to end the 13-month-old BiH war would be through the creation of three separate states, each ruled by one of
the former Yugoslav Republic's three warring factions. 2588/ "Bosnia never existed, and it will never exist", he said.

(c) **International reported events**

1985. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that the Vance-Owen Plan should be implemented with or without Bosnian Serb acceptance. "We don't have to wait until the last Bosnian fighter endorses" the plan, he contended, "we can put out the fire in the former Yugoslavia step by step".

17. 17/5/93 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo radio said that the city was reported quiet after a noisy evening with scattered small arms and mortar fire across the city. The radio reported that 14 shells hit the Mojmilo and Alipašino Polje district west of the city centre. 2589/ UNPROFOR recorded two shell impacts on the city. 2590/ In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR described the city as extremely quiet. The cease-fire was relatively respected on both sides and for two of the last seven days there were no incoming rounds and only on 10 May was the number of impacts registered as significant (56). An average of 150 persons tried to cross the airport each day and at least one of them was reported killed during the attempts. One French officer was lightly wounded during the prevention of the runway crossings. People were reported to be on the streets of the city and some shops were open, although small arms and sniper fire remained active. The restriction of UNPROFOR movements was reported to have decreased considerably. 2591/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Mojmilo; Alipašino Polje. Source(s) Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported nine killed and 58 wounded in Sarajevo last week. It also reported to date 8,722 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,351 were children), 51,060 wounded (of which 13,300 were children), and 16,301 heavily wounded (of which 2,806 were children). 2592/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

1986. Sarajevo radio said that the city was reported quiet after a noisy evening with scattered small arms and mortar fire across the city. The radio said that 14 shells hit the Mojmilo and Alipašino Polje district west of the city centre. 2593/

(b) **Local reported events**

1987. Bosnian Serb Army General Ratko Mladić said that the Serb state in BiH was a reality and the world could do nothing about it. Mladić warned the West not to intervene with air strikes to force the Vance-Owen plan on the Serbs and threatened revenge if they did. "If they bomb me; I'll bomb London", Mladić said. On the possibility of UN military intervention on the ground, he said; "They can get in but they would not know how to get out . . . whoever comes here would leave their bones here". 2594/
1988. Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić called BiH General Mladić's threat of terror "idiotic and irresponsible" and said that he must be disciplined. 2595/

(c) International reported events

1989. Deeming it fruitless to continue to discuss the Vance-Owen Plan, US officials refused to attend a Security Council foreign ministers' meeting on peace-keeping in BiH. Secretary of State Christopher believed that the overwhelming rejection of the plan created "new opportunities". He stated that he planned to establish a "strong consensus with our allies" on a new approach to the conflict. 2596/

1990. Lord Owen greeted the veto of the Vance-Owen Plan with what he described as "consternation". He appealed to Western nations to avoid the "temptation" to respond "with bombs", and he urged them to instead stick with the "process of negotiation". 2597/

18. 18/5/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 22 shell impacts on the city. 2598/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

1991. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

1992. Serbian President Milošević met with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Belgrade. 2599/

1993. Initial results from 15 of the 83 voting districts indicated that about 98 per cent of those casting ballots supported establishment of an autonomous Serb state, and 99 per cent opposed the UN peace plan which would cut Serb control of BiH from 70 per cent to 42 per cent. 2600/

1994. In interviews, Radovan Karadžić and his top military commander, Ratko Mladić, declared that Serb-held territory in BiH must be contiguous and that at most they would accept a confederation of their self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb republic with political entities led by the other two factions in the war. The Serb leaders said that the only way peace would come to BiH was if all three factions would separate in a massive population transfer. 2601/

1995. A report from the Professional Fire Brigade of the City of Sarajevo described the material and human losses it had suffered during the siege of the city. At the outset of hostilities four stations were occupied by enemy
forces: the stations Vogošća and the Airport of Sarajevo, and the substations Iljiš and Pale. The equipment from the Airport of Sarajevo was seized by "Četniks", it said, and the building itself was put under the control of UNPROFOR. It stated that the brigade was down to 65 per cent of its capacity, servicing the city from the stations Vratnik, Bjelave, Novo Sarajevo, and Alipašin Most. Both buildings and equipment were subject to shelling, even during rescue operations, and the extinguishing of fires. During such action, 11 firefighters were killed and 38 either lightly or seriously wounded. The material losses due to this shelling had been great, it said. 2602/

(c) International Reported Events

1996. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev released a four-point plan to bring peace to BiH. He proposed creating a war crimes court, sealing the border between Serbia and BiH, fully imposing UN sanctions, and creating safe havens. 2603/

1997. US Secretary of State Christopher told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the war in BiH was essentially a "European problem". 2604/

19. 19/5/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 12 shell impacts on the city. 2605/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The Ukrainian Battalion (seven mortar rounds). 2606/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A civilian couple was shot and killed while attempting to leave the city along the north bank of the Miljacka river. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

1998. A Serb man and a Muslim woman were shot and killed while trying to escape from the city. Boško Brkić and Admira Ismič, both 25 years old, who had dated since high school, set off for Serbia after having negotiated permission with local commanders on both sides to cross battle lines to leave the city. They walked 500 yards along the north bank of the Miljacka river in plain sight of both government and Serb soldiers. As they approached the Vrbana bridge and Serb-held territory, they were shot and killed. Both sides denied responsibility. 2607/

(b) Local reported events

1999. In a meeting at what used to be a ski resort in the Jahorina Mountains, the Serbs' election commission proclaimed that 96 per cent of the voters in Serb-held BiH territory cast ballots against the UN-backed Vance-Owen peace plan and in favour of creation of an independent Serb state in BiH. 2608/
(c) International reported events

2000. After talks mediated by Owen and Stoltenberg, Croatian President Tudjman and BiH President Izetbegović reportedly agreed to begin implementing Vance-Owen in the regions under their control. Bosnian Serb leader Boban said that this was "nothing new", but just a restatement of old accords. Not long afterwards, Muslim-Croat fighting erupted in Vitez. 2609/

20. 20/5/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Clashes broke out after several weeks of relative calm. Reports said that Serbian gunners positioned in the Grbavica district traded artillery rounds with BiH troops defending the downtown area. More than 20 shells reportedly hit Grbavica shortly before noon. UNPROFOR recorded 51 shell impacts on the city. 2610/ Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Grbavica (more than 20 shells); downtown Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Medical officials said that mortar shells which landed in the centre of the city in the morning left one person dead and four injured, including one child. 2611/ Later reports claimed that at least four people were killed during the day. 2612/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2001. Clashes broke out in Sarajevo after several weeks of relative calm, as fighting between Muslim-led BiH army and Croatian paramilitary forces in central BiH calmed down. 2613/

2002. Serbian gunners positioned in the Sarajevo district of Grbavica traded artillery rounds with BiH troops defending the downtown area of the city, news reports said. More than 20 mortar shells landed in Serb-held Grbavica shortly before noon, said a statement by Bosnian Serb military command, which added that the alleged BiH offensive was unprovoked from the Serbian side. But Sarajevo radio said that the Serb gunners first fired on Sarajevo from the surrounding hilltop positions. Neither source revealed the number of casualties. 2614/

(b) Local reported events

2003. An investigation on childhood trauma by two psychologists in Sarajevo stated that 92 per cent of the children thought they could have been killed at some time. One child in two (48 per cent) had seen a member of their family hurt or their house occupied, 72 per cent had to leave their village or town and 89 per cent had been homeless. One in four (24 per cent) had also tried to help a dying person and three out of four had seen war wounds. It was reported that at the time, there were 65,000 to 80,000 children living in Sarajevo. The report highlighted the grave danger to the children's mental health. 2615/
(c) International reported events

2004. Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev met with Secretary of State Christopher in Washington and predicted that a joint approach would produce "positive results". 2616/

2005. Representatives from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania reached agreement with the WEU to tighten the blockade on Yugoslavia. 2617/

   21. 21/5/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 14 shell impacts on the city. 2618/ The shelling in Serb and Muslim areas on Thursday and Friday were described by UN officials as the worst since the 8 May truce. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire reported in casualty account below. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Radio Sarajevo reported that artillery and sniper fire killed three people and wounded seven in the city on this day. 2619/ A later report stated that four people were killed and more than 30 wounded, (eight of whom were children). 2620/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2006. The shelling of Serb and Muslim areas of the city on Thursday and Friday was described by UN officials as the worst since the two warring sides signed a truce on 8 May. 2621/

(b) Local reported events

2007. Yugoslavia refused to accept the deployment of UN monitors to enforce a blockade on its borders with BiH. Yugoslavia's rejection came ahead of a UN Security Council decision to send 500 inspectors to Serbia to ensure it kept its promise to cut off supplies to Bosnian Serbs. "They (UN monitors) do not solve the problem and they endanger our sovereignty and offend the dignity of our state", Yugoslavia's President Dobrica Ćosić said. 2622/

2008. Reuters wrote that

"[s]pring and a cease-fire have brought new life to Sarajevo after months of death and destruction. Vegetable gardens are sprouting on balconies and vacant lots across the city. Children, pale from months of confinement, play outside under parents' watchful eyes. Lovers stroll hand-in-hand down streets kept clean by Serb sniper fire for most of the past year . . . having survived 13 months of siege warfare and a winter without electricity, running water and telephone, the people of Sarajevo are anxious to get on with their lives". 2623/
(c) International reported events

2009. US President Clinton described safe havens as "shooting galleries". Skeptical of the new plan under discussion, he said, "I don't want to see the United States get in a position where we're recreating Northern Ireland, Lebanon, or Cyprus or anything else". A senior US official revealed that Secretary of State Christopher had dropped his opposition to safe havens, as long as they were temporary. 2624/

22. 22/5/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb forces reportedly hit the city with artillery fire on the first anniversary of BiH's admission to the United Nations. In seven hours, there were reports that 43 mortar and artillery rounds fell in Muslim areas and 62 artillery and mortar rounds hit the Serb-held areas. UNPROFOR recorded 128 shell impacts on the city. 2625/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: UN military observers said that six people were killed and 14 were wounded in the Serb-held Sarajevo districts of Grbavica and Ilidža. Sarajevo radio said that nine people were killed and 103 wounded in BiH-held areas. 2626/ The casualty toll was the heaviest in the city since the UN-brokered cease-fire between BiH and Serb forces on 8 May. 2627/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2010. Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with artillery fire, killing at least nine persons and wounding more than 100 civilians, one of them a top government official. Serbian forces and BiH government troops blamed each other for beginning the artillery duel shortly before noon. Hospital officials said nine people were killed and another 103 were wounded, about 60 of them seriously according to radio reports monitored in Belgrade. In Sarajevo, Barry Frewer, a spokesman for UNPROFOR confirmed that Bosnian Serbs and Government troops traded artillery rounds. Zlatko Lagumdžija, a Deputy Prime Minister of the BiH government was wounded and underwent surgery in a Sarajevo hospital. Later he was recovering and off the danger list. Bosnian Serbs fired 82 millimetre and 120 millimetre mortars and howitzers from hills overlooking the city, said Sarajevo radio. 2628/

2011. In seven hours of shelling in the Sarajevo area, 43 mortar and artillery rounds fell in Muslim territory and 62 mortar and artillery shells hit Serb-held districts. "We're seeing dead and wounded on both sides. We can't tell you who started it and we can't tell you why", said Barry Frewer. "This was the worst day of the war in many, many weeks", said Faris Goran Kapetanović, a surgeon at the Koševi hospital, where so many casualties arrived they had to line up in the corridors. 2629/
(b) **Local reported events**

2012. The day marked the first anniversary of BiH's admission to the United Nations. 2630/

(c) **International reported events**

2013. The United States offered air power to protect international forces that would be sent to safeguard Muslim civilians under the United Nations plan to establish safe havens in BiH. A British official discussing the safe haven plan said that foreign powers had reached a tentative division of labour, under which Canadian troops would remain in Srebrenica, British troops would be deployed to Tuzla, French troops would be responsible for Sarajevo and Bihać and Ukrainian troops would protect Žepa. 2631/

23. 23/5/93 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Small arms and machine-gun fire was heard throughout the night. Shelling of the city centre was reported during the day. UNPROFOR recorded 26 shell impacts on the city. 2632/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Targets Hit:** The Holiday Inn (1:00 a.m.). Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported shelling in the city centre on Sunday. Nine people were killed and 105 wounded on this day. It also reported 26 killed and 190 wounded in the last week. To date, 8,748 people were reported as killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,360 were children), and 67,616 as wounded (of which 16,186 were children). Because of water and electricity shortages and difficulties with waste disposal, the city was in danger of various epidemics. There were 120 cases of enterocolitis acuta registered in one part of Sarajevo in the last week. 2633/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2014. Small arms and machine-gun fire sounded throughout the night. Sarajevo radio reported that a shell landed near the Holiday Inn hotel used by journalists at around 1:00 a.m.. There were no reports of resumed artillery fire. 2634/

(b) **Local reported events**

2015. BiH President Alija Izetbegović rejected the US-European effort to contain the war, accusing the West of abandoning his people and plotting to herd them onto "reservations". Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić hailed the initiative and praised President Clinton, referring to him as "a sage man to reject the counsel of hawks who wanted to pull him into a Balkan... war". In a statement read in Sarajevo, Izetbegović criticized Western leaders for their role in what he called an "absolutely unacceptable plan". 2635/
24 24/5/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR recorded 13 shell impacts on the city. 2636/ In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported the beginning of the week as fairly quiet. The situation turned worse later in the week, but the cease-fire agreement generally continued to be respected. A total of 73 cease-fire violations were observed from the Serb side and 26 from the BiH side. Some of the cease-fire violations were directed against the Ukrainian Battalion, where seven mortar rounds were impacted on 19 May. The number of impacts peaked on 22 May with 128. Attempts to cross the airfield continued; one civilian was killed and eight were wounded. There were three incidents of restriction of movement of UNPROFOR during the week and strong controls over humanitarian convoys were observed at Butmir and Kasindolska. There were indications of possible movements of Bosnian Serb artillery and the reinforcement of troops around Sarajevo. Three new check points had been established between Vogošća and Rajlovac. 2637/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported seven killed and 17 wounded on this day. 2638/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2016. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2017. Military representatives of Bosnian Muslim, Serb and Croat forces failed to agree on the size of Sarajevo's future safe zone in talks at the airport. A military official with UNPROFOR which organized the talks said that the BiH army wanted the limit of the zone extended 20 kilometres (12.5 miles) beyond the present front lines, while the Serbs, who were supposed to withdraw their heavy artillery, wanted to maintain the status quo. The meeting was planned to organize a "summit" meeting between the military chiefs of the warring sides, to be held at Sarajevo airport Tuesday. Sarajevo was one of six safe zones declared by the UN Security Council at the beginning of May. 2639/

(c) International reported events

2018. French Foreign Minister Juppé said that peacekeepers must be endowed with the power to retaliate against attacks on safe havens. He added that UN forces must be prepared to undertake air-strikes to protect the Bosnian Muslims. They are not to be "mere spectators", he said, but "protagonists" who are authorized by a UN draft resolution to "deter attacks, to monitor the cease-fire, to secure the withdrawal of forces, to occupy some key points on the ground", and "to participate in delivering humanitarian relief to the population". 2640/
25. 25/5/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Mortar and tank fire were reported in Grbavica and around the Presidency, but the situation was otherwise reported as "very quiet". UNPROFOR recorded 19 shell impacts on the city. 2641/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Grbavica; the area near the Presidency. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported two killed and 18 wounded on this day. 2642/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2019. UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer reported mortar and tank fire in the Serb-held neighbourhood of Grbavica in Sarajevo and around the President's office, but said that the situation had been otherwise "very quiet". 2643/

(b) Local reported events

2020. Serbian President Milošević told Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin that there was "no need" for international monitors on the border between BiH and Serbia. 2644/

2021. Bosnian Serb soldiers retrieved the bodies of a slain couple from a "no man's land" early in the day. The couple, a Serb man and a Muslim woman (both age 25) were shot and killed last Wednesday trying to escape Sarajevo for Serbia. In the interim, their bodies lay rotting in the street while the two sides argued over who had the rights to recover them. A six-man Serb "commando team" reportedly resolved the dispute by braving Muslim sniper fire from three directions. The corpses were taken to Serb-held Lukavica where preparations were made for their burial. 2645/

(c) International reported events

2022. United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 was passed, establishing a war crimes tribunal. 2646/

2023. NATO defence ministers convened in Brussels to discuss the possible deployment of NATO troops to protect the Muslim "safe havens". In what was described as a "free-swinging" session, German and Turkish representatives openly criticized the plan. German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe, declared, "The expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims must not be allowed to last and must not be sanctioned by drawing new borders". One senior US official remarked, "I'm not even sure 'safe haven' is the right phrase. Safe havens conjure something we may not be providing here". 2647/
26. 26/5/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported 174 shell impacts on the city. 2648/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping was reported in the city (see casualty report below).

Casualties: BiH radio said that one person was killed and one wounded by sniper fire and shelling of the city. 2649/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 11 wounded. It reported no deaths on this day. 2650/

Narrative of Events:

2024. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2025. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg visited the city to push the draft plan providing for deployment of international military forces to guard Muslims in six "safe havens" in BiH. President Alija Izetbegović told him that the BiH Government would not accept the proposal under current conditions unless the UN set a deadline for Serbian forces to return BiH territory they had captured. President Izetbegović also told the negotiator that the Government would reject the plan unless the UN clearly indicated that it would intervene militarily if the Serbs continued to attack and would guarantee that aid reached the besieged enclaves. 2651/

(c) International reported events

2026. After a two-day session, NATO defence ministers were unable to issue a joint communique in support of the Washington Accord. Although Secretary of Defense Aspin described "a general receptivity to the joint action plan as a first step to stopping the killing", NATO appeared to be divided. 2652/

27. 27/5/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Intermittent shell fire was reported during the day, mainly on the Old Town. Several shells landed in New Sarajevo during the night after heavy artillery duels on the outskirts Wednesday subsided in the evening. Serb anti-aircraft gunfire was reported throughout the night around Vogošća and BiH mortar attacks were reported in Hadžići and Ilidža. UNPROFOR recorded eight shell impacts on the city. 2653/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Old Town area; the New Sarajevo district; Vogošća; Hadžići; Ilidža. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: One woman was killed and seven children were reportedly injured in BiH shelling on Hadžići. Source(s): Reuters.
Sniping Activity: Sniping was reported on this day. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: One woman was killed and seven children were reportedly injured in BiH shelling on Hadžići. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and eight wounded on this day. Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2027. One person was killed as shells fell intermittently during the day, mainly on the Old Town in the east. There was also sniping reported. Several shells landed in the New Sarajevo district during the night after heavy artillery duels on the city's outskirts Wednesday subsided in the evening. Radio Sarajevo said that Serbs fired anti-aircraft guns around Vogošća throughout the night. Tanjug reported that Bosnian Serbs said that a woman was killed and seven children were wounded in Muslim mortar attacks in Serb-held Hadžići, south-west of Sarajevo, and that they launched assaults on the Ilidža suburb.

(b) Local reported events

2028. Three hundred forty-nine Macedonian citizens were evacuated from Sarajevo in one of the rare opportunities for the population to leave the city. Slovenians were evacuated last November, and other groups, including Jews, had been allowed to leave. Four people were taken off buses, however, before they left when BiH police said their papers were not in order.

(c) International reported events

2029. The plan for creating guarded Muslim safe havens in BiH approved by the United States, Russia, Britain, France and Spain last weekend was skeptically received by other Security Council members and appeared to lack the nine votes needed for adoption by its 15 members. As a result, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali proposed reconvening the London peace conference on Yugoslavia.

28. 28/5/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An UNPROFOR spokesman said that from 9:00 p.m. Thursday until 1:00 a.m. Friday, local Serb commanders reported 60 mortar shells falling on their positions. UN military observers then reported that from 4:40 to 7:20 a.m., 67 mortar rounds and 26 artillery shells fell in central Sarajevo, near the Presidency building. There was also anti-aircraft machine-gun fire reported. Fierce fighting reportedly continued around the clock between Serbian and BiH forces after an overnight attack by the BiH army on the Serb-held road between the airport and Pale. Fighting reportedly flared up all day along the front line on Mount Trebević. Sarajevo radio reported that Serb forces attacked BiH positions along the Trebević front and that a BiH army counter-attack routed the Serb forces from several gun positions but touched off Serb shelling of the downtown area. UNPROFOR reported 190 shell impacts on the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near the Holiday Inn (including a nearby apartment building); the area near the Presidency building (26 shells); the downtown
area; unidentified Serbian positions; Mount Trebević. Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Two Serbian tank shells struck the Holiday Inn and started small fires on two floors. Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported six killed and 14 wounded on this day. 2662/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2030. Several shells fell within minutes of each other at midday around the Holiday Inn in central Sarajevo. The increased shelling in Sarajevo followed several days of relative calm. An UNPROFOR spokesman said that from 9:00 p.m. Thursday until 1:00 a.m. Friday, local Serb commanders reported 60 mortar shells falling on their positions. UN military observers then reported that from 4:40 to 7:20 a.m., 67 mortar rounds and 26 artillery shells fell in central Sarajevo, near the Presidency building. There was also anti-aircraft machine-gun fire reported. 2663/

2031. Fierce fighting continued around the city between Serbian militiamen and BiH Army forces after an overnight attack by the BiH Army on the Serb-held road between the airport and the Serbian mountain stronghold at Pale. Fighting flared up all day along the front line on Mount Trebević, just above the city's old quarter, where brush fires burned into the evening and artillery and small-arms fire erupted around the city. Two Serbian tank shells struck the Holiday Inn, starting small fires on two floors, and another shell exploded into a nearby apartment building. Sarajevo radio reported that Serbian militiamen attacked BiH positions along the Trebević front and that a BiH Army counter-attack routed the Serbs from several gun positions but touched off Serbian shelling of Sarajevo's downtown area. 2664/

(b) Local Reported Events

2032. The commanders of the BiH Army and the main Croatian militia met and agreed in principle to transform Sarajevo into a safe area whose outer edge would be defined by the then present war front. The commander of the Serbian forces attacking the BiH capital, General Ratko Mladić, did not attend, telling UN officials at the last minute that he had "more pressing matters to attend to". But General Phillipe Morillon indicated that Serbian militia negotiators had agreed to the demilitarization agreement. Under the agreement, Serbian forces would be required to place their medium and heavy artillery under UN supervision or withdraw it out of range of the city. Sarajevo's BiH forces would be required to place their artillery in the city under UN supervision. The BiH commander, Sefer Halilović, and the Croatian militia leader, Milivoj Petković, said that they would sign the agreement in principle in the town of Konjic in an effort to ease tensions between the BiH Army and Croatian forces. 2665/

(c) International reported events

2033. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali submitted a report to the Security Council criticizing the new Washington Accord. Without the assent of the warring parties, he said, implementation would be impossible. He also faulted the plan for "legitimizing ethnic cleansing" and complained that it lacked any
"connection to an overall political solution". 2666/

29. 29/5/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was shelled overnight and sporadic gun and sniper fire continued. Shelling early in the morning was concentrated on Stup and Dobrinja in the west and the Old Town in the east. Tank and machine-gun fire reportedly erupted near the Vrbana bridge late in the day and two fires burned in the district. Sarajevo Radio said that both sides continued firing at each other late in the evening. UNPROFOR reported 210 shell impacts on the city. 2667/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Stup; Dobrinja; the Old Town; the Vrbana bridge. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire continued in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported three killed and 15 wounded on this day. 2668/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2034. Sarajevo was shelled overnight and sporadic gun and sniper fire continued Saturday. Radio Sarajevo reported that fires were burning on Trebević hill just south of Sarajevo overnight after a day of fighting, which the BiH army said involved a BiH counter-attack which set houses ablaze. The shelling early in the morning in Sarajevo was concentrated on the suburbs of Stup and Dobrinja in the west and the Old Town in the east. 2669/ 2669/

2035. Tank and machine-gun fire erupted near Sarajevo's Vrbana bridge late in the day and two fires burned in the district. Sarajevo Radio said that both sides continued firing at each other late into the evening, and that at least seven people in the Government areas were wounded. 2670/

(b) Local reported events

2036. A Bosnian Serb army commander, General Stanislav Galić, issued a protest to UNPROFOR, accusing the Muslims and Croats of provoking the Serbs into responding and then blaming them for shelling Sarajevo. "Due to a total media blockade of Serb positions around Sarajevo by major foreign television and radio companies, the two other sides can impose any scenario they like and show the Serbs in a bad light", he said. 2671/

30. 30/5/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After a night of shelling, machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire erupted at 4:30 a.m. along the front-line running south from the Parliament building to the Jewish cemetery and east along Mount Trebević. Each side accused the other of initiating the morning's attack. Although UN officials refused to speculate about who started the fighting,
their monitors registered 300 Serbian shells exploding on BiH-controlled central Sarajevo and only three BiH shells striking Serbian-held neighbourhoods in a 17 hour period, from 4:00 p.m. Saturday through 9:00 a.m. on Sunday. 2672/ The New York Times reported that the sound of artillery fire demonstrated that Government troops had fired more shells than indicated. 2673/ Reports the next day by UNPROFOR described the barrage as one of the worst since the outbreak of the war and said that 1,467 howitzer, cannon and mortar shells were fired by Bosnian Serbs in the 24 hour period that ended Monday morning. 2674/ Another report stated that UNPROFOR recorded 997 mortar or artillery rounds on Government-held positions in Sarajevo between dawn and mid-afternoon Sunday. 2675/ UNPROFOR recorded 1,467 shell impacts on the city. 2676/ Source(s): New York Times; United Press International; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The area near the Holiday Inn; the main hospital; the Presidency. Source(s): New York Times.

Description of Damage: At least two dozen howitzer and tank shells struck the grounds near the Holiday Inn and sent shrapnel through several windows. Mortar and howitzer shells and rocket-propelled grenades also struck the area of the main hospital and the Presidency, littering the streets with rubble and glass. Source(s): New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: It was initially reported that at least 20 people were killed and more than 150 were wounded during this fighting. 2677/ A doctor from the state hospital, who asked to be identified only as Goran, said that unlike on ordinary days, his hospital was getting patients from all over Sarajevo instead of just the west-to-central part. 2678/ Later reports from the two main hospitals reported a total of 25 dead and 164 wounded. Officials at Koševko Hospital said that dead and wounded were brought in up to 11:00 p.m.. Only three of the 25 dead were reported to be soldiers. 2679/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 22 killed and 138 wounded on this day. It also reported to date 8,789 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,374 were children), 51,471 wounded (of which 13,410 were children), and 16,466 heavily wounded (of which 2,871 were children). 2680/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2037. After a night of shelling, machine-gun and anti-aircraft fire erupted in Sarajevo at 4:30 a.m. along the front line running south from the gutted Parliament building to the Jewish cemetery and east along Mount Trebević. It was reported that the well-entrenched forces did not appear to have yielded ground except in the Zlatište neighbourhood on Mount Trebević. There, BiH Government forces said, they overran a Serbian gun emplacement, destroyed two tanks and cut a road from the Serbs' stronghold at Pale to Lukavica, their main military base near Sarajevo, and Ilidža, the Serb-held suburb. 2681/

2038. Brush fires burned throughout the day on Mount Trebević. There, Serbian forces held the high ground and the BiH forces held the low ground. BiH forces had severed the lower Pale-Lukavica road several times since the siege of Sarajevo began in April 1992, but had never been able to maintain their grip. 2682/

2039. During the artillery barrage, at least two dozen howitzer and tank shells struck the grounds near the Holiday Inn and sent shrapnel through several windows. Mortar and howitzer shells and rocket-propelled grenades also struck the area of the main hospital and the Presidency, littering the
streets with rubble and glass. 2683/

(b) Local Reported Events

2040. UN officials became increasingly frustrated by their inability to enter "safe areas". UNPROFOR Spokesman Frewer said, "this has been a pattern from the beginning . . . they have been turned back, and each time we have given the very strongest protests. We must be witness to what is going on". 2684/ 31. 31/5/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo radio reported the city as relatively calm overnight and into the morning. It reported mortar fire until 3:00 a.m. in Vogošća, north of the city and sporadic small-arms fire around Dobrinja. The Old Town area was reported shelled in the evening and anti-aircraft fire hit the city all night long. UNPROFOR recorded 170 shell impacts on the city. 2685/ In its weekly summary ending 29 May UNPROFOR reported that the beginning of the week was fairly quiet. The situation increased in tension on 26 May with 174 impacts 28 May with 190 impacts, and 29 May with 210 impacts. A total of 40 cease-fire violations were observed from the BiH side and 53 cease-fire violations from the Serbian side. 2686/ In its monthly operational report, UNPROFOR noted increased tension towards the end of the month with increased fire coming from BiH forces and some operational movements from Serbs. 30 May was seen as especially tense when an attack from BiH forces was strongly retaliated against by Bosnian Serb forces. UNPROFOR reported that it had counted 3,030 artillery and mortar rounds for the month. It had also counted 530 cease-fire violations (339 from the Serbian side and 200 from the BiH side). With regard to airport crossings, UNPROFOR reported a decrease to 5,773 (the decrease was attributed to the efforts of the French Battalion). 2687/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Vogošća; the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Description of Damage: A report from the Government of BiH stated that from 21 May 1992, when the Olympic Complex "Zetra" was first shelled, 350 projectiles of various calibres were launched against it, with 140 direct hits inflicting serious damage. During this period three individuals were killed: Goran Jakić, Mirsad Šehović, and an unknown citizen. Lightly injured were: Andrej Mezei, Hilno Dobrašina, Djuro Matic, and an unknown citizen. The building was being used by humanitarian organizations (including Doctors Without Borders, UNHCR and Caritas), and as a shelter for refugees. 2688/ A report from the Institute for Academic Construction Bosnia-Hercegovina described the damage inflicted to academic institutions in the city of Sarajevo (including, primary, secondary, and higher education, student buildings, special education, religious schools, and institutes) from September 1992 to March 1993. Of the buildings which were accessible to inspection, 14 suffered 27 per cent to 50 per cent damage, 11 were damaged from 51 per cent to 75 per cent, and three from 76 per cent to 100 per cent. For the most part, there were no individuals in the buildings during shelling, although some were sheltering refugees. 2689/ Source(s): Reuters; Government of BiH.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Radio Sarajevo reported that three children were killed and seven people were injured in shelling of the Old Town district in the evening. The
BiH Public Health Ministry reported 24 killed and 153 wounded on this day. Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2041. According to Radio Sarajevo, the city was reported relatively calm overnight and Monday morning. It reported mortar fire until 3:00 a.m. in Vogošća, north of the city, and sporadic small-arms fire around the western suburb of Dobrinja.

2042. The Old Town area was reported shelled in the evening and anti-aircraft fire hit the city all night long.

(b) **Local reported events**

2043. The SRNA news agency reported that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić threatened that his troops would enter Sarajevo by force if Muslims continued their offensive against Serb positions. Karadžić made his threat during a televised interview on Sunday evening following the fighting, in which at least 25 people were killed. He said that if the Muslims did not stop their attacks, Serb soldiers would enter Sarajevo by force to protect the city's 50,000 ethnic Serbs.

2044. Meanwhile, Bosnian Croat military leaders warned that Muslim-Croat fighting in central BiH might spread to Sarajevo. "Despite the utmost efforts on the part of the HVO in Sarajevo, the chances of staying on good terms with leaders of the Bosnian army in Sarajevo and averting armed clashes are increasingly slim", said an HVO communique, quoted by the Croatian news agency HINA in Zagreb. Croatian radio said the southern city of Mostar and the towns of Jablanica and Konjic, between Mostar and Sarajevo, were the scene of Muslim artillery and infantry attacks and sniper fire on Sunday.

2045. Yugoslav President Kosić was removed from office for constitutional breaches. There was speculation that the hard-line Serbian Radical Party orchestrated the move because it deemed Kosić too moderate. Montenegrin President Bulatović said that the overthrow illustrated the growing strength of Šešelj's Radical Party: "This is the greatest danger for Yugoslavia and all of the Balkans, fascism brought about as a result of the sanctions".

2046. Demonstrators gathered to protest Kosić's ouster and clashed with riot police in Belgrade.

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O. June 1993

1. 1/6/93 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** An informal soccer game in a parking lot in Dobrinja (10:30 a.m.). Source(s): New York Times.

**Description of Damage:** At approximately 10:30 a.m., mortar shells exploded on a make-shift soccer field in a parking lot in Dobrinja, killing at least 12 people and wounding 80. Source(s): New York Times.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified
Casualties: At least 12 people were killed and 80 others wounded when mortar shells exploded on a make-shift soccer field in a parking lot in Dobrinja. The BiH reported eight killed and 92 wounded on this day. 2697/ Source(s): New York Times; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2047. At approximately 10:30 a.m., about 200 Sarajevans gathered for an informal soccer game in suburban Dobrinja. Moments later, mortar shells exploded on the make-shift soccer field, which had been set up in a parking lot, killing at least 12 people and wounding 80. The attack was called one of the worst on civilians since the "bread-line massacre" a year ago when at least 16 people were killed while waiting in line for bread. A witness, Ahmet Fazli, a 51 year-old factory worker, said the artillery rounds appeared to have been fired from one of two nearby Serbian-controlled areas. "The shots either came from Trapare or Lukavac. If they were 60 millimetre shells, it was Trapare. Anything larger and it was Lukavica", he said. Another witness, 43 year-old Zlatan Šteković, stated that everyone in Dobrinja had been talking about the tournament for the last two days and that he thought the Serbs knew in advance. According to Šteković, the battle front was only about 100 metres from the soccer field, "just on the other side of the apartment building". 2698/

(b) Local reported events

2048. President Dobrica Ćosić of Yugoslavia was ousted by a parliamentary no-confidence vote on Tuesday. The federal parliament voted Ćosić out of office in the early morning after a bitter attack against him by radical Serb nationalist deputies and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's Socialist Party. With Ćosić relieved of his post, the speaker of the upper house, Miloš Radulović, became the acting President until parliament chose a replacement. 2699/

2. 2/6/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Two French legionnaires were seriously wounded by sniper fire at Sarajevo airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 17 killed and 127 wounded on this day. 2700/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2049. Humanitarian flights into Sarajevo were suspended for 24 hours after two French legionnaires were seriously wounded by sniper fire at Sarajevo airport. The move came amid escalating fighting throughout BiH and a rash of attacks on Western aid workers and UN soldiers fulfilling humanitarian missions. 2701/
(b) **Local reported events**

2050. The peace conference co-chairmen traveled to Zagreb for talks with President Tudjman and UNPROFOR. 2702/

2051. Dobrica Ćosić, Yugoslavia's ousted President likened Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević to Adolf Hitler. Ćosić termed Milošević "Fuehrer of the Serbian Radical Party", and went on to say that "conservative and extreme forces . . . are drawing the state into catastrophe". 2703/

2052. Christiane Berthiaume, a UNHCR spokeswoman, said that UN aid workers would continue to supply humanitarian aid to refugees in BiH, recognizing that "the fate of 2.3 million people is at stake". 2704/

3. 3/6/93 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 15 wounded on this day. 2705/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2053. No reported incidents.

(b) **Local reported events**

2054. The peace conference co-chairmen met with Radovan Karadžić in Pale. 2706/

2055. A Reuters report gave a detailed account of a rogue commander named "Čaćo" who had been capturing civilians in the street in Sarajevo, and taking them to the front line to dig trenches. Reuter's noted that Čaćo's theory was that it was unfair to make soldiers fight the war and dig the trenches. Čaćo, whose real name is Musan Topalović, was working in Germany as a musician at the beginning of the war. He returned to Sarajevo to lead the BiH army's 10th Mountain Brigade, which defended the city from rebel Serbs on the slopes of Mount Trebević, towering above Sarajevo to the south. Čaćo and his 2,800 men had seen some of the war's toughest fighting. Wounded several times, and having lost most of the fingers on his left hand, Čaćo's career as a musician was finished. He launched a disastrous attack on Serb supply routes along the top of Trebević mountain the previous week without orders from the BiH army high command. His men managed to cut the road briefly, provoking a savage Serb artillery barrage on the city. More than 1,300 shells rained down on Sarajevo in a single day, killing 20 and wounding more than 150 people, many of them civilians. Caught without an army when the war broke out, the BiH government had been forced to rely on an array of commanders such as Čaćo. 2707/
4. 4/6/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported five wounded. No deaths were reported on this day. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2056. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2057. The peace conference co-chairmen met with BiH President Izetbegović in Sarajevo and Boban in Split.

(c) International reported events

2058. The UN Security Council in Resolution 836, voted to approve large scale troop deployments and the use of air power to defend six Muslim-held towns in BiH that had been designated by the United Nations as "safe areas". The towns were designated as "safe areas" by the Council to prevent them from being captured by Bosnian Serb forces and to protect civilians from continued artillery bombardments. The safe areas included Sarajevo, as well as the eastern towns of Tuzla, Žepa, Srebrenica and Goražde and the western town of Bihac. Some of the towns had been hit hard by Serb artillery while UN peacekeeping troops remained incapable of intervening. The resolution adopted by the Security Council said "safe areas" were a temporary measure only. The language was a concession by Western nations to the five non-aligned countries of the Council, which were reluctant to accept the idea. The resolution said the "primary objective" would remain the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. The resolution said UN forces would be allowed to use force "in reply to bombardments against safe areas by any of the parties or armed incursion into them, or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement" of UN troops and humanitarian convoys. The resolution authorized countries participating in the enforcement of the "safe areas" to take "all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of BiH". The Council asked Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to submit immediately plans to deploy thousands of troops to defend the "safe areas" and to assist the current UN Protection Force in the Republic.

5. 5/6/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Heavy machine-gun fire was reported on the front lines in the evening and sporadic shells crashed into the centre of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.
**Targets Hit:** The city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 16 wounded. It reported no deaths on this day. One death was reported by another source in the Old Town. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health; Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2059. Heavy machine-gun fire could be heard on the front lines in the evening and sporadic shells crashed into the centre of the city. Sarajevo radio reported one death in the Old Town.

6. **6/6/93 (Sunday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Small-arms fire and mortar explosions reportedly shook the downtown areas of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** The downtown areas of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and 13 wounded on this day. It also reported to date 8,840 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,395 were children), 51,892 wounded (of which 13,550 were children), and 16,608 heavily wounded (of which 2,941 were children). It said that food delivered to Sarajevo covered only 35 per cent of daily needs. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2060. Small-arms fire and mortar explosions shook the downtown areas of the city.

(b) **Local reported events**

2061. UN commander Phillipe Morillon blamed the BiH government for preventing UN military observers from reaching the Serb-besieged Muslim enclave of Goražde. General Morillon told Agence France Presse that Alija Izetbegović's 23 May rejection of the so-called "Washington Agreement", on protecting UN mandated safe havens and a general call to arms by Izetbegović had stopped the negotiating process over the areas.

2062. The UN humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo resumed.

7. **7/6/93 (Monday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sniper fire continued after a quiet night.
Shelling was reported in Dobrinja and small arms fire was reported in the Old Town. Fires were reportedly burning on Trebević hill to the south in the evening after a day of machine-gun fire along the front-lines cutting through the city. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that "although the number of impacts diminished as the week progressed, the city remained tense". 2718/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Dobrinja; the area near the city's bread factory. Source(s) Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** A shell wounded five people when it landed near the city's bread factory in the morning. Source(s) Agence France Presse.

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire that was intense Sunday afternoon, continued Monday after a quiet night. Radio Sarajevo said that Serb gunners were using the M-84 machine-gun for sniping, a weapon known in Sarajevo as the "death seeder" for its effectiveness. The machine-gun had optics that made it as precise as a rifle. 2719/ In the suburb of Dobrinja two people were wounded and one was killed by sniper fire. 2720/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** A shell wounded five people when it landed near the city's bread factory in the morning. In the suburb of Dobrinja two people were wounded and one was killed by sniper fire. 2721/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2063. Radio Sarajevo reported shelling in the western suburb of Dobrinja and small arms fire in the Old Town in the east. 2722/

2064. Fires were reportedly burning on Trebević hill over Sarajevo to the south in the evening after a day of machine-gun fire along the front-lines cutting through the city. It was not immediately clear if the fighting today was merely an exchange of machine-gun fire and mortars or an attempted offensive. 2723/

2065. A shell wounded five people when it landed near the city's bread factory in the morning. 2724/

(b) **Local reported events**

2066. Peace talks between the warring factions failed to make progress. At Sarajevo airport, a mixed military group of representatives of the armies of the BiH Government, the Bosnian Croat HVO and the Bosnian Serbs met at the subcommittee level. Meeting under UNPROFOR supervision, the three parties discussed establishing Sarajevo as a safe-zone, but Bosnian Serb General Milan Gvero said he refused to talk about Sarajevo as a safe zone as long as the future of BiH was not politically determined. 2725/

(c) **International reported events**

2067. The BiH Government reluctantly accepted the UN plan to create "safe havens" to protect Muslim enclaves besieged by Serb forces. In a statement, the BiH Presidency said it accepted UN Security Council resolution 836. Earlier, on 23 May BiH President Alija Izetbegović rejected the idea of "safe havens". But today's statement said that confronted with deteriorating conditions in the eastern regions of Goražde, Srebrenica and Žepa, "the Presidency and the Government have decided to cooperate with the UNPROFOR in carrying out its mission as defined in Resolution 836". BiH conditions for
agreeing to the safe haven plan included the creation of UN-protected routes linking the zones with other BiH-held territory and guarantees that Serb heavy weaponry "be effectively put out of use". 2726/

8. 8/6/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as relatively calm. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2068. Sarajevo was reported as relatively calm after machine-gun fire was exchanged throughout Monday along the front lines in the city. 2727/

(b) International reported events

2069. Lord Owen met with the EC Foreign Affairs Council, which focused on European support for the Vance-Owen Plan and considered the Washington proposal on safe areas. 2728/

9. 9/6/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Strong sniper fire and intermittent shelling was reported. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Strong sniper fire was reported in Sarajevo. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2070. Strong sniper fire was reported in Sarajevo as shells fell intermittently. 2729/

(b) Local reported events

2071. Colonel Rasim Delić, who on Tuesday took over from General Sefer Halilović as the commander of the BiH army, announced in Sarajevo that his forces would halt an offensive around Travnik. 2730/
2072. The co-chairmen visited Belgrade for talks with President Milošević. They also received a delegation from the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement, which protested the arrest and ill-treatment of its leader, Drašković. 2731/

10. 10/6/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was hit by mortar and artillery shells after dark. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area outside the entrance to the 10th Mountain Brigade; the Boljakov Potok hill (to the north of the city). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A shell killed three people and wounded 19 others when it fell in the early evening outside the entrance of the 10th Mountain Brigade; 10 children were wounded in shelling on Boljakov Potok, a hill in the north of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A shell killed three people and wounded 19 others when it fell in the early evening outside the entrance of the 10th Mountain Brigade; 10 children were wounded in shelling on Boljakov Potok, a hill in the north of the city. Hospital and morgue officials reported that at least six people had been killed and 37 wounded in the latest upsurge. 2732/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2073. Sarajevo was hit by mortar and artillery shells after dark. Hospital and morgue officials reported that at least six people had been killed and 37 wounded in the latest upsurge. 2733/ Radio Sarajevo said that in one incident, a shell killed three people and wounded 19 when it fell in the early evening outside a military headquarters in the Old Town in the eastern part of the city. It fell at the entrance to the 10th Mountain Brigade as UN troops were in the square in front of the building giving sweets to children. 2734/

2074. In other shelling in Sarajevo, 10 children were wounded on Boljakov Potok, a hill in the north of the city. 2735/

(b) Local reported events

2075. Agence France Presse reported that Serb forces besieging Sarajevo knew the city well, having spotters on the hills they occupied over the valley city and were believed to have many informants in the city itself. 2736/

2076. At the same time that Muslims and Croats were nominal allies against Serbs and had joint forces defending Sarajevo, it was reported that Croats attacked a huge Muslim relief convoy and shot and killed at least seven people. The convoy, attempting to travel through Croat territory to deliver aid to Tuzla, was attacked in Novi Travnik. 2737/

(c) International reported events

2077. The UN Security Council took a step towards monitoring the Yugoslav-BiH
border, including air surveillance to check on weapons and other supplies to Bosnian Serbs. Security Council Resolution 838, which was adopted by a 15 to zero vote, asked the Secretary-General to study the deployment of monitors. 2738/

2078. NATO offered combat aircraft to protect UN personnel deployed in BiH but the Europeans and the Americans disagreed on whether air protection should cover all UN troops in BiH or only those deployed in the "safe havens". 2739/

11. 11/6/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There were reports of sniper fire and sporadic shelling south of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The south area of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: There was sniper fire reported in the city. An Iranian diplomat was killed by sniper fire outside the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo hospitals reported 11 people wounded by late afternoon. 2740/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2079. An Iranian diplomat was killed by sniper fire while travelling outside of Sarajevo. BiH press reports said that Bosnian Croat forces killed the diplomat and a companion, who the reports identified as Mejid Mountazeri and Muhamed Avdić, while they were travelling from Sarajevo to Zenica. Mountazeri was the head of an Iranian humanitarian organization working in BiH and Avdić worked for the group as well. The UNHCR office in Zenica stated that the diplomat was killed by sniper fire near Kakanj, 50 kilometres northwest of Sarajevo. 2741/

2080. There was sniper fire reported in Sarajevo with sporadic shells falling. Sarajevo hospitals reported 11 people wounded by late afternoon. 2742/ Sniping and explosions were reported in the south of the city. 2743/

12. 12/6/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city came under its heaviest bombardment in weeks, which included the shelling of a funeral at the city's eastern Budakovii cemetery. These events occurred after UN commander General Phillipe Morillon warned that the Republic risked descending into a "state of total anarchy". Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Defence lines of the BiH army; unidentified Serb positions; a group of mourners attending a funeral at the city's eastern Budakovii cemetery. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Three civilians were killed and five were wounded in a
bombardment of Serbian positions; eight people were killed and five others wounded when a mortar round hit a funeral service in the city's eastern Budakovici cemetery. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Shelling intensified in the afternoon in almost all parts of the city. Sarajevo hospitals and the morgue reported 12 killed and 30 wounded by the evening. 2744/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2081. Heavy shelling hit Sarajevo with continuous firing from artillery, mortars, machine-guns and small arms. "Right now, all defence lines of the BiH army around Sarajevo are being shelled" the commander of the BiH 1st Army Corps, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, told Reuters. 2745/

2082. Bosnian Serbs, quoted by the Belgrade-based news agency Tanjug, said that Muslim forces had launched an all-out attack on Serb positions, hitting them with hundreds of shells. Tanjug said that three civilians were killed and five wounded in the bombardment, which ended a relative lull in fighting around Sarajevo that had lasted several weeks. 2746/

2083. A mortar shell exploded among mourners at a funeral, killing eight people and wounding five others. Sarajevo morgue officials said the mortar round, presumed to have been fired by Serb forces, hit a funeral service in the city's eastern Budakovici cemetery. The person being buried had been killed in a bombardment on Thursday. 2747/ The funeral shelling was the most deadly single incident in Sarajevo since two mortar shells killed players and spectators during a soccer game two days ago. 2748/

(b) Local reported events

2084. The city came under its heaviest bombardment in weeks after UN commander General Phillipe Morillon warned that the Republic risked descending into a "state of total anarchy". Morillon said that his peace-keeping forces might be forced to leave the Republic. 2749/

2085. The shelling cast doubts on efforts made by General Lars-Eric Wahlgren (UNPROFOR's overall commander in the former Yugoslavia), to organize a meeting at Sarajevo's airport on Tuesday between the commanders of the Bosnian Serb, BiH and Croat armies to discuss a lasting cease-fire.

13. 13/6/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported heavy in the city overnight and during the day, particularly in the Dobrinja and Stup suburbs to the west. Sniper fire was also very heavy. Bosnian Serb forces made a concerted effort to enter the city. According to a BiH army commander, the Serb forces made "infantry breach attempts" around the western areas of Azici and Stup. BiH forces responded with artillery fire. Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Targets Hit: The main runway at Sarajevo airport; Dobrinja; Stup; unidentified buildings in central Sarajevo; UNPROFOR headquarters. Source(s): United Press
International; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** The city's airport was closed for 75 minutes after shells hit the main runway. UN workers patched the holes, which were caused by shells reportedly fired by Serbian forces; artillery shells struck UNPROFOR headquarters, causing minor damage to the building. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire hit the residence in downtown Sarajevo of French General Phillipe Morillon, causing no reported injuries and little damage. 2750/ UNPROFOR spokesman, Barry Frewer characterized Sarajevo as "mad with sniper activity". 2751/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** Sarajevo radio said that nine people were killed and 16 wounded in the Government areas of the capital. Tanjug said that three were killed and 15 were wounded in Serb suburbs as the BiH offensive took place. 2752/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

2086. The city's airport was closed for 75 minutes after shells hit the main runway, suspending humanitarian relief flights. UN workers immediately patched the holes caused by shells fired by Serbian forces stationed in the hills. 2753/

2087. Bosnian Serb infantrymen made a concerted effort to enter Sarajevo, according to Colonel Jovan Divjak, the deputy commander of the BiH army. Divjak said the Serbs made "infantry breach attempts" around the western neighbourhoods of Azići and Stup, where civilians no longer lived. "We responded by artillery as much as we could but the aggressor is superior in weapons, he can continue to fire at civilian targets in the town", Divjak said. 2754/

2088. Shelling was reported heavy in Sarajevo overnight and on Sunday, particularly in the Dobrinja and Stup suburbs to the west of the city, not far from the airport. Heavy-calibre artillery rounds also hit buildings in central Sarajevo. 2755/

2089. Sarajevo radio said that artillery shells also struck the UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, causing minor damage to the former telephone company building but no reported casualties. 2756/

(b) Local reported events

2090. Agence France Presse reported that Western military officers in Sarajevo believed that a stalemate existed between Bosnian Serb forces besieging Sarajevo and the BiH forces defending it. It was thought that the Serbs did not have enough infantry to take the capital while the BiH army did not have the heavy weapons, especially artillery, they would need to break the 14 month siege. 2757/

2091. Sarajevo was without electricity and water as electricity plants in central BiH were out of operation. Muslim-Croat fighting sparked Croats to withhold coal stocks at one power plant, Kakanj, said UN engineer Michel Maufre. 2758/
(c) **International reported events**

2092. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, on a visit to Athens, warned Muslim countries and NATO, which had offered air power to back up UN forces in safe areas, not to get involved in the former Yugoslavia. "This will only make things worse", he said. 2759/

2093. Lord Owen said in Geneva that allowing the BiH army to rearm was no longer an option for the West. "When you are seeing the shooting going on, Croatian versus Muslims, Muslims versus Serbs, Serbs versus Muslims, sometimes Serbs versus Croats, I don't think you should add to the arms. The urgent need is for peace", he said. 2760/

14. 14/6/93 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported as calm in the morning. North and northwestern parts of the city were reportedly shelled. The BiH army was reported to have advanced in the northwestern part of the front after taking two points from the Serbian forces on Sunday (in territory between Vogošća and Rajlovac). Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** North and northwestern parts of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 31 killed and 194 wounded in the last week. It also reported to date: 8,871 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,401 were children), 52,086 wounded (of which 13,598 were children), and 16,660 heavily wounded (of which 2,967 were children). 2761/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2094. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that there were "no changes in the general situation. However, events in central and south Bosnia could change this". 2762/

2095. Sarajevo radio reported the city as calm in the morning. 2763/

2096. Serb forces set up what they called a "border post" on Sarajevo's airport road, at one point blocking UN humanitarian aid until UNPROFOR Sarajevo Chief Marcel Valentin intervened. Serbs at the heavily fortified checkpoint told journalists that they had set up an international border crossing on behalf of the self-proclaimed Serb Republic in BiH. The blockade was lifted at 2:00 p.m.. 2764/

2097. Sarajevo radio reported that north and northwestern parts of the city were shelled. The BiH army was reported to have advanced in the northwestern part of the front after taking two points from the Serbs on Sunday, in territory between Vogošća and Rajlovac. 2765/
(c) International reported events

2098. In Vienna, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed support for a new peace conference on the former Yugoslavia to be held in London, with the Vance-Owen plan as the basis for a solution to the BiH crisis. 2766/

15. 15/6/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was reported shelling of BiH army defence lines near Vogošća and the western suburbs of Sokolje and Stup between midnight and Tuesday morning. Mojmilo, to the west, was shelled occasionally throughout the night, as was Dobrinja. Serb forces reportedly blamed the BiH forces for the fighting, saying that it was their two day offensive that prompted the artillery duels. It said that the Serbs succeeded in regaining two positions along the Perivoj-Vis and Mijatovića Kosa-Vis route in the northwest suburbs. There was also reported shelling in the northern part of the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: BiH defence lines near Vogošća, Sokolje and Stup; Mojmilo; Dobrinja; the northern part of the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Three apartment buildings in Dobrinja were set on fire as a result of shelling and two people were wounded. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Heavy sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo hospitals and the morgue reported three civilians killed and 21 wounded by the evening. 2767/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2099. UNHCR flights to Sarajevo were suspended in the afternoon when an aeroplane coming into the airport was locked onto by anti-aircraft radar. 2768/

2100. Sarajevo radio reported that Bosnian Serbs shelled BiH army defence lines near the Serb-held northwestern suburb of Vogošća and western suburbs of Sokolje and Stup between midnight and Tuesday morning. Mojmilo, another western district, was shelled occasionally throughout the night and in Dobrinja, near the airport, three apartment buildings were set on fire and two people were wounded. Tanjug reported that the Serbs blamed the Muslims for the fighting, saying it was their two day offensive that prompted the artillery duels. It said that the Serbs succeeded in regaining two positions along the Perivoj-Vis and Mijatovića Kosa-Vis route in the northwest suburbs. 2769/

2101. There was reported shelling in the northern part of Sarajevo and heavy sniper fire in the city. 2770/
(b) **Local reported events**

2102. Rasim Delić, commander of the BiH Government Army, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladić, Commander of Bosnian Serb forces, and Milivoj Petković, commander of the HVO, entered the Sarajevo airport building shortly after midday to begin talks on a workable cease-fire and protection of "safe havens". The three warring parties agreed to observe a fresh cease-fire and allow UN monitors into the Serb-besieged Muslim enclave of Goražde.

16. 16/6/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Despite a new cease-fire agreed upon Tuesday between the three warring factions, more shelling was reported. Overnight shelling was reported to be less intensive than earlier in the week. The area near the airport was also hit. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The area near the Sarajevo airport. Source(s) Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2103. Relief flights into Sarajevo were suspended as a result of the shelling around Sarajevo airport and a radar sweep by unidentified anti-aircraft weapons.

2104. Despite a new cease-fire agreed upon Tuesday between BiH's three warring factions due to go into force Friday, Sarajevo saw more shelling overnight, although apparently less intensive than earlier in the week.

(b) **Local reported events**

2105. BiH's Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić challenged the credibility of a UN human rights conference in Vienna with his impassioned plea to stop the slaughter of Muslims and especially those now in Goražde.

2106. Eight unarmed UN military observers left Sarajevo for the besieged eastern Muslim enclave of Goražde, after receiving written permission from Lieutenant General Ratko Mladić.

(c) **International reported events**

2107. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, flew to Geneva for peace talks. They were joined by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Mate Boban, chief of the Bosnian Croats. Alija Izetbegović was also due to arrive in Vienna to join the talks. Also attending the table was David Owen, who admitted that his plan to divide BiH into 10 ethnic cantons would have to be altered.
17. 17/6/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo radio reported that the town of Kreševo, on the western outskirts of the city, was attacked for the first time by BiH forces. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: An unidentified section of eastern Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Three people were killed by a shell which hit eastern Sarajevo in the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three people were killed by a shell which hit eastern Sarajevo in the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2108. Sarajevo radio reported that the town of Kreševo, on the western outskirts of Sarajevo, was attacked for the first time by forces loyal to BiH President Alija Izetbegović. 2778/

2109. Three people were killed by a shell which hit eastern Sarajevo on Thursday evening. 2779/

(b) International reported events

2110. BiH President Alija Izetbegović was criticized by EC peace negotiator Lord Owen for rejecting out of hand a new partition plan crafted by Serbia and Croatia. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman had announced the day before that he and his Serbian counterpart Slobodan Milošević had agreed on the idea of a "federal state in BiH made up of three constituent nations". Diplomatic sources said that a rift among the multi-ethnic collegiate BiH Presidency was so deep that it would not be a surprise if Izetbegović were replaced by a more pragmatic leader. It was reported that according to some diplomats, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg would be happy to see Izetbegović replaced by Fikret Abdić, a Muslim member of the presidency from the Muslim dominated Bihać enclave. 2780/

2111. The peace conference co-chairmen met separately with BiH Presidency member Abdić and Serb Krajina leader Hadžić. u/

18. 18/6/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: North Dvor; an UNPROFOR armoured personnel carrier 12 miles north of Sarajevo. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A Canadian UNPROFOR soldier was killed when his armoured personnel carrier was hit by a shell 12 miles north of Sarajevo. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A Canadian UNPROFOR soldier was killed when his armoured personnel carrier was hit by a shell 12 miles north of Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2112. UNPROFOR reported that Serb shelling and an unexpected Bosnian Serbian army attack took place in the area of north Dvor. The aim was to try and prevent BiH control of the Dvor bridge and the road towards the south. 2782/

2113. A Canadian soldier attached to the UNPROFOR was killed 40 minutes after the latest cease-fire went into effect. The soldier, whose name was not immediately available, was riding in an armoured personnel carrier when his vehicle was hit by an anti-tank shell some 12 miles north of Sarajevo. 2783/

(b) Local reported events

2114. It was reported that despite the 14 month siege of the city and daily shelling, people in Sarajevo were strongly against the Geneva peace plan that would divide BiH into three ethnic states. 2784/

(c) International reported events

2115. The following United Nations Security Council Resolutions were passed: UNSCR 842, extending the mandate to allow deployment of US troops in Macedonia; UNSCR 843, referring requests for sanctions assistance to the sanctions committee; UNSCR 844, providing for implementation of the "safe areas" resolution, and for reinforcement of UNPROFOR; UNSCR 845, urging settlement of Greek/Macedonian differences. 2785/

19. 19/6/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as relatively quiet with occasional sniper fire. The Old Town area was hit by five rounds of mortar fire. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Hadžići; the Old Town area of the city. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Eleven people were reported to have been wounded in a Serb attack on Hadžići. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Occasional sniper fire was reported. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Eleven people were reported to have been wounded in a Serb attack on Hadžići. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2116. In Sarajevo, 11 people were reported to have been wounded in a Serb attack near the district of Hadžići. Serbs said the Muslims were fiercely
attacking them in Vogošća and Rajlovac. 2786/

2117. The state-owned news agency Tanjug reported that Sarajevo was relatively quiet, with occasional sniper fire but no artillery duels. 2787/

2118. A report from Agence France Presse said that five rounds of mortar fire struck the Old Town in eastern Sarajevo at 4:15 p.m., violating the nationwide cease-fire. 2788/

(b) Local reported events

2119. Tony Land of UNHCR said that Sarajevo airport remained closed for a fourth day after it had been shut down by the UN when an approaching Canadian aeroplane was locked onto by anti-aircraft radar. 2789/

(c) International reported events

2120. Brazil's deputy ambassador, Luiz August de Araujo Castro, told the Security Council that its many resolutions on the former Yugoslavia "have had scant if any positive bearing on the actual situation on the ground". U.S Ambassador Edward Walker said the safe area deployment did not "foreclose options involving tougher measures" and warned of further unspecified action if the Serbs failed to cooperate. 2790/

20. 20/6/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Two unidentified neighbourhoods were hit by shells, causing civilian injuries. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Two unidentified neighbourhoods. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Five people were reportedly wounded in the shelling of two unidentified neighbourhoods. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2121. Two neighbourhoods were hit by shells, wounding a total of five people. A mortar shell wounded a whole family, with doctors reported as being likely to amputate the arms of a 10 year-old girl. 2791/

(b) Local reported events

2122. The Sarajevo airport was reopened.

21. 21/6/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Isolated gunfire was reported on the fourth day
of a cease-fire. In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that Serb shelling and an unexpected Bosnian Serb army counter-attack took place on 18 June in the area of north Dvor. The aim was to try to prevent BiH control of the Dvor bridge and therefore the road towards the south. The cease-fire was for the most part respected on 19 June. UNPROFOR commented that the BiH army gained some ground towards the Rajlovac-Dvor road and that the BiH army would try to keep the attention of the international community on their plight and would continue trying to regain lost territory. UNPROFOR also commented that Serbs forces would continue trying to keep Sarajevo contained. 2792 Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Seventeen people were wounded by isolated gunfire in Sarajevo. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 42 killed and 221 wounded in the last week. It also reported to date 8,913 killed, missing, or dead (of which 1,412 were children), 52,307 wounded (of which 13,672 were children), and 16,786 heavily wounded (of which 3,006 were children). 2793 Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2123. Seventeen people were wounded by isolated gunfire in Sarajevo, on the fourth day of the cease-fire, as the inhabitants ventured out to greet the first signs of summer. 2794/

(b) Local reported events

2124. UNPROFOR reported that food supplies delivered in the last week covered only 18.8 per cent of the city's needs. 2795/

(c) International reported events

2125. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that he would not attend a fresh round of peace talks in Geneva, but would fly to Sarajevo as signs emerged of a deepening rift in the BiH collective presidency. 2796/

2126. The European Council adopted a declaration on BiH, in which it expressed its full confidence in the co-chairmen, and called both for an immediate cease-fire, and for the speedy implementation of UN-protected areas. 2797/

23. 23/6/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting was reported around the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2127. BiH radio reported fighting around Sarajevo. 2798/

(b) International reported events

2128. The peace conference co-chairmen met with members of the BiH Presidency in Geneva. They then held talks at a Swiss Government villa with Presidents Milošević, Tudjman and Bulatović, Karadžić and Boban. After a separate meeting with the co-chairmen, the BiH Presidency joined the Serb, Croat and Montenegrin Presidents for discussions at the villa. 2799/

24. 24/6/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo's airport suburbs were shelled during the night, but activity died down in the morning. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The suburbs near the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2129. Sarajevo's airport suburbs were shelled during the night but the shooting reportedly died down by the morning. 2800/

(b) International reported events

2130. The peace conference co-chairmen held bilateral talks with Karadžić and Boban. 2801/

2131. It was reported by the French Defence Minister, Francois Leotard, that the two top UNPROFOR commanders were being replaced. According to the report, a French General would replace Sweden's Lars-Eric Wahlgren as overall commander of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, and French General Phillipe Morillon would be replaced as UNPROFOR commander in BiH. 2802/

25. 25/6/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city reportedly experienced a quiet night except for some shelling near the airport and in a south-western suburb. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: The area close to the runway at Sarajevo airport; an unidentified south-western suburb. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2132. Sarajevo radio said that a mortar bomb exploded close to the runway at Sarajevo airport during the night. The rest of the city had a quiet night except for a shell which hit a south-western suburb. 2803/

26. 26/6/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2133. No reported incidents.

27. 27/6/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2134. No reported incidents.
28. 28/6/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: In its weekly summary, UNPROFOR reported that the general situation in Sarajevo was relatively quiet but tense during the week. Some explosions were reported each day but in numbers of 20 or less. There was speculation that this was due to the fact that the factions might be waiting for the results of the Geneva meetings. 2804/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 21 killed and 211 wounded in the last week. It also reported to date 8,934 killed or missing (of which 1,418 were children) and 52,518 wounded (of which 13,738 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2135. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2136. UNPROFOR commented in its weekly summary that the lack of water and the risk of epidemic were the most important problems facing the city. 2805/

2137. The BiH Health Ministry reported that the epidemic situation was worsening due to a lack of essential goods and services. During the last five months, 500 cases of enterocolitis, 80 cases of viral hepatitis A and 60 cases of bacilar dysentery were registered in Sarajevo alone. The Health Ministry also reported that the city received food aid which covered only 36 per cent of daily needs and distribution was hampered due to a shortage of fuel. 2806/

(c) International reported events

2138. The peace conference co-chairmen met with members of the BiH Presidency in Geneva. 2807/

29. 29/6/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

2139. No reported incidents.

30. 30/6/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: In its monthly report UNPROFOR reported that the most important events of the month were the cessation of hostilities in the whole of BiH, which was promulgated on 18 June, so that the number of registered impacts and confirmed cease-fire violations had considerably decreased; and, at the end of the month, the announcement of the arrival of reinforcement coming from France no later than 20 July. According to UNPROFOR, sniper fire, especially at the airport, remained a constant problem. The total number of airport crossings for the month was 5,384. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2140. No reported incidents

(b) Local reported events

2141. Mayor Muhammed Kreševljaković and 11 other members of the city government started a hunger strike. In conjunction with the hunger strike they made the following demands: delivery of 50 per cent of the food that the people would normally eat, 30 per cent of regular water supplies, and minimal electricity and fuel. Dr. Zulfikar Alatas of Doctors Without Borders reported that the average person in Sarajevo had already lost 30 to 40 pounds since the war began and to date received 1,000 calories a day, half of the normal intake.

2142. It was reported that Serbs let three aid trucks into Sarajevo but seized three others carrying diesel fuel and oil. The situation was described as critical, with warfare in central BiH blocking regular supply routes.

(c) International Reported Events

2143. United Nations Security Council Resolution 847 was passed, extending UNPROFOR's mandate by three months.

P. July 1993

1. 1/7/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively quiet
overnight with small arms fire in the New Town and three shells hitting the
western Stup area. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The western Stup area (three shells). Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2144. Sarajevo radio said that the city was relatively quiet overnight with
some small arms fire in the New Town district. It said that three shells
smashed into the western Stup area. 2812/

(b) **Local reported events:**

2145. A spokeswoman for the UNHCR reported that Serbian commanders introduced
road tolls ranging from $140 to $350 per vehicle for UNHCR trucks, trailers,
buses and cars driving on roads in Serbian controlled territories in BiH. "The
decision is completely unacceptable and we totally deplore it", said
spokeswoman Lyndall Sachs. An eight-truck convoy carrying 38 tons of food for
Sarajevo stopped at the Serbian checkpoint of Karakaj, on the BiH side of the
Drina River west of Zvornik, and was asked to pay the toll. 2813/

2. **2/7/93 (Friday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Several shells reportedly hit the city during
the night. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Six Serb soldiers were reported killed near the front line in the
centre of the city. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

2146. Several shells reportedly hit Sarajevo during the night and the BiH army
said its men killed six Serb soldiers near the front line in the centre of the
city. 2814/

(b) **Local reported events**

2147. UNHCR announced that food stocks at its warehouses in Sarajevo were down
to two day supplies and could not be distributed because there was no fuel for
the trucks. There was fuel at Sarajevo airport, where 16 to 17 relief flights
a day continued to arrive, but trucks were unable to get into the city, due to
a Serb roadblock, UNHCR said. 2815/
(c) International reported events

2148. On the first anniversary of the start of the Sarajevo airlift, a UNHCR spokesman in Geneva admitted that the humanitarian operation in BiH, which faced growing threats and the imposition of tolls at Serb roadblocks, had never been more difficult. 2816/

3. 3/7/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The UN reported that more than 1,000 shells hit Sarajevo in one of the heaviest shelling days in almost a month. 2817/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Žuć and Rastović (main areas of concentration); Sarajevo generally; central and eastern parts of the city; Stup; Dobrinja; Vogošća; Rajlovac; Ilidža; Nedžarići. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A Reuters photographer witnessed six dead and 27 wounded brought into a city hospital and Sarajevo radio reported three wounded and one killed in the Novigrad area after it came under heavy shelling. 2818/ UN and hospital sources said that more than 1,000 artillery shells hit Sarajevo, killing seven people and wounding approximately 20 in the heaviest attack in nearly a month. 2819/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2149. Two differing reports described the day's events in Sarajevo. In one report, mortar and rocket fire was heard in Sarajevo at dawn. Much of the artillery fire, which began early in the morning, appeared to be outgoing from BiH government positions in the centre of the city. Reporters surveying the city from the top of the Holiday Inn could not see any shells landing in the city. Regular mortar fire continued two hours later, with small-arms and machine-gun fire audible across the city. 2820/

2150. In another report, UN and hospital sources said that more than 1,000 artillery shells hit Sarajevo, killing seven people and wounding approximately 20 in the heaviest attack in almost a month. It was reported that Serb forces opened up with a pre-dawn tank and artillery barrage that lasted three and a half hours, according to UNPROFOR. The attack continued throughout the day but the shelling became more sporadic and spread to the central and eastern part of the city, UN officials said. They added that it was the heaviest shelling to hit Sarajevo in almost a month. 2821/

2151. Sarajevo radio reported shelling in Vogošća. The radio also reported shelling in the Stup and Dobrinja districts. The Bosnian Serb news agency said that the Serb-held suburbs of Vogošća, Rajlovac, Ilidža and Nedžarići came under BiH army assault. 2822/

2152. A BiH army unit (the 10th Mountain Brigade), led by a 29 year-old musician known as Čačo (Musan Topalović), attacked three police stations, seizing 30 officers and taking them off to dig trenches at the front-line positions held by Čačo's men on Trebević mountain. (Čačo was the commander who led an ill-fated attack on the Serb-held Mount Trebević on 30 May in which
many were killed). Gun battles broke out around the police stations and one police unit fired mortars at Čačo's positions on Trebević. Before the battle ended it had involved machine-guns, armoured cars, and mortars, and at least one policeman was killed. For much of Saturday, traffic in the heart of the city was blocked by barricades. The Serbian forces looking down from mountainside positions opened up with a barrage of shelling on the city after the mortar volleys on Čačo's positions ended.

4. 4/7/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city reportedly came under intermittent bombing, with shells concentrated on the airport area. UNPROFOR reported that some 630 artillery rounds fell near the airport and in the western part of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The airport area; an UNPROFOR armoured vehicle on the road link between the city and the airport; the Stup district; the western part of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Three people were reportedly killed during the shelling of the Stup district. Source(s): Agence France Presse

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three people were reportedly killed during the shelling of the Stup district. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2153. A spokesman for UNPROFOR said that the city came under intermittent bombing, with shells concentrated on the airport zone. The road link between the city and the airport was reportedly cut during the day after an UNPROFOR armoured vehicle was disabled by a mortar round. The UNPROFOR spokesman reported that no one was injured in the explosion.

2154. Three people reportedly died during shelling on the Stup district of Sarajevo, Sarajevo radio said.

(b) Local reported events

2155. It was reported that over 60 severely wounded patients were rushed to the Košev Hospital after one of the heaviest Serbian bombardments in months. Without power for lights in the operating theatre, surgeons reportedly moved to a small room with picture windows looking toward the mountains, where they worked by natural light without monitors or x-rays. Operating theatres were described as running as they did at 19th century battlefronts with amputations by paraffin lamps; anesthetists hand-pumping oxygen with rubber bladders; chest, abdominal and head surgery without x-rays; and surgeons wearing the same bloodstained gowns for days.

2156. French General Jean Cot, who took over as commander of UNPROFOR on 1 July planned to land in Sarajevo and drive to the UN BiH headquarters at nearby Kiseljak. "The General flew to Split instead and will take a helicopter to Kiseljak", said Colonel Marcel Valentin, commander of UN peacekeepers in Sarajevo. UN bases in Kiseljak were being blockaded by Croat forces in response to the actions of Muslim troops who had sealed off a Canadian UN base.
at Visoko since Saturday. General Phillipe Morillon, Commander of UN forces in BiH, was inside UNPROFOR's headquarters at Kiseljak when the Croats surrounded it on Sunday morning, and he was unable to leave, UN officials said. The Muslim forces around the Visoko base aimed to prevent the departure of two senior Croat officers including Ivica Rajić, Commander of the Croat forces in central BiH. The United Nations had been trying to negotiate the safe passage of the two Croat officers to defuse the crisis. "This is just one of those pointless exercises which I hope won't last long", said a UN source. 2828

2157. It was reported that from the outset of the city's siege, United Nations officials decided that all aid reaching the Sarajevo area would be divided, with Serbian nationalist forces being given between 20 per cent and 25 per cent, about equal to the proportion of the population in areas under their control. But for several weeks, Serbian leaders in Ilidža, the Serbian-held suburb straddling the route into the city used by relief convoys, had demanded that they be given 50 per cent of all fuel. For a month, the impasse reportedly blocked all fuel convoys. Then last week Serbian forces pledged to allow a United Nations-escorted fuel convoy unimpeded passage and greeted the trucks at the first Serbian roadblock north of the city with glasses of slivovitz, the plum brandy favoured in the Balkans. However, at the next roadblock, the convoy was surrounded by 100 Serbian troops who demanded half of the 120 tons of fuel. After a standoff lasting several hours, United Nations officials surrendered one of the four trucks of diesel fuel. When the convoy advanced to the airport, still several miles from the city, Serbian commanders allegedly demanded one of the remaining trucks. United Nations officials refused and more than 70 tons of fuel, enough to power essential services in Sarajevo for two weeks, remained blockaded at the airport for seven days. 2829

2158. United Nations officials expressed concern with the collapse of the city's water system. With summer temperatures rising to nearly 100 degrees Fahrenheit, the city reportedly was receiving less than 2 per cent of its normal water supply and there were increasing fears of water-borne epidemics as people resorted to drawing water from polluted rivers, wells and springs. 2830

5. 5/7/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shells reportedly hit the Buča Potok area where children were playing. In its weekly summary UNPROFOR reported that the general situation in Sarajevo was relatively tense and on 3 July the area suffered a significant increase of activity with approximately 1,500 rounds reported. Main areas of concentration were Žuč and Rastović. The attack came from the north of the city and was a result of Serb observation of BiH troops regrouping in the town. Fighting between the BiH army and BiH police was reported, resulting in the establishment of many check points throughout the city. It was further reported that the 9th and 10th Brigades tried to take the Ministry of the Interior near the Presidency. 2831/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The Buča Potok district (where children were playing). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Christine Wikutt, a 52 year-old British aid worker was killed by sniper fire. Wikutt, who worked for Direct Aid, a relief
organization based in Edinburgh, was killed as she travelled aboard an unescorted relief truck on "snipers alley" leading from the centre of the city toward the airport, Direct Aid officials said. (Convoys organized by private agencies were not escorted by armoured UN personnel carriers). A CNN television crew close by in an armoured Landrover went to her aid and took her, accompanied by her husband Alan, to a UN military hospital in the nearby Post and Telegraph building. 2832/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Hospital sources reported that Shelling in Sarajevo killed at least four persons and wounded 31 including 12 children. 2833/ It was later reported that 11 children were wounded and one 11 year-old girl was killed. Doctors reported that the mortar rounds appeared to have contained phosphorous. 2834/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 40 killed and 229 wounded in the last week. It also reported 8,983 killed (of which 1,430 were children) and 52,747 wounded (of which 13,795 were children). 2835/ Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2159. Croat forces lifted a blockade of two UN bases, including the BiH headquarters of UNPROFOR in Kiseljaj. UNPROFOR spokesmen said that the Croat Defence Force (HVO) pulled back its men after getting assurance that negotiations would continue for the release of two senior Croat officers trapped by Muslim fighters at a Canadian UN base at nearby Visoko. 2836/

2160. Shells were reported to have hit the district of Buća Potok where children were playing. 2837/

(b) Local reported events

2161. UNPROFOR reported in its weekly summary that the Serb attitude towards the United Nations and UNHCR convoys had deteriorated and the number of restrictions of movements increased. As an example, on 30 June a UNHCR convoy was stopped in Blažuj at 9:00 a.m. 2838/

6. 6/7/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Dobrinja was heavily shelled during the night and mortar as artillery attacks were reported in the city, especially near the airport and western sections. Fighting between BiH and Serbian forces was reported in Stup and around Vogošća. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja (overnight); the city (concentrated near the airport and western sections). Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The Serbian news agency Srna reported that 10 Serb soldiers had been killed in overnight fighting with BiH forces in Vogošća. 2839/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2162. Sarajevo radio reported that the suburb of Dobrinja was heavily shelled
during the night ahead of military talks between the three warring sides at the nearby airport. It reported the bombardment began before midnight Monday and lasted until the early hours Tuesday but that there were no immediate reports of casualties. 2840/

2163. Fighting between Muslim and Serb forces also took place in the Stup suburb and around Vogošća. 2841/

2164. Mortar and artillery attacks were reported in the city, especially near the airport and western parts, UNPROFOR said. 2842/

(b) Local reported events

2165. Peace conference co-chairman Stoltenberg traveled to Zagreb where he met with the UNPROFOR commander General Cot and UNPROFOR staff. 2843/

2166. The new commander of the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, French General Jean Cot, was to have met with Bosnian Serb leader Ratko Mladić and his Croat and Muslim counterparts, Milivoj Petković and Rasim Delić, to discuss the military situation. A UN spokesman said that Cot and the new UN commander for BiH, General Francis Briquemont of Belgium, arrived in Sarajevo late Monday, but that the Serb and Croat military chiefs told the UN on Tuesday that they had "problems to attend" the talks. Instead, a "low level" meeting was held at Sarajevo airport by a "mixed military working group" representing UNPROFOR and the three factions. 2844/

2167. It was reported that the birth rate in Sarajevo plummeted and an increase was found in the number of abortions since the start of the war. According to Šrećko Šimić, chief of Obstetrics at the Košev Hospital, before the war the hospital delivered 9,000 to 10,000 babies per year as compared to a present rate of 2,000 to 3,000. Dr. Ljiljana Masleša, of Doctors Without Borders was quoted as saying that before the war, there were two deliveries for every abortion and that now there were two abortions for every delivery. 2845/

(c) International reported events

2168. UN Commission of Experts Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations, William Fenrick in Sarajevo stated that a "considerable amount of evidence" about war crimes in BiH had been collected by a UN probe. "I have a pretty reasonable chance of conviction", Fenrick said. The investigation covered the rape of women, a general study of war crimes, and specific incidents such as the mortar attack on a football game on 1 June in which 11 people were killed. "I don't think any side in this conflict is entirely innocent", Fenrick remarked. He said there was "a lot of material" to bring the suspects to court. "I think it can be done, but I don't know if it would be done", he said, adding: "Progress in this area is extremely slow". His assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Kim Carter, said it was important to carry out inquiries now, without waiting for the war to end, since "evidence can disappear very quickly, you can lose witnesses". 2846/

7. 7/7/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reportedly quiet at night with some anti-aircraft artillery and small arms fire in the city and some sporadic
shelling of Stup and the New Sarajevo areas. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Stup; New Sarajevo. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2169. Croatian radio said Croat forces were holding their positions in the morning after a fierce BiH army attack on Kiseljak, near Sarajevo which killed 15 and wounded 15 others on Tuesday. UNPROFOR spokesman Commander Barry Frewer described the situation in Kiseljak and nearby Visoko as "very difficult". 2847/

2170. BiH radio reported a relatively quiet night in Sarajevo with some anti-aircraft artillery and small arms fire in the city and some sporadic shelling of Stup and the New Sarajevo areas. 2848/

(b) Local reported events

2171. United Nations envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg was in Zagreb in a new round of shuttle diplomacy to persuade the three warring factions in BiH to agree to a peace plan. He was expected to be joined by co-mediator Lord David Owen, who Tuesday urged the Muslims to talk directly to the Serbs and Croats about their joint plan for a three-sided BiH confederation along ethnic lines. Owen and Stoltenberg were due to go to Belgrade to meet Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. 2849/

2172. UN envoy Thorvald Stoltenberg, speaking after he and co-mediator Lord Owen met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, said he was still waiting for a response from the BiH leadership on whether to open talks. "If this will be negative, that we cannot go on with negotiations, there is much concern about the continued development", he told reporters. Owen urged BiH Tuesday to enter talks with the Serbs and Croats. He said that the partition proposal was the only one currently on offer. 2850/

2173. The bulk of the BiH collective Presidency met to consider an inquiry commission report recommending that the country should be a federal state or a protectorate under international control. Both ideas appeared to be at odds with the joint Serb-Croat proposal being pushed by the international mediators for a confederal division of BiH into Serb, Croat and Muslim mini-states. Muslim leaders said that such a partition would reward military aggression and crowd the Muslims into ghettos with little freedom of movement or economic opportunity. Mirko Pejanović, a Serb member of the BiH Presidency, said that the commission formed last month to consider the partition plan would recommend a federal state with "substantial provincial, cultural and social autonomy". This would fall well short of the Serb-Croat confederal proposal, implying three autonomous states in charge of all their own affairs with a weak central government. 2851/
8. 8/7/93 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2174. UNPROFOR spokesman, Commander Barry Frewer said that there was continued tension in Kiseljak where the road linking the town to Sarajevo had been mined. 2852/

(b) **Local reported events**

2175. The peace conference co-chairmen traveled to Belgrade, where they met with UNPROFOR and UNHCR representatives. They also met with representatives of the SPO Party and the Farmer's Party, and doctors treating SPO party leader Drašković. Meetings were also held talks with Yugoslav President Lili, and Foreign Minister Jovanović, and later with President Milošević and Bosnian Serb leaders Karadžić and Krajišnik. 2853/

2176. The BiH Presidency continued its talks on proposals put forward by the Serbs and Croats that would see the Republic divided up along ethnic lines. BiH President Alija Izetbegović and others of the 10 member Presidency met in Sarajevo with different BiH political parties to discuss the proposals. According to Presidency member Serb Miro Lazović, a working group had come out in favour of dividing BiH into four to 18 provinces of federal units, with four being the most likely number. He said that the Presidency had on Wednesday refused the idea that the four provinces be created along ethnic lines. 2854/

9. 9/7/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2177. No reported incidents.
(b) Local reported events

2178. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that the Presidency had already decided to refuse the Serb-Croat proposal being promoted by international mediators. "The ethnic division of Bosnia has been refused", he told a news conference, adding that a meeting of seven out of the Presidency's 10 members had agreed unanimously on the issue. Izetbegović said that six of the Presidency members would travel to Zagreb on Saturday, where they would join up with three others traveling from Croat-controlled areas, for a formal vote before meeting with co-mediators Stoltenberg and Owen. Izetbegović said he would stay behind in Sarajevo "because of urgent business". Officials in Sarajevo said that the final vote was little more than a formality. He proposed reconvening the London Conference, saying the government's conditions for participating were a complete cease-fire and free passage of humanitarian convoys. Izetbegović rejected suggestions that the BiH army was on its last legs saying: "the fight is only finished once you capitulate". Mediators felt that this decision would lead to further bloodshed. Peace mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said earlier that the alternative to negotiations was an intensified war. 2855/

2179. International peace mediator Lord Owen left Belgrade for Zagreb following talks with Serb President Slobodan Milošević and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. Owen's co-mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg, who also attended the talks was to leave Belgrade later in the day. 2856/

2180. Bosnian Serb and Croat military leaders for the second time refused to attend a meeting convened in Sarajevo to sign an accord confirming the city as a "safe area", UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said. Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladić said some work was still needed before he could sign and his Bosnian Croat counterpart Milivoj Petković found the road to the city "too dangerous", Frewer reported. Frewer admitted the rejections were disappointing and that, without Mladić's cooperation, it would be difficult for the UN to implement its resolution naming Sarajevo as one of six "safe areas" in BiH. 2857/

2181. The UN command awaited the arrival of 150 French reinforcements called into the city to help implement the "safe areas". The troops were reportedly still waiting for authorization to cross a Serb roadblock between Kiseljak and Sarajevo, a French officer said. 2858/

(c) International reported events

2182. In Geneva, the head of the UNHCR, Sadaka Ogato warned that Sarajevo was on the brink of disaster as a result of the tightening blockade by Bosnian Serbs. Ogata said the amount of water available to each person in the city was down to two and a half litres per day and was expected to drop further as the remaining pump ran out of fuel. "The danger of epidemics grows with each passing day", Ogata said. "The city sewage system has broken down and rubbish is piling up in the streets. Many people are already using contaminated water". "For more than a year now UNHCR and its partners have struggled against all odds to help the people of Sarajevo stay alive", Ogata said. "I condemn the actions of those who are blocking the delivery of food, medicine, fuel, water, power, gas, and other humanitarian assistance in a cowardly attempt to starve and kill innocent victims". 2859/

2183. Another UNHCR official said that the Bosnian Serb forces blocked some 75 tons of diesel fuel for the water pumps at the Sarajevo airport, demanding to keep half for themselves before allowing the rest to reach the city. 2860/
10. 10/7/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The morning was reported as relatively calm in the city with snipers aiming at passersby and sporadic mortar explosions in the valley. A total of 67 artillery shell impacts were recorded in the BiH controlled areas, seven between the airport and Butmir on the southern side of the airfield. 

**Targets Hit:** BiH-controlled areas, including the area between the airport and Butmir on the southern side of the airfield. 

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** As more than 1,000 French troops began arriving at a former Olympic complex in the city to begin a United Nations military buildup, snipers opened fire, wounding one in the neck. Small arms and sniper activity were reported in the city. 

**Casualties:** One British journalist was killed and one BiH civilian was lightly wounded; a French UNPROFOR soldier was wounded by sniper fire. Sarajevo Radio reported that doctors in Sarajevo confirmed five cases of typhoid fever and said that 750 people fell ill with dysentery.

**Narrative of Events:**

2184. As more than 1,000 French troops began arriving at a former Olympic complex in the city to begin a United Nations military buildup, snipers opened fire, wounding one in the neck. The soldier, who was expected to live, was evacuated to France on a military flight. It was reported that he was one of at least 1,500 people who had been killed or wounded in the city in the two months since the United Nations Security Council designated Sarajevo and five other predominantly Muslim enclaves to be safe havens.

2185. The morning was reported as relatively calm in the city with snipers aiming at passersby and sporadic mortar shell explosions heard in the valley.

2186. UNPROFOR reported small-arms and sniper activity. One British journalist was killed and one BiH civilian was lightly wounded.

(b) Local reported events

2187. The peace conference co-chairmen met with President Tudjman in Zagreb. They also hosted a meeting of the BiH Presidency in Zagreb.

2188. Sarajevo residents began to make a black joke of the term "safe area". This week a placard was seen with the words "Sigurnosna Zona", meaning safe area, on a fence outside one of the impromptu graveyards that had sprung up in the city.
11. 11/7/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2189. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2190. Members of the collective BiH leadership continued their meeting with Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg in Zagreb to discuss the latest proposed peace plan. 2871/

12. 12/7/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as relatively quiet with 48 shell impacts. Sniper activity also continued. 2872/ Casualty rates were high after two shells hit civilians in Dobrinja and the Old Town area. Source(s): UNPROFOR; New York Times; Chicago Tribune.

Targets Hit: A water line in Dobrinja; the Old Town area. Source(s): New York Times; Chicago Tribune.

Description of Damage: Thirteen people were reported killed and 15 others wounded when an 82 millimetre mortar struck a line of people at a garden water pump in Dobrinja; two people were reported killed and three wounded by a shell hitting the Old Town area. Source(s): New York Times; Chicago Tribune.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported to have continued. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Thirteen people were reported killed and 15 others wounded when a 82 millimetre mortar struck a line of people at a garden water pump in Dobrinja; two people were reported killed and three wounded by a shell hitting the Old Town area. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 57 killed and 348 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,040 killed (of which 1,439 were children) and 53,095 wounded (of which 13,882 were children). 2873/ Source(s): New York Times; Chicago Tribune; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2191. In the suburb of Dobrinja, several dozen men, women and children were lined up at a garden well pump when a single 82 millimetre mortar struck, a Muslim government police inspector at the scene said. It was reported that 12
people were killed and 15 were wounded in the afternoon attack, occurring at 3:40 p.m. 2874/ The bodies of the victims, both Muslims and Croats, lay in the street, their water containers still strapped to their backs. The youngest of the victims was six years old, Sarajevo radio said. A 23 year-old nurse and her mother were also among the dead. Inspector Bakir Germanovic said that the mortar bomb was a blind shot lobbed over a few hundred yards of already bomb-cratered apartment buildings from Serb front lines in the suburb of Nedžarići. "They couldn't see the line but they knew people were drawing water here", he said. 2875/ The city, in its fifth consecutive week without electrical service, natural gas, or functioning water mains, and the mortar attack produced difficult conditions at Dobrinja's hospital and at Koševo's Hospital downtown where some of the wounded were transferred. With supplies of diesel fuel for emergency generators exhausted, surgeons reportedly operated without monitors for patients' vital signs and used flashlights and miners' lamps for illumination in operating theatres as night fell. 2876/

2192. Two people were reported killed and three wounded by a shell hitting the city's Old Town. 2877/

(b) Local reported events

2193. BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić signed an agreement restoring water and utilities. The agreement was negotiated by Bernard Kouchner, France's former health minister. The agreement, signed by Izetbegović and Karadžić, pledged not to use utilities as "weapons of war" by cutting off flows of water, natural gas and electricity. In the document, the two leaders also undertook to halt interference by their forces with repair missions undertaken by the United Nations military force, who had suspended such work 10 days before because of attacks on repair crews. Kouchner said that Izetbegović agreed in principle to attend peace talks in Geneva if utilities were restored and if the warring parties ceased offensive action during the talks. 2878/

2194. It was reported that although Serbian forces, not BiH forces, had cut most of the utility supplies during the siege, the utilities crisis was a result of a complex standoff in which the BiH Government had refused to allow the repair of a power line which supplied a Serbian ammunition plant at Vogošća, about four miles north-east of the city centre. In retaliation, the Serbian forces cut the only power line feeding Sarajevo, as well as the flow of natural gas. 2879/

2195. UNHCR reported that the last major source of drinking water in Sarajevo had been cut because of a lack of fuel for a pump. The acute water shortage raised concerns that disease could spread. UNHCR reported 200 to 300 cases of dysentery daily due to residents using dirty groundwater. Kessler said that the pump serving a well at the city brewery stopped operating Sunday because of a Serb blockade of fuel. It was reported that a "trickle" of water was still reaching the city on one line, providing about a pint per resident each day. 2880/

13. 13/7/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was relatively quiet with 21 impacts recorded, but the UNPROFOR Sector Commander assessed that the cease-fire was no longer being respected as both the Ukrainian and French Battalions were subjected to fire. 2881/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Targets Hit: The areas near the French and Ukrainian. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2196. The UNPROFOR Sector Commander assessed that the cease-fire was no longer being respected. Both the French and the Ukrainian Battalions were subjected to fire and were forced to take shelter on a number of occasions.

(b) Local reported events

2197. Nicolas Studer, the head engineer for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo said that electricity and water could be restored in Sarajevo by the week's end if the warring factions respected an agreement signed by Muslim and Serb leaders. "If everything goes well", things could return to normal by the end of the week, Studer said. He said that the initial phase of the repairs would require transferring electricity from the Kakanj power plant, located in a Muslim-held region 30 miles from Sarajevo, to the Blažuj power plant supplying Serb-held areas west of Sarajevo. Studer said a second phase of repairs would entail restoring electricity to all of Sarajevo and, to appease the Serbs, repairing power lines within Serbia proper, which would enable them to resume production at a weapons factory making mortar and artillery shells. Studer said that the second phase had not yet been approved by Muslim and Serb leaders. The UN also asked for safety guarantees to protect its repair teams.

2198. The Bosnian Serb military command blamed the BiH army for Monday's mortar attack that killed at least 15 civilians who were waiting for water in Dobrinja. "The mortar shell that killed the civilians was fired by the Muslim troops stationed on the mountain of Igman", the Serbian command said in a public statement, accusing the Muslims of killing their own people and laying the blame on the Serbs in order to gain international sympathy.

14. 14/7/92 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR said that Serb shelling of the city had intensified. It was reported that 224 artillery hits were recorded by UNPROFOR military observers stationed in Sarajevo. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The Koševo district (location of the central hospital). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2199. UNPROFOR reported that the Koševo district, where the central hospital
is located, was one of the regions targeted.  

(b) **Local reported events**

2200. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadaka Ogato, arrived in Sarajevo on an emergency visit to assess immediate needs for international financial support. She vowed to do her best to help 2.2 million displaced people. She offered no remedy for the problems but said that going in with UN guns blazing would only backfire. "The whole situation is moving into a downward spiral. Oh, the temptation is there [to blast our way past roadblocks], but what happens afterward?" she said. 

2201. UN officials said that running water was restored to a third of Sarajevo, but Serbs failed to switch on a natural gas line as promised. Sarajevo had been cut off of its tap water and electricity since 21 June. Utility engineers with UNPROFOR said that running water was restored to New Sarajevo in the western part of the city. Supplies resumed after the Serbs reactivated a major pumping station in a western suburb they controlled, said Major Nicholas Studer, chief of UNPROFOR's combat engineers. "The Serbs have respected only part of the first phase of the agreement. I don't know if they are playing games, but they have cited technical problems and declared that they intend to solve them", Studer said.  

15. **15/7/93 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported increased tension following the resumption of shelling especially in the area of Zlatište where 78 impacts were recorded. 

**Targets Hit:** The area of Zlatište. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2202. BiH radio said some 8,500 Muslim refugees had flocked to Bjelašnica Mountain just south of Sarajevo from Trnovo, which was recaptured by Serb forces earlier in the week. 

2203. There were reports of fighting across BiH, including a tank attack and sporadic shelling in Sarajevo. 

2204. UNPROFOR reported increased tension following the resumption of shelling especially in the area of Zlatište where 78 impacts were recorded. 

(b) **Local reported events**

2205. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić rejected an offer by Islamic countries to send 17,000 soldiers to join the UN peace-keeping force in BiH. "The government resolutely opposes the proposed deployment of further Muslim forces to this country as projected recently by the Islamic Countries", 
Karadžić said in a letter to U.N Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 2893/

2206. A day after the visit by Sadako Ogata, Bosnian Serbs allowed 75 tons of diesel fuel stuck at the airport for two weeks to be brought into Sarajevo. The Serb forces reportedly confiscated an additional 25 tons of the diesel fuel for themselves. The first stops were the city bakery, a main water-pumping station and the hospital which needed the fuel to run generators. The bakery was making bread within two hours of the delivery after a 15 day shutdown, the longest in its 40 year history. Restoration of natural gas service, reportedly cut by Serb forces last month was also considered a major breakthrough, allowing residents to cook normally for the first time in weeks. 2894/

2207. More than half of the city was still reportedly without running water and electricity. 2895/

16. 16/7/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2208. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2209. The BiH collective Presidency convened in Sarajevo to work out final details in a proposal for the future of BiH that was expected to be debated at a new round of Geneva talks next week. At their preparatory session, BiH leaders were scheduled to discuss two options: a federation made up of either 10 units or three units. Under the latter scheme, each of the three regional units would be further divided into three provinces. None of the provinces would be geographically contiguous in order to discourage ethnic communities from adopting separatist policies. 2896/

(c) International reported events

2210. A new round of talks aimed at ending the war in BiH was announced. Presidents Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and Franjo Tuđman of Croatia were expected to meet under UN auspices in Geneva Saturday in a new bid to end the war, Tuđman's office said. Belgrade's Tanjug news agency said that Tuđman and Milošević would discuss resolving the BiH crisis "on the basis of a confederal organization of Bosnia". The BiH Presidency under Alija Izetbegović, had rejected confederation into three ethnic mini-states, although it had backed a plan to establish BiH as a federal state along economic lines. 2897/
17. 17/7/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces launched a major offensive in the region of the Igman mountains overlooking Sarajevo airport. Reportedly, more than 2,000 shells were fired on BiH positions. According to Sarajevo radio, combat was reported as BiH forces resisted attacks by Serb infantry backed by tanks. The main offensive was launched from Trnovo, a BiH position captured on 11 July by Serb forces about 12 miles from the city. Tanks meanwhile closed in from Hadžići west of Igman, surrounding the BiH positions in a pincer movement. The radio said that the BiH army had repulsed several attacks but it quoted the army as saying its forces were in great difficulty. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Mount Igman area. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2211. UNPROFOR announced that in the east section of the city, BiH troop movements were continuing. There were also reports that residents in the southern suburbs were fleeing their homes and heading for the city centre amid fears of a new Serbian offensive following the fall of Trnovo, an access point to the city. Some 400 Muslims from Trnovo had reached Butmir near Sarajevo airport.

2212. Sarajevo radio quoted military sources as saying that Serb forces launched a major offensive in the region of the Igman mountains overlooking Sarajevo airport and that fighting raged as night fell on the city. More than 2,000 shells were said to have fallen on BiH positions only a few miles from the city proper. Hand-to-hand combat reportedly took place as BiH government troops resisted several attacks by Serb infantry backed by tanks, the radio said. The main offensive was launched from Trnovo, a Muslim position captured on 11 July by Serb forces about 12 miles south of the city. Tanks meanwhile closed in from Hadžići west of the Igman hills, surrounding the Muslim positions in a pincer movement. The radio said that the BiH army had repulsed several attacks but it quoted the army as saying its forces were in great difficulty.

(b) Local reported events

2213. The 10 member BiH Presidency at its meeting in Sarajevo announced it "agreed in principle" to take part in the next round of peace talks in Geneva scheduled for next week, Sarajevo radio reported. The Presidency conditioned its participation on the cessation of the Serbian offensives in BiH and restoring electricity and the restorations of water supplies to the city.

2214. In Geneva, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman held closed door talks with mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord Owen. Diplomats said the session was aimed at pushing BiH toward accepting a plan turning the state into a confederation of three ethnic republics. Stoltenberg told reporters that the atmosphere had improved and
that it might be possible to achieve a peaceful solution in the next two to six weeks. "The point is to get started", he said. Conference spokesman John Mills said the aim of the talks was to prepare for a meeting of all three parties in the conflict. 2901/

2215. UNPROFOR announced that it’s probe into Monday’s shelling of Sarajevo residents queuing for water revealed that the mortar round in the incident had almost certainly been fired by Serb artillery. 2902/

(c) International reported events

2216. Moves to protect UN troops guarding Muslim enclaves in BiH were stepped up when the United States said it would send 40 warplanes, including four Special Forces AC-130 gunships to Europe. The Pentagon announcement followed an agreement by NATO on Wednesday that US, French, British and Dutch warplanes could start protecting UN ground troops in BiH, including those in the planned "safe areas", as early as 22 July. Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, warned against sending NATO aircraft. Such actions would be "packed with possibilities for new incidents and an escalation of the conflict", he told the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug. 2903/

18. 18/7/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serb forces broke through BiH army defence lines on their Mount Igman stronghold overlooking Sarajevo. Sarajevo radio quoted the BiH army press centre as saying BiH government troops rallied to prevent a decisive advance. Serb artillery and infantry units hit Muslim defenders on the mountain all day and government army commander Rasim Delić conceded the situation was difficult. Heavy shelling and shooting on Mount Igman could be seen from the city below. Serb gunners also shelled western parts of the city. Sarajevo radio said that the Serbs were using helicopter gunships in the Mount Igman battle in violation of the no-fly zone over BiH imposed by the United Nations. 2904/ It was further reported that the BiH army press centre admitted in a communiqué that Serbs had broken through its defence lines and had occupied the nearby hamlet of Golo Brdo. Other Serb forces reportedly broke through BiH army lines just south of the city and were advancing toward the villages of Ledići, Dobre Vode and Šiljak, all in the foothills of Mount Igman, the army said. The army said the Serbs were continuing heavy shelling as they closed in on the mountain from the north-west and from the south along a supply line leading from Trnovo. Foreign observers counted at least 28 Serb tanks advancing toward Igman Saturday from the north-western outskirts of Sarajevo. 2905/ UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo as relatively tense with increased military activities. A total of 101 impacts were registered by UNPROFOR. 2906/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Igman Mountain; western parts of the city; The area close to the PTT building (five shells). Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNCIVPOL.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified
Casualties: UNPROFOR reported that three BiH civilians were wounded while attempting to cross the airport. 2907/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2217. UN sources who asked not to be identified cited a growing peril to Muslim refugees on government-held Igman mountain after more than two dozen tanks were spotted advancing on the area on Saturday. More than 3,500 Muslims had fled towards Igman last week after Serb forces seized the government enclave of Trnovo 18 miles south of Sarajevo and began what refugees described as a northwards sweep towards the city. It was reported that there was concern in recent days that Trnovo's fall would allow Serbs to reinforce troops besieging the city. 2908/

2218. Serb forces broke through BiH army defence lines on their Mount Igman stronghold overlooking Sarajevo. Sarajevo radio quoted the BiH army press centre as saying BiH government troops rallied to prevent a decisive advance. Serb artillery and infantry units hit Muslim defenders on the mountain all day, and government army commander Rasim Delić conceded the situation was difficult. Heavy shelling and shooting on Mount Igman could be seen from the city below. Serb gunners also shelled western parts of the city. Sarajevo radio said that the Serbs were using helicopter gunships in the Mount Igman battle in violation of the no-fly zone over BiH imposed by the United Nations. 2909/

2219. It was further reported that the BiH army press centre admitted in a communique that Serbs had broken through its defence lines and had occupied the nearby hamlet of Golo Brdo. Other Serb forces reportedly broke through BiH army lines just south of the city and were advancing toward the villages of Ledići, Dobre Vode and Šiljak, all in the foothills of Mount Igman, the army said. The army said the Serbs were continuing heavy shelling as they closed in on the mountain from the north-west and from the south along a supply line leading from Trnovo. Foreign observers counted at least 28 Serb tanks advancing toward Igman Saturday from the north-western outskirts of Sarajevo. 2910/

2220. UNCIYPOL described the situation in Sarajevo as "tense". Five shells were reported to have landed close to the PTT building. 2911/

(b) Local reported events

2221. The BiH collective Presidency at a meeting decided to remove the Commander of the Army's 1st Corps, Mustafa Hajrulahović, and replaced him with Vahid Karavelić. The 1st Corps was assigned to the defence of Sarajevo. Commentators said the dismissal of Hajrulahović might have reflected dismay over recent military successes by Serb forces who captured the town of Trnovo, south of Sarajevo and had since closed in on Igman. 2912/

2222. UNPROFOR reported that electricity repairs were canceled due to the absence of Serbian workers. 2913/

(c) International reported events

2223. BiH President Alija Izetbegović ruled out attending renewed peace talks with international mediators in Geneva unless Serb forces stopped offensives against Muslims. "We cannot go there if offensive activities in Bosnia continue, especially against Sarajevo", he said. "Under current conditions, I don't see that we could be ready to go today or tomorrow but, if we found
ourselves at the negotiating table, I'm convinced we might reach a settlement". 2914/

19. 19/7/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo was relatively calm. A total of 169 impacts were recorded and the areas most affected were on the southern side of the city. 2915/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The southern side of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that a French officer was wounded by sniper fire. UNPROFOR expressed concern that the high level of sniping could jeopardize the UN engineering repair mission efforts. 2916/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 47 killed and 201 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,087 killed (of which 1,450 were children) and 53,298 wounded (of which 13,932 were children). 2917/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2224. Heavy fighting continued on Mount Igman overnight, lighting up the night sky to the south-west of the city. 2918/

(b) Local reported events

2225. A UN official said that Sarajevo was still without electricity and water as utility repair efforts were being hampered by workers who refused to show up. 2919/

20. 20/7/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A spokesman of the UN said that sketchy reports from Mount Igman indicated night attacks by BiH troops were recapturing positions seized by Serb forces during the day. UNPROFOR reported that overnight and into the day, fighting and mortar shelling took place around the Ukrainian and Egyptian Battalion locations in the eastern part of the city. During the daylight hours sniper activity was reported to have increased. Shelling was also reported on the outskirts of the airport. UNPROFOR recorded a total of 144 impacts in Sarajevo, 15 of which were close to the airport. 2920/ UNPROFOR monitors were not let into the Igman area. Source(s): Chicago Tribune; UNPROFOR; UNCIVPOL.

Targets Hit: The area around the Ukrainian and Egyptian Battalion locations; the outskirts of the airport (15 shells). Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: During daylight hours sniper activity was reported to have increased. One French non-commissioned officer was hit by sniper fire. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2226. Outside Sarajevo the Serb attack on Mount Igman, overlooking the city's UN-controlled airport, was reportedly among the fiercest in the area since the Serb siege of the city began in April 1992. Major Luuk Niessen, a spokesman for the UN said that sketchy reports from Mount Igman indicated night attacks by BiH troops were recapturing positions seized by Serb fighters during the day. 2921/

2227. UNPROFOR reported that overnight and into the day, fighting and mortar shelling took place around the Ukrainian and Egyptian Battalion locations in the eastern part of the city. UNPROFOR reported that it was relying on media accounts on the fighting in the Igman mountain area due to the fact that the Serb side was restricting its monitors' movements in the area.

2228. UNCIVPOL reported shelling on the outskirts of the airport. 2922/

(b) Local reported events

2229. BiH President Alija Izetbegović appealed for international help in a letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and other officials. "There are signs that the Serbian forces plan a general attack on the town itself", said Izetbegović, "I call on you to intervene and stop this act of aggression", he said. Commentators suggested that the Serbian offensive seemed to be designed to increase pressure on BiH to accept ethnic partitioning. 2923/

21. 21/7/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The centre of the city suffered the heaviest shelling in weeks. General Ratko Mladić said that his troops had advanced 20 miles in a week and were close to capturing two key roads that would cut off the retreat of the BiH forces defending the western approaches to the city. After that he said it would not be long, possibly only days, before Butmir and Hrasnica would fall. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Targets Hit: The city centre; the area near the Parliament building; the area near the Holiday Inn; the area near barracks shared by BiH troops and UNPROFOR forces. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Description of Damage: A pall of smoke was seen rising near the Maršal Tito army barracks shared by BiH troops and UN peacekeepers. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

2230. The centre of the city suffered the heaviest shelling in weeks, reporters said. Mortar and artillery shells struck near the Parliament building and the Holiday Inn for more than an hour and a pall of smoke was seen rising near the army barracks shared by BiH troops and UN peacekeepers. The intensified shelling came one day after the commander of the advancing Serbian forces stood on a strategic mountain overlooking Sarajevo and spoke to Western reporters about his troops' successes. To the accompaniment of Serbian artillery fire, General Ratko Mladić said that his troops had advanced 20 miles in a week and were close to capturing two key roads that would cut off the retreat of the BiH forces defending the western approaches to Sarajevo. After that he said that it would not be long, possibly only days, before Butmir and Hrasnica (Muslim strongholds at the gates of the city) would fall, significantly tightening the Serbian hold on the city. "Things are moving very well, according to plan", Mladić said. "And they will get even better". 2924/

(b) Local reported events

2231. It was reported that the 2,000 UN peace-keeping forces in the designated "safe area" of Sarajevo had been unable to do much but stand by as the Serbian forces advanced. The UN troops were not able to approach the battlefield on Mount Igman to observe the fighting or to resist it. 2925/

(c) International reported events

2232. United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher ruled out US military action or other direct intervention to prevent Serbian forces from capturing Sarajevo. In turning down appeals for outside help from BiH, Christopher called the crisis a "tragic, tragic situation". But he said at a news conference that deeper American involvement in the Balkans was not in the US national interest. He defined the US national interest in BiH as limited to "humanitarian relief to the extent that we can provide it, coupled with the spread of the conflict, doing all we can to make sure that those who are involved in the evil conduct there realize that they will be subject to, as people, war crimes trials, and as nations, to continuing sanctions". Commentators noted that these remarks may have removed any fears that Serb and Croat leaders had about whether taking Sarajevo or other UN-declared "safe areas" would draw military retaliation from the US. 2926/

2233. It was reported that President Clinton's top foreign policy advisers Christopher, Defense Secretary Les Aspin, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, met Tuesday for a second time in a week to discuss the deteriorating situation around Sarajevo. But they reportedly broke up their meeting, unable to agree on new actions. As Serb forces advanced Wednesday against government troops on Mount Igman, the strategic high ground and a key supply route for the capital, Clinton reportedly blamed European governments for the impending defeat of the BiH government. Clinton said that the European opposition to his proposal to lift the UN arms embargo for the BiH government doomed what appeared to be a moment when Serb and Croatian leaders might have been willing to settle the conflict through negotiations. "That's when things began to deteriorate again instead of move toward peace", he said during an appearance Tuesday night on CNN's "Larry King Live". 2927/

2234. It was reported that the United States had moved 40 warplanes to bases in Italy to join British, French and Dutch aeroplanes (possibly beginning
Thursday), in providing air cover and rescue missions for UN peacekeepers coming under fire. That operation came under NATO auspices. 2928/

2235. It was reported that UN officials expressed hope that the Serbs would honour a promise to suspend their offensive on Mount Igman if peace talks started Friday in Geneva. 2929/

22. 22/7/93 (Thursday)
(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN military observers counted 3,777 Serbian fired shells hitting the city in a 16 hour period from midnight Wednesday, one of the highest recorded by UN observers in the year that they had monitored artillery fire in Sarajevo. Of these shells 680 impacts had been recorded in the city centre. UNPROFOR commented in its report that a large portion of these rounds were fired into the Mount Igman area. Reports said that the bombardment began at dawn and continued much of the day. Reporters gave accounts that at midmorning, Serbian tanks in the western district of Nedžarići fired repeatedly at houses in the Buča Potok district on a hillside less than a mile away. For nearly two hours at noon, Serbian tanks and howitzers on Trebenići Mountain reportedly fired heavy-calibre shells at New Sarajevo. The principal target appeared to be the Maršal Tito barracks shared by Ukrainian troops of UNPROFOR and BiH army units. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The city centre (680 impacts); the area around the Presidency building; houses in the Buča Potok district on a hillside; New Sarajevo; the Maršal Tito barracks; the power station at Velešić; the Mount Igman area (received a large portion of the impacts). Source(s) Chicago Tribune; New York Times; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Hospitals reported at least 10 people killed and more than 50 seriously wounded but, with the heavy shelling and transport idled by a fuel shortage, it was thought that other casualties had not been brought in. 2930/ Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

2236. United Nations officials said on Wednesday that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić had promised to stop Serb offensive operations around Sarajevo, as requested by the BiH government before they would attend the talks. But while Serb troops halted a six-day attack on Mount Igman, which controlled the city's only supply line, they commenced an artillery barrage on the city. Sarajevo's city centre, including the area around the Presidency Building, sustained some of the heaviest shelling in weeks before the bombardment subsided. 2931/

2237. The bombardment began at dawn and continued much of the day. Reporters at the UN military headquarters watched at midmorning as Serbian tanks in the western district of Nedžarići fired repeatedly at houses in the Buča Potok district on a hillside less than a mile away. For nearly two hours beginning at noon, Serbian tanks and howitzers on Trebenići Mountain to the south fired heavy-calibre shells at New Sarajevo. The principal target appeared to be the Maršal Tito barracks shared by Ukrainian troops of UNPROFOR and BiH Army
2238. UNPROFOR reported that the power station at Velešići was damaged during the fighting. 2239/

2239. UN military observers counted 3,777 Serbian fired shells hitting the city in a 16 hour period from midnight Wednesday, one of the highest recorded by UN observers in the year that they had monitored artillery firing in Sarajevo. Of these shells 680 impacts had been recorded in the city centre. UNPROFOR commented in its report on operational activities that a large portion of these rounds were fired into the Mount Igman area. 2240/

(b) Local reported events

2240. Three UNPROFOR and 14 UNHCR flights landed in the city. 2241/

(c) International reported events

2241. In Washington, President Clinton rejected suggestions that the US had given up on helping bring peace to BiH, saying the administration was continuing to work on the problem with European allies. A day earlier, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the administration had ruled out military intervention or any other forceful strategy to rescue Sarajevo and prevent partition of BiH. Clinton, when asked if that meant he had given up on BiH, said, "that's not so . . . We have aggressively committed ourselves to the process in Geneva, and if the BiH government voluntarily signs an agreement, we have made it clear that we were prepared to participate in the enforcement of it". "We are continuing to work with the Europeans on other options", Clinton said. "That is not true that we've given up on it. We're continuing to work". 2242/

2242. Plans for new peace talks stumbled after Serbs hit Sarajevo with one of the heaviest bombardments in weeks. The Geneva talks were scheduled to focus on competing peace plans: a Serb-Croatian plan to partition BiH into three ethnic states and a plan by the BiH government to keep the Republic together. Citing the plight of BiH civilians, mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg had urged the parties to "sit in continuous session until a settlement is reached". 2243/

2243. BiH President Alija Izetbegović reiterated his earlier position that he would not attend peace talks while fighting continued. "Unfortunately, up to this moment, there are no signs that attacks are diminishing", he said in a letter to Owen and Stoltenberg. 2244/

2244. The UN Security Council condemned the Serb assault on Sarajevo and demanded an end to the siege, calling for safe passage of food and medicine. The Council demanded no military action. 2245/

23. 23/7/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Serbian artillery batteries reportedly pounded wide areas of Sarajevo in a sustained offensive. The shelling was reportedly at a lower level than on Thursday, suggesting that the focus had moved from Mount Igman on the south-western edge of the city to a strategic hill on the north-western periphery. UN officers said that they believed that the key to
the battle lay in an attempt by Serbian forces, strengthened by new artillery and infantry groups, to break through the BiH lines on the hill located about four miles from the city centre. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Chicago Tribune.

**Targets Hit:** Wide areas of Sarajevo. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Chicago Tribune.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2245. Serbian artillery batteries pounded wide areas of Sarajevo in a sustained offensive. The Serbian attack on Sarajevo, the most intensive since last fall, sent the new United Nations commander in BiH, Lieutenant General Francis Briqueumont of Belgium, on a trip into the mountains south of Sarajevo for a meeting with the Serbian military commander, Lieutenant General Ratko Mladić. Mladić told reporters after the meeting that his troops would observe a cease-fire beginning at 10:00 a.m. on Sunday but UN officers cautioned that there was no guarantee that BiH forces, driven back by the latest Serbian attacks, would agree to a truce. 2940

2246. The shelling was at a lower level than on Thursday, suggesting that the focus of the battle had moved from Mount Igman on the south-western edge of the city to a strategic hill on the north-western periphery. UN officers said that they believed that the key to the battle lay in an attempt by Serbian forces, strengthened by new artillery and infantry groups, to break through the BiH lines on the hill located about four miles from the city centre. 2941

(b) Local reported events

2247. In Belgrade, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that peace talks should be postponed for months because negotiating would be pointless. "Why should we negotiate with the Muslims at all?" Karadžić said. "They are militarily defeated, and we have no urgency to negotiate with them". The latest peace negotiations due to begin Friday in Geneva, were postponed two days by the shelling in Sarajevo. International negotiators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg urged all sides "to exercise restraint and create suitable conditions for talks". 2942

24. 24/7/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Throughout the afternoon and past dusk, Serbian forces renewed artillery and infantry assaults on BiH forces defending strategic hillsides on the northern edge of Sarajevo. The city was hit with tank, artillery and mortar shells on the hillsides of Kobilja Glava, Slatina and Kromolj. UNPROFOR reported that the BiH-controlled area of Žuč was shelled and that over 3,000 impacts were recorded. It was reported that the BiH forces appeared to be holding their own but were sustaining heavy losses. Source(s): New York Times; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Kobilja Glava, Slatina, and Kromolj (hillsides standing above a narrow valley leading to the heart of the city); Žuč; the area near the Egyptian, Ukrainian and French Battalion camps. Source(s): New York Times;
UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2248. Serbian forces renewed intensive artillery and infantry assaults on BiH forces defending strategic hillsides on the northern edge of Sarajevo, apparently seeking a breakthrough that could bring large parts of the city under Serbian control. Throughout the afternoon and past dusk, the city was hit with tank, artillery and mortar shells on Kobilja Glava, Slatina and Kromolj, hillsides standing above a narrow valley leading to the heart of the city. It was reported that the BiH forces appeared to be holding their own, but were said to be taking heavy losses. The Serbian offensive, in its third day, alarmed UN commanders with the possibility that crucial defences of the city could be overrun. 2943/

2249. UNPROFOR reported that the BiH-controlled area of Žuč was shelled and attacked by infantry from the north-west. More than 3,000 impacts were recorded. The area, however, could not be monitored by the UNMOs. The situation was tense for the Egyptian, Ukrainian and French Battalions with small arms fire and artillery impacts near their camps. 2944/

(b) Local reported events

2250. The new UN commander in BiH, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont of Belgium told a news conference that all shelling in the Sarajevo region would be halted at 10:00 a.m. Sunday as part of a BiH-wide agreement, which was to coincide with the reopening of peace talks in Geneva on Sunday. The talks had since been deferred until Tuesday. BiH President Alija Izetbegović demanded that attacks on many of the remaining Muslim population centres in BiH, including Sarajevo, Maglaj, and Mostar, be halted before the BiH government would attend the talks. He also stipulated that Serbian and Croatian forces should halt their attempts to delay and block UN relief convoys. 2945/

2251. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that BiH President Alija Izetbegović must accept the partition of BiH into three ethnic states or Serb forces would settle the question on the battlefield. 2946/

2252. UNPROFOR reported that two UNPROFOR and 15 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 2947/

25. 25/7/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces reportedly attacked the UN peacekeepers base in Sarajevo with dozens of tank and mortar rounds (at least 68 impacts were reported). Government positions on Žuč mountain were reportedly shelled. It was reported that "low level" shelling could be heard from the surrounding hills. Fairly consistent shelling hit the city centre in the afternoon. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Targets Hit: The UNPROFOR base operations centre for French peace-keeping
forces (at least 68 impacts); government positions on Žuč mountain; the city centre (afternoon). Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Description of Damage: A Serbian attack on the UNPROFOR base operations centre for French forces consisted of at least 68 rounds, which destroyed four UN vehicles and damaged eight others. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2253. Serbs attacked the UN peacekeepers' base in Sarajevo with dozens of tank and mortar rounds. No one was hurt. The base commander said it was a direct Serb attack, and UN officials were trying to contact General Ratko Mladić to protest and demand an explanation. "It is a miracle no one was killed or wounded", said a UN spokesman, Commander Barry Frewer. The attack on the UN base consisted of at least 68 rounds, which destroyed four UN vehicles and damaged eight at the base, the operations centre for 150 French peacekeepers brought in to help set up the Sarajevo "safe area". The United Nations believed it was a Serb attack because "it's coming from their direction. We know there are tanks in the area". UN soldiers did not return fire, and Frewer said there would be no retaliation for the incident. But "if this would ever happen again, we are prepared to act in the strongest way", he said. Earlier, base commander Colonel Roger Duburg had suggested that retaliatory air strikes could be ordered under the latest Security Council resolution on BiH. That resolution created six "safe areas", in BiH including Sarajevo and authorized UN air strikes if peacekeepers were attacked. 2948/

2254. BiH radio accused Serbs of violating the new no-offensive accord by shelling government positions on Žuč mountain outside Sarajevo. It was reported that "low level", sporadic shelling could be heard in the city coming from the hills ringing it, and that fairly consistent shelling hit the city centre by afternoon. 2949/

(b) Local reported events

2255. Early in the day, an accord to halt military offensives by the warring factions in BiH had taken effect. All three warring factions claimed that the others had broken the agreement. The UNPROFOR commander for BiH, Lieutenant General Francis Briqueumont of Belgium announced the no-offensive accord Saturday after meeting with officials of the warring parties. 2950/

2256. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that he would attend the peace talks scheduled to start on Tuesday in Geneva if the no-offensive accord held. The talks had been postponed twice because of fighting. Izetbegović said that the United Nations had done almost nothing to implement its "safe areas" scheme for the country's Muslims and called for tougher action by the Security Council. Sarajevo radio said that Izetbegović laid out his objections in a letter to the Council and to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 2951/

26. 26/7/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as quiet but tense. Some sporadic firing was reported by the Egyptian Battalion around the Bistrik
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area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** The Bistrik area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 72 people were killed and 461 wounded in the last week. It also reported cumulatively 9,159 killed (of which 1,466 were children) and 53,759 wounded (of which 14,028 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2257. Sarajevo was quiet but tense. Some sporadic firing was reported by the Egyptian Battalion around the Bistrik area. 2952/

(b) **Local reported events**

2258. In Sarajevo, UN commanders warned Serbs who attacked a UN base Sunday that they faced immediate retaliation if they did it again. Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, UN commander for BiH, said: "I am angry at this betrayal. I have told my commanders they must reply immediately, within the next few seconds". If attacked again, he said, "they must fire against the adversary". French General Jean Cot, commander for all forces in the former Yugoslavia, said the peacekeepers were surprised by the attack as they set up a position in Sarajevo, and had not unpacked weapons, apparently including anti-tank weapons. 2953/

(c) **International reported events**

2259. The BiH government said it would not go to the negotiating table in Geneva until the attacks on Sarajevo had abated. But UN observers reported that Sarajevo was quiet on Monday, and the lull in the fighting appeared to be holding reasonably elsewhere. It was reported that BiH government military setbacks, a tightening blockade of government-controlled areas and divisions in the BiH leadership appeared to have softened Izetbegović's resistance to the plan. "We're leaving with hope and fear but with a strong determination to find an escape from the cycle of killing and suffering", Izetbegović said upon leaving Sarajevo Monday. "If there is a way out, this delegation will find it". On Monday night he held a first meeting with Lord David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, chairmen of the international mediation effort. The new talks were scheduled to begin formally on Tuesday. 2954/

27. 27/7/93 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Bosnian Serb forces reportedly opened a new assault on Žuč mountain, pushing for control of the western end of the city. BiH radio called the attack the biggest push for the mountain. The Serb infantry assault reportedly followed a two hour artillery barrage, and it was not clear if any ground was gained. UNPROFOR reported heavy shelling from Serb positions in Sarajevo between 11:05 a.m. to 1:30p.m. and 4:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. totalling approximately 2,390 artillery, tank and mortar rounds. Areas most effected were in the north of the city. 2955/ UNPROFOR observed four
unusual artillery impacts causing dense smoke which was assessed to be irritant gas. The BiH Liaison Officer reported 14 such impacts. 2956/ Source(s): Chicago Tribune; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Western Sarajevo; the area near the French Battalion at the BiH radio and television centre (seven shells); areas to the north of the city.; the Žuć Mountain area. Source(s): Chicago Tribune; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire reportedly engulfed the centre of the city. Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

**Casualties:** It was reported that the Serb attack on Mount Žuć left about 100 Muslim soldiers dead. 2957/ A 13-year-old boy was reported killed and 21 people wounded in shelling. 2958/ Source(s): Chicago Tribune; Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

2260. Bosnian Serbs opened a new assault on Žuć mountain on Sarajevo's outskirts, pushing for control of the western end of the city. BiH radio called the attack the Serb's biggest push for the mountain. Commentators suggested that if it fell, the Serbs could sweep across the western end of Sarajevo, but the radio reported that defence lines were holding. The Serb infantry assault on Žuć followed a two hour artillery barrage. It wasn't clear if they gained ground, said UN spokesman Commander Barry Frewer. 2959/ 2261. Sniper fire engulfed the city centre while shelling intensified in western Sarajevo. 2960/

2262. UNPROFOR observed four unusual artillery impacts causing dense smoke which was assessed to be irritant gas. The BiH Liaison Officer reported 14 such impacts. 2961/ 2263. Seven shells reportedly landed 500 metres away, and two shells landed 80 metres away from the base of a French battalion unit in the Bosnian radio and television centre. Major Luuk Niessen, a UN press officer, said that the shells were not directed at the unit. 2962/ A Reuter photographer, Chris Helgren, was at the scene. 2963/

(b) **Local reported events**

2264. It was reported that Sarajevo remained without basic utility services. The UN stated that it had not received clearance to carry out repairs on the Serb side. 2964/ UNPROFOR reported that four UNPROFOR and 17 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 2965/

(c) **International reported events**

2265. In Geneva, leaders of all three warring factions held a rare joint meeting. The 90 minute meeting brought BiH President Alija Izetbegović together with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Croatian leader Mate Boban. Karadžić, who had insisted that BiH accept an ethnic partition of the Republic warned: "This is the last chance for an honest peace". Later he said that discussions were going in the "right direction", despite his "basic pessimism". Izetbegović announced "some progress" in the talks. His government still wanted some kind of federation and feared that Serb and Croatian areas would join with neighbouring Serbia and Croatia, leaving Muslims with small land-locked pockets. 2966/
2266. France made a formal request to the UN and NATO for swift action to provide air cover for UN troops after Serb gunners shelled a French engineering unit in Sarajevo Sunday. 2967/

28. 28/7/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling in the Žuč area reportedly eased on this day. Shelling was reported in Iliđa in the evening. Source(s): Chicago Tribune; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Iliđa (evening). Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Thirteen people were wounded when shells fell in Iliđa in the evening. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2267. In Sarajevo it was reported that the Serbs took a break from their assault Tuesday on Mount Žuč west of the city which left a reported 100 Muslim soldiers dead, one of the heaviest one-day losses of the 16 month siege. 2968/

2268. UN military observers confirmed that 13 people were wounded when shells fell on Sarajevo's Serb-held suburb of Iliđa Wednesday evening. 2969/

(b) International reported events

2269. After French UN forces had come under fire from Serbs battling for control of Sarajevo, the UN announced that it was ready to accept its commitment from NATO to use air support to protect troops assigned to defend six "safe zones". UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said that NATO would be ready to supply the air cover early next week when ground observers and other support personnel were in place. Boutros-Ghali said that the air cover would begin, "Monday, Tuesday". United States President Clinton stated: "The United States is bound, we are committed, to come to the aid of the United Nations forces, as a part of NATO, if they are attacked. And they have been". "All this will unfold over the next few days, during which time the Serbs, the Bosnian Serbs, either will or won't stop shelling Sarajevo and will pull back. We'll just have to wait and see what happens", the President said. 2970/

2270. While the UN and NATO worked on military plans, the peace talks in Geneva were reported to have taken a positive turn when leaders of the three warring factions met without mediators for the first time. 2971/

29. 29/7/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Artillery rounds slammed into Žuč hill where BiH forces were trying to resist a Serb advance. At one point the barrage was intense with shells hitting every few seconds. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: The area of Žuč hill. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2271. In Sarajevo, artillery rounds slammed into Žuč hill, where BiH forces were trying to resist a Serb advance. At one point the barrage was intense, with shells every few seconds sending up thick black smoke from behind a line of trees on the ridge of the hill. The shelling rattled windows at UN headquarters in Sarajevo one mile away. "We expect it is the continuation of a push by Serbs", UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said. "The Bosnians are continuing to put up their defence and counter-attack. There is shelling on both sides but predominantly on the Serb side", he told reporters. 2972/ Frewer told reporters that some shells fired in the Žuč battle appeared to contain riot-control gas, but there was no evidence to back Muslim allegations that the Serbs were using poison gas. 2973/

(b) Local reported events

2272. In its monthly engineering report UNPROFOR addressed the worsening utilities situation in the city. UNPROFOR commented that electricity was and would remain the key to all utilities problems inside the sector (due to its connection to all other utilities). UNPROFOR stated that Serb forces had denied all access to the repair location on the line which was supplying the town (Reljovo/Vogošća) and that fighting and shelling had provoked cuts and damages in the northern area of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR also commented that only five of the 15 scheduled electricity repair missions were successful during the month. UNPROFOR stated that water supplies had improved in parts of the city (notably the west part which was supplied through the reservoir of Mojmilo starting on 13 July). Gas supplies remained turned off. 2974/

(c) International reported events

2273. In Geneva, BiH President Alija Izetbegović, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Croat chief Mate Boban agreed to cease hostilities and ordered their forces to implement the truce accord immediately. 2975/ Geneva Conference sources reportedly said that Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was offering the Muslims about a quarter of BiH territory, an area around Sarajevo and a pocket in the north-west. 2976/ 2274. The BiH leadership's international legal adviser, Francis Boyle of the University of Illinois College of Law, filed a petition in the Hague asking it to prevent the dissolution of BiH as a member of the UN, which he said would follow the acceptance of a peace plan. 2977/

2275. After an hour-long meeting with Defense Secretary Les Aspin, French Defence Minister François Leotard told reporters at the Pentagon that the western allies would not tolerate any further attacks on UN troops in BiH and were prepared to launch air strikes if they continued. 2978/

2276. Seven war wounded from Sarajevo, six of them children, were reportedly being flown to Italy by the UN, according to UN officials. 2979/
30. 30/7/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A shell hit an unidentified court yard in the city and general sniper fire and shelling was reported. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: An unidentified court yard where a group of children were playing. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A shell landed in a courtyard where a group of children were playing, watched by their mothers. One boy and two women were killed, and seven children and five adults were wounded. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported on this day. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: One boy and two women were killed, and seven children and five adults were wounded when a shell landed in an unidentified courtyard where children were playing while supervised by their mothers. According to hospital sources, seven people were killed and 33 wounded by artillery and sniper fire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2277. A shell landed in a courtyard where a group of children were playing watched by their mothers. One boy and two women were killed, and seven children and five adults were wounded. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

(b) Local reported events

2278. In BiH, the commanders of the warring factions signed an immediate cease-fire for all of BiH. The agreement permitted for the free movement of relief convoys.

2279. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, who initially accused Muslim forces of staging the attack on French UN soldiers on Sunday, reportedly said that Serb gunners may have fired at the French by mistake. Karadžić said that those suspected to be responsible for the attack were being arrested.

(c) International reported events

2280. In Geneva, BiH President Izetbegović reached an agreement with leaders of Bosnian Serbs and Croats. The agreement covered only the broad constitutional arrangements that would govern a new tripartite federation but constitutional principles had not been a stumbling block in previous negotiations. Before finalizing a peace plan the parties still had to finalize another accord fixing the precise frontiers of the three new republics, therefore deciding how much territory each faction would control. Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Bosnian Serbs expressed optimism stating: "Only a few spots on the map remain in dispute, and these should be resolved this weekend". President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia was similarly optimistic, predicting that a final peace agreement would be signed by all the faction leaders by Sunday or Monday. He said later on Sarajevo radio, "The hardest part of the job still remains. Everything will be worthless if there is no agreement on the maps". Serbian President Slobodan Milošević described the
accord as "the biggest step toward peace we have ever made since the beginning of the war". 2985/

2281. The document agreed upon provided for a weak central government having no police force or army of its own and would take responsibility for little more than the management of foreign policy and trade. All remaining powers would be vested in the governments of the three republics. 2986/

2282. Despite the agreement in Geneva, US officials in Washington said that they were pressing ahead with their efforts to develop a plan for air strikes. The officials said that there was a broad agreement within the US government that Washington should be prepared to use air power to protect UN peacekeepers, ensure the delivery of food and other aid and prevent the fall of Sarajevo and other key Muslim enclaves. 2987/

2283. UN officials in New York said that one Spanish soldier attached to the UN peace-keeping operation in BiH was killed and 17 wounded when two mortar rounds hit their headquarters in the town of Jablanica. A spokesman for Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said the incident could be the "trigger" for NATO air strikes, once it became clear who carried out the attack. 2988/ The UN Security Council called for nations to prepare to use air strikes in BiH in response to the attack. 2989/

31. 31/7/93 (Saturday)
(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After a week of intense fighting, Sarajevo was reported as mostly quiet, with Serbian shells striking sporadically in civilian areas of the city. The signing of a cease-fire appeared to have brought a lull to the battle that had raged for days on the BiH stronghold atop Žuč Mountain. Source(s): New York Times.


Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Reports on the casualties suffered by the BiH army during the battle of Žuč ranged from 150 to 300 killed. Wounded soldiers at the Koševo hospital estimated the figure at 300 dead. Most of the bodies remained on the battlefield at Žuč awaiting efforts by the United Nations to broker an agreement for their recovery. 2990/ Source(s): New York Times.

Narrative of Events:
2284. After a week that saw some of the most intense fighting of the war, Sarajevo was reported as being mostly quiet, although Serbian shells continued to strike sporadically in civilian districts of the city. The signing of the cease-fire appeared to have brought a lull to the battle that had raged for days on the BiH stronghold atop Žuč Mountain. 2991/

(b) Local reported events

2285. BiH political and military leadership remained divided over the peace agreement reached on Friday. "The text was not signed", Miro Lazović, the speaker of the BiH parliament and a member of the presidency said of the
agreement. "We only accepted it as a basis for further talks". Lazović's explanation underscored the deepening confusion in Geneva about the real willingness of the BiH leadership to accept the division of BiH along ethnic lines. Lazović also had his doubts about the willingness of the BiH army to go along with the plan. Lazović said that only the three Croatian members of the 10 member BiH Presidency, together with Fikret Abdić, the leader of the Biha Muslims in north-western BiH and "maybe President Alija Izetbegović . . . believe we should go with the new agreement". Izetbegović and Abdić were the only two members of the Presidency at the meeting during which the constitutional pact was apparently accepted. 2992/

2286. The leaders of the BiH and Serbian factions spent the day trying to resolve issues concerning the boundaries of the ethnic republics that would be established under the plan. 2993/

(c) International reported events

2287. The peace conference co-chairmen held bilateral talks with Izetbegović and Karadžić, and Boban and Karadžić. The day ended with a trilateral meeting with Izetbegović, Karadžić and Boban. 2994/

2288. The United States began meetings with France and Britain to discuss the possibility of bombing targets threatening Sarajevo. There was reportedly a building consensus that about 60 warplanes already stationed in the region (30 of them American) would provide air cover for the UN forces protecting relief convoys and six civilian "safe zones" including Sarajevo. Officials in Washington said that the NATO council would meet Monday to discuss the use of air power in BiH. Sarajevo is "very important symbolically" to the Muslims said Madeline Albright, US ambassador to the UN. "Everybody that watches what's going on in Sarajevo believes that more has to be done to alleviate the suffering there". Commentators suggested that even if the West did not initiate its threatened bomb runs, the current threats were viewed as a useful tool, keeping negotiators at the bargaining table in Geneva, discouraging the Serbs from making a final push for Sarajevo and serving notice that a peace enforced by the UN troops would have some force behind it. 2995/

Q. August 1993
  1. 1/8/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported on Mts. Igman and Bjelašnica. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Mount Igman; Mount Bjelašnica. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Snipers killed three people and wounded five others as they crossed the UN-controlled airport, according to a UN military spokesman. 2996/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Three people were killed and five others wounded by sniper fire at the airport. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 62 killed and 301 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,221 killed (of
which 1,482 were children), and 54,060 wounded (of which 14,112 were children). Source(s): Reuters; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2289. Shelling was reported on Mount Igman throughout the day. BiH Interior Minister Bakir Alispahić said that about 10 villages in the area of Mount Bjelašnica and neighbouring Igman were burned down in the day's offensive. Alispahić, in a letter to UN forces made available to reporters, claimed that the assault was directed personally by the Bosnian Serb army commander, General Ratko Mladić, despite his agreement to a cease-fire Friday.

2290. The Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency reported that Bosnian Serbs claimed to have captured strategic Mountain Bjelašnica overlooking the city after several days of fighting. BiH Radio reported Serb shelling there early in the day, and plumes of smoke were visible on its slopes. Bosnian Serb army general staff sources said that Serb forces controlled the BiH Television relay station located on the summit; however, as BiH Television carried on its evening program uninterrupted, the Serb claim seemed doubtful. UN monitors were not allowed access to the mountain zone or to the adjacent Mount Igman.

2291. Sporadic fighting was reported, as the city remained without electric power and water.

(b) Local reported events

2292. High-ranking BiH, Serb and Croat officers held talks at the Butmir airport outside Sarajevo on the cease-fire accord signed Friday, which none of the three factions had respected. A UN military spokesman said the talks had covered freedom of movement for UN military observers to monitor the truce.

(c) International reported events

2293. In Geneva, the peace conference co-chairmen met with BiH opposition leaders. After separate talks with Karadžić and Boban, a further trilateral meeting was held with Izetbegović and the Bosnian Serb and Croat leadership.

2294. In Geneva, BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that he would pull out of peace talks unless Serbs halted attacks around Sarajevo and Brčko in the north. Sources close to the peace talks said that major territorial issues remained unresolved.

2295. The Washington Post reported that the US would bring a proposal for military intervention in BiH to a NATO meeting Monday in Brussels. The decision to present the plan was made at a meeting Saturday attended by President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, Defense Secretary Aspin, National Security Advisor Lake and General Powell, the armed forces Chief of General Staff. Vice President Gore refused to discuss the possible use of air power, but said "there is movement" among US allies toward agreement on what to do.

2296. In Madrid, Spanish Defence Minister Julian Garcia Vargas said he would support selective air strikes in BiH to protect civilians, UN peace-keeping troops and, in particular, the city of Sarajevo. In an interview with
the state news agency Efe, he stated that: "The international community has acted so far with caution and what is now needed is firm action". 3011/ 

2. 2/8/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces reportedly captured Mount Bjelašnica in a huge offensive. There was only sporadic firing in Sarajevo. 3012/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2297. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić confirmed that Serb forces, in a "huge offensive" backed by helicopters, had captured Mount Bjelašnica. BiH President Alija Izetbegović immediately threatened to pull out of the peace negotiations in Geneva if the Serbs did not give up this gain. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić was reported to have assented, agreeing to surrender the mountain to UN control. 3013/

2298. There was only sporadic firing in Sarajevo. 3014/

(b) Local reported events

2299. The commander of the Bosnian Serb air force, General ivomir Ninkovi, told Belgrade radio that Serb forces would respond "by all available means" to any Western attack on their positions. 3015/

2300. It was reported that 15 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3016/

(c) International reported events

2301. The latest round of peace talks was postponed in Geneva at the request of BiH President Alija Izetbegović. Conference sources said that the BiH leadership was seeking time in light of US proposals to use military force against Bosnian Serb positions. BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić described Serb attacks around Sarajevo as "breaking of good faith". Silajdžić reportedly said, "The condition for successful negotiations was to restore electricity, water and gas to Sarajevo". Division of the map of BiH continued to be the "thorniest issue" at the talks, according to conference spokesman John Mills. 3017/

2302. In Brussels, Senior NATO officials met for 12 hours to discuss a US plan for air strikes against Serb positions, in particular around Sarajevo. 3018/ Diplomats at NATO headquarters said final decisions on when and where to use air power rested with UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. 3019/ They said in a communiqué that the alliance would make preparations to take "stronger measures including air strikes" if the strangulation of Sarajevo
continued. 3020/ No immediate air strikes were ordered. NATO sources said that members of the alliance with troops in BiH were concerned that those troops could be endangered by air strikes and the retaliation which could follow air strikes. Meanwhile, in Washington, President Clinton told reporters, "I don't believe that the allies will permit Sarajevo to either fall or starve". 3021/

2303. Mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg reportedly registered their opposition to air strikes, on the grounds that it would hurt the peace process. 3022/

2304. Several high-ranking members of the mainly European UN force stationed in Sarajevo said that they were opposed to the US proposal to launch air strikes against Serb positions besieging Sarajevo. One high-ranking European officer reportedly said, "In BiH alone, there are thousands of UN soldiers and relief workers whom it would be impossible to protect from becoming targets and hostages once the first bomb is dropped". Barry Frewer, UNPROFOR spokesman, said that UN troops were awaiting orders on the matter. 3023/

3. 3/8/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Koševo Hospital received only four wounded patients, the lowest total in months. Source(s): New York Times.

**Narrative of Events:**

2305. UNPROFOR sent a five-member monitoring team to explore the situation on Mount Bjelašnica, according to Barry Frewer, UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo. 3024/

2306. At Koševo Hospital, the trauma clinic received only four patients with war wounds all day, the lowest toll in months. 3025/

(b) International reported events

2307. In Geneva, the three Croatian members of the collective BiH Presidency, Mile Akmadžić, Franjo Boras and Miro Lasić, said they were not walking out, but were boycotting the talks as long as Muslims continue to attack Bosnian Croats. They refused to recognize BiH President Alija Izetbegović as representing the collective presidency. Izetbegović shunned the talks because of the continued Bosnian Serb siege of Sarajevo. 3026/ Mediators called the presidents of Serbia and Croatia back to Geneva in an effort to get the three warring factions to resume negotiations. Momir Bulatović, the president of Montenegro, also flew back to Geneva. 3027/ John Mills, spokesman for the mediators, said that the scheduled meeting did not take place. Mills said, "Directives from the leaders to military commanders have resulted in a very significant reduction in the intensity of fighting". He looked forward to the installation of UN military observers on hills around Sarajevo. 3028/
2308. US officials welcomed the support of European allies for air strikes. President Clinton said that the allies delivered the message that they were "determined to protect UN forces [in BiH], determined to secure the humanitarian relief program". According to the Washington Post, a US official said that "speculations about [air strikes] over the last few days may have encouraged Serb flexibility" at the bargaining table in Geneva. 3029/ Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that Western threats could adversely affect peace talks by encouraging the Muslims to hold out for military intervention. 3030/ Lord Owen said that he was satisfied with the NATO alliance's threat to conduct air strikes against Serbian forces in BiH. Officials close to Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg said they believed that NATO had signaled to the BiH Government that the US would not intervene on its own against the Serbs, and that the Muslims should return to the talks. 3031/

4. 4/8/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Serbian tanks, artillery and infantry appeared to have trapped BiH forces atop Mount Igman. It was reported that the only gap in the Serbian siege lines around Sarajevo remained along a corridor of territory which connected the suburb of Dobrinja, on the south-western edge of Sarajevo, across the airport to two other BiH-held suburbs, Butmir and Hrasnica, and, from there, over Mount Igman to Konjic and Jablanica. Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2309. Lieutenant Commander Barry Frewer, spokesman for the UN military command, said that Serbian tanks, artillery and infantry appeared to have trapped BiH forces atop Mount Igman. It was reported that the only gap in the Serbian siege lines around Sarajevo remained along a corridor of territory which connected the BiH-held suburb of Dobrinja, on the south-western edge of Sarajevo, across the airport to two other BiH-held suburbs, Butmir and Hrasnica, and, from there, over Mount Igman to Konjic and Jablanica. From Jablanica, BiH forces had maintained a tenuous supply line to the Adriatic coastline of Croatia. This supply line reportedly had served both soldiers and civilians. The capture of Mount Igman threatened to sever this supply line. Also, the capture of Mount Igman reportedly endangered the 32,000 Muslim civilians living in villages in the vicinity. Their flight path as refugees would take them across the airfield. The agreement by which the airport was ceded to the UN prohibited civilian crossing of the airfield. Those who had done so invariably came under fire from Serbian guns at both ends of the runway. 3032/

(b) Local reported events

2310. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said his troops were ready to hand over to UN peacekeepers the key hills near Sarajevo. According to Karadžić, the UN had already taken over part of Mount Igman and was flying its flag
there. Karadžić said that the Serb advance in the Igman area was not a Serb offensive, but rather served to protect Serb-populated parts of Sarajevo from Muslim bombardment. 3033/

2311. British Brigadier General Hayes, Chief of Staff of UN forces in BiH, told reporters in the BiH capital that the BiH army bore the main blame for blocking relief supplies to Sarajevo. He said the current Serb assault on Mount Igman was strangling only the BiH military supply line into Sarajevo. 3034/

2312. It was reported that 15 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3035/

(c) International reported events

2313. In Geneva, Lord Owen said that the air raids proposed by the Clinton administration were inadequate. "The only military solution is if you're prepared to put ground troops in and take it seriously", he said. He appealed to the international community to give peace efforts a chance before ordering airstrikes. Later, Serbian and Croatian leaders quit the peace talks and headed home, promising to return Friday if President Izetbegović agreed to rejoin negotiations. 3036/

2314. In Washington, the State Department's chief expert on BiH, Marshal Freeman Harris, resigned, charging that the Clinton administration was putting undue pressure on the BiH government to agree to the partition of the country. In a letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Harris said the US push for airstrikes was too little, came too late and represented an abandonment of the stance that BiH should be preserved as an independent state. 3037/ He wrote, "I can no longer serve in a Department of State that accepts the forceful dismemberment of a European state and that will not act against genocide and the Serbian officials who perpetrate it". He wrote that in pressuring BiH to agree to a partition, the Clinton administration was "driving the BiH Government to surrender its territory and its sovereignty to the victors in a war of aggression". 3038/

5. 5/8/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported quiet after some small arms and anti-aircraft fire and distant shelling overnight. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2315. Following their meeting in Pale, UNPROFOR General Francis Briquemont and Bosnian Serb leader Ratko Mladić left to inspect Mount Igman and Mount Bjelašnica. 3039/ Briquemont spent more than one hour on the summit of Mount Bjelašnica, where he saw about 30 Serb soldiers. Ambulances evacuated wounded
soldiers to the rear. Piles of shell cases littered the mountainside. Clashes reportedly were visible between Bosnian Serb and Muslim forces below. 3040/ Sarajevo radio quoted the BiH Army 1st Corps, responsible for defending Sarajevo, as saying that it had secured the village of Malo Polje on the south slopes of Igman. 3041/

2316. Sarajevo was quiet 3042/ after some small arms and anti-aircraft fire and distant shelling overnight. 3043/

(b) Local reported events

2317. According to Bosnian Serb leader Nikola Koljević, UN peacekeepers would replace Serb forces on Mount Igman on Friday. Lord David Owen and Thorwald Stoltenberg confirmed that Bosnian Serbs had agreed to cede Mount Igman to UN troops, and to instruct their military commanders to negotiate the opening of roads leading to Sarajevo to all except military vehicles. 3044/ The agreement was reached in Pale, where Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and his military chief Ratko Mladić met with an UNPROFOR delegation led by General Francis Briquemont, head of UN forces in BiH. Karadžić read a joint statement, which said he had agreed to withdraw forces from Mount Igman, to allow UNPROFOR to occupy the area and to reopen two access roads to and from the capital to UNPROFOR, UNHCR, civil and commercial vehicles. The opening of the roads would be discussed Friday. 3045/

2318. The withdrawal from Mount Igman was the condition set by BiH President Alija Izetbegović for the resumption of the international peace talks in Geneva. 3046/ Talks in Geneva were suspended until Monday, according to UN spokesman John Mills. 3047/

2319. A meeting was scheduled for Friday to discuss supplying Sarajevo with electricity, gas and water. 3048/

2320. It was reported that 16 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3049/

2321. According to a Sarajevo radio report, UNPROFOR officials in Sarajevo said that clashes around Gornji Vakuf had blocked for the past week a number of humanitarian relief convoys bringing food and medicine to Sarajevo. 3050/

(c) International reported events

2322. The BiH Presidency resumed talks with the peace conference co-chairmen. 3051/

2323. Paddy Ashdown, the leader of Britain's Liberal-Democratic Party, told BBC television that he had suggested to the Serbs that there be "an area of no-go around Sarajevo--and that after a certain deadline any heavy weapons seen in that area would be subject to air attack". According to Ashdown, the Serbs agreed to this proposal. Ashdown said that with winter approaching, the West had "somewhere between six and eight weeks to save the city, to lift the blockade and to get supplies through". 3052/

2324. In Amman, US Secretary of State Christopher said he would fly to Italy Friday for NATO talks on possible air strikes against the Serbs. Meanwhile, an association of 51 Islamic countries called to Geneva for rapid implementation of NATO proposals for air strikes. 3053/
6. 6/8/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo radio reported that Serbian forces had reinforced troops on Mount Igman. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2325. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

2326. Bosnian Serb Commander General Ratko Mladić said he was reluctant to fulfill his promise to withdraw troops from Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica. Mladić told Dnevnik, the government-run Serbian newspaper, that Serbian troops would not withdraw until politicians agreed on ending the war. Sarajevo radio reported that Serbian forces had reinforced troops on Mount Igman.

2327. It was reported that 14 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day.

7. 7/8/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN observers reported that Serbian forces opened fire on BiH Army units that were abandoning positions on Mount Igman and withdrawing to Hrasnica. It was also reported that there were no Bosnian Serb movements to withdraw from the area. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2328. UN military observers reported that Serbian forces opened fire at BiH Army units that were abandoning positions on Mount Igman and withdrawing to Hrasnica. In Sarajevo, Barry Frewer, UN spokesman, reported, "What we are seeing is the Bosnian Serb army consolidating up there . . . There are no movements at this time to withdraw". Commander Frewer described talks on the Serbian withdrawal from Igman as "virtually at an impasse". UN civilian official Viktor Andreyev described General Mladić, the Serbian military commander, as "emotional" during talks in which Mladić referred to the supply route across Mount Igman as "Allah's road." According to one report,
however, Mladić agreed that UN peacekeepers were free to deploy observers on the heights. 3057/

2329. Two BiH soldiers returning to Sarajevo from the battle zone said that the BiH garrison on Mount Igman had been effectively abandoned, with units retreating north to Sarajevo and south toward the towns of Lokve and Pazari. 3058/

2330. The Tanjug news agency said that the Serbian military command in BiH ordered its forces around Sarajevo to refrain completely from "all combat activities which, however, does not exclude the right for self-defence". 3059/

(b) Local reported events

2331. In Pale, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić told Reuters Television that he had set as a condition for the withdrawal of troops from Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica that the UN install troops sufficient not only to observe but to take over the area. 3060/

2332. It was reported that 17 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3061/

(c) International reported events

2333. BiH President Alija Izetbegović called for a meeting of the UN Security Council to confirm the primacy of principles laid down at the 1992 London conference on the former Yugoslavia. In a letter to Council President Madeleine Albright of the US, he said current negotiations in Geneva "sanction genocide and reward aggression while making Bosnia the victim forced to accept humiliating terms in order to establish peace". This referred particularly to the future of Sarajevo, "which is to be divided, isolated and sentenced to a slow annihilation", he said. 3062/

2334. US officials said that it agreed not to bomb any target in the former Yugoslavia without the approval of UN ground commanders. 3063/

8. 8/8/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The day's events focused on the negotiations on Bosnian Serb withdrawal from positions on Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica.
Source(s): New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2335. General Ratko Mladić, commander of the Serbian army in BiH, said he would make a "phased withdrawal" from positions on Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica
after five hours of talks at Sarajevo airport with UN commander, Lieutenant
General Francis Briquemont. UN spokesman, Lieutenant Commander Barry Frewer,
said that the Serbs' removal on Saturday of two tanks and several heavy guns
from Mount Igman appeared to have been "stage management", rather than a sign
of withdrawal. General Mladić said the Serbs would give up positions one by
one, contingent on their replacement by UN forces. They would withdraw only
if fully guaranteed that the BiH army would not regain the positions. General
Mladić said that the first step would be reconnaissance of Mount Igman at 6:00
a.m. Monday by UN and Serbian units. At 9:00 a.m., Serbs would pull back from
the 6,800-foot peak of Mount Bjelašnica. There was speculation that the
demand that UN resources cover the ceded territory could cause delays in the
pullback because the UN commanders repeatedly stated that their overall force,
about 9,000 troops, allowed only for monitoring, not control, of the areas
that Serbian forces had left. 3064/

(b) Local reported events

2336. Bosnian Croat representatives reportedly rejected the proposal made by
Alija Izetbegović in Geneva last week, to join forces with Muslims to form a
joint Muslim-Croatian state in BiH. "Our experience tells us that any
agreement with Muslims would only cause damage to Croats", said Miro Lasić,
one of three Croat members of the BiH collective presidency. "Too much blood
of Croatian civilians was spilled by Izetbegović's forces", Lasic said in an
interview with Zagreb government-controlled radio. 3065/

2337. Dr. Edin Jaganac, a French military doctor sent by UNPROFOR, 3066/ was
frustrated in repeated efforts to evacuate a five year-old girl from Sarajevo.
The girl, Irma Hadžimuratović, was wounded 10 days ago when Serbian mortar
fire hit a street near Irma's home, killing two people, including Irma's
mother, and wounding 12 children. A committee of four foreign doctors was
required to approve every evacuation aboard a UN aeroplane. Two of the four
committee members were based outside BiH, had no plans to meet, and there were
no emergency provisions for such a situation. 3067/ According to one report,
a further obstacle to flying the child out of Sarajevo was that the agreement
which opened the airport for international aid airlifts required the Bosnian
Serbs to have up to three days' notice of UN flight schedules. 3068/ Those
responsible for the 20 UN aircraft which left Sarajevo each day refused to
transport the girl. 3069/ One report stated that the UN, while unable to
evacuate the child, had allowed local employees of the UN headquarters in
Sarajevo to leave on short notice. 3070/ "If she stays in this hospital, she
will die, that is certain", said Dr. Jaganac, referring to adverse hospital
conditions, including a lack of main electricity and the impossibility of
conducting extensive blood tests. Dr. Jaganac said, "We would not be asking
the United Nations to evacuate a patient that we thought would die
anyway". 3071/

2338. It was reported that 16 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during
the day. 3072/

9. 9/8/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Activity on Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica were
monitored by UNPROFOR for signs of Bosnian Serb troop withdrawal. The
television tower atop Mount Bjelašnica was reportedly destroyed by the Serb
forces. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse; New York
Times.

Description of Damage: UN officers said that a Serbian special forces unit (called Cobra), which had led the assault on Mount Bjelašnica, dynamited the television tower atop the mountain so that it leaned over "like a broken matchstick." Sarajevo radio reported that Serb forces over the weekend had destroyed two unidentified hotels located on Mount Igman. Source(s): New York Times; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 17 killed and 148 wounded in the last week. It also reported cumulatively 9,238 killed (of which 1,487 were children) and 54,208 wounded (of which 14,149 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2339. Peter Osborne, a spokesman for UNPROFOR, said that there was no apparent sign of Serbian withdrawal from the positions overlooking Sarajevo. Earlier in the day, two UN military observers said that the Serbian flag had been taken down from the summit of Mount Bjelašnica, but when UNPROFOR troops arrived at the summit around 4:00 p.m. they were met by Serb soldiers who told them to leave after one hour there. Initially, UN troops sent to monitor the Serbs' withdrawal had been hindered by demonstrators, minefields and bad weather in trying to reach the heights. Observers said that demonstrators, mostly women, blocking the patrol at the village of Blažuj were likely encouraged by Serb militiamen opposed to the Geneva peace process. UN officers said that the Serbian special forces unit, called Cobra, which had led the assault on Mount Bjelašnica, dynamited the television tower atop the mountain so that it leaned over "like a broken matchstick". Serbian officers reportedly belied the importance of pullback activity by pointing out that control of the summit was strategically irrelevant since their advance had carried them five miles past the base of Bjelašnica.

2340. UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said that there was no indication that Serbs had withdrawn or begun to withdraw from neighbouring Mount Igman. The captain of the UN reconnaissance team sent to Mount Igman reportedly said, "They have absolutely no intention of withdrawing, as far as I can tell". State-run Sarajevo radio said that Serb forces over the weekend had destroyed two hotels on Mount Igman. According to one report, almost all of the buildings between Veliko Polje and Malo Polje were burned.

2341. A BiH soldier, standing in a forest clearing on Mount Igman, told reporters, "A Serbian withdrawal? . . . Let me tell you: when you reporters are around, or the United Nations, the Serbs behave like babies. But as soon as you go, pow! Tanks, howitzers, mortars, antiaircraft guns--everything".

2342. Serb demonstrators blocked the UN patrol scouting one of the two supply routes slated to be cleared for the transport of humanitarian aid between Mostar and Sarajevo, according to UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer. Frewer said a second patrol in charge of monitoring a route between Sarajevo and Zenica was unhindered in accomplishing its mission.

2343. At the front line, at the ski village of Malo Polje, Serbian tanks and howitzers shrouded beneath pine branches reportedly aimed at BiH positions a half-mile ahead. Serbian soldiers in tented camps reportedly were seen
fetching water and cooking over wood fires. Spent shell casings littered the road. A soldier reportedly said, "Pull back? Why? This is Serbian land". Across the line, over the bank of a road blocked by a fallen tree, a man identified as Mr. Kozar and 10 other soldiers stood over a wood fire with nothing but assault rifles to defend their positions. Kozar said that Serbian attacks, backed by helicopters, had been so sudden and overpowering that the BiH forces had no chance of resisting. Survivors, he said, waited in the forests without even dugouts to protect them. 3084/

(b) Local reported events

2344. Five year-old Irma Hadžimuratović was flown out of BiH after the British government provided an aircraft for her evacuation. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd told the BBC that a Royal Air Force Hercules aeroplane, usually used to shuttle relief supplies, carried the girl to Ancona on the Adriatic coast of Italy where she was transported on an air ambulance to Britain. 3085/

(c) International reported events

2345. BiH President Alija Izetbegović, in Geneva, said that negotiations would resume Tuesday if the Serbs withdrew from the hills surrounding Sarajevo. 3086/ Radovan Karadžić reportedly told the BBC, "Step by step, we are withdrawing from [Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman], replacing our forces with the forces of UN" Karadžić reportedly said that the shelling of Sarajevo would cease. 3087/

2346. NATO leaders approved a joint plan for possible air strikes on Bosnian Serbs to break the siege of Sarajevo, but deferred the prospect of an immediate attack and gave the UN Secretary General an effective veto on such military action. The ambassadors of the 16 NATO nations said in a communique that they had endorsed a list of options drawn up by the alliance's military committee over the past week. According to a NATO official, the list specified types of targets--such as heavy artillery pieces, supply and transport links, and command centres--but not specific ones. The leaders made clear that the choices they endorsed were in support of humanitarian relief efforts, rather than any of the warring parties. Any military action would be determined jointly by NATO and the UN. Leaders said they were ready to convene at short notice to decide whether to implement air strikes if the strangulation of Sarajevo continued and UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked NATO to act. A senior US official said the alliance would be prepared to bomb within one to two days. 3088/ NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said the necessary precautions had been taken to ensure the safety of UN troops in BiH against Serb retaliation following NATO air attacks. 3089/

10. 10/8/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb forces on the surrounding mountains continued to be monitored. UNPROFOR stated that it had noticed increased movements of Serbian military vehicles on Igman, but that it was too early to say whether they were preparing to withdraw. UN troops sent to monitor the withdrawal said that they had been refused permission to patrol by Serbian officers. Reporters who had reached Serbian positions said that all signs on the two mountains pointed to a consolidation of the Serbian strongholds. They said that they had seen columns of self-propelled field guns and military trucks moving along the main access routes to the mountains, backed up by at

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2347. UNPROFOR spokesman Frewer stated that the UN had "noticed increased movements of [Serb] military vehicles on Igman, but it is still early to say whether they are preparing to withdraw". 3090/ Reporters who crossed the Serbian siege lines and reached Serbian positions on the heights returned to the city at night with the news that all signs on the two mountains pointed to a consolidation of the Serbian strongholds. They said they had seen columns of self-propelled field guns and military trucks moving along the main access routes to the mountains, backed up by at least 600 newly-arrived soldiers. UN officers in Sarajevo said that radio reports from their military observers confirmed this information. UN troops sent to monitor the withdrawal from the mountains said that they had been halted by Serbian officers as soon as they reached the mountains and had been refused permission to patrol. 3091/

2348. Two reporters who reached the Serbian front lines on Mount Igman at Malo Polje said they saw Serbian soldiers formed into platoons, who claimed to have been fighting for a month in Banja Luka, where fresh units drawn from the Trnovo area would replace them. The reporters said they saw no evidence of any pullback of tanks, howitzers and antiaircraft guns deployed along the road at Malo Polje and in forest clearings beside the road. Instead Serbian forces appeared to be covering the heavy weapons with fir tree branches, apparently in an effort to conceal the weapons from possible air attacks. The reporters said that they had seen Serbian replacement troops, along with heavy guns and ammunition, arriving at a burned-out Muslim village about halfway between Trnovo and Mount Igman. 3092/

(b) Local reported events

2349. According to the New York Times, anonymous UN sources said that Serbian commanders appeared to have decided that NATO had attached such stringent conditions to planning for air strikes that the threat of bombing was far less than Serbian commanders had previously feared. In deciding whether to withdraw from the heights around Sarajevo, UN sources said, the Serbs seemed to have followed closely negotiations between the US and NATO allies on terms for bombing attacks. 3093/

2350. General Mladić, Commander of Bosnian Serb forces, met through the day and into the night at Butmir airport with UN commander Francis Briquemont, who sought a broader agreement which would commit the Serbian forces to lift the siege of Sarajevo. 3094/

2351. As Irma Hadžimuratović, the five year-old girl injured by mortar fire and evacuated from Sarajevo underwent emergency surgery in London, a spokesman for the BiH Government information centre in London spoke bitterly of the effort required to evacuate one girl from a city where three children died daily as a result of the lack of fuel, electricity and medicine in the hospitals. 3095/ Reportedly, 40 critically wounded people, including 11 year-old Edhem Dedović who had lost an eye, waited on a UN evacuation list for a
country and a hospital to offer treatment impossible in Sarajevo. 3096/ UNHCR officer Tony Land in Sarajevo called for more offers to enable evacuations. "The bed is no good unless there is someone to meet the expense", he was reported to have said. UNHCR Sarajevo spokesman Peter Kessler said that the US had taken 19 cases, but were only convinced after great persuasion to take seriously-injured patients. 3097/

(c) International reported events

2352. In Geneva, peace negotiations were canceled when President Izetbegović failed to attend. The Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency reported that Izetbegović met privately with peace negotiators Stoltenberg and Owen after appearing late in the afternoon at the Palace of Nations. Peace conference spokesman John Mills told reporters that Stoltenberg and Owen had earlier called in Karadžić and his Bosnian Serb delegation to demand the evacuation of Mount Igman. Mills said that Karadžić, in the presence of the co-chairmen, telephoned General Ratko Mladić, commander of the Bosnian Serb forces. 3098/

2353. UNPROFOR spokesman Frewer said that NATO had not decided on immediate bombing attacks aimed at strongholds around Sarajevo. "Right now we don't see any indication that we would need the use of air power", he said. According to the New York Times, UN commanders' opposition to airstrikes stemmed from a belief that it was safer and in the long run more effective to placate the Serbian forces than to confront them. 3099/

2354. The Irish government said it would provide emergency orthopedic surgery for five BiH children and accept a group of 200 refugees, most of them relatives of members of a similar group allowed to settle in Ireland last year. 3100/

11. 11/8/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity


Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2355. A reporter who reached Trnovo, the Serbian-held town which served as a base camp for forces on Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman, said that he had seen a convoy of buses arriving in the town with Serbian soldiers returning from the front. Serbian officers had told the reporter that 2,500 Serbian troops were being withdrawn, leaving 1,500 troops in position. Despite the fact that UN reconnaissance missions claimed to be unable to monitor the withdrawal, UN commanders in Sarajevo depicted the Serbian forces as cooperating in the withdrawal plan. A spokesman conceded, however, that the withdrawal was not significant and that the limited number of UN observers (less than 10) had complicated its assessments. The UN spokesman told reporters that UN observers had filed reports on Tuesday which described the
withdrawal of 250 Serbian troops from Mount Bjelašnica, along with three
tanks, two howitzers and five self-propelled guns, but the spokesman said that
it was not clear where the units were heading. 3101/

(b) Local reported events

2356. Relief officials said that the Croatian nationalist army, not the
Serbian forces, were the main problem for relief efforts because of obstacles
to truck movement through central BiH. More than half of all UN aid had to
pass through that region on its way to Sarajevo, Zenica and Tuzla. Anthony C.
Land, head of UN relief operations in Sarajevo, said that Croatian forces
required separate permits for every relief truck and imposed 72 hour delays on
convoys moving into BiH from the main UN depot at Metković, Croatia. Also, by
refusing to allow passage through a main artery, Croats had added days to
delivery times by forcing aid convoys to make a 140 mile detour over unpaved
mountain roads. According to Land, UN trucks were delivering only a quarter
of the food possible because of delays. 3102/

2357. The British and Swedish governments said they would evacuate 41 war
victims from Sarajevo. Britain would receive 20 of the injured, Sweden 16 and
Ireland five. 3103/ Spokesman Manuel Almeida of UNHCR in Zagreb said that the
breakthrough on evacuating Sarajevans occurred after a private relief agency,
the International Organization for Migration, IOM, agreed to help UNHCR
process the new offers. 3104/ Ramiz Hadžimuratović, father of the five year-
old girl who was injured by mortar fire and was evacuated to England, appealed
for the rescue of other wounded children in Sarajevo, describing the city as
"a concentration camp". 3105/

(c) International reported events

2358. The United States warned that Bosnian Serbs could face a NATO attack
unless they abandoned positions on Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman.
Secretary of State Christopher made it clear that the allies were determined
to use any means to prevent the stranglehold of Sarajevo. Administration
officials said that the allies would wait to see whether the Serbs came
through on a promise to abandon their positions by Thursday. This promise was
extracted in Geneva after negotiators warned the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan
Karadžić, that the withdrawal from the peaks had to be completed by mid-
morning Thursday. According to Clinton Administration officials, the allies
would regard the Serbs' failure to withdraw as a grave offence. The State
Department had begun to provide the Europeans and the UN with daily reports
about Serbian actions in BiH. Some officials acknowledged that the allies had
yet to agree on what Serbian action would set off a military response. One
senior Administration official who advocated military action said, "The Serbs
are brilliant at showing just enough restraint to make it appear that things
are getting better". 3106/

2359. The official Russian Defence Ministry daily Krasnaya Zvezda commented on
NATO plans for air strikes at Bosnian Serbs, saying in part, "the USA. and the
North Atlantic bloc put one more obstacle on the road to a political
settlement of the Bosnian crisis". 3107/

2360. The UN announced that the ground controllers necessary to coordinate air
strikes were in place in BiH and that their links to NATO aircraft were being
tested. Air attacks under Security Council Resolution 836 or Resolution 770
would require coordination between warplanes and forward air controllers, who
would guide the pilots to precise targets. While the US and its allies
assembled more than 50 military aircraft to carry out raids, the UN did not
begin until late last month to assign air controllers and their laser equipment to BiH. 3108/

12. 12/8/93 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Bosnian Serb troop movements continued to be monitored on Mounts Bjelašnica and Igman. The US government asserted that shelling and sniping activities had continued despite Serb concessions.  
Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; New York Times.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Some sniping activity was reported by the US government.  
Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** According to UNHCR statistics, at least six children were injured daily in Sarajevo in the 16-month war. 3109/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2361. UN spokesman Barry Frewer in Sarajevo told reporters that a number of troops had withdrawn, but that there were still sizable forces on Igman. Said Frewer, "we are probably talking in the thousands. There are heavy artillery pieces, there are tanks, there are trucks, there are mortars". 3110/ Later, UN commander General Jean Cot told a news conference in Zagreb he had given mediators in Geneva "evidence that the Serbs had resumed their withdrawal, starting with logistic elements to be followed this afternoon by combat elements". 3111/ Cot also said that the UN commander in BiH, General Francis Briquemont, met NATO officers at an air base in Vicenza, Italy, to discuss possible air strikes against the Serbs. 3112/

2362. The New York Times reported that Serb forces remained at front-line positions on Mount Igman and that most of the withdrawals appeared to have taken place from around Mount Bjelašnica. According to the Times, a UN general, who asked not to be identified, produced a map marked by Serbian commander General Mladić to show Serbian positions on Mount Igman and said that Mladić had acknowledged that the positions, some of which were only about four miles from Sarajevo airport, had not been withdrawn. The General said that in resisting the demand of Serbian forces for more UN troops to be sent to the mountains, UN commanders were wary that to do so would mean securing the Serbian front lines and allowing Mladić to redeploy his troops for offensives elsewhere. 3113/

2363. On Wednesday, Reuter correspondent Natela Cutter saw a convoy of 20 buses, three armoured personnel carriers, two tanks and trucks towing heavy artillery pieces on the main road leading north from Sarajevo to Bjelašnica. The vehicles, she said, contained several hundred armed and battle-weary Serb soldiers who had apparently been based on Mount Igman. A British television crew returning to Sarajevo from Trnovo reported seeing hundreds of Serb soldiers boarding buses and heading towards Pale. The soldiers said they were part of a 1,200-man brigade ordered to withdraw. 3114/
(b) Local reported events

2364. Bosnian Serb military leaders, Ratko Mladić and Manojlo Milovanović, said they had not withdrawn completely from Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman because the UN was moving too slowly to occupy in strength all the positions they were prepared to vacate. 3115/

(c) International reported events

2365. US State Department spokesman Michael McCurry said the administration was not prepared to convene a meeting of NATO, despite the fact that "Lord Owen and Stoltenberg indicate that they are not satisfied that the type of withdrawal that they had expected to see has occurred". McCurry said that Owen and Stoltenberg's assessment was "consistent with" the State Department's understanding of the situation. One State Department official characterized the Serbs' steps to withdraw from Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman as "more bobbing and weaving". A senior Clinton Administration official reportedly said that shelling and sniping persisted despite some evidence of "better behaviour" on the part of the Serbs. 3116/

2366. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić said, in a letter to Security Council President Madeleine Albright, that Serb forces had stationed rockets on Mount Igman. Ganić wrote, "I believe that UNPROFOR knows of this positioning of heavy artillery rockets but is not making the information public". Ganić added that even without shelling, 20 to 30 children and elderly in Sarajevo would die daily of infection and exhaustion. 3117/

2367. Bosnian Serb delegation spokesman Jovan Zametica told reporters in Geneva, "As of 8:00 a.m. today, there are no more Serb troops on Mount Igman. They have withdrawn to lines of July 30". 3118/ Later, negotiators in Geneva said the Serbs had agreed to binding arbitration on the issue on Friday. 3119/

13. 13/8/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb troop movement continued to be monitored on Mounts Bjelašnica and Igman. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2368. Brigadier General Hayes, a commander of UN peacekeepers, and Serb Chief of Staff General Manojlo Milovanović toured the mountains in an effort to assess compliance. 3120/
(b) Local reported events

2369. Serb forces allowed a food convoy into Sarajevo through a new route behind their lines. 3121/ Sarajevo's main hospital reportedly received five tons of diesel fuel. It was reported that before the arrival of the shipment some patients had provided their own diesel fuel to enable doctors to perform operations. 3122/

2370. A Belgian hospital at Huy, south-east of Brussels, offered 20 beds for the care of injured children in Sarajevo. Anne-Marie Lizin, a Belgian lawmaker and mayor of Huy, announced the offer, which included some funds and a chartered aeroplane for transportation. 3123/

(c) International reported events

2371. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicated that the Clinton Administration would be satisfied with a partial Serb withdrawal from Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman. 3124/ Christopher said, "The mountaintops are important but fundamentally what is necessary is food, water, electricity and no more shelling in that area". 3125/ According to a State Department official, US policy shifted from an initial, clearly defined threat over withdrawal from the mountains to a broader, more ambiguous warning on ending the lengthy siege. The official indicated that the overall objective of the US was "to improve the condition of the people of Sarajevo before winter comes". 3126/

2372. In Geneva, talks were postponed until Monday, rather than canceled, after mediators Owen and Stoltenberg said that they had received news of "further withdrawals" by Serb forces. 3127/

14. 14/8/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb forces on Mounts Bjelašnica and Igman reportedly withdrew behind the line agreed upon in talks. Sarajevo itself was reported quiet. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2373. UN officials said that about 250 UNPROFOR troops took key positions on Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica as "thousands" of Serbian forces withdrew behind a line which was agreed upon in talks among UNPROFOR chief of staff Brigadier General Hayes, Major General Manojlo Milovanović, Bosnian Serb forces chief of staff, and General Rasim Delić, commander of the Muslim-dominated BiH government army. 3128/ One report said that approximately 1,800 troops pulled back this day. 3129/ UN General Francis Briquemont said that Serb military commanders agreed to complete the retreat by 4:00 p.m. local time. 3130/ General Briquemont said, "When I look at the list of people, equipment and vehicles that have withdrawn, I think the area is free of Serb soldiers".
2374. Sarajevo itself was reported quiet. 3131/

(b) Local reported events

2375. In Sarajevo, workers succeeded in repairing overhead cable systems, bringing electricity back to parts of the city after a 55 day blackout, according to Sarajevo radio. 3132/ Electricity was restored to vital facilities and households were expected to receive service within two to three days. 3133/

2376. The Koševio hospital remained without running water and electricity. 3134/ The hospital also lacked vital medicines and food. 3135/

(c) International reported events

2377. President Clinton welcomed the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from Mount Bjelašnica and Mount Igman. The US State Department said more had to be done to help the besieged capital. 3136/

15. 15/8/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported near-complete withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from Mounts Bjelašnica and Igman. Small-arms fire and occasional shelling were reported in Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One woman was killed while gathering wood in the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2378. According to UNPROFOR, Bosnian Serb forces nearly completed withdrawal from the heights of Mount Igman and Mount Bjelašnica. UNPROFOR said all heavy weaponry had been withdrawn from the sites and Sunday morning only one company of Serb infantry, about 200 men with 10 trucks, remained on the hills. "We consider it a success", said UN spokesperson Barry Frewer of the UN-brokered agreement under which the Serbs were pulling back from positions around Sarajevo. Frewer confirmed reports that withdrawing Serb forces had burned down captured buildings in recent days as they pulled back. "As they were withdrawing from the area, they torched them", he reportedly said. He called the burning "a very sad testimonial to what's happening". UNPROFOR will have about 150 men deployed over several square miles of wooded hilly terrain with which to keep both Bosnian Serb and BiH government forces from retaking positions on the two mountains. Said Frewer, "It still requires cooperation of both sides". 3137/

2379. Small arms fire and occasional heavy machine-gun fire could be heard during the day in Sarajevo. 3138/ One woman was killed while gathering wood, according to a UN report. 3139/ Small arms fire and occasional shelling was
heard throughout the night. 3140/

(b) Local reported events

2380. The first group of 40 people, including seven children in critical condition, were evacuated from Sarajevo. A British Royal Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aeroplane evacuated 21 patients and 19 relatives from Sarajevo to the Falconara Air Base near Ancona, Italy. The mission was called "Operation Irma". Four of the children and five of the adults had to be carried onto the aeroplane on stretchers. Dr. Faruk Kulenović, chief of surgery at Koševo hospital, reportedly said, "The West is making self-promotion out of this. But it's too little and too late to clear their consciences . . . it would clear their consciences if there were not 9,000 dead in Sarajevo, if there were not 600 amputees, 150 paraplegics". 3141/ Doctor Patrick Peillot, head of the UN medical evacuations committee, criticized Britain for its "supermarket attitude" to the evacuation, saying it was giving preference to children over adults to gain maximum media attention. 3142/ "Patients are not animals", said Peillot. 3143/

2381. Eighteen seriously wounded or ill persons, accompanied by 20 relatives, were flown from Sarajevo to Swedish hospitals. 3144/ Italian authorities were reportedly willing to receive 100 wounded children from Sarajevo. 3145/ Italy requested, according to the UNHCR, that only children—not adults—be evacuated to the country's hospitals for treatment. 3146/

(c) International reported events

2382. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that Sarajevo was "no longer under siege" and that peace talks could resume in Geneva. "Shells are not falling on Sarajevo and convoys with humanitarian aid are entering the city unhindered. With this, practically all civilian questions linked with Sarajevo are resolved, which means that civilian Sarajevo is no longer under siege", he told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA. 3147/

2383. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that he would attend peace talks on Monday if the Serbs completed their withdrawal from the hills around Sarajevo. 3148/

16. 16/8/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as quiet and the Serbian withdrawal from Mount Igman was described as nearly complete. Dobrinja was heavily shelled. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One person was killed and 14 were injured in Dobrinja on this day. The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 21 killed and 72 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,259 wounded (of which 1,492 were children) and 54,280 wounded (of which 14,167 were children). 3149/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Narrative of Events:

2384. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić said that Serb troops had tightened their strategic noose around Sarajevo by deploying 2,000 fresh troops in less visible lowlands closer to front lines after pulling them off Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica. Ganić told reporters after meeting with US Ambassador Viktor Jakovic, "Igman and Bjelašnica are 15 to 20 miles from [downtown] Sarajevo so now we have tanks even closer to Sarajevo, in positions around the city, so the siege is stronger than before". UN military officials did not give any indication that the Serb troops from Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica had been deployed elsewhere near Sarajevo. Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont conceded that the Serbs still threatened the city with their firepower.

2385. Two hundred Serb troops reportedly awaited transport from Mount Igman, according to UN peacekeepers, despite the UN-brokered agreement by which the Serbs were to have withdrawn by 2:00 p.m. on 14 August.

2386. UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo as quiet. It said that the Serbian withdrawal from Mount Igman was nearly finished, including the two east companies which were located in the area of Babin Dol.

2387. It was reported that Dobrinja was heavily shelled, resulting in one dead and 14 injured.

(b) Local reported events

2388. "There is no humanitarian siege of Sarajevo", said Brigadier General Hayes, UN chief of staff. Commander Barry Frewer, spokesman for UNPROFOR, also said that Sarajevo was not a city under siege. Frewer said, "We say that [the Bosnian Serb army] are in a tactically advantageous position around the city . . . I don't want to portray it as a siege . . . I see it as an encirclement". Frewer added: "To me, the word siege has a connotation of an intention militarily to starve out the city, to prevent free access in and out, to bring the city to its knees. That to me is what a siege means . . . what I'm saying is that [the Serbs] are moving in a way that will improve the conditions here . . . How long it will last I don't know". Tony Land, the director of UN relief operations in Sarajevo, however, said "one would have to consider the city still to be besieged". One report speculated that UNPROFOR's mandate, giving priority to the delivery of relief supplies across Serbian lines with only lightly armed UN troops as escort, had caused UN representatives not to offend the heavily armed Serbian forces.

2389. US Ambassador Viktor Jakovic said he would remain in Sarajevo for several days to update Washington's assessment of whether NATO should send its warplanes into action. Jakovic declined to comment on Karadžić's statement that the city was no longer under siege, but suggested that the Serb withdrawal from Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica had not really changed the city's state of siege in saying, "The Serb withdrawal simply means we're back to the same situation we were in when NATO made its decision [to approve the principle of air strikes to break the siege of Sarajevo]".

2390. UN commander Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont said that UNPROFOR was gradually opening routes in and out of Sarajevo for supplies such as fuel. "There is an economic siege but we can now say we are improving the situation", he said.

2391. In response to the controversy over the evacuation of Sarajevo wounded, UNHCR spokesman Manuel Almeida stated that the Geneva Convention held that an
unarmed and seriously wounded combatant must be treated in the same way as any other person in urgent need of medical attention. Dr. Patrick Peillot, the French UNHCR doctor in charge of the evacuations, said "I think the people who are now in hospitals in London are wounded people regardless of their social position. We are working according to the Geneva Convention and a soldier in this particular case, once wounded, is considered as a civilian". 3160/

2392. It was reported that 17 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3161/

(c) International reported events

2393. In Geneva, agreement in principle was achieved on having Sarajevo placed under UN administration, allowing full freedom of movement for UN observers. 3162/

2394. The US agreed to airlift 100 emergency patients from BiH to the US for treatment, 3163/ as Western nations reportedly "fell over each other" to offer to evacuate hundreds of sick and wounded BiH nationals. A UNHCR spokesman said that 14 other countries had offered at least 800 hospital beds (Italy: 450; Finland: 100; France: 98; Poland: 40; Turkey: 40; the Czech Republic: 40; Jordan: 20; Canada: 20; Ireland: 10; The Netherlands: 5; Switzerland: 5; Denmark: undetermined number; Norway: undetermined number). 3164/

2395. The BiH delegation in a statement delivered at the Geneva peace talks, lashed out at Britain, whose evacuation of critically wounded and ill Sarajevans they called a "cynical initiative" to mask "the British government's seemingly limitless appeasement of fascism". Allegations had been made that bribes were paid to enable wounded BiH soldiers to take the place of children in the evacuation. "The British government's preference for children--ideally those young enough not to be able to speak, is well publicized", the BiH officials said. "All males and many women between the ages of 16 and 60 are liable for military service in Sarajevo. They are no less deserving than the children who will in time take their place", the statement continued. 3165/

17. 17/8/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The situation in Sarajevo and Igman was described as very quiet, but some shelling was reported in the city. Two BiH army platoons were reported to have carried out an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate the Igman area in the afternoon. Dobrinja was shelled at night. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja area (six shells at night within a 30 minute period). Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Six 120 millimetre mortar shells hit Dobrinja within a 30 minute period, one aimed as people went to the aid of wounded. Witnesses said that 14 people were wounded, five seriously. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Fourteen people were wounded (five seriously), after an evening shelling incident in Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters; New York Times.
Narrative of Events:

2396. UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo and Igman as very quiet, but it was noted that the news media mentioned some shelling in the city. Two BiH army platoons were reported as having carried out an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate into the Igman area in the afternoon. The opening of two routes, one between Visoko and Ilijaš, the other one between Tarčin and Hadići, was reported as going well. One convoy had already been brought in on the Visoko route. 3166/

2397. BiH Television said that US Ambassador Viktor Jakovic visited the suburb of Dobrinja during the day. At night, six 120 millimetre mortar shells hit the neighbourhood within a 30 minute period, one aimed as people went to the aid of wounded. Witnesses said 14 people were wounded, five seriously. 3167/

(b) Local reported events

2398. It was reported that 17 UNHCR relief flights landed during the day. 3168/

2399. A production of Samuel Beckett's "Waiting for Godot" opened in Sarajevo. 3169/ During rehearsals for the play, some of the actors became so exhausted that they had needed to lie down after only half an hour's work. 3170/ About 100 people, including BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić and UN peace-keeping soldiers, crammed into a small children's theatre in central Sarajevo for the 100 minute premiere. 3171/

(c) International reported events

2400. According to conference spokesman John Mills, negotiations in Geneva began in the morning with a bilateral meeting between Izetbegović and his delegation, and the Bosnian Serb group led by Radovan Karadžić. A meeting followed between Izetbegović and his delegation and the Bosnian Croat, faction headed by Mate Boban. In the afternoon, Owen and Stoltenberg convened a trilateral session involving all three factions. Officials said that the talks included highly detailed bargaining over locations in the three proposed republics of villages, rivers, streams, roads and, for the Muslims, access to the sea. 3172/

2401. BiH President Izetbegović said that the talks in Geneva had made no progress on maps. 3173/ BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić told reporters in Sarajevo that he was skeptical that an agreement reached in Geneva on the fate of Sarajevo would keep the city from division by Serbs and Croats. Still, Ganić acknowledged that "people are exhausted", and said it was better to have UN administration in the city than to be overrun by Serbs. 3174/

2402. In Geneva, a spokesman for BiH President Izetbegović said that he insisted that BiH remain a viable republic. Izetbegović reportedly demanded that the Government get 40 per cent of BiH, take parts of eastern BiH captured by Serbs as part of their "ethnic cleansing" campaign, and have access both to the sea and to the Sava River joining the Danube. Izetbegović demanded humanitarian relief for Mostar. He rejected UN statements saying that Sarajevo was no longer under siege. 3175/

2403. In New York, BiH representative at the United Nations, Muhammed Sacirbey, said at a news conference that he hoped that a dispute over remarks made by UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo Barry Frewer could be "resolved in a
rather subdued fashion”. Frewer had come under fire by BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić for referring to Sarajevo as "encircled" rather than under siege. Mr. Sacirbey added that he felt that General Hayes' comments were "much more destructive" than Frewer's. Mr. Sacirbey said that Hayes' comments had "been insensitive, sometimes total falsehoods, and insulting". Mr. Sacirbey referred to Hayes' suggestion that "Serbs had shown good faith by withdrawing from [Mounts Bjelašnica and Igman], that there is no more siege, and that Muslims were responsible for blocking the humanitarian relief to Sarajevo because of what was going on in central BiH". 3176/

2404. NATO officials met in Brussels for a routine evaluation of the conflict in BiH. A NATO official remarked, "The situation has not really changed. The strangulation of Sarajevo continues". He added that NATO aircraft were ready to strike following a meeting of UN and NATO military chiefs on Saturday which drew up a final list of targets. 3177/

2405. In Copenhagen, the Parliament approved participation in possible NATO air strikes against Serbian forces. In Sweden, the Swedish Government said that it would send a battalion of 850 soldiers to help monitor a cease-fire. 3178/

18. 18/8/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo radio claimed that a small number of Serb forces remained atop Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica, but that they were pulling back and being replaced by UNPROFOR forces. Sarajevo and Mount Igman were reported as quiet. Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2406. UNPROFOR commander General Francis Briquemont toured Mount Igman, telling a Serb commander that his forces needed to withdraw immediately. 3179/

2407. Radio Sarajevo claimed that a small number of Serb forces remained on Mounts Igman and Bjelašnica overlooking Sarajevo, but that they were pulling back and being replaced by members of UNPROFOR. 3180/

2408. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo and Mount Igman were quiet. 3181/

(b) Local reported events

2409. Two UNPROFOR and 17 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 3182/

2410. In Sarajevo, UNPROFOR spokesman Frewer said that fighting in Mostar would affect the Geneva peace talks and prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. 3183/
(c) International reported events

2411. In Geneva, mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg hosted a session between the BiH delegation headed by Alija Izetbegović, and the Bosnian Croat faction, led by Mate Boban. They also convened a session of Serb, Croatian and Muslim factions to discuss boundaries of the proposed new "Union of Republics of Bosnia and Hercegovina". 3184/

2412. A plan, fleshing out an accord to make Sarajevo a demilitarized UN-run city, was handed to the three leaders at the end of negotiations in Geneva. "I am not happy with this paper because I don't see in it the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo", BiH President Alija Izetbegović said of the plan. Announcing the agreement to demilitarize Sarajevo and put it under interim UN administration, conference spokesman John Mills said, "The devil's in the details". Muslim Muhamed Filipović, member of the mixed three-member committee to work out those details, said agreement had been reached on preserving the borders between nine of the city's 10 municipalities. The Bosnian Serb stronghold of Pale, the 10th municipality, was omitted from the plan. 3185/

2413. According to US Ambassador Madeleine Albright, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali accepted a US complaint that two UN peace-keeping officers, Brigadier General Hayes, chief of staff of the commander of the UNPROFOR, and Lieutenant Colonel Barry Frewer, the Sarajevo spokesman of UNPROFOR, made inappropriate remarks. Hayes and Frewer had told reporters that Sarajevo was no longer under siege, but was "encircled" by the Serbs. Albright and most UN Security Council members, who met Tuesday and Wednesday to discuss the situation in BiH, expressed dissatisfaction at the officers' statements, but did not ask Boutros-Ghali to replace or reprimand them. Reportedly the BiH government declared Frewer "persona non grata" in Sarajevo and called for his removal, but no action was taken by UNPROFOR. 3186/

19. 19/8/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that some 100 Bosnian Serb soldiers were said to be still present on Mount Igman, equipped only with light weapons. The overall situation in the city was described as calm with sporadic mortar and sniper fire continuing. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2414. UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Barry Frewer said that only about 250 UN soldiers could be deployed to supervise Mount Igman. Sarajevo radio quoted UN officials in Sarajevo as saying 100 Serbian soldiers were still present on Igman. 3187/ Frewer expressed concern that "the Serbs have not completed their withdrawal within the [agreed] timeframe". Frewer stressed
that the Serb forces still on the mountain were equipped only with light
weapons and were in no position to redeploy or launch an offensive. He said
that Serbs blamed the incomplete withdrawal on communication and logistics
problems. He added that the UN was continuing to exert pressure to bring
about a full retreat. 3188/

2415. UNPROFOR spokesman Barry Frewer said that sporadic mortar and sniper
fire was continuing, but that the overall situation was calm. 3189/

2416. UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo as quiet with only small arms fire. FreBat 4
reported that "liaison with parties on Igman mountain continued though a Serb
Company still is in Babin Dol area". 3190/

(b) Local reported events

2417. It was reported that 16 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during
the day. 3191/

(c) International reported events

2418. The Serbs' failure to withdraw from Mount Igman as promised prompted
threats of a boycott from Muslim president Alija Izetbegović at the peace
talks in Geneva. 3192/

2419. UNPROFOR commander Francis Briquemont reaffirmed his opposition to NATO
air strikes against Serb forces. A senior NATO diplomat said that Washington
retained its conviction that the NATO air strike threat remained valid. 3193/

2420. Ireland agreed to take 10 wounded people from Sarajevo and donate 40,000
punts ($60,000) to Sarajevo hospitals, according to Irish Foreign Minister
Dick Spring. 3194/

20. 20/8/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively calm after
a night of sporadic shelling and machine-gun fire. During the day, occasional
automatic weapon fire and several mortar shells were heard landing outside the
city centre. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area outside the city centre. Source(s): United Press
International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2421. British military spokesperson Patricia Purvis said there were still more
than 100 Bosnian Serb soldiers on strategic Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo,
despite the UN-brokered accord under which Serbs had agreed to a complete
withdrawal. 3195/

2422. Sarajevo was described as relatively calm. 3196/ The morning was quiet
after a night of sporadic shelling and machine-gun fire.  During the day, only occasional bursts of automatic weapons fire and several mortar shells were heard landing outside the city centre.

(b) Local reported events

2423. It was reported that 14 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day.

2424. Lyndall Sachs, spokesperson for the UNHCR in Sarajevo, said that the UN had delivered five tons of diesel fuel for emergency generators at Sarajevo's main hospital and that another five were expected next week. Sachs said, "I am told [the delivery] was enough for the basic functioning of the hospital and its emergency generator, but we are still trying to get to the bottom of this".

2425. Serbian and Croatian armies blocked the main roads linking the Adriatic and Sarajevo to other Bosnian population centres inland, requiring UN aid convoys to move over back roads built for horse and cart. Before the war, the drive between Sarajevo and Split took approximately three hours. Along the route which the UN convoys were forced to take, the drive required two days under good conditions. With heavy vehicles like tankers carrying diesel fuel to power hospital generators in Sarajevo, the trip took a week or more. The journey reportedly included sharp inclines, hairpin bends, enormous potholes, rocks jutting through the dirt surface which shredded tires and soft road edges along mountain sides. Some bends were so tight that fuel tankers got around them by having a crane lift them from the rear while UN armoured vehicles attached tow ropes to drag the vehicles from the front. The Prince of Wales Own Yorkshire Regiment, about 1,000 men, of the British Army was charged with keeping the road open from a base at Vitez, reportedly blasting and bulldozing around the clock.

21. 21/8/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After a night of sporadic shelling and machine-gun fire, Sarajevo was reported quiet. UNPROFOR reported that on Mount Igman, there was no fighting or changes among the warring factions. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2426. After a night of sporadic shelling and machine-gun fire, Sarajevo was reported quiet. UNPROFOR stated that on Igman Mountain, there was no reported fighting or changes among the warring forces.
2427. A meeting of BiH Army and Serbian militia leaders reportedly broke up with each side accusing the other of violating the Mount Igman withdrawal agreement. Bosnian Croat leaders refused to attend the meeting. 3204/

2428. It was reported that 15 UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3205/

22. 22/8/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo and Mount Igman were described as quiet. A UN spokesman said that 120 Serbian troops remained on Mount Igman. A UN military official speaking on condition of anonymity said that BiH troops were provoking Serb troops still on Mount Igman by staging nightly raids against them. Source(s): UNPROFOR; New York Times.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2429. A UN military spokesperson said that 120 Serbian troops remained on Mount Igman. A UN military official who spoke to the New York Times on condition of anonymity said that BiH troops were provoking the Serbs still on Mount Igman by staging nightly raids against them. 3206/

2430. UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo and Mount Igman as quiet. 3207/

(b) Local reported events

2431. Alija Izetbegović returned to Sarajevo in the afternoon to present the agreement forged in Geneva to his Parliament. 3208/ In a news conference, Izetbegović said that he would not recommend that Parliament vote in favour of the proposal. He said his government would seek changes in a map delineating the proposed borders. 3209/ Under the plan, the Bosnian Serbs, who seized control of 70 per cent of the former Yugoslav republic's territory, would retain more than 52 per cent, leaving the Muslim's with 30 per cent and the Croats with just over 17 per cent. 3210/ Ejup Ganić, BiH Vice President, said in an interview that the creation of the three ethnic states in the plan would spell the end of BiH. "This is not an offer. They are saying that if we do not sign the agreement they will kill us today, but if we do sign, they will kill us tomorrow", he said. 3211/

2432. It was reported that Norway joined the airlift with a C-130 Norwegian Airforce aeroplane. Fifteen UNHCR relief flights landed in Sarajevo during the day. 3212/

2433. After months without electricity many Sarajevo residents had power restored. In some areas of Sarajevo, residents formed watch groups to ensure that no one removed the transformer oil from the local generating stations. 3213/
2434. The streets remained filled with people pushing makeshift trolleys laden with plastic containers filled with water from street-corner standpipes. Food remained scarce. Prices on the black market were beyond most people's reach at 110 German marks ($65) for the only chicken present on Sunday. A crowd of people gathered outside the gates of one of the UN barracks waiting for the soldiers to hand out some of their rations. 3214/

23. 23/8/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo and Mount Igman were reported as quiet. UNPROFOR reported that it saw signs of withdrawal on Mount Igman from Babin Dol, but that this needed to be confirmed. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One person was reported killed and 17 were wounded on this day. 3215/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported that 50 people were killed and 101 were injured in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,273 killed missing, or dead (of which 1,494 were children) and 54,381 wounded (of which 14,192 were children). 3216/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2435. In Metković, Bosnian Croat authorities refused for a sixth day to let UN convoys out of the city to relieve Sarajevo and other towns. Lyndall Sachs of UNHCR described this activity as "completely unacceptable". UNHCR reported that it was having difficulty funding its relief operations. 3217/

2436. Conditions in Sarajevo were reported to have improved despite continued mortar shells and small arms fire from Serb positions in the surrounding mountains. With electricity, the city's night life returned and cafes had begun to open. Water supplies improved. The UN said it expected five new water pumps to arrive soon. 3218/

2437. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo and Mount Igman were quiet. 3219/

2438. UNPROFOR noted that it saw signs of withdrawal on Mount Igman from Babin Dol (this needed to be confirmed). It was reported that negotiations were underway between UNPROFOR and the warring factions regarding the question of the logistical routes. UNPROFOR noted that both warring parties agreed to alter their attitudes towards the demanded routes and let UNPROFOR and UNHCR deal with the matter. 3220/

2439. A UNHCR white soft-skin vehicle with UNHCR markings was hit by seven machine-gun bullets. It could not be confirmed from which side the fire came. 3221/
(b) Local reported events

2440. According to Radio Sarajevo, BiH Parliamentary Speaker, Miro Lazović, said that an extraordinary parliamentary meeting would be held to discuss the new Geneva peace plan. It was reported that BiH President Alija Izetbegović would open the meeting (which would take place in Sarajevo), to a number of BiH intellectuals, artists and military representatives. Izetbegović said he was not calling people to the meeting to vote for or against the project, but to give their opinions on the plan, which he described as having its "good and its bad points". Under the plan, Muslims who had made up 44 per cent of the population before the war would be assigned 30 per cent of the territory. The Geneva talks had succeeded in saving BiH as a state, said Izetbegović, but had provided unsatisfactory boundaries for that state. The Geneva talks were halted until 30 August to allow the warring parties to consult their parliaments. 3222/

2441. Officers in the BiH army dismissed the peace map drawn up in Geneva, which President Izetbegović would introduce to Parliament. "If the government decides to accept the plan, there would be a military coup", said an officer who identified himself as Nezir, deputy commander of the 17th Brigade in the central BiH city of Travnik. 3223/

2442. UN military spokesperson Patricia Purves said that it appeared that the UN was investigating allegations of corruption among UN military personnel. General Francis Briquemont requested civilian police detectives to come to Sarajevo to investigate a series of rumours about black market trading by UNPROFOR soldiers. At least 13 Ukranian troops had been sent home and dishonourably discharged for offences relating to the black market. Reportedly, journalists had seen French troops engaging in black marketeering. 3224/

2443. UNPROFOR reported that one electricity repair mission was carried out along with water repairs. Three UNPROFOR and 11 UNHCR aircrafts landed at the airport. 3225/

(c) International reported events

2444. In Vienna, Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontić said that any military strikes on Serb targets would lead to a full-scale war in the Balkans. 3226/

2445. In London, Janes Defense Weekly said that Yugoslavia had reconstructed its defence industry despite UN sanctions. The article said that Serbia was determined to have arms to sell to the third world market and to prepare itself for a possible conflict with Croatia. 3227/

2446. In Washington, Foreign Service officer Stephen W. Walker resigned in to protest to the Clinton Administration's policy in BiH, the fourth such official to do so. 3228/

24. 24/8/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo was quiet with only two shells. However, at least three mortar shells were reported to have hit a crowded street in the Old Town section of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International; New York Times.
**Targets Hit:** An unidentified street in the Old Town section of the city (three shells). Source(s): United Press International; New York Times.

**Description of Damage:** Two people were killed and seven wounded when at least three mortar shells landed on a crowded street in the Old Town section of the city. Source(s): United Press International; New York Times.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Two people were killed and seven wounded when mortar shells hit a crowded street in the Old Town area. Hospital sources said that three people were killed and at least 11 were wounded this day. 3229/ The BiH Public Health Ministry reported one killed and nine wounded. 3230/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2447. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo was quiet with only two shells and sporadic small arms fire reported. Mount Igman was likewise quiet with indications that the Serbs had left the area of Babin Dol. 3231/

2448. It was also reported that fighting intensified as two people were killed and seven wounded when at least three mortar shells landed on a crowded street in the Old Town section of Sarajevo. The streets were crowded before the shelling and a few people were reported downtown carrying pushcarts loaded with water jugs. 3232/

(b) Local reported events

2449. BiH Foreign Minister, Haris Silajdžić, said that changes needed to be made to a UN peace proposal before the BiH government would accept it. "The future Bosnian republic, the central republic, is not in my view viable either economically or geographically", he said at a news conference. He said that the BiH Government would demand that Bijeljina, Zvornik, Višegrad, Poča, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kljuć be joined with the Bosnian state. He said that the lines on the map rewarded the genocide by which means the Serbs had emptied those areas of their population. Mr. Silajdžić indicated that Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairmen of the peace talks, pressured the BiH Government to accept the plan, but denied that any linkage was made with future deliveries of aid or money for reconstruction. "The co-chairmen are doing a not-so-clean job for the international community and it is in large part not their fault", he said, "These men are giving the green light for the continuation of the aggression if the BiH government does not sign the agreement. This makes it obviously an ultimatum". 3233/

2450. Nineteen patients and 17 relatives were medically evacuated to Italy. 3234/

25. 25/8/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo was reported as quiet. UNPROFOR also reported that there were no more Serbs north-west of the agreed upon line south of Mount Igman. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Four people were reported killed and 20 wounded. 3235/ A French Battalion Officer was reported shot and seriously wounded after a skirmish with BiH forces. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health; UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2451. UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo as quiet. One officer of FrenchBat 4 was reported shot by BiH forces and seriously wounded in the chest. At noon, a BiH detachment reportedly opened fire toward a French Company Headquarters and the French returned fire and wounded a BiH officer. Later the BiH forces withdrew. BiH 1 Corps Headquarters admitted the skirmish and explained it as an error. UNPROFOR also reported that there were no more Serbs north-west of the agreed line south of Mount Igman. 3236/

(b) Local reported events

2452. Ten patients and 10 relatives were evacuated for Ireland. 3237/

(c) International reported events

2453. Lord Owen, the European Community mediator in the conflict, said that the latest Geneva peace plan for the former Yugoslav republic could be viable only if it had NATO and Russian backing. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel expressed skepticism over the outcome of the plan. 3238/

2454. At the Hague, BiH representative to the UN Muhammed Sacirbey, speaking before the International Court of Justice, strongly criticized the world community for its "passivity" in allowing "genocide" in BiH. In particular, Sacirbey condemned the arms embargo which denied BiH authorities their "right to self-defence". 3239/

2455. In Brussels, diplomats speaking on the condition of anonymity told Agence France Presse that members of NATO would favour strikes to protect any relief convoys trying to reach Mostar, recently ravaged and cut off from all sustenance by battles. 3240/

2456. Three US State Department aides explained to the New York Times why they quit over the US policy toward BiH. Jon Western said that an average story to cross his desk was that of a nine year-old Muslim girl, raped by Serbian fighters, then left in a pool of blood while her parents watched helplessly from behind a fence for two days before she died. "You can't read through the accounts of atrocities on a daily basis . . . and not be overwhelmed. It calls into question your morality". Mr. Western and Stephen Walker reported that dissent with the policy was widespread and consistent in all but the highest ranks at the State Department. Mr. Walker said that the Clinton Administration's inaction would harm American credibility, undermine UN peace-keeping efforts, lead to a peace settlement which would not hold, and set a dangerous precedent for the oppression of ethnic minorities elsewhere in the world. 3241/
26. 26/8/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two people were killed and nine were wounded. 3242/ Staff at the Koševo Hospital reported that new victims of sniper fire and shelling arrived each day, despite the cease-fire. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health; UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2457. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2458. The United Nations Under Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr. Kofi A. Annan, accompanied by UNPROFOR commander, General Jean Cot, went to Sarajevo for intensive operation briefings from the UNPROFOR Commander in BiH, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, and the Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General V. Hayes. Mr. Annan met with BiH President Izetbegović and stressed that every effort was being made to identify resources necessary to implement UNPROFOR's mandate. "The problem is that it is not easy to find governments willing or able to commit the enormous number of troops and equipment required. We are, however, close to having commitments from governments for the 7,500 additional troops required for implementation of Security Council resolution 836", he said. Mr. Annan also visited Koševo Hospital, meeting with the head surgeon and speaking with patients in the surgical wards. He was told that new victims of sniper fire and shelling arrived each day, despite the cease-fire. 3243/

2459. The Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported that Bosnian Serb and BiH negotiators agreed at the Sarajevo airport to allow 1,400 people to leave Sarajevo. Half would go to Serbia and half to Croatia. 3244/

27. 27/8/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Small arms fire was reported in the city along with the occasional mortar rounds fired from the hills. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo and Mount Igman were stable and quiet with some small arms fire. Source(s): United Press International; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two people were killed and seven were wounded. 3245/ Source(s):
BiH Ministry of Public Health.

**Narrative of Events:**

2460. Small arms fire was reported in the city, along with the occasional mortar rounds fired at Sarajevo from Serb positions in the surrounding hills. NATO warplanes could also be heard. 3246/

2461. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo and Mount Igman were stable and quiet with only some small arms fire reported. 3247/

(b) Local reported events

2462. The Parliament of BiH met in Sarajevo at the Holiday Inn to discuss the peace plan brokered in Geneva. 3248/ From time to time during the meeting the electricity went off, leaving the hall nearly pitch black. Several hundred academics, writers, army officers and other public figures joined the debate. 3249/ The peace plan about which the Muslim-led BiH Parliament met would cede the 12 mile BiH coastline to the Bosnian Croat state and provide BiH with access to the sea via a road connecting their republic with the Croatian city of Ploče. BiH government officials reportedly feared that international guarantees of free access to the port through Croat territory would not prevent the Croats from cutting that access at will. 3250/ Muslim deputy Muhamed Filipović, a member of the delegation to the Geneva talks, said, "We want an outlet to the sea". 3251/ BiH President Izetbegović called on the mediators of the peace talks to grant the proposed, mostly-Muslim republic an outlet to the Adriatic Sea near the town of Neum. He also called for guarantees, including a UN resolution and a show of support from the US and NATO that the proposed union of Bosnia and Hercegovina would remain an internationally recognized country and UN member. The BiH Government would seek the inclusion in the Muslim-dominated republic of eight districts, which included Višegrad, Zvornik, Foča, Bratunac, Sanski Most, Bijeljina, Ključ and Bosanska Krupa, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Sulejman Suljić. 3252/

2463. Criticism of the plan in the BiH Parliament included views that the plan would reward the Serbs for "ethnic cleansing", create a land-locked Muslim-dominated country with grim economic prospects and pave the way for erasing BiH from the map by linking the Serb and Croat republics with Serbia and Croatia. 3253/

(c) International reported events

2464. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, former Polish premier and UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, said in a report on a visit he made to Sarajevo 11-12 August that the ongoing fighting in and around Sarajevo was worsening the human rights situation of all the city's residents: Serbs, Croats and Muslims alike. Mazowiecki cited breaches of the laws of war: the tactical use of starvation of the city; the deliberate military targeting, killing and wounding of civilians; the strategic denial and destruction of electricity, water, food, medical and gas supplies essential to the survival of civilians; the shelling of hospitals and the detention of civilians as hostages. "Sniping at civilians to kill or wound deliberately those taking no part in hostilities constitutes a war crime", Mazowiecki said. He said the international community should set up an overland relief route to Sarajevo and enforce its protection, take over the central hospital under international protection and set up a procedure for the evacuation abroad of wounded, sick and maternity cases. 3254/
28.  28/8/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was subjected to numerous mortar attacks, but was described by UNPROFOR as generally quiet. On Mount Igman, Serbian forces initiated unprovoked anti-aircraft artillery and mortar fire toward BiH positions, according to UNPROFOR. Two Serb platoons were observed west of the agreed line on Mount Igman. Late in the evening, two Serb sections were still settled about 500 metres west of the agreed line in the Mount Bjelasnic area, presumably observing BiH forces. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Unidentified BiH positions. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two people were killed and 21 were injured. Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2465. UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo and Mount Igman as generally quiet. Two Serb platoons were observed west of the agreed line on Mount Igman (the UNPROFOR BH Command was investigating this). Monitoring officers reported that Sarajevo was subjected to numerous Serbian mortar attacks. UNPROFOR reported that on Mount Igman, Serbian forces initiated unprovoked anti-aircraft artillery and mortar fire toward BiH positions. UNPROFOR subsequently reported that late in the evening, two Serb sections were still settled about 500 metres west of the agreed line in the Mount Bjelašnica area, presumably observing BiH forces.

(b) Local reported events

2466. The outcome of two days of deliberations in the BiH Parliament was an agreement to urge radical changes to the proposed map. The Parliament neither accepted nor rejected the plan, but instead endorsed the immediate cessation of hostilities, a return to the negotiating table and a renewed request for guarantees of the “territorial integrity” of BiH.

2467. The Bosnian Croat assembly adjourned after calling on Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban to negotiate expanded borders for a Croat state.

2468. Serb deputies endorsed the Geneva peace plan. “After this acceptance of this proposal, the Bosnian Serb republic is a fact that cannot be denied, and I think that the international community has to accept it and recognize it”, Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić told reporters. Karadžić reportedly said of the BiH stance toward the plan, “They are really risking the loss of what they already have, and may provoke the division of Bosnia into two parts . . . I really don’t know what more they want . . . They won their state at the negotiating table, but lost it in the battlefield.”

2469. UNPROFOR reported that one UNPROFOR and 14 UNHCR flights landed at the Sarajevo airport.

2470. The airlift operation carried out its 5,000th flight into Sarajevo.
29. 29/8/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported small-arms fire and some mortar impacts in Sarajevo and described Mount Igman as calm. Troops on both sides were described as becoming hostile towards UNPROFOR. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One person was killed and 14 others were injured. 3264/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2471. UNPROFOR reported small arms fire and some mortar impacts in Sarajevo. Mount Igman was reported as calm, but troops on both sides were described as becoming hostile towards UNPROFOR. 3265/

(b) Local reported events

2472. UNPROFOR reported that three UNPROFOR and 17 UNHCR flights landed at the Sarajevo airport. 3266/

30. 30/8/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The situation in Sarajevo and Igman mountain was described as quiet. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry Reported 13 killed and 97 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,286 killed (of which 1,496 were children), and 54,478 wounded (of which 14,211 were children). 3267/ Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2473. UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo and Mount Igman as quiet. 3268/

(b) Local reported events

2474. Eight UNPROFOR and 17 UNHCR aircraft landed in Sarajevo. According to the UNHCR, some countries pledged to add aircraft to the international airlift bringing food and medicine to Sarajevo, but money for these supplies was at
issue. Serbian and BiH government authorities were talking about a food-for-fuel swap if the Serbs opened the railroad from Zenica to Sarajevo to bring in coal to Sarajevo. 3269/

2475. In its weekly report UNHCR noted that there was electricity in the city after repairs at the Kakanj, Jablanica and Tuzla power plants. UNHCR reported that the hospitals and bakery had electricity and that 80 per cent of the city's population had power for a few hours every two days. Technical problems, however, remained due to a lack of transformer oil for generators and the occasional break-down of power lines. As a result of the restored electricity, the Baevo water pumping station was working again. However, it was noted that the water supply was still not sufficient for the whole population. 3270/

(c) International reported events
2476. International mediators Stoltenberg and Owen postponed the resumption of the Geneva peace talks until Tuesday morning because BiH President Alija Izetbegović could not fly to Geneva in time. 3271/

31. 31/8/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the situation in Sarajevo and Mount Igman as quiet. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:
2477. UNPROFOR described the situation in Sarajevo and Mount Igman as quiet. 3272/

(b) Local reported events
2478. Two UNPROFOR and 15 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 3273/

R. September 1993
1. 1/9/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo and Mount Igman remained quiet. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2479. Sarajevo and Mount Igman remained quiet. UNPROFOR was again warned by the warring factions that imminent offensive actions were due to take place. 3274/

(B) International reported events

2480. Talks in Geneva among the leaders of the warring factions collapsed after BiH representatives said that they wanted more territory than had been offered under a proposed peace plan. BiH President Alija Izetbegović presented international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg with what he said were his "minimum of minimum" demands, giving a rump Muslim republic an extra 4 per cent of the 30 per cent of BiH territory offered to them. BiH was said to currently control 10 per cent of BiH. 3275/

2481. The three delegates agreed to stay in Geneva until Thursday, but Lord Owen said he doubted an "overnight miracle" would save the talks. 3276/

2482. Former US Secretary of State George Shultz and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called for US-led airstrikes to help BiH forces. "Western governments should act now substantially to reduce Serbia's immediate and future power of aggression . . . with this limited political aim, Western power would play a much larger role", Thatcher, Shultz and others said in an open letter to President Clinton. 3277/

2. 2/9/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Infantry and sniper fire was reported in Sarajevo. Serbian and BiH officials traded accusations over who opened fire first. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2483. Infantry and sniper fire was reported in Sarajevo. Serbian and BiH officials traded accusations over who opened fire first. 3278/

(c) International reported events

2484. US President Bill Clinton issued a stern warning to Bosnian Serbs that a NATO response "is very much alive" if the warring parties failed to forge a peace agreement and fighting resumed. Clinton told reporters that the United
States would do whatever was necessary to restart stalled peace talks, which broke down Wednesday in Geneva over how the nation would be divided among the warring Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats. "If while talks are in abeyance, there is abuse by those who would seek to interfere with humanitarian aid--attacking protected areas, resuming the sustained shelling of Sarajevo, for example--then I would remind you that the NATO military option is very much alive", Clinton said. 3279/

2485. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher demanded greater flexibility from Serb and Croatian leaders, saying "the world community will certainly hold them responsible" if a settlement for BiH broke down. 3280/

2486. A US official said that Washington backed the BiH territorial demands for a settlement, including a wider corridor than the one offered by Serbs to link the isolated Muslim enclaves in Serb-held eastern BiH and a corridor linking Sarajevo to the Adriatic Sea. 3281/

2487. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said Western air strikes remained a possibility if the Bosnian Serbs or Croats attacked UN forces or resumed the bombardment of Sarajevo. 3282/

2488. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said more pressure should be put on the Serbs to make concessions to achieve peace. 3283/

3. 3/9/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A thick fog over Sarajevo quieted all shooting, according to the Bosnian Serb agency SRNA. 3284/ UNPROFOR reported that the situation remained quiet in the city and on Mount Igman. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2489. A thick fog over Sarajevo quieted all shooting, according to the Bosnian Serb agency SRNA. 3285/

2490. UNPROFOR reported that the situation remained quiet in the city and on Mount Igman. 3286/

(b) Local reported events

2491. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić denied that his side was to blame for current fighting. "I think someone is misinforming President Clinton", Karadžić said in Belgrade. "The Serbs are not in the war any longer. We haven't fought the Croats for five months. We don't fight against the Muslims except for some border incidents". 3287/

2492. The UNHCR said that Bosnian Croats had authorized passage for UN relief
Convoy to reached besieged civilians in Sarajevo and central BiH, after weeks of delay. A UN convoy loaded with food and fuel was to head for Sarajevo on this day, while another was headed for Zenica. 3288/

2493. Sarajevans indicated that they were apprehensive about the collapse of peace talks but many were reported to have said that they rejected "peace at any price". Ragib Brajlovic, a 63 year-old butcher said: "The world forced us to talk peace with men who were ethnically cleansing, killing and raping our people. If one of these international leaders had his wife or daughter raped I don't think he would be so interested in talking peace". 3289/

(c) International reported events

2494. Western leaders appealed to combatants to return to negotiations after the failure of peace talks in Geneva and UN officials warned that fighting could intensify. "I think the danger of a recurrence of fighting may be more imminent", said Cedric Thornberry, UN chief deputy of mission for the former Yugoslavia, at a news conference in Zagreb. 3290/

2495. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé urged Serb, Croat and Muslim leaders to return to the negotiating table to avoid an escalation of the conflict. "The negotiations must resume as soon as possible. In the meantime, the cease-fire should be observed in Bosnia and ex-Yugoslavia", the Secretary-General said. 3291/

4. 4/9/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo and Mount Igman as calm. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2496. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo and Mount Igman as calm. 3292/

(b) Local reported events

2497. Italian Red Cross officials said that two seriously ill BiH children, a one month-old baby boy and an eight year-old girl, were flown to Italy from Sarajevo for urgent medical treatment. A German C-130 transport aeroplane, part of the United Nations relief effort, brought them from Sarajevo to the Adriatic base of Ancona where they were driven by ambulance to a hospital in Rome. Deni Ajanović, the baby boy, required surgery to correct a severe bowel condition. His parents accompanied him on the flight out of Sarajevo. The other child, orphan Gorana Bošković, needed an operation to cure a kidney ailment and also had malformed feet which rendered her unable to walk. Italy last month had offered 450 hospital beds to sick and wounded Bosnians but the difficulties in evacuating people from Sarajevo meant that only about 20
patients had arrived. 3293/

2498. One UNPROFOR and 11 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 3294/

(c) International reported events

2499. In Istanbul, BiH President Alija Izetbegović said he expected the Geneva talks to reconvene, not in the coming week, but the next. He said that the BiH delegation was prepared to return to Geneva for negotiations but "we don't know if (the Bosnian Serbs and Croats) are ready". 3295/

5. 5/9/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo and Mount Igman as stable. Monitoring officers reported Serb shelling toward Sarajevo while Battalions described the situation as "rather quiet". Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH crisis centre reported that 23 people were killed and five wounded in the 24 hours to mid-morning. 3296/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2500. UNPROFOR reported Sarajevo and Mount Igman as stable. Monitoring officers reported Serb shelling toward Sarajevo while Battalions described the situation as "rather quiet". 3297/

(b) Local reported events

2501. UN officials in the city said that its population could run out of fuel within days, as fighting between Croat and Muslim troops blocked supply routes into Sarajevo. 3298/

2502. Two UNPROFOR and 13 UNHCR flights landed at the airport. 3299/

2503. The vice-president of the Bosnian Serb republic, Nikola Koljević, was quoted as saying that the door to Geneva was still wide open and that the Serbs were ready to resume talks. But he also told the Serbian newspaper Dnevnik that the Bosnian Serb parliament would meet shortly to vote on withdrawing Serb concessions made in Geneva on access to Muslim enclaves in east BiH. 3300/

2504. Seven Sarajevo students, with scholarships to a United States university, were reported stranded in Sarajevo after the United Nations rejected a request for seven seats on an outbound aeroplane. Two of the students were Muslim, two Croat and one was the child of a mixed marriage. The UN selection process for evacuations had come under severe criticism in August when several children lay near death because it would not authorize their transport out of the city. The resulting public outcry produced commitments for treatment for more than 1,000 war wounded and critically ill Bosnians by
other countries. The possibility for the students to fly on a US aeroplane was
dimmed after a BiH delegation of about 20 people, ostensibly en route to
Geneva peace talks, left Sarajevo on an American flight bound for Frankfurt.
American military sources in Sarajevo said that once the flight landed in
Frankfurt, 17 of those on board made it clear that they had no intention of
going to Geneva. Some of those involved were reportedly traveling on personal
business and at least one requested political asylum. "The transportation of
BiH nationals by the US military has been suspended for the time being", one
American officer stated. 3301/

(c) International reported events

2505. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher criticized the planned division
of BiH, but said that without an agreement Bosnians faced the prospect of
another winter of war. "This is not an ideal settlement", Christopher said.
"We regard it as better than the alternative . . . a restarting of the war". The
Secretary of State also said that the United States was still willing to
carry out threatened air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets if NATO determined
that the strangulation of Sarajevo continued. Asked about the division of BiH
among Serbs, Croats and Muslims discussed in Geneva last week, Christopher
blamed the Serbs for the breakdown of talks saying that they failed to take
into consideration the demands of BiH. 3302/

6. 6/9/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There were general reports of sniper fire and
artillery shells in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2506. The new school year was rung in by artillery shells and sniper fire as
thousands of children headed for makeshift classrooms in garages, cellars and
stairwells. In a city where shelling made it dangerous for people to gather in
one spot, officials dispersed improvised classrooms as widely as possible.
"The learning environment in may of these locations is unsuitable, but at
least they are safe", one teacher said. 3303/

(b) Local reported events

2507. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić threatened to declare an
independent Serb state in BiH if the Muslim side delayed much longer in
signing the proposed peace agreement. At a news conference at Serb
headquarters in Pale, Karadžić said that his side was prepared to wait for the
international community to persuade BiH President Alija Izetbegović to return
to the Geneva talks. "We will wait as long as we have any hope for a political
solution", Karadžić said. "If we learn that the Muslims are not ready for any
political solution, and are using delaying tactics, then we will demand
international recognition”. When asked if the Geneva peace package calling for three ethnic ministates in a loose Bosnian federation was a last, take-it-or-leave-it offer, he replied, “definitely”. 3304/

2508. Earlier in the day, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman confirmed that Bosnian Croats would not give the Muslims a 12 mile strip of the Adriatic coast including the resort of Neum, which was part of BiH in the old Yugoslav federation. Tudjman told a news conference in Zagreb that the three ethnic ministates envisaged in the new peace plan would be a part of a unified BiH, so Serbs and Muslims would have as much access to Neum as Croats. 3305/

(c) International reported events

2509. BiH Alija Izetbegović flew to New York to meet officials of the UN Security Council’s five permanent member countries. Sarajevo radio said that his foreign minister, Haris Silajdžić, flew to Moscow for talks with Russian officials, traditional allies of the Christian Orthodox state of Serbia, Sarajevo radio said. 3306/

7. 7/9/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb positions on Mount Žuč were reportedly shelled by government forces in the morning. It was also reported that Serb forces shelled Žuč and the Buljakov Potok area. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: BiH and Serb positions on Mount Žuč; the Buljakov Potok area. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: BiH snipers were reported along the Sarajevo front by the Srna news agency. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Doctors at the city's French hospital reported that one woman was killed and six people were wounded in a shelling attack on the Buljakov Potok area of Sarajevo. 3307/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2510. Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA reported that a Bosnian Serb army commander accused Muslim forces of launching an artillery attack on Serb positions on Mount Žuč. The commander also said that Muslim snipers were active along the Sarajevo front. Two shells were fired at around 8.45 a.m. at Mount Žuč followed by heavy artillery fire, SRNA reported, citing the Serb military press service. SRNA added that Serb forces did not respond. However, the Serb army commander, whom the agency did not name, warned on Monday that he had been "forced" to riposte "with all our might by all means" to any attack on Serb positions as from 6 September at 7:00 a.m.. "Ten Serb soldiers and several civilians have died on the Sarajevo front since a cease-fire agreement was signed on 30 July, which proves that Muslim forces are constantly violating the truce", the commander said. 3308/

2511. United Nations military observers on Mount Igman reported BiH army and Bosnian Serb troops preparing for a "possible" resumption of fighting on the strategic heights above Sarajevo. Major Idsbald van Biesenbroeck, a UN press
officer, said movements (involving 1,000 men on either side), were observed Monday night and early Tuesday afternoon inside the respective areas of the two parties. van Biesenbroeck said that there was no shooting but that troops were "busy putting themselves into position". He said that it was not clear exactly what was happening, as the movements were taking place at night, nor which side started troop movements first. But he added that UNPROFOR was "afraid something is growing". He said that UNPROFOR officials had the impression that the two parties were "scared of each other". van Biesenbroeck stressed that while troop movements had been observed in the area in the past, it was the first time since a 13 August agreement on the withdrawal of Serb forces that such maneuvers had been so obvious. He said that apart from Serbs shelling Žuč hill Tuesday, there were no significant changes. But he warned that the situation in the city was "more tense" than in previous days. 3309/

2512. Doctors at the city's French hospital reported that one woman was killed and six people were wounded in a shelling attack on the Buljakov Potok area of Sarajevo. 3310/

8. 8/9/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The situation on Mount Igman was reported to have eased, as Serb forces shelled BiH army positions in northern and northwestern Sarajevo. UNPROFOR reported that an exchange of small-arms and machine-gun fire took place around the airport settlement in the evening.

Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: BiH army positions in northern and north-western Sarajevo.

Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A 14 year-old boy was reportedly killed by sniper fire.

Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: A 14 year-old boy was killed by sniper fire, eight people were wounded by mortar shell fragments. 3311/ 

Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2513. BiH and Bosnian Serb troops strengthened their positions on Mount Igman, but fears of renewed fighting on the strategic height receded, UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said. Both sides had reinforced their positions earlier in the day within the boundaries set last month under a UN-brokered truce for the sector, but calm returned later in the day after a tense 48 hours, van Biesenbroeck said. The tension flared after Serb forces monitored and interpreted BiH troop movement as the prelude to an offensive manoeuvre. The Serbs embarked on their own manoeuvres, but calm returned after it became clear the BiH army were only rotating their troops, the spokesman said. Each side had about 20,000 men on Igman and the surrounding area, van Biesenbroeck added. 3312/

2514. UNPROFOR reported that an exchange of small-arms and machine-gun fire took place around the airport settlement in the evening. 3313/

2515. Serb troops shelled BiH army positions in northern and north-western Sarajevo, Sarajevo radio said. A 14 year-old boy was killed by sniper fire, eight people were wounded by mortar shell fragments. 3314/
(b) Local reported events

2516. The BiH government urged UNPROFOR to take control of utilities in Sarajevo and the distribution of gas, water, and electricity, warning that winter would be especially harsh for the city's inhabitants. The plea came in a letter sent to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata, US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the UNPROFOR command. 3315/

(c) International reported events

2517. A source close to the Belgian Defence Ministry said that 185 Belgian soldiers were to leave for BiH in the coming days. The source said that the company of engineer corps troops would join 915 compatriots already stationed in the former Yugoslavia as part of the UNPROFOR contingent. Last month, Belgian Defence Minister Leo Delcroix agreed in principle to send reinforcements following a UN request. The engineer corps troops would be accompanied by bomb disposal experts responsible for maintaining roads to ensure access for winter aid convoys inside BiH. 3316/

9. 9/9/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Vogošća in the north of the city and Žuč hill were shelled during the day but otherwise, most fronts were reported as quiet. UNPROFOR described Igman as quiet. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Northern suburbs of the city; Vogošća; Žuč hill. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Chicago Tribune.

Description of Damage: A power line was damaged on Žuč hill. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Chicago Tribune.

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in downtown areas of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported four dead and 25 wounded in Sarajevo. 3317/ One French soldier was wounded by a mine while on patrol. 3318/ Source(s): Chicago Tribune; ICFY.

Narrative of Events:

2518. Bosnian Serb gunners shelled northern suburbs of Sarajevo but the city was reported as otherwise quiet, although sniper fire was reported in downtown areas. Vogošća in the north of the city and Žuč hill were shelled during the day but otherwise, Sarajevo radio reported that most fronts were quiet. UNPROFOR described Igman as quiet. 3319/

2519. The only power line feeding the city was damaged in an overnight firefight between Serbian and BiH forces on Žuč hill. 3320/

(b) Local reported events

2520. Despite fighting in central and southern BiH, the UNPROFOR commander in the former Yugoslavia, General Cot, said in Zagreb that a 31 July cease-fire agreement was being "more or less respected" in the Sarajevo region. He also
tried to settle confusion over reports of recent BiH government and Serb troop movements on Mount Igman. An UNPROFOR press officer in Sarajevo, Idesbald van Biesenbroeck, said Wednesday that UN military observers had reported Muslim and Serb troops preparing for a possible resumption in fighting on the mountain, which was put under UN control last month after falling to Serbian units. But Cot said that the reports were wrong. "The situation was very calm on Mount Igman and all (other) information which people were trying to spread was false", he said. 3321/

2521. French philosopher Bernard Henri-Levy and writer Gilles Herzog arrived in Sarajevo to spend a week with intellectuals in the city. They were scheduled to meet with President Izetbegović upon his return from visits to Turkey and the United States. 3322/

(c) International reported events

2522. BiH President Izetbegović told reporters in Washington that his government was ready to resume negotiations in Geneva but insisted that Croatians and Serbs yield more territory. Izetbegović ended a two-day visit to Washington, during which President Clinton rebuffed his request to set a deadline for US airstrikes if the Bosnian Serbs did not lift their siege of Sarajevo. 3323/

2523. In Washington, the Pentagon announced that Defense Secretary Les Aspin canceled plans to visit Sarajevo because of the breakdown in peace talks. 3324/

10. 10/9/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2524. No reported incidents.

11. 11/9/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Mortar shells and artillery fire hit overnight in the Žuč area and Koševo. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Žuč (overnight, 30 shells); the Koševo area. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Twelve people were reported wounded by gunfire in the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2525. UNPROFOR described the situation in Sarajevo as quiet with some shelling in the Žuč area.

2526. Mortar shells and artillery fire hit overnight in two sectors of northern Sarajevo. Firing was heard throughout the night, with about 30 shells falling on the district of Žuč, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said. There was firing on both sides, the spokesman said.

2527. UNPROFOR also reported that a similar number of mortar shells fell on the Koševo sector (the location of the city's main hospital), which also witnessed overnight machine-gun fire. There were no details on possible victims of the shelling, but the hospital said it had received no casualties.

2528. UNPROFOR also described the situation on Mount Igman as "very tense." 

(c) International reported events

2529. US Ambassador Viktor Jakovic told Serb leader Radovan Karadžić that Washington expected more flexibility from the Serbs in the peace talks in Geneva, BiH radio reported. "We no longer believe words. The US wants to see an improvement in the situation and not to listen to promises", Jakovic said. Karadžić told Reuters Television that he had been encouraged by his meeting with Jakovic. "I got some messages from the State Department that are very encouraging, since the Department is encouraging the Geneva process for the resolution of the crisis in BiH", he said.

2530. Diplomats said that EC peace mediator Lord Owen told European Community foreign ministers in Belgium that he hoped a deal on BiH could be signed by the end of September. But, at a news conference later, Owen was far more cautious and declined to forecast a timetable for a settlement.

12. 12/9/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2531. No reported incidents.
13. 13/9/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo remained quiet with the exception of the area around the UkrBat, where some small-arms fire and mortar shelling was reported. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: The BiH Public Health Ministry reported 15 killed and 102 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,313 killed (of which 1,501 were children), and 54,656 wounded (of which 14,246 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:
2532. UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo remained quiet with the exception of the area around the UkrBat, where some small-arms fire and mortar shelling was reported.

14. 14/9/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: There was sporadic automatic weapons fire in the city around midday in northern districts and small arms fire in the city centre. In the evening, the Old Town area and the north-west area of the city were pounded by shellfire. Shelling was also reported on BiH positions on Mount Igman. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The Old Town area of the city; the north-west area of the city; BiH government positions on Mount Igman (two shells). Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported sniping activity in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Early in the day, two people had been hospitalized in Sarajevo's main hospitals, one for a machine-gun fire wound, and the other having stepped on a mine. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:
2533. There was sporadic automatic weapons fire in Sarajevo around midday in northern districts, and some small arms fire in the city centre.

2534. UNPROFOR initially described the area as stable. However, Bosnian Serb artillery in the evening pounded the Old Town section, prompting a general alert in the area, Sarajevo radio reported quoting BiH military officials. The radio added that Serb forces shelled the north-west area of the city. Correspondents noted a slight increase in firing in the city compared to previous days. The radio also said that two shells had been forced at BiH
government positions in the Mount Igman area. 3337/

2535. Witnesses later said that shelling in the city appeared to have been directed at heights on the outskirts of the Old Town where the front line was located, rather than at residential areas. 3338/

2536. The main Sarajevo hospitals said that they had received no new admissions following the evening shelling. Hospital officials said that earlier in the day, two people had been hospitalized, one injured by machine-gun fire, the other having stepped on a mine. 3339/

(b) Local reported events

2537. UN officials said that robbery, hijacking and intimidation of relief workers were so widespread that the United Nations might turn over delivery of humanitarian aid to its armed forces. "The militarization of our operation may become inevitable", said Phillippos Papaphilippou, head of the Zenica office of UNHCR, the main relief agency in BiH. 3340/

(c) International reported events

2538. In Geneva, Presidents Alija Izetbegović of BiH and Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, in a step toward a possible BiH peace accord, announced agreement on an immediate cease-fire between Muslim and Croat forces in BiH. Diplomats said the accord could clear the way for early resumption of overall negotiations on a peace plan creating a new Bosnian "union" of three ethnic republics. But they cautioned that an earlier wide-ranging agreement in May quickly collapsed and was followed by some of the bloodiest fighting in the conflict. "I think we have to wait and see before getting too excited", one diplomat said. Izetbegović and Tudjman agreed also to close all prison camps and reopen roads for humanitarian convoys. 3341/

15. 15/9/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb forces reportedly fired several howitzer rounds during the afternoon in the north-west part of the city while small arms fire was reported along BiH lines. Intermittent artillery and small arms fire was reported in the evening. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The north-west area of the city (afternoon). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2539. Sarajevo radio reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired several howitzer rounds during the afternoon into the north-west of the city, while there was small arms fire along BiH government lines. Intermittent firing of artillery and small arms fire could be heard in the city during the evening. 3342/
16. 16/9/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The downtown area was shelled during the lunchtime and sniper fire was reported in the city. Žuč hill was reportedly shelled by Bosnian Serb forces in the evening. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The downtown area; Žuč hill (evening). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: A two year-old boy was killed and his mother, sister and an unidentified man were wounded when a shell hit the downtown area during the lunchtime. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: One man was killed and five others were reported wounded in the city, mostly by sniper fire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: One child was killed and three people wounded when a shell hit the downtown area at lunchtime; one man was killed and five others wounded, mostly by sniper fire. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2540. A two year-old boy was killed and his mother, younger sister, and a man were wounded when a shell struck the downtown area during the lunchtime, hospital officials said. Another man was shot dead by a sniper and five more people were injured, mostly by sniper fire. 3343/2541. UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman stated that a much lower level of confrontation between Muslims and Serbs appeared to have been maintained since fighting around Sarajevo died down at the end of August. He said that there had been no notable clashes between government and Serb forces, save for "significant shelling of Žuč (hill) by the Serb side" on the outskirts of the city in the evening. 3344/

(b) Local reported events

2542. UNPROFOR spokesman Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said that a military accord, confirming the political truce agreement concluded earlier in the week in Geneva, was signed by Rasim Delić, for the government forces, and General Milivoj Petković, for the Croat forces. The cease-fire signing followed several hours of talks between Delić, Petković and the commander of UNPROFOR in BiH, General Francis Briquemont, at Sarajevo airport. The earlier cease-fire deal was concluded by BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. This was the first time a representative of the Bosnian Croat forces fighting in the field acknowledged the earlier accord. van Biesenbroeck said the deal also allowed for freedom of movement for all humanitarian convoys as of Saturday midday, followed at a later stage by the release of all prisoners and the disbandment of prison camps. The military also discussed the implementation of the cease-fire which was due to come into force Saturday at noon. 3345/

2543. A separate cease-fire agreement was also signed by the leader of the Bosnian Serb assembly, Momilo Krajišnik. 3346/

2544. UNPROFOR Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont said he hoped for a signed peace accord but cautioned that the current 8,000-strong UN force
deployed in Sarajevo and in central BiH would need to be expanded by 15,000 to ensure a durable cease-fire. "For the future, we would need 4,000 to 5,000 more for Sarajevo", he said. According to reports, Sarajevo had 3,000 UN troops. 3347/

(c) International reported events

2545. In Skopje, Macedonia, international mediator David Owen said he expected the leaders of the three warring factions to sign a peace agreement when they met in Sarajevo. "I expect the agreement will be signed on Tuesday", he told reporters after meeting Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov. "It will be a very difficult agreement, but it must be signed". 3348/

17. 17/9/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as stable with some artillery and mortar shelling on Žuč and Zlatište. There were reportedly many BiH attempts of infiltration on Igman during the evening of 16-17 September. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2546. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as stable with some artillery and mortar shelling on Žuč and Zlatište. There were reportedly many BiH attempts of infiltration on Igman during the evening of 16-17 September. 3349/

18. 18/9/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The morning passed in the city with occasional firing. Areas to the north-west and south-west were also shelled. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo and Mount Igman as stable. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: City hospitals said that two people were wounded by snipers after the ceasefire, one of them seriously. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Two people were wounded by sniper fire (one seriously); one child was wounded by shrapnel. Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

2547. The morning passed in the city with occasional firing and an early high-altitude overflight by NATO jet fighters patrolling the air exclusion zone. As in previous days, people were out on the streets attending to their daily chores in the warm sunlight. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo and Mount Igman as stable.

2548. One child was reported wounded by shrapnel. There was "provocative small arms fire" and areas to the south-west and north-west were also shelled, Sarajevo radio said.

(b) Local reported events

2549. BiH President Izetbegović stated that he could not hold his country together by force, but added that Serbs and Croats must hand over more territory in exchange for peace. In an interview on Sarajevo radio, the President insisted that he would not sign a peace package on Tuesday if Serbs and Croats did not agree to his demands for more territory made earlier this month in Geneva. Izetbegović and leaders of the Bosnian Croats and Serbs were due to meet at Sarajevo airport for what had been billed as a possible peace breakthrough. "Attempts to preserve Bosnia by force would lead to constant conflict. As a member of the Moslem nation, I don't want my nation to experience one more genocide which would probably happen if we tried to keep people together by force", he said. He defended the idea of a nationwide referendum, to be held once peace had taken hold, by saying this would solve the problem of whether "one nation wanted to break away from the others". Izetbegović earlier in the week signed an agreement with Bosnian Serbs in Geneva agreeing to the referendum idea which would allow the individual ethnically-defined states eventually to break away completely and join up with the neighbouring Serbian and Croatian states.

2550. In Split, Lord David Owen said that the peace accord might not be signed at the scheduled meeting Tuesday at the Sarajevo airport between the three warring factions, Radio Zagreb said. Owen, speaking after talks with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, said he did not plan to go to the meeting unless he was certain that an overall agreement would be signed, the radio said. Owen said that President Izetbegović was demanding a land corridor to the sea before he would sign, a demand Boban described as irrational. Owen's co-mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg, who was also present at the Split talks, remained optimistic, saying that he felt there was still reason to hope the accord would be signed Tuesday.

2551. The co-chairmen of the UN-sponsored Geneva talks on the former Yugoslavia, David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg visited the coastal towns of Ploče and Neum where they looked at possibilities for the establishment of a Muslim exit to the sea, one of the conditions for the signing of the plan to divide the republic into three mini-states, linked by a loose central government.

2552. Fighting gradually died down throughout BiH in the afternoon in the wake of a general cease-fire, but isolated shooting incidents were continuing, UNPROFOR spokesmen said.

2553. When asked how many cease-fires had been called since the beginning of the war 18 months ago, BiH army deputy commander Stjepan Šiber said he had lost count. "I've lost track. Everyone stopped taking them seriously", he said.
19. 19/9/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR described the city as quiet. However, some shelling was reported in the Old Town and in the Žuč area. In the evening, Serb gunners reportedly shelled an unidentified building housing war refugees. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The Old Town; the Žuč area; an unidentified building housing war refugees. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Serb gunners pounded a building housing war refugees in the evening, starting a huge fire which forced the occupants to flee. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported sniper activity in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2554. UNPROFOR described the city as quiet. However, some shelling was reported in the Old Town and in the Žuč area.

2555. Witnesses said that Serb gunners pounded a building housing war refugees in the evening, starting a huge fire which forced the occupants to flee. The Serb units on a hillside 500 yards above the Miljacka River fired incendiary bullets at the building in a 15 minute barrage. Firefighters evacuated 10 refugee families and no serious injuries were reported.

(b) Local reported events

2556. Heavy artillery exchanges between BiH troops and Croatian forces persisted despite a shaky, one-day old cease-fire, casting doubts that an agreement might be signed in negotiations scheduled to begin on Tuesday. Fighting raged between Bosnian Croat and government forces in central BiH despite the cease-fire.

20. 20/9/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported quiet after Sunday's attack on a refugee building. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2557. The city was reported quiet after Sunday's attack on a refugee
local reported events

2558. Mediators called off Tuesday's meeting in which they had hoped that ethnic leader's would sign an accord to end the bloodshed in the region. "There won't be a meeting in Sarajevo tomorrow (Tuesday) because all sides have not shown sufficient flexibility", John Mills, spokesman for mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg said. The mediators, seeking to overcome the last obstacles to their peace deal, held talks with representatives of the Croat, Serb and Muslim factions on the British aircraft carrier Invincible in the Adriatic sea. Those attending included Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, BiH President, Alija Izetbegović and Presidents Milošević of Serbia, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia and Momir Bulatović of Montenegro. Mills said the decision to call off Tuesday's meeting was disappointing, but he added: "Progress has been made . . . The settlement is possible". Mills said that the mediators had received a report from a French-German technical team that had looked at the issue of the Croat-held ports of Neum and Ploče. The report concluded that Neum, the only coastal town in BiH, was not feasible for use as a commercial port. But Mills said: "President Izetbegovic continues to want access to Neum not necessarily for a port, but for its psychological value . . . He even says that himself". Tudjman said the talks were difficult because of Izetbegovic's insistence on laying claim on Neum. "Muslims are persistently asking for Neum and the Croat side cannot accept that", he said.

21. 21/9/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sniper fire was reported in the city with small arms fire on the outskirts, in the Žuć hill area. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: The BiH Health Ministry reported 14 killed and 77 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,327 killed (of which 1,503 were children), and 54,733 wounded (of which 14,261 were children). Source(s): BiH Ministry of Public Health.

Narrative of Events:

2559. Sniping in Sarajevo and some firing on the outskirts, in the Žuć hill area was reported by UNPROFOR. 3364/

(b) Local reported events

2560. BiH Deputy Foreign Minister Sulejman Suljić said that the three leaders meeting with international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg Monday had reached agreement on a corridor to the sea for BiH. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who was also at the meeting on the warship, blamed the
breakdown of Monday's talks on what he called tough talks on demands by Izetbegović for a land corridor linking the proposed Muslim mini-state to the Adriatic coast. But Suljić said Tuesday: "Territorial concessions were obtained last night to the east and the west". Following the meeting, Lord Owen said he thought it "pretty accurate" to say that an agreement was closer now than at any time in the past. He said that BiH demands for access to the sea had been met by a Croatian proposal to create free zones, notably at Ploče. The mediator also said the Bosnian Serbs had made "small but significant" concessions on the river Drina in eastern BiH along the border with Serbia. Owen, speaking in a BBC radio interview from Zagreb, rejected reports that the talks had ended in failure. "The talks didn't break up or break down", he said. "They ended with a package of modifications and changes which (BiH) President Izetbegović decided that he would put to his assembly in Sarajevo Monday". 3366/ "I just hope and literally pray that they decide to accept it and we can bring this bloody ghastly war to an end", Owen said. "Nobody believes it's the ideal, but it's time for peace". 3367/

22. 22/9/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city and Mount Igman were described as quiet with occasional sniper fire and some firing on Žuč Hill. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Žuč Hill. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Occasional sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2561. Sarajevo and Mount Igman were described as fairly quiet, with occasional sniping in town and some firing on Žuč Hill nearby. 3368/

2562. It was reported that in the evening, UNPROFOR was called in to defuse tension between Interior Ministry special forces and HVO troops following an armed stand-off between the two near the front lines. 3369/

(b) Local reported events

2563. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that he had gained access to the Adriatic sea by swapping territory with Croatia. Karadžić said that Bosnian Serbs would have access to the Adriatic sea near the Montenegrin border with BiH in exchange for Serb-held territories around the Croatian Adriatic port of Dubrovnik, according Tanjug, the state-run Yugoslav news agency. He said that access to the Drina River had been given to the Muslims as one of the Serb concessions, but that the major sticking points in the talks were territorial disputes between the Muslims and Croats over the division of central BiH. "There are indications that the Muslim side will accept it (peace accord)", said Karadžić, confirming that he thought the Geneva partition plan might be signed by BiH, reported Tanjug. But Karadžić warned that he would retreat to his former hard-line stance should any new attempts for further concessions be presented. 3370/
2564. It was reported that representatives of the three warring factions were expected to return to the negotiating table in Geneva next week should the BiH parliament accept the aeroplane negotiated aboard the British warship. 3371/

2565. An UNPROFOR spokesman suggested that following Monday's peace talks and the announcement that the BiH parliament would be summoned next week to discuss the latest peace proposals, the belligerents "still expect to have some kind of peace, that is the reason things are so quiet". 3372/

2566. It was reported that before the start of the war in April 1992, Sarajevo's 435,000 population was 50 per cent Muslim, 25 per cent Serb and 7.5 per cent Croat. It was now estimated that there were now 40,000 Serbs in the city. 3373/

23. 23/9/93 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** After an exchange of sniper fire, Serb forces reportedly fired 50 tank and 24 mortar rounds and anti-aircraft fire in the Skenderija quarter. Shelling was also reported in the area near the Presidency. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Skenderija quarter; the area near the Presidency. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire was reported between the BiH and Serbian sides. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** One French UNPROFOR soldier seriously wounded. Area hospitals reported eight people wounded for the day. 3374/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2567. UNPROFOR initially described the city as quiet, but at the end of the afternoon firing and shelling increased in the area of the Presidency. Serbs forces were reported to have fired with tanks from Grbavica towards the east. 3375/

2568. A French UNPROFOR soldier was shot and badly wounded in the afternoon at the start of a firefight between government and Serb forces in the Skenderija quarter. The firefight appeared to have been kicked off by an exchange of sniper fire between the two sides, followed by the Serbs' firing of 50 tank and 24 mortar rounds, along with anti-aircraft weapons. There was no immediate word of any BiH casualties. 3376/

24. 24/9/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Renewed shelling was reported in the morning with sniper fire near the Presidency building. UNPROFOR described the general situation in the city as quiet, but noted an instability between HVO and BiH forces in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.
Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported near the Presidency building. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2569. Renewed shelling was reported in the morning, with sniper fire near the Presidency building. UNPROFOR described the general situation in the city as quiet, but noted an instability between HVO and BiH forces in the city.

2570. Electricity which had only recently been reconnected to much of the city, was off again for the second day running amid reports that links between three power stations providing electricity to the city had been cut.

2571. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher acknowledged that it was uncertain whether Congress would support sending 25,000 US troops to help enforce a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia. The US forces would be part of a planned NATO deployment of up to 50,000 men.

25. 25/9/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Overnight shelling was reported along confrontation lines. UNPROFOR reported the city as relatively quiet with some artillery and mortar shelling and small-arms fire. A total of 23 outgoing shells were observed from Serbian positions and zero shells were observed from the BiH side. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported around the city. A sniper fired at least one round at a Danish armoured personnel carrier. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2572. There was again overnight shelling along confrontation lines and sniper activity around the city.

2573. UNPROFOR described the city as relatively quiet with some artillery and mortar shelling and small-arms fire. A total of 23 outgoing shells were observed from Serbian positions, zero from BiH positions. A sniper fired at
least one round at a Danish armoured personnel carrier on the daily Sarajevo-
Kiseljak shuttle convoy. All three convoy vehicles opened up fire towards the
building from which the sniper-fire originated. About 80 heavy machine-gun
rounds were used and the sniper did not return fire. 3382/

(b) Local reported events

2574. Croat HVO forces who had been fighting alongside BiH forces against the
besieging Serbs expressed concerns for their own safety. The Bosnian army on
Friday had ordered the HVO forces, which were responsible for the defence of a
two-kilometre long front, to stand down, disarm and retire to barracks. The
order was later rescinded following a meeting between BiH President Alija
Izetbegović and HVO local commander Slavko Zelić. But Zeli later said that
they he expected more trouble in the days to come. “They (the Muslims) want to
eliminate the HVO from Sarajevo”, he stated earlier. 3383/

2575. HVO forces in Sarajevo had helped the BiH government army defend the
city in the 17 month siege. The HVO units served in front-line positions,
particularly along a stretch of the Miljacka River which faced the Serbian-
held districts of Kovači, Grbavica and Hrasno. But relations between Muslim
and Croat forces had grown tense in the city as the former allies fought for
land in central BiH and the southern city of Mostar. 3384/ Word had also gone
out around town that Serbian gunners held their fire along sections of the
front defended by the HVO and men returning from the HVO units at the front
had described how they traded cigarettes and food across the Miljacka River
with Serbian forces. 3385/

2576. The United Nations said that it had received reports that hundreds of
Muslim men had been rounded up around Croat-held Kiseljak near Sarajevo and
sent to dig trenches near the front lines. 3386/

2577. Sarajevo was reported to be without electricity due to mechanical
problems at the Kakanj electrical power plant, UN sources said. 3387/

26. 26/9/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that situation in the city
remained quiet. Sniper activity was reported as having increased. Source(s):
UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported an increase in sniper activity. One French
UNPROFOR soldier was wounded by sniper fire. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence
France Presse.

Casualties: One French UNPROFOR soldier was wounded by a sniper bullet. It
was reported that the current number of UN troops wounded in the former
Yugoslavia was 629 and the total number killed was 58. 3388/ Source(s): Agence
France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2578. UNPROFOR reported that situation in the city remained quiet. Sniper
activity was reported as having increased. It was reported that a French UNPROFOR soldier was seriously injured when he was struck by a sniper bullet.

27. 27/9/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling, machine-gun and sniper fire were reported overnight. The city was reported quieter in the morning. UNPROFOR described the general situation in Sarajevo as stable with Serb artillery and mortar attacks. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire on UN personnel was reported near the Holiday Inn Hotel. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: The BiH Health Ministry reported 11 killed and 59 wounded in the last week. It also reported a cumulative total of 9,338 killed (of which 1,505 were children) and 54,792 wounded (of which 14,270 were children). Source(s): BiH Health Ministry.

(b) Local reported events

2581. BiH President Alija Izetbegović told a meeting of 352 BiH intellectuals and religious leaders in Sarajevo that the decision on whether to accept or reject the latest peace plan was a decision "between a just war and an unjust peace". The Sarajevo meeting was scheduled to be followed Tuesday by a session of parliament to vote on whether to approve the Geneva peace plan carving BiH into three ethnic republics. Izetbegović stressed his main objection to the deal--that the Serbs had refused to hand back territory which he believed was rightfully Bosnian. His reasons to accept the deal included the weakening of BiH, that siege warfare was forcing the BiH army onto the defensive and the world was unlikely to intervene militarily or to lift the arms embargo. Similarly, having to fight the Croats as well as the Serbs meant that the number of refugees was rising, winter was approaching and there had been warnings that aid would be cut off if more aid workers were harmed. The world was also in danger of turning its attention to the crisis in Russia at the expense of BiH, the president said.

2582. The Rome-based World Food Program said that critical food shortages could occur at the height of winter because donors had pledged very little food for January onward.
28. 28/9/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo as calm. Fighting was reported near the suburb of Kiseljak, where BiH forces shelled civilian and military targets. In addition to sporadic shelling, there was a high level of sniper activity reported in Sarajevo. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area near Kiseljak; the area near Jablanica. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Shell fire near Jablanica damaged a power-line supplying the Sarajevo area with electricity from the Neretva hydro-electric power system. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: A "significant level" of sniper fire was reported in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2583. UNPROFOR reported the situation in Sarajevo as calm. 3396/

2584. Fighting was reported near the suburb of Kiseljak, where BiH government forces shelled civilian and military targets, Zagreb radio said. 3397/

2585. In addition to sporadic shelling in Sarajevo itself, there was "sniper fire to a very significant level" throughout the day, according to a UN source. 3398/

2586. Shelling near BiH-held Jablanica damaged a power line supplying the Sarajevo area with electricity from the Neretva hydro-electric power system. An electricity board statement, quoted by BiH radio said that Sarajevo would receive small supplies of electricity for basic humanitarian needs until the power line was repaired. 3399/ Sarajevo was also reportedly left without water after the shelling incident. 3400/

(b) Local reported events

2587. After hours of open debate, the BiH parliament met in closed session for about an hour and adjourned. Political parties planned to meet on Wednesday morning for final consultations in advance of the vote on the peace plan, according to a BiH information ministry official. Earlier in the day, a meeting of influential BiH intellectuals gave conditional approval to the peace plan, advising the parliament to agree to the plan only if "territories seized by force" were returned. But the BiH cabinet, which had kept in the background for most of the 18 month conflict, voted to accept the plan without conditions. Haris Silajdžić, BiH foreign minister and a member of the BiH delegation to the peace talks, was believed to have played an influential role in the cabinet, according to analysts in Sarajevo. Sources close to the 18 member cabinet said that the 14 members present had asked only for international guarantees from NATO and the United Nations for the implementation of the plan. The cabinet met President Alija Izetbegović to discuss the parliamentary session, and it was believed that the cabinet's opinion could serve as a pointer to the parliamentary vote. 3401/
2588. BiH forces cut off by Serb forces in the Bihać enclave in north-western BiH rejected the proposed peace plan and declared themselves an autonomous province, Croatian television and radio said. A 400-member constituent assembly of the enclave met in the town of Velika Kladuša and voted to form an "Autonomous Province of Western BiH", naming Izetbegović rival Fikret Abdić as president of the new entity. The television quoted Abdić as calling the vote a rejection of BiH dismemberment into Serb, Croat and Muslim mini-states as agreed by Izetbegović at peace talks. "Instead of a unified state Bosnian citizens got three national republics. Muslims, the real victims, were made into just one of those three sides. Muslims of `Western Bosnia' cannot forget this historic disgrace", he told the Bihać assembly. The BiH constitutional court called the proclamation from the Bihać pocket unconstitutional, Sarajevo radio said. 

2589. Izetbegović also called unconstitutional the "Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia", Tanjug reported. Izetbegović ordered the imposition of martial law in the Bihać area, 140 miles (220 km) north-west of Sarajevo, Zagreb radio reported. Zagreb radio said that many people were in the streets protesting against Izetbegović's imposed rule. "The implementation of military dictatorship had caused great bitterness among the population", the radio said. 

2590. Abdić fell out with Izetbegović during peace talks in Geneva because of the president's reluctance to negotiate with Serb foes on a swift end to fighting in the region. The BiH parliament voted by 61 to one with seven abstentions to dismiss Abdić from the BiH collective Presidency. A replacement had not yet been named but needed to be found within 10 days. 

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Four to five mortar shells hit downtown Sarajevo in the afternoon just minutes after the radio had announced rejection by parliament of the latest peace terms. There was also artillery fire reported on Igman road near the airport. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Downtown Sarajevo (four to five mortar shells); Igman road (near the airport). Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Two people were killed and six were wounded by sniper fire while trying to cross the airport frontline overnight. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Two people were killed and six others wounded overnight while trying to cross the Sarajevo frontline at the airport; three people were wounded (a man, woman and an eight year-old boy), as a result of the afternoon shelling of downtown Sarajevo. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2591. Two people were killed and six wounded overnight when several hundred civilians tried to cross the Sarajevo frontline under cover of darkness, a UN military official said. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman, spokesman for UNPROFOR, said that the attempted crossings at the airport, both in and out of Sarajevo, were a regular nightly occurrence with civilians running a gauntlet
of snipers to cross the tarmac in a bid to leave the city or to bring in goods from the outside. The airport, located on one of the frontlines between BiH and Serb forces, was controlled by UN French troops who were supposed to prevent any crossings in what was declared a neutral zone. 3406/

2592. Four to five mortar shells hit downtown Sarajevo in the afternoon just minutes after the radio had announced rejection by parliament of the latest peace terms. Hospital officials said that three people (a man, woman, and an eight year-old boy), were slightly wounded. This was reported to be the first mortaring by Bosnian Serbs of the old centre of the city in several weeks. 3407/ It was reported that in the days preceding the parliament's vote, Serbian commanders warned that they would respond to a rejection of the plan by "flattening" Sarajevo and by renewing offensives elsewhere. 3408/

2593. Sarajevo radio reported that there was artillery fire on Igman road, a BiH-held area near the airport. 3409/

(b) Local reported events

2594. The BiH Parliament voted by a wide majority to reject the Geneva peace plan as it stood. Senior BiH officials gave contradictory accounts of the voting by the assembly, but discrepancies were small, with Sarajevo radio quoting figures given by Vice President Ejup Ganić. Ganić said that 69 deputies took part in the afternoon's vote. Four voted for acceptance of the peace plan as it stood, seven voted against, and 58 voted to accept the plan only if a number of conditions were met, including return by the Serbs of more Muslim-dominated territories. The parliament originally consisted of 240 deputies, but many of its Serb and Croat members no longer attended and others had been killed. The parliamentary vote, the country's official response to the Geneva peace package, was on the same lines as that of a consultative assembly which was attended by most of the top leaders in BiH. Vice President Ganić told reporters that the parliamentary vote aimed to get peace talks going again "in a positive direction" and win the "return of land taken by force". 3410/

2595. "I think that all of us need peace and what we expect is a minimum compromise to reach a solution", parliamentary president Miro Lazović told a news conference. "Time is working for us", said Muhamed Filipović, a leading opposition figure, adding that the Bosnian Serbs would eventually agree to further negotiations because of pressure on them from Belgrade which was anxious to have international sanctions against it lifted. Lazović said that deputies had reaffirmed their commitment to UN Security Council resolutions on BiH and to the conclusions of the London Conference on Yugoslavia of August of last year which had pledged no international acceptance of any territories seized by force. Commentators suggested that the parliament's anger at world pressure in favour of a peace deal, fear that a fragmented Muslim state might have no future, and hope that further concessions could be gained in a piecemeal way, appeared to have convinced the parliament to follow the lead given by Tuesday's assembly. 3411/

2596. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić called the Sarajevo vote tantamount to a rejection of the peace plan, the Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency reported. "It is clear to everyone that the plan is on the table and that it is either accepted or not", said Karadžić, speaking in the northern BiH town of Banja Luka. 3412/

2597. BiH army commander Rasim Delić called on citizens to support the war effort, just hours after the parliament had rejected the latest peace talks. In an address on Sarajevo radio, Delić said that the army would "need the
full support of those who haven't given help so far". "Fighters, soldiers let us be ready to defend this country", he added. 3413/

(c) International reported events

2598. In Washington, President Clinton expressed sympathy to the BiH parliament's demands, but said that the price of rejecting a peace agreement could be "very high". "I think they're entitled to some more territory. But I don't know if they can get it", Clinton said. "I think the price of passing up this peace may be very high". 3414/

30. 30/9/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported quiet after an evening of intermittent shelling. Shelling was reported later throughout the city, specifically in the Old Town. UNPROFOR described a slow increase of tension in the city. Sniper activities were reported high. Shelling was reported in Žuč and in the north-west of the city. Shelling was also reported in the Serb-held areas of Grbavica, Lukavica and Rajlovac. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Žuč; the north-west of the city; the Old Town; Grbavica; Lukavica; Rajlovac. Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A high level of sniping activity was reported in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: At least one person was killed and 15 others wounded in shelling and sniping incidents. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2599. Sarajevo was quiet after an evening of intermittent shelling, Sarajevo radio said. 3415/ UNPROFOR described a slow increase of tension in the city. Sniper activities were reported high. Shelling was reported in Žuč and in the north-west of the city. 3416/

2600. Shelling and sniping in the city left at least one person dead and 15 others wounded, hospital officials said. One of those hurt, a woman whose flat was hit by a shell, died in an unidentified hospital. Two children were injured in the same attack. Several shells were reported to have hit the old part of town and there was occasional firing reported in different parts of the city. 3417/

2601. The Serb-held suburbs of Grbavica, Lukavica and Rajlovac were reportedly shelled. 3418/

(b) Local reported events

2602. Opposition in BiH to President Alija Izetbegović mounted as thousands marched in protest in the western region one day after the BiH parliament rejected a plan to end the war. "We will not give 200,000 Muslims for Alija's state" clamored more than 18,000 people on the street of Pećigrad, 150 miles
(240 kilometres) north-west of Sarajevo, said Croatian Radio Zagreb. The people were referring to Izetbegović’s statement that he would sacrifice 200,000 troops for the formation of a Bosnian state at the beginning of the war in the spring of 1992. Izetbegović ordered the imposition of martial law in the Cazinska Krajina region of western BiH after it proclaimed autonomy and he declared the move unconstitutional. Forces loyal to Izetbegović who attempted to implement martial law were met with opposition as people in the streets chanted "Long live the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia". Self-styled prime minister of the Western Bosnian pocket, Božidar Šicel, said that "nearly 75 per cent of Bosnian government troops have signed the initiative for the formation of the autonomous region", in an interview with Croatian television. The self-styled parliament, headed by Zlatko Jusić, a Croat, held its first parliamentary meeting to form the ministry of foreign affairs and put the army and police under unified command, said Radio Zagreb. An independent news agency under the name of "ZBIA" was also formed as an alternative source to government controlled Radio Sarajevo.

2603. The commander of the BiH government forces, Rasim Delić, declared a cease-fire with Bosnian Croat militia, known as the HVO. The cease-fire was to take effect at noon in central BiH and at 6:00 p.m. in Mostar. Delić said that he ordered all of his troops to halt military offensives against HVO troops, but added that his troops would answer with fire if they were attacked.

2604. In Belgrade the president of the Serb self-proclaimed parliament, Momcilo Krajišnik, urged the body to retaliate against the BiH rejection of the peace plan by "retracting certain territorial concessions" made earlier.

2605. In Zagreb, the director of civilian affairs for UNPROFOR, Cedric Thornberry, warned that the BiH parliament's rejection of the Geneva plan could spark an escalation in the fighting.

2606. Seven UNPROFOR and 20 UNHCR flights landed at the airport.

2607. Ray Wilkinson, of the UNHCR warned that the prospect of continued fighting into the winter "leaves us looking into the jaws of a major disaster".

(c) **International reported events**

2608. Mediators David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg held consultations in Geneva to plot the future of BiH peace efforts, with the diplomats saying that the BiH rejection of the partition plan left few options open for ending the war. Their spokesman John Mills declined to say if and when the European Community and UN mediators would make a new attempt to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table.

2609. Nato in Brussels called on the parties in BiH to resume peace talks, stating that it was continuing preparations to help carry out a UN-backed peace plan.

**S. October 1993**

1. 1/10/93 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city came under overnight shelling and
sniper fire but fighting subsided in the morning. UNPROFOR described the situation during the day as unstable with artillery and mortar attacks. Heavy shelling was reported on the frontline areas late in the evening and overnight. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Žuć; Grdonj; Čolina Kapa; unidentified front line areas; an UNPROFOR APC; the city centre. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** The city reportedly came under overnight sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Two French soldiers were slightly wounded by a hand grenade explosion on an APC. An UNPROFOR spokesman later said that three French soldiers had been lightly wounded in two separate incidents in the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2610. The city came under overnight shelling and sniper fire but fighting subsided in the morning.

2611. UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as unstable with artillery and mortar attacks in the areas of Žuć, Grdonj and Čolina Kapa. Mount Igman was reported quiet. Two French soldiers were slightly wounded by a hand grenade explosion on an APC. An UNPROFOR spokesman later said that three French soldiers had been lightly wounded in two separate incidents in the city.

2612. UNPROFOR Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman reported heavy shelling of the city’s frontline areas late in the evening and overnight, along with limited shelling in the city centre.

(b) **Local reported events**

2613. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that his side was withdrawing territorial concessions it made to BiH in light of the parliament’s rejecting the recent peace plan. Karadžić’s statement, reported by the Tanjug news agency Saturday, followed a threat from Bosnian Croats to also withdraw territorial concessions they made to BiH if the plan was not accepted by all of the parties by 15 October. The BiH foreign minister, Haris Silajdžić, however, said that his side was ready to resume talks with the Serbs and Croats. “We are ready to continue (negotiating) as soon as we are invited”, he said in an interview broadcast on BiH radio and television. “In the short term I'm not very optimistic”, he added. Turning to the Croat threat to renege on concessions, Silajdžić expressed surprise, saying that “such an initiative is not in keeping with this (peace) process”.

2614. In Zagreb, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman said that Croatia might accept an extension of the UN mission on its territory, despite its demands for peacekeepers to ensure the return of lost land or leave. Tudjman, returning from New York where he addressed the UN General Assembly, spoke as the UN Security Council extended by 24 hours the mandate of its peace-keeping force, which would have expired overnight.
(c) International reported events

2615. Lord Owen said that he and peace conference co-chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg were abandoning attempts to immediately reconvene talks on their plan to partition BiH into ethnic Croat, Serb and Muslim mini-states. The plan was accepted in principle by the Croats and Serbs but had been rejected recently by the BiH parliament. Referring to the Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim negotiating teams, Owen said, "There is perhaps too great a tendency for the parties to believe that all they need to do is turn up in Geneva [for peace talks]". "That is not enough. There has to be a readiness to compromise". 3435/

2616. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a one-day extension of the mandate of its peace-keeping force in Croatia. 3436/

2617. The Chairman of the United Nations Commission of Experts to investigate war crimes in the former Yugoslavia stated that he had resigned from his post because frustration at the UN bureaucracy and obstruction by Western governments had harmed his health. "The Commission did not have the full political support of major governments", Frits Kalshoven said. 3437/

2. 2/10/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as calm with some sporadic sniper activity and some mortar shelling in Žuč, Vraca, Kobilja and Grdonj. 3438/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč; Vraca; Kobilja; Grdonj. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported sporadic sniper activity. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2618. UNPROFOR described the city as calm with some sporadic sniper activity and some mortar shelling in Žuč, Vraca, Kobilja and Grdonj. 3439/

3. 3/10/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as quiet. However, unidentified gunfire was reported "both into and out of" the city. 3440/ Source(s): UNPROFOR

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: An Italian protester was hit by sniper fire on the Vrbanja bridge. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.
**Casualties:** An Italian protestor was either killed or severely wounded by sniper fire on the Vrbanja bridge. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

2619. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as quiet. However, unidentified gunfire was reported "both into and out of the city. 3441/

2620. An Italian citizen with the Catholic group "Blessed are the Peacemakers" was shot by unidentified gunmen. Reports conflicted as to whether he had been killed or wounded. One report stated that Gabriele Moreno was fatally shot when he was hit by two bullets as he and four other members of his peace group attempted to cross a bridge over the Miljacka River. The group had made two previous attempts to cross the Vrbanja bridge but had been turned back by BiH forces. On the third attempt they carried banners with the word "Mir" (Peace). Snipers then opened fired from both sides of the front-line near the parliament building. It was not clear who fired the shots. The man was thereafter taken to the city's French hospital. 3442/ Another report, stated that the protester had been wounded and that his life did not appear to be in danger. 3443/

(b) Local reported events

2621. The New York Times and Agence France Presse reported on black market activity in Sarajevo. In particular, it was noted that by day Serbian gunners in the suburb of Grbaica fought with BiH soldiers, but by night the two forces met on bridges spanning the Miljacka, conducting a thriving black market trade. 3444/

4. 4/10/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as stable with some shelling observed in the areas of Žuč and Kobilja Glava (north of the city). Sniper activity was also continuing. 3445/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Žuč; Kobilja Glava. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported continued sniper fire in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2622. UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as stable with some shelling observed in the areas of Žuč and Kobilja Glava (north of the city). Sniper activity was also continuing. 3446/
5. 5/10/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2623. No incidents reported.

(b) Local reported events

2624. In an incident which reflected the growing willingness of Sarajevans to venture into open areas vulnerable to mortar and gunfire, a crowd of several hundred people gathered along the embankment of the Miljacka River, watching for a half an hour as men waded into the water to save a drowning dog. There were cheers as the men lassoed the animal and pulled it to safety. 3447/

6. 6/10/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as unstable. Monitoring officers reported that some sporadic artillery and mortar fire initiated by Serb forces had fallen in the north, central and southern parts of the city. 3448/ Observers noted an increase in shelling in the wake of last week’s decision by the BiH parliament to reject the latest peace terms. 3449/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The north, central and southern sections of the city; an unidentified schoolyard in the city centre. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Both sides reported sniping and shelling in the city. Sniper fire could be heard in the morning. 3450/ Sniper fire directed towards a UN vehicle was reported. 3451/ French troops escorting workmen positioning shipping containers used to protect people from sniper fire were shot at by snipers, UNPROFOR said. The French UNPROFOR soldiers fired back with heavy machine-guns from their armoured vehicles. No casualties among the French were reported. 3452/ Some sniper fire was reported in the city centre. 3453/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Two people were reportedly killed and five others wounded when a single mortar shell hit a schoolyard in the city centre. 3454/ Source(s): The Press Association; Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

2625. UNPROFOR described the city as unstable. Monitoring officers reported that some sporadic artillery and mortar fire initiated by Serb forces had fallen in the north, central and southern parts of the city. 3455/

2626. Two people were reportedly killed and five wounded when a single mortar shell hit a street in the city centre. 3456/ The shell reportedly fell at 2:30 p.m. among a group of people in a schoolyard inhabited by refugees in the downtown area. The shell was reportedly Serb-fired. The victims killed included a 38 year-old mother and her five year-old daughter who were refugees living in the school. The five wounded included two children. 3457/

(b) Local reported events

2627. BiH President Alija Izetbegović left for New York to explain to the United Nations why his parliament effectively rejected the latest Geneva peace plan. The parliament said it accepted the plan which would divide BiH into three ethnic statelets, but only on condition that "land seized by force" was returned. 3458/

7. 7/10/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and sniping were noticeably more intense in the city after BiH President Izetbegović stated that his government could never accept the terms of the latest peace plan. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The airport area; the city centre; BiH command headquarters. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping in the city was noticeably more intense. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Four persons were wounded when a mortar round hit the city centre; 3459/ UNPROFOR monitoring officers confirmed three civilians dead and 12 injured in the city. 3460/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2628. Hostilities increased after BiH President Izetbegović stated that Bosnians his government could never accept the latest plan to end the fighting. 3461/

2629. In Sarajevo, which had enjoyed relative peace in recent days, shelling and sniping were noticeably more intense. UN spokesman Idesbald Van Biesenbroeck described the situation in the city as "unstable", with shelling around the airport and small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire between BiH and Serb settlements nearby. 3462/

2630. A mortar round reportedly hit the city centre, wounding four people. 3463/

2631. UNPROFOR reported that most of the shelling originated from the Serb
side. One small-arms bullet came through a window on the second floor of BiH Command Forward Headquarters. No casualties resulted.

(b) Local reported events

2632. In a recent poll in Sarajevo, only 50 per cent of those interviewed said they planned to stay in BiH if peace came. Refugees comprised the highest percentage (67 per cent) of those saying that they would stay. Only 20 per cent of students and those with a college education said that they would remain.

(c) International reported events

2633. In New York, BiH President Izetbegović stated that his parliament had rejected a peace plan that would have divided BiH into three ethnic mini-states, because his country was being subjected to "political vivisection". He repeated demands that Serbs and Croatians give back more land than they had agreed to under the plan. "The unjust peace plan is flawed because it is based upon the repugnant and historically failed concept of ethnic partition and apartheid", he told the UN General Assembly.

8. 8/10/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was described as relatively quiet in the morning. However, several areas were later shelled. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The New Town area; several unidentified areas. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2634. Sarajevo radio described the city as relatively quiet in the morning.

2635. Several areas of the city, including the New Town area were shelled.

(b) Local reported events

2636. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić stated in an interview that his troops would not renew their attacks on Sarajevo and other strongholds. "We are of the same blood, we are all Slavs", he said. He repudiated earlier statements, including threats by Serbian commanders to use renewed artillery bombardments against the city. "No, no, we will never do that", he said. "We don't intend to resume the war. We don't intend to punish the Muslims because they didn't sign. We don't intend to take territory we consider Muslim. Serbs are not fighting now. For us, the war is finished". Referring specifically to events in the city, Karadžić stated, "[T]he siege of Sarajevo is over".
2637. UNPROFOR issued a statement saying that it had appointed an Austrian UN military officer, Major General Gunther Greindl to chair a commission probing allegations against UNPROFOR soldiers and other personnel. The six-week inquiry was ordered by UNPROFOR commander General Jean Cot after media reports of alleged widespread black market dealing and other improper behaviour by UN troops in Sarajevo. 3471/ 

(c) International reported events

2638. BiH President Izetbegović and Croatian President Tudjman talked in Vienna but made no apparent breakthrough to revive stalled peace negotiations. They told a news conference that they had discussed proposed changes to the peace-keeping force in BiH, but made no mention of new moves to resolve major differences on the latest Geneva peace plan. They issued a joint proposal calling on NATO to send peace-keeping forces to BiH and Croatia. 3472/ 

9. 9/10/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 64 shells into the Žuč, Kobilja Glava and Mojmilo districts. BiH forces were reported to have shelled the Serb ammunition factory at Vogošća. Sniper fire from both sides was reported as active, particularly in the Grbavica area. 3473/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč; Kobilja Glava and Mojmilo Districts; Serb ammunition factory in Vogošća. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire from both sides was reported as active, particularly in the Grbavica area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2639. UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 64 shells into the Žuč, Kobilja Glava and Mojmilo districts. BiH forces were reported to have shelled the Serb ammunition factory at Vogošća. Sniper fire from both sides was reported as active, particularly in the Grbavica area. 3474/ 

10. 10/10/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sniping and machine-gun fire was reported in the city early in the day after overnight shelling. UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with over 100 shell rounds and that BiH forces shelled the Vogošća ammunition factory. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč Hill; Old Town; the Vogošća ammunition factory. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified
**Sniping Activity:** Reports stated that there was heavy sniping in the city. **3475/** UNPROFOR, however, reported a slight decrease in sniper activity. **3476/** Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2640. Sniping and machine-gun fire were reported in the city early in the day after overnight shelling. **3477/**

2641. UNPROFOR reported that Serb shelling of the city continued with more than 100 rounds hitting the city. BiH forces were reported to have fired seven mortar rounds at the Vogošća ammunition factory. **3478/**

2642. The contested Žuć hill to the north of the city centre was shelled by Serb forces. The Old Town area was also reportedly shelled. **3479/**

(b) **Local reported events**

2643. UNPROFOR officials said that medical evacuations were set to resume after Ismet Bajramović, the former chief of the city’s military police, was airlifted out as part of a deal with Bosnian Serbs. Bajramović, who was suffering from serious chest wounds after being hit by a bullet, was taken to an Italian hospital on board a British aeroplane, UNHCR spokesman Ray Wilkinson said. All medical evacuations had been suspended after Bosnian Serbs refused to let Bajramović leave Sarajevo for treatment, charging that he was a war criminal. It was reported that BiH foreign minister Silajdžić demanded Bajramović’s evacuation, but that Bosnian Serbs insisted that he could leave only if three ill Bosnian Serbs were taken from Sarajevo to hospitals in Belgrade. The three Bosnian Serbs and five members of their families were taken to Belgrade by road Saturday. Bajramović’s evacuation opened the way for medical evacuations to resume. However, UNHCR spokesman Wilkinson accused the two sides of playing a “political game”, which had even put UNHCR personnel in physical danger. According to a UN source, the medical evacuation unit was forced to close its hospital office on Friday and Saturday after receiving threats. **3480/**

11. **11/10/93 (Monday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Sarajevo came under artillery, machine-gun and sniper fire overnight, but the bombardment died down by the morning. UNPROFOR reported an estimated 155 shell impacts. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper fire was reported overnight. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2644. The city reportedly came under artillery, machine-gun and sniper fire overnight but the bombardment died down by morning. **3481/**
2645. UNPROFOR described the situation in Sarajevo as unstable with continuous shelling during the day. An estimated 150 shell impacts were recorded in BiH controlled areas and four in Serb controlled areas. Mount Igman was described as calm. 3482/

(c) International reported events

2646. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe estimated that thousands of persons could die in Sarajevo alone over the winter and urged the European Community and Muslim countries to rebuild the road to the city from the Adriatic coast to ensure the flow of supplies. 3483/

12. 12/10/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported overnight in an upsurge of fighting. UNPROFOR described the city as tense and unstable with a high level of sniper fire. Monitors recorded 160 shell impacts in the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: BiH front lines; unidentified BiH-controlled areas. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of sniper activity. One French soldier was struck in the head by sniper fire. His condition was serious but not life threatening. 3484/ The sniping reportedly took place near the Old Town's Skenderija district. 3485/ A French UNPROFOR officer was seriously wounded by a sniper on his way down from Mount Igman. 3486/ The officer, a captain serving with the Foreign Legion, was wounded in the head and was scheduled to be evacuated to France. 3487/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Chicago Tribune; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2647. Bosnian Serb forces reportedly shelled BiH front lines overnight in an upsurge of fighting. 3488/

2648. UNPROFOR described the city as tense and unstable with a high level of sniper fire. Monitors recorded 67 shell impacts, 3489/ all in BiH controlled areas. Mount Igman was reported as quiet. 3490/

2649. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated that the HVO had severed the city's supply routes from the Adriatic coast. The HVO had reportedly mined the main road to the city between Visoko and Kiseljak and was blocking UN aid convoys along the Busovaca-Kiseljak road, the secondary route to Sarajevo. 3491/

(b) Local reported events

2650. The UNHCR announced that the Sarajevo airlift was in its 467th day, overtaking the 462 days of the Berlin airlift between June 1948 and September 1949. 3492/ Berlin had received more than two million tons of food and coal on
277,000 flights, while Sarajevo had received 63,000 tons of aid on 5,800 flights since July 1992. 3493/

2651. Sarajevo lost its electricity supply because of a breakdown somewhere between Jablanica and Kakanj, south-west of the city. This reportedly reduced the city's water supply. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that UNPROFOR technicians were trying to restore the power supply. 3494/

13. 13/10/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy machine-gun and sniper fire reportedly subsided in the morning. 3495/ UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as tense with widespread sniper fire and continued artillery and mortar fire. Monitors recorded 94 shell impacts. 3496/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Hadžići; Žuč; Kobilja Glava; Grdonj; Hladivode; Vasin Han; Čolina Kapa. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Heavy sniper fire reportedly subsided in the morning. UNPROFOR described widespread sniper fire during the day. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Sniper fire wounded two people. 3497/ An HVO infantry attack, reportedly killed two persons. 3498/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2652. Heavy machine-gun and sniper fire reportedly subsided in the morning. Sarajevo radio said that Bosnian Serb forces shelled BiH army defence lines near Hadžići close to the city, and that Croat HVO forces had then launched an infantry attack, killing two persons. 3499/

2653. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as tense with widespread sniper fire and continued artillery and mortar fire, mainly around Žuč, Kobilja Glava, Grdonj, Hladivode, Vasin Han and Čolina Kapa. Monitors recorded 94 shell impacts. 3500/

2654. Sarajevo radio reported that shelling subsided in the afternoon, but that intensive sniper fire wounded two people. 3501/

2655. Reuters noted a sharp rise in shelling and sniping in the city. The UN reportedly stated that this activity was a reminder to the city that it was still at the mercy of the besieging forces. 3502/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated: "Our impression is that it has been a decision by the Serbs to maintain pressure on the city and make sure that the government within the city is aware of what they are capable of doing". 3503/

(b) Local reported events

2656. Reuters reported that prior to an increase in shelling, Sarajevans were taking to the city streets along with brilliant autumn weather. Some cafes were said to be open and shopfronts smashed in by mortar shells had acquired new glass. The United Nations was also reported to be helping local workers to clean up garbage accumulated over the course of the siege. 3504/
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2657. Repair teams were reported attempting to repair electricity lines in the
city. 3505/
(c)

International reported events

2658. BiH ambassador to the UN, Muhammed Sacirbey, stated that his government
could not count on the world enforcing a peace settlement in BiH in the light
of recent events in Somalia and Haiti. "The Bosnians have to reconsider
whether or not they can rely on any segment of the international community",
he said in Washington. In the absence of credible guarantees from the UN and
NATO "we may need to go back to the strategy of preparing ourselves for an
indefinite period of time for a defensive war", he said. 3506/
2659. In Brussels, Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO, told
ambassadors from the 16 member countries that NATO air strikes in BiH "are
still on the agenda". 3507/
14.
(a)

14/10/93 (Thursday)

Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city came under overnight shelling attacks.
Sirens sounded a general alert in the morning as Bosnian Serb forces hit the
ŽuF hill area in apparent retaliation for an early morning BiH attack on the
VogošAa industrial area. UNPROFOR reported a heavy exchange of fire around
Stup in the afternoon and around the Tito Barracks throughout the day.
Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR; United Press
International.
Targets Hit: ŽuF Hill; VogošAa; Stup; Tito Barracks; central Sarajevo; the
outskirts of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; UNPROFOR;
United Press International.
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: According to UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman, sniper fire was
increasing in the city. UN peacekeepers were also increasingly being targeted
by snipers, with four UN vehicles hit in Sarajevo during the last 36 hours and
two soldiers wounded, Aikman added. 3508/ Source(s): Reuters.
Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported that Bosnian Serb forces shelled both
civilian targets and positions of the BiH forces both in central Sarajevo and
on the outskirts of the city. No casualty figure was available but doctors in
hospitals throughout the city said that they had admitted a number of injured
persons, according to the radio. 3509/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:
2660. The city came under overnight shelling, with machine-gun and sniper fire
lasting into the morning. 3510/
2661. Sirens sounded a general alert in the city in the morning as Serb
gunners hit the contested northern ŽuF hill near the old part of the city. The
shelling was reportedly in retaliation for an earlier BiH attack. (According
to reports, the BiH forces attacked the VogošAa industrial area at around 7:30
a.m. local time) 3511/
2662. "There has been steady firing into the city over the last 24 hours",


UNPROFOR spokesman Colonel Bill Aikman said. BiH forces used mortars and small-arms to fire at Serb lines at Vogošća, north of the city, he added. "The Serbs decided to throw everything they could back. For about an hour it was quite dramatic in town", Aikman said. "Certainly the tensions around here are rising, certainly the fire into the city is clearly up and I think everyone has reason to be concerned". 3512/

2663. UNPROFOR reported that the situation in the city remained unstable and was expected to continue as Serb forces re-occupied many previously abandoned positions. UNPROFOR also reported a heavy exchange of fire around Štip in the afternoon and around the Maršal Tito Barracks throughout the day. 3513/

(b) Local reported events

2664. The leaders of Serbia and the self-declared Serbian state in BiH reportedly urged Croatia, Bosnian Croats and the BiH government to renew direct negotiations. 3514/

2665. An operation to fly out sick and wounded patients from Sarajevo was called off as Bosnian Serb officials imposed new conditions for the evacuation. Dr. Genevieve Begkoyian said that Bosnian Serb authorities had insisted on being given a list of all patients to be evacuated 48 hours in advance, a demand which she described as inconsistent with the urgent nature of the evacuation operation. Two flights, one due to take four patients to France and another to fly four more to Italy, were canceled as ambulances stood by to take the patients to the airport. Begkoyian said that it was also not certain if eight children awaiting evacuation to the US could leave as planned. She added that of all of these cases, two were emergencies: one man with burns and the other a child with a brain tumor. Altogether, 127 sick and wounded persons were awaiting evacuation from the city. However, there were reportedly only 47 beds reserved for them at foreign hospitals. 3515/

(c) International reported events

2666. In Brussels, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner warned that the US would be reluctant to send peace-keeping troops to BiH after recent events in Somalia and Haiti. But he added that the alliance could not enforce a peace plan without US assistance. "NATO will not do it and cannot do it without the United States . . . We could not even try". 3516/
the city. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2667. The Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency reported sporadic BiH artillery and machine-gun fire on Serb-held suburbs around the city. 3518/

2668. UNPROFOR reported the situation in the city as unstable with scattered Serb shelling concentrated in the Žuč area. UNPROFOR commented that shelling of Žuč was an attempt to drive BiH lines back from positions able to fire into Vogošća. UNPROFOR also announced that the French Battalion on Mount Igman had been rotated. 3519/

2669. The Holiday Inn was reportedly hit by a short burst of small-arms fire in the evening. 3520/

2670. Four artillery shells landed next to a UN observers' mission on one of the heights south-east of the city in the evening. According to UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman, observers thought that Serb forces were responsible for the shelling. 3521/

(b) Local reported events

2671. The city was reported as relatively quiet in the morning but was virtually without electricity because of a break in the supply line near the front line close to Kiselják. Engineers were said to be reluctant to repair it until a cease-fire was negotiated. 3522/

16. 16/10/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported an unusually active day with approximately 600 shell impacts recorded in the city. (A later report said that UNPROFOR counted 570 shell impacts.) 3523/ UNPROFOR commented that this fire was prompted by an early morning attack by the BiH army 10th Brigade, aimed at cutting the road to Pale in the south-east of the city. Serb forces reportedly responded with very heavy fire directed at military and civilian targets. 3524/ UNPROFOR spokesman, Bill Aikman said that BiH forces had fired about 10 mortar rounds at the Serbs, who responded with heavy artillery into the old town district. He told reporters that the Serb forces were using 152 millimetre artillery. "That's pretty heavy stuff", he said. 3525/ Aikman said that Serbian forces began their response by using barrel bombs filled with a mixture of explosives and fuel, detonated by a delayed-action timer. Colonel Aikman said that at least six of the bombs were rolled down the steep Trebević hillside into the Bistrik district, causing craters 20 feet across and six feet deep. 3526/ Residents said that the explosions had destroyed three homes. 3527/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Bistrik district; the Old Town district; unidentified Bosnian Serb positions; Dobrinja. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Blasts in the Bistrik district reportedly caused craters 20 feet across and six feet deep; three homes were reportedly destroyed in the Bistrik district. Source(s): New York Times; Reuters; UNPROFOR.
Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported overnight and into the morning. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: There were at least 10 persons confirmed killed and 70 others wounded in the city. City authorities said that at least 12 civilians had been killed in the city in the 24 hour period ending at 1:00 p.m. Saturday. According to officials at the city's two main hospitals, eight people had been killed in the city and 55 wounded in the past 24 hours. Fifteen persons were also reported seriously wounded. Source(s): New York Times; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2672. Persistent artillery, machine-gun and sniper fire hit the city overnight and into the morning. Serb forces reportedly hit the city with a barrage of artillery rounds, shutting down the airport in the heaviest shelling in several weeks.

2673. Radio Sarajevo issued a warning for the city's citizens to remain inside their homes and to take shelter in basements. The radio did not offer any casualty numbers in the day's attacks, but quoted city authorities as saying that at least 12 civilians had been killed in the city in the 24 hour period ending at 1:00 p.m. Saturday.

2674. Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with at least 30 152 millimetre tank shells. Doctors at the trauma clinic at Koševo Hospital, said that four people who had been brought to the clinic had died of their wounds and that 30 others had been treated. One of the wounded included a woman named Čima Zenić, who suffered shrapnel cuts from a shell that destroyed her home in the Bistrik district and killed her 22 year-old daughter-in-law. In broadcasts from Pale, the Serbian leadership blamed the BiH forces for the renewed fighting around the city, stating that units defending the city had opened fire first with mortar and other attacks on Serbian positions. The BiH Government disputed this, stating that the Serbian forces began the assault at 4:00 a.m. by rolling oil barrels filled with explosives down the slopes of Trebević Mountain into the heavily populated Bistrik district.

2675. The airport was closed for three hours due to the shelling. A UN monitoring patrol being evacuated from their observation post (due to the heavy shell fire) was reported arrested by BiH forces. Their vehicles, equipment, and that of their French escort were seized and not yet returned.

(b) Local reported events

2676. The Sarajevo airport was closed as a result of the day's shelling. United Nations officials said that fighting around the airport, including Serbian tank fire on the Dobrinja suburb, made landing at the airport too risky.

(c) International reported events

2677. BiH President Alija Izetbegović sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York, urging him to help to resume peace talks which were last held in late September.
17. 17/10/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as tense, but noted that the level of shelling had been significantly reduced from that of the previous day. Artillery impacts were reported in the city centre. Tank activity was reported around Lukavica. Sniper and heavy machine-gun fire were continuous throughout the day. 3539/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: City centre; unidentified districts in the south and north-east of the city; water line in Dobrinja; Hrasnica; Sokolović Colony. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that sniper and heavy machine-gun fire were continuous throughout the day. 3540/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: At least six civilians were reported killed; 3541/ The city crisis centre reported that 13 people had been killed and 78 wounded in the 24 hours up to Sunday morning. 3542/ Source(s): Chicago Tribune.

Narrative of Events:

2678. The city was subjected to sporadic artillery, machine-gun and small-arms fire overnight. 3543/

2679. The shelling in the city was reported as lighter than on Saturday. On both days, BiH army officials claimed that Serbs were using chemical weapons, but these reports could not be substantiated. NATO warplanes flew low-level sorties over Serbian gun positions on the mountains surrounding the city in an apparent warning to Serb leaders. 3544/

2680. Districts in the south and north-east of the city were targeted by gunners, the same areas hit on Saturday, according to UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. 3545/

2681. A Serbian mortar shell reportedly struck among residents lining up at a well in the Dobrinja suburb. Yusuf Hajir, the Palestinian director of the Dobrinja clinic said that 13 people were wounded, six seriously. 3546/

2682. In separate mortar attacks on the suburbs of Hrasnica and Sokolović Colony, six people were reported killed and six others wounded. 3547/

(b) Local reported events

2683. BiH army 1st Corps commander Bihir Karavelić said that Saturday's artillery barrage could be a sign that Bosnian Serbs were preparing an assault on the city. UN officials had reported Serb troop movements around the city but were unsure whether the Serbs planned an offensive. Bosnian Serbs were reported to have said that it was the BiH forces who were trying to push forward on fronts in central BiH. 3548/

2684. UNPROFOR commander, General Jean Cot, met with BiH army commanders in Sarajevo to protest the temporary detention of eight or nine 3549/ UNPROFOR soldiers by BiH irregular troops on Saturday. 3550/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that the incident started after a house used by three of the captured observers was damaged by shellfire and their vehicles were destroyed.
Six UNPROFOR soldiers in two armoured personnel carriers went to rescue the observers and were detained by the BiH soldiers. The BiH soldiers reportedly freed the UNPROFOR soldiers and observers three hours later but kept one APC and some equipment. It was reported that the unit responsible for this incident was commanded by the local BiH leader "Ćaço". 3552/ 18. 18/10/93 (Monday) 

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Fighting reportedly decreased around Sarajevo, but the city continued to be shelled. Nineteen shells reportedly hit the city overnight and BiH forces returned a smaller number of rounds. UNPROFOR recorded 40 mortar and artillery shells in the Žuč area. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Žuč. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniper activity was reported at a higher level. 3553/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2685. Fighting reportedly decreased around Sarajevo, but the city continued to be shelled. A UN spokesman said that 19 shells hit the city overnight and that BiH forces had returned a smaller number of rounds. 3554/

2686. UNPROFOR described the city as less tense. Monitors recorded 40 mortar and artillery rounds in the area of Žuč. Sporadic tank activity was observed throughout the city area. 3555/

(b) **Local reported events**

2687. BiH forces returned one of the two armoured vehicles taken from UNPROFOR over the weekend. Brigade commander Mensud Lagundija said the other carrier, mounted with a machine-gun and containing UNPROFOR light weapons and bullet proof vests, remained in a dangerous war zone and would be retrieved under cover of darkness. 3556/

2688. The weekend incident in which UNPROFOR soldiers were detained and their weapons and vehicles confiscated, could have "serious repercussions" on the continuance of the mission in Sarajevo, UN commander Cot warned. A statement released by UNPROFOR in Belgrade said that General Cot met with BiH President Alija Izetbegović and BiH General Rasim Delić and demanded explanation and assurances that no other troops would be harassed. Cot said that he was "disgusted" by the incident. The BiH leaders said that they would settle the incident in the "shortest possible time". 3557/

(c) **International reported events**

2689. International mediators trying to come up with a peaceful solution to the war were working on a new "global approach", UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said. Boutros-Ghali told the French daily Le Monde that he met
mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg on 9 October to discuss all options in case a peace plan for BiH failed and the situation deteriorated in Croatia and Serbia. "We worked on the idea of a global approach and a new international conference following the London conference", he said. Boutros-Ghali said that the plan to divide BiH into three ethnic mini-states was not dead. "No, nothing is buried", he said. "We must be very flexible, very pragmatic. Suppose that tomorrow the parties in ex-Yugoslavia suddenly come to agreement. One can never know". 3558

2690. The US State Department warned the Serbian leadership for the second time in two months of the possibility of NATO air strikes if there was an increase in attacks on Sarajevo. The warning was contained in a message from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, reminding him of the statement on 3 August by NATO that it would not tolerate "the strangulation of Sarajevo and other areas", and that it was ready to order retaliatory air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. US State Department spokesman, Michael McCurry noted that "there has generally been an improvement", in the situation in Sarajevo since attacks in early August, but that there had been "a sharp escalation of shelling" by Bosnian Serb forces in recent days. No mention was made in the announcement of the BiH attacks southwest of Sarajevo, which, according to UNPROFOR, provoked the Serbian shelling. Asked about low-level sorties flown by NATO warplanes over Sarajevo on Sunday, a State Department official said that they had been scheduled as practice runs before the latest artillery exchanges and were not related to actions on the ground. 3559

19. 19/10/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a lower level of shelling activity in the city. However, 100 mortar and artillery rounds were observed falling on the Old Town area. 3560/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Old Town area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH authorities said that three people were killed and 26 wounded by shelling and sniping in the 24 hours up to Tuesday afternoon. 3561/ Sarajevo radio said that one person was killed and three injured during the day's shelling. 3562/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2691. UNPROFOR reported a lower level of shelling activity in the city. However, 100 mortar and artillery rounds were observed falling on the Old Town area. 3563/

2692. Mount Igman was described as quiet. 3564/

2693. UNPROFOR reported that the seized French vehicles had been recovered, but that the weapons remained with the BiH army's 10th Brigade. 3565/
(b) Local reported events

2694. The evacuation of the sick and wounded from Sarajevo, suspended since 7 October resumed when 13 people were flown out of the city to Kuwait along with eight of their relatives. Three others were flown to France, a spokeswoman for the Organization for International Migration (OIM), Regina Boucaut, said in Geneva. A US aeroplane was scheduled to fly out later in the day with six evacuees and five of their relatives. OIM and the UNHCR were in charge of carrying out the evacuations. Serb forces reportedly allowed the operation to resume after humanitarian officials fulfilled their last demand to evacuate a severely wounded Serb girl from Sarajevo to Belgrade and then on to Ancona, Italy. 3566/

2695. UNPROFOR stated that it was suspending its repair work in the city as long as BiH forces refused to return a French armoured car they seized. UNPROFOR stated that the work, which involved repairing electricity and water lines as well as garbage removal, would be suspended until the armoured car was returned. 3567/ Sarajevo radio denounced the UN’s action as an unwarranted collective punishment of innocent civilians. It was later reported that the BiH forces returned the stolen vehicle and that UN officials said that they would resume repairs in the city. 3568/

2696. Ivica Dačić, spokesman for the ruling Socialist Party in Belgrade said that a US warning that air strikes could be made against Bosnian Serbs if they continued their attacks was an example of US bias against Serbs. Dačić stated, "This is just another example of double standards towards the warring sides in BiH where the Serbs are always being blamed for the war". 3569/

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as relatively quiet, except between 1:00-1:50 p.m., when the city was heavily shelled. Monitors reported that at least 200 rounds of mixed calibre shells fell on the city. UNPROFOR commented that the shellfire was provoked by BiH fire from mortar positions located close to the hospital. Mount Igman was described as quiet. 3570/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated in a later report that there had been intense artillery fire along the front-line north of the Koševo Hospital. 3571/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Front-line areas north of the Koševo hospital. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire throughout the city continued. One French soldier was wounded when a small-arms round ricocheted off his vehicle. 3572/ UNPROFOR also reported an increase in sniper activity in two unidentified Sarajevo neighbourhoods under Serbian control. 3573/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2697. UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as relatively quiet, except between 1:00-1:50 p.m., when the city was heavily shelled. Monitors reported that at least 200 rounds of mixed calibre shells fell on the city. UNPROFOR commented that
the shellfire was provoked by BiH fire from mortar positions located close to
the hospital. Mount Igman was described as quiet. 3574/

2698. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated in a later report that there had
been intense artillery fire along the front-line north of the Koševko
Hospital. 3575/

21. 21/10/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported shelling in the eastern part
of the city in the morning. Observers counted 42 mortar, seven artillery and
15 tank rounds initiated by Serb forces. This shelling activity calmed down by
noon. 3576/ Sarajevo radio reported that the city was struck by 64
shells. 3577/ Source(s): UNPROFOR, United Press International.

Targets Hit: Eastern part of the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2699. BiH radio reported that the city was quiet overnight with isolated
machine-gun and small-arms fire. 3578/ The radio reported that a new assault
on the city began at 8:00 a.m. CITY officials sounded a general alert and
urged citizens to take immediate cover. 3579/

2700. UNPROFOR reported shelling in the eastern part of the city in the
morning. Observers counted 42 mortar, seven artillery and 15 tank rounds
initiated by Serb forces. This shelling activity calmed down by noon. 3580/

2701. Sarajevo radio reported that the city was struck by 64 shells on this
day. 3581/

2702. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that a UN repair team were shot at
by BiH government forces as they went out to fix a war-damaged link in the
major hydro-electric power line serving the city. The crew, traveling in
several UN armoured cars, were reportedly stopped at a BiH checkpoint just
short of Kiseljak. The government army command in Sarajevo had given
permission for the repair job, but the local checkpoint commander ignored the
permit papers. "He refused to let us pass, commenting to the effect that if
his town did not have electricity, no one else was going to get it", Aikman
told reporters. "During negotiations in which the Canadian engineering unit
tried to get through, they were shot at, about 20 rounds, several bouncing off
the APCs", he said. "So they turned around and returned to base and we are
without electricity in Sarajevo for another several days". 3582/

(b) Local reported events

2703. UNPROFOR commander General Jean Cot, issued a directive to his sector
commanders to try to obtain assurances from military commanders of the warring
factions that local cease-fire agreements would be respected. In the
directive, made public on Friday, Cot told his subordinates to "negotiate the
cessation of hostilities with the military commanders of the warring factions at all levels and interpose UNPROFOR troops, establishing observation posts as necessary. Cot asked his commanders to "assist in assessing the requirements, distribution and monitoring of humanitarian aid and increase the protection of the local population". In his statement Cot said "the implementation of these initiatives will require the political commitment of the warring parties at the highest level and could create the momentum required to initiate the needed atmosphere of trust to negotiate a global cease-fire".

22. 22/10/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as calm. Monitors reported 60 shell impacts mainly in the area north of the PTT Building. Targets Hit: The area north of the PTT building. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit:

Description of Damage:

Sniping Activity:

Casualties:

Narrative of Events:

2704. UNPROFOR described the city as calm. Monitors reported 60 shell impacts mainly in the area north of the PTT Building.

2705. BiH radio reported that the city was still without electricity because UN engineers could not repair power lines without risking being shot.

(b) Local reported events

2706. Bosnian Muslim leader Fikret Abdić, signed a peace agreement with Bosnian Serbs. He reached the agreement in Belgrade with Radovan Karadžić and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, who stated that it would "bring peace to half of (Bosnia)". In a joint declaration, Karadžić recognized the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, which Abdić set up in the Bihać pocket after the BiH parliament last month rejected an international peace conference to end the war.

23. 23/10/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated that Bosnian Serb artillery launched some 830 shells into Sarajevo while BiH forces also fired "some shots". Aikman stated that the Serb forces launched the shells between 7:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.. "We cannot say who started the battle", Aikman said, adding that unlike last weekend, the BiH army had not attempted reprisals. The focus of the attack was reportedly Žuč hill which was still in BiH hands. The area around the Vogošća industrial zone was also
targeted as was the south-east of the city including parts of the Old Town. Shells reportedly landed close to the UN's observation post south of Čolina Kapa, in south-east Sarajevo. 3591/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Žuč; north area of the city; south area of the city; south-east area of the city; Old Town area; New Town area; Vogošća; UN observation post south of Čolina Kapa. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** According to UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman, a sniper shot and slightly wounded a French UN soldier near Skenderija, in the south-east of the city. 3592/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** Hospitals reported at least five people dead and 37 others wounded in the day's shelling. 3593/ A report on Sunday stated that 10 people were killed and at least 55 were wounded. 3594/ The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA reported three civilians killed and at least 10 wounded in a BiH artillery attack on the suburb of Ilidža. 3595/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

2707. UNPROFOR reported 800 shell rounds in the Žuč area. Monitors also reported 100 shell rounds in the north area of the city and 100 shell rounds in the south-east area of the city (in the area of the BiH 10th Brigade). 3596/

2708. The local media reported more than 200 artillery impacts in the city. 3597/

2709. Reports described a Serbian artillery bombardment on the Old Town and New Town areas, as well as the north-western suburbs. Sarajevo radio reported that BiH army positions on Žuč Hill were hit by Serb shelling while NATO jets flew low overhead. 3598/

(b) **Local reported events**

2710. BiH Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić protested to Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban against his signing a peace pact with Fikret Abdić. Boban and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić both signed agreements during the week with Abdić, president of the self-proclaimed Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia which had broken with the BiH government. 3599/

2711. Government leaders and UN officials were among the 500 well-dressed guests who gathered at an international film festival in the city. The 10 day event was planned to boost the city's morale in the face of the siege. "Despite this most brutal siege happening at the end of the 20th century in the middle of Europe, we still have to manage our lives every day and we are able now to present films in our city", said festival organizer Haris Pašović. The festival proceeded, in spite of the absence of British actors, including Vanessa Redgrave, who were supposed to be honorary patrons of the festival. The UN refused to fly them from Italy on aeroplanes used to bring humanitarian aid to the city. 3600/
(c) International reported events

2712. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg held talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević on the stalled peace process, Tanjug news agency said, quoting a presidential statement. Stoltenberg and Milošević agreed that the factions should be encouraged to settle outstanding issues "as quickly as possible", Tanjug said. 3601/

24. 24/10/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported between 77 and 100 artillery impacts, mostly in the area of Žuč, Mojmilo and Vogošća (70 Serb and seven BiH in origin). 3602/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč; Mojmilo; Vogošća. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper activity reportedly decreased. 3603/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2713. Sarajevo radio described the city as quiet after coming under a heavy artillery bombardment on Saturday. 3604/

2714. UNPROFOR reported between 77 and 100 artillery impacts, mostly in the area of Žuč, Mojmilo and Vogošća (70 Serb and seven BiH in origin). 3605/

25. 25/10/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR monitors counted 390 shell impacts on the city. 3606/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Vogošća. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper activity remained at a high level. 3607/ A sniper shot and seriously wounded a four month-old baby in its stroller on a Sarajevo street. The mother was walking her infant son Berin on a downtown street on a sunny autumn day when he was hit in the neck with a bullet from an automatic rifle, apparently fired from a Serb-held hill overlooking the city, nurses at Koševo hospital said. The baby, which was undergoing surgery, was one of at least 13 Sarajevans wounded by shelling or sniping. 3608/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Casualties: At least 13 Sarajevans were wounded by shelling or sniping. 3609/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

2715. UNPROFOR monitors counted 390 shell impacts on the city. 3610/

2716. Serbian military officials reported that Bosnian Serb troops and the BiH army fought in the industrial suburb of Vogošća, located north-west of Sarajevo. The officials, quoted by the SRNA news agency, said that BiH troops triggered the fighting by shelling factories in the region and then targeting residential areas in Vogošća. They said that the number of victims was unclear but that Serb troops had retaliated with a barrage of gunfire. 3611/ (b) International reported events

2717. The European Commission announced that it planned to allocate an additional 72 million ECU ($85 million) to help victims in the former Yugoslavia. A Commission spokesman said that the money was part of a special fund of 89 million ECU that the European Community had set aside for emergency aid. He added that since the beginning of the year, the EC had allocated some 314 million ECU in humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia. 3612/

26. 26/10/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: After months of growing lawlessness and black market activity, the BiH government began a crackdown on two of its military commanders (a.k.a. Čačo and Ćelo). After stand-offs, Ćelo surrendered, Čačo was killed, 18 to 21 others were reportedly killed, and another 500 individuals were arrested. In addition to the above stand-off, UNPROFOR reported checkpoints in the eastern part of the city and restricted UN movements. Some shelling was reported in the Žuč area. The airport was on "yellow alert" for a major portion of the day. Source(s): New York Times; Agence France Presse; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Late reports said that 18 to 21 people were killed and more than 500 arrested in the day's government crackdown. Interior Minister Bakir Alispahić said that 537 members of the two involved army brigades were detained, but 428 were freed as "disciplined and loyal soldiers". An Interior Ministry communique on Wednesday said that 21 people were killed in the incident and that eight of the dead were civilians "caught in a crossfire". 3613/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2718. After months of growing lawlessness and black market activity, the BiH Government began a crackdown on two reputed gangsters within its own armed forces, laying siege to their headquarters. As the Government broadcasted stay-at-home appeals, government forces and supporters of the two renegade army commanders, exchanged automatic rifle and mortar fire in crowded neighbourhoods. Shortly after nightfall, a stand-off between the two sides appeared to have been broken with the surrender of the first of the two renegade commanders. Government radio said that Ramiz Delalić (a.k.a. Ćelo),
one of the two commanders, had agreed to give himself up. The second man, Musan Topalović (a.k.a. Čačo), surrendered just before midnight at his headquarters, the Associated Press reported, quoting a BiH army commander who spoke on condition of anonymity. Radio Sarajevo read an official communiqué stating that the two men had been dismissed from their posts as commanders of the 9th and 10th Mountain Brigades. The commands made them responsible for key sections of the city's defences on Trebević Mountain. Those defences appeared to hold despite the day's crackdown, which was accompanied by intermittent volleys of Serbian artillery and sniper fire. The communiqué reportedly acknowledged for the first time that the BiH forces had been preying on the city's residents, as well as defending them. It said that the two commanders "have been involved in organized crime along with parts of their units", and added that "any resistance" from the two men would be met with force. By nightfall, the radio said that 278 of the commanders' men had been arrested and 84 of them released after questioning. Many of those arrested were said to have repudiated their commanders and asked for clemency. 3614/

2719. Čačo was reportedly killed as he tried to flee from a vehicle after being arrested, deputy military prosecutor Ljubomir Lukić said. Officials at the morgue said that he was killed by a single bullet to the neck. Twelve men were also killed in the operation, Lukić said. Those killed included nine policemen who had gone to Čačo's headquarters to arrest him and were taken hostage. Several of the policemen had been tortured, Lukić said. 3615/ Three soldiers loyal to Čačo were also killed. Čačo, was earlier reported to have killed a number of civilian hostages he had been holding at his command post. But Lukić stated that no civilians appeared to have been held at the headquarters, adding that those reportedly detained were in fact local residents who had been unable to leave their homes because of shooting around the command post. 3616/

2720. Officials said that the government was provoked into action after Čačo ransacked a funeral home and then seized two UNPROFOR armoured cars this month, prompting the UN to threaten to stop humanitarian efforts in the city. 3617/

2721. In addition to the above stand-off, UNPROFOR reported checkpoints in the eastern part of the city and restricted UN movements. Some shelling was reported in the Žuč area. The airport was on "yellow alert" for a major portion of the day. 3618/

(b) Local reported events

2722. Bosnian Muslim leader Fikret Abdić disputed Alija Izetbegović's right to be president of BiH. Abdić, who won more votes than Izetbegović in the first democratic elections in the republic, said that he was the legitimate president of BiH instead of Izetbegović. "I had stepped down (in 1990) from my rightful place as the president [of BiH] on my own will, with the best intentions and desire to avoid internal Moslem clashes", Abdić said in an open letter carried by the Croatian and Serbian media. He said that it was a mistake that Izetbegović had campaigned for foreign intervention instead of negotiating with the enemy to stop the BiH bloodshed, charging the president was exploiting dead and suffering citizens. "Alija Izetbegović will have to answer for bloody profiteering over the bodies of more than 200,000 dead Moslems", he said. 3619/
27. 27/10/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as "generally unstable" with a low level of shelling. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR noted significant sniper activity in the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2723. UNPROFOR described the city as generally unstable with a low level of shelling, but with notable sniper activity. The Mount Igman area was reported as stable. 3620/

(b) Local reported events

2724. Officials said that monthly inflation in Serbia and Montenegro reached a rate of 10.5 per cent daily or 1.9 billion per cent annually amid UN imposed sanctions. Mirjana Ranković, Director of the Yugoslav government's Federal Statistics Bureau, said the latest figures constituted an all-time record for inflation, and included an even higher rate of growth in the cost of living. Ranković said that the steepest climb in consumer costs across Serbia and Montenegro was for services, which had risen in October at a monthly rate of 2,896 per cent. The average cost of living, which included food, clothing and other living essentials, had risen in October at a monthly rate of 2,050 per cent, she said. 3621/

28. 28/10/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of shelling activity in the city. Monitors reported 745 impacts (mainly tank shells) in the city. There were 163 outgoing rounds. The shelling had been directed towards the 10th Brigade area with each side accusing the other of having initiated infantry attacks. UNPROFOR commented that the reason for the heavy shelling was unclear. UNPROFOR speculated that the actions of the 10th Brigade could be attributed to their having just lost their commander and wishing to demonstrate their continuing effectiveness. 3622/ According to UNPROFOR officer, Major Idesbald Van Biesenbroeck, more than 140 mortar rounds were fired by the BiH 10th Brigade at Serb positions on Trebević. 3623/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Hrasno Brdo Hill of New Sarajevo; central residential areas and defence lines below Trebević mountain. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper activity was reported to be high. 3624/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Casualties: At least one person was reported killed and 22 others wounded in morning shelling. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2725. Bosnian Serb forces reportedly shelled parts of the city centre and western neighbourhoods in a barrage which began at 6:55 a.m.. The attack was concentrated around the Hrasno Brdo hill of New Sarajevo, a district of small houses in the western part of the city, and in central residential areas and defence lines just below Serb-held Trebević mountain. BiH defenders replied with mortars in a two-hour battle which left at least one person dead and 22 wounded. Sarajevo radio said that Serb forces attempted an infantry breakthrough near the section of front-line held by forces once led by Musan Topalović, the commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade.

(b) Local reported events

2726. At dusk, BiH President Izetbegović led hundreds of mourners in a park in the city centre for the burial of six of the policemen killed on Tuesday.

2727. Senad Pear, the BiH army's 10th Brigade Chief of Staff, was appointed to replace Musan Topalović (Caço) as commander, and was reported to be reorganizing his ranks after the recent government crackdown.

2728. BiH government Foreign Minister Haris Silajdžić sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asking him to immediately lift a suspension on humanitarian aid road convoys to central BiH. Boutros-Ghali banned UN humanitarian aid convoys from traveling in the area after a Danish driver was killed and eight relief activists wounded Monday under crossfire between Croat forces and BiH government troops near Novi Travnik.

2729. The four month-old boy shot by a sniper on Monday was reported in good condition. Doctors said that the baby sustained surface wounds to the neck and chest when he was struck by a bullet as his mother walked him in his stroller in central Sarajevo. The boy (Berin Celjo), had to have his left nipple removed and the left side of his neck patched below his ear. His mother stated that the shot was preceded by sniper fire from the direction of Serb-held Trebević mountain.

2730. Local officials reportedly found the bodies of 30 people whom they said had been "savagely" murdered by Commander Musan Topalović (Caço). Graves containing the bodies were found in a forest south-east of the city, the BiH army press office said. A statement said the corpses had been burned and were found in the Gaľ forest, a zone under Caço's control. Seventeen of the bodies unearthed were identified. Most of the names given by the press office were Serbian. It said that 26 other people living in the zone had disappeared. "Several dozen people of all nationalities were savagely killed", the statement said, a spokesman adding that the killing had taken place in the last few months.

29. 29/10/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sarajevo was reported as mostly quiet overnight. BiH and Serb forces shelled each other for an hour during the day. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: Žuč hill area. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping was reported in the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: A French radio journalist was wounded near the airport. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2731. The city, shrouded in a thick autumn fog with temperatures just above freezing, was described as mostly quiet overnight.

2732. Bosnian Serb and BiH forces reportedly shelled each other for more than an hour, with Serb forces targeting government-controlled Žuč hill districts to the north.

2733. Paul Marchand, a French radio journalist who once declared to Serbian forces in the city, "Don't waste your bullets, I am immortal", was shot and wounded near the airport. The reporter, who never wore a bulletproof vest, was hit while driving his car south of the city near the airport. French radio said that he was struck by a .50 calibre machine-gun bullet which broke his left arm and partially severed his right.

30. 30/10/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as quiet in the morning. Shelling, however, commenced as BiH President Alija Izetbegović swore in a new cabinet at the Presidency building. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2734. Sarajevo radio reported "minor provocations" by Serb forces overnight after more than a week of shelling.

2735. The city was reported as quiet in the morning.

2736. The city was reportedly shelled as BiH President Alija Izetbegović swore in a new cabinet in the Presidency building.

(b) Local reported events

2737. The new BiH Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić, formed an overwhelmingly Muslim government. Cutting the number of posts awarded to Serbs and Croats to four from eight out of a total of 21 he declared, "Our top priority will be to seek peace and ensure the survival of our people".
31. 31/10/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the city was relatively quiet. Monitors recorded 500 shell impacts in the Žuč area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Žuč area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The airport was closed in the afternoon due to increased sniping on the tarmac. A French Captain was reported injured by a bullet to his left arm. Another French soldier was hit earlier by a bullet, but his helmet saved him from injury. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: A French UNPROFOR officer was wounded by sniper fire at the airport. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2738. UNPROFOR reported that the city was relatively quiet. Monitors recorded 50 shell impacts in the Žuč area.

2739. UNPROFOR also reported that the remaining elements of the BiH 10th Brigade left their positions in Malo Polje in the Mount Igman area after negotiations between the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo Commander and the 1st Bosnian Corps Commander.

2740. Relief flights were suspended after a French peacekeeper was wounded by gunfire that erupted across the airport. According to UN official Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman, the peacekeeper and others were getting ready to board a routine flight to Zagreb when the shots were fired. According to Aikman, "A UN Protection Force flight was loading at 4:15 p.m. when a hail of bullets hit the area. The airlift has been suspended for the moment until the situation is clarified". It was not immediately clear who fired the shots because both troops of the BiH and Serbian forces held positions along the runway.

(b) International reported events

2741. Reuters reported that NATO was deeply reluctant to use airstrikes against Serb forces surrounding the city. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner was reportedly worried that the alliance's credibility was at stake as a result. "He's furious", said an unidentified NATO diplomat. "We promised something. There are some people here who feel that if we do not keep that promise when circumstances require it, we risk damaging the alliance severely". "Unless something cataclysmic happens to Sarajevo or to an aid convoy, I don't think there's any chance we will do this", said another NATO diplomat. "There's an agreement on paper but we don't have the political will, the unity to do it".
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1. 1/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as "relatively quiet" with some small arms fire. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2742. UNPROFOR reported that the city was relatively quiet with only some small arms fire. 3646/

(b) Local reported events

2743. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that the airlift had resumed as conditions were regarded as safe. 3647/

(c) International reported events

2744. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg who met on the weekend with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade, stated that no further progress was made toward setting a date for the resumption of peace talks. He said that the main obstacle to the talks was just "2.9 per cent of the territory". 3648/

2. 2/11/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of small arms fire in the city centre and some shelling and gunfire in the airport area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Airport area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency reported two civilians killed and one wounded by BiH snipers in the Serb-held Grbavica district in the past 24 hours. 3649/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Two civilians were reportedly killed and one other was wounded in Grbavica by BiH sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2745. UNPROFOR reported a high level of small arms fire in the city centre. Some shelling and gunfire was reported in the airport area. 3650/
(b) **Local reported events**

2746. The BiH army dismissed its army chief of staff. General Sefer Halilović, chief of staff, and the commanders of the 4th Corps and 5th Corps based in Mostar and Bihać respectively, were discharged "at their own suggestion". Halilović had been demoted to chief of staff from supreme commander of the army last spring. BiH radio said that Halilović had been questioned about a recent wave of robbery, extortion and murder by army gangs in the city. BiH radio said that Halilović had been replaced by Enver Hadžihasanović, the commander of the army 3rd Corps in Zenica. Halilović’s replacement as army supreme commander was General Rasim Delić. 3651/

3. 3/11/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR monitors reported approximately 150 artillery impacts in the city. The situation in the city was described as unstable. 3652/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** UN armoured personnel carrier near the UN headquarters.
Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2747. UNPROFOR monitors reported approximately 150 artillery impacts in the city. The situation in the city was described as unstable. 3653/

2748. A UN armoured personnel carrier was hit by anti-aircraft rounds in the city centre. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that as the vehicle left the headquarters of UN BiH commander General Francis Briquemont at around 5:30 p.m., it "came under heavy fire from what seemed to be 20 [millimetre] anti-aircraft fire from high up in the hills". Aikman said that the UN troops fired some 120 rounds back at their attackers, and shell fragments were found in the residency compound, but that no one was hurt. 3654/

(b) **Local reported events**

2749. BiH government security forces arrested seven suspected members of army black-market gangs in the city. The arrests raised the number of soldiers jailed for alleged black-market and other illegal activities to at least 110 in a week. Scores of interior ministry and army military police descended on several western highrise districts in the city and arrested seven soldiers involved in local racketeering, BiH radio said. One of the seven arrested was the commander of an army unit in the Čengić Vila district which straddles the Miljacka river a few hundred metres below Serb positions on Vraca mountain. Local residents commented that the commander controlled the district black market where items smuggled in from Serb-held territory sold for exorbitant sums. 3655/
4. 4/11/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the city as "relatively quiet". Between 60 and 150 shells hit the city. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: An UNPROFOR monitoring station was hit by sniper rounds, but there were no casualties. 3656 Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2750. UNPROFOR described the city as relatively quiet. Monitors counted 60 shell impacts in the city. An UNPROFOR monitoring station was hit by sniper rounds, but there were no casualties. 3657/

2751. UN officials said that as many as 150 incoming artillery impacts were recorded over the previous 24 hours in BiH government-controlled parts of the city. 3658/

(b) Local reported events

2752. Repair teams and UNPROFOR officials were in the city's southern suburbs to repair damage to electric overhead cables. 3659/

5. 5/11/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city's southern front lines were hit overnight. However, the shooting abated as the dawn broke. Source(s): Reuters

Targets Hit: The southern front lines. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2753. The city's southern front lines were hit by low-level but almost constant small arms, heavy machine-gun and mortar overnight. Residents said that the shooting abated as a rainy, misty dawn broke. 3660/

6. 6/11/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH and Bosnian Serb forces engaged in an
intense firefight late in the day with heavy artillery shells hitting the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2754. Serb and BiH forces engaged in an intense firefight late in the day, with tracer rounds lighting up the night sky and heavy artillery shells hitting the city centre. 3661/

2755. The Croatian HVO commander, Slavko Zelić, was reportedly arrested. In a statement on BiH radio the army said that it was disbanding the HVO. It accused some members of "actively cooperating" with Serb forces around Sarajevo, jeopardizing its defences, but it did not elaborate. It also said that the HVO had refused to send units to some areas of heavy fighting when ordered to do so. It was reported that the Croatian-led force of about 2,000 soldiers had been deployed in an area close to Serb lines, but had not seen as much heavy fighting as other fronts. It was also reported that the BiH army invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the 1st Corps, the main Sarajevo defence force. 3662/

2756. Sarajevo radio said that government forces encountered no resistance from the HVO brigade and that most of its men had agreed to enlist in the BiH army 1st Corps. "The new Croat brigade incorporated in the 1st Corps will participate equally in the defence of Sarajevo", the radio said. Earlier a spokeswoman at Bosnian Croat military headquarters in Mostar criticized the BiH army's move, saying that the Croat soldiers had the right to keep their own command. 3663/

(b) **Local reported events**

2757. The BiH military imposed a curfew on the city, postponing a planned evacuation of more than 1,400 civilians. The government said that the curfew was needed for it to disband Croat militia forces and resume its crackdown against renegade soldiers. Sarajevo residents were told by the Army 1st Corps that "freedom of movement on the streets was restricted" and they were advised to remain home until the action was completed, Sarajevo radio said. Sarajevo radio also reported that the BiH army had ordered the disbandment of the Bosnian Croat Defence Council, which controlled the HVO within the city. "In an effort to consolidate the defence against (Serbian) aggressors, the 1st Army Corps has decided to disband the HVO command in Sarajevo and integrate it into the 1st Army Corps", the radio said. "Some HVO units took the side of the aggressor by launching assaults against BiH army units in Kiseljak and Mostar", it said. 3664/

7. 7/11/93 (Sunday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported as mostly quiet in the morning. Source(s): Reuters.
Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2758. The city was reported as mostly quiet in the morning. 3665/

(b) Local reported events

2759. The curfew imposed by the BiH government delayed for the second day the evacuation of more than 1,400 civilians from the city. The curfew had eased, but the United Nations postponed the evacuation until 10:00 a.m. Monday, UN spokesman Rupert Colville said. "The centre is still sealed off because of BiH police and army actions against HVO forces". He said that the fighting had eased by late in the day. 3666/

8. 8/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the city was relatively quiet with small arms fire. Some shelling was reported in the Dobrinja area, near the airport on the Presidency side. 3667/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that two UN monitoring teams came under sniper fire in two separate incidents, but no casualties or damage resulted. 3668/ BiH army snipers reportedly fired in the direction of buses carrying Serbian civilians being evacuated from the city. Two buses with some 100 Sarajevo Serbs aboard (mostly women, children and the elderly) were crossing the lines between the BiH army and Bosnian Serb forces at the Sarajevo airport runway at around 2:45 p.m. when the shooting took place. 3669/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2760. UNPROFOR reported that the city was relatively quiet with small arms fire. Some shelling was reported in the Dobrinja area, near the airport on the Presidency side. 3670/

2761. BiH army snipers reportedly fired in the direction of buses carrying Serbian civilians being evacuated from the city. Two buses with some 100 Sarajevo Serbs aboard (mostly women, children and the elderly) were crossing the lines between the BiH army and Bosnian Serb forces at the Sarajevo airport runway at around 2:45 p.m. when the shooting took place. 3671/ Ray Wilkinson, a spokesman for UNHCR, later said that the shooting "was not directed at the convoy". 3672/ United Nations officials said that no one was injured in the shooting. United Nations armoured vehicles reportedly escorted about 300
Serbian women, children and elderly people in six buses from Sarajevo to Lukavica, in the first large-scale evacuation since the summer. 3673/

2762. United Nations officials said that Serbian gunmen abducted two aides 3674/ of Sarajevo’s Roman Catholic Archbishop from UN armoured cars. The cars were transporting Monsignor Vinko Puljić, two priests and three aides from Sarajevo to Vares (the archbishop was reportedly traveling to Vareš in an attempt to restore order among Roman Catholics who remained there). Officials said that about 50 Serbian militia members halted the convoy, forced the men from their vehicles and abducted the two aides, saying that the captives were "war criminals". 3675/ The others reportedly returned to the city after well-armed United Nations armoured vehicles were dispatched to the scene. United Nations officials said that the co-chairman of peace talks, Thorvald Stoltenberg, was personally working on trying to get the aides released. 3676/

(b) Local reported events

2763. Busloads carrying Serbian women, children and the elderly left Sarajevo at midday, commencing the evacuation civilians. Until a shooting incident (see above narrative of events), 300 civilians left the city out of the 640 Sarajevo Serbs expected to be evacuated. "It (the evacuation) will continue tomorrow, until 1,500 Croat, Muslim and Serbian civilians leave Sarajevo, UNHCR spokesman Ray Wilkinson said. 3677/

2764. The Bosnian Croat Habena news agency reported that BiH troops in Sarajevo had arrested HVO president Slavko Želić, Željko Jukić, commander of the HVO’s "King Tvrtko" brigade, Tomislav Kokor, chief of the security service and Vinko Bošnjak, assistant commander of the operations group. 3678/

(c) International reported events

2765. France and Germany pressed ahead with an attempt to restart the peace process. The two countries urged the European Community in Brussels to consider offering economic aid to Serbia if it could convince the Bosnian Serbs to give some more of the territory they controlled to BiH as part of a peace deal. Diplomats said that the idea that the Serbs could cede a further 3 per cent of territory to BiH and in turn be rewarded with a partial lifting of international sanctions was contained in a letter from French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. 3679/

9. 9/11/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observers reported some 80 artillery round into the city and five outgoing rounds. 3680/ Significant casualties resulted in the shelling of a primary school and other sites in Alipašino Polje. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNICEF; New York Times; United Press International.

Targets Hit: The "May 1" school in Alipašino Polje; square or breadline in Alipašino Polje; an unidentified school in Alipašino Polje. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNICEF; New York Times; United Press International.

Description of Damage: A high number of casualties were reported as a result
of the shelling of the "May 1" school in Alipašino Polje. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNICEF; New York Times; United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Sniping activity in the city had reportedly been on the increase over the past few days, with cars regularly drawing gunfire on the city's "sniper's alley". 3681/ One man was also reported killed by a sniper's bullet in Alipašino Polje. 3682/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo hospitals said that a total of seven people were killed and about 40 were injured in morning shelling of the city. 3683/ A subsequent report said that nine people had been killed and 70 wounded in the day’s attacks. 3684/ The day's casualties were described as the highest since the July shelling of a water queue. 3685/ Physician Davor Sepetavc said that the Koševo hospital had treated 21 wounded persons since 8:00 a.m.. A doctor at the French Hospital in the downtown area said that the facility had received two dead and treated 34 wounded, six with serious injuries. Twelve of the injured were later sent to the Koševo hospital. Around 20 of the injured were children, the doctor said. 3686/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2766. Shells hit a French-sponsored school in the Alipašino Polje suburb. 3687/ The "May 1" School was set up in a former clothing store in what had been a shopping and residential area before the war. 3688/ Early accounts said that at least seven people, including three to four children and one teacher, had been killed when mortar rounds exploded near the school entrance. UNICEF reported that at least three children and their teacher were killed and 20 others were seriously injured. 3689/ The three children in the Koševo morgue had reportedly died from wounds to the body and their teacher, thought to be in her early forties, was killed instantly by shrapnel injuries to the head. 3690/ Three or four shells apparently landed at short intervals outside the school building. "We were writing when we heard something fired somewhere", Mirza Huskić, a child who was wounded, told BiH radio. "Suddenly I heard screaming and noise. I went toward home to see where my mother was. Then a man picked me up and brought me to the ambulances". The BiH radio quoted Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić as saying that nine people were dead. He said that as were children but at least one teacher was known to have been killed. The radio earlier quoted civil service officials as saying that the shells came from Nedžarići, a suburb held by Bosnian Serbs. But the Serbs denied responsibility for the attack. 3691/ Local residents believed that the school was hit by a 120 millimetre shell. 3692/

2767. Sarajevo radio said that Serb forces began firing artillery from their hilltop positions down into the suburb at around 9:00 a.m.. The radio said that at around 10:50 a.m., shells landed outside the school at a time when children, along with their teachers were outside the building. 3693/

2768. It was reported that a minute after the school attack, a mortar bomb hit a nearby square where people were sitting out in the open in the mild weather or waiting in a bread queue. The casualties there reportedly included a child whose legs were blown off. 3694/ In another report which probably involved this same incident, two persons were reported killed in Alipašino Polje. 3695/ UNICEF reported that less than a half hour later, another shell fell in front of another primary school in the same part of the city, killing another child. 3696/
(b) Local reported events

2769. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg visited the city to meet with government officials. BiH President Alija Izetbegović avoided a scheduled meeting with him without explanation. The envoy met Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and other members of the collective presidency instead. The Prime Minister warned Stoltenberg that the peace process would remain deadlocked for as long as the world pressed BiH to accept an inferior settlement under the plan to divide BiH into separate Muslim, Croat and Serb states. 3697/

2770. Following the day's school attack, the BiH Government requested that the UN Security Council either use force to lift the siege of Sarajevo or end the arms embargo against them. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that Bosnian Serbs were ready to consider giving up more territory to the BiH government and resume the stalled peace talks. "We are for the continuation of the talks and are ready to help the Moslems to get a bigger part of Sarajevo and some territories", he said. 3698/

2771. Late in the day, Sarajevo radio cited the BiH government as saying that all primary and secondary school classes would be canceled for a week because of the school attack in Alipašino Polje. The radio said that a decision would be taken later about resuming classes. 3699/

2772. UN officials said that BiH authorities in Sarajevo were postponing the evacuations of Sarajevans for security purposes. A spokeswoman for UNHCR said that the delay of the evacuation was apparently caused by the detention on Monday of two BiH government policemen by Serbian soldiers outside the city. 3700/

2773. In the evening, some 300 former HVO soldiers met a BiH presidency delegation, including two Croats and Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić, to present a petition with their grievances. They asked for: the restoration of their HVO unit, which they said had loyally defended Sarajevo alongside the BiH army; the freeing of five senior HVO officers who they said were jailed on trumped-up charges; and work for Croat-Muslim peace in BiH. The soldiers complained that the BiH army had ambushed them from behind on Saturday, desecrated their flags and emblems, and stolen their money and cigarettes. "We have been unjustifiably accused of cooperating with the aggressor. How can we be motivated to fight further for the defence of Sarajevo", said Ivan Slavicek, the HVO's former officer in charge of liaison with the BiH army in the city. He said that 80 HVO soldiers had been killed and 200 wounded thus far in helping to defend Sarajevo. 3701/

(c) International reported events

2774. In New York, the UN Security Council condemned Monday's abduction of two Bosnian bodyguards under UN protection, as a "flagrant challenge to the authority and inviolability" of the UNPROFOR. 3702/

2775. After the schoolhouse shelling, White House spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers said that the United States would not let violence choke off Sarajevo. "The folks on the ground in Sarajevo know what we mean", Myers said. "We're not going to allow that city to be strangled, to be cut off, to be relentlessly attacked". 3703/

2776. In Washington, the Clinton administration dismissed the Franco-German proposal to end the economic sanctions against Serbia in exchange for territorial concessions. The Pentagon, meanwhile, said it was studying several options for stepping up the humanitarian airlift in light of predictions of a
harsh winter and continued fighting. "We are interested in anything that would help move the peace process", Michael McCurry, the State Department spokesman said. "But I don't think at this point a discussion of sanctions or lifting of sanctions is something the United States is enthusiastic about". 3704/

10. 10/11/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling attacks occurred in the city beginning at about 2:00 p.m.. Numerous civilian areas were hit and significant civilian casualties resulted. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Otoka District in the New Town area; the Sarajevo television centre; Zrtava Fazizma street in the downtown area (about 500 metres from the Holiday Inn). Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Eight people were reported killed and 44 others wounded in mortar attacks on the city. 3705/ According to BiH radio, new mortar attacks on the city killed eight people, including three children, and wounded about 25 (about half of them children). 3706/ Sarajevo radio said that at least one person was killed and five wounded, as casualties began pouring into the main hospital after an attack at around 2:00 p.m.. 3707/ One of the attacks occurred in the Otoka district in the New Town area at 2:30 p.m.. 3708/ Eleven persons were reported injured, four of them seriously, when a shell exploded in a street in the New Town area, witnesses said. 3709/ Five people, including three children, were killed when two mortars landed near the Sarajevo television centre, said a nurse from the hospital in the city centre. 3710/ A woman was reportedly killed in an artillery attack on Zrtava Fazizma street in the downtown area, about 500 metres from the Holiday Inn. 3711/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; New York Times; United Press International; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2777. Sarajevo radio said that at least one person was killed and five wounded, as casualties began pouring into the main hospital after an attack at around 2:00 p.m.. 3712/ One of the attacks occurred in the Otoka district in the New Town area at 2:30 p.m.. 3713/ Eleven persons were reported injured, four of them seriously, when a shell exploded in a street in the New Town area, witnesses said. 3714/ Five people, including three children, were killed when two mortars landed near the Sarajevo television centre, said a nurse from the hospital in the city centre. 3715/ A woman was reportedly killed in an artillery attack on Zrtava Fazizma street in the downtown area, about 500 metres from the Holiday Inn. 3716/

(b) Local reported events

2778. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that his side would concede 5 per cent of land to the BiH government, only if the Bosnian Serbs were given Sarajevo. In an interview with Belgrade radio, Karadžić was asked to elaborate on his statement Monday that the Bosnian Serbs were prepared to consider the possibility of giving more land to BiH. "We demand that Sarajevo be given to
us because it is a Serbian city... on Serbian territory", Karadžić said. 3717/

2779. BiH President Izetbegović said that the BiH army was considering launching a "war of liberation" unless peace could be obtained by political means, BiH radio said. 3718/

2780. The UNPROFOR in Sarajevo said that it had conducted an investigation into Tuesday's mortar attacks. Analysis of the bomb craters did not establish clearly whether the rounds had been fired from Serb or Muslim territory, UN military spokesman Colonel Bill Aikman told a news briefing. 3719/

2781. The Tanjug news agency said that Bosnian Croat forces launched Tuesday's schoolhouse attack in retaliation for the recent crackdown by BiH government troops on Croatian militia. In an interview with the Bosnian Serb television station, Bosnian Croat commander, Ilyica Rajić, said the attack was deliberate and threatened continued shelling of Sarajevo if BiH authorities did not release Croat troops from custody. "I directed some of the canons toward Sarajevo", Rajić said, adding that "violence is the only response to violence". 3720/

2782. Three children and the teacher killed in Tuesday's schoolhouse shelling, were buried in a traditional Muslim ceremony. The ceremony was held at dusk in a hollow below the Zetra football field to provide protection against gunfire. 3721/

2783. Electricity was restored to a significant portion of Sarajevo after UN engineers repaired power mains skirting front lines around the city. A UN military spokesman said that 30 megawatts of the city's prewar 80 to 100 megawatt output had been reactivated over the past two days. "It's enough for 80 per cent of the city to get electricity over three days", UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said. The other 20 per cent continued to be deprived of power because of a lack of oil for local transformer stations. 3722/

2784. The evacuation of Serbs from Sarajevo, set to resume on this day, was again delayed because Bosnian Serb forces were still reportedly holding two BiH Government bodyguards abducted from a United Nations armoured car on Monday. The evacuation was called off at around 5:45 p.m.. The disappointed persons who spent almost three hours aboard buses ready to transport them out of the city, were told to come back at 10:00 a.m. Thursday. 3723/ UNPROFOR spokesman, Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck, said that a United Nations negotiator, Victor Andreev, would meet the Serbs again on Thursday to negotiate their release. 3724/

(c) International reported events

2785. US President Clinton warned that he had not ruled out air raids on Bosnian Serb positions in retaliation for the shelling of Sarajevo. "All we can do is try to... get the United Nations to agree to let the NATO position that the United States put together, on the availability of air power in the event that Sarajevo is seriously shelled, be an actual, live option and not just something on the books", said Clinton in a press conference. 3725/

2786. In Washington on Tuesday and in Brussels today, United States officials rejected proposals by France and Germany to revive peace negotiations by easing international sanctions on Serbia in exchange for territorial concessions by Bosnian Serbs to the BiH government in Sarajevo. It was reported that Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić had renewed his offer to give up some territory to the Muslims. But at an afternoon news conference,
President Clinton said that "none of the parties now are of a mind to make peace on any terms that the others will accept because there are different military results being achieved on the ground there in different places and ways that make all the parties feel that they shouldn't agree now". "Under those conditions", the President said, "all we can do is try to make sure that we minimize the human loss coming on for this winter". Mr. Clinton added that "in the event that Sarajevo is seriously shelled", the United Nations should permit NATO to have the "live option" of using air power against the Serbian forces besieging the city. 3726/

2787. At the State Department in Washington, spokesman Michael McCurry said that the United States had estimated that a total of 431,000 persons in Sarajevo were "at risk". The United States reportedly counted someone as being at risk if they were refugees, homeless, malnourished or in any other way suffering because of the combat in the region. McCurry said that US humanitarian aid to BiH had totalled $417 million since 1991. 3727/

11. 11/11/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as quiet overnight after two days of mortar attacks. 3728/ Sniper fire was directed towards UN forces and utility repair crews. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Bosnian Serb snipers reportedly fired at the French UNPROFOR base in central Skenderija. The French responded with a 20 millimetre cannon and the shooting stopped. A few hours later, UN engineers came under fire while repairing pylons on a front line to the north of the city in Kobilja Glava. An UNPROFOR vehicle shot back with its heavy machine-gun. 3729/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported that 11 people were killed and 47 others wounded in the city in the 24 hour period ending at midday Thursday. 3730/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2788. The city was reported as quiet overnight after two days of mortar attacks. 3731/

(b) Local reported events

2789. UNPROFOR General Jean Cot said that all sides in the conflict had gone too far in their repeated attacks on relief convoys. "I think that we have reached the limit of acceptable interference from the parties, who are handicapping and hampering the movement of humanitarian convoys", Cot told a news briefing in Zagreb. "There is no doubt that we are approaching the point where force will have to be used". 3732/

2790. A special envoy of Libyan leader Colonel Momar Gaddafi arrived in Belgrade to offer Libya's assistance in resolving the BiH crisis, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported. The envoy, Ali Triki, held talks with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanović on the peace process and ways to support
efforts to end the conflict, Tanjug said. Libya had reportedly broken ranks with the Muslim community by taking a softer line toward Belgrade and urging BiH to make a quick peace deal with Bosnian Serbs. 3733/

2791. The evacuation of Serbian civilians was allowed to resume after Bosnian Serb military authorities released two bodyguards who had been abducted while riding with the city's Roman Catholic archbishop. About 60 Bosnian Serbs (mostly elderly people and children), left the city by bus and were escorted by five UN armoured vehicles and two light tanks, moments after the guards were released. They were reportedly headed toward the Bosnian Serb-held Lukavica area. Some 350 Bosnian Serbs out of a total of 642 had been evacuated before the operation was suspended. About 875 Croats and Muslims were reportedly still waiting to go to Croatia, but no date had been announced for their departure. 3734/

2792. According to Ray Wilkinson, spokesman for UNHCR, two of the children wounded in Tuesday's mortar attack on a Sarajevo elementary school were scheduled to be airlifted to hospitals in France. 3735/

2793. UNPROFOR officers in the city from the Commonwealth countries wore traditional poppies on their lapels in recognition of Armistice Day. "It's a rather fitting thing to be wearing poppies now in this particular city because 75 years ago is when the First World War ended and here we are again", said UN spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman. 3736/

12. 12/11/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2794. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2795. Croat leaders and the BiH government said that they would seek a cease-fire and press the West to use force to protect UN aid convoys to the area. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić announced the steps after five hours of talks in Sarajevo. Granić was believed to be the most senior Croatian minister to visit the city since the war began. Granić’s trip was viewed to be an eleventh-hour bid to stop fighting between the BiH government army and HVO forces as the winter set in. Granić said that a follow-up meeting would be held within a week with the goal of agreeing to a cease-fire. 3737/

2796. Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin met Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in Pale to discuss aid routes into central BiH disrupted by Croat and Bosnian fighting. 3738/
(c) **International reported events**

2797. The head of the Western European Union (WEU) assembly called for stepped up NATO flights over Sarajevo to deter Bosnian Serb forces from shelling the city. The WEU said that observers had noted that Serb shelling stopped whenever NATO combat aircraft passed over the city to enforce the no-fly zone. "Each day free of bombardment means saving lives and every NATO flight contributes to that process", a WEU statement quoted Sir Dudley Smith as saying. 3739/

13. 13/11/93 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported a low level of shelling. 3740/ However UNPROFOR expressed concern over BiH troop movements on Mt. Igman.

*Source(s):* UNPROFOR; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2798. UNPROFOR reported a low level of shelling. 3741/

2799. UNPROFOR feared a new confrontation between BiH and Bosnian Serb forces on Mount Igman. UN spokesman Idesbald van Biesebroeck said that the problem was caused by BiH forces moving their positions too close to Serb lines. "The Serbs have warned that they could react with cannon fire, artillery and mortars", he said. A small UN peace-keeping force was stationed between the two sides on the mountain. 3742/ 

(b) **Local reported events**

2800. Russian envoy Vitaly Churkin met members of the BiH leadership in Sarajevo to discuss ways of reviving the peace talks. 3743/ After meetings with Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić, Churkin said that he hoped for an early solution to Sarajevo's gas problem. "I hope that very soon certain agreements will be completed and that Russia will be able to continue supplying gas to Sarajevo, which will hopefully result in an improvement in the humanitarian situation in the city", he said. 3744/

2801. Reports detailed the situation of 576 hospital patients (including children, mental patients and the bedridden sick), who were trapped in hospitals in the mountains to west Sarajevo. These hospitals were reportedly on the front line of a northward offensive launched by Bosnian Croats. Shells had reportedly exploded during the week on the grounds of the Bakovići hospital, trapped in a valley between the warring sides. 3745/
14. 14/11/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:
2802. No reported incidents.

15. 15/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:
2803. No reported incidents.

16. 16/11/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:
2804. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2805. The city was hit by its first heavy snowfall of the season. 3746/
2806. Officials of UNHCR in Geneva said that the BiH government and leaders of the Bosnian Serb and Croatian factions had accepted an invitation to talks Thursday in Geneva which would discuss the issue of humanitarian aid. "This is a last-ditch effort to get what's needed in there" said spokeswoman Sylvana Foa. It would be the first meeting of BiH ethnic leaders in two months. Ray Wilkinson, the UNHCR spokesman in Sarajevo, said that a three-week suspension of convoys to central BiH meant that no supplies had been stockpiled. "Even if we started tomorrow, even if the weather is good, it's going to take time to replenish", he said. "We have to be searching for new routes all the time to dodge the fighting, dodge the snipers, dodge the snow, to keep up even a minimum lifeline". Wilkinson said that the situation in Sarajevo was at least tolerable. Last week, he said, 1,832 tons of food and winter supplies reached the city out of 2,820 tons needed. 3747/

17. 17/11/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2807. No reported incidents.

(b) International reported events

2808. The 11 judges of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia took their oaths in the Hague. 3748/

18. 18/11/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2809. No reported incidents.
(b) Local reported events

2810. UNPROFOR forces were prevented from taking food to a BiH-controlled mental hospital outside Sarajevo where hundreds of patients were trapped without heating. Bosnian Serb women reportedly refused to allow the forces to deliver the food to the hospital at Pazaric until Serb prisoners were released by the BiH army. Some of the mental patients were wandering naked in freezing temperatures, said Ray Wilkinson, a UNHCR spokesman. 3749/

2811. Humanitarian Aid and Medical Development (HAMD), a British-based medical charity, said it was suspending reconstructive surgery in the city's two main hospitals, citing unacceptable risks in operating on malnourished patients in unheated theatres. They cited the case of Amira Mekić as an example of their fears. Amira, 26, was struck by shell fragments near the city's television station on 10 November. Her left leg suffered multiple fractures and extensive vascular damage. Vascular surgeons tried to restore the veins and arteries necessary for blood to circulate through the damaged limb. Doctors set the leg. Eight days later her leg had to be amputated. "We should have been able to save the leg, but Amira was just too weak", said Dr. Slavenka Straus, a member of the surgical team. 3750/

(c) International reported events

2812. After a day of talks in Geneva, the leaders of the factions signed a six-point declaration fulfilling key UN demands to keep humanitarian convoys rolling. As part of the aid agreement signed by Silajdžić, Karadžić and Boban, the three sides agreed to "suspend hostilities" along convoy routes. Silajdžić said only time would tell whether the factions would observe the agreement or ignore it like previous agreements. He said that an agreement had been "averted on paper--but wait and see". 3751/

2813. After signing the joint declaration, BiH Prime Minister Silajdžić spent three hours in talks with Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić and said that they had discussed "all political questions", including the possible resumption of peace negotiations. 3752/

2814. EC mediator Lord Owen, met all three of the Bosnian leaders today. Silajdžić commented, "I don't think we have anything concrete. The important thing is that we have agreed to talk and meet and solve these problems". "We have not yet set a date". Silajdžić said. 3753/

19. 19/11/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was hit by an estimated 80 shells.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: 2 people were killed in the day's shelling. Source(s): The Press Association.
Narrative of Events:

2815. The city was hit by an estimated 80 shells and two people were killed. Most of last week, an estimated 20 to 30 shells hit the city per day. 3754/

(b) Local reported events

2816. A UN-brokered agreement between city officials and Serb forces reportedly allowed substantial amounts of natural gas to begin flowing into Sarajevo. Gas flow was said to be up to 29,000 cubic metres per hour, from 5000 earlier in the week, bringing some heat and hot water back to parts of the city. 3755/

2817. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić met in Zagreb with Croatian leaders, including President Franjo Tudjman and Mate Boban, leader of the Bosnian Croats. Silajdžić said they discussed how to guarantee aid convoys free passage, as well as a possible cease-fire. Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić said they agreed to establish military and civilian commissions to work on securing aid routes. 3756/

2818. A UN convoy delivered food to the mental hospital outside Sarajevo where patients were suffering from frostbite and tuberculosis. The four-truck aid convoy was supposed to include hundreds of blankets and sleeping bags. However, UNHCR spokesman Ray Wilkinson, said that Bosnian Serbs controlling roads into the area refused to let those items pass, so the convoy brought only food. This reportedly violated a day-old agreement to allow the free passage of convoys and to give the UN authority over what was considered humanitarian aid. 3758/

(c) International reported events

2819. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali gave the green light in New York for aid convoys in central BiH to resume. The US will soon make a "major contribution" to address winter needs in BiH, US Ambassador Madeline Albright said. 3760/

20. 20/11/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2820. No reported incidents.
(b) Local reported events

2821. The city airport was shut down by heavy snow. 3761/

2822. The United Nations reported that road convoys to central BiH remained idle. The UN said that Serb and Croat forces continued to block vital routes into the region, despite an agreement signed Thursday to allow convoys through. 3762/

21. 21/11/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling was reported in the mountains surrounding the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: The mountains surrounding the city; the electricity generating station in Jablanica. Source(s): United Press International.

Description of Damage: Sarajevo lost a good portion of its electricity due to shelling damage to the electricity generating station in Jablanica, 40 miles to the west of the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Artillery attacks reportedly killed three persons and nine others over an 18 hour period. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2823. Sarajevo radio reported artillery attacks by Bosnian Serb forces in the surrounding mountains. The attacks reportedly killed three people and wounded nine over an 18 hour period. 3763/

2824. The city was in virtual darkness caused by shelling damage to an electricity generating station in Jablanica, 40 miles to the west. 3764/

(b) Local reported events

2825. While suffering subzero temperatures, the city lost its gas supply again, its main source of heat. BiH radio reported a worsening water situation and said that only priority users such as hospitals were getting power. 3765/

2826. The city airport reopened after being shut down by Saturday's snowfall. 3766/

22. 22/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Serb forces reportedly fired 125 shells into the city, according to UN officials. There were no reports that BiH troops fired back. 3767/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: A sledding slope near the French UNPROFOR military base. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Three children were killed in the shelling of a
sledding slope near the French UNPROFOR military base. Source(s): Reuters.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Three children were killed, and two others were wounded in the shelling of a sledding slope near the French UNPROFOR military base. Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

2827. A Serb shelling attack reportedly killed three children as they were sledding in the snow. The three children were playing in the city centre on a slope near the French UN military base when a shell landed, a BiH radio report said. Two other children were also injured in the attack, one seriously. Two of the victims were dead on arrival at the hospital and a third died during an operation, the radio said. 3768/

(b) **Local reported events**

2828. UN officials said that they hoped to move aid convoys within a day in BiH. 3769/

2829. Referring to a proposal by the EC to ease economic sanctions on Serbia if BiH was given more land as part of a peace agreement, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said in Pale: "We welcome the new approach of the European Community to this conflict". 3770/

2830. The head of the Bosnian Serb assembly, Momčilo Krajišnik, blasted the EC initiative as "another political trap of the West" to force concessions from the Serbs, according the Yugoslav Tanjug news agency. 3771/

(c) **International reported events**

2831. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes said after a meeting of EC foreign ministers in Luxembourg that the EC would call fresh peace talks in Geneva next Monday to discuss new proposals on peace and aid convoys. The European diplomats said they favoured easing international economic sanctions on Serbia if BiH was given more land as part of a peace agreement. 3772/

23. 23/11/93 (Tuesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2832. No reported incidents.
2833. Fourteen severely wounded persons were flown out of the city aboard a Canadian Hercules transport aeroplane. The group included two children, three women, and nine men (one of them a Serb shot by a sniper and said to be on the verge of death). The wounded were bound for hospitals in Italy, Norway, Luxembourg and Belgium. Earlier, UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler said that the mission had been blocked by local Bosnian Serb officials. But after Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić intervened, the group and their UN escorts passed the sole Bosnian Serb checkpoint on the way from the city to the airport without incident. 3772/

24. 24/11/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2834. No reported incidents.

25. 25/11/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Not specified

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2835. No reported incidents.

(b) Local reported events

2836. UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler announced that a group of 1,200 evacuees (including women, children, the elderly and other vulnerable civilians) were scheduled to begin gathering on Friday to leave the city for Dubrovnik. A convoy was scheduled to include at least 17 buses, five trucks for luggage and a UN observer vehicle to deter any attacks. 3774/ The go ahead for the evacuation followed protracted negotiations with Bosnian Serb authorities who
had raised a last-minute issue over safety guarantees from the Croatian authorities. The issue was only resolved following top-level negotiations between BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, president of the Bosnian Serb parliament. For his part, Dušan Kovačević, the Serb defence minister, had given the convoy safety guarantees through territory held by Serb forces. UNPROFOR troops would escort the convoy while the UNHCR would provide bread and blankets for the journey, city officials said. 3775/

(c) International reported events

2837. Lord Owen, the European Community's negotiator in peace talks, charged that the United States "killed" his most promising plan to end the fighting in BiH with its reluctance to send large numbers of troops as peacekeepers. "Body-bag counts are still part of US public opinion's measure of whether their forces should or should not intervene", Owen said in an evening speech to the English Speaking Union's annual Churchill lecture in London. He added, "The European Community and the Russian federation had backed Cyrus Vance and myself to the hilt against US doubts and hesitations from January to May 1993". History "will I suspect, judge that what was abandoned was the only hope of keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina together", he said. 3776/

26. 26/11/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and sniping was reported in the city all day. The fighting around the city damaged electrical power lines.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniping was reported in the city all day. A Danish UN officer was wounded in the leg by sniper fire, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said. He was driving in a vehicle (which was not armoured) through the "sniper's alley", on his way to a building housing downtown UN offices. 3777/

Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2838. Shelling and sniping was reported in the city all day. 3778/

2839. Fighting around Sarajevo damaged electrical power lines to the city, leaving it with almost no electricity, heat or running water. The United Nations said that it would take at least 48 hours to repair the power lines. 3779/

(b) Local reported events

2840. The planned evacuation of civilians from the city was delayed. About 1,100 people (mainly women, children and the elderly) waited for hours in subfreezing weather until the evacuation was called off. One official said that Croatians who were to provide buses appeared to be raising fresh problems and might be trying to free Bosnian Croat militia leaders arrested by the BiH
government. Peter Kessler, a spokesman for the UNHCR, said that Bosnian Serbs apparently were not keeping agreements reached on the passage of the convoy.

2841. An unidentified BiH commander was reportedly refusing to allow medical staff to enter the Baković mental hospital and insisted that UN convoys to the hospital be searched. The UN described the demands as "unacceptable".

2842. Ron Redmond, spokesman for the UNHCR in Geneva, said that convoys had delivered 1,000 tons of aid in BiH during the past three days. But Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman, spokesman for UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, said Serbs, Croats and Muslims were again hampering operations barely a week after leaders agreed to grant relief convoys safe passage.

(c) International reported events

2843. In Geneva, John Mills, the spokesman for the International Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, confirmed that the three warring Bosnian leaders and the Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin presidents had verbally agreed to meet in Geneva Monday in a bid to revive stalled peace talks.

27. 27/11/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A heavy artillery shell hit the city centre, but no injuries were reported. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The city centre. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2844. A heavy artillery shell hit the city centre in the evening, but no one was reported injured.

(b) Local reported events

2845. The city was without electricity for a second consecutive day and was left with scarce water and natural gas supplies.

2846. UN relief convoys were allowed to pass Bosnian Serb checkpoints into Sarajevo and Srebrenica, but relief efforts elsewhere were reported to have been hampered. The convoys were waved across the BiH border with Serbia after being blocked on Friday, according to Lyndall Sachs, a spokeswoman in Belgrade for UNHCR. In Sarajevo, five trucks were able to deliver needed fuel.

2847. Buses were running again, free of charge, on the 108th anniversary of the city's transport company. However, there were only two buses operating (between the television station and the cathedral). Little of the transport's system remained intact after being destroyed during the siege. Ibrahim
Jusufranic, manager of the company, said that the city's trams stopped on May two last year. Fighting had inflicted an estimated $60 million of damage to the company's property. Thirty per cent of the city trams had been destroyed, along with 20 per cent of trolley buses and half of the city's buses. "We could have trams running in 15 days if (Bosnian) Serbs give guarantees they will not shoot at us", Jusufranic added. 3787/

28. 28/11/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observed significantly heavier Serb shelling of the city, which spokesman Bill Aikman ascribed to the use of fresh troops over the weekend. "We have the impression that the Serbs rotate their troops, and the Sunday guys take over", he told a news briefing. "It's definitely a different attitude". 3788/ The city was reportedly hit by 116 shells in areas including the city centre. 3789/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The city university political science school; unidentified positions in the east section of the city. Source(s): Reuters; The Press Association; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Significant casualties resulted from the day's shelling of the city university political science school. Source(s): Reuters; The Press Association; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: At "sniper's alley", a man riding a bicycle was shot dead through the heart by a sniper's bullet, an Red Cross worker said. 3790/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Five persons were killed and eight others were wounded in the shelling of the city university political science school. A man was killed by sniper fire at "sniper's alley". Source(s): Reuters

Narrative of Events:

2848. An artillery barrage reportedly took place as BiH President Alija Izetbegović was leaving for Geneva. Moments earlier, Izetbegović told reporters, "If the Serb side does not return territories, sanctions should be tightened and not lifted". 3791/ Shells were reported to have landed near the city university's political science school, killing five people and seriously wounding eight. The shells struck near the Drvenija bridge shortly before 1:00 p.m.. 3792/ Four of those killed died instantly, one being decapitated and another losing his legs. The fifth victim was declared dead on arrival at the city's Koševo hospital, doctors said. 3793/

2849. Seval Ganijun, 31, was one of those wounded in the day's shelling attack. He suffered shrapnel wounds in the chest and legs and from his hospital bed later gave his personal account of what he witnessed. "I was just walking out of the door of my building when I felt the explosion", he said.

"It's a kind of emptiness I never felt before. Right after that I heard people screaming and I felt the pain in my chest and in my legs. Then I felt the warm blood and my mind cleared. What I saw in front of me was a young guy, about 20, and I could see the inside of his stomach and his hip. There was blood everywhere and he was calling for his mother. People ran out and started helping them. I got up and walked a few steps into the street. Next to a vehicle I saw only a torso to my left. When I
turned to the right there was another body of a man without a head
leaning over a wheelbarrow full of jerry cans of water. Maybe two yards
further, another torso, and then behind that one other person who was
dragging himself along and leaving a bloody trail and calling for help.
The screams were horrible, like they didn't come from this world.
Something I never heard before. I wanted to help, but I didn't know
where to go. I saw people coming and helping, and I saw my brother, who
was completely confused, but who helped me walk over the bridge. We
decided to walk to the hospital because we wanted to leave the cars for
the badly wounded. When we crossed the bridge a car stopped with two men
inside and they took me to the hospital. Then I saw other people coming
in wounded". 3794/

2850. BiH positions in the east section of the city reportedly came under
heavy shelling. Most of the gunfire reportedly originated from Trebević to the
south. 3795/ There were also reports that tank fire came from the west side of
the city for an hour in the evening. 3796/

(b) Local reported events

2851. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić said that the day's attack was an attempt
by the besieging forces to put pressure on BiH to accept a peace settlement.
"This is pressure on us. This was a demonstration of power", he said. 3797/

2852. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that he did not have high
hopes for the upcoming Geneva meeting and that he expected the Serbs would be
blamed for prolonging the war. "Our estimates before departing for Geneva
indicate that the Serb position after the meeting will be worse than it is now
because it is obvious that Serbs will be accused again, and by those who have
the least right to do so", he said. He accused Germany, which along with
France proposed the gradual lifting of sanctions in exchange for territorial
concessions, of trying to help the BiH and Croatia. "Germany should at least
for reasons of good taste keep away from the Yugoslav crisis", he said. 3798/

2853. A convoy of 13 trucks, including four carrying 60 tons of fuel, arrived
in the city. It was reportedly the first time a fuel truck had reached the
city since August. 3799/

(c) International reported events

2854. Peace talks were scheduled to begin in Geneva on Monday. The talks were
to centre on a proposal presented last week by France and Germany calling for
a gradual suspension of sanctions against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
if Bosnian Serb forces agreed to a slightly larger handover of territory than
the amount specified in a plan rejected in September by the BiH government. "I
would be very surprised if we got a peace agreement", Thorvald Stoltenberg,
the UN mediator, told reporters in Geneva. "It would be wonderful, but my hope
is that we get the basis for further negotiations". 3800/

29. 29/11/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a marked increase in shelling
and small arms fire in the city as the Geneva talks resumed. Source(s):
Reuter.
**Targets Hit:** The city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Sniping activity was reported in the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2855. UNPROFOR spokesman Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck reported a marked increase in shelling and small arms fire in the city. He said that mortar and sniper rounds hit the city centre as the Geneva talks began. "Sarajevo was unstable due to shelling", he said. 3801/

(b) Local reported events

2856. The city was reported without electricity overnight after a pylon was damaged in fighting or as a result of sabotage. 3802/

(c) International reported events

2857. The three factions agreed to resume direct negotiations for a settlement. The agreement to restart negotiations was accompanied by a separate military accord, signed by all parties to the conflict. In it, the three sides agreed once again to guarantee the safe passage of UN relief aid and "to take positive action, including the use of force, against those elements who refuse to be controlled". UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said that UN soldiers were also prepared to use force if confronted in their mission. 3803/

2858. As the meeting of 12 EC ministers and the leaders of three Bosnian factions opened, the current EC president from Belgium said that the Community was willing to rebuild BiH if Serbs, Croats and Muslims found a political settlement. "Negotiations between the Bosnian parties have been deadlocked since the end of September. They must be resumed and be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible", Belgian Foreign Minister Will Claes said. The meeting was attended by Izetbegović, Karadžić and Croat leader Mate Boban. Also present were Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. 3804/

2859. Peace envoys Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg said that while the three sides were at least talking again, long and hard bargaining would be needed for a negotiated settlement. "We're not in my view going to get a signed, sealed agreement here in the next few days but I think we may take the process on", Owen said. 3805/

2860. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said that UN peacekeepers would have to consider abandoning former Yugoslavia if fighting had not stopped by springtime. "If at the end of winter our plan has failed, we could not stick indefinitely with the status quo", he told the French business daily Les Echos. We could not indefinitely keep on spending hundreds of millions of dollars, leaving thousands of men on the ground, if the warring parties refuse any political settlement". 3806/
30. 30/11/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a low level of tension in the city. UNMO observed 21 incoming and 12 outgoing artillery rounds. However, reports described an increase in shelling and small-arms fire. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Koševo Hospital. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Five shells hit the Koševo hospital area. One shell burst through a window and killed two nurses and wounded at least three other persons. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Two nurses were killed and at least three other persons were wounded when shells hit the Koševo hospital in the evening. A patient at the hospital also died of shock during the shelling. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; The Press Association.

Narrative of Events:

2861. The city was subjected to an increase in shelling and small-arms fire.

2862. An artillery attack in the evening killed two nurses and wounded three others at the city’s main hospital. Doctors at the Koševo hospital said that an artillery round burst through a window in the evening as the five were sitting in a room used by medical staff on rest breaks. "It hit outside and exploded on the outside and blew the wall in", said UN spokesman Colonel Bill Aikman. The room was virtually destroyed by the explosion which took away much of the wall and scattered shrapnel from the floor to the ceiling. "The nurses were sitting right here", said one doctor, pointing to a sofa covered with a brown blanket. "They were consulting with the three doctors. They have their coffee breaks here-except we have no coffee". Doctors at the hospital said that a total of five artillery rounds were fired at it from Serb-held positions. In addition to the hospital personnel, a patient who was in a room destroyed by an explosion died of shock, an employee at the city morgue said. The hospital is in a residential area, and Aikman said: "There are no military targets here".

2863. BiH army officers accused Bosnian Serb forces of launching the Koševo hospital attack to put pressure on the Geneva peace talks. UNPROFOR immediately lodged a protest with Bosnian Serb authorities, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said. UNPROFOR military experts who examined the site to determine the origin of the shelling were expected to give their conclusions on Thursday.

BiH army officers alleged that the mortar fire came from a Serb position south of the city, while Serbs claimed it probably originated from a BiH army position. Colonel Stjepan Siber, number two in the BiH army, protested against the attack in what he termed as an "upsurge in attacks by the [Serb] aggressors since 28 November throughout BiH, particularly against civilian targets", Sarajevo radio said. In a letter to the co-chairmen of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, he said: "We view these attacks as pressure on our delegation at the Geneva negotiations" and "we ask the international community to punish the aggressors". Siber's letter, quoted by Sarajevo radio, was also addressed to officials of UNPROFOR, NATO, the UNHCR and the ICRC.
(b) Local reported events

2864. Amid freezing temperatures, the city was reportedly without fuel for heating, electricity and running water. 3815/

(c) International reported events

2865. BiH President Alija Izetbegović submitted a new map in talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. Karadžić stated that he was hopeful that some kind of accord could be reached. "Unfortunately the Muslims have come with an over-exaggerated map proposal, but we still hope there will be a fair solution", he said. 3816/

2866. Peace negotiations in Geneva stood on the verge of collapse. "The talks are going backwards", said Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. "The Muslim side has increased its requests and so caused delays". Disagreement at the latest round of peace talks centered on the BiH demand that Serbs return land in eastern BiH and that the Croats cede territory on the Dalmatian coast to insure that a proposed Muslim mini-state had access to the sea. "I am afraid we are going nowhere", said BiH Prime Minister, Haris Silajdžić. "We are at the very start again, and I cannot say I am optimistic". Mr. Silajdžić blamed the European Community and the Croats and Serbs for the lack of progress. He said that the European Community had lured BiH back to the table with an assurance that it could gain 3.7 per cent more territory. "We are waiting for the European Community to deliver", he added. 3817/

2867. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced in Rome that the United States would send increased aid to BiH. Mr. Christopher said that the United States would spend an additional $150 million in relief aid, much of it to defray the cost of flying Air Force aeroplanes. The US had reportedly already contributed $400 million in aid to BiH. In a speech to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Christopher stated: "This winter the snows have come early in Bosnia and the humanitarian crisis has deepened". "Whatever we do to help, it will not be enough. So long as the armed conflict continues, it is not humanly possible to end the suffering of the people of Bosnia". "The only answer is to bring the fighting to an end and the only means to that end is a negotiated settlement", he said. 3818/

U. December 1993

1. 1/12/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that more than 120 shell rounds fell on the heights surrounding the city. 3819/ UNPROFOR also reported higher tension in the western part of the city due to the shelling of Košev hospital and the airport. 3820/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The airport; the Košev hospital; the heights surrounding the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported near the Holiday Inn throughout the day. 3821/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

2868. UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said that increased Serb shelling of the city had closed the airport. He said that more than 120 shell rounds fell on the heights surrounding the city.

2869. UNPROFOR also reported higher tension in the western part of the city due to the shelling of Koševno hospital and the airport.

(b) Local reported events

2870. Fahro Isaković, a spokesman for the BiH Ministry of Education, said that the city's schools would close next week. "Both primary and high schools will stop operating because of worse than appalling conditions", he said. When asked what "worse than appalling meant", he said: "Cold, lack of security--do you need anything else?" Isaković said that teachers were being told to stop holding classes until things improved. "If possible, schools will start operating on 15 February next year and the semester will be completed", Isaković said. "If not then, then the first of March."

2871. The city received a small amount of electricity, but power was only going to priority sites such as hospitals and the industrial bakery, Sarajevo radio said.

(c) International reported events

2872. Leaders of the three warring factions decided to continue peace talks into Thursday, conference spokesman John Mills said. Diplomats said the decision to continue the talks beyond their expected conclusion was at least one positive sign for negotiations between Moslem, Serb and Croat leaders.

2873. BiH officials said that a map outlining their territorial demands had been dismissed by the Bosnian Serbs and that negotiations were proceeding with "great difficulty". But the BiH negotiators also said that there was "room for optimism" on another of their key demands--full access to the Adriatic Sea at the Croat-held port of Neum. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who returned to Zagreb on Tuesday evening, had rejected such an idea.

2874. The BiH government for the first time said that it would agree to share Sarajevo with the Serbs if it would save the population. Sources close to peace talks said that the Serbs were insisting on about 40 per cent of the city and would be willing to return other territory to BiH as part of a deal. "Frankly, I find any division of Sarajevo to be repugnant, the recreation of Berlin", said BiH UN ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey. "But on the other hand the people of Sarajevo have to survive the consequences of the world not coming to their aid to lift the siege", he said, "and if the division is what the world deems, somehow by default is necessary, then, we're going to try to save lives".

2875. The European Community warned that it would carry out its threat to use force against forces in BiH if they ignored guarantees in Geneva and interfered with aid deliveries. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes said that the EC would allow several days for the Geneva agreement to be communicated to all military commanders in BiH. But after that, "if local chieftains resist the implementation of the agreement we will utilize military means", Claes said.
2877. General Jean Cot, the UNPROFOR military chief in the former Yugoslavia warned that the United Nations would consider withdrawing from BiH by springtime if combatants continued to tolerate commanders who repeatedly harassed and blocked aid convoys. "We cannot continue to put ourselves at the service of madmen, and I refer here to the leaders", said General Cot. 3832/

2878. At a meeting of the United Nations Security Council committee overseeing trade sanctions imposed on the rump Yugoslav federation of Serbia and Montenegro, the United States said that it was inclined to oppose the Russian request to supply 130 million cubic metres of natural gas a month to Belgrade. The British government expressed a similar intention. As all decisions of the sanctions committee must be unanimous, the immediate effect of this stand was to block the Russian proposal for the time being. Some humanitarian organizations expressed concern that Bosnian Serbs might retaliate against the decision by cutting off the intermittent supplies of natural gas and other forms of energy reaching Sarajevo through Serb-held territory. "There is a real danger that the Serbs will do this now", said Roy Williams, overseas operations director of the International Rescue Committee, which was running a $10 million project to repair the city's damaged gas distribution system. 3833/

2. 2/12/93 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported the city as calm during the evening and unstable during the day. 3834/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Stup. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2879. UNPROFOR reported the city as calm during the evening and unstable during the day. Some shelling was reported in the city. The main targeted area was Stup. 3835/

(b) **Local reported events**

2880. The airport reopened after being closed on Wednesday due to shelling. 3836/

2881. Many Sarajevans reportedly scoffed at the idea of carving up the city along Serbian and Muslim lines. "If it is possible we must have a whole city, not to divide it", said Mustafa Keveljan, a 42 year-old technician and soldier. "If that is not possible we must keep on fighting so we can keep a multi-ethnic city". But others (notably Croats and Serbs), did not take such a hard line on dividing the city. "Why not? Let it be divided if it means peace", said Dobrislav Savić, 60, a Serb, "In time people will get back together again". A Croat woman, 19 year-old Suzana Šarec, said she did not want to see Sarajevo split in half. But if opposing the idea meant more carnage, then she was all for partition. It is better to divide this city than to kill all these young people", she said. 3837/
2882. BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić went into a final meeting at the Geneva peace talks amid conflicting claims. After morning talks, Karadžić said that the BiH government had agreed that Sarajevo should be split into "twin cities". However, BiH ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Sacirbey told reporters: "There is no agreement on Sarajevo". Diplomats close to the conference said that the most likely Sarajevo deal would involve the Serbs ceding to BiH two industrial suburbs, Vogošća and Ilijaš. In return, the Serbs were demanding two besieged Muslim enclaves to the east, Srebrenica and Žepa, but would leave Gorazde in BiH hands.

3. 3/12/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR said that 140 mortar shells fell on the city, particularly on civilian areas during the day. UNPROFOR also reported that the mortar shelling in the city (especially the eastern part) had increased the tension in Sarajevo. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: A makeshift emergency clinic next to the city bakery; the Princip Bridge; the Old Town; the Vogošća area. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Loss of civilian lives. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: A sniper critically wounded a French UN peacekeeper in the city. A UN official said that the soldier, a member of the French Legion, was critically wounded by a sniper bullet in the Dobrinja area. The soldier's femoral artery was cut and doctors were guarded about his chances of survival, said spokesman Colonel Guy de Battista. A probable Bosnian sniper equipped with a heavy calibre rifle hit a (French) soldier in the lower part of the body, wounding him badly", UN military spokesman Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said. He added, "the gunner seems to have fired from a high floor of the building next to the location of distribution". The soldier had been guarding UN humanitarian workers while they delivered aid to the people in the area. He was reportedly outside his armoured personnel carrier but behind the turret of the vehicle's machine-gun. In another incident, a French soldier from the airport protection detachment was lightly wounded in the hand by a bullet from a Serb sniper position, van Biesenbroeck said. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: The final casualty toll was four dead and 13 injured, according to UNPROFOR information. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2883. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire hit the city overnight and in the morning.

2884. Two people were killed and two others were wounded when a shell landed near a makeshift emergency clinic next to the city's main bakery. The area around the bakery was reportedly exposed to Serb positions on hills just one kilometre south of the city. Witnesses said the victims, a 50 year-old man and a 35 year-old woman, were killed when the shell hit as they left the clinic.
Two passers-by were slightly injured. The bodies were reportedly still lying in the street more than two hours after the attack. 3847/

2885. Earlier, at 8:30 a.m., 3848/ a shell hit the Princip bridge 3849/ in the city centre, killing two people and wounding eight, according to staff at the Koševno hospital. Hospital staff also said that six people were wounded when a shell landed in the centre of the city's Old Town early in the morning. 3850/

2886. The Yugoslav Tanjug news agency reported that BiH forces fired small arms and mortars into Serb positions in the Vogošća area. 3851/

(b) Local reported events

2887. BiH President Izetbegović returned to the city after peace talks in Geneva ended without a resolution to territorial disputes. 3852/ "No matter what the final outcome, we will not withdraw from any parts of the town that we are holding. I would like both our citizens and our fighters to hear that", Izetbegović told reporters. 3853/

2888. Prime Minister Silajdžić, said that discussions on territorial concessions involved in a settlement were stuck at their "starting positions". There had been "not an inch of progress", he said. 3854/

2889. The United Nations said that 14 UN relief flights landed at the city's airport. 3855/

2890. UNPROFOR spokesman Ray Wilkerson reported that early in the day, a 10 truck convoy reached the city with 105 tons of wheat and 48 tons of other food. 3856/

2891. Aid distribution was suspended in the suburb of Dobrinja, where a French Foreign Legion soldier had been hit by sniper fire, "probably Bosnian", UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said. He added that aid distribution would only resume in the suburbs when UN officials had obtained "better security measures".

(c) International reported events

2892. UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg described the Geneva talks as "constructive", but added: "There is no agreement on any issue". He added: "There is a basis for continued talks". 3857/

2893. In Geneva, a UN spokesman said that the peace conference co-chairmen would continue "contacts" with the three sides next week at the Sarajevo airport. 3858/

4. 4/12/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described Sarajevo as tense in the city centre, with heavy shelling in the Tito camp area. 3859/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The city centre; the Tito camp area. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Fog reportedly brought a respite from sniper and shelling attacks in the city during the day. 3860/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Officials at the Koševo hospital said that they operated on a Bosnian woman wounded when a mortar bomb hit the city centre. 3861/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:
2894. Sarajevo radio said that the city suffered shelling overnight Friday and into the morning. 3862/

2895. Fog reportedly brought a respite from sniper and shelling attacks in the city during the day. 3863/

(b) Local reported events
2896. The situation in the city had reportedly been worsened because its power was diverted to the north-eastern enclave of Tuzla, where a missile knocked out a coal-fired generating plant. There were few details on the missile, but UNPROFOR Commander van Biesenbroeck said that it had severely damaged pumps, cables and water pipes. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman, another UNPROFOR spokesman, said that the city's sharing of electricity with Tuzla meant that power would probably be available only on a rotating basis until repairs were finished. 3864/

2897. A mild earthquake shook central BiH in the evening. Two tremors could be felt in Sarajevo, the first at 9:05 p.m., and the second at 6:23 a.m. Sunday. The BiH Seismological Institute said that the tremors measured between three and four on the Mercalli scale, meaning that it was barely felt. Sarajevo television reported that the quake's epicentre was about 95 miles (150 kilometres) from the city, but did not say in which direction. 3865/

(c) International reported events
2898. Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Konti• asked Bulgaria to mediate with international organizations for the lifting of United Nations sanctions against his republic. "We are certain that in the near future, sanctions will be softened or lifted since there is no longer a reason for them", Konti• said after meeting Bulgarian Prime Minister Lyuben Berov in Sofia. 3866/

6. 5/12/93 (Sunday)
(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported 70 shells fired by Serb forces and 10 fired by BiH forces. 3867/ UNPROFOR described the city as relatively calm. Infantry street fighting was also reported. 3868/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH officials said that eight people were wounded in the 24 hour
period ending at noon. 3869/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2899. Bosnian Serb force, quoted by the Tanjug news agency, said that BiH forces had stepped up their attacks in the Sarajevo area, shelling 10 areas under Serb control. 3870/

(b) Local reported events

2900. The fog closed the city airport for part of the day. 3871/

6. 6/12/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that the city was hit with 93 shells (a relatively low number), but that it was noticeable that populated areas rather than front lines were attacked. 3872/ Aikman said that while the number of shells to hit the city on Monday was relatively low, populated areas rather than front lines were attacked. "What is significant is where it hit", Aikman told reporters. "The main targeting was the populated areas of the city, whereas in the past few weeks and months it has been mainly along the confrontation lines". When asked about Serb denials that they had shelled the city, Aikman said: "It boggles the mind". 3873/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Ciglane market; the area near the BiH army headquarters; an unidentified cemetery; the Hrasno neighbourhood. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters; The Press Association.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in an unidentified cemetery during a funeral for two shelling victims. Source(s): The Press Association; United Press International.

Casualties: Six persons were reported killed and 29 others wounded in the day's shelling. 3874/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2901. One shell reportedly hit a market near the Olympic stadium, killing four persons, and another, which Sarajevo radio said was a tank round, hit near the BiH army headquarters. The market was near the Koševo hospital. Kemal Drnda, chief surgeon at the Koševo hospital, said that 19 wounded adult civilians were treated after the shelling, 17 of them severely injured. A Reuter photographer traveling to the scene said that people dived for cover as the shelling started. He said that he saw three or four shells land within a few hundred metres of the hospital. 3876/

2902. A short time after the market was hit, mortar rounds landed in a cemetery during the funerals of a 34 year-old woman and an older man who were killed in shelling last week. There were no reported injuries. There was, however, continuous sniper fire as the mourners gathered, and three shells landed, each closer to the funeral party than the previous ones. 3877/

2903. A shell reportedly landed in the Hrasno neighbourhood, wounding at least
two persons, including a child playing in his home. Ten year-old Danijel Doroti• was playing with his friend in his family's sixth floor apartment when a shell landed outside. "I heard the explosion and felt pain in my stomach", he said from his hospital bed, showing a shrapnel wound. Another shell hit a heavily traveled alleyway near Maršal Tito Street. 3878/ 

2904. The day's shelling reportedly lasted five hours and was the heaviest in more than a week. It also reportedly came the day after the first infantry clashes in weeks between Serb forces and the BiH army. 3879/ 

2905. Bosnian Serbs denied firing the shells and accused government forces of attacking their own people, Belgrade TV reported. 3880/

(b) International reported events

2906. EC mediator, Lord Owen, said that there could be no peace accord in BiH unless the BiH government got at least a third of the republic's territory. "The [peace] process is on track. But the basic fact is that we look for more territory" for the government, Owen said after briefing the European Community foreign ministers on the peace talks in Geneva. 3881/ 

2907. BiH Vice President Ejup Gani• called on the international community to put a stop to "the genocide of the Bosnian people". Gani• criticized western countries, notably the United States and Britain, for what he called their "passive and negative" role in the face of the "tragedy" affecting his country, which had been unjustly deprived by the UN arms embargo "of the right to defend itself against the Serbian and Croatian armies". His comments were made during a press conference in Rabat following talks with King Hassan II of Morocco. 3882/ 

2908. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadži• told a Belgrade newspaper that a settlement to the war could be reached by the end of the year, but he said that the BiH government had unrealistic territorial demands. "Expectations are that a peace agreement will be concluded by the end of the year, which implies a fair and frank approach to the resolution of controversial issues", Karadži• was quoted as saying by Ve•ernje Novosti. Karadži• accused the BiH of stalling the negotiating process. "How else can we interpret unrealistic Muslim demands that few are ready to support?" Karadži• said. 3883/ 

7. 7/12/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that "major activity", including heavy artillery fire, took place all day, overnight and on Wednesday, between the BiH army and Bosnian Serb troops in the suburb of Grbavica. The fighting was reportedly heaviest around the Vrbanja bridge where BiH troops made some advances. The BiH-controlled Stup and Dobrinja neighbourhoods also came under artillery and mortar fire but frontlines did not change. "A lot of shelling" was reported from the northern Koševo neighbourhood and from Busovaa on Mount Igman. 3884/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Grbavica; the area around the Vrbanja bridge; Stup; Dobrinja; the Koševo area; Mt. Igman; Vogoš•a; Gornji Kotorac. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2909. UNPROFOR spokesman, Bill Aikman, said that "major activity", including heavy artillery fire, took place all day, overnight and on Wednesday, between the BiH army and Bosnian Serb troops in the suburb of Grbavica. The fighting was reportedly heaviest around the Vrbanja bridge where BiH troops made some advances, Aikman said. The BiH-controlled Stup and Dobrinja neighbourhoods also came under artillery and mortar fire but frontlines did not change. "A lot of shelling" was reported from the northern Koševo neighbourhood and from Busovaa on Mount Igman, according to the spokesman. 3885/

2910. Tanjug reported that BiH forces had launched strong attacks on Serb positions in the Grbavica, Vogošća and Gornji Kotorac districts. However the agency, quoting Serb military sources, dismissed a UN report that BiH forces appeared to have made military gains along the front line running through central Sarajevo. 3886/

(b) Local reported events

2911. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and the speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, Momčilo Krajišnik, spoke for several hours at the city's airport. The meeting, under the auspices of the UN, was the first between them since peace talks adjourned last week. 3887/

2912. The Belgrade government told the UN that the sanctions imposed 18 months ago on Yugoslavia had created a devastating effect on its economy, causing losses of more than $20 billion. 3888/

(c) International reported events

2913. In Bonn, the German government approved a 10 million DM special aid package for BiH. 3889/

8. 8/12/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Late into the evening, Bosnian Serb and BiH soldiers engaged in heavy fighting in the Grbavica district. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: According to UN military spokesman Bill Aikman, the day's fighting killed one person in the city centre. 3890/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2914. Late into the evening, Bosnian Serb and BiH soldiers engaged in heavy
fighting in the Grbavica district. UN officials, however, said that despite intense fighting over the last several days, the frontline had shifted only a few yards. Observers noted that the increase in fighting appeared to be a move by BiH forces to regain control of Grbavica in advance of a settlement that could include some division of Sarajevo. 3891/ "The fighting was heavy in Grbavica", said UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. "The fighting went on into the evening, well after darkness, which is not the norm in this part of the country". 3892/

(b) Local reported events

2915. Bosnian Serb leader MomČilo Krajišnik and BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdži*, held a second day of peace talks at the airport. "They are basically a continuation of the Geneva peace process", UN mediator Viktor Andreev said. Krajišnik was quoted by the Belgrade-based Tanjug news agency as saying that the two sides had discussed territorial questions including the status of Sarajevo and access to the sea. 3893/

9. 9/12/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: "The last 24 hours have been very difficult and very tense", UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said at midday. Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with around 270 shells overnight, with most falling on frontline areas, while the BiH army fired 46 shells, Aikman added. Infantry clashes were also reported, Aikman said. 3894/ The day's shelling came amid increased fighting in the Grbavica area, and after talks between Bosnian Serbs and the BiH government appeared to have broken off. 3895/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Stup; the airport area; Žu*; a market in the •engi• Vila district; an unidentified park in the centre of the Old Town area. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; United Press International; The Press Association.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Three persons were reported wounded by snipers in a residential district. 3896/ UNPROFOR reported a marked increase in sniper fire due to improved visibility after weeks of fog. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Intense shelling and sporadic sniper fire reportedly killed at least eight people and wounded 26 others, hospital and local media reports said. 3897/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

2916. Bosnian Serb press agency SRNA said that Bosnian Serb forces had repulsed overnight, "a violent attack" by BiH government forces on the Serb-held suburb of Iliša. Citing the Bosnian Serb military press service, the agency said that the BiH troops had "lost men" in the attack, but gave no further details. 3898/ UNPROFOR spokesman Aikman said that the worst of the fighting had centered on Grbavica, adding that improved visibility after weeks of fog had led to a marked increase in sniper fire. The Stup district and the airport zone also came under heavy shelling, as did the northern height of Žu*, he said. 3899/
2917. Four persons were killed and four wounded when three mortar shells hit a busy market at around 2:30 p.m. The mortar rounds fell on a makeshift market in a parking lot surrounded by high-rise apartment buildings in the Engi• Vila district. "There were about 50 to 100 people outside", said Enesa Halilovi•, 26, a BiH television employee who lived near the market. "About 10 people fell down. At first I thought all of them were dead". Officials at the French hospital near the site and at the Koševo hospital, said that three men and one woman were killed in the shelling, and four other persons were wounded. The shells shattered glass in the surrounding apartment buildings and scattered shrapnel and garbage from trash bins in the parking lot. 3900/ One of the persons killed was one of the city's leading children's doctors, Dr. Galib Eleho, a pediatrician well known for his work with UNICEF. "One of our trucks was delivering milk to the (adjacent) clinic for a baby food program", said a UNICEF spokesman. "Eleho had just stepped out to arrange for someone to unload it when the mortar landed and killed him". 3901/

2918. Several of the shells reportedly hit at least eight locations in crowded areas within minutes of each other, and were reported to have come from Bosnian Serb positions in the hills surrounding the city. Eyewitnesses said that one shell hit a park in the centre of the Old Town area, missing a crowded market by only several yards. No one was injured. 3902/

(c) International reported events

2919. Peace mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, met Serbian President Slobodan Miloševi•, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadži• and Mom•ilo Krajšnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb assembly, for several hours in Belgrade in a continuation of the Geneva peace process. Their spokesman, John Mills, said that he had no further details of the Belgrade discussions. "They hope to be in a position to hold a meeting beginning 20 December. No decision has been taken on the venue for that meeting", Mills said. "Meanwhile they will continue their contacts with the parties". 3903/

2920. Peace mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, who had planned a meeting of all of the warring parties in the northern Greek port of Salonika on Sunday, decided instead to arrange another round of talks in the week beginning 20 December. "Their view after [Thursday's] meeting [with Serb leaders in Belgrade] was that the time is not quite ready for a meeting between the parties this weekend as had been envisaged", spokesman John Mills said at UN headquarters in Croatia. 3904/

10. 10/12/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shells reportedly hit residential districts as well as contested front-line areas to the north of the city. 3905/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Butmir; the area near the airport; the area near the PTT building. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that at least 21 people were wounded by sniper fire on this day. 3906/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: The city's crisis centre reported 11 persons killed and 38 wounded
in artillery and sniper attacks in the 24 hours up to mid-afternoon. 3907/
Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2921. UNPROFOR reported heavy shelling in Dobrinja, Butmir, and around the
airport. In central Sarajevo, the situation was tense too, with shelling
reported around the PTT building. 3908/

(b) Local reported events

2922. Two large convoys of flour and other foodstuffs reached Sarajevo, the
United Nations reported. 3909/

11. 11/12/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sirens sounded a general alert in the city as
Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with tank, artillery and mortar fire.
UNPROFOR reported that the city had been hit by 250 shell rounds since Friday
in Serb retaliation for an attack on Lukavica where the Bosnian Serb army had
its headquarters. Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The Lukavica barracks; Dobrinja; Stup; the city centre; Grbavica;
the airport area. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; United Press
International.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least two persons were wounded in the day's shelling.
Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2923. Sirens sounded a general alert in the city as Bosnian Serb forces hit
the city with tank, artillery and mortar fire. UNPROFOR reported that the city
had been hit by 250 shell rounds since Friday in Serb retaliation for an
attack on Lukavica where the Bosnian Serb army had its headquarters. "The
Bosnian army assaulted with shelling Lukavica yesterday and I suspect that was
part of the reason for the large number coming back", said Bill Aikman,
UNPROFOR spokesman. At least one BiH shell hit the Serb barracks in the
morning while UN military observers were in the buildings but no casualties
were reported. Sarajevo radio said that at least two civilians had been
wounded in the city by Serb return fire. 3910/

2924. The shell fire came from the heights to the west of the city, Aikman
said. Districts worst affected by the shelling included Dobrinja and Stup, the
city centre, and the district of Grbavica. In response, the BiH army fired 27
rounds into Bosnian Serb-held districts, notably the Lukavica barracks to the
south, he added. 3911/

2925. Bosnian Serbs reportedly shelled the airport, hitting a terminal
building and forcing the suspension of some relief flights. 3912/
(b) **Local reported events**

2926. United Nations officials were reportedly angered and frustrated at what they portrayed as an effort by Bosnian Serbs to systematically block relief convoys. "We are having blockages, blockages, blockages", said UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. Today, two convoys had been turned back as they headed for the besieged city of Goražde. 3913/

(c) **International reported events**

2927. In Belgrade, Aleksa Buha, the foreign minister of the Bosnian Serb republic, was quoted by the Tanjug news agency as saying that a European Community plan for the Serbs to relinquish more territory in exchange for the gradual lifting of sanctions on Serbia had set the peace talks back to square one. Buha said that BiH were avoiding a definitive solution in the hope that they would eventually take over the whole territory. 3914/

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12. **12/12/93 (Sunday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that shelling activity decreased and that tension in the city dropped to a relatively low level (with the exception of eastern Sarajevo). 3915/ **Source(s):** UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2928. UNPROFOR reported that shelling activity decreased and that tension in the city dropped to a relatively low level (with the exception of eastern Sarajevo). 3916/

(b) **Local reported events**

2929. Reuters reported that the recent October purge of mafia-style leaders and renegade units from the BiH army had revitalized the forces. "There is a new testiness on the part of the Bosnians", said UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. "They are not being pansies. Aikman said that the BiH forces had moved forward by "a few houses" in the Grbavica area and been firing an unusually high number of shells and mortar bombs at the Serb forces. BiH army deputy commander Colonel Jovan Divjak stated that ridding the army of criminals and other "uncontrolled elements" had been a major factor in improving discipline and solidarity among the troops. 3917/

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13. **13/12/93 (Monday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Not specified
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

2930. No reported incidents.

14. 14/12/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Sarajevo suffered a new period of a high level of shelling, mainly in the downtown area. More than 300 shell rounds were reported by observers. 3918/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The downtown area; the Drvenija bridge; the Egyptian UNPROFOR barracks near the Old Town; the Koševo hospital; Grbavica; the airport area; the road to Pale. Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters; Agence France Presse; New York Times; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: One BiH soldier was killed by a sniper in the Vogošća district. 3919/ UNPROFOR reported that sniper activity was high in the city. 3920/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: UNPROFOR reported that at least 11 persons were killed and 19 others were wounded. 3921/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

2931. The morning was reported as quiet after shelling and sniping continued well into the night. 3922/

2932. Doctors at the Koševo hospital said that five women and three men were killed when two mortar shells landed near the Drvenija bridge at 1:00 p.m., and near the Old Town barracks of the Egyptian UN brigade. 3923/ Relative calm in recent days appeared to have enticed many Sarajevans out of their homes on this sunny afternoon, raising the day's casualty count. A surgeon at the Koševo hospital, Dr. Kemal Drnda, said that many of the wounded civilians suffered abdominal wounds from shrapnel. 3924/

2933. A Reuters photographer said that a 120 millimetre mortar bomb hit a building in the Koševo hospital complex. There were no injuries reported. 3925/

2934. Shells and automatic weapons fire were reported in the Grbavica district. 3926/

2935. Idesbald van Biesenbroeck, a spokesman for UNPROFOR said that Serb forces fired more than 200 artillery shells and mortar bombs on the city. 3927/

2936. The airport was closed at 10:00 a.m., for three hours after two mortar
shells, reportedly fired from the Serb-controlled Rajlovac district, fell near some buildings.  

2937. van Biesenbroeck said that the BiH forces fired 32 shells, most of them aimed at the road to Pale.  

2938. As night fell, machine-gun fire could still be heard from the direction of Grbavica.  

(b) Local reported events

2939. A BiH army official told Sarajevo radio in the evening that Serb forces were redeploying troops, tanks and other heavy weaponry to new positions around the city and warned residents to remain under cover.  

2940. The day's shelling, which began in the morning, forced UNPROFOR to close the airport for three hours.  

2941. The United Nations agreed with Bosnian Serb forces to expedite the shipment of aid and military resupply past Serbian checkpoints in BiH by allowing the faction's police to escort convoys. Angus Ramsay, deputy commander of UN forces in BiH reached an unsigned "understanding" with Bosnian Serb General Manojlo Milovanović that the Serbs would not obstruct UN convoys and would halt the practice of inspecting aid convoys at numerous checkpoints in Bosnian-Serb held territory. In exchange, the United Nations agreed that Serbian police using UN supplied fuel would escort the convoys and that the UN would help maintain the roads it used. "This agreement should minimize delays, but it doesn't mean that everything was solved", UN military spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said.  

(c) International reported events

2942. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé called on the United Nations to use air strikes against those violating agreements on the safe passage of humanitarian aid in BiH. "I have to ask myself why the United Nations is not using force in Sarajevo", he told the French television channel France 2 after viewing film of the victims of shelling in the city. "It has all the necessary means. Everyone has committed himself to ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and the preservation of the security zones. So, why, when someone violates the agreements, when the Serbs violate them, why doesn't it use air force?" he asked. 

15. 15/12/93 (Wednesday) 

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 163 shells hit the city. UNPROFOR also reported that the high level of shelling in the city had continued. Several areas of the city were reportedly affected, including the downtown. UNPROFOR commented that these events indicated that the Bosnian Serb army intended to carry on pressuring and harassing Sarajevo residents. However, UNPROFOR noted that an offensive on the city was considered unlikely. 

Targets Hit: Mojmilo; Stup; Žuljana; the downtown area. Source(s): The Press Association; UNPROFOR.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported in the morning that 24 persons had been killed and 20 wounded over the past 24 hours. One person was killed and 11 others were wounded in separate attacks on the city. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

2943. Fighting continued throughout the night in the city, where Sarajevo radio reported in the morning that 24 persons had been killed and 20 wounded over the past 24 hours.

2944. One person was killed and 11 others were wounded in separate attacks on the city. A number of mortars hit the Mojmilo district in the south of the city, killing one person and wounding three others, Sarajevo radio said.

2945. Bosnian Serb and BiH forces reportedly traded artillery and mortar rounds in the suburbs, including Stup and Žu• in the north-west.

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: An estimated 580 Bosnian Serb shells fell on the city between 6:00 p.m. Wednesday and 9:30 a.m. Thursday, according to UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck. He added that "a large number of BiH shells were also fired. van Biesenbroeck said that Serb forces accused BiH forces of making territorial gains in the sectors of Rajlovac and Grbavica but added that UNPROFOR had been unable to confirm any changes. He said that BiH forces had begun the clashes by targeting Serb-held districts, which sparked a massive response.

By the end of the day, the United Nations said that it had reports from Bosnian Serbs that BiH troops had taken several hundred yards in the Rajlovac district and a few buildings in the Grbavica district. But a UN military spokesman said that the BiH gains were unlikely to weaken the Bosnian Serb forces. "The gains they won were so minimal they would not change anything. But I think the Serbs will of course retaliate", said UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck.

UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 743 shells on the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: The area near the Vrbanja bridge; Stup; Grbavica; a bread line on Maršal Tito Street in the Old Town area. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: BiH army sniper activity was reported. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Shelling killed one person and wounded 35 others, BiH radio said. Sniper fire from the BiH army injured five persons in the Grbavica district, the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency said. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2946. Bosnian Serb forces reportedly hit the city with artillery and tank fire during the night and into the morning. Sarajevo radio said that the Serb
forces were firing at the Vrbanja bridge, which crosses the Miljacka river in the centre of the city. Shells also landed in the Stup suburb and other parts of the city. 3946/

2947. Infantry attacks backed by heavy automatic weapons fire broke out at dawn in Grbavica, which BiH troops were trying to capture. 3947/

2948. Six persons were wounded when a mortar shell hit a bread line on Maršal Tito Street in the Old Town area. 3948/ The shell reportedly hit at 1:20 p.m., near two trucks loaded with bread awaiting distribution to civilians. 3949/

2949. United Nations officials in Sarajevo speculated that the fighting was an attempt by Bosnian Serb leaders to put pressure on the BiH government to sign a peace plan. The BiH army counter-attacks, they felt, were an attempt to show that the army could still strike back. 3950/

(b) Local reported events

2950. Bosnian Croat and BiH commanders agreed to a Christmas truce to run from 23 December to 3 January, Croatian radio reported. General Ante Roso, commander of the Bosnian Croat Defence Council, and BiH General Rasim Delić approved the agreement at a meeting at the UN headquarters in Kiseljak. 3951/ Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić agreed to the truce on Wednesday following talks with the UNPROFOR BiH commander General Francis Briquemont. "Mladić said that he would respect the truce as long as he was not attacked, UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald Van Biesenbroeck said.

2951. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić said on Sarajevo radio that talks at the airport with Momčilo Krajišnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament, had failed to reach agreement on any key issues. "The Serb side is continuing to reject our claims", he said. 3952/

2952. In Belgrade, Serbian opposition leader Vuk Drašković told voters at a rally that the world would lift economic sanctions if his party won Sunday’s parliamentary elections. Drašković accused President Slobodan Milošević of selling out the country’s interests and mismanaging the economy. Milošević called for early elections on 19 December after dissolving the Serbian parliament. 3953/

17. 17/12/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bosnian Serb forces reportedly fired 138 shells into the city. BiH forces reportedly fired two shells out of the city. 3954/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: At least three persons were reported killed, according to the city morgue. 3955/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

2953. Bosnian Serb and BiH forces traded shell and small arms fire overnight, but the fighting eased after dawn. Sporadic shelling and small arms fire were reported in the city during the day.

2954. The UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector commander General Andre Soubirou denied Serb claims that UN troops had withdrawn from sites on Mount Igman where they were monitoring demilitarized zones. Spokesman van Biesenbroeck also denied reports of BiH army attacks on the western heights of the city.

(b) International reported events

2955. Geneva mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg held talks in Belgrade on the conflict in BiH with Serb and Croat representatives while BiH officials held talks in Vienna with European Community representatives. The meetings came ahead of a new round of negotiations next week in Geneva and Brussels involving all parties to the conflict.

18. 18/12/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and heavy sniper fire were reported in the city. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: An unidentified hospital; Ilidža. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: The city reportedly came under heavy sniper fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: Two people were reportedly killed and 17 others wounded from shelling and sniper fire. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2956. Six persons were severely wounded when a shell landed near a city hospital.

2957. The Tanjug news agency reported that two persons in Ilidža were killed and four others wounded by BiH shelling.

(b) Local reported events

2958. A Canadian transport aeroplane airlifted six sick and wounded children and six of their relatives out of Sarajevo. The evacuation was part of a larger mission by UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and the British government to ferry 90 sick and injured to treatment abroad. The children were initially flown to the UNHCR operations base in Ancona, Italy, with some going to Britain and the rest to the United States.
(c) International reported events

2959. Belgian Foreign Minister Will Claes, whose country held the European Community presidency, commented on Friday’s meeting with BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić in Vienna: "It was not a question of putting pressure on the Moslems, but finding out what their position was", he said in a statement released today. "Further concessions are expected from the Serbs as well as greater flexibility from all sides", he added. 3965/

19. 19/12/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported 142 shell impacts on the BiH side with the shelling concentrated on the areas of Stup, Žuć, Kobilja Glava, Grbavica and the city centre. 3966/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Stup; Žuć; Kobilja Glava; Grbavica; the city centre. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

2960. UNPROFOR reported 142 shell impacts on the BiH side with the shelling concentrated on the areas of Stup, Žuć, Kobilja Glava, Grbavica and the city centre. 3967/

(b) Local reported events

2961. UNPROFOR reported that two convoys reached the city, one from Metkovic and one from Belgrade, carrying a total of 130 tons of mixed food and wheat flour. The Belgrade convoy included two tankers carrying 36 tons of diesel fuel. 3968/

2962. Local parliament elections were held in Serbia. 3969/

20. 20/12/93 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Heavy shelling was reported in the city as BiH President Alija Izetbegović and Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić were leaving the Presidency building for the airport and a flight to Geneva for resumed peace talks. 3970/ Observers reported that a total of 213 shell rounds hit the city on this day. 3971/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

2963. At dawn, machine-gun fire could be heard from Vrbanja bridge near the Holiday Inn, where Serb and BiH soldiers had clashed in recent days. 3972/

2964. At the airport, an Ilyushin-76 transport was hit by five heavy machine-gun bullets as it prepared to land, damaging one of its fuel tanks. The airlift was thereafter suspended. 3973/

2965. Two children were killed and one other was injured when masonry collapsed on them while playing in a deserted shell-damaged house in the Bua Potok district in the north of the city. 3974/

**(b) Local reported events**

2966. In Belgrade, the Socialist Party of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević claimed victory in Sunday’s parliamentary elections. Spokesman Ivica Dasić said that the ruling Socialists needing 126 seats for an overall majority, had won between 124 and 128 according to unofficial returns. 3975/

21. 21/12/93 (Tuesday)

**(a) Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Bosnian Serb forces hit the city with a total of 1,500 artillery shells, in what UN officials described as the heaviest attack in two months. 3976/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** Stup; Rajlovac; Žulja. Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** UNPROFOR reported that six civilians were killed and 26 others were wounded in the day’s shelling. 3977/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Narrative of Events:**

2967. Heavy artillery and mortar shells hit the city in the morning, with 118 shell rounds falling in four hours. 3978/

2968. The UN said that most shells struck Stup and Rajlovac, frontline areas on the edge of the city. However, the confrontation line had not changed there, a UN official said. UN military spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said that the shelling was probably more harassment than an all-out attack because the Rajlovac area had little strategic value. "I think it's a last-minute push before the Geneva talks, but it's only a show of force", he said. 3979/

2969. Shelling also continued on the Muslim-held Žulja hill to the north of the city. 3980/
(b) **Local reported events**

2970. UNHCR announced that the city's humanitarian airlift would resume on Wednesday after being suspended on Monday following an attack on an air transport. UNHCR spokesperson Sylvana Foa said that three conditions set by the UN for aid flights to resume had been met. UNHCR had asked for a formal protest to be lodged with the faction responsible for the shooting, an immediate investigation and guarantees for the safety of aid flights from leaders from all sides. Officials were not sure of the origin of the Monday's gunfire, but it appeared to be from Serb-held territory. "The shots signaled that the shooter intended to seriously damage the aircraft", Foa said. "They fired directly below the aircraft as it was making its final approach above Bosnian Serb territory", she added. The incident reportedly resulted in the most severe damage sustained by a UN aircraft operating in the area since a German aeroplane was hit by anti-aircraft fire in February 1993. It was also the sixth reported incident at the airport in six weeks (152 incidents had been recorded since the airlift began in July 1992). 3981/

(c) **International reported events**

2971. In Geneva, BiH said that they could not accept a new Serb-Croat map for BiH, even though it gave them the one-third of the territory that they were demanding. The proposal was presented to BiH President Izetbegović in late-night talks. A spokesman for the BiH government said that the new map was "totally unacceptable" because it took no notice of specific demands on territory. "I have to say that all the concessions have been made with land that does not belong to the Moslems", said spokesman Mirza Hajrić. "We do not get anything we asked for . . . [we got] a lot of quantity but not quality". 3982/  

22. 22/12/93 (Wednesday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR observers reported that 228 shell rounds hit the city overnight until 9:00 a.m.. 3983/ UNPROFOR observers reported that 1,744 shells landed in the city. 3984/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.  

**Targets Hit:** Žuš. Source(s): Reuters.  

**Description of Damage:** Not specified  

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified  

**Casualties:** UNPROFOR observers reported that shelling killed one person and wounded 12 others. 3985/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.  

**Narrative of Events:**

2972. The Bosnian Serb shelling of the city continued. Heavy fighting was reported around Žuš and Rajlovac. BiH radio said that several thousand shell rounds hit the city. 3986/  

2973. UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said that most of the morning shelling centered on Žuš, a desolate hilltop battlefield overlooking key roadways in and around the city. 3987/
(b) Local reported events

2974. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević appeared to have fallen just short of a majority in Sunday's elections for the Serbian Parliament. In what had been billed as the announcement of the final results, the official election supervising commission announced that with 98.65 per cent of the votes counted, Mr. Milošević's Socialists had won 123 seats, leaving them three seats short of control of the 250-seat Parliament. However, the election commission said that some 4 per cent of the vote counted had been declared invalid because of errors and spoiled ballots in 45 polling stations and that another round of voting would have to be held in those stations, probably within the week. Zoran Đumić, the commission spokesman, said that it was unlikely that the new round of voting would substantially change the results. But he added, "anything is possible". 3988/

2975. The biggest defeat in the election appeared to have been suffered by the militia leader, Arkan, who lost not only his seat in Parliament, but the parliamentary immunity that went with it. The candidate, whose real name is Željko Ražnjatović, mounted the most expensive campaign, reportedly costing about $3 million, but he did not keep any of the five seats that he had from the Kosovo region. 3989/

(c) International reported events

2976. In Brussels, the warring factions agreed to a cease-fire in time for Christmas. "The parties accepted the application of a Christmas truce, which means the end of shelling, access for humanitarian convoys, and access for UN peace-keeping troops", Belgian Foreign Minister Will Claes said. Officials of the European Community said that no details had been worked out as to how the cease-fire would be implemented. 3990/

2977. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić said that his government had asked Serbs and Croats to return areas that had been ethnically cleansed, but instead had been offered inivable bits of "no-man's land". Asked if there had been progress toward peace over the past several days, Silajdžić said, "I must say I don't see any". Serbia and Croatia had reportedly failed to offer the BiH government territory in two key areas--land in the west that would give it territorial access to the Adriatic Sea, and land in the east to tie together isolated Muslim enclaves. 3991/

2978. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić rejected outright an EC proposal that Sarajevo be put under the administration of the United Nations, officials said. 3992/

23. 23/12/93 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observers counted 1,309 artillery rounds hitting the city. 3993/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Žuvica; Grbavica; the area near the Parliament building; Mokmilj; Dobrinja; Maršal Tito Street. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that snipers were active all day in the city. 3994/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.
Casualties: At least 10 people were killed and 62 wounded in the city, on the first day of a Christmas truce agreed to by the parties in Brussels. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

Narrative of Events:

2979. Heavy fighting erupted in the city in the morning, as BiH and Bosnian Serb forces fought with artillery and mortars. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., discharges of heavy weapons and light automatic arms could be heard and were gaining intensity 50 minutes later. Within a three-hour period, UNPROFOR observers tallied 142 shells fired by Bosnian Serb forces and 14 by BiH forces. A UN spokesman said that it was impossible to determine who had fired first. Artillery and mortar fire was heard coming from the north of the city, probably from the Žu• hills. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

2980. Intense artillery and mortar fire was reported around Žu•. Scores of shells fell around Žu• and the Serb-held Grbavica district. Government radio warned residents to stay indoors as mortar, machine-gun and small-arms fire occurred along the inner-city confrontation line near the parliament building throughout the morning. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./ A large building on the Serb side of the line was reportedly burning through the afternoon and Serb forces were said to be firing anti-aircraft and machine-gun fire into the upper stores of BiH-held buildings. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

2981. Heavy arms fire was also reported in the west in the Mojmilo and Dobrinja districts. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./ Mortar shelling reportedly hit on Maršal Tito Street. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

2982. In Belgrade, Tanjug news agency reported that BiH forces had launched "fierce attacks" on Serb positions in several sectors of the city. It added that three persons were injured in BiH shelling of Grbavica. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

2983. Heavy shelling continued late into the evening despite a call by the United Nations to halt the fighting. "We hope that all warring parties in Bosnia will spend their holiday season with their families, rather than engaging in war-like activities", said General Charles Ritchie, UNPROFOR chief of staff. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

(b) Local reported events

2984. A UN spokesman said that pilots would fly food into the city on Christmas Day because besieging Serbs had cut its land links to the outside world. "The situation is that Sarajevo is for all intents and purposes effectively isolated from the outside world by land", said Ray Wilkinson, Sarajevo spokesman for UNHCR. He added that Serb forces were denying UN ground convoys access to the city by the usual route from the south and east, insisting on a more dangerous route near front lines. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

2985. UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said that the cease-fire "doesn't work, at least for Sarajevo". He added that he could not say how the truce (which started early Thursday, just after midnight), was being observed in other parts of BiH. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./

(c) International reported events

2986. Peace talks in Brussels between the three warring factions ended without a settlement, mediator Lord Owen said. Serb, Croat and Moslem leaders agreed to meet again on 15 January, the last date of an agreed Christmas truce. /Source(s): Agence France Presse./
He said that the current fighting in BiH could turn the cease-fire into "just another joke". "Our experience is that cease-fires are not worth the paper they are written on unless there is a political underpinning", he said. Owen added: "If the political will is missing, the parties will go away and fight through January, February, and March, and there is nothing we can do about it". 4006/

24.  24/12/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Fighting reportedly subsided slightly in the city for the first time in a week. 4007/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: A residential area near the French UNPROFOR base. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Three persons were killed and 39 others were wounded in shelling of the city. 4008/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2987. Mortar fire hit a residential area in the city centre, with eight rounds landing near the French UN base. 4009/

2988. Although shelling subsided slightly in the city, UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald Van Biesbroeck said that Bosnian Serb forces were attacking BiH forces to the north of the city. "There is no cease-fire for the moment, that is very clear", he said. "It is quite clear the Serb side is using quite a lot of artillery", he said referring to the fighting near the city. 4010/

2989. BiH radio reported that BiH forces had repelled a Bosnian Serb infantry attack in the Žu• and Vogoš•a areas. 4011/

(b) Local reported events

2990. BiH President Alija Izetbegovi• lashed out at the European Community, complaining that officials had not put enough pressure on Bosnian Serbs in the recent peace talks in Brussels. Izetbegovi•, who returned to Sarajevo today, stated in a television and radio broadcast: "Europe has demonstrated its feebleness by failing to persuade the Serbs on the issues of Sarajevo and the Tuzla airport". "It is either a defect of power or a defect of will" he said. 4012/

2991. Speaking to Reuters television, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadži• threatened to withdraw all Serb offers of territorial concessions to BiH unless they accepted the deal currently on the table. Mom•ilo Krajišnik, head of the Bosnian Serb assembly, said on Thursday that the BiH delegation was demanding too much territory and was refusing to accept a division of Sarajevo along ethnic lines. "It seems war is inevitable and that we will fight for a long time, because we have Moslem leadership that has no possibility, nor means to end the war", Krajišnik told Belgrade state television. 4013/

2992. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé arrived in Sarajevo to spend
Christmas with French peacekeepers. He stated that he was indignant that fighting had resumed in BiH despite the parties' pledge to keep a Christmas truce. "I see with indignation that once again a commitment has not been kept", Juppé said in a statement. Juppé singled out the continued shelling of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs as criminal and barbaric. But he condemned all three factions for continuing to attack in the field while "pretending to discuss" in Brussels and Geneva. "This obstinacy and this contempt for the life of civilians is more than ever revolting", he added. "Those responsible must be pointed out clearly". 4014/

(c) International reported events

2993. In Istanbul, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić urged the United Nations to lift the arms embargo against BiH. "They (members of the UN) should allow us to defend ourselves", the Anatolian news agency quoted Silajdžić as saying when he arrived in Istanbul on a four-day visit. 4015/

25. 25/12/93 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UN monitors reported 689 shells hitting the city, including several that landed near the Koševo Hospital. 4016/ Source(s): Associated Press.

**Targets Hit:** The area near the Koševo hospital; Žu. Source(s): Associated Press; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** The electricity installations at Žu hill were destroyed in the shelling. Source(s): Associated Press; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** One person was reportedly killed and 15 others were wounded, bringing the city's casualty toll since Thursday to 11 dead and 99 wounded. 4017/ Source(s): Associated Press.

**Narrative of Events:**

2994. BiH army officials reported a break in shellfire around midnight Christmas Eve. At dawn, however, more automatic weapons fire and shelling was reported. There was no immediate word on casualties, but a UN forces spokesman confirmed that heavy shelling continued to plague parts of the city for the fifth consecutive day. 4018/

2995. The electricity installations at Žu hill were destroyed in the shelling of the city. According to reports, this reduced the electricity supplied to the city to an average of only 12 megawatts from a previous average of 35 megawatts of electric power. Observers noted that the minimum of electricity was barely enough for the city's water pumps. 4019/

(b) Local reported events

2996. This day marked the second straight Christmas under siege for Sarajevans. Thousands of worshipers packed two Roman Catholic churches in the city. 4020/
2997. A convoy carrying beans, mattresses and 60 tons of diesel fuel arrived in the city. UNHCR spokesman Ray Wilkinson said that the trucks were held up initially by Serb forces who tried to divert the convoy onto an impassable route. 4021/

(c) International reported events

2998. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel condemned the fighting that broke out in BiH despite a cease-fire brokered for the Christmas holiday season. "Obviously, the warring parties do not want peace. That is bitter", he said in a statement issued by the German Foreign Ministry. 4022/

26. 26/12/93 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The Bosnian Serb-held Grbavica area was targeted in the afternoon hours and Serb troops reportedly responded by shelling BiH-held positions. 4023/ Fierce fighting was reported in the city centre late in the day, as BiH forces battled Serbs near the Parliament building. 4024/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: The area near the Holiday Inn; Vrbanja bridge; Grbavica. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sporadic sniping was reported. Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Sporadic shelling and sniping reportedly wounded 18 persons, hospital officials said. 4025/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

2999. Fierce fighting was reported in the city centre late in the day, as BiH forces battled Serbs near the Parliament building. Heavy machine-gun, small arms, mortar and artillery fire were reported near the Holiday Inn. The fighting appeared to be centered on the Vrbanja bridge about 500 metres away. Tracer fire was reported and stray bullets could be heard hitting buildings in the vicinity, a Reuters correspondent reported. According to reports, BiH troops had made some gains against Serb forces near the Parliament building in recent weeks and a BiH offensive to take more land in the area had been rumoured for several days. 4026/

3000. The Bosnian Serb-held Grbavica area was targeted in the afternoon hours and Serb troops reportedly responded by shelling BiH-held positions. 4027/ The targeting of Grbavica increased at about 12:30 p.m.. 4028/

(b) Local reported events

3001. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, quoted by Tanjug, told a news conference that EC countries had prolonged the war by backing BiH demands at peace negotiations. He again threatened to withdraw Serb peace proposals if BiH rejected the latest peace map. "The offer is still on the table in a way and, unless the Muslim side accepts it in the near future and signs peace, there will have to be talks on a different footing, largely based on the actual situation", he said. 4029/
3002. BiH Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankić blamed the Serbs and Croats for breaking the Christmas truce and preventing a peace accord. "I don't have the impression there is a real willingness to carry out the cease-fire", he said on Sarajevo radio. 4030/

3003. A team of UNPROFOR electrical engineers were reported in the Žula hill area, trying to repair the recent damage and restore basic utilities. 4031/

(c) **International reported events**

3004. The Organization of the Islamic Conference made a fresh appeal to the United Nations Security Council to "authorize the use of force against Serbia to force it to lift its siege on Bosnian towns and villages". 4032/

27. 27/12/93 (Monday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Artillery, machine-gun and small-arms fire were reported through the hills surrounding the city. BiH army soldiers accompanying the wounded reported that Serb forces had captured two BiH trenches in the Vogošća battle zone and that BiH troops were counter-attacking. Many of the dead and wounded were soldiers from the fighting in that area. 4033/Artillery attacks were reported beginning at 5:00 a.m. Shelling intensified overnight and on Monday morning, with UNPROFOR reporting 321 rounds hitting the city and 70 fired at Serb positions. 4034/In the 24 hours up to 7:00 a.m., approximately 600 Serb-fired shells hit the city, while BiH forces fired 100 shells, UNPROFOR reported. 4035/Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Targets Hit:** Grbavica; "sniper's alley". Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least seven persons were reported killed and 58 others wounded in the city. 4036/Source(s): Associated Press.

**Narrative of Events:**

3005. UNPROFOR reported violent fighting with heavy shelling, particularly in Grbavica. 4037/

3006. Among the civilians wounded were five workers from Sarajevo's television station who were hit by Serb fire while travelling to work in a van in the area known as "sniper's alley". 4038/It was later reported that one person was killed and three others were wounded in the same incident. 4039/

(b) **Local reported events**

3007. An UNPROFOR spokesman charged that Serb forces had deliberately cut electricity and were obstructing repairs to the power grid. "The Serbs cut the power to Sarajevo and they are hindering the repairs by refusing clearance for engineering teams to do the necessary work", said Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck. He also said that the BiH government had retaliated by cutting the power to Serb and Croat-held areas around the city. According to reports,
on 20 December the Bosnian Serb forces blew up a pylon carrying electricity from Reljevo into the city. In response, the BiH government cut off the utilities for Reljevo. 4040/

3008. UNPROFOR commander, General Francis Briquemont said that recent bombardments on the city’s electrical supply system "had no political or military purpose, but are tragic for human lives". 4041/

28. 28/12/93 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UN officials reported a decrease in the level of fighting around the city. 4042/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that snipers were active in the city. 4043/ Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: The city morgue reported that three persons were killed in the city. 4044/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

3009. UN officials reported a decrease in the level of fighting around the city. 4045/

3010. Russian drivers ferrying diesel fuel into the city faced problems when a tanker in their convoy was hit by small arms fire near a front-line area on the approach to the city. The tanker reportedly made it to the city leaking fuel. 4046/

(b) Local reported events

3011. After months of waiting, hundreds of persons began a bus journey out of the city. Several previous departures had been blocked by fighting or bureaucracy. Eight buses accompanied by a UN escort left Tuesday for Lukavica. After Serb checks, they were to go to Split, Croatia. Some people were then to go to third countries. By the evening, about 400 persons had arrived in Lukavica. About 200 were en route, and 200 others were still waiting for a UN escort. Most of the evacuees were Muslims, who were mainly women, children and elderly people. There were also Croatians and Serbs, including a separate group of Serbs who were going to Serb-held territory. 4047/

29. 29/12/93 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observers reported that 74 artillery rounds hit the city. 4048/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of sniper activity. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: City hospitals reported 12 persons wounded by sniper fire. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

(b) Local reported events

3013. The city spent its fifth day without electricity in freezing temperatures as Bosnian Serb forces refused to allow the UN access to repair downed power lines. Talks between the UN, Bosnian Serbs, and the BiH government on reconnecting the power supply ended in failure during the afternoon. "Talks will continue tomorrow, said UNPROFOR spokesman Major Manuel Cabezas. Earlier in the day, UNPROFOR said that it hoped to get French army engineers to the site of a damaged pylon. 4052/

3014. The Royal Air Force celebrated its 1,000th successful aid flight into the city. 4053/

(c) International reported events

3015. The United Nations commander in BiH said that the UN Security Council and European Community should spend less time passing resolutions on the former Yugoslavia and concentrate instead on sending enough peace-keeping troops. "I don't read the Security Council resolutions any more because they don't help me", Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont of Belgium said in an interview. "There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions and the means available to commanders in the field". Briquemont illustrated his complaint by pointing to Security Council resolution 836, passed in April to establish "safe areas" around BiH enclaves threatened by Bosnian Serb forces. 4054/

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Sporadic shelling was reported in the city. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported that snipers were active in the city. Tanjug reported that one person was killed and another wounded by BiH snipers. 4056/ A 31 year-old French unidentified UNPROFOR soldier, was hit by sniper fire on the road from Sarajevo to Pale. He was driving a tanker truck back to Pale after delivering fuel to Sarajevo in a UNHCR convoy. At approximately 4:30 p.m., a bullet fired by a sniper from a zone controlled by the BiH government pierced the truck's windscreen and passed through the soldier's neck, damaging his spine, an UNPROFOR spokesman said. He was rushed to the French medical unit in Sarajevo where he underwent a seven-hour operation. The treating physicians there said that it was virtually certain
that he would be a paraplegic for life.  

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3016. UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck reported that "tension decreased dramatically" in the city, but that snipers were still active. He stated: "In Sarajevo, it was relatively quiet in the past 24 hours, but the situation is still unstable". He added that heavy machine-gun and small arms fire was reported in the Serb-held suburbs of Grbavica and Vogošća.

3017. The last buses evacuating persons from the city were expected to reach their final destinations today. The progress of the convoys, which finally crossed the front lines around the city on Tuesday after months of delay, was beset by engine and fuel problems, but the first 76 evacuees reached Banja Koviljača in Serbia on Wednesday. Other refugees stayed overnight in the Serb-held town of Ljubinje and local officials said that they were due to cross into Croatia in the morning. The UN said that another 13 persons, most of them injured, were airlifted into Finland. More than 1,000 persons had been evacuated from Sarajevo by bus in the last few days.

3018. Doctors in the city were talking about "Sarajevo Syndrome", a sort of posttraumatic stress syndrome. The term "Sarajevo Syndrome" was first used by Dr. Ismet Cerić, director of the city hospital's neuro-psychiatric clinic. He estimated that 90 per cent of Sarajevans showed physical signs of stress and that some 30 per cent were severely affected.

3019. In Brussels, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes called on the European Community to look at strengthening economic sanctions against Serbia following the breakdown of the Christmas truce in BiH.

3020. In New York, UN officials said that the organization was seriously considering appointing an inspector to investigate abuses among UN peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The move followed allegations that soldiers from the Ukraine, France and other nations were involved in drug smuggling, bootlegging, selling UN supplies, and prostitution.

31. 31/12/93 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: In a brief respite from the worst shelling in two months, people crowded the barren markets for last minute New Year's Eve shopping. Shortly thereafter, shelling of the city began. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The downtown area (Vase Miškina Street). Source(s): Associated Press; United Press International.

Description of Damage: Not specified
**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least five persons were killed and 36 others wounded when shells hit the city centre. 4064/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

3020. Four adults and a 12 year-old child were killed in New Years Eve shelling of the downtown area. The shelling injured another 28 people, Koševs Hospital reported. The shelling took place on Vase Miškina street. "It seems that three shells fell, one after the other", a Koševs Hospital spokeswoman said. The city's French hospital reported another 10 persons wounded by shrapnel in shelling of other parts of the city. 4065/

3021. Gunfire and church bells ushered in the New Year. 4066/

(b) Local reported events

3022. A curfew placed between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., was lifted until 3 January. 4067/

3023. Black market prices in the city were reported as follows: a brand-name bottle of liquor sold for 100 DM, the equivalent of $60; a bottle of wine sold for $24; and a pint of beer for $3; fresh beef, a delicacy, was reported at $18 per pound. The average salary of the few who worked was reported at $1.80 per month. 4068/

V. January 1994

1. 1/1/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR observers said that 93 shells hit the city area overnight. 4069/ UNPROFOR observers reported 140 incoming shells in the city throughout the day and a general increase in sniping activity. 4070/ The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said that BiH forces had attacked Serb forces around the city with artillery and small arms fire. 4071/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The parking lot of UNPROFOR's 4th Battalion headquarters; the cafeteria and press briefing room of UNPROFOR headquarters; the area near UNPROFOR commander Cot's residence; the city centre; an unidentified residential area. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported a general increase in sniper activity. Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** Two people were killed and five others were wounded in the city, an official at the Koševs Hospital said. The dead were a young woman who died after a mortar shell landed on her apartment in the city centre, and a soldier in the BiH army who was fatally wounded while on duty on the city's frontline. 4072/ Ten persons were reported wounded overnight in shelling attacks. 4073/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

3024. Ten persons were injured overnight by intense shelling as Sarajevo ushered in the New Year. The shelling started at around midnight as American soprano Barbara Hendricks began a concert inside the BiH television building where 200 people were invited to attend the performance. Several of the persons attending the concert were escorted afterwards by UN armoured vehicles. 4074/

3025. Three UNPROFOR sites were hit by shelling in the last 24 hours, with one French soldier slightly injured by shrapnel, UNPROFOR spokesman Manuel Cabezas said. He said that the French soldier was injured after a shell fell on the parking lot of the UNPROFOR's 4th Battalion headquarters in the city centre. One shell reportedly damaged the cafeteria and press briefing room of the UNPROFOR headquarters in the city and another two shells fell near the building housed the commander of the UN forces in BiH, General Francis Briquemont. 4075/

3026. A 70 year-old woman was buried in debris after two shells landed in quick succession in a residential neighbourhood. 4076/

(b) Local reported events

3027. In Pale, the Bosnian Serb parliament postponed debate on the latest peace talks until 10 January a few days before the parties were due to reconvene in Geneva. Parliamentary speaker Momčilo Krajišnik, quoted by the Serbian radio Priština, said that there would be no more concessions to BiH. "I hope that . . . an agreement will be reached, but if the fundamentalist and militant forces in the Moslem camps do not allow this, nothing remains for us than to defend our land". 4077/

3028. In his New Year's message to BiH, President Izetbegović said that the country's hardest year was now behind it. "We are stronger now than we were a year ago, and reason is on our side", he said. 4078/

3029. The head of the Bosnian Serb army, Ratko Mladić, pledged in a speech to defend Serb-held territory. "We must be ready to defend what we have gained, but also to be ready, if we have to, to fight until final victory", said Mladić, quoted by the Tanjug news agency. 4079/

3030. The Tanjug news agency reported that former French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing met with BiH President Alija Izetbegović in Sarajevo. 4080/

2. 2/1/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that most of the day's activity concentrated on the front-line areas of Vogošća, Rajlovac and Stup, to the north and west of the city. 4081/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

3031. UNPROFOR reported that most of the day's activity concentrated on the front-line areas of Vogošća, Rajlovac and Stup, to the north and west of the city. 4082/

3032. A Norwegian C-130 Hercules military transport was slightly damaged by small arms fire as it prepared to land in the city. 4083/

3. 3/1/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported the situation in the city as remaining unstable. UNPROFOR observers estimated that Bosnian Serb forces fired 203 shells into the city while BiH forces fired 37. 4084/ Shells killed at least 15 people, including six members of one family in their flat. Source(s): Reuters; Chicago Tribune; The Press Association; New York Times.

Targets Hit: The area near UNPROFOR headquarters; No. 2 Omladinska Street (about 500 yards from the BiH Presidency building; an unidentified school in the western area of the city (Otoka). Source(s): Reuters; The Press Association; New York Times.

Description of Damage: Significant civilian casualties were reported at No. 2 Omladinska Street. Source(s): Reuters; The Press Association; New York Times.

Sniping Activity: Sniping erupted throughout the city in the afternoon. Source(s): The Press Association.

Casualties: The United Nations counted 14 dead on the BiH side (including at least three children), and 22 wounded. One woman was killed in a Serb-held district. 4085/ Another report said that shelling killed at least 15 people in the city, including six members of one family in their flat and a girl as she and other children left school. 4086/ Source(s): Chicago Tribune; The Press Association; Reuters; New York Times.

Narrative of Events:

3033. UNPROFOR said that the situation in the city remained unstable. 4087/

3034. Shelling killed at least 15 people in the city, including six members of one family in their flat and a girl as she and other children left school. By early afternoon, shelling and sniping erupted throughout the city. Fifteen shells hit near the UN headquarters, said UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck. According to reports, the Tatarević family was sitting together in one room in their apartment at No. 2 Omladinska Street, about 500 yards from the BiH Presidency building, when a 122 millimetre howitzer shell hit at about 3:00 p.m.. The only family survivor from the blast was 77 year-old Mensur Dragnić, whose wife (Nadja 68), daughter (Dženana 42), son (Veseljko 49), two grandchildren (Nadi 16 and Asija 10) and son-in-law (Adnan Tatarević 41) were killed. "We were living in two rooms on the safe side of the building, but see what happened", said Dragnić. "There is no escape", he added. 4088/

3035. At least one girl was killed when two shells hit a crowd of children leaving a school in the western area of the city. "There were a lot of children playing", said Alma Begović, who sustained light leg wounds and shock in the shelling of Otoka. 4089/
(b) Local reported events

3036. UNPROFOR in Sarajevo said that the situation of fighting in central BiH was abating, except for in Sarajevo. "We have the impression the last two days have been very quiet, except Sarajevo where there is still tension, and Mostar where it is not quiet", UNPROFOR spokesman Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck said. 4090/

3037. UNPROFOR Commander, General Jean Cot, said from Zagreb that his forces were ready for military intervention if the UN ordered it. "We have prepared for an offensive intervention" in former Yugoslavia as envisaged by UN resolution 836, and "we are ready", he told the French television channel France 2. But he said the plan would not be put into action unless he considered that conditions for such an intervention had been met and that he had the agreement of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York. 4091/

(c) International reported events

3038. Hopes for an easing of tension between BiH and Croatia grew when a spokeswoman for Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granif said that he would meet BiH Prime Minister Silajdžić in Vienna on Tuesday to discuss territorial disputes and humanitarian issues. Sources at the Geneva conference said that European Community and UN mediators Owen and Stoltenberg would also attend the Vienna meeting. They said that talks would focus on how to secure access to the Adriatic Sea for BiH as part of a peace deal. The talks were also expected to cover the cease-fire agreement which was supposed to last throughout the Christmas season but had been violated repeatedly by all sides. 4092/

3039. British Prime Minister John Major told BBC radio that Britain's more than 2,000 troops would not remain indefinitely in BiH and warned that they would be withdrawn if their safety was jeopardized. "They will be there for a while but we cannot guarantee they will stay there indefinitely, any more than can any of the other countries with large troop emplacements there", he said. 4093/

3040. The body of a former BiH general was found in a car park along the main highway between Liege in eastern Belgium and the German border town of Aachen. Sources said that two Romanian hitchhikers found the corpse of Jusuf Prazina at Walhorn overnight Friday. Prazina, 30, who had been fighting in Sarajevo, and later Mostar, settled in Liege last August. He once headed BiH troops on Mount Igman and was praised for his defence of the city in 1992. However, he later fell out with the BiH high command, was termed a traitor and fled in the spring of 1993 when he joined HVO Bosnian Croat forces. He had reportedly been missing since late last month. 4094/

4. 4/1/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity


Targets Hit: A police station about 22 metres from the Holiday Inn; the city centre; the area near Presidency building; the Old Town area; the area near Skenderija. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.
Description of Damage: The roof of a police station near the Holiday Inn was destroyed by a shell. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: BiH radio said that eight people had been killed and 39 others wounded in shelling in a 24 hour period in the city and in nearby Visoko. 4096/ Nine people were reportedly killed and at least 48 others were wounded in the city on this day. 4097/ The BiH Republic Institute for Public Health reported that by the end of T393, a total of 9,662 persons had been killed and some 56,000 persons had been wounded in the city. 4098/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

3041. During the day's shelling, an explosion destroyed the roof of a police station in the city centre. "A huge fireball hit the roof of the building . . . It literally blew the roof off and the street was blocked with twisted metal", said Reuter correspondent Kurt Schork who witnessed the explosion from the Holiday Inn Hotel 200 metres away. 4099/ The shelling reportedly took place just hours before Croatian and BiH ministers met in Vienna. 4100/

3042. Six persons were reportedly killed in the city centre and approximately six shells were said to have landed close to the Presidency building. Another two persons were killed later in the downtown area. 4101/

3043. Shelling was reported heavy in the Old Town area. 4102/ At least six shells hit a building located between Maršal Tito Street and the Skenderija neighbourhood. The shells fell a few hundred metres from Skenderija and the the BiH Presidency building. 4103/

3044. The city's electricity went off shortly before noon and local sources said the principal power line into the city had been destroyed by fighting around Žuč. 4104/

(b) Local reported events

3045. The United States was about to double the number of relief flights into the city, UNHCR said. "Within the next few days the number of aircraft will be increased [from eight] to 17. These will be mainly American, although the French and Germans are considering raising their contributions", UNHCR's Ray Wilkinson said. Of the eight aircraft already delivering aid to the city, six were reportedly American C-130s. France and Germany had contributed one aircraft each. 4105/

(c) International reported events

3046. BiH and Croatian leaders held talks in Vienna. 4106/

3047. The Belgian defence ministry said that the commander of UNPROFOR forces in BiH, General Francis Briquemont, might leave his post early and return to Belgium. Briquemont, an outspoken critic of political efforts to end the fighting, 4107/ had been due to leave in July, but a ministry spokesman said that he had asked in December to return early. 4108/
5. 5/1/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: According to UNPROFOR, at least 249 shells hit the city overnight. UNPROFOR observers counted 1,353 shells on BiH-controlled areas of the city. Observers counted 56 shellings on the Serbian side. Heavy fighting was reported near the Jewish cemetery to the south of the city centre. Heavy front-line fighting was reported around Vogošća and Žuć. Intense fighting with both heavy and light weapons broke out in the Grbavica district at approximately 8:40 p.m.. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; Chicago Tribune.

Targets Hit: Buča Potok district; Žuć area; airport area; the Holiday Inn Hotel; the Sarajevo television building; the area near the Post and Telecommunications Engineering building. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR; United Press International; The Press Association.

Description of Damage: A large hole was blown in the roof of one of the Holiday Inn's dining rooms. Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR; United Press International; The Press Association.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Hospitals and the city morgue reported late in the afternoon that three people had been killed and 28 others wounded during the day. Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

3048. Five people were wounded in the morning as Bosnian Serb forces shelled the heavily populated district of Buča Potok in the north-west and the Žuć area in the north. The shelling started in the morning and smoke was rising from Buča Potok at noon.

3049. Heavy fighting was reported near the Jewish cemetery to the south of the city centre. Mortar explosions, heavy artillery shells and tracer fire was reported on the front line. Shelling also closed the airport.

3050. UNPROFOR spokesman Major Manuel Cabezas said that the airport facility was closed after 3:00 p.m., after it was hit during a period of heavy shelling.

3051. The Holiday Inn Hotel was hit by what was estimated to be a 144 millimetre shell, but no one was hurt. A large hole was blown in the roof of one of the hotel's dining rooms while scorched debris and broken glass were blasted in all directions.

3052. UNPROFOR also reported that the Sarajevo television station was hit and that shells fell around the Post and Telecommunications Engineering building, where UNPROFOR had one of its main bases.

3053. BiH radio reported heavy front-line fighting around Vogošća and Žuć.

3054. Intense fighting with both heavy and light weapons broke out in the Grbavica district at around 8:40 p.m.
(b) Local reported events

3055. British Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose was appointed to replace Belgian Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont as the new commander of UNPROFOR forces in BiH. Briquemont cited exhaustion as the reason he asked to be relieved of his post at the end of the month. 4120

3056. The city was without water. UNPROFOR said that it would take days to repair transmission lines downed in the fighting. 4121/ UNPROFOR also said that the main power supply line (30 megawatts) between Reljevo and Buća Potok, damaged in shelling before Christmas, could not be repaired before mid-January while several days would be needed to obtain authorization to repair the 18 megawatt line between Vogošća and Velesici. The power supply to the city was hit further by a technical halt ordered late on Tuesday at the Kakanj plant 50 kilometres to the north-west. 4122/

(c) International reported events

3057. BiH and Croatian leaders held a second day of talks in Vienna. 4123/ Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić and BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić announced that a plan to halt hostilities between their two sides would be put to a meeting in Bonn on Saturday between BiH President Izetbegović and Croatian President Tudjman. "Both sides have confirmed that they will, within the framework of the preparations for the summit meeting, make firm efforts to prepare a complete plan of the cease-fire implementation along all the frontlines", a statement said. The joint statement issued by BiH and Croatia in Vienna said that both sides pledged to "cease all military activities and establish conditions for the durable cessation of hostilities" in central BiH. 4124/

3058. Negotiator Lord Owen, stated that cease-fires alone would not solve the problems in the former Yugoslavia. Negotiator Stoltenberg, added that there had already been 69 cease-fires and still no sign of an end to the war. Owen said that the BiH warring generals had not taken "a blind bit of notice" of their Christmas cease-fire. On a positive note, he added: "What is important is that they're starting to grapple with the real issues underlying the problem". 4125/

6. 6/1/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR monitors counted 732 shells landing in the city during the morning, most of them in the Jewish cemetery area of the Grбавica district. 4126/ Reporters who witnessed the combat from the Holiday Inn Hotel said that it was the heaviest fighting in weeks so close to the city centre. 4127/ Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The area of the old Jewish cemetery; the Grбавica district; the airport; the Holiday Inn; the Central Bank; the area near the Presidency building. Source(s): Reuters; Associated Press; Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Eight persons were killed and 61 others were wounded, including five French UNPROFOR troops. 4128/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

3059. Shelling was reported across Sarajevo at 6:00 a.m., a day after the city experienced one of its worst bombardments in months. Much of the shelling landed around the old Jewish cemetery, which marked one line of confrontation in the city. (The hillside cemetery was important in that it was located close to a major road leading to the city centre) "Sometimes artillery firing couldn't be counted because of the intensity of the shelling", said Major Idesbald van Biesenbroeck, UNPROFOR spokesman. 4129/

3060. The airport also came under fire, forcing its closure again. 4130/ Before the closure, two relief flights had landed. An UNPROFOR spokesman said that two French soldiers were wounded in separate incidents at the airport. The first was hit in the right forearm by mortar fragments and the second, more seriously, in the right leg. 4131/

3061. Reporters who witnessed the combat from the Holiday Inn Hotel said that it was the heaviest fighting in weeks so close to the city centre. The Hotel was once again hit by shellfire. 4132/

3062. As dusk fell, a series of shells fell into the main street, hitting the Central Bank building and a number of apartment blocks. UNPROFOR soldiers retrieved the body of a man who was killed on the spot when a shell landed in the streets outside the Presidency building. 4133/

(b) Local reported events

3063. BiH President Izetbegović demanded that the UN Security Council stop the shelling of Sarajevo. "We are demanding the Security Council that it take efficient measures and stop the tragedy of Sarajevo and its citizens", BiH radio quoted him as saying in a letter to the Council. "This is the 10th day that Sarajevo is being shelled by the Serb aggressor and its residents are being killed daily by the scores before the world", Izetbegović said. 4134/

3064. A group of about 50 mourners buried the family of six who were killed on Monday. The funeral took place at the Lion cemetery. 4135/

3065. UNHCR Sarajevo spokesman, Ray Wilkinson, said that aid convoys in Serb areas of BiH would be suspended on safety grounds over the next three days, the Serbian Orthodox Christmas period. This decision was based on a concern that a means of celebrating Christmas would include the firing of shells and ammunition into the air. 4136/

3066. BiH soldiers were reportedly wearing red ribbons to distinguish themselves from the Bosnian Serbs in close-quarter combat. 4137/

7. 7/1/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR observers counted more than 900 Bosnian Serb-fired shells earlier in the day. The BiH army reportedly fired 6 shells against Serb positions. 4138/ Intense fighting between BiH and Bosnian Serb forces in Grbavica eased during the day, with BiH forces saying that the front line several hundred metres from the city centre, had remained unchanged. 4139/ However, the fighting was reported to be at a lower intensity level than on the previous day. 4140/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Targets Hit: The car park of the French UNPROFOR base in Skenderija. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Description of Damage: UN vehicles were damaged in the shelling of the French UNPROFOR base in Skenderija. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of BiH sniping. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Seven people were killed and 25 others were wounded, including a French UNPROFOR soldier, according to UN and hospital sources. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

3067. One French UN soldier was wounded when a mortar shell landed in the car park of the French UNPROFOR base in Skenderija in the city centre, destroying one truck and damaging an armoured personnel carrier. The soldier sustained burst eardrums when shells fell near him.

3068. Intense fighting between BiH and Bosnian Serb forces in Grbavica eased during the day, with BiH forces saying that the front line several hundred metres from the city centre, had remained unchanged. However, the fighting was reported to be at a lower intensity level than on the previous day.

(b) Local reported events

3069. UNPROFOR said that BiH government troops had launched several attacks on Serb positions around the city over the past few days, drawing a heavy Serb artillery response. "There are certainly no major changes in the front lines", UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman added.

(c) International reported events

3070. In Bonn, Germany, BiH Prime Minister Silajdžić demanded the resignation of Europe’s mediator, accusing Lord David Owen of trying to force BiH to accept an unjust peace.

3071. The bombardment of the city prompted the UN Security Council late in the day to make the following statement: "The Security Council condemns any hostilities in the United Nations-designated safe areas, especially in the Sarajevo area. In particular it strongly condemns the continuing military pressure on and the relentless bombardment by Bosnian Serb forces of the capital city, Sarajevo", it added.

3072. US and British diplomats told Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to stop Bosnian Serbs from their continuous shelling of Sarajevo and concentrate on negotiations. Britain's UN ambassador, Sir David Hannay, said that British and American representatives in Belgrade "went and saw the President of Serbia and underlined the serious view which we took of the shelling of Sarajevo and the urgent need to stop it and to get back to the negotiating table and get a settlement". He said that no threats were made and that air strikes were not mentioned, adding: "It was a question of bringing to him the seriousness of the situation. The main purpose of the demarche was to bring home to him that this continuing bombardment of Sarajevo was totally counter-productive and that we should get back to the negotiating table and get a settlement", he said. "The positions are now much closer together and it is a tragedy really
that while this very slow process of moving the parties along is going on, lives were being lost", he added. Hannay spoke to reporters as the Security Council was meeting in an informal session regarding the shelling of Sarajevo. 4150/

3073. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that air strikes in BiH were still a possibility that would be discussed next week at a NATO summit that President Clinton was to attend. But he made it clear that Americans did not want the Brussels' summit to be dominated by a debate over the policy towards the former Yugoslavia. He said it would focus instead on the fate of eastern European countries wishing to join NATO. Addressing the issue of NATO airstrikes, Christopher said that this "remains a valid resolution with respect to air support" and that Sarajevo's status "is under constant review by the United States and NATO". 4151/

3074. Following a meeting between mediators and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé in Paris, a foreign ministry spokesman said that UN troop deployment in BiH would have to be reviewed if a peaceful solution was not forthcoming. 4152/

3075. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, who met in Paris with French President Mitterrand said that his government would decide whether to withdraw its 1,500 peacekeepers from BiH in March or April. 4153/

8. 8/1/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Observers reported that the city was hit by a total of 170 shells during the day. 4154/ Numerous districts of the city had reportedly been shelled throughout the day. By hitting various city districts, the shelling appeared less intense than in recent days, but observers noted that the death toll was the highest since Monday. 4155/ UNPROFOR reported small arms and heavy machine-gun fire all along the confrontation line. 4156/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** The airport area; an unidentified water line; the city centre; the area near the UNPROFOR commander's residence. Source(s): New York Times; Chicago Tribune; Reuters; Agence France Presse.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that the level of sniping in the city remained high. 4157/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Hospitals and the morgue reported 12 people killed and 42 others wounded. 4158/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

3076. Fighting reportedly died down in the morning. 4159/

3077. Hours after unilaterally declaring a cease-fire, Bosnian Serb forces resumed their shelling of the airport, preventing BiH President Izetbegović from attending peace talks in Germany. In announcing the cease-fire, the Bosnian Serbs did not say when it would take effect or how long it would last. They also called upon BiH government forces to end their attacks on the Grbavica area. 4160/
3078. Just before noon, shrapnel from an exploding shell wounded at least seven persons waiting in an unidentified water line. 4161/

3079. Two people were killed and 10 were injured when two shells hit the city. One of the shells landed close to the city centre residence of UNPROFOR Commander Briquemont. 4162/

3080. Shelling was reported late in the day in the city centre. Numerous districts of the city had reportedly been shelled throughout the day. By hitting various city districts, the shelling appeared less intense than in recent days, but observers noted that the death toll was the highest since Monday. 4163/

3081. UNPROFOR reported small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire all along the confrontation line. 4164/

(b) Local reported events

3082. Defending the recent BiH army tactic of initiating offensives in Sarajevo, an unidentified BiH official told the New York Times: "The world has shown us that only raw force matters here. The world has shown us for two years that arguments mean nothing". The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that it was absurd to suppose that the BiH government was trying to garner sympathy in world public opinion by provoking the Serbs to shell Sarajevo. "It is not our strategy to sacrifice our own civilians", he said. "We called our people to stay off the streets". "If Mladić only attacked Sarajevo whenever we attacked Grbavica, that would be an argument", the official said. "Mladić attacks this city whenever he's in the mood. The United Nations too rarely criticizes that". "The situation is such that we must take some targets. The war cannot be resolved militarily, but this military activity is necessary to strengthen our negotiating process", he added. 4165/

3083. Local officials reportedly refused to permit reservoirs developed by the New York-based International Rescue Commission (IRC) to flow into the municipal water system, as they were worried about the water's safety. Three of five planned reservoirs had been completed and one of them was full with more than 220,000 gallons of water, enough to supply one quarter of the city's minimum needs. The IRC system was designed to pump water from the Miljacka river into a chemical treatment and purification system and then store the clean water in steel reservoirs for release into the municipal system. 4166/

3084. Several hundred Bosnian Serb residents gathered to celebrate Christmas Mass in the morning at an Orthodox church in the old part of the city. 4167/

(c) International reported events

3085. The latest round of peace talks had to be pushed back a day until Sunday, because BiH President Izetbegović was unable to fly out of the city due to the airport's closure. 4168/

3086. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reportedly turned down a request by UNPROFOR commander, General Jean Cot, that he be given the power to order punitive air strikes. 4169/ The commander denied making any such request. 4170/
9. 9/1/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** In its daily report, UNPROFOR described shelling at a "relatively low level". Sixty per cent of the rounds were reportedly directed at the confrontation line, the rest impacted in populated areas. The situation in the Mt. Igman area was described as getting tense. The Bosnian Serb army was reportedly moving supplies to support their efforts in the western part of the city. 4171/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Airport runway; the Catholic cemetery; the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Associated Press; United Press International.

**Description of Damage:** Shelling of the airport runway shut down the airport in the morning. Source(s): Associated Press; United Press International.

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Four persons were wounded in the shelling of the Catholic cemetery. Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

3087. Shelling of the runway shut down the airport in the morning, but repair work completed at about noon later allowed the first air flight in five days to land. The runway shelling forced a UN aeroplane carrying Japan's Yasushi Akashi, civilian head of UN peace-keeping in the former Yugoslavia, to turn back to Zagreb. 4172/

3088. UNPROFOR blamed the day's airport shelling on Bosnian Serb forces. According to UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman: "The results of the crater analysis have just been completed. Two mortar rounds were fired from Serb-controlled areas this morning onto the airport runway". 4173/

3089. Four persons were wounded in the morning when a shell hit the city's Catholic cemetery. 4174/

3090. Several shells reportedly hit near the Holiday Inn. 4175/

(b) Local reported events

3091. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that his side was unwilling to concede any more territory and warned that if BiH wanted to carry on fighting they could expect a massive response. "We've fulfilled everything that was expected of us and there can be no question at all of any more territorial concessions by the Serbs", Karadžić was quoted as saying by the Bosnian Serb news agency. If BiH continued fighting, "we will activate wartime production, mobilize wartime production, mobilize the entire population", he said. 4176/

3092. UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi arrived in the city after a delay of several hours caused by the temporary closure of the airport. He reached the city overland from Kiseljak. After a meeting with members of the BiH presidency, Akashi said that the men "agreed on the utmost urgency of restoring peace and ensuring freedom of movement for humanitarian convoys because people are suffering". 4177/
(c) International reported events

3093. In Bonn, BiH President Izetbegović and Croatian President Tudjman were greeted by German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. Izetbegović told reporters that he was pessimistic about the outcome of the Bonn talks. "To be sincere, to be frank, I do not expect any big progress, any big breakthrough. From my experience before, from my experience with Croatians, I am not encouraged". 4178/

3094. A BiH-Croatian agreement was seen as crucial to making progress towards an overall peace settlement of the conflict at Geneva negotiations later in the month, at which Bosnian Serbs would also be present. 4179/

3095. US Vice President Al Gore, Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili all amplified warnings during the day, saying that air strikes could be ordered at any time by NATO ministers in Brussels this week. 4180/

10. 10/1/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as relatively calm with a noticeable lull as far as shelling was concerned. UNPROFOR observed that this temporary change could be attributed to Mr. Akashi's visit and the presence of television journalists. 4181/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The city centre; an unidentified area near the city centre; the PTT building. Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR described a high level of sniping activity. 4182/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Twelve persons were wounded in shelling of the city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3096. Shells hit the city centre, wounding 12 people. A wire-guided missile reportedly fired from the direction of a Bosnian Serb position hit a residential area near the city centre. 4183/

3097. A stray shell reportedly hit the PTT building. No damage or casualties were reported. 4184/

(b) Local reported events

3098. UN special envoy Akashi said that UNPROFOR in BiH had been refining a system by which it could call in punitive air attacks when its troops were attacked. Akashi said that the so-called "close-air support" system would still depend, for first use, on the go-ahead of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He added: "We have had some exercises . . . and we are experimenting as to how to shorten the time required". "We are still refining the concept, but actual use of close air support has never been recommended". 4185/
3099. After meeting with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in Pale, special envoy Akashi stated: "I have been assured by Dr. Karadžić that so far as his side is concerned there will be full respect for the use for our purposes of Sarajevo airport". 4186/

3100. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić warned that any NATO air strikes against his people would force them to reconsider all concessions to BiH. "If NATO adopts a new resolution aimed against the Serbs it would most certainly not contribute to the peace process, but instead would cause new difficulties in the search for a peace agreement", Karadžić told the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA. 4187/

(c) International reported events

3101. NATO leaders said that they were ready to order air strikes in BiH under UN authority to prevent the siege of Sarajevo or to protect other areas, according to a draft of an alliance summit statement. A copy of the statement, which NATO sources said had been agreed to by all 16 leaders and was to be issued Tuesday stated: "We affirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council ... to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in BiH". 4188/

3102. In Bonn, BiH President Izetbegović and Croatian President Tudjman met face-to-face in the morning for nearly three hours before being joined by mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. After a break for lunch and consultations, the four resumed talks. "The talks will go on through the afternoon and probably into the evening", a UN source said. 4189/

3103. After two days of talks, the Bonn meetings ended. Croatian diplomats said that a cease-fire agreement had been reached, but BiH officials denied it. President Izetbegović told German television that the talks had yielded "no great results" but had improved the atmosphere between the two sides. 4190/

11. 11/1/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman, said that BiH forces fired 200 shells, an unusually high number, at the Serbs. Bosnian Serbs were observed to have fired 600 shells in return. "Inevitably gun positions are near civilian locations", he said. 4191/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The television centre; the area near the ICRC headquarters; an airport runway; the PTT building. Source(s): New York Times; United Press International; TASS; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A young girl was killed by sniper fire in Dobrinja, a spokesman for the Koševro hospital said. 4192/ UNPROFOR reported that the level of sniper activity was still high. 4193/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Nine people were killed and at least 50 others were wounded. 4194/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

3104. The UN commander in BiH, General Francis Briquemont, issued a statement saying that BiH forces opened fire on Serb forces with mortars from the city centre early in the morning. 4195/ Reporters in the city said that while both sides traded fire, much of the day's shelling appeared to be coming from BiH-held positions. 4196/

3105. A woman was reportedly killed and two others wounded near the television centre where an estimated six shells hit. 4197/ A single mortar shell landed near the entrance of the International Committee of the Red Cross headquarters at 9:15 a.m., killing a woman who had gone there to drop off a letter and wounding two local Red Cross employees. 4198/ The woman was identified as 66 year-old Ljeposava Pajić, a Bosnian Serb retired cafeteria worker. Ironically, the letter, which was found in her pocket, contained the following message to her granddaughter on the Serbian side of the siege line: "Thank God that you are all alive and well, and that we're all alive and well", she wrote, asking her granddaughter to send boxes of powdered milk and a picture of her grandson's wedding in a package through the Serbian Orthodox Church's aid organization. "It would make grandma happier than anything else to see you at least in a picture". 4199/

3106. The humanitarian airlift was halted only hours after being resumed, according to UNHCR spokesman Ron Redmond. Redmond said that a shell exploded on a runway at 1:00 p.m., prompting the airport's closure. A dozen relief flights managed to deliver an estimated 120 tons of food in the morning during a lull in the fighting. 4200/ "We are very concerned. Planting a shell in the middle of the runway looks very deliberate", Redmond said. 4201/ UN officials said that a 128 millimetre rocket hit the tarmac. They said that only the Serbs, who received most of their arms from the Yugoslav Army, had 128 millimetre rockets. UNPROFOR monitors, however, said that the rocket appeared to come from a BiH army position. "The French at the airport cleaned up the debris, so a proper crater analysis couldn't be made", an unidentified UN official said in the evening. United Nations crater analyses had established that Serb forces had shelled the airport five days in a row last week, keeping it closed. 4202/

3107. UNPROFOR reported that the PTT building was hit by a number of small arms rounds. Observers believed that these projectiles originated from BiH weapons. 4203/

(b) Local reported events

3108. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić blamed BiH forces for the day's airport shelling and said that this was done to pin the blame on the Serbs. "All this is pressure directed on us. All that we can do is live and act like there was no pressure", he said.

3109. Bosnian Serbs dismissed the NATO warning to break the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened areas, saying that this was "unworkable" and describing the issue as a "storm in a tea cup". "We have been threatened for two years and these threats are unworkable" mainly because of the close proximity of Muslim and Serb front lines around the besieged cities, General Manojlo Milovanović, chief of staff of the Bosnian Serb forces said. 4204/

(c) International reported events

3110. NATO leaders wound up their summit meeting in Brussels. Addressing the
BiH issue, NATO warned Serb forces that it was ready to launch air strikes if shelling did not stop. The leaders reaffirmed an August decision to "prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo" by using air strikes, denounced cease-fire violations and said that the present "situation cannot be tolerated". They also extended the air-strike threat beyond the one contained in the August communique, vowing to deliver humanitarian relief by opening the air strip at Tuzla and to break a siege at Srebrenica so that UN soldiers from Canada, who were trapped there, could be replaced by Dutch troops. There were no signs, however, that air strikes were imminent, but British Prime Minister John Major was reportedly meeting with NATO military commanders to work out the rules of engagement. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said that he saw "stronger determination", but was not sure if all members of the alliance were resolved to act. He said: "My interpretation is there is a clear determination not to continue the situation as it stands. (But) more I cannot say at this time". 4205/

12. 12/1/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Shelling and sniper fire continued in the city killing at least six people and wounding 36 others. Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire reportedly continued in the city. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: The UN reported that six people were killed and 36 others wounded in the city. 4206/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

3111. At least five people were killed and 16 others wounded as shelling sniper fire continued in the city. 4207/ This number included two BiH soldiers. Fourteen of the wounded were taken to the Koševo hospital and two others to the BiH state hospital. 4208/

(b) Local reported events

3112. The humanitarian airlift into the city resumed. 4209/

3113. UNHCR reported that fierce fighting between BiH and Croat troops in central BiH had blocked humanitarian aid routes from the Adriatic coast to Sarajevo and Tuzla. 4210/

3114. The International Committee of the Red Cross condemned random firing on the civilian population in the city after a woman was killed outside its headquarters on Tuesday. "We request all parties to put an end to all actions which are contrary to international humanitarian law, notably the indiscriminate shelling and sniper shootings against civilians", it said. 4211/
(c) **International reported events**

3115. In Geneva, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali ordered a feasibility study of the more immediate NATO threat to launch air strikes. UN officials said that the Secretary-General had asked Yasushi Akashi to assess the risks of Western military action for review at a high-level meeting of UN officials in Geneva on Monday. 4212/

13. 13/1/94 (Thursday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UN observers reported 350 shell impacts on BiH areas of the city and 10 impacts on Serb positions over the past 24 hours. 4213/ UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as tense. UNPROFOR also noted that it had been reported that BiH artillery positions were located next to the UN compounds in order to prevent Bosnian Serb battery fire. 4214/ Source(s): Reuters; UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Vogošća; Dobrinja; the State Hospital. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that sniper activity was high between the PTT building and the airport. 4215/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Four people were killed and 13 others were wounded in the city. 4216/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

3116. Sarajevo radio reported that the northern suburb of Vogošća and the Dobrinja district were shelled during the morning. 4217/

3117. A unidentified factory complex on the confrontation line burned fiercely, sending a large cloud of smoke over the city. 4218/

3118. The State Hospital was hit by at least two shells. One shell hit the hospital's roof, next to its generator. One person was killed and another was wounded in the shelling. 4219/

(b) **Local reported events**

3119. The UN accused Bosnian Serbs of preventing repairs to a key electricity pylon, contributing to a power shortage in the city. "It's straight out-and-out bureaucratic harrassment by the Serbs", said UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. 4220/

14. 14/1/94 (Friday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** Bosnian Serb forces reportedly launched a bombardment on the Orthodox New Year, firing about 150 shells at about midnight. 4221/ UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired about 300 artillery and mortar rounds while BiH forces fired 11 rounds. 4222/ Source(s): Reuters.
**Targets Hit:** The Holiday Inn. Source(s): Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Four people were killed early in the day in shelling. Hospital officials said that two more persons were killed and 23 others were wounded during the rest of the day. 4223/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

3120. Four people were killed in the city early in the day as Bosnian Serbs launched a bombardment on the Orthodox New Year. The United Nations said that Serbs fired about 150 artillery and mortar rounds on the city at about midnight. Hospital officials said that two more persons were killed and 23 others were wounded during the rest of day. 4224/

3121. One shell struck the Holiday Inn Hotel just after midnight, but there were no casualties reported. 4225/

3122. The bombardment, which subsided in the early morning hours, picked up again at 9:00 a.m., BiH radio said. 4226/

(b) **Local reported events**

3123. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić threatened to boycott peace talks in Geneva next week unless the shelling of the city stopped. Sarajevo radio said: "Speaking about the future of the Geneva talks, Silajdžić stressed that if the aggressor continues to destroy Sarajevo and other towns and to kill civilians during the Geneva talks, the talks will not be held". 4227/

15. 15/1/94 (Saturday)

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** The city was reported as quiet in the morning, enshrouded in a heavy fog. Isolated artillery rounds were reported thereafter. Source(s): Reuters.

**Targets Hit:** The confrontation line. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** UNPROFOR reported sniping activity at a high level. 4228/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Casualties:** Sarajevo radio said that four people were injured by the isolated artillery rounds which fell on the city. 4229/ Source(s): Reuters.

**Narrative of Events:**

3124. The city was reported as quiet in the morning, enshrouded in a heavy fog. 4230/

3125. UNPROFOR reported that most of the shell impacts were on the confrontation line. 4231/
3126. After a day of negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić held out little hope for next week's round of peace talks in Geneva. "I can't say that things are going to be better in Geneva", he said after meeting Momčilo Krajišnik, president of the Bosnian Serb parliament. "We have been offered an unequal peace", he said.  

16. 16/1/94 (Sunday)  

(a) **Military activity**  

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR described the city as relatively quiet. However, monitors counted 200 shells fired into the city by Serb forces and 38 shells fired by BiH forces.  

**Source(s):** Reuters.  

**Targets Hit:** Not specified  

**Description of Damage:** Not specified  

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified  

**Casualties:** UNPROFOR reported that two persons were killed and 30 others were wounded by artillery and sniper fire.  

**Source(s):** Reuters.  

**Narrative of Events:**  

3127. UNPROFOR described the city as relatively quiet. However, monitors counted 200 shells fired into the city by Serb forces and 38 shells fired by BiH forces.  

(b) **Local reported events**  

3128. The leaders of the warring factions cast doubt over the prospects of a settlement at Tuesday's peace talks in Geneva. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić stated: "There is new pressure on our government not to give away what is ours". He added, "[I]f the international community tries to divide according to power and force, it will not stand. Even if we sign an agreement, the dispossessed will not obey it".  

3129. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić stated: "Sarajevo used to be completely a Serb city. We will never leave and it will be the capital of our new state". He added, "They (Serb military) are advocating us to prepare for a long war and I think they are right".  

3130. BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić dropped his threatened boycott of the negotiations. Silajdžić left Sarajevo for the talks with President Izetbegović, Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankić and army chief Rasim Delić. When asked about what he would demand at the peace talks, he replied: "Return of the refugees, stopping the aggression".  

17. 17/1/94 (Monday)  

(a) **Military activity**  

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UN observers reported that the BiH army may have made a small advance in the city.  

**Source(s):** UN observers said that at least 380
shells hit the city before 6:00 p.m. local time. 4240/ Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Five people were killed, including one child, and at least 20 others were wounded in the city. 4241/ According to the daily Oslobodjenje, seven people were killed and another 20 persons were wounded in the city. 4242/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

3131. UN observers reported that the BiH army may have made a small advance in the city. Canadian Major Ray Thomas, chief of the 60 UN military observers (UNMOS) in the Sarajevo area said that the BiH infantry may have gained turf up a slope above the central Parliament building and the Miljacka river. The residential area, including the Jewish cemetery and abutting the Serb-held Grbavica district on the west, was too embattled for UNMOS to approach, rendering precise reconnaissance impossible. "We think there have been some adjustments to the confrontation line [in favour of the BiH army]", Thomas said at a news briefing. "The Bosnians have warned us that we should be careful travelling the Pale road. This would indicate that they feel they can bring fire to bear on the Pale road. They didn't give us this warning [before]", he said. 4243/

(b) Local reported events

3132. The Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency, citing an official communiqué issued by Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, said that he issued a "severe warning" forbidding any attacks by Serb troops on the Sarajevo airport, on UNPROFOR troops, on the International Committee of the Red Cross and on any other humanitarian organizations. 4244/

3133. British squadron leader John McEvoy, deputy in charge of the 60 UNMOS in the Sarajevo area, observed that the BiH army forces in the city had become more efficient in recent days. He said that the BiH army was originally a disorganized unit which included hired guns and a criminal element. However, "[E]ver since the reorganization and moving of certain commanders last summer, you can definitely say the Bosnian army comes across as more professional", he said. "They have introduced a rank system. They have appointed officers with JNA training in command positions, and the criminal element that was in charge during the summer has been put firmly to the rear". 4245/

3134. McEvoy stated that the UN had no proof that sides in the conflict were bombarding their own areas as a way to gain international sympathy but could not rule out such a possibility. The British officer complained about the state of UN staffing in BiH, saying that he needed 15 times as many observers in Sarajevo and that the monitors were not equipped to count precisely the number of outgoing shells. The mobility of BiH government artillery pieces, mostly small mortars, also made monitoring more difficult. Observing Serb positions was easier because the UN had checkpoints closer to their batteries, McEvoy said. 4246/

3135. Outgoing UN commander Briquemont was critical of the prospect of air strikes in BiH. "People who don't know the situation in Bosnia should be more
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circumspect . . . .", Briquemont said in an interview to be published in the German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel. 4247/

(c) International reported events

3136. Eight Islamic states, meeting in Geneva, renewed calls for a UN arms embargo to be lifted and for air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. After meeting the BiH government delegation they issued a vague threat of economic action against Western states deemed to be blocking the peace process. 4248/

18. 18/1/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR described the level of shelling as one of the lowest for a long time. The most affected areas were the residential part of the city and the confrontation line. 4249/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Unidentified residential parts of the city; the confrontation line. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Reduced sniper fire was reported. Source(s): United Press International.

**Casualties:** Sarajevo had its first death-free day since the beginning of the year, hospitals reported at 7:00 p.m.. However, five people were wounded by shell fire. Observers noted that earlier peace talks had generally been accompanied by an upsurge in fighting. 4250/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Narrative of Events:**

3137. The city reportedly enjoyed a quiet day as snowy weather reduced sniper fire and shelling. 4251/

3138. A German aid aeroplane turned back from the city after it was struck by two bullets while approaching the city. The German aeroplane, a C-160 transport, was hit approximately two miles from the airport. Upon returning to its base in Italy, the crew found bullet holes in the right wing and the radar dome under the cockpit. No one was injured. The airlift continued despite the shooting, according to an UNPROFOR spokesman. 4252/

(b) Local reported events

3139. According to UN officials, since June 1992, 7,272 flights had brought in 81,948 tons of aid into Sarajevo via the humanitarian airlift. 4253/

(c) International reported events

3140. In Geneva, international mediators held out little hope for agreement at the latest round of peace talks between the warring factions. Lord Owen said that military offensives made the prospects for agreement "not very high". Thorvald Stoltenberg said that the atmosphere "has never been less conducive" to ending the war. Owen said that he did not know if renewed Western threats of airstrikes against the Serbs had much effect on the three sides. "I think
that there is a fairly hardened cynical bunch of politicians out there who make their own assessment about the likelihood of this". "I don't think this is the fundamental thing. I think the fundamental thing is that there is a lot of fighting to be done, on the face of it", Owen said. 4254/

3141. Mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg held separate talks with leaders of the Serb, BiH and Croatian sides. 4255/

3142. In Geneva, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali ordered his special envoy in the former Yugoslavia to draw up plans for possible military action, including air strikes against Serb forces, UN sources said. 4256/

19. 19/1/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 230 artillery rounds, killing three persons and wounding six. BiH forces reportedly fired four rounds, wounding six persons. 4257/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported three people killed and 20 others wounded in the city. 4258/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3143. The humanitarian airlift was suspended after another attack on a relief aeroplane. A US C-130 transport aeroplane was hit by two bullets in the left wing and one in the right wing, a UN spokesman said. "The airlift will not be flying tomorrow", said Ron Redmond, spokesman for the UNHCR. "It is not just because of one incident but because of the cumulative effect of attacks two days in a row". 4259/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that three small-arms rounds fired almost vertically from Serb-held territory near the airport struck the aeroplane moments after it took off after an aid delivery. 4260/

(b) International reported events

3144. A second day of talks began in Geneva between the mediators and Presidents Milošević of Serbia and Tudjman of Croatia. The Presidents and later BiH's warring Serb, Bosnian and Croat leaders joined a plenary session with the mediators. Arriving at the meetings, Lord Owen predicted that Milošević and Tudjman would go home later in the day unless there was "a very dramatic change in the tone and tenor of negotiations". 4261/

3145. Croatia and Yugoslavia agreed to start normalizing relations as the latest round of BiH peace talks faltered. The accord did not amount to a full mutual recognition but "representative offices" would be opened in Zagreb and Belgrade by 15 February, diplomats said. 4262/

3146. The UN Secretary-General won support from France to remove the UNPROFOR commander in the former Yugoslavia, General Jean Cot, who publicly criticized Boutros-Ghali's refusal to empower him to order air strikes. The French defence ministry announced that Cot would return home in March, four months
before his one year term as commander expired. 4263/

20. 20/1/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the level of shelling in the city remained rather low. An increase of small arms and sniper activity was reported. 4264/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported an increase in sniper activity. 4265/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3147. UNPROFOR reported that the level of shelling in the city remained rather low. An increase of small arms and sniper activity was reported. 4266/

(b) Local reported events

3148. UNPROFOR commander, General Francis Briquemont said that commitments by military commanders of the warring factions were not being honoured by their troops on the ground. Briquemont called a meeting of the commanders of the Bosnian Croat and BiH armies, Ante Roso and Rasim Delić, at Sarajevo airport Wednesday to protest their forces' obstructionism. Today he said in a statement: "More than ever, it must be very clearly stated that it becomes impossible for us to deliver humanitarian aid to the population of BiH while the warring parties continue to fight". The statement listed instances where commitments by Bosnian Croat and BiH army commanders on access for humanitarian operations were not honoured by local troops. 4267/

(c) International reported events

3149. BiH President Alija Izetbegović vowed that he would not accept peace at any price despite increased pressure from agreements on closer links between Serbs and Croats. "We said we do not want any kind of peace. We want a fair peace", he said after the latest round of Geneva peace talks ended on Wednesday no nearer to a deal to halt the hostilities. The Geneva talks were scheduled to resume on 10 February. President Izetbegović said: "In our opinion the peace process should not be stopped. It won't be in the interest of BiH". 4268/

3150. The French government proposed that the United States, Russia and the 12 European Union countries hold urgent talks to work out a new approach to trying to stop the BiH conflict. 4269/
(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR said that fighting quieted down as heavy snow swept across the city. 

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** Not specified

**Narrative of Events:**

3151. UNPROFOR said that fighting quieted down as heavy snow swept across the city.

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22. **22/1/94 (Saturday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported that during the day, 40 shells were fired by Bosnian Serb forces while three were fired by BiH forces. 

**Targets Hit:** Alipašino Polje. 

**Description of Damage:** Significant casualties to children sledding. 

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified

**Casualties:** At least six children were killed and nine others were wounded when they were hit by shell fire while sledding in the Alipašino Polje area. 

**Narrative of Events:**

3152. An artillery barrage broke a period of relative quiet in the city, killing six children and critically injuring at least three others as they played together in the snow. According to reports, at least one of the children had been decapitated by the shelling (Jasmina Brković). The children were sledding on a newly fallen snow when a shell landed at about 1:30 p.m. in the Alipašino Polje neighbourhood at the eastern end of the city (According to reports at least four 82 millimetre shells hit the area with one direct hit). Three girls and two boys, ranging in age from six to 12, were immediately killed. Four other children were rushed to the hospital where one died. The Koševo hospital received at least seven other children, three of whom were described as being in critical condition. UN officials initially reported that it was too early to tell who fired the shell. However they said that UN observers would analyse the mortar craters as soon as possible to determine the shelling origin. Sarajevo radio said that the shell was fired from the nearby Serb-held district of Nedžarići.
(b) Local reported events

3153. In a protest letter to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali after the killing of the six children today, the BiH government again called for air strikes to knock out the Serb artillery surrounding the city. Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić stated: "We ask you to request the bombardment of Serb positions around Sarajevo according to UN and NATO resolutions. What more must happen before UN resolutions to protect six Serb-besieged enclaves in BiH be implemented?" 4276/

3154. UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said that aid convoys were flowing relatively freely again in BiH but he called the situation precarious because it was feared that heavy fighting would resume following the collapse of the Geneva talks. 4277/

3155. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman admitted anxiety about the resumption of fighting--"everyone knows the current calm cannot last"--but said that reports of imminent violent combat were "somewhat exaggerated". 4278/

23. 23/1/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as quiet. 4279/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: A total of seven persons were confirmed killed and seven others wounded in BiH-controlled areas of the city in the past 24 hours. One person was killed in Serb-controlled areas. 4280/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3156. The city was reported as quiet. 4281/

(b) Local reported events

3157. The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted the command of the Sarajevo Mount Romanija Corps as saying that the mortars which killed a group of children on Saturday were not fired from Serb positions. "Bosnian Serb army units in the Sarajevo zone did not fire a single shell at the time the massacre took place", SRNA said. 4282/

3158. UNPROFOR reported that it was unable to determine who fired Saturday's shell which killed six children. According to reports, the shell's angle of trajectory could not be calculated from the shallow crater made on impact. 4283/ However, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman made the following statement regarding the shelling: "We can give you the direction, but we can't confirm the distance it was fired from". But he said that the shell had come from due west of the Alipašino Polje neighbourhood where it landed. "It was a 120 millimetre mortar shell", he added. Both the Bosnian Serb and the BiH army had such weapons. 4284/
3159. Bosnian Serbs threatened to bar medical evacuations from the city after BiH authorities arrested seven Bosnian Serbs for trying to flee the city. Sarajevo police sources said that five doctors were arrested on 3 and 4 January as they tried to slip over the BiH army front lines into the Serb-held inner city district of Grbavica. Two Serb employees of the state oil company were also arrested in a Sarajevo apartment at the same time. All were jailed on charges of "avoiding military duty" (the BiH government banned citizens of draft age or holding essential jobs from leaving territory it controlled without exit permits). 4285/

3160. Between 300 and 400 people gathered at a Sarajevo cathedral for a mass attended by the papal nuncio in BiH, Francesco Monterisi, to celebrate a "prayer for peace in the Balkans" day. "We have come to show our solidarity with your suffering", Monterisi said, adding that the Catholic Church would "ask for an end to shelling, killing and destruction". 4286/

(c) International reported events

3161. In the Vatican, Pope John Paul II, in a speech on the Roman Catholic Church's international day of prayer for BiH, edged towards support of military intervention in the region. "Appropriate authorities have the responsibility to try everything humanly possible to disarm the aggressor and create conditions for a just and lasting peace", he said. 4287/

24. 24/1/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 116 shells into the city while 30 were fired out by BiH forces. 4288/ In Belgrade, Bosnian Serb forces, quoted by the local SRNA news agency, said that they had captured "strategic positions" above Sarajevo to secure the route from Lukavica to Pale. 4289/ Source(s): United Press International; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The front-line near the Old Town and city centre. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3162. At noon, artillery, anti-aircraft and small-arms fire was reported on the front line near the Old Town and city centre. Bosnian Serb forces accused BiH forces of provoking them into shooting back with a view towards blaming them for the attack. 4290/

3163. UNPROFOR spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman said that after several "eerily quiet" days, artillery exchanges in Sarajevo had "increased dramatically" beginning in the early hours. "Surprisingly, a lot of the shells are outgoing--from the Bosnian [government] side to the [Bosnian] Serb side", he said. 4291/
(b) Local reported events

3164. British General Michael Rose arrived in the city to take over the command of the UNPROFOR troops in BiH. Rose, 54 was named to the post on 5 January by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to replace Belgian General Francis Briquemont. He formerly headed the elite Special Air Service commandos and led SAS regiments during the American Embassy siege crisis in Iran and in the Falklands war. 4292/

3165. UNHCR successfully evacuated sox injured persons from the city. Two of the evacuees were brothers, injured in Saturday's shelling. The other evacuees included another boy with a several-week-old eye injury, two Bosnian Serb men with war injuries and a woman with a brain tumor. 4293/

(c) International reported events

3166. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, in talks in Paris with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, raised the possibility of imposing a peace settlement in BiH but Washington rejected the idea, a senior US official said. "We made clear that we would not support the idea of imposing a settlement on the aggrieved party, putting pressure on the Moslems", the official said. "And we discussed the fact that imposing a settlement logically could lead to the suggestion of using troops to do so, and he understood we are not prepared to do that", he said. 4294/

3167. In Washington, US President Clinton said that he had no information to suggest that either UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali or the NATO heads of state were prepared to go forward with air strikes. "I don't think that the international community has the capacity to stop people within the nation from their civil war until they decide to do it", he said. He predicted there would be no settlement in BiH "until the sides decide that they have more to gain from signing a peace agreement than by continuing the fighting". Clinton said that the BiH officials "appear to be the most reluctant to sign a peace agreement at this time" because they have been able to obtain some weapons and have made some battlefield gains in recent weeks. 4295/

25. 25/1/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported small arms and heavy machine-gun fire on the southern confrontation line in the Lukavica area. 4296/
Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified


Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3168. Only sporadic tank and machine-gun fire was reported in the city. Fog reduced sniper activity and closed the airport to humanitarian aid flights in the morning. 4297/
3169. UNPROFOR reported small arms and heavy machine-gun fire on the southern confrontation line in the Lukavica area. 4298/

(b) Local reported events

3170. Political and military representatives of the three warring factions met for talks at the airport, but were unable to reach an agreement, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić told Sarajevo television. The meeting, originally scheduled to take place in Split, lasted six hours and was to resume on Wednesday. Issues raised included resuming power, water and gas supplies to Sarajevo, the establishment of "hot lines" between the warring groups and the setting up of joint commissions to negotiate the status of specific disputed areas, Silajdžić said. Bosnian Croat military leader General Milivoj Petkovic, the head of the Bosnian Serb parliament Momčilo Krajišnik and the Bosnian Serb military leader General Ratko Mladić also attended the meeting. 4299/

3171. A UN spokesman said that police in the Serb-held Ilidža suburb, the origin of small-arms fire that hit overflying US and German aeroplanes last week, had arrested three persons for shooting at aircraft. Arrest warrants had been issued for five others, said Colonel Bill Aikman. "One of the individuals arrested has admitted to shooting at aircraft in the last couple of weeks", he told a news briefing. Aikman did not know if the suspects were soldiers in the Bosnian Serb army, irregulars, or civilians. The arrests reportedly came after Serb supreme commander General Ratko Mladić allowed UN observers to keep watch along the airport perimeter abutting Ilidža following the shooting incidents. "The UNMOS went out last week, were active in patrolling the area down from the airport, and worked together with Serb authorities who said they did not approve of [shooting at aeroplanes]", Aikman said. 4300/

(c) International reported events

3172. UNPROFOR commander General Jean Cot said that he wanted the decision making process for NATO air strikes to be no more than 30 minutes. He said: "In the case of a massive attack against a safe area or anywhere else, the only means we have of reacting against this, of reacting immediately, is close air support--on condition, though, that we are able to react immediately". "Immediately means three minutes. That would be perfect. Half an hour would be nice. But it's certainly not more than that". 4301/

26. 26/1/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 350 shells hit the city. Of these, 60 per cent were reportedly aimed at BiH positions on Mount Žuč, 30 per cent at the south-western districts of Dobrinja and Mojmilo and 10 per cent at the city centre. 4302/ UNPROFOR also reported that the Grbavica area was shelled. 4303/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Vogošća; Žuč; Dobrinja; Mojmilo; the city centre; the Grbavica area. Source(s): Reuters; Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Hospital officials said that 10 persons were injured after Bosnian Serb forces shelled the western suburbs. Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3173. Hospital officials said that 10 persons were injured after Bosnian Serb forces shelled the western suburbs. Bosnian Serb forces accused BiH forces of shelling the Vogošća area, the Tanjug news agency said. 4304/

(b) Local reported events

3174. The three warring factions reached an agreement to restore part of the electrical power grid serving the city. The accord was worked out after two days of talks at the airport among representatives from the Bosnian Serb, Croat and BiH sides. The parties pledged not to destroy pylons, to refrain from hindering the distribution of electricity and to repair six power lines in southern, central, northern, eastern and north-eastern sectors of the city. However, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić acknowledged that talks on political and military issues made no headway. "We're just going in circles", he said, adding that a new round of tripartite contacts would take place on 5 February at a level of representation still to be determined. 4305/

3175. UN brass usually traveled in armoured cars in Sarajevo. However, on his second day of command, UNPROFOR commander Lieutenant General Michael Rose walked the 550 yards from his residence to the BiH Presidency building. 4306/

(c) International reported events

3176. In Geneva, the United States initially agreed to consider Russia's call for another meeting of foreign ministers from members of the UN Security Council, to try to bring an end to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Russia's special envoy, Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, called for Council foreign ministers to meet urgently in Geneva to persuade the warring sides to agree on a political settlement. 4307/ The US reportedly rejected the Russian proposal. State Department spokesman Mike McCurry said: "It seems to us at this point very doubtful that a meeting called by the Security Council foreign ministers would have any greater success than the efforts that the European Union has attempted". 4308/

3177. Foreign ministers of the five Nordic countries said that they remained committed to keeping their 1,300 troops in BiH. "They must stay, the humanitarian reasons are so overpowering", Sweden's Margaretha af Ugglas said. 4309/

27. 27/1/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR military observers reported 214 shells hitting the city, while four were fired by BiH forces. 4310/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Thirteen persons were wounded by sniper fire. Source(s):
Casualties: Local hospitals reported late in the afternoon that they had treated 13 civilian sniper victims and two other individuals with shrapnel wounds. 4311/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

3178. The city was reported as mostly quiet early in the day, with occasional exchanges heard between BiH and Bosnian Serb forces. 4312/

(b) Local reported events

3179. Oslobodjenje reported that 61 soldiers from the BiH army, including a former commander, Ramiz Delalić, had been charged with mutiny. The paper said that the troops involved in uprisings in July and October 1993 would be tried by a military tribunal in Sarajevo within a month. Most of the soldiers, who belonged to the army's 9th and 10th Brigades, had been arrested and warrants had been issued for 16 who were still at large. Ismet Mehic, the Sarajevo prosecutor, said that 36 others had been acquitted. According to the charges filed, the soldiers staged the mutinies after the dismissal of several army commanders including Musan Topalovic (a.k.a. Caço) and Delalić (a.k.a. Celo). The charges against the soldiers said that the commanders planned to launch an attack on the headquarters of the BiH Presidency on 2 July and again three months later. 4313/

(c) International reported events

3180. In Paris French Foreign Ministry spokesman Richard Duque accused the US of playing bystander to BiH bloodshed. "If we are talking on a moral level, the choice today is between only watching the fighting or doing all possible to stop it". 4314/

3181. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the United States remained "quite prepared" to participate in NATO-coordinated airstrikes for limited objectives, as was agreed at the NATO summit. But airstrikes were not imminent, US officials said, because UN commanders had not yet submitted aeroplanes for the airstrikes that NATO would be called on to implement. 4315/

28. 28/1/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported artillery and mortar shelling along the confrontation line. 4316/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The confrontation line. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A French soldier serving with UNPROFOR suffered a gunshot wound to the leg near the airport. The soldier was injured when a lone sniper opened fire on a convoy of vehicles. 4317/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Thirteen BiH citizens and one Bosnian Serb citizen were wounded, UNPROFOR reported. 4318/ Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

3182. UNPROFOR reported artillery and mortar shelling along the confrontation line. 4319/

(b) International reported events

3183. In Brussels the outgoing commander of UN forces in BiH, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, called for the replacement of international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg. "I said I was tired. Perhaps they are tired too. They always talk with the same people. They have a plan, it's difficult to change one's plan with the same people. Perhaps it would be better with new negotiators", he told Belgian radio. 4320/

3184. Cities across Europe held a cultural day to help keep the arts alive in Sarajevo. 4321/

29. 29/1/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 66 shells fired from Serb-held positions hit the city and that none were fired in return. 4322/ This shelling was mainly concentrated on Grbavica and Žuč. 4323/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Grbavica; Žuč. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3185. UNPROFOR reported that 66 shells fired from Serb-held positions hit the city and that none were fired in return. 4324/ This shelling was mainly concentrated on Grbavica and Žuč. 4325/

30. 30/1/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as tense. Bosnian Serb artillery concentrated their fire on the confrontation lines at Rajlovac and Žuč/Hum where BiH forces were observed by UN monitors reinforcing their positions. 4326/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: The confrontation lines at Rajlovac and Žuč/Hum. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

3186. UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as tense. Bosnian Serb artillery concentrated their fire on the confrontation lines at Rajlovac and Žuć/Hum where BiH forces were observed by UN monitors reinforcing their positions.

(b) Local reported events

3187. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić pledged that his forces would halt "all military activity in Sarajevo" for the duration of the winter Olympic Games from 12 to 27 February. Karadžić proposed the cease-fire in a meeting in Pale with the new UNPROFOR commander in BiH, General Michael Rose, the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA said.

3188. BiH General Jovan Divjak warned that any withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the former Yugoslavia would spark increased fighting in the region. In an interview with Agence France Presse, Divjak (a former officer of the Yugoslav army, of Serb origin), one of the two deputy chiefs-of-staff in the BiH army, criticized the "lack of determination" shown by the United States and the "irresponsibility" of the European Community. With the present balance of forces in BiH, any UN withdrawal would "only put a match to the powderkeg the Balkans have become", he said. "Despite protestations of peace, the three parties continue to clash on the ground, because the Serbs and Croats have not yet completed the boundaries of their quasi-states, while the BiH government is seeking to recapture the territory taken from it by force", he added.

31. 31/1/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported an increase of intense shelling in the Stup and Rajlovac areas. / Source(s): UNPROFOR. 

Targets Hit: Stup; Rajlovac. / Source(s): UNPROFOR. 

Description of Damage: Not specified 

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported a continuation of sniper activity, mostly in Grbavica and Lukavica. / Source(s): UNPROFOR. 

Casualties: Two persons were reported killed and 19 others were wounded. Four of the wounded were children. / Source(s): Reuters. 

Narrative of Events:

3189. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that Bosnian Serb forces bombarded Sarajevo, although the number of shells fired was somewhat lower than usual. He gave the casualty toll as two dead and 19 wounded. Four of the wounded were children. 

3190. UNPROFOR reported an increase of intense shelling in the Stup and Rajlovac areas. 

3191. Three men suspected of involvement in the killing of a British UN aid driver were killed after being stopped by BiH forces while trying to flee, police said. A police statement said that the trio, thought to be involved in
the killing last Thursday of a British driver at Zenica, took two hostages while trying to flee via Sarajevo airport. They were reportedly ambushed by BiH army forces on Mount Igman. When they opened fire, BiH forces reportedly responded, killing the three men and one hostage. Police said that the three men had identity documents that were probably false including British and Pakistani passports stamped with transit visas for Croatia. 4335/

(b) Local reported events

3192. The Bosnian Serb army high command announced that it had taken a series of decisions "aimed at mobilization of the republic's available resources that would lead to a successful end to the war". A statement said that the steps had been taken because "the international community has decided to support the Moslems in the war option and to recognize the results of their struggle". The Serb army command said the economy of the republic would be put on a war footing. All able-bodied citizens would be mobilized into the army or put to civilian work, with special units formed for women. Disciplinary measures were being introduced to combat "all forms of illegal trade". 4336/

3193. Russian hardliner Vladimir Zhirinovsky held talks with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić in Bijeljina in north-eastern BiH. Commenting on the recent NATO airstrike threats he said: "I would like to reassure the governments of some Western countries that using force will not help them. If a single bomb falls on the towns of Bosnia ... I warn them that this means declaring war on Russia and we will punish them for that". 4337/

(c) International reported events

3194. In Paris, French Defence Minister François Leotard said that he was concerned about the announced Bosnian Serb mobilization order. 4338/

        W. February 1994

        1. 1/2/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 170 artillery shells into BiH-held parts of the city, with BiH troops returning 10 rounds. 4339/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Journalists staying at the Holiday Inn said that sniper fire around the hotel was at its worst in weeks and that vehicles were forced to zigzag in order to avoid bullets. 4340/ In the morning, French UNPROFOR troops working outside the city's telephone Building, were fired upon by an unknown sniper. French jeeps were also shot at in a suburban section of the city. An Egyptian armoured personnel carrier was struck by a large calibre bullet outside the Holiday Inn. 4341/ Source(s): Reuters; United Press International.

Casualties: An UNPROFOR spokesman said that one person was killed and eight others were wounded in BiH-held areas of the city, including a child hit by a sniper. Two persons were wounded in Serb-held areas. 4342/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

3195. UNPROFOR reported that Bosnian Serb forces fired 170 artillery shells into BiH-held parts of the city, with BiH troops returning 10 rounds. 

(b) Local reported events

3196. Following talks in the morning with UN envoy Yasushi Akashi, BiH President Alija Izetbegović said: "I told him we are not in favour of peace at any price, but in favour of a just peace". He added, "no such peace has been offered".

3197. In a statement in Belgrade, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that he expected the BiH conflict to be settled by war. He told the Bosnian Serb SRNA news agency: "The international community is going to allow the conflict to be settled by war which means that the world will give Moslems credit for land acquired through fighting. This same principle should be adopted for the Serbs".

3198. Speaking in Sarajevo, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić said: We cannot go to Geneva month after month, year after year, without a result". He added: "If this conference continues to block UN decisions by way of fruitless discussions, we shall decide to call for the matter to be returned to the Security Council and ask the UN body to consider only the positions of the legally-formed Bosnian government".

3199. A UNICEF survey released on this day indicated the following information on children in Sarajevo: 97.3 per cent of the children interviewed had experienced shelling nearby; 79.3 per cent had seen someone injured in the war; 46.3 per cent had seen someone killed in the war; 65.5 per cent had been in a situation where they thought they would be killed; 58.8 per cent were from homes that had been attacked or shelled. The UNICEF survey, conducted by Rune Stuveland of Norway, asked 1,505 children in the city to complete a questionnaire in June and July of last year to measure war related trauma. Stuveland said that many children were losing touch with reality as a result of the war. "We see children walking through dangerous areas instead of running", he said. "They just don't care anymore". Of the 749 boys and 756 girls, 22.5 per cent said that they didn't think that life was worth living. "Children should grow up making plans . . . but this may disappear", Stuveland said. "These children don't make plans because for them there is no tomorrow". he said.

3200. The gunmen who killed a British air worker in Zenica last week, were foreign Mujahideen fighters, the BiH government said.

(c) International reported events

3201. In New York, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali signaled his preparedness to use air power in BiH.
ground attack which was stopped by the Bosnian Serb army from the start. In the city the situation was described as stable. UNPROFOR stated that it was obvious that the Bosnian Serb army did not "fall into the trap laid by the BiH army which was likely to expect a massive response during the visit of the Pakistani and Turkish Prime Ministers". 4350/ Bosnian Serb forces fired an estimated 400 shells into BiH-held parts of the city after the departure of the Pakistani and Turkish Prime Ministers. 4351/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; UNHCR; United Press International.

**Targets Hit:** Alipašino Polje area; the area near the Holiday Inn. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** A child was killed by a sniper in the Srebrenik area, Sarajevo radio said. 4352/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

**Casualties:** Sarajevo hospitals reported six persons injured by sniper fire, and two others by shell fragments. 4353/ The city morgue reported three deaths, and hospitals said that they treated at least 22 others for injuries. 4354/ Source(s): United Press International.

**Narrative of Events:**

3202. Just after 4:00 p.m., a shell hit the Alipašino Polje area, killing two persons and injuring four others, Sarajevo radio said. Hospitals received nine other wounded during an otherwise quiet day, among them a single civilian hit by sniper fire in the morning. 4355/

3203. At least 10 persons were wounded in an evening battle. "There was a terrific gun battle", a local reporter said. The battle, which began with an exchange of small arms fire and developed into an artillery duel, lasted two hours. The fighting concentrated mostly around the Grbavica district. "It is the worst evening battle in weeks", an unidentified reporter said as shells hit close to the Holiday Inn. 4356/

(b) **Local reported events**

3204. Pakistani and Turkish Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Tansu Ciller called for a lifting of the arms embargo on BiH and urged the government to reject any "unjust" negotiated settlement to the war. In a joint declaration issued during their brief visit to the city, the two Islamic heads of government said that "rarely has a nation been subjected to such merciless savagery in the full view of the world" as had BiH. 4357/

3. **3/2/94 (Thursday)**

(a) **Military activity**

**Combat and Shelling Activity:** UNPROFOR reported a high level of tension during the day. Two hundred incoming and three outgoing artillery shells were reported. 4358/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

**Targets Hit:** Not specified

**Description of Damage:** Not specified

**Sniping Activity:** Not specified
Casualties: UNPROFOR reported that six civilians were killed, and that 15 others were wounded. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Narrative of Events:

3205. UNPROFOR reported a high level of tension during the day. Two hundred incoming and three outgoing artillery shells were reported.

(b) Local reported events

3206. BiH President Izetbegović said that he did not expect to attend the next round of peace talks on 10 February in Geneva unless some "progress" was made between now and then. In an interview with Sarajevo radio, Izetbegović said that he was still "undecided" but that he had already told Lord Owen that he would "probably not" attend because it "would be a waste of time". He said that he told Owen that Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić would probably lead the BiH government delegation.

4. 4/2/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR described the situation in the city as tense with heavy shelling (200 incoming rounds registered). Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: A food line in Dobrinja. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Description of Damage: Significant loss of civilian lives. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR reported a high level of sniper activity. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Casualties: Nine people, including two children, were killed and 18 others were wounded when shells hit a line of people waiting for flour to be distributed in Dobrinja at 11:00 a.m. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3207. Nine people, including two children, were killed and 18 others were wounded when shells hit a line of people waiting for flour to be distributed in Dobrinja at 11:00 a.m. The people were lined outside a local government building, waiting for food to be distributed (Friday was "flour day"). Two of the dead were girls aged eight and nine, and most of the wounded were women, according to officials at the Dobrinja Hospital. Hospital officials said that 26 persons were brought in after the attack, six of whom were dead on arrival. The six most seriously wounded were sent to the Koševo hospital, and three died later.

3208. According to UNPROFOR, the "flour line" shell was fired from a Serb-held area. "A crater analysis by UN military monitors has shown that the mortars came from the Serb side, about 2.5 miles to the south-east in the Lukavica area", UN military spokesman Major Jose Labandeira said. He also said that the line was hit by three 120 millimetre mortar shells. Labandiera added that UNPROFOR BiH commander Sir Michael Rose had inspected the blood-spattered site.
right after the early afternoon attack and a crater analysis quickly followed. 4366/

3209. Bosnian Serbs denied responsibility for the shelling. In a statement carried by the Tanjug news agency, the Bosnian Serb army command stated that "no mortars were fired from Serb army positions in this sector around 11:00 a.m.", the time of the attack. Nikola Koljević, vice president of the republic, "vigorously protested" at what he called a "set-up job" that had cost civilian lives. He said that UNPROFOR "can check for themselves that Serb forces don't have artillery pieces at Vranješ", from where the BiH army alleged the mortars were fired. 4367/

(b) Local reported events

3210. BiH government leaders wrote protest leaders to NATO and the UN Security Council, saying that were tired of Western governments denouncing repeated bloodbaths in Serb-besieged towns but never intervening to protect civilians and restore peace. 4368/ BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić wrote to the Security Council: "The international community's indecisiveness found fertile ground again today, inspiring the aggressor to new crimes". 4369/

5. 5/2/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Despite a low level of shelling, this was the most deadly day in Sarajevo after a single 120 millimetre shell round exploded in a market place in the old city. 4370/ UNPROFOR reported that 46 mortar shells hit the city. 4371/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Markale market, close to the Sarajevo cathedral. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: This was the single most deadly attack of the siege, killing at least 66 persons and wounding at least 197 others. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters; UNPROFOR.

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sixty-six persons were killed and at least 197 others were wounded when a shell fell on the Markale market at 12:20 p.m.. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3211. A mortar shell fired on the city's main market killed at least 66 persons and wounded at least 197 others in the worst attack on civilians during the siege. The shell fell on the Markale market, close to the Sarajevo cathedral at 12:20 p.m.. Witnesses described a scene with severed limbs and blood everywhere. 4372/

3212. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that his own investigators found that the shell was fired from Bosnian Serb positions at Mrković, north-east of the city. But Bosnian Serb military chief Manojlo Milovanović blamed BiH forces and said that "Serb positions are not that close, and we do not possess arms capable of causing such a massacre". 4373/

3213. After a first investigation, UNPROFOR military experts said in a
statement that "UNPROFOR has confirmed that the explosion was caused by a single, 120mm mortar bomb fired from the north-east of the market". But they added that it had not been possible to determine "the exact origin" of the launch and noted that Bosnian Serb and BiH forces had positions close to each other north-east of the city. 4374/

(b) Local reported events

3214. BiH President Alija Izetbegović said that today's market massacre would not stop peace talks in Geneva, due to resume 10 February. "An initial emotional reaction would be to refuse to take part in the negotiations", he said. 4375/

3215. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić denied responsibility for the market attack. He told a news conference: "This massacre is cold-blooded murder by the Muslim leadership". 4376/

3216. The Bosnian Serb army threatened to halt humanitarian aid deliveries in BiH unless the UN exonerated it of responsibility for the market shelling. An ultimatum by Serb chief of staff General Manojlo Milovanović demanded an immediate response from UNPROFOR commander Sir Michael Rose. Milovanović told the Tanjug news agency: "I categorically claim there was no opening of fire from Bosnian Serb army positions in that area and at that time". 4377/Milovanović also called for a joint investigation to determine responsibility for the shelling. In the text of a letter carried by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, he said that he expected the joint committee to be formed by 8:00 a.m. Sunday by representatives of the BiH government, Bosnian Serbs and UN military forces. 4378/

(c) International reported events

3217. In New York, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued a statement condemning "in the strongest possible terms this heinous act of violence", and ordered an investigation to establish the facts surrounding the incident. 4379/

3218. UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi commented on the market shelling: "I express my outrage, and that of the whole international community, at this unspeakable act of barbarity". In a statement from Zagreb, Akashi said that he and UNPROFOR commander Cot would go to Sarajevo on Sunday, "carrying some specific proposals to the parties for concrete action to reduce the tension". 4380/

3219. US President Bill Clinton called for an urgent UN investigation of the attack. "I have directed that Secretary Christopher engage our allies in Europe and the United Nations on the situation and on the appropriate next steps", the President said. "We do not rule out the use of NATO airstrikes once responsibility had been fixed", Christopher said. 4381/

3220. Earlier, a senior US administration official said that Washington had "very little doubt" that Serb forces fired the mortar shell. He said the attack "makes it more likely that the United States will consider pressing for action" against Serbs but no decisions had been taken. 4382/

3221. President Clinton also ordered the Pentagon to offer assistance in "evacuating, hospitalizing and treating those injured in this savage attack". American C-130 transport aeroplanes were scheduled to evacuate the wounded to a mobile army surgical hospital near Frankfurt, Germany. 4383/
3222. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said in a statement: "The shelling is the latest and worst example of the miseries of this war. The only lasting answer is a negotiated peace". 4384/

3223. France said in a French Foreign Ministry statement: "Faced with the dramatic deterioration of the situation the latest bombardments of Sarajevo, France has consulted its partners in the European Union and the United States". The statement continued: "France demands action to permit the immediate lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, the gathering together of heavy arms held by all sides and their control by the United Nations". The statement added: "It hopes that modalities for implementing this action, including the use of air power, should be set out as soon as possible by the United Nations in collaboration with the Atlantic alliance. 4385/

3224. Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes called for NATO air strikes against Serb positions around the city. "After a [NATO] bombardment, the Serbs can naturally try to take their revenge against the [UN] blue helmets on the ground, but once again I don't see any other way out", he said in a television interview. 4386/

3225. In Rome, Pope John Paul II characterized the shelling as: "a massacre .. by criminal hands [which] continue systematically to slaughter and destroy" and said they would answer before God. 4387/

6. 6/2/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported a low level of shelling. The most affected areas were Dobrinja and Butmir. UNPROFOR's main activity was the evacuation of market casualties. 4388/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Dobrinja; Butmir. Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: According to BiH Health Minister Mustafa Beganović, the death toll in Saturday's shelling attack rose to 68. 4389/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

3226. Sarajevo had a quiet night after Saturday's attack. The city was also reported calm in the morning. 4390/

3227. UNPROFOR reported a low level of shelling. The most affected areas were Dobrinja and Butmir. UNPROFOR's main activity was the evacuation of market casualties. 4391/

3228. Three US aeroplanes evacuated about 60 of the wounded victims of Saturday's shelling. One hundred twenty of their relatives were also airlifted to Ramstein, Germany. An International Red Cross aircraft was due to fly out more of the nearly 200 casualties to Frankfurt. 4392/

3229. UNHCR delivered two truckloads of medicine to Koševo hospital to help treat the wounded and a Norwegian surgical team was on its way from Tuzla, in north-eastern BiH, to assist doctors in Sarajevo. 4393/
(b) Local reported events

3230. UNPROFOR BiH commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose reported the general results of the crater analysis of Saturday's shelling. He stated that the "crater analysis has been completed. It was impossible to tell who fired the shell". But the general said that the mortar was of the same type that had been determined to have been fired on the Dobrinja neighbourhood on Friday, killing 10 people. "The world will certainly draw its own conclusions", he said. 4394

3231. UNPROFOR spokesman Colonel Bill Aikman said that investigations into the shelling were inconclusive at this stage. "There was only one shell, and it hit the roof of a stall and blew up first before it hit the ground", he said. "So we can't even use the depth of the hole as an indicator". 4395

3232. British Brigadier General Chris Ritchie said that it might not ever be known who actually fired the deadly shell on Saturday. Ritchie said that a trajectory line had been ascertained, placing the firing point somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 yards away. "I'm afraid that spans both sides of the confrontation line", he said. Ritchie said that mortars are not precision weapons and he suspected the shell's accuracy was "luck" for whoever fired it. "The reason there were so many casualties is because when the mortar landed, it landed on a table and exploded three feet off the ground", he said. "If it had impacted on the ground, the casualties would have been lessened". 4396

3233. UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi and UNPROFOR commanders General Jean Cot and Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, visited the Sarajevo market. They were escorted to the site by Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kreševljaković and BiH Interior Minister Bakir Alispahić. They were later to meet with BiH leaders before heading back to Zagreb. 4397

3234. Sarajevo Mayor Muhamed Kreševljaković, commented: "This was the worst day of death in this city for 500 years". 4398

3235. Special envoy Akashi later said that he had failed in a mediation bid between the warring factions. He stated after a meeting with both BiH and Serb officials: "I regret to tell you that these discussions have not reached an agreement yet". He added: "The major difference is that the Bosnian side wants to have the withdrawal of artillery, mortars and other heavy weapons out of range of the city of Sarajevo and be placed under UNPROFOR control. This is not acceptable for the Serb side". 4399

3236. BiH President Izetbegović said that his government was willing to agree to a cease-fire covering Sarajevo, but not until Serb forces withdrew their heavy artillery from around the city. "The basic situation is that we will accept a cease-fire on the express condition that the Serb side withdraws its heavy artillery from around Sarajevo, with which it has been killing the civilian population", he said. He said that the Serb artillery on the hills around the city had "no strategic military significance". It was "only there to intimidate the city and to kill its inhabitants". 4400

3237. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that a draft agreement on a cease-fire between the sides in Sarajevo had been drawn up, the Tanjug news agency reported. He was speaking after talks with the UN special envoy Akashi. Tanjug said that if BiH accepted the cease-fire it would come into effect at 10:00 a.m. Monday. Akashi was quoted as saying after the meeting: "We hope for a cease-fire and now everything depends on the Bosnian government in Sarajevo". 4401

3238. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević condemned the market shelling,
Tanjug news agency reported. "The dead and wounded in Sarajevo are not victims of war but victims of war criminals", Milošević said. 4403/

3239. Nearly 300 people, including more than 100 Jews, reached the Croatian coast after being evacuated from the city on Saturday. Sarajevo's 400 year-old Jewish community numbered 14,000 before World War II and 1,400 before the current conflict. It was estimated that only a few hundred Jews remained in the city. 4404/

(c) International reported events

3240. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked NATO to authorize air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery positions in response to attacks against civilians, a senior UN official said. According to the report, Boutros-Ghali had written to Manfred Woerner, the Secretary-General of NATO, asking that he get authorization from the NATO council for strikes. 4405/

3241. European mediator Lord Owen said that he had a "glint" of optimism that Sarajevo could be put under UN control as a result of Saturday's shelling. "What has happened has demonstrated once again that you cannot go on with the situation in Sarajevo. It's an absolutely desperate situation", Owen said. Owen reported that he was flying to Belgrade today for talks with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić that he hoped would show the Bosnian Serbs ready to agree to a deal for Sarajevo under which the city would be put under UN administration. 4406/

3242. BiH's embassy in Vienna charged that the UN Security Council was responsible "de facto" for the latest shelling attack in Sarajevo. "The Security Council is empowered to prevent attacks on safe havens [in BiH], which can be done by taking any action necessary, including air strikes . . . "The international community has also pledged to prevent any further strangulation of the city of Sarajevo . . . It stands to reason that by not using its full powers and commitments, the Security Council in fact supports the aggressor and encourages his crimes", the embassy said in a statement. 4407/

3243. Lord Owen commented on the prospect of airstrikes around the city. "Punitive air strikes against Sarajevo have been thought to be the way through it. I've never made any secret I don't believe that will succeed", he told Sky news. 4408/

3244. France called early Sunday for a plan of action from the United Nations and NATO, including the possible use of air power to end the siege of Sarajevo. A statement released by the foreign ministry said that France had consulted its EC partners and the United States following the market place shelling. "France wants action to be taken to enable the siege of Sarajevo to be lifted immediately as well as the collection of all heavy weapons held by all parties and their control by the United Nations", the statement said. The statement added: "It hopes that the United Nations in conjunction with [NATO] will determine ways as soon as possible to implement such measures, including recourse to air power". 4409/

3245. British Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind said that western military retaliation for Saturday's mortar attack could endanger the whole UN relief effort. "We are all giving very, very careful thought as to whether there's anything we can do that can actually help resolve this terrible problem", he told Sky news. "We want to get food and aid through to the people of Sarajevo—-that's been a very great success story for the United Nations—if at all possible we want that to continue", he added. Rifkind, who was in Sarajevo to
discuss with allies the use of military power in the wake of Saturday's shelling, later agreed that NATO should convene an emergency meeting to consider further action, including the use of air strikes against Serbian positions. "Of course it's right that NATO should consider it and the United Nations is obviously looking at it very, very carefully", he said. 4410/

3246. US President Clinton called on the UN to confirm who was behind Saturday's shelling attack before the US took any action. Speaking after a meeting with Secretary of State Christopher and other top advisers he said he hoped the "horrible incident can be the spur for peace". But he appeared to rule out any immediate American military response because of allies' concerns for their peace-keeping troops on the ground. "I want to give the United Nations a chance to confirm responsibility for it", Clinton said. 4411/

3247. Addressing Saturday's shelling, Russia's foreign ministry stated: "We demand that the international community be informed immediately about the results of this inquiry", the ministry said in a statement. It added: "We are indignant about the terrorist act against Sarajevo . . . Whoever the authors are, they must be punished severely". 4412/

3248. Canada expressed outrage over Saturday's shelling. Foreign minister Andre Ouellet described the attack as the "deliberate killing and wounding of hundreds of innocent civilians". He added, "This latest atrocity underscores the urgent need for concerted international action to prevent further violence against the innocent civilian population of Sarajevo". 4413/

3249. Greece's Secretary of State for Defence, Nicholaos Kouris, said on Sky radio, that Saturday's shelling could have been a provocation by BiH and repeated Greek opposition to any military opposition. "At first sight, the Serbs don't have any reason to provoke the massacre", Kouris said. He stated further that the shelling seemed to "serve the plans of those who want to see a military intervention in favour of the Moslems". He added: "We cannot exclude a provocation". Greece, which held the rotating presidency of the European Community, had not yet given an official reaction to the attack. 4414/

3250. Turkish President Suleyman Demirel supported calls for air strikes in a statement while Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, just back from a visit from Sarajevo, repeated calls for the lifting of the arms embargo against BiH forces. 4415/

3251. Italy said that it was willing to support any NATO decision to launch air strikes. "Taking into consideration the latest tragedies . . . air raids against the main sources of fire could be launched", Defence Minister Fabio Fabbri said. 4416/

3252. Iran condemned Saturday's mortar attack. Iran Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said that Iran was ready for "any kind of cooperation" with the world community to "restore the rights" of the Moslems in BiH. "We strongly condemn this crime and urge the international community to seriously confront Serbian aggression", he said on the radio. 4417/

3253. Romanian President Iliescu condemned the market shelling. He stated: "We condemn this brutal terrorist action", and believed that those who caused the incident would receive a deserved punishment. 4418/

3254. Pakistan condemned the shelling attack: "Pakistan vigorously condemns the heavy shelling of innocent people in Sarajevo by the Serbian forces. We reiterate our call on the international community to take effective steps to respond to the latest act of aggression", a government spokesman said. "We are
continuing our efforts within the United Nations to secure the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia", he added. 4419/ 

7. 7/2/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: According to UNPROFOR, 34 artillery rounds hit BiH-controlled parts of the city. 4420/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Žuć; Dobrinja. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: UNPROFOR said that French peacekeepers at the airport were targeted by snipers, but that no one was injured. Several shots also hit an Egyptian armoured personnel carrier but caused no injuries. 4421/ Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: One person was reported killed and seven others were wounded (five of whom were sniper victims). 4422/ Source(s): United Press International.

Narrative of Events:

3255. Heavy sniper fire and artillery explosions just before dawn shattered the overnight calm in the city. Sarajevo radio said that Bosnian Serb forces shelled the suburbs of Žuć and Dobrinja. 4423/

3256. More victims from Saturday's shelling were expected to arrive in Germany for hospital treatment in the evening, a spokeswoman at the Ramstein US airbase near Kaiserslautern said. She said that an unknown number of persons were expected to arrive at about 6:00 a.m.. 4424/

3257. Ten wounded and ill patients were flown to Ancona, Italy, a UNHCR spokesman said. 4425/

3258. According to morgue officials, there were 59 funerals in the city today. A few of those buried died from snipers' bullets or earlier wounds. Muslims reportedly buried their dead after the sun went down, a change in their usual religious practice adopted to prevent attacks on mourners. The Serbian Orthodox, Croatian Roman Catholics and others, were buried mostly by day. The funerals were reportedly brief due to the fact that the main graveyards were exposed to the Bosnian Serb installations in the surrounding mountains. 4426/

(b) Local reported events

3259. UNPROFOR spokesman Colonel Bill Aikman when asked about BiH President Alija Izetbegović's charge that the UN was shrinking from blaming the Bosnian Serbs to blunt pressure for foreign military intervention, said that decisive evidence was lacking. "I don't see anything to substantially change the conclusion that we have now", he said. He reiterated that Saturday's shell struck a market stall roof and then a table where it exploded before hitting the ground. "The thing had already hit two solid objects and you can't guarantee you still have the (original) angle when it hits the ground. You don't have a deep enough hole to get an angle", he said. Another problem was that evidence such as shell fragments were lost in the efforts to save the wounded. "It (should be) like a crime scene. The police normally seal it off
and nobody touches it until all the measurements and calculations are made", he said. "But on Saturday people were roaring around helping where they could to save lives. There was not enough left to give anything other than a direction from which the mortar came". 4427/

3260. BiH President Izetbegović said that he believed Bosnian Serbs would try to exploit the indecision on how to respond to Saturday's shelling. "I don't think the Serbs will withdraw their artillery", he said after the first meeting of the BiH parliament since the shelling. "I think they will take a risk, and they will try to test Europe, playing their indecision", he said. 4428/

3261. Late in the day, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić said that the threat of western air strikes could bring peace to BiH. While stressing that western air strikes were not "an objective in themselves", he said that they could restore the balance of power in the BiH conflict and thereby "bring about the return of peace". He warned in a statement that "if the international community and in particular NATO only reacts with empty threats, it will lose all credibility". 4429/

3262. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said that foreigners in BiH would not be safe if the West went ahead with threatened air strikes. "We would defend ourselves with all means. I do not think that if there would be any air strikes we would partially lose control and there would be chaos and any outcome is possible", he said from Pale. "That means foreigners would not be safe and secure in Bosnia", he warned. 4430/

3263. The Ukraine stated that it decided to go ahead with the planned replacement of its peace-keeping troops in BiH, the Press Service of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry said. The Ukraine dispatched a second aeroplane-load of peacekeepers to the Sarajevo sector, the Press Service said. 4431/

(c) International reported events

3264. European Community foreign ministers called for the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo by "all means necessary, including the use of airpower". 4432/ The foreign ministers of the 12 European Community countries moderated the terms of a draft ultimatum that Bosnian Serbs stop shelling Sarajevo, or come under air attack by NATO warplanes. The ministers stepped back from giving the Serb forces a three week deadline to withdraw, as advocated by France. According to Irish Foreign Minister Dick Spring, at least seven of the 12 foreign ministers were against the air strikes, including himself. Britain, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Denmark, Luxembourg and Portugal backed a negotiated settlement. France, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium backed air strikes. Germany, banned by its constitution from sending forces, did not take part in the vote. 4433/

3265. NATO ambassadors informally discussed a request by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that the 16 member alliance confirm the use of its warplanes to bomb artillery emplacements around Sarajevo. They were expected to meet formally either Tuesday or Wednesday and could formally approve attack plans for some of the 160 NATO warplanes already patrolling the BiH skies, diplomats said. 4434/

3266. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev warned against NATO airstrikes. "Urgent measures are necessary, but we should not get into a trap", he said in remarks reported by the ITAR-TASS news agency. "This is a well-placed trap, and, maybe, a provocation from any side". "Already once, in 1914, a provocation was staged in Sarajevo when a similar horrible act of terror became the reason of a global tragedy", Kozyrev said. An escalation stemming
from Saturday's violence could result in "a repetition of the tragic scenario", Kozyrev added. He warned world leaders to be guided by a "cold political mind and not by emotions". 4435/

3267. Special envoy Yasushi Akashi said that he had obtained assurances from Serbian President Slobodan Milošević that negotiations scheduled in Geneva this week would take place. Speaking at the end of a one hour meeting with Milošević in Belgrade, Akashi said that the Serbian president was "very eager to make progress on the UN administration of Sarajevo as well as on its demilitarization even before a peace agreement is reached". The two international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, had met Milošević in the morning. In response to questions from reporters at the end of their meeting, Lord Owen stated: "Nobody but a fool wants air strikes, but on the other hand, nobody but a fool can go on tolerating the situation in which as many people can lose their lives as happened Saturday in Sarajevo". 4436/

3268. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić accepted to negotiate a demilitarization of Sarajevo that would place the city under UN control, international mediators said in a communiqué released in Geneva. According to the communiqué: "In order to bring peace to Sarajevo now, the Bosnian Serbs are ready, in the circumstances where it is not yet possible to reach an overall peace settlement, to negotiate for United Nations administration and the demilitarization of Sarajevo district prior to a final settlement for Bosnia-Hercegovina". 4437/

3269. US President Bill Clinton expressed support for UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's call for NATO authorized airstrikes in BiH. Clinton said that the UN mission in BiH must determine who was responsible for the attacks and "the Secretary-General has now asked that authority be given to our commanders there on the ground to take appropriate action". He added, "I have directed our representatives in NATO to support the Secretary-General's request". 4438/

3270. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher accused Bosnian Serbs of a pattern of shelling against civilians that went beyond last Saturday's attack. Acknowledging that there had been no precise finding that Bosnian Serbs fired the mortar into the marketplace, he said that Serbs were determined to be responsible for the recent shelling of a food line and other attacks. "The death toll from that (marketplace) shelling was not only the worst since this tragic conflict began, it is also part of a pattern of shelling of civilian areas by Serb artillery that has continued despite NATO's repeated warnings", Christopher said. "We expect that the North Atlantic Council will decide on a course of action on an overall strategy within the next few days", he added. 4439/

3271. US national security advisers met at the White House to consider what action to take in response to Saturday's shelling in Sarajevo. The meeting was attended by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defense Secretary William Perry, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili. 4440/

3272. British Prime Minister John Major said that he wanted immediate, effective and "more muscular" action to halt the bombardment of civilians in the city. Downing Street said that Britain would call for political backing for a new approach at the European Union's Foreign Affairs Council in Brussels during the afternoon. 4441/

3273. The Organization of the Islamic Conference called on the United Nations to back military and other action against Serbs after Saturday's shelling attack. The statement from the 44-member OIC called for an urgent Security
Council meeting to examine "the continuing Serb attacks on civilians". 4442/

8. 8/2/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 160 artillery shells were fired into the city by Bosnian Serb forces, while BiH troops fired 19 shells. Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3274. According to an UNPROFOR spokesman, shelling of the city abated dramatically after the European Community approved air strikes. 4444/

3275. Much of the eastern, old part of the city, was without electricity. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that a deliberate short-circuit had been detected in a feeder line in Croat-held Kiseljak, 25 miles to the northwest. 4445/

3276. UNHCR reported that 28 relief flights landed at Sarajevo airport. 4446/

(b) Local reported events

3277. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić claimed that the Sarajevo market attack was a "stage-managed fraud", alleging corpses of persons who had died earlier and plastic body parts were used to boost casualty figures. According to the Tanjug news agency, Karadžić, in a letter to the US and Russian presidents, said that the incident was a fraud and that only a few people were killed or injured. Karadžić was quoted as saying: "An explosion took place in the market, killing and injuring a few people. Everything else around this incident has been stage-managed". He added that according to eyewitnesses, there were only a few people at the market just before the explosion, not 300. "All the witnesses, even the Muslims in the Muslim-controlled media, have asserted that this was an unusual bomb because the characteristic whistling noise was not heard prior to the explosion", Belgrade television quoted him as saying in the letter. "Television footage clearly shows that manipulation of bodies has taken place in this tragedy. In the footage, one can see the bodies of casualties who had died hours earlier, as well as plastic body parts", Karadžić said. 4447/

3278. Serb ballistics experts said that a single shell could not possibly have caused Saturday's massacre, blaming instead explosives laid in the market by BiH forces themselves, Serbian news reports said. In making this claim, the experts said that a 120 millimetre shell containing three kilograms of explosives could not have produced the results of Saturday's blast. Instead they said that they concluded that a number of home-made devices, carrying 30 kilograms of plastic explosives stuffed with shrapnel, had been placed among the market stalls, and were detonated by the single falling shell. 4448/
3279. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić threatened to shoot down any aeroplanes attacking Serb positions around Sarajevo. But Karadžić said that the Serb forces could agree to reduce or move their artillery from Sarajevo within a peace plan and possible UN administration of the city. 4449/

3280. BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić appealed to the United States to launch airstrikes against Bosnian Serb gun positions in the hills surrounding the city. "Militarily you can do a lot. You can lift the siege of Sarajevo in a few hours", Ganić said on US television. Speaking from Sarajevo, Ganić said that unless the US launched air raids the siege would not be lifted. "Your pilots know the hills like their backyards", he said. "The Serbs are convinced that you will not make a new move", he added. 4450/

(c) International reported events

3281. NATO held "intense" consultations on the possibility of airstrikes against Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the city. "As you know intense consultations are taking place now and have been taking place during the last hours within NATO and among [our] membership", said NATO Deputy Secretary General Sergio Silvio Balanzino. He added: "As to air strikes I will have a very definite and clear answer tomorrow. Stay tuned as they say on TV . . . At this stage, I can't say anything more". 4451/

3282. The UN Human Rights Commission called for "firm and resolute action" to halt violations in BiH. "This deliberate and indiscriminate shelling of the civilian population of Sarajevo is part of a pattern of despicable and outrageous violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights", said the consensus statement read out by the Commission's chairman, Peter van Wulften Palthe. "The Commission . . . calls in the strongest possible terms for firm and resolute action to be taken immediately by the international community in order to stop these human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and other genocidal acts, rape and abuse of women, strangulation of Bosnian cities, shelling and killing of civilians; to secure a just and lasting peace in the Republic of Bosnia Hercegovina and to bring the war criminals to trial", it concluded. 4452/

3283. Japan condemned last Saturday's marketplace shelling, but remained non-committal on support for possible air strikes. "We strongly condemn such a barbarous and atrocious act against innocent civilians", Foreign Ministry deputy spokesman Kishichiro Amae said. 4453/

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that 53 artillery shells hit the city. 4454/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Some sniper activity was reported. Source(s): United Press International.

Casualties: According to report, no fatalities were reported by 8:00 p.m., and only one sniper victim was treated for injuries. Source(s): United Press International.
Narrative of Events:

3284. Fighting was reported as light in the city. According to reports, the city was calm, with no fatalities reported by 8:00 p.m. and just one sniper victim being treated at the state hospital. 4455/

(b) Local reported events

3285. Bosnian Serb and BiH forces agreed to an immediate cease-fire on the Sarajevo front and the withdrawal of their heavy weapons, UNPROFOR commander General Michael Rose said. The announcement came as members of NATO were reported to be near agreement on sending the Serb forces an ultimatum. Rose said after chairing talks between the two sides that the weapons would be placed under UNPROFOR control and that UN forces would be posted to key positions on the front. "With full consent of their political and military authorities I have today concluded an agreement between the representatives of the Bosnia-Hercegovina army and the Bosnian Serb army that there should be an immediate cease-fire in and around the city, i.e. that no further attacks or shooting should take place from either out or within the city, that there should be a positioning of UNPROFOR troops in key locations and sensitive places, that there should be monitoring and placing of all heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control", he announced. 4456/

3286. General Jovan Divjak, the deputy commander of the BiH army, 4457/ said that he doubted that the latest cease-fire would hold. "I don't believe in it. I think this is yet another game which the Serbs will get away with", he said. "We accepted the agreement only so that we would not be told we do not want talks on peace", Divjak added. 4458/

(c) International reported events

3287. NATO agreed to give Bosnian Serb forces 10 days, starting at 1:00 a.m. Friday, to withdraw their heavy weapons from Sarajevo or face airstrikes, a statement said. The statement also said that NATO would launch strikes at the Serbs' big guns found within 20 kilometres (13 miles) from Sarajevo which were not under UN control after 1:00 a.m. 21 February. The BiH government would also have to put its heavy weapons in the "exclusion zone" under control of UNPROFOR. "Heavy weapons of any of the parties found within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, unless controlled by UNPROFOR, will, along with their direct and essential military support facilities, be subject to NATO airstrikes", the statement said. 4459/

3288. At the United Nations in New York, an official said that the latest Sarajevo cease-fire could obviate the need for western military action. "If the cease-fire agreement and the details are accepted by all the parties, then it is obvious that there may be no need to launch airstrikes", said UN spokesman Ahmad Fawzi. "We hope it is a real cease-fire, we hope the parties realize that it is time to take a serious stand and end the bloodshed". 4460/

3289. US President Clinton stated that he was encouraged by the Bosnian Serb agreement to a cease-fire. "It's a good beginning but it shows, again, every time NATO shows a little resolve there we get some results", Clinton said. "Anyone, anyone shelling Sarajevo must recognize this fact and be prepared to deal with the consequences", Clinton said shortly after NATO approved its ultimatum demanding that Bosnian Serbs move their artillery within 10 days or face air strikes. 4461/

3290. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev said that Moscow was opposed to
threatened NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs. He tried to rally support for a Russian proposal to make the city a UN protectorate and said that Moscow might send its own troops to implement the plan. "We say yes to a security zone, yes to withdrawal of artillery and heavy weapons from this security zone--to exclude the possibility of bombardments and tragedies like the one which happened--but no to escalation of the conflict by resorting to air strikes", he said. Speaking during a visit to Kazakhstan, Kozyrev stated: "What we really need is to reduce and exclude hostilities and create a security zone around Sarajevo. This could be done by filling the zone with UN peacekeepers". He added, "I would not exclude Russia considering direct participation in UN peace-keeping efforts".

3291. Canada reversed its opposition and agreed to NATO air strikes in BiH, saying that it was encouraged by US President Clinton's efforts to reach a broader peace. Canada had opposed air strikes out of concern for its 800 peacekeepers on the ground in BiH, but agreed that NATO could no longer stand idle. "We have accepted [air strikes] in order to protect the civilian population and not see the repetition of the massacre of the last weekend", Prime Minister Jean Chretien told Parliament. "President Clinton's involvement and his determination to impress on the parties a peaceful solution is a factor that has influenced Canada's decision", Foreign Minister Andre Ouellet said. "We have the assurance that the Americans will be very much involved in this process of bringing the parties to a peace solution", he said. 4462/

3292. NATO commanders briefed Italian Defence Minister Fabio Fabbri in preparation for possible air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces. During a visit to the 5th Tactical Air force Command (ATAF) in northern Vicenza, Fabbri reaffirmed that Italy would allow its air bases to be used for the strikes. 4463/

3293. Foreign ministers from Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy and Romania met international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg in Geneva to discuss the effect on the region of economic sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia. Albanian President Sali Berisha, on the eve of the meeting, encouraged the conference participants to support NATO actions against Bosnian Serb forces. "I would wish that it [the conference] supports and encourages NATO to take punitive action against the perpetrators of the massacre", he told reporters on Tuesday. 4464/

10. 10/2/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was hit by a brief round of artillery and machine-gun fire just before midnight, shattering the UN cease-fire. 4465/ Source(s): Reuters.

Targets Hit: The downtown area; the area behind the Parliament building; the area near the Jewish cemetery. Source(s): Reuters.

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: One BiH soldier was reported wounded by an anti-aircraft round fired from Hrasno Brdo. 4466/ Source(s): Reuters.
Narrative of Events:

3294. The city was hit by a brief round of artillery and machine-gun fire just before midnight, shattering the UN cease-fire. Three shells hit the downtown area at 11:00 p.m. and were followed by a heavy burst of machine-gun fire that lasted about 10 minutes. The fighting took place around the contested front-line positions at Vrbanja bridge. Explosions were reported behind the parliament building on the BiH side and near the Jewish cemetery. 4467/ At 11:30 p.m., UNPROFOR reported three outgoing mortar rounds. At 11:40, Sector Sarajevo reported five mortar rounds from Skenderija and heavy fire exchanges for 10 minutes. 4468/

(b) Local reported events

3295. Bosnian Serbs rejected NATO's ultimatum to end their siege of Sarajevo or face air attacks and said that their heavy weapons would not be removed from around the city. "Despite this ultimatum, the Serb artillery will not move an inch", said their main spokesman Miroslav Tethoven. "We are ready to retaliate". 4469/ The Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb army, General Manojlo Milovanović, said: "The withdrawal of the artillery is out of the question. The Serbs have never accepted ultimatums and will not accept this one". At Pale, Radovan Karadžić's spokesman, Jovan Zametica, said: "We are not going to cave in. If NATO aircraft attack our positions, we are going to take them out". 4470/

3296. Russian Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin said later in the day, after a meeting with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, that the Bosnian Serbs were "committed to the arrangement" reached Wednesday with the BiH government and UN forces. 4471/

3297. French UN peacekeepers in armoured personnel carriers took to the streets in the city, ushering in the latest cease-fire agreement. Six French army platoons, numbering 40 men each and armed with 90 millimetre cannon mounted on armoured cars, were deployed. French Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pernod said that the "no man's land" strips taken over included Žuč Mountain, Mojmilo Hill, Dobrinja, the inner-city "Bridge of Friendship and Unity" and Vidikovac and Mount Trebević overlooking the Old Town. Pernod said that a joint commission of Serb and BiH government military officers coordinating the disengagement would meet on Friday to set in motion the first withdrawal of Serb artillery ringing the city. "We hope that tomorrow we will start to have a certain number of these heavy weapons withdrawn", he said. 4472/

3298. Closed negotiations on the cease-fire agreement's details were held at the airport among unidentified military officials from both sides under UN supervision. The talks were expected to continue on Friday morning. UNPROFOR BiH commander Lieutenant General Michael Rose said that the goal was to remove all Bosnian Serb artillery larger than 12.5 millimetres from positions in the mountains surrounding the city. 4473/

3299. The United States reportedly identified 200 to 300 possible targets around Sarajevo if and when airstrikes were ordered, a senior Pentagon official said. US surveillance overflights had reportedly given US officials a good idea of where possible targets were located but indicated that there still could be difficulty in hitting the targets, the officials said. "They are easy to hide. They dig them in, they camouflage them, they put them near schools", said General James Hill of the Defense Department's strategic planning office. 4474/
(c) International reported events

3300. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić said in Geneva that he would not take part in peace talks until last Saturday’s shelling was properly investigated to determine who was responsible. He spoke as he was entering the talks, and said that he would tell the BiH and Croatian delegations his conditions for proceeding. "I just want to say that we are not going on with the conference until we get an international investigatory body to investigate and resolve the Sarajevo massacre", Karadžić told reporters. 4475/

3301. In Geneva for the opening of the BiH peace conference, BiH Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić said that peace might be at hand in BiH. "There is a line that has been crossed", he said. It "might be the first step towards disengagement", he said. 4476/

3302. Russia called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss ways to demilitarize the city, in what some analysts deemed an effort to sidestep UN airstrikes. 4477/

3303. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou said that the NATO threat issued on Wednesday was "very regrettable, completely wrong and unpardonable". Speaking after a closed cabinet meeting Papandreou said that, in the event of a military intervention against Bosnian Serb forces, he would withdraw Greek crews serving with NATO early warning radar aeroplanes and refuse to allow allied forces to use the NATO airbase near Preveza, western Greece, for attacks. 4478/

11. 11/2/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the cease-fire in the city held in spite of minor violations. The withdrawal of heavy weapons to UN controlled areas began with a total of 13 artillery/mortars moved to the Bosnian Serb Lukavica barracks. 4479/ Another five were moved to the BiH army Tito barracks. 4480/ UNPROFOR report only three mortar shells fired by each side in the city. 4481/ Source(s): UNPROFOR; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3304. International efforts to lift the siege of Sarajevo moved forward as BiH and Bosnian Serb forces began handing over their big guns over to UN control. By late afternoon, five mortars of the BiH army had been moved to an asphalt parade ground in the city’s Tito barracks, guarded by Ukrainian UNPROFOR soldiers. Elsewhere, Serb troops began handing over heavy weapons to UN control at a former Yugoslav barracks in Lukavica. Seven Serb guns, including a multiple-barrelled rocket launcher and mortars, were delivered and peacekeepers expected another seven heavy weapons before the end of the day. 4482/ Well armed Serb troops were still stationed there, prompting concerns that they could easily regain their weapons if the truce and disarmament process broke down. 4483/
(b) Local reported events

3305. UNPROFOR BiH commander, General Sir Michael Rose, said that he was "reasonably satisfied" with the cease-fire that began on Thursday despite a burst of shelling and machine-gun fire late in the day. Bosnian Serb and BiH forces blamed each other for the violations but the UN said that both sides were guilty. "A comparatively small number of rounds have been fired since the start of the cease-fire—as far as I can judge, as many out of the city as into the city", Rose said in a statement through his spokesman. "It seems quite extraordinary that renegade military units are attempting to sabotage the cease-fire and thus prolong the suffering of their own people in Sarajevo". 4484/

3306. As peacekeepers negotiated with the warring factions for the surrender of their weapons, UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said: "So far, so good. For the first time in many, many months the people have been able to walk the streets without too much fear". UNPROFOR commander General Sir Michael Rose, toured the city on foot assuring people the world was serious about imposing peace. 4485/

3307. Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, ordered a follow-up investigation of the 5 February market shelling. The investigation was mandated to complement earlier investigations conducted by the UN, and was confined to the crater analysis and technical aspects of the explosions. The report was to include all relevant physical information, and any relevant findings with respect to culpability. The investigation team was composed of the following individuals: Colonel M. Gauthier, team leader; Major S. Khan; Captain Y. Lavarde; Lietenant Colonel N. Rumyanstev; and Captain J. Grande. 4486/

(c) International reported events

3308. In Washington, US Defence Secretary William Perry ordered 12 additional warplanes sent to Italy to join 65 American jets already there as part of an allied force keeping watch over BiH, the Pentagon said. 4487/

12. 12/2/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that the cease-fire was respected on the whole, but that no weapons were put under UNPROFOR control. Four cease-fire violations were reported. 4488/ Source(s): UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Sarajevo radio said that the past 24 hour period was the first day since April 1992 where there were no dead or wounded reported by local hospitals. 4489/ Source(s): Reuters.

Narrative of Events:

3309. Sarajevo remained generally quiet, although there were reports of scattered mortar, machine-gun, grenade and small-arms fire. 4490/
3310. Moves to demilitarize Sarajevo suffered a setback when Bosnian Serbs demanded BiH troops to withdraw from their positions defending the city. UN officials said that the Serbs refused to turn over more of their big guns to UNPROFOR unless BiH troops defending the city pulled back from their positions. 4491/

(b) Local reported events

3311. Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić confirmed in Geneva that his forces would withdraw their heavy artillery from Sarajevo, but he also said that BiH infantry must be controlled. "On 5th of February I agreed with Mr. Akashi a settlement for long-lasting cease-fire in Sarajevo and this agreement envisaged on-site control of heavy weaponry of both sides of Serbian and Moslem", Karadžić said. "We are not members of NATO. We do not live with NATO. We have agreed this cease-fire with Moslems brokered by Mr. Akashi and this agreement envisaged control of Moslem infantry", Karadžić said. 4492/

3312. Karadžić expressed concern about the advantage that BiH infantry would soon have. "Moslems have three times more numerous infantry than the Serbs. Serbian weaponry was the element of strategic balance. If we put our heavy weaponry under [UN] control, then the Moslem infantry should be under control too", he said. 4493/

(c) International reported events

3313. BiH peace talks were suspended today to allow time for a new diplomatic initiative by the US and Russia. As two days of negotiations on the shape of a new union of three ethnic states broke up, international mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said that they would not resume until "late February or early March". "The reason is that in the days to come both the United States and Russia will have high activity with the parties to see if they can influence the negotiating process", he said. 4494/

3314. European mediator, Lord Owen, said that the talks had made some progress, but he said that the talks had gone slowly "because the sides are all waiting, and in particular the Bosnian government [is waiting] for the American position to be clearer . . . Certainly, the Bosnian government is not going to shift its position until they get that, and also probably until they see what is happening in Sarajevo, and whether there are air strikes". 4495/

13. 13/2/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that during the last 24 hours, seven shells were fired into the city and eight were fired back. 4496/ UNPROFOR reported that the withdrawal of heavy weapons continued with 18 from the Bosnian Serb side and five from the BiH forces. 4497/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; UNPROFOR.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

3315. The cease-fire was reportedly being respected, although a "small number of violations" were observed, said Bill Aikman, spokesman for UNPROFOR.  

(b) Local reported events

3316. Talks on the surrender of Bosnian Serb and BiH heavy weaponry to UNPROFOR were again blocked by new Serb demands, one week before the end of the NATO ultimatum. Serb representatives failed to turn up in the morning for talks at the airport called by UNPROFOR, after the planned arms handover first failed to go ahead. UNPROFOR General Andre Soubirou, commander of the Sarajevo sector, immediately went to Pale to meet senior Serb military officials who demanded that BiH forces be confined to barracks.  

(c) International reported events

3317. NATO aeroplanes could stage airstrikes on Bosnian Serb forces within minutes of an attack, US Defense Secretary William Perry said. "From the time of the impact it's a matter of seconds to get the information coordinates to an airplane", Perry said in a television interview.  

14. 14/2/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Bill Aikman, spokesman for UNPROFOR said that the BiH army was taking advantage of the cease-fire to bolster its positions along several fronts around the city.  

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3318. Bill Aikman, spokesman for UNPROFOR said that the BiH army was taking advantage of the cease-fire to bolster its positions along several fronts around the city. "Bosnian infantry units are expanding and advancing their trench system in Žuč and Mojmilo", Aikman said. "They are improving their defence positions. It's a violation of the cease-fire".  

(b) Local reported events

3319. BiH and Bosnian Serb officials discussed the weapons handover at Sarajevo airport, but the key meeting was scheduled for Tuesday morning between Ratko Mladić, commander of the Bosnian Serb forces and Rasim Delić, the BiH army commander. If that meeting failed to produce a "concrete plan for the withdrawal of Serb artillery" from around Sarajevo, then NATO strikes
against any heavy guns would be "one step closer", a high-ranking UN officer said. 4504/

3320. US envoy Charles Reman arrived in Sarajevo for a two-day visit, and went straight into talks with BiH President Izetbegović. The talks were aimed at trying to bring the warring factions closer together on a plan for the partition of BiH. 4505/

3321. According to UNHCR, Bosnian Serbs did not allow a three-truck UNHCR convoy to cross the Unity and Fraternity bridge, newly under UN control, saying that it did not have the "necessary authorization". 4506/

(c) International reported events

3322. In Brussels, a NATO spokesman disputed remarks by the British deputy UNPROFOR commander in BiH, Lieutenant Colonel Simon Shadbolt, that the Serbs did not have to move their weapons as long as they were placed under UN control. Simple monitoring of the weapons was not good enough "because this has never stopped the weapons from being used", the spokesman said. 4507/

15. 15/2/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: According to reports, Bosnian Serb forces had to date placed 33 to 36 artillery pieces under UNPROFOR monitoring. BiH forces had reportedly handed over 10 mortars. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3323. According to one report, Bosnian Serbs had to date placed 33 artillery pieces under UNPROFOR monitoring. (However, these pieces remained within Serb barracks at Lukavica and Mokro) BiH forces reportedly handed over 10 mortars to Ukrainian UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo. 4508/ Another report said that Bosnian Serbs had turned in 36 artillery pieces. 4509/

(b) Local reported events

3324. A key meeting between top commanders of the BiH and Bosnian Serb forces at Sarajevo airport was canceled after BiH commander General Rasim Delić failed to show up. According to BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić, General Delić had left for central BiH and could not attend the meeting. "We shall not be sending representatives to this meeting, Ganić added. BiH Prime Minister Silajdžić said: "We have not been informed of the meeting". 4510/ On Wednesday, Vice President Ganić said that there was no question of their doing so "because the NATO resolution is not negotiable and imposes a deadline". 4511/

3325. Bosnian Serb leaders rejected demands to withdraw all of their heavy
arms from around the city. General Ratko Mladić told the Tanjug news agency that his weapons would stay put to protect Serbs against "fanatical Moslem units".

3326. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman warned Bosnian Serbs to accept the NATO ultimatum to withdraw its guns around Sarajevo by 21 February. "A new world war can break out in Sarajevo between civilizations unless we stop it", Tudjman said at an official dinner in Bucharest.

3327. Malaysia's 1,500 strong contingent serving with UNPROFOR was scheduled to become fully operational in BiH next month. According to Malaysian armed forces chief General Borhan Ahmad, some of the forces had taken up positions in the city, some were outside the city and others were on their way. These soldiers were armed only with light weapons such as assault rifles and mortars.

3328. According to UNPROFOR BiH commander Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Sarajevo's cease-fire was a model for peace that could be exported throughout BiH. "If we can persuade people to accept this sort of exercise in Sarajevo, of course there is a chance we can persuade them to accept it elsewhere", he said. "Certainly we've already started talking about that right now. I can promise you the plan is already in hand for establishing the same program elsewhere in Bosnia Hercegovina", Rose added. According to reports, the cease-fire had thus far brought down the number of war dead in the city from 98 in the first week of February to just one last week.

(c) International reported events

3329. NATO was reportedly increasingly critical of what it deemed as inadequate UN plans to monitor Bosnian Serb artillery, according to a source at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The source who declined to be identified said that plans by UNPROFOR to have monitors check on Serb artillery stored in Serb barracks did not amount to proper control. "We need to be serious about this. The control has to be strong enough to stop the weapons being used", the source said.

3330. NATO and United Nations agreed on how to control heavy weapons of Bosnian Serbs in the Sarajevo area, a UN spokesman said. "Coordination meetings between NATO and the UN have sorted out all points", UNPROFOR spokesman Peter MacFarlane said. His comments contrasted with reports from Brussels that NATO was becoming increasingly critical of apparently inadequate UN plans to monitor the Serb artillery around the city.

3331. Yugoslavia warned against NATO air strikes around Sarajevo. "Once you pull a trigger, it is difficult to stop. The recent decision by NATO is politically and militarily unwise and one that could have serious consequences on the ground", Yugoslav envoy Dragomir Djokic told the UN Security Council. Djokic joined more than 55 speakers addressing the 15-member council during the second day of a two-day debate on the BiH crisis to air views but not to take any decisions. This was the first discussion since NATO agreed last week to a request by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to use air power against shelling of civilians in Sarajevo.

3332. The US government made several strong statements regarding the consequences if Bosnian Serb artillery was not handed over to UNPROFOR after the NATO deadline goes into effect on Monday. White House spokesperson Dee Dee Myers said: Our bottom line has not changed. Weapons have to either be removed from the exclusion zone or put under UNPROFOR control. She added, "Any weapon that is either not under UN control or not removed from the exclusion zone..."
will be subject to air strikes after the deadline". 4518/

16. 16/2/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: BiH forces turned over an additional five artillery weapons to UNPROFOR. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: A sniper killed a 56 year-old man in Sarajevo, the first person to die since the current cease-fire went into effect last Thursday, UNPROFOR said. Ibrahim Osmiƒ was shot near the Vrbanja bridge, which separated the city centre from the Grbavica district. 4519/ "He was hit in the nose and the bullet went out the back of his head", said Alija Hodñiƒ, the city morgue director. 4520/ Source(s): The Press Association.

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3333. The BiH army put five more artillery weapons under UN control, BiH Vice-President Ejup Ganiç said. He did not specify the type of weapons given up. Ganiç said that the BiH had drawn up a list of its weapons and was prepared to fulfil its obligations. "As far as we are concerned it can all be wrapped up in a few hours". He said that the BiH forces had 100 heavy weapons compared with more than 600 for the Bosnian Serbs. 4521/

(b) Local reported events

3334. Canadian Colonel Michel Gauthier, who headed the UN's five-member commission of inquiry on the market shelling, reported that the mortar bomb which hit the Sarajevo market on 5 February could have been fired by either besieging Bosnian Serbs or defending BiH forces. The five-member investigative team, backed by two technical experts, found that the market blast was caused by a single high-explosive bomb from a conventional, factory made 120 millimetre mortar. The precise location of the weapon that fired the round could not be established. Gauthier said that the mortar round detonated on contact with a thin layer of asphalt laid over soft ground in the market, and not on the market table as initially thought. The tail fin of the mortar bomb had been retrieved from the crater, indicating that it was 120 millimetre in calibre but provided no precise details of manufacturer or origin. 4522/ "The distance of origin of fire overlapped each side of the confrontation line by 2,000 metres", Gauthier said. "Both parties are known to have 120mm mortars, and the bombs go along with them. The team has no reason to believe that either party does not have access to this type of ammunition". 4523/

3335. Mom…ilo Krajišnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb parliament expressed displeasure with the UN investigative commission's conclusions on the market shelling: "We are very unhappy with the results because the UN commission of experts has not carried out a detailed or in-depth investigation", Mom…ilo Krajišnik, speaker of the Bosnian Serb Parliament was quoted as saying by the Tanjug news agency. Krajišnik said that an autopsy of the victims could have determined whether a mortar bomb was responsible or not for the market shelling. 4524/
3336. After division over the meaning of the word "control" and several options for handling Bosnian Serb arms, UNPROFOR commander General Michael Rose said that heavy arms would be placed under the physical control of UNPROFOR and that if the warring factions attempted to take them back, air strikes would be launched against them. 4525/

3337. UNPROFOR Sarajevo sector commander, General Andre Soubirou briefed Bosnian Serb commanders in detail at a meeting on how guns were to be turned in. A similar message was given to BiH government commanders. The plan called for collected weapons to be placed in five depots or compounds, each less than a half square mile and surrounded by barbed wire. The compounds were to be under the control of unarmed UNPROFOR military observers and guarded by a platoon of at least 40 to 50 armed UNPROFOR soldiers. Bosnian Serbs would be permitted to send some maintenance personnel to take care of the weapons and a small number of infantry soldiers to guard them, but no gun or tank crews were to be allowed. The guns were to be unloaded and the ammunition kept in a separate place. The compounds were to be located away from firing positions. 4526/

3338. UNPROFOR commander Rose reported that he had ordered surveillance aircraft and ground radar units to pinpoint the position of any big gun firing after the NATO deadline expired. 4527/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman stated that 170 troops with 20 armoured personnel carriers were about 25 miles north-west of the city on route to help monitor the cease-fire. Aikman said that a British battalion near Vitez was also on standby for mobilization to patrol Sarajevo streets. France and Britain had also committed to sending two artillery-locating radar units each, Aikman said. 4528/

3339. UNPROFOR commander Rose requested up to 3,000 backup troops, a UNPROFOR spokesman said. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said the reinforcements, which would double the number of UN troops deployed in the city, would oversee the cease-fire agreement reached last week between Bosnian Serb and BiH leaders. 4529/ The new request for soldiers was in addition to reinforcements which began arriving in Sarajevo on Tuesday to consolidate the cease-fire. About 135 UN military observers were deployed in Sarajevo, up from 60 at the time of the mortar attack 10 days ago. 4530/

3340. Charles Redman, the US envoy to the former Yugoslavia urged the warring factions to seek a political settlement rather than provoke NATO air strikes around Sarajevo. "NATO is prepared to act", said Redman, after meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granij in Zagreb. "But our hope is that it won't be necessary to act, that people will comply with what's been asked and that shelling of Sarajevo will stop", he said. 4531/

(c) International reported events

3341. NATO said that it would not extend its 21 February deadline for Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their artillery from around Sarajevo. 4532/ "Our deadline is firm and will not be extended beyond the deadline set on 9 February"; a spokesman said after a weekly meeting of ambassadors from the 16 nation alliance in Brussels. 4533/ If air strikes go ahead, it would be NATO's first combat action since it was founded in 1949. 4534/

3342. The United States said that it was asked by the United Nations to contribute peacekeepers to demilitarize Sarajevo. There was, however, no sign that Washington was willing to do so. State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly said that she was unable to say if the US had formally turned down the request. But she told reporters: "I think the US position on (committing ground) troops (to BiH) remains unchanged". 4535/
3343. Russia blasted as "illegitimate" NATO's threat to bomb Bosnian Serb military positions around Sarajevo. "We are doing everything to prevent air strikes", Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced in his Parliament, "and we consider the NATO ultimatum illegitimate". 4536/

3344. In Naples, NATO reportedly assembled the largest collection of allied airpower since the 1991 Gulf War, with more than 170 combat aeroplanes deployed. 4537/

17. 17/2/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Russia announced that it was sending a contingent of 400 troops to Sarajevo and had persuaded Bosnian Serbs to comply with the NATO ultimatum. UNPROFOR said that Bosnian Serb forces had begun a major withdrawal of their weapons. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3345. Russia announced that it was sending about 400 troops to join UNPROFOR at Sarajevo and had persuaded the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the NATO ultimatum. 4538/

3346. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that Bosnian Serb forces had begun a major withdrawal of their weapons in compliance with the NATO ultimatum. 4539/

(b) Local reported events

3347. In Pale, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić flanked by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, announced in the evening that Bosnian Serbs had accepted the Russian withdrawal plan. 4540/

3348. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that Bosnian Serb forces had begun a major withdrawal of their weapons in compliance with the NATO ultimatum. 4541/

3349. Bosnian Serb commander Manojo Milovanović said that in the event of NATO air strikes, all foreigners in Serb-held territory would be at risk. "In case of air strikes, all foreigners in the Serb Republic in Bosnia, including UN employees, Red Cross representatives and journalists, will become hostages", he told the bi-monthly Serb magazine Intervju in an article published today. The chief of the Bosnian Serb army's general staff said that his troops would retaliate against air strikes and that one way of doing so could be "a massacre of international representatives". Milovanović made the threat in an interview on 10 February, a day after NATO issued its ultimatum. 4542/
(c) International reported events

3350. Russia offered to send 400 of its troops to help UNPROFOR with the
demilitarization of Sarajevo. Moscow reportedly tendered its offer to the UN
Secretary-General in a letter from Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev delivered
on Wednesday night, just days after it rejected the UN's request for forces to
help demobilize the Sarajevo combatants. 4543/

3351. BiH Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey said that the BiH government "cannot
accept the Russian initiative", and he accused Moscow of being biased in
favour of Bosnian Serb forces. British Ambassador David Hannay disagreed,
saying, "the Russians strongly want to see Sarajevo become a genuinely safe
area. They are wholeheartedly in favour of the efforts to get the heavy
weapons away from Sarajevo. 4544/

3352. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said in the evening that the
prospect of air strikes on Serb positions around Sarajevo seemed more remote
due to the Russian offer of troops in the area. 4545/

3353. US President Bill Clinton expressed hope that NATO air strikes against
Bosnian Serbs would not be necessary, but insisted that NATO was serious about
its threat. "I think the Serbs and others in Bosnia understand that the NATO
allies are dead serious about carrying this out", Clinton said at the White
House. 4546/

18. 18/2/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Two days before the NATO ultimatum, UNPROFOR
commanders and diplomats met in Croatia with a top NATO official to discuss
final plans for possible air strikes. 4547/ However, the NATO Southern
European commander noted that UNPROFOR was making real progress and that
sights were being vacated around Sarajevo. 4548/ Source(s): United Press
International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3354. Defence experts said that Bosnian Serb forces were withdrawing rather
than surrendering most of their big guns around the city in order to use them
in possible battles elsewhere in BiH. "They want to hold onto them just as you
or I would", said Paul Beaver, publisher of Jane's Defense Weekly. "There
could be an offensive shaping up in the north". Charles Dick of the Centre for
Conflict Studies, a British think-tank, said: "I have never thought Sarajevo
was a main objective of the Bosnian Serb army". He added: "Eastern Bosnia,
with the Muslim pockets at Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa, are far more
important to them, and these weapons could be used there in the spring once
the international furor over Sarajevo dies down". Unclassified information
about the numbers of Bosnian Serb guns and large-calibre mortars around the
city was hard to come by, but Beaver said they included several dozen 76
millimetre mountain guns, 122 millimetre D-30 and 152 millimetre D-20
howitzers. A D-20 has a maximum range of about 15 miles, using rocket assisted ammunition. At this range, the gun barrel would wear out in sustained firing. The optimum range was about nine miles, Dick said. He also had no figures on the number of big guns and 120 millimetre mortars in the area. An M-43 has a maximum range of 5,700 yards. According to Defence studies professor Fran Visnar of Zagreb University, the Bosnian Serb army had a total of about 300 guns within the range of Sarajevo. Some 220 had a calibre larger than 100 millimetre. "What they are likely to hand over are obsolescent weapons, mortars and recoilless anti-tank rifles", he said. Visnar said that the weapons around the city during the siege were deployed in two main rings, the first a few hundred yards up to two miles from the city, the second (with about 100 guns) three miles away. He estimated that the Serbs would have withdrawn about a third of their weapons by now and would complete the withdrawal in good time.

(b) Local reported events

3355. Two days before the NATO ultimatum, UNPROFOR commanders and diplomats met in Croatia with a top NATO official to discuss final plans for possible air strikes. "All we had to say to both sides, both on military and political levels has been said correctly", said French General Jean Cot, commander of UNPROFOR troops in the former Yugoslavia. "I believe that over the next two days, we must endeavor to fulfill what is our task", he said.

3356. "The UN Protection Force is making real progress, and we are seeing sights being vacated [around Sarajevo]", said US Navy Admiral Jeremy Boorda, the NATO Southern European Commander. "But our deadline is Sunday night and we all hope it will be met", he told reporters after meeting Cot and UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi at the UN base at Croatia's Zagreb airport.

3357. UN special envoy Akashi, who had the authority to request NATO to carry out initial air strikes, said he had reached an agreement with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić on the effective control of Serb weapons which had not yet been withdrawn. "Tomorrow [Saturday] I will go back to Sarajevo, for another meeting with Karadžić, and technical details of this agreement will be elaborated upon by the mixed commission, chaired by the UN commander in Sarajevo, General Andre Soubirou", Akashi said. Akashi told a press conference that, to date, 50 Bosnian Serb guns had been placed under UN control. "We do not have the account of weapons withdrawn from the 13-mile Sarajevo exclusion zone, but a significant number of artillery and mortars have been withdrawn from the zone", he said. Akashi, who met separately with Karadžić and BiH President Alija Izetbegović, said that the talks gave him hope that progress toward a durable cease-fire would be achieved, as well as disarmament and disengagement. "President Izetbegović expressed satisfaction with the talks with the Serb side", he said. "He hoped the progress will make it possible for us not to call for air strikes".

3358. Akashi, Cot and Boorda refused to comment on any specifics they had discussed over the past few days. "We wanted to make sure we're on the same level as to the ways and means of coping with the situation in and around Sarajevo", Akashi said. He said that his agreement with Karadžić included regrouping and the placing of those heavy weapons, artillery and mortars which had not yet been withdrawn. "These were significant elements in the agreement", Akashi said.

3359. UNPROFOR denied a news report that said it had blamed BiH forces in an official report for the 5 February market shelling in Sarajevo. UNPROFOR spokesman Peter MacFarlane said in Sarajevo that the report by French television channel TF1 was false. "This is totally fallacious and we deny it".
he said. 4555/

19. 19/2/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Four hundred Russian UNPROFOR troops left Croatia, setting off by road for Sarajevo (Pale) where they were expected to arrive on Sunday afternoon, just hours before the NATO deadline was due to expire. 4556/ Late in the day, NATO officials would give no indication about whether Bosnian Serb forces were close to meeting their declared aim of beating the NATO deadline by 24 hours. But UN officials said that UNPROFOR troops were fanning out around the exclusion zone looking for weapon sites and manning eight collection points. 4557/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3360. Four hundred Russian UNPROFOR troops left Croatia, setting off by road for Sarajevo (Pale) where they were expected to arrive on Sunday afternoon, just hours before the NATO deadline was due to expire. 4558/

3361. French UN troops arrived in three armoured vehicles in the main Serb position at Lukavica. They were equipped with 12.7 millimetre machine-guns and 20 millimetre cannons. Sergeant Major Robert Monnert said: "Our role is to control the arsenal that will be assembled here. I am going to post guards next to the arms and ensure that nobody comes to touch them. And if the order is given to defend the position where the weapons are collected, I will do it". UNPROFOR, charged with overseeing the withdrawal of all heavy artillery from within the exclusion zone, had recently been joined by reinforcement contingents from Malaysia and Jordan. 4559/

3362. Late in the day, NATO officials would give no indication about whether Bosnian Serb forces were close to meeting their declared aim of beating the NATO deadline by 24 hours. But UN officials said that UNPROFOR troops were fanning out around the exclusion zone looking for weapon sites and manning eight collection points. 4560/

(b) Local reported events

3363. According to reports, the anticipated arrival of Russian UNPROFOR troops in Pale had given Bosnian Serb forces new confidence. "By Sunday there will be 400 Russians around Sarajevo. How do you think the Americans are going to be able to bomb us after that? It would lead to world war, the crisis is over", an unidentified officer said. 4561/

3364. The deployment of Russian UNPROFOR forces had sparked a controversy over whether the Russian troops would remain neutral in light of Russia's special relations with the Serbs, with whom they shared common religious and ethnic ties. But in return Bosnian Serb forces had charged that the Jordanian and Malaysian troops would favour the BiH army. 4562/
Commenting on the NATO ultimatum US President Bill Clinton said: "We are determined to make good on NATO's word". He added: "Our military goal will be straightforward—to exact a heavy price on those who refuse to comply with the ultimatum".

French Defence Minister François Leotard backed the US insistence that the NATO ultimatum be respected, but he said that it would be re-examined at the last minute on Sunday night according to developments on the ground. US, French, British, Dutch and Italian defence ministers were due to meet at the Italian Air Force base at Aviano less than 12 hours before the deadline for what officials called a final session of preparation and evaluation. But NATO officials, who spoke on conditions of anonymity, said that there was no question that the Aviano or any other meeting would dilute the ultimatum issued last week by NATO.

Russian special envoy Vitaly Churkin warned in Moscow that "rash" air strikes by NATO in Sarajevo could spark a crisis between Russia and the West.

20. 20/2/94 (Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Throughout the day, Bosnian Serb forces, bogged down by snow and mechanical difficulties, were aided by UN forces with fuel and towing equipment in efforts to move heavy artillery. NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said at a news conference that there had been virtual compliance with NATO's ultimatum to remove heavy weapons around Sarajevo and that there was no need for air strikes "at this stage". However, he said that the threat of NATO action remained in force. Source(s): United Press International; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

Throughout the day, Bosnian Serb forces, bogged down by snow and mechanical difficulties, were aided by UN forces with fuel and towing equipment in efforts to move heavy artillery.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner said at a news conference that there had been virtual compliance with NATO's ultimatum to remove heavy weapons around Sarajevo and that there was no need for air strikes "at this stage". But he said that the threat of NATO action remained in force. "NATO's resolve to end the shelling of Sarajevo does not end today. We shall continue to verify compliance and will want to make a rapid assessment of this in the coming hours. We will remain vigilant", he said. He added that if weapons returned to the 20 kilometre zone to threaten Sarajevo or fired on the city from outside that zone, they would be subject to air strikes. Woerner also thanked Russia for its role in BiH in the last few days. "The just and lasting peace that we must now try to achieve in Bosnia involves close Russian
involvement", he said. 4569/

3370. Bosnian Serbs had strewn heavy weapons over 90 sites around Sarajevo and had cleared half of the locations by early in the day, UN officials reported. But Kofi Annan, the Under-Secretary-General in charge of peace-keeping, was unable to estimate how many weapons remained at the end of the day or were now in UN control. But he said that "the objective was largely reached", envoys attending a briefing for troop contributors reported. "It is our understanding that the guns are under control of the UNPROFOR and we are going to be waiting for verification", US Ambassador Madeleine Albright told reporters afterwards. Annan was briefing envoys shortly before NATO lifted its threat of immediate air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions around Sarajevo. Annan, in public comments to reporters, again appealed for 2,500 additional troops in Sarajevo to carry out the monitoring, which was apparently more complex than foreseen. He said that 400 Russians from Croatia, as well as troops redeployed from other regions in BiH would be expected to return to their station. "We have asked for 2,500 troops and some indirect locating equipment for us to pinpoint where artillery and mortar shells are coming from", he said. 4570/

3371. Earlier, BiH President Izetbegović formerly requested that NATO launch air strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in the hills around Sarajevo. In a letter to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner, Izetbegović requested, in part: "I have to tell you NATO's decision has not been respected by the Serb side. I think that heavy weaponry that remains tonight after midnight should be a target for NATO air strikes". The request was reported on BiH radio. 4571/

3372. Earlier in the day, newly arrived Russian UN troops were greeted by an estimated 3,000 Bosnian Serbs with homemade plum brandy, bread and salt, a traditional Slavic custom. 4572/ UNPROFOR information officer, Captain Guy Viney, said that the Russian troops would probably be deployed into Serb territory to the south-east of the city. This would include Vraca, and Mount Trebević. Viney said that the Russians would have their own zone of responsibility and would not be mixed with other troops. 4573/

3373. Outside Pale, Serb forces held a party for over 250 journalists, opening up the slopes for downhill skiing under spotlights and serving warm beverages from 9:00 to 10:00 p.m.. At Vidikovac, one of the Bosnian Serb positions, soldiers roasted a bull on a spit and reportedly celebrated with UNPROFOR soldiers. Bosnian Serb officials said that the site would be lit up as well "so that it would be visible for airstrikes". 4574/

3374. Three mortar locating radars and a 60 member contingent of the British Royal Artillery Force were dispatched from Zagreb to Sarajevo. A UN spokesman said they would set up on Sarajevo hillsides to locate the firing point of any shell. 4575/

(b) Local reported events

3375. Earlier, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžič said that although snow was hampering the withdrawal of weapons, it should be completed ahead of the midnight deadline imposed by NATO. "I think we will make it", he said in an interview with ABC television. "NATO will not have any simple reason to act", he said. "We Serbs do not cause any trouble with NATO". He repeated a warning made earlier in the day that his troops would fire back if attacked by warplanes. "Certainly we will have to defend ourselves", he said. 4576/ Two hours before the deadline, Karadžič told CNN that the heavy weapons would be withdrawn or turned over to UN personnel. He told an interviewer that Serbs would meet the deadline imposed by NATO. "I'm positive about that", Karadžič
said when asked specifically if the weapons would be pulled back to protect Sarajevo. He said that his forces planned to meet the deadline or transfer the weapons, adding one qualifier: "only if (the) United Nations don't have enough personnel". 4577/

3376. Five hours before the NATO ultimatum was to go into effect, UNPROFOR BiH commander, General Sir Michael Rose said: "I have soldiers working out there tonight ensuring that by tomorrow morning we will have got as clear a picture . . . as we possibly can". He added, "I remain reasonably optimistic that we will come to a peaceful end to this terrible war". Rose stated further that he expected to be at home "in bed" when the deadline fell, but that if there were any breaches of the ultimatum, "those who perpetrated those breaches will suffer the consequences accordingly". 4578/

3377. UN special envoy Yasushi Akashi said that snow would prevent the Bosnian Serb forces from meeting NATO's deadline for removal of all of their heavy guns, but he urged against immediate NATO air attacks. He told reporters: "This failure is not necessarily sufficient reason to call in air strikes". Speaking from the Bosnian Serb Army's Lukavica barracks, he said: "Because of the weather, snow and road conditions, not all the weapons which have not been withdrawn outside the exclusion zone may be in actual control of the United Nations Protection Force by the end of the day". 4579/

3378. Earlier, BiH UN ambassador Mohammad Sacirbey said on ABC television that his forces were complying with the NATO deadline. "Our information is of course that our heavy weapons, and we only have about 50 of them, are being withdrawn", he said. 4580/

3379. It was reported that BiH President Alija Izetbegović met with Russian special envoy, Vitaly Churkin, who assured the president that the 400 Russian peacekeepers sent to Sarajevo would be professional and objective. 4581/

c) International reported events

3380. As the NATO deadline for possible airstrikes neared, Russia called for an emergency session of the Security Council. But the closed-door informal session resulted in an exchange of views rather than any action. Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov told reporters that Moscow had been alarmed about possible air strikes and was worried that "snow was hampering everything and obstructing everyone". He said that the Serbs had left guns for UNPROFOR, which it could not find in the snow, but that the UN statement on holding off air strikes was welcome news. Vorontsov also promoted his plan to put Sarajevo under UN administration immediately. 4582/

3381. US President Bill Clinton said early in the day that he was encouraged by reports on compliance with the UN-NATO deadline in Sarajevo, but that some weapons remained in position. "What happens after 7:00 p.m. [Washington time of the deadline] will be determined by facts on the ground", Clinton said. "The deadline will stand". 4583/

3382. US Secretary of State Christopher, interviewed early in the day by ABC television, warned that despite the complications caused by snowfall, "a deadline is a deadline". Every weapon that has not been moved or put under control of the UN is subject to attack, starting after midnight", Christopher said. However, he also said that it could take hours for UN observers to assess whether or not the weapons withdrawal had been complied with, meaning that air strikes were unlikely to be carried out immediately after midnight. 4584/
3383. In London, British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said that he was confident that NATO’s credibility would remain intact after the expiration of NATO’s deadline even if air strikes were not launched. Hurd said that the combined approach of NATO, UN military leaders and Russia had "come together" in a manner he hoped would be effective. 4585/

21. 21/2/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: The city was reported as calm, despite the by now routine roar overhead of NATO warplanes carrying out aerial reconnaissance of the heavy artillery withdrawal. 4586/ UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that Bosnian Serb forces had turned in more than 260 weapons by the early morning NATO deadline, with BiH forces handing over more than 45. 4587/ A senior UNPROFOR officer said that several dozen Bosnian Serb weapons still remained outside UN control, but that they would all be accounted for by midday Tuesday. 4588/ Source(s): Agence France Presse; United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3384. The Russian UNPROFOR forces in Sarajevo assumed their peace-keeping role in Bosnian Serb-held Grbavica. The Russians moved into a badly damaged former civilian police academy building 300 yards from the front line, well known as the site of violent clashes in the early days of the conflict. BiH government officials said that the Russian presence there would bolster the Serb cause and described it as a provocation. The Russian troops maintained that they were in Sarajevo only to patrol the confrontation line and to help maintain the current cease-fire. 4589/

(b) Local reported events

3385. Bosnian Serb Vice President Nikola Koljević said that the thought of the danger of NATO air strikes against Serb positions around Sarajevo was over. "We believe that there is absolutely no danger any longer of air strikes", Koljević said to a local Serbian radio station. "The worst crisis is now over and the Bosnian war is nearly at an end", he said, adding that Bosnian Serbs celebrated the NATO ultimatum "like it was New Year's Eve". 4590/

3386. BiH President Izetbegović hailed the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy guns as a "victory" on Sarajevo television. "It is not without deficiencies but it is a victory because they are not killing us anymore", he said. 4591/

(c) International reported events

3387. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared the UN operation to silence guns around Sarajevo a "great success" and said that the threat of air strikes needed to be kept in reserve. "What happened was a great success for
the United Nations", he said. "And we have been able to obtain this without using the air strikes". He cautioned, however, that the world must prepare itself, "for very long and difficult negotiations". 4592/

3388. The Kremlin declared its mediation in BiH a diplomatic triumph. Boris Yeltsin's press spokesman, quoted by Interfax news agency stated: "It is not just that Russia has returned to the roots of its historical . . . role in the Balkans and defended the Serbs, whose faith, culture and national spirit is close to us", spokesman Vyacheslav Kostikov told the agency. "It has firmly established the parameters of its influence in Europe and the world". Special envoy Vitaly Churkin told Russian television: "The West should learn a lesson from the current Bosnian crisis when it is over . . . And the lesson is that Russia should be treated as an equal partner, not the way some of them did it this time". 4593/

3389. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev proposed deploying western troops as buffers in positions around Sarajevo controlled by the BiH army. According to reports, this proposal received a cool response from the United States. 4594/

3390. United States Defense Secretary William Perry warned that NATO warplanes would enforce continued compliance with the exclusion of heavy weapons from around the city and would retaliate against any resumed shelling of Sarajevo. Perry said that he was "cautiously optimistic" about compliance by both the Bosnian Serbs and the BiH government but added that "compliance is a continuous act". The defense secretary said that NATO aircraft would monitor compliance and would remain ready to strike to enforce it. Perry, who had talked regularly by telephone with Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev in the day's before Sunday's deadline, praised the "constructive role" played by Moscow in winning compliance with the arms rollback. He said that he had asked Grachev to encourage the Bosnian Serbs not to transfer their heavy weapons from Sarajevo to other war fronts elsewhere in BiH. Perry and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, appeared together at a Pentagon news conference. 4595/

3391. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said that Sarajevo should be put under UN control. He also called for action in other UN-declared security zones. Speaking on Europe 1 radio, Juppé said: "The objective of the next few days is that greater Sarajevo be placed under UN administration and that the UN acquires the means to do it". He added that the main aim was still to achieve a negotiated settlement. He also warned that the NATO air strike threat remained in place. "The threat of air strikes in the event of the (Sarajevo) cease-fire being violated is as great as before", he said. 4596/

22. 22/2/94 (Tuesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Almost two days after the NATO ultimatum, heavy weapons were still reported around the city. But UNPROFOR officials stressed that there had been "effective compliance" with the terms of the ultimatum and said that they hoped to gather the remaining weapons in a few days. 4597/ Sarajevo itself was reported quiet. 4598/ However, Sarajevo radio reported that an 82 millimetre mortar shell hit the Brekin Potok neighbourhood at about 9:00 p.m.. UN officials could not confirm the report. 4599/ Source(s): The Press Association; Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: The Brekin Potok neighbourhood. Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3392. Almost two days after the NATO ultimatum, heavy weapons were still reported around the city. But UNPROFOR officials stressed that there had been "effective compliance" with the terms of the ultimatum and said that they hoped to gather the remaining weapons in a few days. "We are searching out isolated weapons that have been left behind and are bringing them under control, UNPROFOR spokesman, Bill Aikman said. "(Removing weapons) is not as easy as snapping your fingers", he said. "I got the feeling that as the deadline neared the Serbs couldn't move some of the guns so they just walked away from them". UN soldiers returning from some of the eight weapons collection sites said that the hills around the city looked like the route of a retreating army. They described tanks abandoned for lack of fuel, howitzers that had slid off roads and unattended artillery still in firing positions. Armed UN patrols and military observers were trying to verify whether weapons not yet brought to UN sites were able to be fired. Others towed away some of the artillery left behind. Aikman said that four French UNPROFOR helicopters were being used to reach remote gun positions and pin-point undeclared weapons sites. Video shot from one of the helicopters reportedly showed a number of Serb tanks and artillery pieces still dug into position on the hills to the east of the city. 4600/

3393. Sarajevo itself was reported quiet. 4601/ However, Sarajevo radio reported that an 82 millimetre mortar shell hit the Brekin Potok neighbourhood at about 9:00 p.m.. UN officials could not confirm the report. 4602/

(b) International reported events

3394. France offered a two-year plan for putting Sarajevo under UN control including appointing a civilian administrator and extending safety zones to three more cities. French diplomats presented the three-part proposal to the UN missions from Russia, Britain, Spain and the United States for discussion during Wednesday's Security Council meeting. Russia had also voiced support for putting Sarajevo under UN control, but the US has said that should be carried out in the context of an overall peace plan. 4603/

3395. In Bonn, Russian and Western European officials met and agreed the next step would be to extend the peace effort across BiH. But even as they spoke, war reports were coming in from across the Republic. German foreign ministry political director Juergen Chrobog, who chaired the meeting of high-level representatives told reporters afterwards that it was necessary to ensure that the weapons that were withdrawn from Sarajevo following the NATO ultimatum "do not show up in other battlefields. We must prevent at any price any spillover". 4604/

3396. US Defense Secretary William Perry said that he was relieved that NATO air strikes had not been needed in BiH, but stressed that the mission was not yet completed. "I can't tell you how relieved I am that we did not need to call on those young men to go on those air strikes", Perry told the House Armed Services Committee. Earlier in the day, Washington said that it would not immediately send peacekeepers to BiH, as the Russians had asked, even if NATO extended the ban on heavy artillery. "It's not something that we plan to do. Our position has not changed", said White House spokeswoman Dee Dee Myers.
“There has been no change in our position”, Myers said. “The only circumstances under which we would send ground troops in Bosnia would be to implement a workable diplomatic solution, a negotiated settlement among all the parties”. 4605/

23. 23/2/94 (Wednesday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Gunfire was reported early on the front line in the city but the isolated incidents failed to disturb the cease-fire that had held for two weeks. 4606/ Sniper fire was also reported. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: In a rash of incidents, French soldiers were fired upon at the Sarajevo airport. Two soldiers of the BiH army were killed by snipers and one was wounded in the city. 4607/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Two BiH army soldiers were killed by snipers and one was wounded in the city. 4608/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Narrative of Events:

3397. Gunfire was reported early on the front line in the city but the isolated incidents failed to disturb the cease-fire that had held for two weeks. The small-arms fire was reported shortly after midnight and at about 5:00 a.m. and came from the direction of the Grbavica district. UNPROFOR Sarajevo commander, General Andre Soubirou, commented: "Now we are counting automatic arms fire while 12 days ago thousands of shells were falling on the town". 4609/

3398. "The cease-fire is still in effect although there has been small-arms fire", UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said. Officials at the Koševo hospital said that they received two dead BiH soldiers killed by sniper fire on the eastern fronts of Špicaste-Stijene and Kozja,uprija. 4610/

3399. UNPROFOR spokesman Aikman said that a BiH soldier was wounded in fighting at the Jewish cemetery in southern Sarajevo, despite the presence of Russian UNPROFOR troops on the Serb side and French UNPROFOR troops with the BiH forces. 4611/

3400. French soldiers were shot at near the Cymbeline radar installation at the Sarajevo airport, French information officer Colonel Richard Pernod said. He said that there were two or three shots and that the French returned fire. The shooting then stopped. One report said that the fire had apparently come from Serb positions, but this was not confirmed. 4612/

24. 24/2/94 (Thursday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Machine-gun and rifle fire was reported overnight and into the day. 4613/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Targets Hit: Not specified
Description of Damage: Not specified
Sniping Activity: Not specified
Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3401. Machine-gun and rifle fire was reported overnight and into the day. 4614/

3402. Sarajevo radio reported heavy shelling of the Maglaj-Tešanj region where Serb forces were reportedly trying to link the town of Pale to Serb-held areas west of the city. 4615/

(b) Local reported events

3403. BiH President Alija Izetbegović charged that Bosnian Serb forces had failed to honour the NATO ultimatum to withdraw all artillery from Sarajevo. In a statement read to reporters by BiH Vice President Ejup Ganić, Izetbegović gave a list of weapons not pulled out since the NATO ultimatum. "According to reliable data, the realization of the ultimatum is not accomplished", the statement said. The statement listed sightings by BiH sources (from Monday to Wednesday) of eight tanks, three armoured personnel carriers and at least 16 artillery pieces in the exclusion zone around the city. Whether these weapons remained Thursday could not be immediately confirmed. UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman said that there were still at least eight weapons sites to be checked and that there were additional sites where Bosnian Serbs were refusing to hand over arms to UNPROFOR. Ganić charged that the 260 artillery pieces collected thus far from the Serbs included many obsolete arms and many below the high calibre weapons the Serbs possessed. 4616/

3404. BiH and Bosnian Serb officials agreed at a meeting at the Sarajevo airport to ease some of the restrictions that had isolated the city. Sarajevo radio reported that roads and power lines into the city and a city-centre bridge linking Serb and government-held neighbourhoods would reopen under the agreement, and that some civilians would be allowed to move between areas held by the BiH government. At the airport meeting, Bosnian Serbs reportedly agreed to open routes from Sarajevo to Visoko and Zenica west of the city through the Serb-held town of Ilijaš. Foreign aid convoys and civilians with special permission would be allowed to move along this and perhaps other "blue routes" patrolled by UNPROFOR. Teams of Bosnians and Bosnian Serbs were to discuss repairing power and gas lines to the city and opening the Bridge of Brotherhood and Unity connecting the Grbavica district with the BiH-held Marijin Dvor area. 4617/
25. 25/2/94 (Friday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: Three detonations were reported in the morning. However, the UN said that there was "nothing to report" about any cease-fire violations. 4618/ Source(s): United Press International.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3405. The UN said that the cease-fire held throughout the day. UNPROFOR military spokesman Major Rob Annick said that there was "nothing to report" about any cease-fire violations in Sarajevo. He said that the UN could not confirm that three detonations heard in the morning had come from artillery shells, in violation of the cease-fire. 4619/

26. 26/2/94 (Saturday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: UNPROFOR reported that there were three mortar firings (one from the BiH side and one from the Bosnian Serb side). These were considered isolated incidents and not a "break" of the NATO ban on heavy weapon fire. 4620/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Not specified

Casualties: Not specified

Narrative of Events:

3406. UNPROFOR said that there were three mortar firings, the first coming in the early morning from the BiH army. But French Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pernod played down their significance, saying that they were isolated incidents and not a "break" of the NATO ban on the firing of heavy weapons. Pernod, press officer for the UN Sarajevo command, provided a statement from "Sector Sarajevo" that said there had been "at least one mortar cease-fire violation" from the BiH side and "two mortar cease-fire violations" from the Serbs. "The Bosnians started first", Pernod said of the shootings, which were not, however, apparently linked as they were hours apart and in different sectors. Pernod said that UNPROFOR in Sarajevo was not asking for NATO aeroplanes to react, although the statement issued a warning that "everyone has to be aware that a cease-fire break will lead to an air riposte asked by UNPROFOR". 4621/

3407. UNPROFOR press officer Dutch Major Rob Annink said that radar installed around the city had detected three mortar shootings during the day. The first
at 3:30 a.m., came from BiH positions in Žuć, some three kilometres to the north. The second at 9:45 a.m. came from Serb positions west of Vogošća, which is two miles further to the north. The third at 11:15 a.m. came from west of Jablanica, a village 10 kilometres south of the city. However, Annink said that UN observers dispatched to these sites had "found no guns or reports of detonations". He also said that there had been "no reports or complaints" about mortar fire from either the Bosnian Serbs or BiH forces, and said that this explained why the mortar fire could not be officially confirmed. For his part, Pernod insisted the shooting had been confirmed since they had appeared clearly on radar.

(c) International reported events

3408. The UN Security Council reportedly neared an agreement late in the day, on a resolution ordering a lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. "The French draft is close to an agreement. We will be bringing that on Monday morning", said Roble Olhaye of Djebouti. Under the most recent version of the proposal, the United Nations would name a senior civilian official to work with the BiH government to re-establish electricity and water service in the city, except for Serb-run Pale. The Council was considering demanding that all sides in the conflict allow civilians and aid to travel in and out of the city without going through checkpoints. The draft also requested that the UN Secretary-General extend the same UN protection to Maglaj, Brčko, Mostar and Vitez that Sarajevo and five other BiH cities had over the past year.

3409. Russia's military chief of staff, General Mikhail Kolesnikov, speaking at a news conference, said that the "trust factor" between Serbs and Russians played a key role in reaching the agreement on the demilitarization of Sarajevo and stated that the West should show a better understanding of those special ties. "Our partners in the West should consider, in an objective manner, the trust factor between Serbs and Russians and the fact that Moscow is deploying its troops in Bosnia while the threat of airstrikes is always present", he added. Kolesnikov reiterated that Russia opposed the NATO threat of airstrikes and stated that Moscow would have considered the military action, had it been carried out, as a "violation of its rights and interests".

27. 27/2/94(Sunday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A French UNPROFOR officer reported that a mortar shell hit 500 metres north of the airport at about 10:00 p.m. The officer also said that BiH forces opened up heavy machine-gun fire at 9:30 p.m. UNPROFOR said that it saw Bosnian Serb forces driving at least six tanks out of the weapons-free zone around Sarajevo, in violation of agreements with the UN and the NATO ultimatum. Source(s): Agence France Presse; Reuters.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: Sniper fire was reported in the eastern and western parts of the city. Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Casualties: Sarajevo radio reported that three persons had been wounded in the city over the past 24 hours. Source(s): Agence France Presse.
Narrative of Events:

3410. The city was reported as calm, with springlike weather and people taking to the streets after two weeks of relative calm. 4629/

3411. Sarajevo radio, however, reported machine-gun and sniper fire in the eastern and western parts of the city. 4630/

3412. A French UNPROFOR officer reported that a mortar shell hit 500 metres north of the airport at about 10:00 p.m.. The officer also said that BiH forces opened up heavy machine-gun fire at 9:30 p.m.. 4631/ The officer, who asked not to be named, said he could not identify where the mortar shell came from. He also said that three Bosnian Serb tanks were seen from the airport moving north-west at about midnight. 4632/

(b) Local reported events

3413. UNPROFOR said that it saw Bosnian Serb forces driving at least six tanks out of the weapons-free zone around Sarajevo, in violation of agreements with the UN and the NATO ultimatum. "We were not aware of the tanks until we saw them leaving", said UNPROFOR spokesman Bill Aikman. "It is of concern to us. We are increasing our ground patrols in the area to clarify if any more (heavy weapons) are hiding". Aikman said that UN military observers saw "six or seven" tanks speeding out of the exclusion zone under cover of darkness in the early hours of the morning. Asked if there had been any thought given to calling in NATO airstrikes against the tanks rather than letting them escape the zone, Aikman said: "The event was over before a decision like that could have been made". He added that the tanks had less than 10 kilometres to go to leave the zone when they were observed. He said that they were in the clear before UNPROFOR commander Sir Michael Rose could be informed. 4633/

3414. A UN Sector Sarajevo statement complained that the 1st Bosnian Corps had refused to allow journalists to visit the positions on Žuč under UNPROFOR control. The BiH army had explained the ban as a need to protect military secrets, but the UN noted that Bosnian Serbs were ready to allow the visit. "It's necessary to note that at least one mortar cease-fire violation came from the Bosnian side proving that some weapons have escaped control", the statement said. 4634/

3415. BiH government officials charged that Bosnian Serb heavy artillery withdrawn from around Sarajevo in line with the NATO ultimatum was being used to set up attacks on Maglaj and other BiH-held areas. 4635/

28. 28/2/94 (Monday)

(a) Military activity

Combat and Shelling Activity: A single explosion was reported along the confrontation line at about 12:15 a.m.. 4636/ Source(s): Agence France Presse.

Targets Hit: Not specified

Description of Damage: Not specified

Sniping Activity: An upsurge in sniper activity was noted by observers in the city. 4637/ Source(s): Reuters.

Casualties: Not specified
Narrative of Events:

3416. A loud explosion hit the city at about 12:15 a.m., in what appeared to be a mortar bombing. The lone detonation was along the confrontation line in the city. 4638/

(b) Local reported events

3417. Bosnian Serb General Manojlo Milovanović, told the Tanjug news agency that he would use force to prevent the UN from reopening the Brotherhood and Unity bridge in Sarajevo and to stop humanitarian convoys from moving freely through BiH without his command's permission. "We shall prevent by force if necessary the attempt to reopen the bridge", he said. The UN had said that the bridge would open today. Announcing its decision, UNPROFOR spokesman Major Rob Annink said: "Both sides have agreed to the opening". 4639/

(c) International reported events

3418. In Washington, BiH and Croat officials entered a second day of talks discussing a proposal for a Muslim-Croat bi-national entity in BiH that might later bring Serbs into the structure and preserve the Republic's multi-ethnic unity. 4640/
Notes

1/ See Appendix 3, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle); Appendices 6-9.

2/ The publication, Breakdown in the Balkans, A Chronicle of Events, January 1989 to May 1993, a Carnegie Endowment Special Publication compiled by Samantha Powers, utilizes reports from the Economist, Facts on File, Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the International Herald Tribune, Keesing's Record of World Events, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, Radio Free Europe/Radio Free Liberty Daily Report, the US Department of State Dispatch, and the Washington Post. This chronology was updated by the IHRLI staff.

3/ Linden Productions has provided IHRLI and the Commission of Experts with volunteer services in creating a computerized videotape database archive, allowing all video footage to be stored in a digital format on CD-ROM.

4/ This analysis is contained in the Appendices.

5/ See Appendix 1, Sarajevo Targets of Shelling with Accompanying Key.

6/ See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling Recorded in the Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

7/ See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas. This table provides a monthly breakdown of the shelling activity in each of the areas designated in the city and is based upon reports contained in the chronology.

8/ See Appendix 6, Photographs Picturing Targets Shelled in Sarajevo. These photographs were submitted by the BiH War Crimes Commission and other sources. In addition to including photographs of shelled targets, this Appendix contains listings of reported shelling dates for the targets which frequently appear in the chronology. Background summary descriptions are also provided for some of the targets pictured.

9/ A team of statisticians from the DePaul University Department of Mathematical Sciences, under the supervision of Dr. Effat Moussa, Director of Graduate Program Applied Mathematics, and graduate student Diane Horstman, helped analyse the statistical information in the chronology.

10/ See Appendix 2, Table of Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

11/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed. This table includes only those reports in the chronology which document the daily total number of persons killed. Numbers of reported killed in individual incidents are not included.

12/ See Appendix 3, Table of Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number of Wounded. This table includes only reports in the chronology which document the total number of persons wounded. Numbers of reported wounded from individual incidents are not included.

13/ See Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day. This graph presents the information contained in Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported, Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, and Appendix 3, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded. By combining the daily shelling and casualty reports in a graph form, it is meant to present the most complete picture of the events in Sarajevo during
Notes (continued)

the siege. See also, Appendix 2, Graph of Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Week. This graph is a weekly breakdown of Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day.

14/ See Appendix 2, Graph of Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events. This graph contains the same information as Appendix 2, Reported Shelling Activity and Casualties by Day, but also charts significant political events contained in the chronology.

15/ For an analysis on the link between shelling activity and political events, see paragraphs 42-43 below.

16/ See Appendix 1 for maps of Sarajevo. The first map is a detailed city plan. The second and third maps illustrate the Sarajevo's topography and the areas surrounding the city.

17/ Sarajevo was a cosmopolitan city sharing many characteristics with other major European cities. The surrounding areas are, however, generally inhabited by a rugged, mountain-rural population. There are, therefore, significant social differences between the city's defenders and the besiegers.

18/ See Appendix 2, Weekly Casualties Source: BiH Institute for Public Health. The casualty reports contained in this table are based on Institute for Public Health Bulletins beginning on 26 June 1992 and ending on 27 September 1993. Any inconsistencies which appear in the data reported by the Institute for Public Health are noted. For example the Bulletins reviewed initially reported victims as "killed", but subsequently listed victims under a broader category: "killed, died of undernourishment, cold and missing". As a result, the table lists this category as "killed or missing" and the sudden increase in numbers from 2,349 to 7,468 on 9 November 1992, reflects the change in the Institute for Public Health's methodology. Similarly, on 16 August 1992, there is a sudden increase in the total number of wounded from 9,446 to 22,677. This increase is due to the fact that the Institute for Public Health then began reporting both severely and lightly wounded persons. The total of 22,677 represents the combined number of persons wounded and thereafter remains consistent. Further, on 9 November 1992, there is a decline in the number of heavily wounded from 13,605 to 12,000. This sudden decline remains unexplained.

19/ It is not clear exactly what percentage of these casualties involve civilians and non-combatants. However, the following indicates that a high percentage of the city's victims have been civilians: the 2 August and 10 August 1992 Bulletins estimated that 70 per cent of the casualties were civilian; the 19 August 1992 Bulletin estimated that 75 per cent of the casualties were civilian; and the 27 September 1992 Bulletin estimated that 80 per cent of those killed and 75 per cent of the wounded were civilians. Information obtained by the Canadian War Crimes Investigative Team from Dr. Arif Smajkic of the Health Institute indicated that about 85 per cent of the casualties in Sarajevo itself were non-combatants. See Annex VI.A, Sarajevo Investigation.

20/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Killed, for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total number of persons reported killed is documented.

21/ See Appendix 2, Daily Casualty Totals Reported: Number Wounded for a table containing the daily reports appearing in the chronology where the total
Notes (continued)

number of persons reported wounded is documented.

The city's residents have attempted to maintain relative normality in the lives of their children. Makeshift elementary schools have been established throughout the city in positions away from snipers and shellfire. These schools move from building to building, partly because the classrooms have been destroyed, but also because groups of children have become targets of shelling attacks. Despite these efforts, the schools are still attacked. For example, on 9 November 1993, a Sarajevo schoolhouse was hit by shellfire, killing at least three children and their teacher, and wounding dozens of others. More recently on 3 January 1994, two shells exploded near a crowd of children as they left a kindergarten, killing at least one and wounding several others.

See Appendix 6, which includes several photographs of the makeshift cemeteries which have appeared throughout the city.

Structural and property damage in this report refers to the infrastructure, as well as to publicly and privately owned property. For a specific treatment of the destruction of utilities, see paragraphs 48-50 below.

See materials submitted by the BiH Government, IHRLI Doc. No. 27259-27260.

See Council of Europe, Third Information Report on War Damage to the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education, 20 September 1993, Doc. 6904, IHRLI Doc. No. 39833.

For a comprehensive breakdown of the forces around the city, see Appendix 8, The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle).

Reports indicate that Hajrulahovic served as the 1st Corps commander through at least 9 May 1993.


Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at the Hague on 18 October 1907.


Conflict, 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (1956).

34/ UNPROFOR has reported that BiH forces have been scattered in different parts of the city and that they have set up mortars and artillery beside hospitals and schools. The location of military forces and weapons too close to civilian or other protected targets may either justify return fire or provide a basis for "military necessity". However, clearly, this does not apply to intentional attacks upon civilian targets and intentional targeting of civilian targets and sniping against civilians. In addition, there may be questionable situations such as the area near the UN-controlled Sarajevo airport. This area constitutes a corridor between the inner-perimeter defenders and the outer-perimeter defenders. Although neither side is permitted in this enclave, it is, however, used on a regular basis by the defenders to bring supplies and munitions from the inner-perimeter to the outer-perimeter defenders.

35/ See Appendix 2, Total Daily Shelling Activity Reported.

36/ The chronology contains shelling counts provided in available UNPROFOR daily, weekly and monthly reports, as well as in media, wire reports and other sources. UNPROFOR did not officially begin counting shelling activity in Sarajevo until October 1992. Additionally, UNPROFOR reports contain daily shelling counts for only a fraction of the siege.

37/ See Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets with Dates of Shelling Recorded in the IHRLI Chronology of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo.

38/ Because of the sniping and shelling in the city, journalists at Oslobodjenje are required to remain in the building to work in seven day shifts. According to reports, five of Oslobodjenje's staff have been killed and 20 wounded, including its editor Kemal Kurspahic. But despite near total destruction of its building, restricted electricity and a shortage of paper, the newspaper has been published ever day. For many of Sarajevo's residents, Oslobodjenje has been the only source of information since a lack of power and a shortage of batteries renders radios and televisions useless. See Askold Krushelnycky, "Voice of the People that Refused to be Killed by War," The European, 9-12 September 1993.

39/ See Appendix 3, Table of Frequency of Shelling in Sarajevo Areas; and Appendix 4, List of Most Frequently Hit Targets With Dates of Shelling.

40/ See Appendix 9.


42/ It is interesting to note that before the siege, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić served for many years as a clinical psychiatrist at the Koševno Hospital.

43/ It has been observed that following infantry attacks by the defensive forces and other efforts to break the siege, the besieging forces have often retaliated with intensive shelling into the city centre causing extensive damage and a high number of casualties. UNPROFOR has observed that the besieging forces have inferior infantry to mount counter-attacks and
therefore use mortar and tank fire to shell the city. This fire is usually directed towards civilian areas.

44/ The chronology contains reports of sniping attacks by both BSA and BiH forces.

45/ The siege has proven particularly dangerous to the city's rescue workers. For example, the Sarajevo Fire Department reported that its casualty rate was 10 per cent higher than that of the BiH army.

46/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have often increased their artillery attacks on the city prior to and during the international peace conferences. See Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events, and the examples below. One explanation for this increased shelling activity is that the besieging forces are using the siege as a means to politically pressure the BiH government to agree to peace terms favorable to the Bosnian Serbs.

47/ It has been observed that the besieging forces have on many occasions increased shell fire in reaction to statements made by local political leaders. It has also been observed that the besieging forces seem to calculate events and the risks that they can take in relation to threats by third-party governments and organizations. In this regard, when threats by third-party governments or organizations are not perceived as immediate, the besieging forces increase or continue their shelling of the city. For example, Sarajevo was hit with a siege-high 3,777 shells on 22 July 1993 after the US ruled out direct intervention to prevent the shelling of the city. The opposite behavior was observed in August 1993, when President Clinton warned that the US would consider bombing Serbian forces if the shelling of Sarajevo continued. When this threat appeared immediate, the attacks on Sarajevo diminished and Serbian troops were withdrawn from the surrounding mountains to the southwest. Likewise, in reaction to NATO's ultimatum on 9 February 1994 which gave Bosnian Serb forces 10 days to withdraw their heavy weaponry or face airstrikes, the besieging forces substantially complied and curtailed their shelling of the city. This behavior by the besieging forces suggests that there is a centralized command and control of the besieging forces and that when there is pressure for the shelling to stop, it does.

48/ See also II below (Chronology); Appendix 2, Sarajevo Shelling and Casualties: Relationship to Political Events.

49/ This shell count does not appear in the statistical data since there is no report on the total number of shells fired for the day.


51/ It has been estimated by the United Nations that the average adult in the city has lost approximately twenty-five pounds.

52/ Berlin had received more than two million tons of food and coal on 277,000 flights, while Sarajevo had received 63,000 tons of aid on 5,800 flights.
Notes (continued)

53/ Most recently on 4 May 1994, a German plan carrying UN relief supplies and Germany's new ambassador to BiH was hit by three bullets at the Sarajevo airport. Soon afterward, an Ilyushin-76 plane, flying for the American Soros foundation was hit once by small arms fire. The airlift was suspended thereafter. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.

54/ See Appendices 3 and 4.

55/ The reports reviewed demonstrate that on occasions, even a single shot fired in the direction of a relief aircraft has suspended the humanitarian airlift. The forces therefore know that any shelling or combat between them in the airport area will inevitably suspend the airlift.

56/ One consequence of cutting down these trees is that the city has become more vulnerable in that snipers and gunners have a better view of their targets.

57/ A UN investigation of the market shelling was inconclusive. A five-member investigative team found that the market blast was caused by a single high-explosive bomb from a conventional, factory made 120 millimetre mortar. The precise location of the weapon that fired the round could not be established. See UN Background Paper, "Sarajevo Market Explosion of 5 February 1994, A Background Summary of UNPROFOR's Investigative Report," 16 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63707.

58/ According to UNPROFOR reports, a total of 296 heavy BSA weapons were either turned in or were being monitored. A total of 46 BiH weapons were accounted for. See UNPROFOR list of weapons collected in the Sarajevo area, IHRLI Doc. No. 63775.

59/ There are, however, reports as recent as 4 May 1994, that while the two month truce has generally held in the city, UNPROFOR has noted a recent increase in violations of the NATO ultimatum. A UN spokesman, Major Dacre Holloway, said that at least two or three explosions heard in the city on 4 May, were probably tank cannons. Holloway also said that a BSA tank was spotted earlier in the day in Krupac, just south of BSA-held Lukavica. Both suburbs are inside the arms exclusion zone. See Associated Press, "Aid Flights to Sarajevo Suspended, German Ambassador's Plane Hit by Gunfire," Chicago Tribune, 5 May 1994.


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177/ "Lisbon Delegations Support UN Troop Arrival", Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 29 April 1993, 1007 GMT, FBIS LD2904133592.


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303/ Incid. No. 12030, Source: Save the Humanity.


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369/ "UNPROFOR Chief Departs for Sarajevo", Belgrade Tanjug in English, 10 June 1992, 1538 GMT, FBIS #LD1006163592.
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649/ Nikola Gurovic, "Largest Humanitarian Aid Convoy in Sarajevo",
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Notes (continued)


3626/ Id.


3633/ Mark Heinrich, "Villagers Seek Refuge From Croat and Moslem Soldiers", 29 October 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, October 1993.


3635/ Mark Heinrich, "Villagers Seek Refuge From Croat and Moslem Soldiers", 29 October 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, October 1993.


3641/ UNPROFOR Operational Update for 31 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47115.

3642/ Id.

3643/ Id.

3644/ Associated Press, "U.N. Suspends Relief Flights into Sarajevo", New York Times, 1 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, October 1993; Mark Heinrich, "Gunfire Forces Suspension of Aid Flights to Sarajevo", 
Notes (continued)


3646/ UNPROFOR Operational Update for 1 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47118.


3650/ UNPROFOR Operational Update for 2 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47121.


3652/ UNPROFOR Operational Update for 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47126.

3653/ Id.


3657/ Id.


3663/ Mark Heinrich, "Sarajevo Military Crackdown Traps Civilians",
Notes (continued)


3668/ Id.


3670/ UNPROFOR Operational Update for 8 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47134.


3672/ Id.


3674/ These "aides" were also identified as "bodyguards" and "policemen" in several reports.


3679/ Id.
Notes (continued)

3680/ "Seven Killed, 35 Wounded in Mortar Attacks", Agence France Presse, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.

3681/ Id.


3685/ "Seven Killed, 35 Wounded in Mortar Attacks", Agence France Presse, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3687/ Mark Heinrich, "Seven Die, Including Children, as Mortars Hit Sarajevo", Reuters, 9 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3694/ Mark Heinrich, "Seven Die, Including Children, as Mortars Hit Sarajevo", Reuters, 9 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3697/ Mark Heinrich, "Seven Die, Including Children, as Mortars Hit Sarajevo", Reuters, 9 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.

3698/ Mark Heinrich, "Sarajevo Evacuation is Blocked by Serb Abduction", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3701/ Mark Heinrich, "Croat Troops Demand Rights After Allied Force Dissolved", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.

3702/ Mark Heinrich, "Sarajevo Evacuation is Blocked by Serb Abduction", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3708/ Mark Heinrich, "Mortars Kill Children Again in Besieged Sarajevo", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


Notes (continued)

3713/ Mark Heinrich, "Mortars Kill Children Again in Besieged Sarajevo", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3718/ Id.

3719/ Mark Heinrich, "Mortars Kill Children Again in Besieged Sarajevo", Reuters, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3725/ "Clinton Warns of Possible Air Raids on Sarajevo", Agence France Presse, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3727/ "Clinton Warns of Possible Air Raids on Sarajevo", Agence France Presse, 10 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3730/ Natela Cutter, "Refugees Flee as Bosnian Serbs Scorch Villages",
Notes (continued)


3733/ Id.


3739/ "WEU Calls For Deterrent Flights Over Sarajevo", Reuters, 12 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3741/ Id.


3743/ Id.


3747/ Id.

Notes (continued)


3753/ Id.


3755/ Id.


3757/ Another report, however, stated that winter blankets and sleeping bags were delivered to the mental hospital at Pazaric. See "Aid Trucks Reach Isolated Mental Home", Agence France Presse, 19 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3759/ The aid convoys had been suspended three weeks ago after a Danish driver was killed.


3764/ Id.


3766/ Id.

Notes (continued)


3770/ Id.
3771/ Id.
3772/ Id.


3775/ "More Than 1,000 To Quit Sarajevo Friday", Agence France Presse, 25 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3779/ Id.


Notes (continued)


3798/ Id.

3799/ Id.


3801/ Maggie Fox, "Peace Talks Offer No Let-up For Besieged Sarajevo", Reuters, 30 November 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.

3802/ "One Person Killed in Moslem-Croat Fighting in Mostar", Reuters, 29 November 1993 IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, November 1993.


3806/ Samir Koric, "Fighting Rages On as Peace Talks Begin", Reuters, 29


3813/ A press report on 2 December 1993, stated that UN officers were in no doubt where the shells were fired from. "It came from the north, from the direction of Serb positions", said Lieutenant Colonel Bill Aikman. See Jim Muir and Robert Fox, "Nurses Killed in Serb Mortar Attack", Daily Telegraph, 2 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993. Another report stated that UNPROFOR spokesman Idesbald van Biesenbroeck confirmed the BiH army report that the shell had been fired from the Mrkovici zone in the south. See "Serbs Fired on Hospital: UNPROFOR", Agence France Presse, 2 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993.


3816/ Id.


3820/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 1 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55321.


Notes (continued)


3824/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 1 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55321.


3828/ Id.


3831/ Id.


3834/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 2 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No.55324.

3835/ Id.


Notes (continued)


3844/ Id.


3849/ The Princip bridge is where the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip shot dead the Grand Duke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary in 1914.


3852/ Id.


3857/ Id.


3859/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 4 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5531.


Notes (continued)


3868/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 5 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55475.


3875/ Reports described the market as a "makeshift black market", see "Four Killed by Shell in Sarajevo Market", Reuters, 6 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993. The market was also referred to as the Ciglane market, see Peter S. Green, "Five Die as Shell Hits Sarajevo Market", United Press International, 6 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993.


Notes (continued)


3880/ Id.


3885/ Id.


3887/ Id.

3888/ Id.


3893/ Id.


3896/ Id.

3897/ Id.
Notes (continued)


3899/  Id.


3904/  Id.


3910/  Maggie Fox, "General Alert Sounded As Sarajevo is Shelled", Reuters, 11 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993.


3914/  Maggie Fox, "General Alert Sounded As Sarajevo is Shelled", Reuters, 11 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993.

3916/  Id.
3917/  Maggie Fox, "Purges Renew Morale in Bosnian Army", Reuters, 12
3918/  ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 14 December 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 55349.
3919/  "Eight Killed in Shelling Attack on Sarajevo", Reuters, 14
3920/  ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 14 December 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 55349.
3921/  Id.
3922/  "Serbs Attack Moslem `Safe Areas' in Eastern Bosnia", Reuters, 14
3923/  Maggie Fox, "Eight Killed, 10 Wounded in Attack on Sarajevo", Reuters,
14 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993; "Four
Dead Amid Escalation in Fighting", Agence France Presse, 14 December 1993,
IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993; Chuck Sudetic, "Intense Shelling
and Firefights in Sarajevo Leave 11 Civilians Dead", New York Times, 15
3924/  Peter S. Green, "Shelling Kills 10, Wounds 22 in Sarajevo", United
Press International, 14 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December
1993.
3925/  Maggie Fox, "Eight Killed, 10 Wounded in Attack on Sarajevo",
3926/  Peter S. Green, "Shelling Kills 10, Wounds 22 in Sarajevo", United
Press International, 14 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December
1993.
3927/  "Ten Dead Amid Escalation in Fighting", Agence France Presse, 14
3928/  Id.; "Nine Dead Amid Escalation in Fighting", Agence France
3929/  "Ten Dead Amid Escalation in Fighting", Agence France Presse, 14
3930/  Id.
3931/  Chuck Sudetic, "Intense Shelling and Firefights in Sarajevo Leave
3932/  Maggie Fox, "Eight Killed, 10 Wounded in Attack on Sarajevo",
Reuters, 14 December 1993, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993; "Ten
Dead Amid Escalation in Fighting", Agence France Presse, 14 December 1993,
IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, December 1993.
Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


3955/ Id.


3964/ Id.

3965/ Id.


3967/ Id.

3968/ Id.


Notes (continued)


3979/ Id.


3989/  Id.
3991/  Id.
3992/  Id.
Notes (continued)


4011/ Id.


4017/ Id.


4021/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4030/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4049/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 29 December 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 58084.


4051/ Id.

4052/ Id.


4056/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4074/ Id.


4077/ Id.


4080/ "Bosnian Fighting Widespread", United Press International, 2
Notes (continued)


4082/ Id.


4093/ Kurt Schork, "No Sign of Anything But More Fighting in Bosnia", 
Notes (continued)


4107/ Briquemont reportedly saw a direct connection between the shelling of the city and the peace process. "Each party wants to show it has the ability to go on fighting, that it is strong enough to withstand pressure from other factions", he said recently.


Notes (continued)


4125/ Id.


4128/ Id.
Notes (continued)


4139/ Id.


4141/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 7 January 1994, IHLRI Doc. No. 58921.


4145/ Id.


4149/ Reports noted that this statement mentioned Bosnian Serbs only once after Russia elicited a report from UN officials that BiH forces had helped to provoke the latest offensive by shelling several Serb-held areas of the city. But Undersecretary-General Chinmaya Gharekhan, told the Council that the recent Serb shelling of the city was disproportionate to any provocation, diplomats said. See Evelyn Leopold, "U.N. Council Condemns Serb Bombing of Sarajevo", Reuters, 7 January 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, January 1994.


4153/ Id.


4156/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 8 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 58924.

4157/ Id.


4161/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4181/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 10 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 58930.
Notes (continued)

4182/  Id.


4195/  Id.


4215/ Id.

4217/ Id.

4218/ Id.


4224/ Id.


4237/  Id.
4241/  Id.
4253/  Id.
4255/  "No Headway In Bosnia Peace Talks", The Press Association, 18
Notes (continued)


4262/ Id.


4265/ Id.

4266/ Id.


4271/ Id.


4273/ This is an exposed area of high-rise buildings that has come under heavy fire during the siege. A teacher and several children were killed there in November when mortar bombs hit near the entrance of a local school.

4274/ Joseph Chrysdale, "Shell Kills Six Children In Sarajevo", United


Notes (continued)


4295/ Id.


4307/ Mark Heinrich, "Police Injured In Bosnia Convoy Attacks", Reuters,
Notes (continued)


4312/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4327/ Id.


4331/ Id.


4333/ Id.


4337/ Id.

4338/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4345/ Id.

4346/ Id.


4350/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 2 February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 60738.


4359/ Id.

4360/ Id.


4363/ Id.


4374/ Id.

4375/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4381/ Id.


4396/ Joseph Chrysdale, "U.N. Officials Visit Sarajevo Massacre Site", 
Notes (continued)


4400/ "UN Special Envoy says Peace Bid Fails In Sarajevo", Agence France Presse, 6 February 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, February 1994.


4412/ "Indignant Russia Demands Inquiry Into Sarajevo Massacre", Agence France Presse, 6 February 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File, February 1994; "Russian Ministry Urges Inquiry Into Sarajevo Blast", ITAR-TASS, 6 February
Notes (continued)


4415/ Id.


4422/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4446/ Id.


4457/ General Divjak was reportedly one of a small number of moderate Serbs serving in the BiH army.


4465/ Mark Heinrich, "Serb Troops Hand Over To Peacekeepers, Shells Hit
Notes (continued)


4468/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 10 February 1994, IHLRI Doc. No. 61480.


4479/ UNPROFOR noted that these weapons did not seem to be able to be fired.

4480/ ICFY, UNPROFOR Operational Update for 11 February 1994, IHLRI Doc. No. 60759.

Notes (continued)


4490/ Id.

4491/ Id.


4495/ Id.


4499/ According to press estimates, there were 15,000 Serb soldiers
around Sarajevo and some 300 pieces of artillery. The BiH army had only 150 heavy weapons and 13,000 armed men, but could mobilize 45,000 soldiers.


4505/ Id.

4506/ Id.

4507/ Id.


Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


4544/ Id.


Notes (continued)


4548/  Id.


4551/  Id.

4552/  After the first order to attack, all of the air strike decisions would rest with three military commanders: US General Jeremy Boorda, in charge of NATO's Southern Europe command; and UNPROFOR commanders, General Jean Cot and Lieutenant General Michael Rose.


4554/  Id.


4559/  Id.


4562/  Id.


4564/  Id.
Notes (continued)

4565/ Id.

4566/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':
Serbs Celebrate", United Press International, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.

4567/ "NATO's Woerner Says No Bosnia Air Strikes For Now", Reuters, 20

4568/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':
Serbs Celebrate", United Press International, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.

4569/ "NATO's Woerner Says No Bosnia Air Strikes For Now", Reuters, 20

4570/ Evelyn Leopold, "U.N. Says Serbs Cleared Arms From At Least 45

4571/ "Bosnian Leader Calls On NATO To Attack Serb Guns", Reuters, 20

4572/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':
Serbs Celebrate", United Press International, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.


4574/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':
Serbs Celebrate", United Press International, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.

4575/ Id.

4576/ Sebastian Smith, "Karadzic Predicts Serb Compliance With U.N.
Deadline", Agence France Presse, 20 February 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.

4577/ "Serb Leader Says Serb Leaders Beating Deadline", Reuters, 20

4578/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':


4580/ Sebastian Smith, "Karadzic Predicts Serb Compliance With U.N.
Deadline", Agence France Presse, 20 February 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.

4581/ Peter S. Green, "Airstrikes Appear Off: Rose Sees 'Peaceful End':
Serbs Celebrate", United Press International, IHRLI Sarajevo Source File,
February 1994.
Notes (continued)


4584/ Id.


4587/ According to an UNPROFOR report, a total of 296 heavy BSA weapons were either turned in or were being monitored. A total of forty-six BiH weapons were accounted for. See UNPROFOR list of weapons collected in the Sarajevo area, IHRLI Doc. No. 63775.


Notes (continued)


4608/ Id.


4611/ Id.

4612/ Id.

4613/ Id.

4614/ Id.


4617/ Peter S. Green, "Serbs, Bosnian Government Agree To Ease Isolation Of Sarajevo", United Press International, 24 February 1994, IHRLI Sarajevo


4619/ Id.


4621/ Id.

4622/ Id.


4628/ Id.


4631/ Heavy machine guns were not included in the arms ban.


4636/ "Explosion In Sarajevo", Agence France Presse, 27 February 1994,
Notes (continued)


4640/ Id.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VI, PART 2
STUDY OF THE BATTLE AND SIEGE OF SARAJEVO

Under the Direction of:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

Principal Legal Analyst:

William B. Schiller, Director of Research

Contributors:

Ralph Peter Spies, Research Fellow
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The Staff of the International Human Rights Law Institute,
DePaul University
Appendix 6

PHOTOGRAPHS PICTURING TARGETS SHELLED IN SARAJEVO

I. CITY CENTER

Shelling of the City Center appears in the Chronology of the battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:

(1992): 05.04.; 22.04.; 18.05.; 07.06.; 09.06.; 22.06.; 26.06.; 30.06.;
         04.07.; 07.07.; 08.07.; 10.07.; 21.07.; 26.07.; 29.07.; 04.08.;
         13.08.; 17.08.; 21.09.; 24.09.; 29.09.; 04.10.; 05.10.; 29.10.;

(1993): 12.01.; 14.01.; 15.01.; 17.01.; 24.01.; 05.02.; 01.03.; 20.04.;
         06.05.; 28.05.; 24.07.; 22.07.; 25.07.; 20.08.; 16.09.; 29.09.;
         07.10.; 19.10.; 14.10.; 17.10.; 28.10.; 29.10.; 06.11.; 10.11.;

(1994): 03.01.; 04.01.; 08.01.; 10.01.; 24.01.; 26.01.; 10.02.
UNIS Company
UNIS Company
UNIS Company
UPI Company
Ergoinvest Company
Socijalno Building
Sibica Building
ZGP Hotel
Sarajka Department Store
II. OSLOBODJENJE

Shelling of Oslabodjenje appears in the Chronology of the battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:

(1992) 18.05.; 10.06.; 20.06.; 08.07.; 22.08.; 24.08.
Qalobodienie
Oslobodjenje
Oslobodzenie
Pero Kosoric Square
Grbavica Shopping Settlement
Buildings on Obala Vojvode Stepe
Bridge between Park Cara Dujaica and Obala Vojvode Stepe
Building on Kalja Romislava and Damijila Ozme
Eiffel Bridge (behind destroyed "Gras" Trams)
Town Hall
Novo Sarajevo
Train Station in Novo Sarajevo
Offices on Kidrica Boulevard
Bank on Marshal Tito Street
Bank on Maršal Tito Street
Majinska Skola Mechanic High School on Maršal Tito Street
Building on Marshal Tito Street
III. HOLIDAY INN

Shelling of the Holiday Inn appears in the Chronology of the battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:

(1992)  09.06.; 04.07.; 06.07.; 07.07.; 10.07.; 28.07.; 05.08.; 21.08.;
        24.08.; 30.08.; 12.09.; 14.09.; 19.09.; 05.10.; 05.12.;

(1993)  09.02.; 26.02.; 27.02.; 06.05.; 28.05.; 30.05.; 21.07.; 15.10.

(1994)  05.01.; 09.01.; 14.01.
Holiday Inn
IV. PARLIAMENT

Shelling of the Parliament appears in the Chronology of the battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:


(1993): 11.01.; 14.01.; 25.01.; 09.02.; 30.05.; 21.07.

Parliament
Parliament
Building on Marijin Dvor
V. HOSPITALS AND RED CROSS

Red Cross Building
Military Hospital
Military Hospital
Military Hospital
Students Polyclinic
Students Polyclinic
Traumatology Clinic, UMC
Traumatology Clinic, UMC
Internal Diseases Polyclinic, UMC
Internal Diseases Polyclinic, UMC
VI. MOSQUES AND CHURCHES

Mosque in Sokolje
The Tabački Mesžid, built in 1591, is a well-known monument of the Ottoman Empire in the Baščaršija (the old town area of Sarajevo) which was hit by at least nine incendiary bombs and burned down.
Tabački Međžid
White Mosque in Vratnik
Carina Mosque in Vratnik
Mosque in Sirokaca
The Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque, built in 1531, represents one of the major achievements of Islamic architecture in BiH. In addition, there is the Muslim religious secondary school, the Gazi Husrev Bey's School, one of the most beautiful monuments of old Sarajevo. It was founded and constructed in 1537. The Gazi Husrev Bey's library was established in 1537 and represents the greatest treasury of oriental scripts in the former Yugoslavia. Its possessions include a number of old, important and unique manuscripts in Arabic, including some works from Islamic sciences still unknown in the field of Islamic studies.
Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque
Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque
Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque
Gazi Husrev Bey Mosque
Mosque in Ugorsko
Catholic Church in Ravno
Catholic Church in Ravno (interior)
Catholic Church in Marijin Dvor
Catholic Church in Dolac Malta
Catholic Church on Maršal Tito Street
Orthodox Chapel in the Košev Cemetry
Orthodox Chapel in the Košević Cemetery
St. Vincent Church
The Old Orthodox Church, built before 1539, is situated in Baščaršija. A great number of icons from the church museum, founded in 1889, were reportedly transferred to Serbia at the beginning of the war in 1992.
Ali Pasha Mosque, built in 1560, is considered a masterpiece of oriental architecture.
The Magrabija Mosque, built in 1538, was totally destroyed.
VII. HISTORIC MONUMENTS

The National and University Library of the Republic of BiH, situated in the building of the City Hall, used to be a center containing an enormous library with holdings amounting to about 2,500,000 volumes. In this context, it is important to focus on the department named Bosniaci, containing the total literary inheritance (old books and manuscripts) dating as far back as the sixteenth century.

The City Hall is a structure designed in Moorish style by the Czech architect Aleksander Vitek and build between April 1892 and 1896. The National and University Library holdings were stored in this building, which repeatedly was bombarded from April 1992 until at least late August 1992, when it burned down. With the exception of 50% to 60% of the library stock that had been transferred to other sites in the city, everything had been destroyed.
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library
City Hall and National and University Library (interior)
City Hall and National and University Library (interior)
The Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games. During the night of 25 April 1992, the museum, located in a famous building dating from 1903, was shelled with three incendiary bombs and burned down shortly afterwards.
Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games
Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games
Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games
Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games
Museum of the XIV Winter Olympic Games
Gate in Vratnik
Fine Arts Academy
Franji Racki Square
VIII. BAŠČARŠIJA AND OLD TOWN

Shelling of the Old Town and Baščaršija appears in the Chronology of the battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:


(1993): 13.01.; 14.01.; 17.01.; 22.01.; 24.01.; 25.01.; 26.01.; 29.01.; 11.02.; 16.02.; 23.02.; 28.02.; 01.03.; 21.03.; 03.05.; 06.05.; 29.05.; 31.05.; 10.06.; 19.06.; 12.07.; 24.08.; 24.08.; 14.09.; 19.09.; 30.09.; 16.10.; 19.10.; 23.10.

(1994): 04.01.; 24.01.; 05.02.

Baščaršija is a commercial, trade and catering center of oriental expression, just as its name says (Persian čarš, a bazaar on the crossing of four roads). It is the historical nucleus of the city, 14 acres large and five hundred years old, a cultural monument.

The network of streets in the Old Sarajevo čaršija (the commercial quarter of the town) is one of the specific features of the complex. In an urban sense, it remained almost unchanged for more than 450 years, with all characteristics of modern town planning: the streets leading out of the town (Kovaci, Samardžije, and Sargrdžije) main streets (Baščaršija, Saraci Abadžiluk, Titova, and Gazi Husrev Begova) and traffic (other streets). In order to meet the requirements of a large and modern čaršija, new streets were added, respecting the existing ones. The outline of traffic roads was made and implemented according to the plan. The shops were lined towards streets, while various monumental buildings were left in the background.

In 1895, Baščaršija was proposed for inclusion into the UNESCO list of the universal heritage. As far as is known, the proposal has been put on the preliminary list.
LOCATION OF THE OLD
ČARŠIJA OF SARAJEVO IN THE
HISTORICAL PART OF THE
TOWN.
1. NOMINATED MONUMENTAL COMPLEX OF THE OLD BAZAAR-
SIJA.
2. PROTECTED ARCHITECTURAL AND URBAN MONUMENTAL
COMPLEXES.
3. REGISTERED ARCHITECTURAL AND URBAN MONUMENTAL
COMPLEXES.
Islamic Theological Faculty
Vase Miškina Street "Breadline Incident"
Vase Miškina Street "Breadline Incident"
Vase Niškina Street "Breadline Incident"
Market Place Massacre on 5 February 1994
Market Place Massacre on 5 February 1994
IX. SCHOOLS

Veselin Maniesa Primary School
Gymnasium
Franjo Klutz Primary School
Student Dormitory in Něžarići
Textil School
Student Dormitory in Bjelava
Student Dormitory
X. THE OLYMPIC CENTER

The Olympic Center "Skanderija", situated on the left bank of the river Miljacka, was a commercial, cultural, and sports center. The whole structure of 70,000 meters, and the usable space amounts to 50,000 meters. The 39,200 square meter roof has been totally destroyed. Four fires demolished the whole Youth Center Dancing Hall from the roof to the foundation. Between May 1992 and February 1993, the center reportedly was bombarded continuously (about 100 bombs). The damage is estimated at 65% to 70%, amounting to $8,360,000 US.
The Olympic Complex "Zetra" is located on Djure Djakovic Street No. bb.
Through May 1993, the complex was reportedly shelled 150 times.
Mojmilo Olympic Hall
Mojmilo Olympic Hall
XI. RESIDENTIAL AREAS

Private House in Sokolje
Sokolje Settlement
Našelje Sokolje
Naselje Sokolje
Pofalići Settlement
Mojmaló Settlement
Vojničko Polje Area
Ciglane Settlement
Danijel Ozmo Street
Private House in Vratnik
Breka Settlement
Naselje Buča Potok
Naselje Velešići
Nedžarići-Dobrinja Road
XII. HRASNO AREA

Shelling of the Hrasno Area appears in the Chronology of the Battle and siege of Sarajevo on the following dates:


(1993): 01.01.; 06.01.; 13.01.; 14.01.; 22.01.; 23.01.; 26.01.; 27.01.; 02.02.; 05.02.; 28.10.; 06.12.
XIII. PUBLIC FACILITIES

Railway Station
Railway Bridge in Pofalici
The "JP Gres" Public Transportation Firm was founded in 1885. Since then, the firm worked continuously until the war broke out in April 1992. Since early April 1992, the Public transportation capacity has reportedly been destroyed. The damage done to the transportation infrastructure ranges from 20% to 100%. The damage caused to the transportation network is estimated at 30% to 60%.
XIV. PRIVATE INDUSTRY

Alhoa Factory
Dairy Factory
Tobacco Factory
XV. PUBLIC BUILDINGS

Old Tobacco Factory
The Main Post Office Building, designed by the architect Josip Vankas and built in the style of the Secession, was opened in 1938.
Main Post Office
Main Post Office
Main Post Office (interior)
Post Office in Dolac, Malta
Zemaljski Museum
Television Tower on Hum Hill
XVI. NEW CEMETERIES

Cemetery of Šeheti Kovači
Catholic Cemetery
Stadium Cemetery
New Cemetery at Zetra
New Cemetery at Zetra
Gradskog Chapel, Bare Cemetery
Lav Cemetery
Lav Cemetery
Appendix 7

UNPROFOR HQ BH Command Sarajevo PICINPSUM, CONTAINING BATTLE DETAILED MAPS OF THE SARAJEVO AREA FOR THE FOLLOWING DATES:

Appendix B

THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF THE FORCES INVOLVED IN AND SIEGE OF SARAJEVO (ORDER OF BATTLE)
The Structure and Location of the Forces Involved in the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo (Order of Battle)¹

I. The Besieging Forces

1. The Sarajevo Romanija Corps is the force of the Bosnian Serbian Army (BSA) which has surrounded the city since the beginning of the siege. According to sources reviewed, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps forces around the city included the following units:²

A. 1st Corps Sarajevo Romanija³

   Headquarters: Lukavica BP 8555, AOR: Eastern BiH North Sarajevo/Igman (Podromania not included)

   Commander: Major General Stanislav Galic (current from at least 20 July 1993)

   Major General Tomislav Sipcic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 23 May 1993)

   Chief of Operations: Colonel Lj Gcdo (current as of 8 November 1993)

   Chief of Staff: Colonel Milosevic (current as of 8 November 1993)

   Deputy Chief of Staff: Major Imzic (current as of 8 November 1993)

¹This summary outline of the command structures of the BSA Sarajevo Romanija Corps and the BiH 1st Corps Sarajevo is based on the following sources: UNPROFOR, "Bosnia-Hercegovina Warring Factions HQ BH Command," Edition No. 3 as at 14 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 15811; Edition No. 4 as at 22 March 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 38621; Edition No. 5 as at 25 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 25048; Edition No. 6 as at 22 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43141; Edition No. 8 as at 24 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 62963. Also consulted were the following UNPROFOR ORBAT Database printouts: "BSA - 1st Corps Sarajevo," as at 8 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55804; and "BiH - 1st Corps Sarajevo," as at 8 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55813.

²The units listed below were identified by UNPROFOR on 8 November 1993 as the BSA forces directly around Sarajevo. See UNPROFOR ORBAT Database printout: "BSA - 1st Corps Sarajevo," as at 8 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55804. UNPROFOR orders of battle dated from 14 February 1993 to 24 January 1994 were reviewed to provide the following information on the command structure of these units.

³Originally called the IV E Bosnia Corps.
Deputy Commander for Discipline: Colonel Kosovac (current)

Deputy Commander for Logistics: Colonel Krstanovic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Deputy Commander for Security: Colonel Lugonja (current as of 8 November 1993)

Chief of Cooperation with United Nations: Colonel Zarcovic (current as of 8 November 1993)

1. 1st Sarajevo Brigade
   Headquarters: Lukavica and Cica barracks
   Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Stojanovic (Staganovic) (current)
   Deputy Commander: Major Isailovic (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Military Police: Captain Sarenac (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Tank Battalion
   Headquarters: Ilinica
   Commander: Major Milankovic (current)
   Deputy Commander: Captain Krstanovic (Krstanovic) (current)

2. Artillery Brigade
   Headquarters: Uzdojnice
   Commander: Captain Simic (current)
   Deputy Commander: (unknown)
   Chief of Staff: (unknown)
   Field Artillery Commander Uzdojnice: Major Skrba (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Multiple Launch Rocket System Artillery Commander: Captain Draskovic (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Mortar Commander Klek: Lieutenant Mitrovic (current as of 8 November 1993)
Artillery Battery Commander Cicabarracks: Lieutenant Cado (current as of 8 November 1993)

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery Commander Ilinaca: Captain Antejevic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battery Deputy Commander Ilinica: Lieutenant Minic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Mortar Battery Commander G. Kotorac: Lieutenant Papaz (current as of 8 November 1993)

Mortar Battery Deputy Commander G. Kotorac: Lieutenant Papaz (current as of 8 November 1993)

3. 2nd Sarajevo Brigade (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Headquarters: Vojkovici, Rear HQ, BP 8452, Forward HQ, Ostrici
   Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Shehovac (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Deputy Commander: Captain Markovic* (current as of 8 November 1993)
   Chief of Staff: Captain Zaric (current as of 8 November 1993)

4. 1st Ramanija Infantry Brigade
   Headquarters: Pale, BP 9861
   Commander Infantry (Hresa BP 9861): Captain Vlado Lidzek (current)
   Commander Artillery: Grajic Milomic (current)
   Sy Off: Mile Pajic (current)
   Grbavica/Lukavica (CP49) Battalion Commander: Major Dragan Tupojic (current as of 8 November 1993)

5. Kosevo Brigade

*In July 1993, Colonel Markovic served under the command of Col.-Krstic, who was the commander of the 49th Armoured Infantry Brigade. This Brigade was apparently disbanded after July as it does not appear on UNPROFOR orders of battle.
Headquarters: Radava BP 9263

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Milo Krajišníc (current)

Deputy Commander: Major Vlado Medic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Chief of Staff: (unknown)

Deputy Chief of Staff or Operations: Captain Jovan Sarenac (current as of 8 November 1993)

6. Rajlovac Brigade

Headquarters: Academy of Rajlovac BP 8360

Commander: Major Mira Radic (current)

Commander Artillery-Ljubisa Lemez (current as of 8 November 1993)

7. Ilidža Brigade

Headquarters: Ilidža BP 827561

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Radojcic (current)

Deputy Commander- Guzina (current as of 8 November 1993)

Chief of Staff: Captain Popadic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Commander 2nd Battalion, Butmir: Slobodan Jamic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Commander, 5th Battalion: Zoran Tufinovic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Deputy Commander 5th Battalion: Milorad Gavovic (current as of 8 November 1993)

1st and 4th Battalions in Nejdarici, 3rd and 5th Battalion locations unknown

8 Vogosca Brigade

Headquarters: Vogosca BP 858641, Cemetery
Commander: Colonel Delic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Deputy Commander: Major Robert Jovanovski (current as of 8 November 1993)

Chief of Staff: Captain First Class Alexander Kovac (current as of 8 November 1993)

9. Hadzici/Igman/Blazuj Brigade (10th Brigade)

Headquarters: Hadzici BP 7456; Blazuj BP 790577; AOR: Igman Northwest

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Cojic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Deputy Commander: (unknown)

Chief of Staff: (unknown)

10. Igman Brigade (current as of 24 January 1994)\(^5\)

Headquarters: BP 790577

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Cojic (current as of 8 November 1993)

11. Ilijas Brigade

Headquarters: AOR: Breza BP 8076; Visoko BP 7475

Commander: Colonel Yossipovic (current) (Operational Group Commander, Ilijas/Vogosca/Igman)

L.O.: Ljublj Bosnjak (current)

12. Butmir Brigade (7th), Butmir

Headquarters: BP 8452; AOR: Igman Northeast

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Jovo Bartula (current from at least 14 February 1993)

\(^5\)According to sources reviewed, this Brigade appears to have been formed from part of the Hadzici/Igman Brigade (10th Brigade), which as of 8 November 1993, was under the command of Cojic.
Deputy Commander: (unknown)
Chief of Staff: (unknown)

S of Butmir (BP 8652) Battalion Commander: Slavisa Terzic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

Brannac (CP 6693) Battalion Commander-Svetozar Antic, (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

Srebrenica (CP 6385) Battalion Commander-Ilija Stanarevic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

13. Ostojici Brigade (current as of November 1993)6

Headquarters: BP 8741 Igman Area

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel Isailovic (current as of 8 November 1993)

Deputy Commander: (unknown)

Chief of Staff: (unknown)

1st Battalion (BP 8443 D. Grkarica) Commander: Major Cedo Nogo (current as of 8 November 1993)

2nd Battalion (BP 9041 Javorak) Commander: Major Srdan Kvezevic (current as of 8 November 1993)

II. The Defensive Forces

The 1st Corps Sarajevo has served as the BiH defensive force in the city since the beginning of the siege. According to sources reviewed, the 1st Corps forces in the city included the following units:

A. 1st Corps Sarajevo Command and Staff:

- Headquarters: Kramlja Tomslava Street/Daniela Ozme 2; AOR: Sarajevo City/Igman

- Commander: Vahid Karavelic (current);
  - Mustafa Hajrulahovic (through at least 9 May 1993)

- Deputy Commander: Ismet Dahiric (current); Nisad Balta (through at least 20 July 1993); Vahid Karavelic (through at least 9 May 1993)

- Chief of Staff: Nedjad Ajnadzic (current); Ismet Alija (reported as 20 July 1993); Asim Dzambacovic (from at least 22 March 1993 to at least 9 May 1993); 14 February 1993 ORBAT reports no Chief of Staff, but reports Ismet Alija as Deputy Chief of Staff;

- Deputy Chief of Staff: None currently reported
  - Esad Pelko, from at least 22 March 1993 until at least 9 May 1993;
  - Ismet Alija, through at least 14 February 1993;

- Chief of SY: Fikret Muslimovic (current);
  - Jusuf Jasarevic (reported as to 20 July 1993)

- Political Officer: Ekrem Cerimovic (current prior to January 1994)

- Supply Officer: Zlatko Pap (current prior to January 1994)

- Chief of Security: Fikret Muslimovic (current prior to January 1994)

- Intelligence Officer: Esad Pelko (current)

- Logistics Officer: Zlatan Cico (current)

---

The units listed below were identified by UNPROFOR on 8 November 1993 as the BiH forces in Sarajevo. See UNPROFOR ORBAT Database printouts: "BiH -1st Corps Sarajevo," as at 8 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 55813. UNPROFOR orders of battle dated from 14 February 1993 to 24 January 1994 were reviewed to provide the following information on the command structure of these units.
B. Corps Assets, Sarajevo City

1. 1st Motorized/Mechanized Brigade (8 November 1993 source reports as 1st Motorized; this unit previously reported as 1st Mechanized):

   Headquarters: Grabo Viste/Kobilja Glava
   Area of Operation: Zuc Hill, Hum Hill
   Commander: Ramiz Besic (current);
   - Enver Sehovic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 22 March 1993)
   Deputy Commander: Ibrahim Dervisevic "Ramsin" (current);
   -(Prior Deputy Commanders unknown)
   Chief of Staff: Tahir Hadjari (current);
   - Ibrahim Dervisevic (from at least 14 February 1993 until at least 22 March 1993)
   1st and 2nd Battalion Cdrs: (unknown)
   3rd Battalion Cdr: Fikret Kavazovic "Raky" (current prior to January 1994)

2. 2nd Motorized Brigade:

   Headquarters and Area of Operation: Vogosca-Zuc (current);
   (Rajlovac reported as location on 22 March 1993)
   Commander: Esad Pelko "Brzi" (current);
   - Safet Zajko, from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 22 March 1993
   Deputy Commander: Hlimo Kovac (current, from at least 20 July 1993);
   - Safet Isovac (reported as 22 March 1993)
   Chief of Staff: Emir Soljagic "Cobo" (current)
   Battalion Commanders: unknown

3. 2nd Mountain Brigade:

   Headquarters: Kosevo-Grdonj-Vratnik (current); Vasin Han, Vase Miskina St (prior to January 1994)
Commander: Hilmija Kadic (current);
-Hibrinja Korac (prior to January 1994);
-Sakid Puskar, also listed as Zakid Puskar, Zakir Puskar, Zakir Buskar (from at least 22 March 1993 to at least 20 July 1993);
-Redzo Mehic (reported as 14 February 1993)

Deputy Commander: Sead Kadic (current)
- Sead Babic (reported as 20 July 1993)
- Reported as unknown 22 March and 24 May 1993

Chief of Staff: (current unknown prior to January 1994);
-Hibrinja (Hilmija) Korac reported as 20 July 1993
-Safer Dzaferagic (from at least 22 March 1993 to at least 24 May 1993
-Osman Cengic (reported as 14 February 1993)

Assault Platoon Commander: Salahudin Karavcic Karaga (current prior to January 1994)

4. 5th Brigade (reported 14 February and 22 March 1993 as 5th Mountain)
Headquarters: Dobrinja

Commander: Ismet Hadzic (current)

Deputy Commander: Humo Cesir (current)

Chief of Staff: uncertain, Halil Bicaj (current and as from 20 July 1993);

Battalion Commanders: (unknown)

5. 15th Mountain Brigade (Combination of Former 1st and 10th Mountain Brigades)

Headquarters: Bistrik/Grbavica

Commander: Nahir Hamzigula (current)

Deputy Commander: Zijad Poprezenovic (current)

Chief of Staff: Zlad Rujanac (current), Senad Pecar (prior to January 1994)

Battalion Commanders (unknown)
2 Mortar Units (under command of Mustafa Zulic, former Commander, 1st Mountain)

a. Former 1st Mountain: reported at Bistrik Trebevic, 20 July 1993; Starigrad, 24 May and 22 March 1993

Commander: Mustafa Zulic (reported as 20 July 1993 and prior)

Deputy Commander: Zlat Poprezenovic (reported as 20 July 1993) (prior unknown)

Chief of Staff: Zlat Rujanac (reported as 20 July 1993)
-Zijad Borezenovic (reported as 24 May 1993 and prior)

b. Former 10th Mountain: reported at Bistrik-Skenderija (20 July 1993);

Commander: Musah Topalovic "Caco", reported as 20 July 1993

Deputy Commander-Unknown

Chief of Staff: Senad Pecar (reported as 20 July 1993)

6. 101st TDF Brigade:

Headquarters: Mojmilo, Area of Responsibility: Hrasno/Mojmilo (formerly reported both as 101st Infantry and 101st Mountain, Mojmilo, and Hrasno-Mojmilo, or former 101st disbanded and new TDF formed with same area of responsibility)

Commander: Ajnadzic Nedzad (current)

Deputy Commander: Sifet Puskar (current)

Chief of Staff: Tefik Sarik (current)

Subordinate Commanders (unknown): (Numerous snipers reported in this unit)

---

*On 26 October 1993, the BiH government initiated a crackdown against "Caco", and the commander of the 9th Brigade ("Celo"). Caco was killed during the course of his capture and Celo was placed under arrest.*
7. 102nd TDF Brigade:

Headquarters: Stup/Azici 34 T BP 8658 (replaces or reported earlier as 102nd Motorized, Stup-Azici, BP 8558, 20 July 1993, and 1st Motorized, Stup, 22 March 1993 and 14 February 1993)

Commander: Esad Paldum (current)

Deputy Commander: Mustapha Dzebo (current), (reported unknown 22 March 1993)

Chief of Staff: Amir Corbo (current from at least 20 July 1993)
-Zlatko Lagumdžija (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 22 March 1993)

Known subordinate officers: Majors Sadiga, Djemal Habibiga and Muninovich, (current prior to January 1994)

3rd Battalion Commander: Rasim Pljevcjak (from at least 22 March 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

8. 105th (former 9th Motorized, Kocevo, 9160, 20 July 1993) Brigade:

Headquarters: Kocevo 34 T BP 9249-5968, Trampina St., 14

Commander: Itzet Bekovac (current)
Former 9th Commander: Suliman Ishirevic (reported 20 July 1993)

Deputy Commander: None (current)
Former 9th Deputy Selo Asurcovic (reported 20 July 1993)

Chief of Staff: Eso (current, none prior reported)
8 November 1993 source reports: former subordinates Sulejman Imsirevic, Ramiz Delatic "Celo" and Sero Asterovic arrested in October 1993.

9. Sarajevo Brigade "Krajl Trvko" (reformation of disbanded HVO brigade of same name)

Headquarters: Grbavica BP 8960

Commander: Veraja Nedeljko (current)

Chief of Staff: Franjo Talinajic (current)

Subordinate staff and officers: (unknown)

a. HVO Sarajevo Brigade "Krajl Trvko" or "Krajl Turko Drugi" (currently disbanded, reported at Grbavica 20 July 1993; BP 9159 Sarajevo, 23 May 1993)

Commander: Ivan Vulic (reported as 20 July 1993) Slarsko Zelic

Chief of Staff: Franjo Talinajic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

b. There was an additional HVO-HSO unit in Sarajevo

Headquarters: Gengic Villa BP 9159 (reported 20 July and 23 May 1993, BP 8858)

Commander: Mate Matasin (current)

- Drasko Vrukovic (reported as 20 July 1993)

Subordinate command and staff: (unknown)

C. Ancillary Units

1. Logistical Brigade

On 10 November 1993, several groups of HVO troops in Sarajevo were marched under BiH army guard and the HVO barracks were occupied by BiH army troops. Zelic was subsequently arrested. The BiH army thereafter announced that it was disbanding the HVO in Sarajevo and accused some of its members of "actively cooperating" with BSA forces around the city, jeopardizing its defenses. The BiH army then invited HVO soldiers to join a new Croatian brigade of the 1st Corps.
Headquarters: Tito Barracks BP 9059

Commander: Ekrem Imsirevic (current prior to January 1994)

Deputy Commander: Almir Sutrovic (current prior to January 1994)

Chief of Staff: Sead (current prior to January 1994)

2. Field Artillery Brigade

Commander: Miro Grbavac (current)
-Radzo Mehic (from at least 14 February 1993 to at least July 20 1993)

Deputy Commander: (Unknown)

Chief of Staff: Osman Cengic (current from at least 14 February 1993)

3. AAA Artillery Regiment

Commander: Darvin Lisica (current); Snija Omanovic and Darvin Lisica (current and prior)

Deputy Commander: (Unknown)

Chief of Staff: Danijel Bilajac (current and prior)

4. Military Police Battalion

Commander: Munir Alibabic (current);
-Stepjan Vasic (prior to January 1994)

Subordinate Command and Staff: (unknown)

5. Special Force Battalion/2nd Independent Battalion

Headquarters: Zuc

Commander: Adlan Solakovic (current and from at least 20 July 1993)
- Fahrudin Hadzimehmedagic, from at least 14 February to at least 23 May 1993
Deputy Commander: Nihad (current prior to January 1994)

Chief of Staff: Fahrudin Hadzimemadagic (current prior to January 1994)

6. Civilian Police/Milicjia (reported 8 November 1993 under 1st Corps Command, HQ, Skenderija)

    Regional Commander: Munir Alibabic (current prior to January 1994)

    Sarajevo Commander: Zelko Varusek (current prior to January 1994)

    Chief of Stari Grad: Ener Bezdof (current prior to January 1994)

    Chief of Centar: Reuf Jacuc (current prior to January 1994)

    Chief of Novi Sarajevo: Alija Kazic (current prior to January 1994)

    Chief of Novi Grad: Jusuf Vatres (current prior to January 1994)

    Chief of Traffic Police: Bairo Cesko (current prior to January 1994)

D. Units No Longer under 1st Corps in Sarajevo

1. 11th Territorial Defense Force Brigade, BP 9159, Novi Sarajevo, under HVO command (reported 22 March to 20 July 1993 sources)\(^\text{10}\)

2. 12th Territorial Defense Force Brigade, Zuc, BP 8762, also under HVO command (current from 14 February 1993)\(^\text{11}\)

    Commander: Nijaz Grebovic (current from at least 22 March 1993)

3. 10th Territorial Defense Force Brigade, Bistrik (reported 22 March

\(^{10}\)According to the reports reviewed this Brigade was possibly subsumed by other BiH brigades.

\(^{11}\)According to the reports reviewed this Brigade was possibly subsumed by other BiH brigades.
4. 3rd Motorized Brigade, Stup (reported 14 February and 22 March 1993 sources)

   Commander: Blevad Radzo
   Deputy Commander: (unknown)
   Chief of Staff: Amir Corbo

5. 3rd Mountain, Sedrenik, (reported 14 February and 22 March 1993 sources)

   Commander: Sabrija Zimic
   Deputy Commander: (unknown)
   Chief of Staff: Ramir Delalic

6. 6th Mountain Brigade, Hrasno (reported 14 February and 22 March 1993 sources)

   Commander: Adem Halilafic
   Deputy Commander: (Unknown)
   Chief of Staff: Barudin Fazlic

7. 7th Mountain Brigade, Kosevo (reported 14 February and 22 March 1993)

   Commander: Mirsad Bezdrob
   Deputy Commander: (unknown)
   Chief of Staff: Mehmed Sesic

E. Corps Assets Mount Igman

1. Operational Group HHQ (1st Corps)

   Headquarters: Hrasnica Stan BP 815505 or Pazaric, AOR: Igman North

   Commander: Nejdad Ajnadzic (1st Hill Brigade) (current prior to
January 1994)
-Salko Gusic (reported as 23 May 1993)
-Dzevad Rado, reported as 22 March 1993

Deputy Commander: Alija Ismet (current)

Chief of Staff: Vehbija Karic (current and from at least 14 February to at least 20 July 1993);
-Salko Mumanovic (prior to January 1994)

2 4th Mountain Brigade (1st Corps)

Headquarters: Hrasnica BP 8452, AOR: North East of Igman and Hrasnica

Commander: Fikret Prevlar (current and from at least 23 May 1993)
-Fikret Delic (reported as 22 March 1993)
-Zulfikar Nihad (reported as 14 February 1993)

Deputy Commander: Esael Mulahasanovic (current and from at least 23 May 1993)
-Zulfikar Nihad, reported as 22 March 1993
-Fikret Delic, reported as 14 February 1993

Chief of Staff: Emir Redzovic (current and from at least 14 February 1993)

3rd Battalion Commander: Sabotir Hirsad (from at least 23 May 1993 to at least 20 July 1993)

3. Units of other Corps serving under 1st Corps Operational Control

a. 81st Mountain Brigade (6th Corps)

Headquarters: Igman, AOR: Malo Polje (formerly reported as 8th Infantry Brigade, Igman BP 8252)

Commander: Fehim Bebic (current)
-Jana Alispago (from at least 14 February to 20 July 1993)

Deputy Commander: Boja Dzic (current and prior)

Chief of Staff: Muhamed Nogo (current and prior)
i. Special Forces

Commander: Juka Prazina (current)\(^{12}\)

b. 9th Mountain Brigade (6th Corps)

Headquarters: Pazaric BP 7252

Commander: Negir Kasic (current and from at least 22 March 1993)

- Dzevad Rado (reported as 14 February 1993)

1st Battalion Commander at Tarcin: Mustapha Abazovic

(reported at least from 23 May to 20 July 1993)

c. 7th Mudjahideen Brigade (3rd Corps) (location, command and staff unknown)

d. 6th Hill Brigade (6th Corps) (location, command and staff unknown)

\(^{12}\)According to source materials, Juka Prazina commands a special forces battalion composed mostly of former convicts, mercenaries of middle-east countries and Europe currently in Konije/Jablanica.
Appendix 2

Review of the Shelling of the Sarajevo Clinical Center Koševski
UNIVERSITY CLINICAL CENTER SARAJEVO
CLINICAL CENTER CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING DEPT.

COMPLETED WITHIN THE "YOSEVO" CLINICAL CENTER
MARCH 30, 1993

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<th>PROJECT HIT</th>
<th>HIT IN THE COMPLEX VICINITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Traumatology Clinic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Technical &amp; Economic Dept.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amphitheater</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Orthopedics Clinic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Diagnostic &amp; Polyclinic</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Nephrology Clinic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Surgery Clinic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Otorhinolaryngology Clinic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. I Internal Clinic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Infectious Diseases Clinic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Pharmacy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. III Internal Clinic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. II Internal Clinic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Neurosurgery Clinic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Engineering Dept.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Central Medical Dept.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Immunology Lab. (Antibiotics)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Former LMC Management</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Dermatology Clinic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;PITAL&quot;</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ophthalmology Clinic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. &quot;Podhrestovi&quot; Clinic</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By March 10, 1993 172 beds fell within the "Yosevo" Clinical Center, 11 at the Ophthalmology Clinic and 26 at the "Podhrestovi" Clinic.

FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VI.A
INCIDENT STUDY REPORT REGARDING MORTAR SHELLING
DOBRIJNA, SARAJEVO ON 1 JUNE 1993: INVESTIGATION

Under the Direction of:

William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to

Prepared by:

Members of Canada's Contributed Personnel to the Commission
of Experts (Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team)
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I. METHODOLOGY

1. This study resulted from an investigation conducted by Sergeant J.L. Lamothé and Warrant Officer S. Murray-Ford, Canadian Forces Military Police, as part of the Canadian Investigation Team. They were part of an investigative group consisting of the Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations, a representative of the Secretariat and the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT), which was comprised of three military lawyers and four military police investigators. The group was deployed to the territory of the former Yugoslavia for the period of 20 June to 10 July 1993 and was in Sarajevo for the period of 24 June to 8 July 1993. The WCIT, in general, consisted of military personnel from the Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General as well as military investigators who were seconded from Canada to the Commission of Experts for specific missions. The teams were referred to within the Commission and for the purposes of its reports as the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team.

2. The objective of this study was to prepare a report analyzing in depth a specific incident in the siege of Sarajevo; to identify specific violations of the law of war, particularly violations in which civilian casualties occurred; to analyze the circumstances of the incident; and to assess the feasibility of identifying and prosecuting alleged offenders, particularly the military commanders. The report was to be based on information which could be obtained in and around Sarajevo.

3. No incident was chosen prior to arrival in Sarajevo. Criteria to be considered in selecting an incident included: number of casualties, number of projectiles fired, sources and, to a lesser extent, time elapsed since the incident. It was hoped that it would be possible to get information from Bosnian, UNPROFOR and Serbian sources. The rationale for preferring an incident in which more than one projectile was fired was that multiple projectiles would give a stronger indication of intent to commit an offence. It might be possible to explain away an incident caused by a single projectile.

4. Authorities from the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) State War Crimes Commission were requested to provide evidence concerning six incidents of their choice, on the understanding that these incidents would be considered, but not necessarily chosen for in-depth investigation. The evidence could not be compiled by the Commission within a short period of time and, as a result, an alternative approach was decided upon. BiH authorities suggested six incidents for which they believed a reasonable amount of information was available. Two of these incidents, the shelling of a soccer game on 1 June 1993 and the shelling of a funeral in mid-June, were selected for possible in-depth investigation. Preliminary investigation indicated that information on the shelling of the funeral would only be available from one source, as heavy rains the day after had washed away the evidence which UNPROFOR had intended to gather.

5. The incident finally selected for in-depth investigation was the mortar shelling of a soccer game in the Dobrinja suburb of Sarajevo on 1 June 1993. The investigators interviewed several witnesses on the BiH side and also reviewed the crater analysis produced by UNPROFOR. Investigators were unable to interview witnesses on the Serbian side.
II. INCIDENT STUDY

6. On 28 June 1993, Sergeant J.L. Lamothe and Warrant Officer S. Murray-Ford, Canadian Forces Military Police, as part of the WCIT, were tasked to conduct an investigation into a mortar attack that occurred in the Dobrinja District of Sarajevo on or about 1 June 1993.

7. They received a copy of a crater analysis conducted by UNPROFOR relating to this incident. The analysis report reveals the following:

(a) the attack occurred at approximately 10:20 a.m. on 1 June 1993;
(b) two mortar rounds fell;
(c) the shells landed at grid reference (GR) 87395653, on a map of Sarajevo, Series M709, sheet 27821, scale 1:50,000;
(d) the minimum calibre of the shells was 81 millimetres;
(e) the first shell had a bearing to the origin of fire of 143 degrees, while the second round had a bearing of 138 degrees;
(f) due to the fact that both rounds impacted into a macadam surface, the angle of descent and range cannot be determined;
(g) working from known angles of descent for both 81 millimetre and 120 millimetre mortars, the minimum range for an 81 millimetre round would be 1,120 metres, while the minimum range for a 120 millimetre round would be 1,340 metres; and
(h) from a determination of the distance from the roof of the surrounding buildings and crater number 1, the team concludes that both shells must have come from the Serbian side of the confrontation line, approximately 300 metres south of Lukavica Barracks.

8. On 1 July 1993, the WCIT visited the University clinical hospital in Sarajevo. The WCIT also interviewed persons injured as well as witnesses. Because of the confidential and prosecutorial nature of the reports, they are not disclosed herein.

9. On 1 July 1993, the WCIT went to Dobrinja, where it met with a member of the BiH State Commission for War Crimes. He provided the WCIT with a list of wounded and injured persons from this incident. Perusal of the list shows that 11 persons were killed as a result of this occurrence, while 133 were injured. The injuries consisted of fractured limbs, abrasions, shrapnel wounds, and the like.

10. While in Dobrinja, the WCIT intended to visit the scene in order to take measurements and take photographs. Information from UNPROFOR officials indicated that the area is on or near the front line, riddled by sniper and heavy machinegun fire, and that the approaches may be mined. It was therefore decided not to go to the scene. At this time, the WCIT received a detailed map of the Dobrinja area.

11. The BiH War Crimes Commission advised the WCIT that any documents relating to the incident would be in the custody of the Chief of Police for Dobrinja.

12. On 2 July 1993, the WCIT visited the Dobrinja Police Station, where it met with the Chief of Police. It was advised that all investigative material
relating to the incident had been forwarded to the Main Police Station in Sarajevo. While at the Main Police Station, the WCIT was informed that materials regarding the mortar attack could be obtained at the Security Services Center.

13. That same day, the WCIT visited the Security Services Center, where it was advised that there was no investigation conducted into the matter by civil authorities, although the BiH military may have made enquiries. The WCIT was further advised that the Center was investigating the organizers of the tournament and that BiH television may have video footage of the event. It would appear that, inasmuch as UNPROFOR authorities had attributed the incident to the Serbian military, this was sufficient for the Security Services Center.

14. On 2 July 1993, the WCIT went to Sarajevo Airport, where it met with a member of the Meteorological Section. He provided the records for 1 June 1993, which showed that the visibility at the time of the incident was 10 kilometres with calm winds.

15. Plans to interview up to 10 witnesses in the Dobrinja area on 3 July 1993 had to be abandoned due to severe shelling in Sarajevo and Dobrinja. Efforts to conduct these interviews on 4 July 1993 were also canceled as a result of heavy fighting in and around Dobrinja and Sarajevo Airport.

16. On 4 July 1993, a copy of a map of Dobrinja was received from UNPROFOR officials. This map shows that the soccer game was held in a location surrounded on three sides by buildings (west, east, and south). In addition, it was explained that there were BiH mortars located outside the hospital approximately 500 metres from the soccer location. However, these were not observed during the WCIT’s visits to the Dobrinja area.

17. On 4 July 1993, the WCIT went to the Serbian Liaison Officer’s office in the Sector Sarajevo headquarters of UNPROFOR. There it explained that it was conducting an investigation regarding the matter, and that allegations had been made regarding Serbian involvement in the incident. The WCIT was advised that all such enquiries would have to be made to the Liaison Officer in Lukavica Barracks.

18. On 4 July 1993, the WCIT went to the site and interviewed an eyewitness. Because of the confidential and prosecutorial nature of the information, it is not disclosed.

III. FINDINGS

19. To date, this investigation has revealed that:

(a) on 1 June 1993, a soccer tournament was in progress in Dobrinja when two mortar rounds fell at about 10:20 a.m.;

(b) 13 persons were killed, and another 133 were injured as a result;

(c) the weather at the time was clear and sunny, and visibility was good; and

(d) an UNPROFOR crater analysis of the scene indicates that the shells came from the Serbian side, approximately 300 metres south of Lukavica Barracks.

20. Other investigative steps relating to this case may include interviews
with Serbian officials as well as other witnesses.

21. In connection with this report, the following documents have been transmitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague: UNPROFOR shelling report; medical report; statements; audio and video tapes; list of casualties; maps of Dobrinja; meteorological records; and crater analysis.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VI.B
THE BATTLE OF SараJEVO AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Prepared by:

William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to

and

Major A.J. van Veen, Canadian Armed Forces;
Member of Canada’s Contributed Personnel
to the Commission of Experts
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I. METHODOLOGY

1. This study was conducted by the Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations and Major A.J. van Veen. They were part of an investigative group consisting of the Rapporteur, a representative of the Secretariat, and the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT), which was comprised of three military lawyers and four military police investigators. The group was deployed to the territory of the former Yugoslavia for the period of 20 June to 10 July 1993 and was in Sarajevo from 24 June to 8 July 1993. The WCIT, as a whole, consisted of military personnel from the Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, as well as military investigators who were seconded from Canada to the Commission of Experts for specific missions. The teams were referred to within the Commission and for the purposes of its reports, as the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team.

2. The writers, both of whom have a background in military operations and in the law of armed conflict, visited Sarajevo from 24 June 1993 to 6 July 1993. During that period of time they visited a number of incident sites in Sarajevo, including Dobrinja, where civilians at a soccer game were killed by mortar fire on 1 June 1993; the National Library, which had been gutted by Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) artillery fire; the Brewery, where people standing in line for water were killed by mortar fire; and the Koševo Medical Centre and the Bakery, both of which had been hit several times. As the normal mode of transport for team members was armoured personnel carriers, and as the team was discouraged from travelling to certain areas and from moving about in open areas, it rapidly became apparent that attempting an in-depth look at property damage was not practicable.

3. The team met with several officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), including City officials; General Delić, the commander of the BiH Army; General Hajrulahović, the commander of BiH forces in Sarajevo; members of the BiH State War Crimes Commission; and Professor Smajkić of the BiH Committee for Health and Social Security. The team discussed casualty figures at some length with Dr. Smajkić and obtained a nearly complete set of The Bulletin, which is produced in Bosnian and English. The team also obtained a certain amount of background information, most of it written in Bosnian from the State Commission and from city officials. The State Commission was preparing a chronology of the battle, but it was not available at the time of the writers' departure. The team was unable to visit the BSA side during the investigation.

4. The team, in particular Major van Veen, met with several UN Military Observers (UNMOs) and with a wide range of officers in the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), both in Sarajevo and in Kiseljak. All were most helpful and forthcoming in their comments, but it is inappropriate to mention these officers by name either here or in the text. They received a substantial amount of information from UNPROFOR, including maps, oral briefings, and a complete set of the HQ BiH Command Weekly INFOSUMS from numbers 1 to 36, and editions 3 and 5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina Warring Factions (apparently editions 1, 2, and 4 are very difficult to locate). These materials, together with a preliminary version of the Draft Study of Sarajevo Battle and Siege, prepared by the Chairman and his staff at the International Human Rights Law Institute at DePaul University (IHRLI), provided the basis for the first draft of the military history and analysis portion of this report prepared by Major van Veen. Although both team members were involved in the writing of this report, Major van Veen was primarily responsible for those sections concerned with the battle organization and tactics, while Commander Fenrick was primarily responsible for the sections concerned with legal issues. The assistance of Lieutenant Commander Phillips of the Office of the Judge Advocate General in analysing the casualty statistics is gratefully acknowledged.
5. This study is a non-exhaustive survey of armed conflict issues arising during the siege of Sarajevo. As the investigators did not have an opportunity to visit BSA forces during the investigation, they were not exposed to allegations of BiH misconduct during the siege unless the allegations came from UN sources. The study focuses on combat-related offences, unlawful targeting, and the use of unlawful means and methods of warfare.

6. The objective of the study was to prepare an analytical survey of the entire battle of Sarajevo, focusing on the major violations of the law of war which have occurred and attempting to impute command responsibility.

7. A consolidated chronology of the battle has been prepared, including a chronology of civilian casualties and a chronology for military units and commanders. These chronologies rely heavily on work which has been done by other entities.

8. It is understood that the Chairman's staff at IHRLI has completed an analysis of the battle relying on documentation in the database. However, this analysis was not available for use during the study.

II. CONSIDERATIONS

9. An analytical study of the battle as a whole, conducted in the same period of time as a study of a selected incident, is bound to be more impressionistic and superficial than the latter study. It is much less likely to result in the development of specific prosecutable cases. The survey approach may, however, result in the development of numerous insights and suggestions worth following up at a later time by teams which are focusing on the development of specific cases.

III. BACKGROUND

10. Sarajevo is the capital city and the economic, political and cultural centre of BiH. The 1991 census indicated that the municipality of Sarajevo, which included the city and some surrounding areas, had a population of 525,980 and occupied 2,049 square kilometres. The population was 49.3 per cent Muslim, 29.9 per cent Serb, 6.6 per cent Croat, 10.7 per cent Yugoslav, and 3.5 per cent "others". Presumably, many members of the group referred to as "Yugoslav" would also have been entitled to classify themselves as "Muslim", "Serb" or "Croat", if they so wished. The population of Sarajevo constituted 11 per cent of the population of BiH.

11. Sarajevo occupies a long, narrow valley on the banks of the Miljacka river. It is in a valley dominated by the steep mountain slopes and ridges of Trebević, Jahorina, Igman, and Bjelašnica, all of which abut directly on the city. The city consists of a dense core, surrounded by a number of quarters which reach up the various slopes and several municipalities located in open ground at its western end. The existence of Sarajevo was first recorded after the Roman conquest of the area in the first century A.D.. The Slavs later colonized the area and erected a castle which can still be seen in the south-east of the city. In 1428 the Turks captured the castle and named the area Seraglio, from which the city takes its name (Sarajevo means "Palace in the fields"). In reality, the native Slavs who had been converted to Islam ruled the city. Sarajevo became renowned for being a prosperous and luxurious city during the Ottoman period. In 1878, the city was assigned to Austria by the Treaty of Berlin. Hatred of the Austrians increased, fed by South Slav (Yugoslav) nationalist fervour. In 1991, a Bosnian Serb student assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, setting in motion World War I.
old part of the city dates from the Turkish and Ottoman Empires. The new part of the city was planned in the Grbavica area, which developed a main electronics and metal industry to supply parts to other areas of the former Yugoslavia.

12. In November and December 1990, multi-party parliamentary elections were held in BiH, which was then one of the constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The Muslim-based Party for Democratic Action (Stranka Democratske Akcije or SDA) won the majority of seats with 86 seats in Parliament, followed by the Serbian Democratic Party (Srpska Demokratska Stranka or SDS) with 72, and the Croatian Democratic Party (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica), which received 44. The remaining parties received 33 seats. The seven-member Presidency, elected by the parliament, included representatives of all three major parties. Alija Izetbegović, the SDA leader, became President of the BiH Presidency. Problems in achieving consensus between national groups in BiH intensified, as the first declarations of independence were made by Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991. Soon after, in October, Muslims and Croats discussed the eventual secession of BiH from the SFRY, which Serb politicians totally opposed.

13. In December 1991, the Muslims and Croats applied for diplomatic recognition by the European Community (EC). On 9 January 1992, Bosnian Serbs declared that they would form their own state, the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (SRBiH), if BiH was recognized as independent. They claimed territory in six regions of BiH where they were the dominant ethnic group. A referendum on independence was held throughout BiH on 1 March 1992, in order to satisfy a condition imposed by the EC for recognition. The results indicated that 63 per cent of eligible voters participated in the vote and 96 per cent of the voters opted for independence. However, local SDS administrations refused to cooperate, a number of polling stations were not opened, and many Serbs boycotted the poll and declared it invalid. After the results of the referendum were announced, President Izetbegović declared the republic independent and called for international recognition.

14. Ethnic tensions gradually increased soon after the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991. Many factors contributed to the escalation of violence, among them, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbian irregular forces stationed in BiH that launched attacks on Croatia, and the arrival of JNA troops withdrawing from Croatia, adding to the presence of Serbian paramilitary groups already in BiH. Clashes involving armed civilians, police, and paramilitaries of all nationalities occurred throughout 1991 and early 1992. Armed conflicts intensified and became widespread during and after the March referendum on independence. Consequently, the President of BiH, on 6 April 1992, declared a state of emergency and mobilized territorial defence units. Violence eventually escalated to a full-scale war in early April, almost immediately after the international community recognized the independence of BiH. On 6 April 1992, the EC voted to recognize the independence of BiH. The United States and Croatia followed suit on 7 April, Canada on 8 April, and so did members of the international community, including the Arab World, all in early April.

15. On 7 April 1992 in Banja Luka, Bosnian Serbs declared the independence of the SRBiH and claimed two thirds of the new state's territory. Serbian irregular forces from BiH, and JNA units stationed in BiH, paramilitary groups from Serbia and Serbian-controlled territory in Croatia launched, or participated in, attacks throughout BiH, in the hope of preventing all or part of the republic from seceding. Muslim forces of the BiH Government, Bosnian Croats, and Croatian Army units sent from neighbouring Croatia responded to these attacks. By mid-April, the self-proclaimed SRBiH controlled approximately 70 per cent of BiH territory.
IV. THE BATTLE

16. A detailed history of the Battle of Sarajevo remains to be written. The battle began in April 1992, at a time when the JNA still had troops stationed in barracks in Sarajevo. On 27 April 1992, the Serbian and Montenegrin members of the SFRY parliament voted to adopt a new constitution for the Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. FRY promptly declared it had no territorial claims on neighbouring republics. On 4 May 1992, the FRY Presidency announced that all members of the JNA who were nationals of the newly proclaimed FRY were to leave BiH within fifteen days. The fighting in Sarajevo for the first significant period of time involved both JNA forces, more or less penned up in their barracks, and Serb forces surrounding the city. JNA forces do not appear to have completed their withdrawal from Sarajevo until 6 June 1992, when JNA troops and their dependents confined in the Maršal Tito Barracks were permitted to evacuate in an 80-vehicle convoy. Since the completion of the withdrawal of JNA troops from the city, the battle had been a siege, with BSA forces occupying the hills surrounding the city and some of the suburbs and BiH forces in the city with the bulk of civilian population. Attachment VI.A.1 is an anecdotal account based on weekly reports prepared by the UN following the establishment of the BiH Command (BiH Comd) by UNPROFOR on 23 October 1992. It gives an impressionistic picture of the battle from one perspective and is no substitute for a comprehensive history.

A. Organization, command, control, and equipment

17. The SFRY relied on a strategic doctrine titled "peoples defence". This doctrine accepted that either a forward defence, or border perimeter defence, of Yugoslavia was strategically futile. Accordingly, based on its World War II experience, and consistent with the extremely rugged terrain, Yugoslav defence was oriented to a concept of operations based on partisan warfare. During World War II, Maršal Tito, by mounting remarkably effective guerilla warfare on a nationwide scale, kept some twenty divisions tied down. This guerilla campaign centred on territorial local forces whose intimate knowledge of the local terrain, coupled with a basic self-sufficiency in most weaponry, amplified their effectiveness to a degree which made the occupation of Yugoslavia prohibitively expensive in military terms. In the modern doctrine of "peoples defence", this success was built upon.

18. Apart from the regular JNA, local territorial forces were equipped and organized to function on a stand alone basis in their own localities. In accordance with doctrine, stores of weapons, munitions, and matériel were dispersed throughout the country, a factor that played directly into the hands of the regional interests that arose as Yugoslavia dissolved. These territorial forces were doctrinally, tactically, operationally, and emotionally wedded to operating in their local areas. This factor has been illustrated fully in that the factions in BiH have been unable to mass sufficient troops to achieve a concentration of forces.

19. At the beginning of the siege, BiH forces in the Sarajevo area composed 1st Corps Sarajevo. From the beginning of the siege to the date of writing, the commander of this corps has been Mustafa Hajrulahović, with his headquarters located in Sarajevo. With the exception of his Deputy Chief of Staff, Ismet Alija, who was replaced by Esad Pelko in the spring of 1993, Hajrulahović's senior staff has remained unchanged, with Vahid Karavelić as Deputy Commander and Asim Džambašović as Chief of Staff.

20. BiH I (Sarajevo Corps) was originally organized as three Operational Groups: Visoko, Sarajevo City, and Mount Igman. This 40,000 strong force was
further divided into one mechanized infantry brigade, three motorized infantry
brigades, seven mountain brigades, an artillery brigade, an air defence
regiment, one territorial defence force brigade, and a special forces unit of
undetermined composition. BiH I (Sarajevo Corps) has been recently
reorganized and the Visoko Operational Group has been placed under command of
BiH 3 Corps. The purpose of the reorganization has been to enhance command
and control, increase political and military reliability, and streamline the
command structure. In furtherance of this goal, a large number of
inexperienced or untrained personnel at command level were replaced at brigade
and battalion level with ex-JNA. Currently, BiH I (Sarajevo Corps) is divided
into 10 infantry brigades plus a logistic brigade, air defence regiment,
military police battalion, an artillery brigade, an anti-sabotage unit, and a
special forces group under direct command of the Minister of Internal Affairs
Bakir Alispahić. The HVO brigade, formerly commanded by the civilian head of
HVO in Sarajevo, Slavko Zelić, is now commanded by Ivan Vulić with Franjo
Taljanić, who has been Chief of Staff since the beginning of the siege. There
is a second HVO special action unit of indeterminate size which reports
directly to the HVO members of Sarajevo city council. The reorganization has
reduced BiH I (Sarajevo Corps) to a more manageable strength of approximately
25,000 to 30,000. Of these, some 8,000 to 9,000 are normally on the front
line.

21. A number of sources indicate that the BiH forces in Sarajevo are facing
a severe shortage of munitions, particularly for their heavy weapons. BiH has
indicated that it has a significant manufacture capability in the city, but
this seems to be limited to the provision of small arms and light mortar
ammunition. Nevertheless, sources estimate BiH I (Sarajevo) Corps' heavy
inventory as follows:

(a) seven to 10 T55 tanks with 100 millimetre guns and no infra-red
capability;

(b) 10 to 15 APCs of various types including BTR 50 and BTR 152
equipped, with either 12.7 or 14.5 millimetre heavy machine-guns;

(c) 15 to 20 artillery weapons, a mixture of 85 millimetre recoilless
rifles, 122 millimetre D30 howitzer and 155 millimetre howitzers of
indeterminate origin; and

(d) 40 to 50 mortars, of either 82 or 120 millimetre with some mounted
on vehicles for enhanced mobility.

In short, the BiH forces are overwhelmingly infantry heavy, with limited
sustainability and insufficient assets for combined operations on any
significant scale.

22. Control of BiH forces seems to be difficult at best. BiH forces in the
city are relying on telephone and easily monitored "Motorola" hand-held
transmitters. Further, there appears to be friction between the Army and the
Presidency and the opposition regarding the line of authority. On a series of
occasions, outside sources have observed the erection of checkpoints and the
repositioning of heavy weapons in support of what appears to be domestic
brinkmanship.

23. A final potential difficulty in the BiH command and control relationship
in the city is the position of HVO troops. These troops, reporting directly
to HVO political authority, constitute a wild card in the BiH hand. As open
war breaks out between BiH and HVO forces in the rest of BiH, the loyalty and
effectiveness of these troops in support of BiH operations and objectives is
an open issue.
24. The July 1993 BiH order of battle at Sarajevo appears to be as follows:

(a) 101 Brigade--Novi Grad: Commander--Nedžad Ajnadžić; Chief of Staff--Vahid Čebo;

(b) 102 Brigade--Stup: Commander--Esad Paldum; Deputy Commander--Mustafa Džebo; Chief of Staff--Amir Čorbo;

(c) 1st Mountain Brigade--Stari Grad: Commander--Mustafa Zulić; Chief of Staff--Zijad Borženović;

(d) 2nd Mountain Brigade--Vratnik, Vasin Han: Commander--Sahin Puškar; Deputy Commander--Atif Adžić; Chief of Staff--Safet Džaferović;

(e) 1st Mechanical Brigade--Vogošća--Žuč: Commander--Enver Šehović; Chief of Staff--Ibrahim Dervišević;

(f) 2nd Motorized Brigade--Rajlovac: Commander--Safet Zajko; Deputy Commander--Safet Isović; Chief of Staff--Enin Suljagić;

(g) 5th Brigade--Dobrinja: Commander--Ismet Hadži; Chief of Staff--Halil Bičaj;

(h) 9th Motorized Brigade--Koševo, Grdanj;

(i) 10th Motorized Brigade--Skenderija; and

(j) HVO Brigade (Kralj Tvrtko)--Grbavica: Commander--Iva Tulić; Chief of Staff--Franjo Taljanić.

25. A final factor having a potential bearing on the BiH command and control structure is the ethnic mix of BiH 1 (Sarajevo Corps). Currently the Corps is thought to have the following ethnic mix: 15 to 20 per cent Serb; 5 to 10 per cent Croat; 10 to 15 per cent Yugoslav; and 55 to 70 per cent Muslim.

26. The BSA forces around Sarajevo from the onset of the siege in April 1992 are troops of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipić and are now commanded by Major General Stanislav Galić, both ex-JNA regular officers. This Corps consists of eight brigades. The troops, consistent with the former Yugoslavia "peoples defence" doctrine, are mainly from either the local area or from Sarajevo itself. A number of factors have made it possible for the BSA to develop a more sophisticated command and control structure than BiH:

(a) the besiegers' organization and positions have, by and large, remained static throughout the siege;

(b) the force does not have the difficulties with ethnic mix as does BiH 1 (Sarajevo) Corps, which is virtually all Serbian;

(c) the vast majority of commanders at battalion, brigade, and corps level are ex-JNA regulars, as is a cadre of NCOs and company grade officers;

(d) the Sarajevo Romanija Corps has enjoyed, for the most part, command continuity over the entire period of the siege;

(e) permanent, secure land line communications have been established, thereby permitting well-coordinated artillery fire planning;
(f) local commanders have been granted the freedom for fire of
opportunity with their heavy weapons and the initiative to use those weapons
in local reprisals for BiH sallies; and

(g) the BSA concept of operations, being primarily militarily
defensive and psychologically offensive, is straightforward.

27. Galić's Corps Headquarters is located at Lukavica on the high ground,
with an excellent view of the entire western half of the city. Based on the
pattern of heavy artillery fires, it appears that Galić has excellent control
of his artillery assets. On a series of occasions, this fire has been
simultaneously directed from a number of directions with coordinated time on
target (TOT). Further, Galić's logisticians have shown themselves to be adept
at replenishing the vast amount of munitions fired quickly across the tortuous
highland road and trail system. Galić is thought to have approximately 600
pieces of artillery at his disposal and has demonstrated a high skill at its
tactical use.

28. The besiegers, numbering some 13,000 troops, are formed into nine
brigades based on their original territorial units. Of these, eight brigades
actually occupy the siege line. These brigades each have an area of
operations with which they both: a) have a territorial affinity, and b) have
occupied on a semi permanent basis.

29. These brigades are as follows:

(a) Sarajevo 1st Brigade--Lukavica: Commander--Lieutenant Colonel
Stojačanović;

(b) Rajlovac Brigade: Commander--Lieutenant Colonel Miroslav Bandžur;
Chief of Staff--Miroslav Radić;

(c) Koševo Brigade--Radava: Commander--Miroslav Krajšnik;

(d) Ilidža Brigade: Commander--Colonel Radojčić;

(e) Vogošća Brigade: Commander--Miloš Delić; Chief of Staff--Robert Evanovski;

(f) Romanija Brigade--Grbavica: Commander--M. Petković;

(g) Nedžarići Brigade--Idejkovići: Commander--Mijović Dragan;

(h) Trebević Brigade and at Igman mountain outside the perimeter; and

(i) Blažuj Brigade: Commander--M. Čojić.

30. In addition to the brigade commanders, Colonel Zdravko Zgonjanin, as
Chief of Police for Boundaries, with his deputy Goran Zubac have been
responsible for the interdiction of Bosnian personnel and refugees across the
international zone at Sarajevo Airport.

31. Like the BiH forces, the BSA use essentially ex-JNA equipment:

(a) Tanks--T55 and M84;

(b) Howitzers--155, 152, 130, 120 and 105 millimetre;

(c) MLRs--truck mounted 122 millimetre;
(d) anti-tank--fired direct fire artillery 100 meters T100;

(e) Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA)--57 millimetre, 40 millimetre, 3 by 20 millimetre Oerlikon, dual 14.5 millimetre, 14.5 millimetre and 12.7 millimetre; and

(f) mortars--82 millimetre and 120 millimetre.

B. Tactics used during the battle

32. As of early July 1993, the strategic situation at the siege of Sarajevo is one where the Serb forces continue to dominate much of the perimeter of the city more for the political significance it holds than for any intention of gaining possession of the city at this time. BiH forces do not appear to be able to amass adequate fighting power to effectively break the state of siege. From a tactical perspective, it is essential to note that, at this stage of the conflict, the siege, while of tremendous political and military significance, is not the main focus of BiH, BSA, or HVO activity. The BiH forces are conducting a major offensive in central BiH, and fighting at various levels of intensity is occurring in the periphery. As a consequence, the operations at Sarajevo have developed into a classic siege, with neither side being in possession of either the will or the military ability to force a conclusion. Nevertheless, both sides have maintained a high tempo of violence.

33. Tactics in Sarajevo and its environs are influenced by a correlation of several factors:

(a) The unique combination and proximity of both prominent high ground and developed urban terrain;

(b) the actual force structure of the warring factions;

(c) the limited ability of both parties to consolidate and reconstitute those forces for subsequent combat operations;

(d) the extremes in weather, which have been particularly telling for troops exposed on the surrounding hill features;

(e) the state of the various intermittent political negotiations; and

(f) the presence of influential external elements, in particular the various arms of the United Nations and, of at least equal importance, the world media.

34. Serb forces have a preponderance of heavy weapons and large stocks of munitions of all calibres. It is apparent that the BSA was able to obtain large stocks of ex-JNA inventory. However, the Serbs suffer from a distinct manpower shortage, with estimates at about 13,000 persons. As the BSA has been hard pressed at Goražde, central and northern BiH, the Bihać area, and the Posavina corridor, there has been no influx of new troops and no rotation of besieging units. Specialist gunners for the heaviest ordnance are moved around the perimeter, as there are more gun positions and 155 millimetre weapons than crews to man them. However, local commanders have the full freedom to use their unit's heavy weapons. As such, the individual unit determines the scale and target of both harassing and interdiction fire.

35. The BiH, as an infantry force, has limited capabilities at best. The areas of vital concern are the high ground, along the steep ridges surrounding
the city, and the open ground at the west end between the airport and the
Butmir/Igman mountain positions. BiH activity has focused on four basic
objectives:

(a) the seizure of the high ground to interrupt Serbian direct line of
sight/line of fire into the city;

(b) the seizure of key mountain roads to isolate Serbian positions on
the various high features;

(c) the opening of a land corridor through the west end of the city,
through the municipality of Ilidža, to break the siege and link up with the
BiH main body; and

(d) focusing as much international attention as possible on the
situation in Sarajevo as a means to obtaining international assistance and
sympathy.

36. The BiH army has dispersed its forces throughout the city, as any
concentration of forces or permanent deployment of assets would bring down an
unsustainable weight of fire from the commanding hills. To that end, those
defenders not actually manning the perimeters or engaged on duty are quartered
at their homes. The weapons shortage is so acute that, on shift change,
reports have been received that the new replacements are "handed off" the
small arms of the previous shift. None the less, the BiH has conducted an
aggressive mobile defence. Heavy weapons are not dug-in in fixed
emplacements. Rather, they are hidden throughout the built-up areas and
shifted to preclude counter-battery fire. As use of these weapons always
provokes a disproportionate Serb response, the BiH army has given its weapons,
most notably its mortars, significant mobility by mounting them on the backs
of trucks.

37. The BiH army also employs the classic infantry tactics but is limited to
smaller unit actions by three factors: lack of supporting firepower, a lack
of logistics sustainability, and the Serb ability to detect and target the
staging of any forces of above-company strength. Consequently, BiH has
primarily employed small-unit tactics. The BiH army, like the Serbs, has
employed a high level of sniping. This tactic has stimulated direct reprisal
by BSA artillery fire, as specifically indicated by them during the week of
14-20 March 1993. Included in this sniping is the use of AAA in the direct
fire anti-personnel mode, particularly in support of the snipers. The BiH
forces have also indulged in sporadic indirect and small-arms fire, most
notably with their mobile 82 millimetre and 120 millimetre mortars.

38. The majority of BiH attacks are of platoon-plus size, with a minimum of
preparatory artillery fire, although supporting fire has been received from
main-body positions on and around Igman mountain. With the advantage of
interior lines of communication and the ability to achieve local tactical
initiative, BiH forces have conducted a series of deliberate pre-dawn attacks
aimed at high features, Serbian strong points, and vulnerable supply routes.
BSA counter-attacks have usually involved severe artillery fire. The common
scenario appears to be an initial BiH success followed by an inability to
consolidate due to a lack of sustainability of logistics and supporting fire
under the weight of Serbian counter-fire from heavy weapons. BiH casualties
are high due to the following factors:

(a) most attacks involve frontal assaults against fixed emplacements
and bunkers equipped with crew-served automatic weapons;
(b) BSA positions have superb positions of observation and fire with pre-registered killing zones;

(c) the BSA has confirmed night vision capability;

(d) the BSA has pre-registered defensive fire plans, including final defensive fire (FDF), on their own positions; and

(e) the presence of significant armour resources permits the deployment of high-flexibility, high-intensity reaction forces, where the terrain permits.

39. None the less, BiH tenacity has been such that the perimeter integrity has, by and large, been maintained.

40. BiH has also mounted large numbers of platoon-size trench raids. These raids have limited tactical objectives, such as the reduction of a particularly bothersome strong point, the elimination or capture of Serb heavy weapons, the capture of BSA personnel, or the diversion of attention from surreptitious crossings at Sarajevo airport or other movements. These operations are of limited size and duration and conclude with a withdrawal to the main perimeter. Due to the factors listed above, coupled with an apparent deficiency in coordination, BiH is unable to exploit tactical opportunities created by these raids. This problem with coordination inhibits larger scale operations. One example of this was an abortive three brigade attack south of Sarajevo from Mount Igman towards the Butmir area on 25 January 1993. Coordination collapsed as regards timing, fire support, and manoeuvre, to the point where the operation rapidly degenerated to a confused series of local platoon attacks and counter-attacks. More successful has been the BiH tactic of long range infiltration into BSA lines. This infiltration has the objective of sabotaging or capturing BSA equipment. This equipment most notably includes tanks, gun emplacements and logistics stores. While BiH has exaggerated the success of these raids to include the accidental destruction of a large BSA ammunition dump, the raids have had sufficient effect to divert BSA overtaxed reserves of manpower for enhanced "rear area" security.

41. In the static defence mode, BiH tactics have followed the conventional techniques for the defence in Fight in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA) operations. The use of mutually supporting strong points, communication trenches and tunnels, jury rigged barricades to block fire, movement and observation are all common. Due to the constant sniper fire, key crossroads, particularly on the north/south streets, have been shielded to facilitate pedestrian and vehicular movement. There are unsubstantiated reports that the BiH has expanded the sewer system and built underground factories, command posts, and hospitals. What has been substantiated was the existence of a steel reinforced tunnel approximately 1.4 metres under the airport from Muslim held Butmir to the Dobrinja quarter in the southwest of the city. That tunnel was detected and flooded.

42. BSA objectives in the siege are much less complex than those of BiH. The Serb concept of operations appears to be the extension of the siege as a focus of political negotiations, activity, and propaganda intended for political leverage rather than military advantage. Notwithstanding, the tempo of BSA operations can be intensive for protracted periods. Their overriding tactical concern is their shortage of manpower. The current manpower situation is such that a definitive BSA military solution is unattainable until forces can be shifted from other areas of operation. The eight BSA brigades are inordinately well equipped with dedicated artillery and mortar assets. Estimates range from between 600 and 1,100 artillery and mortar weapons and do not include the large inventory of heavy calibre AAA weapons
and tanks. Based on its concept of operations, BSA tactics are primarily defensive and reactive in nature.

43. From their entrenched and rivetted positions on the high ground around the city, BSA gunners can strike at any part of the city with relative impunity. The following factors reinforce the predominance of the BSA reliance on artillery:

(a) the high ground offers an unimpeded view of the city with direct lines of sight and, frequently, lines of fire;

(b) for the weapons systems employed, ranges are virtually point blank;

(c) ample munitions for the weapons are in situ;

(d) many of the gunners are locals and as such are familiar with the layout of the city; and

(e) the duration of the siege has permitted the detailed registration of the guns.

44. The BSA has employed its artillery in two ways. The first is for traditional purposes, such as close support for assaults, counter-attacks by fire, defensive fires against BiH forays, the harassment and interdiction of BiH supply lines and staging areas, area denial, the reduction of BiH strong points and entrenchments, and counter-battery fire. The second is for the express purpose of terrorizing the besieged populace. In the conventional role, the BSA use of artillery has been highly effective. On 8 December 1992, for example, when BiH forces attacked various access routes in the northern boundary of the perimeter, the BSA responded with heavy shelling and a quick counter-attack on the high feature at Žuć. The position was isolated on three sides by a curtain of shells, the position was taken, and the BiH counter-penetration attack was broken up by a massive barrage employing the full range of fuses including air burst, delay, and point detonating.

45. It is the second tactic, that of using heavy artillery as a weapon of terror by the BSA, that is most controversial. Some of the shelling into the populated quarters of the city may well have a bona fide military objective, such as counter-battery fire on the elusive BiH tubes. However, the sheer weight of fire precludes any discussion of proportionality. The BSA has indicated, both by its conduct and by direct comment, that shelling of the built-up areas is conducted for the express purpose of reprisal for BiH sniper fire, raids, barrages, and attacks along the perimeter. Further, this shelling has followed a pattern consistent with life under siege. Shelling routinely occurs at dawn and at dusk and is random in both source and target.

There are allegations that civilians are being targeted at schools, parks, sports fields, water and food distribution points, hospitals, and cemeteries. As a variation on this theme, BSA gunners have used AAA in the form of 20 millimetre and 14.7 millimetre auto cannon in the direct fire, anti-personnel mode, directly targeting individual civilians as they move through the city. There are numerous recorded instances where this fire has been directed at UN and relief personnel and activities. As regards the destruction of cultural properties, there has been some evidence to suggest that BiH forces have stationed or positioned weapons either directly in, or in close proximity to, these structures. However, as stated earlier this alone would not account for the sheer volume of fire directed at them. Further, UN sources indicate evidence that city utilities are being directly targeted with predictable effects on the populace.
46. The entire city is under constant BSA small-arms fire. Some of this fire is sporadic or originates from the area of the confrontation line. It should be noted, though, that the majority of this fire is from specifically dedicated snipers, with medium and heavy machine-guns. This fire is directly targeted at any person or vehicle in the perimeter and is completely random. One observed technique is to bring down a victim, wait, and then engage rescuers, including marked ambulances and UN vehicles. Persons on the BSA side have observed numbers of snipers equipped with specialized weapons for their operations. The overwhelming number of casualties from this continuous sniping and sporadic shelling are civilians. The sniping and shelling incidents escalate directly in relation to the lack of tangible results in negotiations. It should be noted that: a) local commanders have the full freedom to use their heavy weapons; and, b) the collapse of negotiations reduces the control over local leaders. It should be stressed, however, with shelling that varies from 20 to 2,400 impacts per day, with an average of 200 impacts recorded per day, the required logistics impute constructive knowledge of this targeting to the higher echelon commanders.

47. As regards offensive tactics, the BSA is not keen to participate in FIBUA operations for a number of reasons:

(a) its concept of operations does not, as yet, require the taking of further ground in the Sarajevo perimeter;

(b) its current selected aims are satisfied by the existing tactical situation;

(c) FIBUA operations are too infantry intensive; and

(d) as indicated during an attack of the city in the Oteš district on 21 December 1992, the BSA has experienced disproportionate casualties in both personnel and equipment, especially tanks, with respect to the advantage gained.

48. In the open areas to the west of the city, the BSA has fared better in combined arms operations. The BSA employs armour in company strength plus (10-20 tanks) supported by APC's and artillery. The combination of the rugged hill features and urban terrain, together with the BiH's effective use of its anti-armour weapons and obstacle plan, have relegated the armour to two secondary roles: mobile artillery and rapid reaction for counter-attack or counter-penetration.

49. The BSA is capable of terrorizing Sarajevo in its geographic entirety with its heavy weapons but cannot force the fall of the city from a strictly military view. In contrast, the BiH can, at the present time, deny the urban terrain to the BSA but cannot break the siege. The key elements, as both realize, are the civilian population and, through them, international pressure.

C. Casualties

50. It is extremely difficult to determine precise civilian casualty figures during an armed conflict. The Committee for Health and Social Security of Citizens of the Ministry of Health of BiH, headed by Professor Dr. Arif Smajkic, has been publishing a weekly publication, The Bulletin, which has attempted to capture total casualty figures for Sarajevo alone and for BiH as a whole. A meeting with Dr. Smajkic convinced the writers of this report that he is making a good faith effort, under enormous difficulties, to compile accurate figures. Unfortunately, for whatever reasons, although all
practicable efforts have been made to compile total casualty figures resulting from military activity, relatively little effort has been devoted to distinguishing between civilian and military casualties.

51. In compiling the tables which follow, all copies of The Bulletin from 3 June 1992 (Number 8) to 28 June 1993 (Number 63) have been reviewed. The totals in the 28 June 1993 issue might be noted. By that time, it was estimated that 8,934 persons had been killed in Sarajevo due to military activity (including 1,418 children) and 52,518 persons had been heavily wounded (including 13,738 children). The vast majority of these casualties were non-combatants and not legitimate objects of attack. If there are eventually to be prosecutions for attacks on the civilian population in the Sarajevo area, it will be necessary to review the casualty figures held by the Committee to precisely identify combatants and non-combatants, because the combatants are, of course, lawful targets. It must also be noted that the casualty figures in The Bulletin, because of the inevitable problems of gathering such statistics in wartime, have certain gaps and discontinuities. Two inexplicable discontinuities are the enormous increase in the estimate of the cumulative number of persons killed, from 2,349 to 7,468 between 27 September 1992, and 9 November 1992, and the simultaneous decline in the estimate of the cumulative number of persons seriously wounded, from 13,605 to 12,000.

52. Certain issues of The Bulletin contain varying estimates of the percentage of total casualties which are non-combatant casualties:

(a) 2 August and 10 August 1992--70 per cent of total casualties were civilians;

(b) 19 August 1992--75 per cent of total casualties were civilians;

and

(c) 27 September 1992--80 per cent of those killed and 75 per cent of those wounded were civilians.

These estimates refer to casualties in all of BiH, not Sarajevo alone. Dr. Smajkić estimates that about 85 per cent of the casualties in Sarajevo itself were non-combatants.

53. The following Table presents some basic statistics from the 1992 and 1993 Sarajevo casualty figures, which are presented in toto in Tables #2 and #3 which follow on the next pages:

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One can quickly see that the figures for 1993 are approximately 44 per cent of 1992 figures.
### 1992 Weekly Sarajevo Casualties

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### 1993 Weekly Sarajevo Casualties

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V. APPLICABLE LAW

54. For the purposes of this report, it is presumed that the law applicable in international armed conflicts applies to the battle of Sarajevo for the reasons indicated in paragraph 45 of the Commission's first interim report (S/25274 of 10 February 1993):

"45. The Commission is of the opinion, however, that the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

55. It is presumed that the law applicable in international armed conflicts includes the provisions of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and of the Hague Cultural Property Convention of 1954, as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the rules of customary law.

56. It is noted that the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal refers to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2), violations of the laws of customs of war (article 3), genocide (article 4), and crimes against humanity (article 5). The Statute, for whatever reason, does not refer explicitly to Additional Protocol I of 1977. The standards set forth in Additional Protocol I will be referred to repeatedly in the discussion and analysis that follows because the various parties to the conflict have agreed to apply Protocol I, and because it is assumed that many of the provisions in Protocol I can be considered statements of customary law. It is noted that article 85 (5) of Protocol I refers to grave breaches as war crimes. It is hoped that article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal can be interpreted in such a way as to include grave breaches of Protocol I.

VI. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

57. A commander giving an order to commit a war crime is equally guilty of the offence as the person actually committing it. He is also liable to punishment if he knew or had information which should have enabled him to conclude, in the circumstances at the time, that a subordinate was committing or going to commit a breach of the law, and failed to take all feasible steps to prevent or repress that breach. The mental element necessary when the commander has not given the offending order is a) actual knowledge; b) such serious personal dereliction on the part of the commander as to constitute wilful and wanton disregard of the possible consequences; or c) an imputation of constructive knowledge. That is, despite pleas to the contrary, the commander, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, must have known of the offences charged and acquiesced therein. (W. Hays Parks, "Command Responsibility for War Crimes", 62 Military Law Review 1, 101-104).

58. Articles 86 (2) and 87 of Additional Protocol I essentially codify the customary law concerning command responsibility. These state:

"Article 86 - Failure to act

2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superior from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit
such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach."

"Article 87 - Duty of commander

1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and, where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.

2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their obligations under the Conventions and this Protocol.

3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Convention or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violation of the Convention or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators thereof."

59 The military commander is not absolutely responsible for all offences committed by his subordinates. Isolated offences may be committed of which he has no knowledge whatsoever. A commander does, however, as a fundamental aspect of command, have a duty to control his troops and to take all practicable measures to ensure that they comply with the law. The arguments that a commander has a weak personality or that the troops assigned to him are uncontrollable are simply unacceptable. One writer, (W.D. Burnett, "Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Program at Shatila and Sabra", 107 Military Law Review 71, 189 (1985)) concluded his study of the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps as follows:

"Finally, to avoid the misfeasance of past commanders, including Eitan, Dreli, and Yaron, any military commander, Israeli or otherwise, assigned command and control over armed combatant groups similar to the Phalangists which has engaged in widespread war crimes in the past should refrain from employing that group in combat situations until they have demonstrated clearly and unequivocally their commitment to the fundamental humanitarian protection of the law of war."

If, for whatever reasons, the argument is made that military forces fighting in the Sarajevo area are not capable of complying with the law, that is no defence to a war crimes charge against a commander.

VII. THE MILITARY OBJECTIVE

60 A fundamental aspect of the law of armed conflict is the principle of distinction: military commanders are required to direct their operations against military objectives exclusively and, to the extent practicable, to avoid causing casualties or damage to civilian persons or objects. Military objectives include enemy combatants and certain objects. The definition of military objective in Additional Protocol I is now generally accepted. It states:
2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. Insofar as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

One of the leading commentaries on the Protocols discusses the definition in the following terms:

"Military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use:

a. make an effective contribution to military action, and
b. whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

2.4.2 The objects classified as military objectives under this definition include much more than strictly military objects such as military vehicles, weapons, munitions, stores of fuel and fortifications. Provided the object meet the two-pronged test, under the circumstances ruling at the time (not at some hypothetical future time), military objectives include activities providing administrative and logistical support to military operations such as transportation and communications systems, railroads, airfields and port facilities and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of the armed conflict.

2.4.3 Military objectives must make an 'effective contribution to military action'. This does not require a direct connection with combat option. Thus a civilian object may become a military objective and thereby lose its immunity from deliberate attack through use which is only indirectly related to combat action, but which nevertheless provides an effective contribution to the military phase of a Party's overall war effort.

(M. Bothe, K. Partsch and W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict 323-324 (1982)).

61. In the municipality of Sarajevo, BiH and HVO forces, their equipment and facilities, including barracks and factories producing weapons or other equipment for the forces, would be legitimate military objectives. The civilian population, civilian housing, medical facilities, schools, religious facilities, and facilities producing food or other objects primarily for the use of the civilian population would not be legitimate military objectives. BiH and HVO forces are not, however, entitled to conceal themselves among the civilian population or in civilian objects and claim immunity from attack. As indicated in article 51(7) of Protocol I, the party being attacked is not to use its own civilian population to shield military objectives from attack. Compliance with the law of armed conflict is particularly difficult during a siege as in Sarajevo because of the almost inevitable intermingling of military forces and the civilian population. The besieged forces continue to have an obligation, to the extent practicable, to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. The besieging forces continue to have an obligation to comply with the rule of proportionality and to avoid causing excessive collateral losses to the civilian population. It is inevitable, however, that there will be a proliferation of dual-use facilities such as communications systems, power networks, transportation systems and supply facilities, which
are used by both the civilian population and military forces. Generally speaking, these dual-use facilities would become legitimate military objectives.

VIII. SIEGE WARFARE

62. Siege is a traditional method of warfare whereby one party to a conflict attempts to compel another party to surrender an area occupied by the other party's forces. It is accomplished by surrounding the area, cutting off all access to the outside, and bombarding or starving the area into submission. Under the law, as set forth in the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, belligerents were forbidden to attack or bombard undefended cities (Sarajevo is defended by BiH and HVO forces), and must notify the authorities in the city of a bombardment, except in the case of an assault. In addition, belligerents must take all necessary steps to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.

63. In the words of Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law*, volume VI, at 419 (7th ed. 1952):

"With regard to the mode of carrying out siege without bombardment, no special rules of International Law exist, and here too only the general rules respecting offence and defence apply. Therefore, an armed force besieging a town may, for instance, cut off the river which supplies drinking water to the besieged, but must not poison the river. Moreover, no rule of law exists which obliges a besieging force to allow all non-combatants, or even women, children, the aged, the sick and wounded, or subjects of neutral Powers, to leave the besieged locality unmolested. Further, should the commander of a besieged place expel the non-combatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his store of provisions, the besieging force need not allow them to pass through its lines, but may drive them back."

64. Subject to article 17 of the Geneva Civilians Convention, which encourages the conclusion of local agreements for removal of some persons from besieged areas, and article 23 of the Civilians Convention, which provides for the free passage of medical and religious supplies for all persons and of essential food for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases, the commander of the investing force has the right to forbid all communications and access between the besieged place and the outside.

65. Simply put, under the law as it existed prior to Protocol I, the investing force was, generally speaking, entitled to starve, freeze, or dehydrate the inhabitants of a besieged area into submission.

66. Assuming that Additional Protocol I is also applicable to the siege of Sarajevo, the legal situation becomes somewhat different:

1a) starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited (article 54);

(b) the provisions concerning relief actions are somewhat stronger (article 70); and

(c) directing fire on non-combatants entering or leaving a besieged area is now unlawful (article 51).
IX. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

67. Any recent visitor to Sarajevo quickly becomes aware of the fact that many violations of the law of armed conflict are being committed during the battle. The focus of this particular investigation is on offences committed during the fighting, in particular, the use of impermissible methods or means of warfare, and attacks on illegitimate targets. Although the question of whether certain acts were lawful reprisals might be raised in defence at a trial, the reprisals issue will be ignored in that study.

68. In the words of the editors of the Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (volume 15, at 109), "Those rules of international law which relate to the actual conduct of hostilities have only infrequently been made the basis of war crime trial proceedings". The editors, writing in the aftermath of World War II, go on to indicate that the then applicable law for the conduct of hostilities on land consisted essentially of articles 27-28 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. They point out (at 110) that "no records of trials in which allegations were made of the illegal conduct of air warfare have been brought to the notice of the United Nations War Crimes Commission". The types of offences which they discuss in their analysis include: wearing enemy uniforms while engaging in combat, inciting troops to deny quarter, continuing to fire on a vessel after it has surrendered, killing the survivors of sunken ships, and participating in hostilities as an unlawful combatant.

69. Article 6(b) of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg listed "wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity" as war crimes. It appears, however, that to date no one has been tried on a charge related to wanton destruction and that those persons tried on charges related to devastation, such as General Rendulic, who was acquitted on a charge of this type in the "Hostage Trial" (8 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34, 67-69), have been tried for offences alleged to have been committed in occupied territory.

70. Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal states:

"The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:

a. employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;

b. wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

c. attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;

d. seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; and

e. plunder of public or private property."

71. With reference to the Battle of Sarajevo, it must be noted that Sarajevo is not "undefended". The British Manual of Military Law Part III 1 290 (1958) contains a concise statement of the applicable law:

"An undefended or 'open' town is a town which is so completely undefended from within or without that the enemy may enter and take
possession of it without fighting or incurring casualties. It follows that no town behind the immediate front line can be open or undefended for the attacker must fight his way to it. Any town behind the enemy front line is thus a defended town and is open to ground or other bombardment, subject to the limitations imposed on all bombardments, namely, that as far as possible, the latter must be limited to military objectives. This means that hospitals, convalescent homes, churches and monuments duly marked by signs notified beforehand must not be deliberately attacked if they are not used for military purposes. Thus, the question of whether a town is or is not an open town is distinct from whether it does not contain military objectives. A town in the front line with no means of defence, not defended from outside and into which the enemy may enter and of which he may take possession at any time without fighting or incurring casualties, e.g., from crossing unmarked minefields, is undefended even if it contains munitions factories. On the other hand, all defended towns whether situated in the front line or not may be subjected to bombardment provided that it is not directed solely against non-military objectives duly marked as mentioned above.*

72. The writers did not see any evidence of the use of poisonous or other unlawful weapons during their time in Sarajevo. As indicated in the anecdotal account of the battle (16 to 22 November 1992, and 7 and 14 December 1992), there have been reports of the BSA using vehicles which were painted white with UN markings. Such acts constitute perfidious conduct, are prohibited by article 37(1) of Protocol I, and can constitute a grave breach under article 85(3)(f) if persons caused death or serious injury while using such vehicles. Also, as indicated in the anecdotal account (21 to 28 December 1992), it appears that BiH forces have, on occasion, directly attacked UN forces. In this context, UN forces are non-combatants and illegitimate targets.

A. Starvation as a method of warfare

73. The tribunal in the "High Command Trial" (12 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 84, 84) approved the following opinion:

"A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a place controlled by the enemy and endeavour by a process of isolation to cause its surrender. The propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not questioned. Hence the cutting off of every source of sustenance from without is deemed legitimate. It is said that if the commander of a besieged place expels the non-combatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten the surrender."

This opinion clearly supports the use of starvation as a method of warfare in the case of a siege. Article 54 of Protocol I prohibits starvation as a method of warfare in general terms. It states:

1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.
2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, as such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve
out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.

3. The prohibitions in paragraph 2 shall not apply to such of the object covered by it as are used by an adverse Party:
   a. as sustenance solely for the members of its armed forces; or
   b. if not as sustenance, then in direct support of military action, provided, however, that in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its starvation or force its movement.

74. One might pose two fundamental questions concerning article 54. First, does it apply to the siege of Sarajevo either because Protocol I applies as a treaty obligation or because its starvation provisions are now part of customary law? Second, if article 54 does apply, does it override the traditional law concerning siege or is the traditional law a form of lex specialis? Both the ICRC Commentary on the Protocols and the Commentary by Bothe, Partsch, and Solf, hail article 54 as a substantial new principle of international law applicable in armed conflicts. It is considered that article 54 applies to the siege as a treaty obligation, not as part of customary law. It is also considered that the law for siege warfare is not a lex specialis and that, as a result, where there is an inconsistency between article 54 and the traditional law, article 54 governs.

75. Although Sarajevo has been under siege from the beginning of the conflict, and food, water, heat, and electricity have been extremely limited for much of that time, The Bulletin, which reports casualty figures in Sarajevo, has not indicated that anyone has died in the city from starvation, dehydration, or freezing. Repeated references are made in the anecdotal history to electricity, food, and water shortages. It is noted in the Observations Concerning the Battle History as of July 1993 subsection that both sides have used the city’s logistics as an instrument of war against the populace to influence each other and affect the media.

76. One of the fundamental problems of legal analysis during a siege is that combatants and non-combatants are collocated, frequently using the same resources and facilities. For example, with reference to article 54, food supplies, drinking water, and electricity may be used by both the civilian population and military forces in Sarajevo. If there is a shortage in any of these supplies, the shortfall may be levied against the military forces, the civilian population, or both groups. As a practical matter, it is extremely unlikely that the shortfall would be levied against the military forces alone. One is faced with the unpalatable fact that, unless there is a neutral arbiter, the only way to starve-out a besieged military force, a legitimate act of war, is to starve the civilian population.

77. As no one appears to have died of starvation, cold, or dehydration in Sarajevo, it is unlikely anyone could be held liable for using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare during the siege.

B. Attacks on civilian persons and objects

78. Under the law as essentially codified in Protocol I:
   (a) attacks must be directed against military objectives;
(b) attacks directed against civilian persons or objects are prohibited;

(c) indiscriminate attacks are prohibited; and

(d) indiscriminate attacks include:

(i) area attacks, and

(ii) attacks causing disproportionate incidental civilian casualties.

Incidental or collateral loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property is a tragic but inevitable byproduct of armed conflict.

79. The battle to recapture Manila from the Japanese in 1945 is a particularly painful example of an attempt to minimize civilian casualties which went wrong for reasons beyond the control of the attacking force. Once American forces were committed to recapture the Philippines, it was necessary for them to retake Manila. General Yamashita, the Japanese commander in the Philippines ordered his troops to evacuate the city on the approach of American forces because he did not have sufficient forces to defend it and did not have enough food to feed the civilian population of one million. A subordinate Japanese commander disregarded Yamashita’s orders and directed his troops to fight to the death to defend the city. In the course of the battle, American forces surrounded the city and closed in towards its centre. The Japanese would not surrender. Initially, American commanders imposed severe restrictions on the use of artillery, but, as American casualties mounted, many restrictions were lifted. The American official history described the situation:

"The losses had manifestly been too heavy for the gains achieved. If the city were to be secured without the destruction of the 37th and the 1st Cavalry Divisions, no further effort could be made to save the buildings; everything holding up progress would be pounded, although artillery fire would not be directed against structures such as churches and hospitals that were known to contain civilians. Even this last restriction would not always be effective for often it could not be learned until too late that a specific building held civilians. The lifting of the restrictions on support fires would result in turning much of southern Manila into a shambles; but there was no help for that if the city were to be secured in a reasonable length of time and with reasonable losses."

(R. Smith, Triumph in the Phillipines, 264 [1943]).

An estimated 16,000 Japanese soldiers died in the battle and American forces casualties were 1,000 killed and 5,000 wounded. Manila was devastated, and the bodies of 100,000 Filipino civilians were found in the rubble, most of them killed in the exchange of fire between American and Japanese forces.

80. Substantial civilian casualties are particularly likely to be caused during sieges, fighting in built up areas, and on other occasions when attacks are directed against cities. As Sarajevo is under siege, a certain number of civilian casualties can be expected even if the combatants made a conscientious effort to comply with the law of armed conflict. Several thousand persons have been killed or wounded in Sarajevo during the siege. The Bulletin estimate of 28 June 1993 was that 8,934 persons had been killed and 52,518 persons had been wounded as a result of military activity. The precise totals, the identity of the killed and wounded and their classification as combatants or non-combatants are not yet known. It is.
however, reasonable to conclude that the vast majority of the casualties, probably over 75 per cent, are civilians and not legitimate objects of attack.

81. The writers did not attempt to conduct their own survey of property damage during the siege of Sarajevo. It is, however, apparent to any visitor to the city that most buildings, including many which are clearly civilian objects, such as churches and mosques, have suffered serious battle damage. The Holiday Inn, where the writers stayed during their visit, is an 11-story structure, but occupancy is now confined to the first five floors, because of damage to one side and because the other side is exposed to sniper fire. It must be conceded, however, that the Holiday Inn was initially the headquarters of the Serbian Democratic Party and some damage was caused when it was seized by Muslim militiamen on 6 April 1992. The writers visited the National Library, however, and it was apparent that this civilian structure had been deliberately destroyed by Serb artillery from the nearby hills. The interior of the library was gutted, yet several surrounding buildings were completely untouched. It will eventually be possible to make a global survey of property damage in Sarajevo, but it will probably be very difficult to establish a precise chronology and indication of causality in most cases. It will also be necessary to apply a discount factor because of the BiH tendency to move its limited artillery resources among various civilian areas. On the morning of 3 July 1993, the writers observed from their windows in the Holiday Inn a BiH mortar being fired repeatedly from an area where civilian housing was located. They also observed a substantial amount of Serb counter-battery fire hitting the houses.

82. The weapons systems being used by BSA forces in the siege of Sarajevo, predominantly direct-fire weapons, and artillery at point blank, frequently direct-fire, range, are systems which can be used with a high degree of accuracy. A sniper rifle is normally aimed at a particular person in view of the sniper. Mortars and guns used at short range normally fire projectiles which land quite close to where they are aimed. These are not inherently indiscriminate weapons, particularly in the case of sniper fire. If non-combatants are being killed or wounded, this occurs because the sniper intends to kill or wound them.

83. There are legitimate military objectives in Sarajevo such as the BiH forces wherever they are located and modest weapons and ammunition manufacturing facilities. It does not appear, however, that conscientious efforts are made to ensure that attacks are directed exclusively against these military objectives. There is every indication that civilians have been deliberately targeted by snipers and by BSA artillery. As indicated in the discussion of BSA tactics, small arms and artillery have frequently been used as weapons of terror directed against the civilian population. There are cases in which BSA artillery has been directed against military objectives and, nevertheless civilian casualties have been caused. In these cases, it is appropriate to attempt to measure military advantage gained against suffering caused to the civilian population in a crude proportionality equation. Quite frequently, however, application of the rule of proportionality will be irrelevant for the simple reason that causing civilian casualties is the objective of BSA action, not an incidental effect.

X. ACCOUNTABILITY

84. This report is a non-exhaustive survey of law of armed conflict issues arising during the siege of Sarajevo. As the writers did not have an opportunity to visit BSA forces during the investigation, they were not exposed to allegations of BiH misconduct during the siege unless the allegations came from UN sources. The report focuses on combat-related
offences, unlawful targeting, and the use of unlawful means and methods of warfare.

85. It is unlikely that weapons which are illegal per se have been used during the siege. If it can be established that named individuals in the BSA used or authorized the use of vehicles which carried UN markings, this could be viewed as perfidious conduct and, if persons were killed or wounded as a result of this action, a grave breach of Protocol I could be established. The "Hagendorf" case [13 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 146, 146-148], in which a German soldier was convicted for abusing the Red Cross emblem by firing at American soldiers from an ambulance, might constitute a useful precedent. In that case, however, the accused was captured at the time of the incident. Somewhat similarly, if it can be established that named individuals attacked or authorized attacks on UN forces, these persons could be charged with violating the laws or customs of war, contrary to article 3 of the International Criminal Tribunal Statute, by committing a grave breach of article 85(3)(a) of Protocol I and making the civilian population or individual civilians the object of attack. In the Sarajevo context, UN peacekeepers are non-combatants and entitled to be treated as civilians. As indicated in the discussion of starvation as a method of warfare, the tendency of both sides to control food, water, and electricity for publicity purposes, the collocation of military forces and the civilian population, and the fact that no one appears to have died during the siege from starvation, make it difficult the establishment of a solid case that starvation is being used as a method of warfare. The conduct on this matter has been deplorable but its criminality is debatable.

86. Most of the war crimes committed in Sarajevo have involved attacks on civilian persons and objects. As indicated in the preceding section, it will be difficult but not impossible to compile a reasonably accurate list of persons killed or seriously injured during the siege of Sarajevo, to determine if they were combatants or non-combatants and to determine when, where, and how they were killed or injured. Once this information is available, it will be possible to determine relative percentages of military and civilian casualties over time. It may also be possible to determine, in a general manner where the projectiles causing casualties came from in such a way that X number of casualties were caused by a particular unit. Whether or not it is possible to determine which individuals or which units caused civilian casualties, it will certainly be possible to establish that a large number of casualties have been caused by the BSA forces surrounding Sarajevo during a specific period of time. It will probably also be possible to determine roughly how many of the civilian casualties have been caused by some form of sniper fire. Whether or not one might consider applying the rule of proportionality in other cases where civilian casualties are incurred, it is reasonable to presume that civilian casualties caused by sniper fire are the result of deliberate attacks on civilians, not the result of indiscriminate attacks.

87. The compilation of a chronological and quantitative survey of damage to civilian objects in Sarajevo will be more difficult to do and has not yet been attempted. It is possible to determine what damage has been caused to certain religious, cultural, and medical buildings and, in most cases, it would be possible to determine whether these buildings were located near legitimate fixed military objectives. It would also be possible to focus on whether certain types of objects were deliberately targeted. For example, a detailed study of the shelling of the Koševo medical facility or of the National Library would probably indicate that these objects had been deliberately targeted. It may also be possible to establish that religious facilities were deliberately targeted. The tendency of BiH forces to conceal their resources among civilian objects would probably result in some of the damage to civilian
objects caused by BSA projectiles, thereby constituting legitimate collateral damage. There is enough apparent damage to civilian objects in Sarajevo to justify an in-depth study. Such a study might well conclude that either civilian objects have been deliberately targeted or that they have been indiscriminately attacked. This study, which would require unimpeded movement for extended periods throughout Sarajevo, is not practicable at present.

88. There have been incidents in the past where substantial civilian casualties have been caused, but substantial military advantage has also been gained by a particular military action. The battle of Manila, referred to earlier, is an example, as are many of the bombing raids of the Second World War. In these cases, one might attempt to quantify both military advantage and civilian losses and apply the somewhat subjective rule of proportionality. As a general statement, however, the rule of proportionality is not relevant to the sniping activities of the BSA forces and it is of questionable relevance to many of the artillery bombardments. BSA forces are deliberately targeting the civilian population of Sarajevo either as a measure of retaliation or to weaken their political resolve. Attacking the civilian population is a war crime.

89. It will probably be very difficult to link specific individuals or units to specific incidents in which civilians or civilian objects have been deliberately attacked or subjected to indiscriminate attacks. It may be possible to localize incidents in such a way that it is clear that a certain unit under a particular commander was the cause of a number of incidents. Whether or not it is possible to develop a firm case against individual soldiers or unit commanding officers, it should be quite practicable to develop a prima facie case against the officer or officers responsible for the BSA Sarajevo Romanija Corps which has been the unit surrounding Sarajevo from the beginning of the siege. It is understood that the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is now commanded by Major General Stanislav Galić and that it was formerly commanded by Major General Tomislav Šipetić. Further research may indicate the identity of other officers responsible at the Corps level.

90. Command has burdens and responsibilities, as well as privileges. The commander of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps is responsible for the attacks on the civilian population and the attacks launched by his troops if he ordered those attacks. He is also responsible to a degree, even if he did not give the orders if he knew or should have known that his subordinates were committing or going to commit such attacks and he failed to take all practicable steps to prevent or punish them. To determine whether or not the Corps commander must have known about the acts of his subordinates, one might consider a number of indices, including: the number of illegal acts; the type of illegal acts; the scope of illegal acts; the number and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of the acts; the widespread occurrence of the acts; the tactical tempo of operations; the modus operandi of similar illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of the commander at the time. On the basis of these indices, a Corp commander headquartered on high ground at Lukavica with a good view of the city, good communications, and a reasonably low tempo of operations at almost all times, would have some difficulty arguing that he was unaware of small arms and artillery fire being directed against civilians and civilian objects.
Appendix

ANECDOITAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE (Derived from UN Reports)

25 October-1 November 1992

BiH positions continued to receive sporadic shelling throughout this week. In the north central sector of the perimeter, the defence line between Uraca and Koševo was heavily shelled with a number of shells hitting the Koševo Medical Centre and the heavily populated area adjacent to the Residency (UNPROFOR BiH Command Forward). Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) gunners continued to interdict BiH movement of personnel and equipment through the airport corridor. UNPROFOR engineers noted problems with shortages of electricity, potable water, and flour in the city.

1-8 November 1992

BiH positions around the airport and the centre of the city continued to be shelled. However, apart from the sporadic shelling and sniping that are the hallmarks of the siege, activity was relatively calm. UNPROFOR speculated that this was probably due to the high profile given to the UNICEF week for children with the attendant media exposure.

8-15 November 1992

This week saw an increase in the tempo of violence due to continued BiH efforts to move personnel and matériel across the airfield corridor. A confrontation between HVO (Bosnian Croat) special forces and BiH regulars flared into a series of fire fights that were finally terminated by a BiH threat with repositioned AAA auto cannon. The week concluded with the locking on of AAA targeting radars on UNHCR aircraft and the consequent closing of the airport. The radars were sourced as coming from Serb positions. Finally, on 15 November 1992, a convoy of 400 refugees escorted by UNPROFOR was heavily sniped while crossing the lines on the route to Kiseljajk by suspected BSA troops.

16-22 November 1992

Sarajevo sector remained quiet until the morning of 18 November, when BiH troops simultaneously attacked BSA positions at Zuč and Ilidža unsuccessfully. The BSA responded with increased shelling into the city centre and with sporadic mortar and tank fire. On 20 November observers reported that the BSA, using white trucks with hand-painted UN letters, moved between Sarajevo and Pale.

23-29 November 1992

Since a cease-fire had been declared BSA shelling in Sarajevo shifted from civilian targets to mostly harassment and interdiction on BiH forces positions at the west end of the city in the suburbs of Dobrinja, Bumir, Ilidža, Mojmilo, and Bistrik. Sporadic sniping throughout the city continued.

30 November-6 December 1992

Shelling in the southwest escalated to high levels in response to BiH
attacks in the Otše area. The BSA counter-attacked Otše with infantry and tanks and shelled the western suburbs with artillery shells fused with air burst, point detonating, and delay.

7-14 December 1992

Muslim refugees abandoned the Otše-Iliđa area and retreated into the city, leaving Otše and Azići. As the week progressed, fighting intensified with a series of attacks and counter-attacks. BSA artillery reprisals were heavy, and large areas were destroyed. Reported sightings of white Serbian vehicles with UN markings resulted in the BiH engagement of some UN vehicles. The fighting caused further restriction of electricity and water by destroying recent repairs to the infrastructure of the city.

13-20 December 1992

As a result of the previous week's operations, only light shelling and sniping continued. It was established that the BSA had suffered heavy casualties in personnel and tanks and had depleted their munitions reserve by taking and holding Otše.

21-28 December 1992

It appeared during this period that BiH forces were deliberately engaging UN forces. The UN shuttle from the Sector Sarajevo headquarters building (PTT) was sniped at, and the forced evacuation of the Residency was made necessary by point blank artillery fire from BiH positions. The 23rd consecutive day for Sarajevo without electricity or water was marked on 27 December 1992.

28 December 1992-4 January 1993

The tempo of small arms and artillery was reduced, and UN sources ascribed the lull to the Geneva talks. Significant troop movement was evident in the Mount Igman area and the BiH Army aggressively launched a series of platoon-sized raids all around the perimeter. Persons crossing the runway continued to cause difficulties for the French battalion at the airport (FRBAT-2). On 1 January 1993, the UN APC shuttle was engaged twice in the Stup area from the BiH area.

4-11 January 1993

On 8 January, an UNPROFOR APC carrying Muslim Deputy Prime Minister Turajlić from Sarajevo Airport to the city was blocked at a Serb checkpoint. During negotiations, a BSA soldier, thought to be operating independently, assassinated the Deputy Prime Minister. The city entered its fifth week without electricity or water. BiH forces were able to consolidate some gains in the Grbavica area in house to house fighting.

11-18 January 1993

Five FRBAT-2 soldiers were injured by shelling that originated from BiH held Hrasnica. In response to increased Muslim efforts to cross the airport, the BSA retaliated on 13 January with a barrage of some 1,300 impacts into the
central districts of the city.

18-25 January 1993

The level of shelling decreased but the areas hit by concentrated fire increased to the entire western side of the city. On 16 January, BH positions at Hrasnica again shelled the airport, wounding three FRBAT-2 soldiers. On 19 January, a UNMO was shot and wounded by sniper fire from BSA positions in the Smiljevići area. During this period, several repair teams working on the city's electrical system came under fire while working from mortars in the Serb positions on the northern perimeter. Although fired upon on five occasions, repair teams were able to alleviate the electrical and water situation. On 21 January, Serbs halted UN humanitarian aid convoys from Kiseljak to Sarajevo.

25-31 January 1993

The level of shelling and military activity remained low, probably due to a Serb national holiday. However, Serbs continued to harass and snipe at UN vehicles and convoys.

1-7 February 1993

Shelling concentrated on the airport area and on the eastern old town. Serious infantry fighting took place at Nedžarići, Dobrinja, and the Rajlovac rail yards. BH elements unsuccessfully struck at the road between Lukavica and Pale in the Batanija area. The BSA shelled the Grdonj and Kosevo hospitals periodically. Serb check points demanded parts of the loads from UNHCR vehicles. On 6 February, the Serbs unilaterally asked for a cease-fire to begin the next day, followed by negotiations.

8-14 February 1993

Activity at Sarajevo increased dramatically on 11 February when both sides exchanged heavy artillery fire. BSA forces struck at Ilicer from Stup in the city and from Bucari, attempting to link up unsuccessfully. The UN found itself increasingly under fire:

(a) on 11 February, 4 FRBAT-2 soldiers were injured in a deliberate mortar attack—one fatally;
(b) the UN airport checkpoint was shelled and sniped;
(c) an UNMO observation position was shelled;
(d) the BH command shuttle was shelled; and
(e) BH mortars were positioned adjacent to the PTT building and the building was subsequently shelled and sniped.

Throughout this period BSA artillery indiscriminately shelled the entire city.

14-20 February 1993

Heavy fighting raged all week as the Serbs and Muslims battled for the
suburb of Ilidža. The BiH had two objectives: 1) break the siege and open the road to Visoko; and 2) cut Serbian supply routes in the siege. These battles saw an extensive use of artillery by both sides and a strong use of armour by the BSA in containing the BiH assaults. In retaliation, the BSA heavily shelled the western end of the city. UN troops were targeted by both warring factions. The fighting petered out with President Izetbegović calling for a cease-fire on 20 February.

21-28 February 1993

The tempo of operations was low during this period. Both sides showed indications of having significantly depleted their munitions stocks. While the cease-fire did not hold there was a marked decrease in shelling, mortaring, and sniping. The previous week's intense fighting accomplished minimal shifting in the confrontation line.

1-7 March 1993

There was a lull in the combat activity in the Sarajevo sector. UN sources speculated that the lull was due to either the very bad weather, the consolidation of positions and resupply, or the latest cease-fire attempt in New York. Generally, however, the level of shelling increased to some 570 impacts per day, concentrated mainly at Stup, Dobrinja, Butmir, the Koševo Medical Centre area, and the city centre. In particular, very accurate tank fire was received, while sniper activity against the besieged increased throughout the city.

8-15 March 1993

The main area of concentration of artillery and mortar fire was in Koševo but generally, shelling activity was low. BiH continued to restructure 1 (Sarajevo) Corps in the city and it was expected that this activity, which commenced with the execution of two BiH battalion commanders on 25 February, would be completed by 10 March. The low level of fighting coincided with the BiH reorganization and new talks in New York. Both sides used the lull to reinforce and resupply.

15-21 March 1993

Sarajevo experienced one of the most turbulent weeks of the siege. Sniper fire was very high on both sides and the BSA threatened its usual artillery reprisal. Fierce fighting erupted in the west end, with very heavy shelling over the entire city. UN forces reported a number of incidents of shelling and sniping and a British aircraft reported being fired upon. The BSA was able to make significant gains in the Rajlovac, Stup, and Medžarići suburbs, setting the stage for fierce BiH counter-attacks. On Sunday, 21 March, the most heavy shelling of the siege was recorded with 2,398 impacts.

22-28 March 1993

Intense fighting continued as strong BSA attacks with heavy shelling continued on Stup, Otcë, Vratnik, and Mrasno-Srbavica. The Serb objective, the Stup bridge overpass, appeared to be within their grasp. The capture of this feature would allow the Serbs to control the main highway into the city and effectively dominate two thirds of the city by direct line of sight/line
of fire. Further, with the Stup position, the BSA would be in a position to isolate the Dobrinja pocket and would allow the Serbs to take the rest of the city piecemeal, by way of smaller operations. However, the attacks at Stup exhausted the limited BSA infantry capability and took a particularly heavy toll on both infantry and armoured assets. This, coupled with dramatically deteriorating weather conditions, ground the BSA offensive to a halt. The BiH shifted AAA weapons into the sector for direct fire support, and the fighting petered out into the usual sporadic shelling, small-arms fire, and sniping.

29 March to 4 April 1993

The city remained relatively quiet as both sides recovered from the intensity of the battle in the west end and the street fighting in Grbavica. During this period only a total of 54 impacts, about one fourth of an average day’s shelling, were recorded in the city. The cold weather and heavy snow continued but the snipers continued to be particularly active, killing four and wounding 14 civilians.

4–10 April 1993

Sarajevo remained relatively quiet with the exception of snipers from both sides. On 8 April, a UN truck being inspected at the BSA checkpoint at Ilidža was found to have ammunition concealed under a removable pallet. The Serbian media leapt on the incident, further restricting UN freedom of movement.

11–17 April 1993

Sniper activity continued as Muslims continued to infiltrate across the airport at night. On 12 and 15 April, the Serb gunners intensified their fire into the centre of the city near the hospital and the Presidency. Observers detected large concentrations of BSA troops at Azizi and Lukavica and anticipated further offensives against Stup and Dobrinja.

18–25 April 1993

The anticipated shifting of BSA reserves to the city from Srebrenica did not occur. The airport area was subject to particularly heavy sniping and machine-gun fire, and the BSA blocked a number of convoys. The city was shelled some fifty times a day on average.

26 April–2 May 1993

The situation in the city remained stable with the average daily shelling calculated at 1991 impacts per day. Troop movement and resupply by the BSA was noted, including the shifting of Serb heavy weapons.

1–7 May 1993

BSA aggressive behaviour against UN operations became highly aggressive, although the lull generally persisted. A number of new Serb checkpoints in the Vogošća area were opened, further restricting the movement of aid convoys.
9-15 May 1993

As a result of the referendums on the Vance/Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), the Sarajevo tactical picture became extremely calm. Despite small-arms and sniper activity, shelling activity dropped significantly. UN sources noted many civilians in the streets and the opening of some shops.

16-22 May 1993

The tempo of activity slowly rose through the week although, in Sarajevo terms, the cease-fire accompanying the VOPP continued to be respected. A total of 73 BSA cease-fire violations (CFV) and 26 BiH CFV were observed. Snipers killed one civilian and wounded eight, while UN convoys continued to be blocked and delayed at BSA check points.

23-29 May 1993

Shelling increased during the week with 174 impacts on 26 May, 190 on 28 May, and 210 on 29 May.

10 May-5 June 1993

Although the number of impacts diminished as the week progressed, the city remained tense as the level of indiscriminate sniping rose.

6-12 June 1993

No change to the general situation, however the shelling in Konjic destroyed the power lines between the Jablanica power plant and Sarajevo. This caused a further degradation of the central BiH power grid with significant effects on the city's utilities. In Sarajevo the provision of water was directly reliant on electric pumps, and the limitation of power had a negative impact on the water distribution system.

13-19 June 1993

Heavy Serb shelling in response to a BiH attack at the Dvor bridge was followed by a BSA counter-attack in an apparent effort to keep the main supply route open. A cease-fire was almost respected on 19 June.

Observations Concerning Battle History as of July 1993

The main BSA objective at this time no longer appears to be the capture of the city. This is apparent from the low Serbian manning levels. The Serb military objectives seem to have been:

(a) continued isolation of the city;

(b) the capture of the Stup bridge; and

(c) cutting the city in half from a North-South axis through Centre Sarajevo.
The reasoning behind these objectives:

(a) Isolation severely limits the power of the Presidency Government to the degree where its collapse and the surrender of the city could undermine Muslim military activity throughout BiH.

(b) The capture of the Stup bridge, as noted earlier, would effectively put the BSA in control of the city and give it a secure covered main supply route into the city; and

(c) The dissection of the city on the north-south axis would either cause the city to fall by shattering BiH tactical integrity or would allow the BSA to take the city piecemeal at their relative leisure.

On the BiH side their strategic objectives appear to be as follows:

(a) To break the siege by attacking from Visoko to the north to link up with troops breaking out from the Vogošća area and with troops breaking out from Stup and Butmir through Ilidža. This would have the effect of cutting BSA supply and movement around the city, pinning down BSA forces to where they can be defeated in detail; and

(b) To keep the support of world opinion by manipulating the media to present the BSA forces and the Serbs as the aggressors.

The levels of fighting in and around Sarajevo reflect the changing postures of the warring factions and are often an indicator of not only their military but also their political intentions. As an example, during the December 1992 negotiations, the BSA lowered its shelling rate to below that of the BiH forces. BiH responded by increasing its fire and carrying out a series of attacks in the hope of prompting a BSA overreaction which could be presented as unwarranted Serbian aggression. On the other hand, the Serbs would use their predominance in artillery to punish the BiH through the civilian populace of the city for any perceived indiscretion, either political or military. This targeting of civilian areas by massive shell fire, coupled with the terrorizing of the populace by the well-equipped and ever present snipers, has been the BSA methodology for using the civilians as leverage against the Presidency.

Both sides have used the city's logistics as an instrument of war against the populace to influence each other and affect the media. The Serbs control the power grid, and power lines and transformers have been damaged by deliberate or accidental destruction or by maintenance failures. UN escorted repair teams have been prevented by a variety of means, including being fired upon, from effecting repairs. The control of UNHCR and NGO-provided supplies is also used as a weapon by both sides. This tactic must be delicately executed because of the food aid's high media profile. Another serious infrastructural difficulty was the city's dry sewage system. The system has been used for communications, movement, storage and, in some cases, shelters. Although the gravity design permits limited function, UNPROFOR engineers have stated that major maintenance is required to preclude the very real chance of disease in the summer heat.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VII
MEDAK INVESTIGATION

Under the Direction of:

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Medak Pocket Operation comprises the military operations of the Republic of Croatia (Croat), United Nations Protection Force (UN or UNPROFOR) and, to a lesser extent, the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (Serb) forces near Medak, Croatia, in September 1993.

2. Sadly, it is only a typical example of how war is, and apparently always has been, waged in the Balkans.

3. It is especially amenable to legal study for a variety of reasons. The operation was confined in both time and geography. The units involved were limited in number. UNPROFOR reported on the operation in a particularly detailed and helpful manner. UN forces anticipated law of war violations and gathered much relevant information during the operation. Lastly, it was a recent event so evidence and witnesses were still available.

II. OVERVIEW

4. The operation took place just north of the town of Medak and just outside the United Nations Protected Area designated as Sector South. Medak is about 150 kilometres south-west of Zagreb.

5. Before 9 September 1993, the Medak Pocket was a collection of small rural villages and hamlets forming a finger of Serb-controlled land jutting into Croat territory.

6. On 9 September, at about 6:00 a.m., Croat forces attacked the Pocket. An artillery, mortar and/or tank fire barrage preceded an infantry and tank advance. Croats attacked from the north-east and quickly killed or routed the few Serb defenders. Overrunning the Serb defences, the Croat forces soon captured Divoselo (Strunči), Čitluk (Lički), Donje Selo, and the surrounding villages. By 10 September, the Croatian army was in charge of the area.

7. The rationale for the Croat attack is impossible to determine with certainty. Speculation includes: a rehearsal by the Croats for a larger operation, a test of their forces by the Croats, retaliation by the Croats for Serb shelling of Gospić, a desire by the Croats to straighten their front, or simply a Croat desire to seize territory.

III. DESCRIPTION

8. Evidence of events during the Medak Pocket Operation emerges from various witnesses experiences. The following is an extremely summarized version of their experiences.

9. Captain "1" was in command of the Serb forces in the Divo Selo area. In the face of the Croat attack, he ordered his soldiers to withdraw. This they did along with many local civilians. Over the next days, this mixed group made its way by foot to Serb territory. During the escape, an unidentified Serb soldier escaping with the group told the Captain that Croat soldiers had spared him. Indeed, the Croats told the unidentified soldier to escape when they could easily have killed or captured him.

10. "2" was a soldier in the Serb army on 9 September. Upon the Captain’s orders, he withdrew in the face of the Croat attack. During his escape to Serb territory, he saw the Croats burn houses and steal livestock. He came across a body. Someone had either badly mutilated it after death or had...
tortured the victim before death. During his escape, he entered Čitluk to try to find food. There he came within 10 to 15 metres of a group of Croat soldiers. He heard instructions translated into German for some soldiers. The apparent commander said in Croatian: "Those houses are Serbian houses and you can do anything you wish."

11. "3" was a Serb soldier on the front line at the beginning of the Croat attack. He retreated with his comrades but became separated from them. He came across a female body with an eye, an ear, and all right-hand fingers cut off. "3" saw Croat soldiers setting fire to houses and stealing sheep.

12. Three other Serb soldiers all fled the Croat attack. They all report that the only Croat activity they saw was legitimate "soldier against soldier" combat.

13. "4", a resident of "A", was in the local Serb militia. He fled the Croat attack and immediately returned to his home. There he saw his elderly sister-in-law dead. A search of the scene after UNPROFOR took control of the area revealed only some clothing. She was wearing this clothing when "4" saw her dead body. During "4"s escape to Serb territory, he saw Croat soldiers killing sheep belonging to local civilians and stealing five or six tractors owned by the local populace.

14. "5", a resident of "A", was also a member of the Serb militia. On 9 September, he was on the front line. Upon the attack he fled, returned to his home, and warned his family to flee. While he was in hiding, before he reached safety, he saw his tractor being stolen by the Croats. Croat soldiers wounded him during his escape.

15. Two persons, "6" and "7", witnessed the murder of an 83 year-old blind woman.

16. "6" was a resident of "B". He left his home at the beginning of the Croat attack. Upon leaving, he saw the victim and a younger unidentified woman outside her home, from about 200 metres away. About 20 unidentified Croat soldiers came up to the victim’s house and ordered the younger woman away. Then, the soldiers gunned down the victim. After this, "6" fled to the forest with relatives, where he eventually joined a mixed group of Serb military and civilians. They walked to safety.

17. "7", a resident of "A", was hiding in the woods also near the victim’s house. From the woods, she saw 10 unidentified Croat soldiers approach the victim, who was standing alone outside her home, and simply kill her.

18. "8" was a resident of "B". During the early morning of 9 September, he tried to evacuate two wounded Serb soldiers in his private vehicle. Croat forces ambushed the vehicle, their gunfire hitting all three vehicle occupants. "8" believed the gunfire killed both of his passengers. "8" escaped and hid in bushes approximately 20 metres from the ambush site. Ten to 15 unidentified soldiers approached the vehicle, dragged the two dead Serb soldiers out, placed the bodies near a building and set the building on fire. In "8"s original statement, he said one of his passengers was alive when taken from the vehicle by the Croats. He also said that they placed both the wounded soldier and the body of the other dead soldier in the building before setting it afire. The correction of the original statement was not placed in all versions of the various reports compiled by UN organizations.

19. "9", a resident of "A", fled the initial attack with her family. When shortly thereafter she returned to her house to get shoes, she was shot and wounded by unidentified Croat soldiers. She heard the soldier’s conversation
from 300 to 500 metres away. The conversation showed that the Croats deliberately targeted her as a civilian. One soldier objected to shooting at her with, "No, it’s a woman"; the other replied, "It does not matter".

20. "10" resided in "A". During the 9 September attack, she was in her home. "10’s" son fled the house at the start of the attack. He took his rifle with him. No one has seen him since, and he is presumed to be dead. An unidentified Croat soldier saw her through a window then threw a grenade into her house. The subsequent explosion wounded her. The same soldier entered the house and fired into the room in which she lay. This gunfire did not hit her. Wounded but still in her house, "10" observed two Croat vehicles pull up disguised as UN vehicles (i.e. white with "UN" lettering). These vehicles carried Croat military forces. She heard instructions, translated between German and Croatian, to slaughter everything and leave nothing. She saw Croats killing her sheep and pigs. During her escape, she also saw Croats killing domestic animals, burning houses and stealing roof tiles. She eventually made her way to safety.

21. "11" lived between "B" and "A". He and his family escaped to the woods at the beginning of the attack. He fled with his rifle. From hiding, he returned to his house on 10 September. There he found all his possessions destroyed, his animals mostly dead or injured and his house burning. During the several days it took "11" to reach safety, he was shot at several times and eventually wounded. A neighbour accompanied "11" during most of the time.

22. "12", a resident of "B", also fled during the attack carrying his rifle. On 10 September, while still in the area, Croat soldiers discovered him and a friend. The Croats arrested both and ordered them to turn over their weapons. A Croat soldier then used his rifle to hit "12". "12" fled with the Croats trying unsuccessfully to shoot him. His friend apparently did not escape, not having been seen since. He spent the next several days hiding in various houses and in the forest in the area. During this time, he discovered Croats had taken the furniture and animals from his house. "12" observed the Croats stealing sheep, cows, and horses belonging to others. He was shot at by Croats twice and wounded in the leg on the second occasion.

23. "13", a resident of "A", fled the 9 September Croat attack. During his escape, he saw civilian Croats stealing cattle, including his own cows and calves.

24. "14" a resident of "A", escaped from her house on 9 September. During the several days she spent in the woods before she made her way to safety in Medak, she saw Croat soldiers burning houses and throwing grenades into houses. Other Croats fired upon her while she was walking to Medak.

25. "15" lived in "C". She entered the Pocket on 26 September to look for her sheep. While searching, she came across the body of a dead female, whose fingers were cut off.

26. Many witnesses report joining up with groups of fleeing Serb soldiers or mixed groups of fleeing Serb civilians and Serb soldiers.

27. Many male civilian residents of the area carried or fled with their rifles.

28. There are many witnesses available who, while not seeing any illegal activity by Croatian forces, can establish the general non-damaged nature of the area prior to the attack and the non-military use of most of the civilian houses.
29. Within several days of their attack, Croatian authorities showed a willingness to withdraw to their 8 September positions. Serb artillery attacks on Karlovac and a Serb missile attack on Zagreb may have prompted this willingness.

30. Negotiations took place, and the parties eventually agreed that the Croats would withdraw to their 8 September positions, and UN forces would occupy the territory vacated by the Croats. UN forces consisted of Canbat I, the Canadian battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry. It was augmented by two companies of infantry from two separate French battalions. The Croat withdrawal and insertion of UN forces started on 15 September and were originally to be completed by 6:00 p.m., 16 September.

31. During the evening of 15 September, UN and Croat authorities held a meeting to iron out the implementing details of the original agreement.

32. As the UN forces began to deploy into the Pocket on 16 September, they could hear tens of explosions and see new smoke rising from Croat-controlled territory. There were no Serb forces in those areas nor had there been for many days. Such explosions and smoke had not been seen before 15 September. They also heard small arms fire from the same area. There are many witnesses to this including nearly all Canbat I personnel, UNMOs, UNCivilPOLS, UN civilian personnel, UN and Canadian Forces public affairs personnel and news reporters. All suspected that the Croats were engaged in ethnic cleansing of the Pocket before turning it over to the UN.

33. During the morning of 16 September, several more meetings took place between Croat and UN authorities. As a result, the time by which UN forces were to complete the takeover of territory evacuated by the Croats was delayed 24 hours until 17 September.

34. At noon, 16 September, Croat forces prevented Canbat I soldiers from crossing into the Pocket. This was a violation of the agreement. UN public affairs video and radio, plus Reuters news agency, videotaped this delay. Additionally, there were numerous witnesses to this delay. UN personnel felt the delay was a deliberate tactic used by the Croats to give them more time to complete their ethnic cleansing of the Pocket. UNPROFOR pressed the Croats, and after a delay of about two hours, they allowed UN forces to enter the Pocket.

35. The explosions and smoke from fresh fires continued to be evident from Croat-controlled parts of the Pocket throughout the Croat withdrawal. Again, there are many witnesses to this, including all UN personnel involved in the operation.

36. As UN forces entered the Pocket, they found every building burning or demolished. There were hundreds of such buildings in the several villages and hamlets, none of which were habitable. Special sweep teams assessed and recorded damage, searched for survivors and collected bodies. The teams included UNPROFOR medical officers, UNCivilPOLS, and soldiers.

37. On 16 September, in the Medak Pocket, "16" saw the crest of the Croat Ninth Mechanized Brigade (Ninth) on several Croat army trucks. He also saw the crest of the Croat 111th Home Defence (HD) Brigade (111th) on a Croat army truck.

38. "17" noted Croat soldiers with the shoulder flashes of the Ninth Brigade. On 16 September, he saw Croat police of the Special Police in the Medak area. He witnessed the explosions and fires that preceded the Croat withdrawal. He also saw the complete destruction throughout the Medak Pocket.
39. "18" heard the explosions and saw the fires within Croat-controlled territory on 16 September. He questioned a Croat liaison officer about these. The Croat officer replied that maybe the Croats were destroying their own homes in the area. "18" also observed that the Croat troops within the territory did not react to the explosions as they would to incoming artillery. He witnessed the total destruction and devastation throughout the area. He saw no house undemolished and took photographs of the damage.

40. Also on 16 September, "19" saw about 15 Croat Special Police at Drjlei in the Pocket. These Special Police appeared fresh, probably having recently arrived in the area.

41. During a 16 September meeting held at 10:00 a.m. an UNPROFOR officer specifically asked a Croatian officer to stop the explosions and fires in Croat-controlled territory. The Croatian officer clearly ordered to ensure his troops stopped those actions.

42. Two more representations to the same effect were made to the Croats that day. The Croats said that Croat soldiers were firing into the houses, but that Croat forces were causing the explosions by detonating mines to make the area safe.

43. On 17 September, after personally viewing the destruction in the Pocket, an UNPROFOR officer expressed his disappointment at this devastation to Croat officers. The Croats offered no explanation, but said they would again warn their troops.

44. Also on 17 September, during a dispute between UN forces and the Croatian Army on the exact proper location of their respective forces, an UNPROFOR officer met a Croatian officer in the Pocket. The Croatian officer had a map and was plainly in charge of the Croat forces. The map had been obviously and crudely altered, and it no longer represented the earlier agreed upon placement of various forces.

45. On 19 September, Croatian and UNPROFOR officers met and discussed the exact boundaries of the UN zone of responsibility in the Pocket.

46. On that same date, an UNPROFOR officer met Croatian officers. During this meeting, a Croatian officer threatened to have his Croat forces fire on UN forces, if he did not receive the cooperation he wanted.

47. On 22 September, a meeting was held to finalize the agreed upon positions of Croat and UN forces in the Medak Pocket. A Croatian officer signed a map depicting the agreed relative positions.

48. The Medak Pocket area falls within the area of responsibility of the Croat OZ Gospi. Croat units involved were largely from OZ Gospi. Some Special Police Forces from OZ Split were seen during the operation, but their role seemed to be secondary.

49. The nominal OZ Gospi Commander was a particular Croatian officer. However, during the relevant prelude to the attack and the attack itself, he was not in command due to his absence on leave and to illness. The actual OZ Commander was another officer.

50. The major Croat unit involved in the attack was the Ninth Mechanized Brigade (Ninth), which is unofficially called the "Wolves". It had been designated the 6th Mechanized Brigade until about July 1993. The Ninth was directly responsible to OZ Gospi. Graffiti left on the walls of buildings in the Pocket by Croat forces included the "Ninth" and "Wolves".
51. The 111th also participated in the attack. Miscellaneous other Croat army units formed a minor part of the attacking forces.

52. The UN Military Information (MI) Branch (at UNPROFOR headquarters and elsewhere) compiles orders of battle (ORBs) for all the protagonists in the former Yugoslavia.

53. UNPROFOR units sweep teams recovered 18 bodies in the Pocket in the immediate aftermath of the operation. Croat authorities turned over another 64 bodies they said they recovered in the Medak Pocket. These bodies were all given to the Serb authorities. Of all the bodies recovered, 59 (71 per cent) were probably those of soldiers and 23 (29 per cent) those of civilians. Among other factors complicating the determination of military status is that many civilians wear items of military clothing and many local military wear items of civilian clothing.

54. Serb authorities have identified most of the bodies. There are no reported witnesses to the deaths of any of the bodies identified.

55. Medical officers examined many of the 18 bodies recovered by UNPROFOR. The preliminary field examinations and the circumstances in which the bodies were found revealed:

   (a) Some suspicious circumstances, e.g., two badly burned bodies were found in a concrete chicken coop that could have been used as a jail, spent casings found near bodies, one body tied up, etc.;

   (b) Some bodies had injuries that might have occurred before death, e.g., broken legs, a broken neck, a smashed face;

   (c) Some evidence of either pre-death torture or post-death mutilation, e.g., missing ears, eyes or fingers; and

   (d) A perhaps higher portion of head and close range wounds than might be expected.

56. These examinations led a medical officer to place the times of death from 24 to over 96 hours before discovery of the bodies, with six having died after 14 September.

57. Serbian authorities had a doctor conduct an examination of the bodies turned over to them by the Croats and UNPROFOR. Only one full autopsy was done. UNCIVPOL describes the rest of the examinations as "cursory". After this, Serb authorities quickly turned over the bodies to relatives for burial.

58. The Serb authorities prepared a postmortem report and gave it to Major Holland. He passed it on to Dr. Robert Kirschner, an experienced pathologist with the independent group, Physicians for Human Rights. Dr. Kirschner's report states that regarding the bodies recovered by UNPROFOR, "there is insufficient evidence to document an execution style slaying". Of those bodies turned over to the Serbs by the Croats, "I could find no evidence to suggest a pattern of extra-judicial executions". His opinions regarding both groups cannot exclude some murders and admit some suspicious circumstances, but in summary the evidence is ambiguous.

59. Dr. Kirschner's further verbal opinion was that the earlier preliminary field examinations and those conducted by a Serbian doctor are not reliable. This unreliability results from the necessarily rudimentary conditions of the field examinations, e.g., the bodies could not be washed, no X-ray equipment was available, etc. Additionally, the medical personnel involved
understandably lacked forensic experience.

60. The Croats claimed in an 11 October statement to the UN in Geneva that they did not violate the laws of war during the Medak battle. They specifically cited the cases of two elderly but apparently still feisty women killed during the attack. They said one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and another blew herself up with a grenade to avoid capture.

61. Most Canbat I personnel entering the Pocket witnessed the total destruction involved. Many buildings were still on fire on 16 September. There may be others with equal experiences. A Canbat I photographer took 1,400 photographs recording the destruction and the 18 recovered bodies. Much of this activity was video recorded by Canbat I personnel.

62. Besides the destruction of buildings, all witnesses saw that most livestock was killed and most personal property, including vehicles and farm equipment, was destroyed. They noted that haystacks were set on fire, and wells were polluted. Croatian forces had discarded hundreds of surgical gloves throughout the area.

63. Canbat I personnel think the bulk of the destruction in the Pocket was done on 16 September.

64. The Canbat I reports state that firewood and other incendiary materials were seen being brought into the area by the Croats. Unfortunately, the report does not identify the specific witnesses to this.

65. UN civilian employees and UNCIVPOLs also witnessed the same destruction. A UNCIVPOL team member made sketches of most buildings and detailed damage assessments of over 100 representative buildings. These assessments confirm the total devastation in the Pocket.

66. The Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) visited the area from 27 to 31 October and on 10 November 1993. The WCIT consisted of Major Holland and Master Corporal T. McComb, both of the Canadian Forces. The team was accompanied by Dr. Kirschner. The team took video and still photographs, interviewed some witnesses and gathered further materials and reports. The team also obtained the 1,400 photographs taken by the Canbat I photographer and arranged and conducted the videotaped assessment by Major S. Laplante (a combat engineer in the Canadian Forces serving as UNPA Sector South Engineer) and Chief Warrant Officer Bastid (an explosive ordnance disposal expert in the French Army serving with UNPROFOR HQ Zagreb) of the damage to civilian buildings.

67. The examinations of the buildings by Major Laplante and Chief Warrant Officer Bastid reveal that the buildings were either set on fire and/or demolished by charges set inside the buildings. Artillery did not cause the damage nor did tank fire, mortar shells, rocket propelled grenades, nor aerial bombardment. Canbat I personnel believed that antitank mines were used to demolish those buildings not burned. However, neither of the above witnesses could be that certain of the type of explosives used.

68. Croat authorities say that the widespread destruction in the Medak Pocket was necessitated by the Serbs using the civilian homes for barracks and the storage of ammunition. What evidence there is of military use of the civilian accommodation is ambiguous or point to its military use by Croat forces. The type of garbage (Croat cigarettes, newspapers, etc.) and the direction the builders pointed the defensive positions (towards Serb controlled areas, etc.) support usage by Croat forces.
IV. ANALYSIS

69. The preceding reveals several potential broad categories of "serious violations of international humanitarian law" or war crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal. These are:

   (a) Murder ("willful killing"--Article 2(a), "murder"--Article 5(a), unlawful targeting of civilians causing their death being a general unlisted violation of the laws of war--Article 3);

   (b) Torture ("torture or inhuman treatment"--Article 2(b), willfully causing great suffering or serious injury"--Article 2(c), "torture"--Article 5(f));

   (c) Genocide by killing (Article 4(2)(a)) or by causing serious bodily . . . harm (Article 4(2)(b));

   (d) Wanton destruction ("extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly"--Article 2(d), "wanton destruction of . . . villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity"--Article 3(b)); and

   (e) Plunder ("plunder of . . . private property"--Article 3(e)).

70. The war crimes have been analysed in a pragmatic narrow legal fashion. The analysis will seek to decide who specifically, if anyone, can be held criminally responsible for any given crime. Dealing with a war crime, no matter how horrendous or how clear, is in this analysis a fruitless exercise if specific legal responsibility cannot be attributed.

71. Such an analysis will deal with those directly responsible "who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted" the crime (Article 7(1)). Also dealt with will be indirect (command) responsibility, as referred to in Article 7(3), of a superior "if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."

72. The analysis of direct criminal responsibility for any of the disclosed war crimes is very simple. At present, there is no evidence implicating any specific identifiable individual in the direct planning, instigation, ordering, commission, aiding or abetting of any of these crimes. Therefore, this analysis will concentrate on indirect, i.e., command responsibility.

73. Proof of command responsibility for war crimes will often be largely circumstantial. Absent capturing or obtaining written orders by the suspects or having the testimony of witnesses to the issuing of these orders, such responsibility can usually only be inferred. Inferences of such orders of a sufficiently reliable nature to satisfy a criminal tribunal can only be derived from clear and convincing patterns. Under the first head of criminal command responsibility, the patterns must be so strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect ordered the commission of the crimes. Under the second head of criminal command responsibility, the pattern must be so strong that the only reasonable inference is that the suspect knew of the crimes and failed to control or punish his offending subordinates or that the suspect criminally abandoned his command.

74. As mentioned, there is no evidence identifying any specific individuals with any crimes, including any of the murders. The only first-hand evidence of a murder is in the murder of the 83 year-old blind woman. However, even
here, neither of the witnesses identified the responsible individuals beyond being "Croat soldiers". In any event, there are serious discrepancies between the two witnesses. "6" describes 20 soldiers, "7" describes 10. Furthermore, "6" describes a second woman with the victim, but "7" omits this.

75. The reliability of these witnesses, particularly "6", is questionable. "6" was 200 metres away. "7" was hiding to save her life and almost certainly greatly upset. Their opportunity to reliably observe is moot.

76. There is no convincing general pattern in the deaths occurring in the Pocket. It is suspicious that UN troops found virtually no survivors. It may also be suspicious that there were more head wounds and close-range injuries than might be expected. However, the majority (71%) of the located dead were military. Although not strictly comparable, this was a higher percentage of military casualties than the global figures in WWII, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.

77. Despite the importance of the presence of surgical gloves stressed in the Canbat I report and elsewhere, their presence is ambiguous. The sinister explanation is a possible one. However, surgical gloves may have simply been ordinary precautions by the Croats to deal with the legitimate dead and wounded anticipated in any attack. The photographs of Canbat I personnel show them also using surgical gloves.

78. A prosecutor cannot use the postmortem examinations of the bodies, as they are unsatisfactory from several points of view. The initial examinations in the field were of necessity cursory, done without equipment and by doctors without forensic pathology qualifications.

79. Further, the examinations done by the Serb authorities were unsatisfactory. They were extremely undetailed and were conducted in an unprofessional atmosphere, i.e., the supervising judge's drunkenness and corruptness.

80. Thus, conclusions reached in the preceding examinations are unreliable. As earlier mentioned, an independent examination of what material remains (Dr. Kirschner's report) also fails to disclose any convincing pattern.

81. Care must be taken in relying upon local witnesses. They tend to be unreliable due to their extremely emotional attachment to their own community's cause and their demonization of the enemy. Witness "9" has given several versions of her experiences. While her versions are not inconsistent, they do not cover the same material, some of which it is surprising not to hear in all versions. Her testimony should be confirmed and carefully considered before presentation.

82. The irrationality of the parties to this conflict is shown by the absurd excuse given by the Croat authorities for the deaths of the two elderly women. They say one was killed while operating anti-aircraft artillery and another used a grenade to kill herself rather than face capture.

83. Therefore, any reliable prosecution should be based on objective evidence, objective witnesses, or clear patterns. One or even two local witnesses may be insufficiently reliable to obtain a conviction.

84. Yet, even using a stringent standard, it is obvious from the many witnesses' experiences that Croatian forces fired on fleeing civilians, killing some. However, this action cannot be proved to be illegal.

85. Many civilians were fleeing in the company of retreating Serb soldiers,
armed Serb civilians or were themselves armed. Thus, the actions of many
Croat soldiers were possibly lawful and, at least, ambiguous. Much of the
firing was at night. They may have believed they were firing on retreating
non-surrendering enemy forces, which remain lawful targets. The law of war
does not impose a standard of perfection on soldiers. It accepts that
unfortunately civilians near military objectives may be incidentally killed
without necessarily breaching the law of war. The inherent ambiguities
surrounding this aspect of the Medak Pocket Operation make building a
prosecution for unlawful targeting of civilians difficult. The evidence is
not sufficiently reliable or clear to obtain a conviction.

86. There is even a hint of contradictory evidence. The sparing of the Serb
soldier, as related to "1" is some, albeit second hand, evidence that either
there was no express policy to kill everyone, or at least any such policy was
not strictly observed. Additionally, the witnesses naturally would not be
aware of the possibly many times they were not fired upon by Croat forces.

87. All this being said, some dead were probably murdered. However, no
individual can be proved to be directly responsible. Further, there is no
strong unambiguous pattern of willful killing emerging from the evidence
available to this point. Without such a pattern, it is impossible to affix
criminal responsibility upon the Croat commanders.

"Clearly, assignment to command military troops is accompanied by broad
authority and heavy responsibility. This has been true of all armies
throughout recorded history. It is absurd, however, to consider a
commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a
murder or a rape."2

What is required is something "extensive and widespread". No such pattern
emerges from the evidence. Many commentators have criticized the General
Yamashita prosecution, which was, at least, an aggressive use of the doctrine
of command responsibility. Even at that, the prosecutors of General Yamashita
could point to tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of victims
with 286 witnesses and 423 exhibits.

88. Unlike the deaths arising from the Medak Pocket Operation, there is a
clear, obvious and overwhelming pattern of wanton destruction. Hundreds of
homes were destroyed, virtually hundreds of other buildings were destroyed,
most animals were killed or taken, virtually all personal property was
destroyed or taken, all vehicles and farm equipment were destroyed or taken,
haystacks were fired, and many wells were polluted. Devastation was total.

89. The timing of the destruction is inconsistent with any legitimate
military conduct or of military necessity. The bulk of this destruction
occurred on 16 September, according to the many eyewitnesses. The sounds of
the explosions, the rising of the smoke from fires, and the fact many
buildings were still on fire as UN personnel entered the Pocket establish
this.

90. The destruction occurred well after all Serb resistance had ended.
There was no Serb resistance in the areas from which the explosions were heard
and the rising smoke seen. All effective Serb forces had fled the area at the
time of the bulk of the destruction. The devastation was wrought in an
unopposed withdrawal, not a contested advance or retreat. Even the Croat
liaison officer was forced to use an excuse not involving legitimate combat
activity by the opposing forces. The scattered nature of the buildings, with
the brief and desultory original Serb defence, does not explain this level of
destruction.
91. The widespread destruction by demolition and fire is also generally inconsistent with legitimate military operations. If buildings are contested, then demolition charges cannot usually be placed inside them. Similarly, absent incendiary weapons, of which there is no evidence, being able to set fire to buildings implies an ability to approach and control them. That is inconsistent with enemy forces being present in them.

92. Various contradictory excuses given by the Croats for the destruction suggest the lack of any legitimate excuse for such widespread destruction.

93. The reports, if confirmed, of incendiary materials being brought into the Medak Pocket by the Croats is some evidence of planning. However, this evidence is ambiguous. Obviously lumber and even timber can be used to construct defensive positions as well as be used to burn buildings.

94. The Canbat I report states that any antitank mines used in demolitions would have been centrally controlled. This indicates that their use to destroy civilian objects would have required high level approval. Such control is usual in a regular well-run military. However, there is evidence that this is not always the case with the forces involved in this conflict. Some minefields in Sector South have overlapped, indicating a lack of such central control. Additionally, all the forces display large measures of ill-discipline, lack of control, and disorganization.

95. There are at least two defences to this charge offered or available to the responsible Croat authorities. A Croat press release said that the level of destruction in the Pocket was required by the Serbs use of civilian buildings as barracks and for ammunition storage. This is clearly an inept excuse. The timing of the destruction, being after Serb resistance ended, argues against it. The extent of the destruction also argues against this excuse. If every destroyed building had contained Serb soldiers and ammunition, the Croats would never have captured the Pocket. Destruction by fire and demolition, as opposed to conventional military assault, also suggests this Croat excuse is invalid.

96. Although not yet raised by the Croats, the second possible excuse is that this destruction was a legitimate use of a "scorched earth" policy. However, pointing out that this excuse was not what the Croats themselves have claimed demolishes it. They chose to rely on the use of these buildings for military purposes by the Serbs.

97. Further, this area was not being turned over or being re-occupied by enemy forces. The UN was taking control of it to the exclusion of the Serb military.

98. Lastly, as a party to the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Croatia is bound by Part IV, Section I of Protocol I. That treaty prohibits this tactic even if the Croats could otherwise claim they were entitled to lay waste to their own territory as a legitimate defensive tactic.

99. It is not practical to prosecute anyone for any torture committed during the Medak Pocket Operation. First, it is not clear anyone was tortured. In each instance of suspected torture, it is possible the body was subjected to post-death mutilation and not pre-death torture. However, mutilation of bodies is itself a conventional war crime. It is not specifically covered in Article 3, but it is perhaps within its general ambit. The determination of this question turns on whether mutilation of corpses is a "serious violation of international humanitarian law" (Article 1).

100. Second, as with the suspected murders, no specific individual can be
identified as involved in any torture or mutilation. Again, assuming torture or mutilation could be proved, the few cases do not form any convincing pattern that could then be attributed to commanders.

101. A particular Croatian officer was clearly in charge of the operation for the Croat forces. The evidence is clear and convincing that he was responsible.

102. The thoroughness of the destruction, the open nature of the methods used (the explosions could be heard and the smoke seen by all), the orders overheard by civilian survivors, the inherent control a commander must or should have, and the express concerns raised by all overwhelmingly point to his responsibility. He, by his actions and by attending at various meetings, was clearly the responsible OZ Commander.

103. Widespread use of roadblocks by all parties in the conflict, particularly near front lines, means that the responsible commanders would or should know about any large-scale movements of personnel or goods entering or leaving an area of operations. Therefore, the commanders either did know or should have known about demolition or incendiary materials entering the Pocket and plundered goods leaving.

104. Can responsibility be found above that officer? Another officer was clearly in charge of the withdrawal of the Croat forces. However, he was only sent from the Zagreb general staff on about 15 September to oversee the withdrawal. The Croats saw the withdrawal as extremely sensitive, requiring a high level of supervision. His responsibility is therefore problematic due to his limited time in the area.

105. There is no direct evidence of the commander of the Ninth's role in the wanton destruction. However, based solely on the orbat information, a prima facie case can be made. As the commander of the major unit involved, he is responsible for the destruction inflicted in the Pocket, which must have involved his unit. Graffiti in some of the destroyed buildings implicate the Ninth.

106. The OZ Commander was replaced shortly after this battle. This, plus his reported Albanian ethnic background, suggests that the Croatian authorities are perhaps more likely to turn him over to the International Criminal Tribunal than another officer of Croat background and in more political favour.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

107. It is recommended that two Croatian officers be charged with the following war crimes, respectively:

(a) A grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, being the extensive destruction and appropriation of property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention, such destruction and appropriation not being justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly contrary to Article 2(d); and

(b) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being the wanton destruction of villages or devastation not justified by military necessity contrary to Article 3(b); and

(c) A violation of the laws or customs of war, being plunder of private property contrary to Article 3(e).
The charges involve the wanton destruction and plunder which occurred during the Medak Pocket Operation. While the case against one officer is stronger than that against the other, it is believed that there is also a *prima facie* case against the second officer.

108. It is also recommended that no one be charged with any murder (murder, killing, unlawful targeting of civilians or genocide related deaths), torture or mutilation occurring during the operation. No one has been identified as being directly responsible for such crimes. There are some suspicious circumstances and even some probable murders. However, no convincing pattern can be proved such that a commander can be held indirectly criminally responsible using the doctrine of command responsibility.
Notes

1/ From the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal (Statute) Article 1. All further references to articles are to those in the Statute, unless stated otherwise. It is interesting that virtually all these provisions are echoed in the Yugoslav constitution.

LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Addendum

ANNEXES TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

VOLUME IV - ANNEX VIII
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX VIII
PRISON CAMPS

Under the Direction of:

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Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report on detention facilities, attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning all alleged detention facilities (camps) within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify detention sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but is intended to provide a description and analysis of the detention facilities reported to have existed.

2. The report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary and analysis. The summary and analysis discusses the methodology of the report and provides the total number of reported detention facilities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The total number of detention facilities is also broken down by geographic region. In addition, the summary and analysis discusses patterns, trends and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of detention facilities.

3. The analysis by geographic location in Section II below, divides detention facilities by their location, i.e., whether they were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), or Slovenia. Within those locations, it further breaks down reported facilities by the county or region in which they were located. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution figures are also provided for each county or region, as well as other background information.

II. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A. Methodology

4. To analyse the contents of the database for this report, all documents in the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) documentation centre were first reviewed to identify those reports containing allegations of detention facilities within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. After initial review, the documents were organized geographically by county or region and then analysed. Relevant information pertaining to alleged detention facilities was then gleaned, and individual geographic reports were thereafter prepared, containing information, wherever available, identifying: 1) the name, location, dates of operation, and physical description of alleged detention facilities; 2) information concerning command and control, including the identities and ethnicity of commanders and guards, and any other groups or individuals reported to be involved in the camp operation; 3) information pertaining to prisoners, including their ethnicity, civilian or military status, subsequent transfers, and total reported prisoner population; 4) the treatment of prisoners, including, maltreatment or good treatment, food, hygiene, toilet and medical facilities, sleeping accommodations, and other conditions.

5. The main criterion for determining whether a site would be deemed a detention facility for purposes of this report, depended mainly upon whether persons were alleged to have been held against their will, and whether the detention site appeared to have been established as a result of the armed conflict between the warring factions identified.

6. In some instances, the existence of certain detention facilities were well documented and independent sources corroborated reports of those alleged facilities. In other instances, only uncorroborated claims or corroborated reports by non-neutral sources were received. Those claims were included in the report and are indicated as such.
7. It is significant to note that a wide variety of sources were utilized in this report. It should also be noted that the Commission had no basis to confirm the information contained in that source material. To make a qualitative assessment of the information contained in this report, efforts were therefore made to confirm or corroborate allegations of camps wherever possible. To this effect, it is indicated in each camp report whether: 1) the existence of the detention facility was corroborated by multiple neutral sources; 2) the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by a neutral source; 3) whether the existence of the detention facility had been corroborated by multiple sources, none of which were neutral; or 4) whether the existence of the detention facility had not been corroborated by multiple sources.

B. Observations

8. Since the armed conflict in Slovenia in June 1991, the warring factions have operated a variety of detention facilities (camps). It appears that as the situation in the former Yugoslavia disintegrated and war erupted, detention facilities came into existence in increasing numbers. A large number of camps came into existence in Croatia after the beginning of hostilities in September 1991. The greatest number of camps came into existence in BiH in the period after April 1992. It appears that many of the camps appearing in this report are now closed.

9. The reports reviewed allege a total of 960 reported places of detention in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Of those 960 alleged places of detention, 466 (48.5 per cent) were reportedly operated by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; 121 (12.6 per cent) by Bosnian Croats or the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Army; 84 (8.8 per cent) by the Government and Army of BiH or Bosnian Muslims; 32 (3.3 per cent) jointly by Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats; 9 (.9 per cent) as private prisons, individuals or groups; 4 (.4 per cent) by the Government or armed forces of Slovenia; and 244 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.

10. As the above statistics and following discussion indicate, the number of camps and reported violations in camps controlled by the Government of BiH and its army are the fewest among the warring factions, irrespective of the ethnic or religious background of the detainees held. The number of reported violations by the Croatian Government, the Croatian Army, and the Croatian Defence Council is larger, particularly against Serbs in Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia and against Muslims from BiH in Herzegovina. The period of time during which those camps were operated in each of these contexts is relatively limited. The two warring factions identified above are, however, reported to have committed far fewer numbers of violations than those committed by the Serb forces and those working on their behalf, whether in Croatia or BiH. Camps operated by Serbs in BiH are by far where the largest numbers of detainees have been held and where the harshest and largest number of violations occurred.

11. The information concerning the number of prisoners includes a wide range of estimates. It appears that none of the detaining powers involved in the conflict made a concerted effort to identify and maintain records of the number of individuals they detained. If they have done so, such information was not made available.

12. The camps reported range in size from small detention and screening centres that temporarily housed a few prisoners, to camps that housed large numbers of prisoners. The duration of their operation varied from days to months. The vast majority of places used to detain prisoners were pre-
existing structures, such as penitentiaries, municipal buildings, administrative offices, schools, sports arenas, factories, warehouses, mines, farms and private homes, hotels, restaurants, and apartments. In a very few examples, camps were reported to have been newly constructed for the purpose of detaining prisoners.

13. Due to a lack of information, it was generally very difficult to determine the command and control in the camps. The information, when available, was usually limited to individual camps at a very immediate and local level. The extent to which superior or central authorities had control in the operation of camps was usually unknown.

14. Some reports describe a situation whereby camps were maintained and operated by a mix of military personnel, former army officers and soldiers, various paramilitaries, local volunteers, members of civilian police forces, or politicians. There were also many reports of situations where there was movement in and out of camps by visitors, including local civilians, paramilitary forces, and the army, who perpetrated abuses upon the prison population.

15. Most detainees appeared not to be prisoners of war, but, rather, civilians. POWs and civilian prisoners were detained together, and prisoners from the conflict were sometimes mixed in with the common criminal population of a penitentiary. Often, civilians were arrested and detained for the purpose of collecting prisoners for exchange.

16. There is little to suggest a legitimate purpose for the internment of so many non-combatant civilians by the various authorities and forces concerned. There is much to suggest that such internment was wholly illegitimate and intended to serve the geopolitical and military objectives of the detaining powers.

17. The parties to the conflict acknowledged and agreed on a number of occasions to the valid effect of those aspects of international humanitarian law relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, civilians and others detained by the parties to the conflict.

18. Under the law of armed conflict, prisoners of war are considered to be in the hands of the detaining power. The detaining power, therefore, is responsible for the treatment given prisoners of war irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist. The same holds true for the treatment of civilians detained.

19. It appears that little or no effort was made by any of the detaining powers to provide the judicial or administrative bodies required by law to identify, record, and determine the status of prisoners of war and internees.

20. Parties to the conflict appear to have considered the detention of those thought to be potentially capable of fighting as a legitimate activity. There are many instances of detention apparently based upon the suspicion of hostile activity against the detaining power.

21. Prisoners were commonly subjected to the most inhumane treatment imaginable. Mass executions, torture, rape, and other sexual assaults were frequently reported. Those in control of the apprehension and detention of prisoners were often reported to have stolen prisoner belongings. Guards and soldiers frequently humiliated those detained. Sometimes prisoners were placed in dangerous situations and used in military operations, such as mine clearing. There were also reports of reprisal killings carried out upon innocents detained in a number of camps.
22. The ethno-religious aspects of the conflict appear to have translated directly into prisoners suffering actively adverse distinctions based on nationality, religious belief, and political opinions.

23. The patterns and violations in the camps appear to differ to some extent, depending on the controlling authority, the purpose of the camp, and the camp commander.

24. The conditions in most camps were generally described as very poor. The camps commonly lacked sufficient heat, light, food, and water. Lack of hygiene was pervasive. Little or no medical attention was prevalent and a total lack of security for the prisoners was apparent. In fact, it was reported that those in control of camps often allowed drunk soldiers and others access to abuse the prison population.

25. Wounded and sick prisoners were often maltreated and/or left to suffer, although many wounded and sick prisoners were treated to some extent.

26. The following section of this summary and analysis is divided by location, and contains various observations relating to certain patterns and commonalities in the detention facilities reported. For a more detailed breakdown of individual regions and camps, see Section II below, which contains a geographical listing and full analyses of the individual detention facilities reported.

C. Camps reported in BiH

27. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 677 camps within BiH. Among those camps, 333 (49.2 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 83 (12.2 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 51 (7.5 per cent), by Croats; 31 (4.6 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 5 (.7 per cent), by private parties; and 174 (25.7 per cent) by unidentified forces.

1. Bosnian Serb controlled camps

28. The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs operated numerous camps where grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law, including killing, torture, and rape occurred on a large scale. Those camps were mostly in BiH and predominantly held Bosnian Muslims, but also Bosnian Croats and a small number of Serbs.

29. The reports indicate that Bosnian Serbs used camps in BiH to facilitate territorial and political control of geographic regions and to expel and eliminate other ethnic and religious populations from that area. In essence, the Bosnian Serb forces, including former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) officers and soldiers, paramilitary units, police forces, civilians, and the political leadership of the Serbs of BiH, apparently with a significant degree of participation by and cooperation with the Serbs and Montenegrins of FRY, incorporated and exploited the detention of civilians as an integral aspect of their campaign of "ethnic cleansing". While armed, uniformed soldiers of the forces opposed to the Serbs were incarcerated in significant numbers, the vast majority of those imprisoned by Serbs in BiH appear to have been civilians.

30. Groups of camps appear to have been established and operated in clusters in various geographical areas and were frequently part of a network. Prisoners were frequently moved from one facility to another. Different facilities often appeared to have separate purposes, such as mass killing, torture, rape, and exchange of and detention of civilian prisoners.
31. The Bosnian Serb implementation of practically identical strategies and tactics for the conquest of territories and subsequent detention of non-Serb populations suggest an overall plan devised prior to the conflict and carried out locally. There seems to be a similarity in the structure of camps which might suggest a degree of pre-planning before the war was started. The notion of clusters of camps, triage camps, distribution camps, older persons and women and children held in established minimum security facilities, and men of fighting age held in established maximum security facilities, suggests such a plan. The similarities of the allegations of camp usage also strongly suggests that a plan did exist and was carried out across the board geographically. Reports suggest a common method of initial apprehension and identification of those non-Serbs detained for ultimate disposition (either long-term detention, deportation, or execution). A common plan is also suggested by the implementation of a system whereby prisoners were detained, classified, and subjected to similar types of abuse (e.g., it was often reported that intellectuals, politicians, police, and the wealthy were regularly tortured and killed in certain camps). There is also a similarity in the command and control of the camps, whereby there was a mix of civilian, political, JNA, paramilitary, and local Serb reservists and civilians involved in camp operations. With regard to practical aspects of camp operation, large suitable facilities appear to have been selected and prepared, to some extent, in advance. Whether a plan was established by the military, police, or politicians, is something that could not be ascertained.

32. The method by which the campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was carried out ensured that, comparatively, the most brutal and inhumane treatment of those detained occurred within the geographic arc following the Sava and Drina Rivers of the former Yugoslavia. See examples, camps in Prijedor, Višegrad, Zvornik, Brčko and Poća, and Bijeljina. For, it is within this region of BiH that the Serbs required absolute control in order to establish a separate nation with contiguous borders and an uncompromised geographic link with Serbia and Montenegro. That control required the subjugation, if not the disappearance of the non-Serb populations of the area. In large part, that subjugation and elimination was accomplished by wholesale detention of those populations in various places of detention.

33. Commonly, Serb forces reduced the opposition of a county area and upon conquest of the territory of that BiH county (opština) immediately began to round up the non-Serb population. It sometimes occurred that the entire population of a town or village was gathered together so that the Serb and non-Serb populations could be separated and dealt with accordingly. During the rounding-up process, members of the population were frequently tortured, raped, and killed. Sometimes, the local population would be interned in different locations. Other times, after an initial round of apprehension, non-Serbs would be released and weeks later re-apprehended and placed in various camps to be either killed or moved out of the area.

34. Frequently, the religious, political, civic, professional, and business leaders of the non-Serb population were immediately identified for detention and for the worst abuses. Often on the captors' side, local civil servants, political leaders, and particularly the police, participated or were involved in the rounding-up process. Prisoners were also often forced to surrender their money and valuables to their captors.

35. It was often reported that men between the ages of 18 and 60 were separated from women, children, and elderly men. Apparently, men between the ages of 18 (or younger) and 60 were considered to be of fighting age, constituting a class of quasi-prisoners of war or perhaps legitimate internees because of their potential for hostility. However, rarely did reports include any information to suggest that those considered capable of fighting had ever
actually committed hostile acts or had organized to do so. In fact, many Muslim villagers simply surrendered the weapons they had upon an initial demand by the Serb forces in the region. After that surrender, the villagers were in many cases detained. The reports indicate that in many instances, men between the ages of 18 and 60, were ultimately transferred to heavily guarded larger camps where killings or torture were prevalent.

36. A large number of Bosnian Serb places of detention appear to have been used as short term detention facilities before transfer or transport of prisoners out of the area.

37. Smaller camps, in many cases, housed prisoners temporarily until the captors divided the prisoners into groups and transported them to the larger camps. The prisoners were often packed into buses, trains, and lorries, and were subjected to physical and mental abuse. During transport, and upon arrival at their new camps, prisoners were also reported to have been killed at random and denied food, water, and access to toilet facilities. The prisoners were on occasion transported by automobile to camps by locals, or were marched under armed guard.

38. Detainees were sometimes transported from camps within a given region to camps in another region because of overcrowding, anticipated International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspections, visits by the media, exchange of prisoners, and as a result of triage for unlawful purposes.

39. Very few camps appear to have been actually constructed for the purpose of detaining captured prisoners or interning the civilian population. The vast majority of the sites used for detention were pre-existing facilities. Some of those facilities were modified in order to create more secure camps. For example, electric and barbed-wire fences were sometimes reported to have been installed around a number of buildings.

40. Bosnian Serbs were also reported to have maintained Muslim "ghettos" in certain towns and sometimes used villages as camps to detain a large group of captives. See examples, Trnopolje camp in Prijedor, Es Naselje in Brčko, and Brezovo Polje in Brčko.

41. There is little to suggest that captured uniformed combatants were treated with the respect required by the law of armed conflict. Those prisoners who had in fact committed hostile acts against the Serbs were frequently punished. The punishments included severe mental and physical abuse and often execution.

42. Those women and children detained were also subjected to the worst kinds of abuse, including rape and other sexual assaults. 1/ There are reports of many detention facilities in existence for the sole purpose of holding women and girls for rape and sexual entertainment. There are also numerous allegations of rape at camps wherever women and girls were held. Captors reportedly raped female prisoners in front of other prisoners. Those who resisted, were often reportedly killed or otherwise brutalized, often in the presence of others. There were also reports of the sexual abuse of men, as well as castration and mutilation of sex organs.

43. Elderly persons detained often suffered the same level of abuse as the others. This indicates that the captors spared no group from detention and maltreatment.

44. There were reports that certain individuals were spared detention and abuse, because of the intervention of influential Serbs in the area or because they were somehow able to bribe their way out of detention. There were also
instances of local Serbs risking their own lives to help Muslims and Croats escape detention in various Serb camps in BiH.

45. There were also reports of Serbs who were detained in Serb-controlled facilities. In those cases, the prisoners had usually refused to participate in the conquest of a region or in the activities of "ethnic cleansing". Those imprisoned Serbs were treated as poorly as the other prisoners.

46. A large number of the Bosnian Serb-controlled camps appear to have served as screening stations for the purposes of interrogation and decisions as to how individual prisoners would be disposed of. Interrogation almost always consisted of questions relating to military and strategic information (including the location and possession of weapons), political affiliation, and political belief. Captors also interrogated detainees concerning the personal wealth and family connections of other detainees. Interrogations were commonly accompanied by brutal conduct and humiliation and, in some cases, by torture and killing. Confessions were often forcibly extracted from prisoners and used as a reason for their detention and treatment. The forced confessions on many occasions described some sort of offence or hostile act.

47. Reports indicate that upon arrival at the larger camps, prisoners were regularly subjected to random beatings. Reprisals appear to have been carried out against the prisoner population for Bosnian Serb setbacks in battle. Such reprisal activities included beatings, severe torture and killings. Apparently, one motivation for the punishment of inmates was retribution for supposed Serb casualties suffered in battle.

48. The type and amount of torture, abuse and maltreatment visited upon the prisoners detained in Bosnian Serb camps was of a great magnitude. Not only were prisoners physically abused, but they were also commonly humiliated, degraded, and forced to abuse one another. In several instances, prisoners were reported to have been forced to inflict injury upon each other, sometimes as entertainment for the guards. Humiliation often involved behaviour contradictory to the prisoners' religious background. Prisoners were also subjected to mental abuse and humiliation, including barrages of ethnic slurs.

49. Several Bosnian Serb controlled camps served as places of mass and continuous killing and execution by various means. Such camps also maintained large populations of prisoners for considerable periods of time. Other camps housed large numbers of prisoners but were not the site of a great number of killings.

50. At the larger camps, prisoners were reported to have been killed on a daily basis. In some cases, their bodies were left to rot on the camp grounds, or were loaded by prisoners and hauled away by truck to various destinations. The bodies were also reportedly disposed of in mass graves abutting the camps and thrown into rivers, lakes, ravines, mine shafts and mining pits, and other local venues. Bodies were also reported to have been incinerated or dismembered.

51. Prisoners who were targeted for torture or death at the larger camps often included prominent members of the community who were wealthy, educated or politically influential. Guards often were reported to have information identifying which prisoners fell into those categories.

52. The conditions in the places of detention were almost uniformly harsh. There was consistently a lack of food, insufficient access to toilets and beatings accompanying toilet-use, little drinkable water supply, an absence of soap and infrequent opportunities to bathe or change clothes, inadequate bedding, and often little protection from the natural elements.
53. Prisoners in some camps were reported to have suffered from dysentery and lice epidemics. Medical attention was, for the most part, non-existent at the camps. In some instances, inmates with medical training, treated fellow prisoners. However, due to an absence of supplies and facilities, such treatment was very primitive.

54. In the larger camps, male prisoners were often reported to be packed tightly into the detention facilities, so that they had no room to lie down or sit, or sometimes even to breathe. The prisoners were in many cases forced to urinate and defecate in containers and on the floors of the rooms in which they were accommodated.

55. Prisoners were often reported to have been subjected to abuse during meals, and, at best, were given one meal per day consisting of small portions of soup or bread. In some reported instances where food was delivered to a camp by the ICRC, the food was not distributed to prisoners, but was instead diverted to Bosnian Serb guards or forces.

56. There appears to have existed a certain degree of acknowledgement by Bosnian Serb authorities that camps were maintained. The camps appear to have been maintained and operated by a mix of former JNA officers and soldiers, Bosnian Serb Army personnel, various Serb paramilitaries, local volunteer Serbs, local impressed Serbs, members of the various Serb police forces and at least some Montenegrins. There also exists information that civilian Serb politicians were intimately involved with the operation of such places of detention.

57. Bosnian Serb authorities often expressed the belief that the above-described detention facilities were legitimate. The reasons stated included the necessity of protecting civilians from the dangers of combat, interning those who threatened the security of the detaining forces and detaining those responsible for criminal activity.

58. It is interesting to note that in at least one Serb-run camp, Batković, Bijeljina, the local Serb population was reported to have become aware of the situation inside the camp and demanded that the prisoners there be treated better. Conditions for the prisoners were reported to have subsequently improved.

2. BiH and Croat controlled camps

59. The BiH Government and Muslim forces and Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have detained thousands of soldiers and civilians in BiH. At one point, because of an alliance between the two parties, they both imprisoned Serbs. A significant number of camps were reported to have been operated jointly by Croat and BiH forces. After that alliance disintegrated, both sides were reported to have imprisoned each others' soldiers captured in battle, and large numbers of civilians of their opponents' ethnicity.

60. There are indications that BiH forces and Bosnian Croats to some extent reacted to the method of warfare and "ethnic cleansing" initiated by Bosnian Serbs by taking up similar methods of warfare. This included the indiscriminate detention of civilians, rather than maintaining methods of behaviour required by the international law of armed conflict. There seemed to be elements of revenge for past imprisonment of Muslim and Croat civilians. Also, the idea existed, perhaps, that if one held a significant number of the "enemy" prisoner, the "enemy" would be more likely to treat its own prisoners well so as to avoid the impulse for reprisals by the other side.
61. Both BiH forces and Bosnian Croats are reported to have interned civilians for the purpose of exchange for members of their own forces and populations held by the other two parties to the conflict. There also seems to be rather isolated attempts at smaller scale "ethnic cleansing".

62. The BiH and Muslim forces were reported to have imprisoned a number of individuals who resisted military service. Some of those persons were tried and convicted of criminal offences, and others were sent to the front to dig trenches. The BiH authorities also arrested people for possession of weapons. In Kladanj, Serbs were said to be imprisoned for the purpose of protecting them against retaliation by the local Muslim population. In Ženica, the BiH captors reportedly established a tribunal to determine the status of those imprisoned as either military or civilian.

63. The treatment of prisoners in Bosnian Muslim run camps was in some cases reported to be brutal and degrading. That treatment was often reported to include violent interrogations and beatings. Reports of forced same-sex sexual acts between prisoners also exist. Drunk guards were reported to have abused detainees, and civilians were allowed access into camps to beat and harass prisoners. Personal vendettas were also allowed to be consummated against prisoners of war. The killing of prisoners was not uncommon. There were also reports the Bosnian Muslim forces used prisoners as human shields.

64. There were reports of Bosnian Muslim-run brothels and rape camps. A number of reports also alleged the operation of private prisons controlled by various Bosnian Muslim forces or individuals. The BiH Government, in fact, acknowledged the existence of such Muslim private prisons and officially deplored them.

65. Reported conditions at most BiH and Muslim camps, were generally described as being no better than the vast majority of other places of detention in the former Yugoslavia.

66. In Bihac, BiH forces were reported to have imprisoned captured soldiers and supporters of leader Fikret Abdić. Likewise, the forces of Fikret Abdić reportedly maintained a camp to hold captured BiH forces and civilians deemed in opposition to Abdić's authority.

67. Bosnian Croat forces were also reported to have maintained camps in areas under their control imprisoning both Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. While there is at least one report of a "death camp" run by Bosnian Croats in Orašje, killing of prisoners, though not uncommon, was on a scale much lower than that apparently perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs.

68. The Bosnian Croat camps were reported to have been maintained by both military and paramilitary forces. The forces of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnian Croat forces apparently cooperated in the detention and transfer of prisoners.

69. The Bosnian Croats were said to have apprehended a significant numbers of individuals to hold for the purpose of prisoner exchanges. Other prisoners were supposedly held to protect them from the dangers of combat. Men were also imprisoned who were considered to be of fighting age. In addition, there appeared to be some attempts to expel non-Croat populations from some areas, such as in Vitez. Some persons there were arrested for so-called security reasons and for possession of weapons.

70. In at least one site, the Central Mostar Prison, it was reported that Croats divided their prisoners into five categories: Serb combatants; enemy
collaborators; prisoners held for purposes of exchange; civilians accused of common crimes; and Croatian soldiers serving time for disciplinary infractions.

71. Bosnian Croat captors reportedly maltreated a significant portion of those detained. Allegations of beatings, rape, and theft of prisoners' personal belongings were rather common. The prisoners were also reported to have been used as human shields. The litany of abuses perpetrated in those camps was much like the abuses perpetrated in the other camps in the former Yugoslavia.

### 3. Reported camps by location

72. Of the reports of 677 camps alleged in BiH, 381 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 296 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in BiH:

73. **Banja Luka:** Total camps: 9
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 2

74. **Bihać:** Total camps: 14
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
   - Muslims: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:

75. **Bijeljina:** Total camps: 12
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 1
   - Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

76. **Bileća:** Total camps: 9
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 6 Uncorroborated: 2
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

77. **Bosanska Dubica:** Total camps: 4
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 4

78. **Bosanska Gradiška:** Total camps: 6
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

79. **Bosanska Krupa:** Total camps: 7
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 5
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

80. **Bosanski Brod:** Total camps: 8
   - Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   - Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
   - Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
81. **Bosanski Novi**: Total camps: 7
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated: 1
   Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

82. **Bosanski Petrovac**: Total camps: 1
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

83. **Bosanski Šamac**: Total camps: 6
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

84. **Bratunac**: Total camps: 3
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

85. **Brčko**: Total camps: 34
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 26 Uncorroborated: 4
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

86. **Breza**: Total camps: 4
   Run by:
   Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 

87. **Bugojno**: Total camps: 12
   Run by:
   Muslims: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
   Croats/Muslims: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 3

88. **Busovača**: Total camps: 1
   Run by:
   Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 

89. **Čajniče**: Total camps: 4
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

90. **Čapljina**: Total camps: 6
   Run by:
   Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

91. **Cazin**: Total camps: 3
   Run by:
   Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 

92. **Čelinac**: Total camps: 4
   Run by:
   Serbs: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
93. Čitluk: Total camps: 2
   Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

94. Derventa: Total camps: 4
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

95. Doboj: Total camps: 13
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 8 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1

96. Donji Vakuf: Total camps: 5
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

97. Foća: Total camps: 15
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 5
           Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2

98. Fojnica: Total camps: 2
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

99. Gacko: Total camps: 15
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 10 Uncorroborated: 3
           Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

100. Glamoć: Total camps: 1
      Run by: Serbs/Montenegrins: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

101. Goražde: Total camps: 3
      Run by: Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 3

102. Gornji Vakuf: Total camps: 2
      Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

103. Gradačac: Total camps: 4
      Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 3

104. Grude: Total camps: 2
      Run by: Croats/Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
            Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

105. Han Pišjesak: Total camps: 1
      Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
106. **Jablanica**: Total camps: 5
   Run by:  
   Muslims:  Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown:  Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated:

107. **Jajce**: Total camps: 1
   Run by:  
   Muslims:  Corroborated:  
   Uncorroborated: 1

108. **Kakanj**: Total camps: 3
   Run by:  
   Muslims:  Corroborated:  
   Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown:  Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated:

109. **Kalesija**: Total camps: 5
   Run by:  
   Serbs:  
   Corroborated: 1  Uncorroborated: 2
   Muslims:  Corroborated: 1  Uncorroborated:
   Unknown:  Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated:

110. **Kalinovik**: Total camps: 5
    Run by:  
    Serbs:  
    Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated: 2
    Unknown:  Corroborated:  
    Uncorroborated: 1

111. **Kiseljak**: Total camps: 7
    Run by:  
    Croats:  
    Corroborated: 1  Uncorroborated: 1
    Unknown:  Corroborated: 4  Uncorroborated: 1

112. **Kladanj**: Total camps: 1
    Run by:  
    Croats/Muslims:  
    Corroborated:  
    Uncorroborated: 1

113. **Kluč**: Total camps: 4
    Run by:  
    Serbs:  
    Corroborated: 3  Uncorroborated: 1

114. **Konjic**: Total camps: 29
    Run by:  
    Muslims:  
    Corroborated: 6  Uncorroborated: 5
    Croats/Muslims:  
    Corroborated: 4  Uncorroborated: 12
    Unknown:  
    Corroborated:  
    Uncorroborated: 2

115. **Kotor Varoš**: Total camps: 9
    Run by:  
    Serbs:  
    Corroborated: 2  Uncorroborated: 7

116. **Krešsevo**: Total camps: 3
    Run by:  
    Unknown:  
    Corroborated: 3  Uncorroborated:

117. **Kupres**: Total camps: 1
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| 124 | Lukavac       | 1           | Unknown         | Corroborated: 1 | Uncorroborated: |
| 125 | Maglaj        | 1           | Croats          | Corroborated: 1 | Uncorroborated: 1 |
| 126 | Modriča       | 3           | Serbs           | Corroborated: 1 | Uncorroborated: 2 |
| 127 | Mostar        | 15          | Serbs           | Corroborated: 2 | Uncorroborated: |
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Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

143. Skender Vakuf: Total Camps: 1
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:

144. Sokolac: Total Camps: 8
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 3
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

145. Srebrenica: Total Camps: 2
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

146. Stolac: Total Camps: 4
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 3

147. Tešanj: Total Camps: 4
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:
Muslims: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

148. Teslić: Total Camps: 7
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 3
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

149. Titov Drvar: Total Camps: 6
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:

150. Tomislavgrad: Total Camps: 9
Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

151. Travnik: Total Camps: 3
Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

152. Trebinje: Total Camps: 2
Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated:
Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
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D. Camps reported in Croatia

164. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 201 camps within Croatia. Among those camps, 77 (38.3 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs; 70 (34.8 per cent) by Croats; 1 (.5 per cent) by Bosnian Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by both Croats and Muslims; 1 (.5 per cent) by Slovenians; 51 (25.4 per cent) by unidentified forces.

165. As armed conflict erupted between Croatians and Serbs in Croatia, the detention of combatants and civilians reached a large scale. Ultimately, at least several thousand Croatians and Serbs had been imprisoned in Croatia from the end of 1991 to the present.

166. Most of the places of detention in Croatia were maintained by Croatians or Serbs. There are, however, a significant number of reported detention facilities where it was unclear who maintained control.

1. Croat controlled camps

167. The reports indicate that Croatian forces captured and detained both Serb combatants and Serb civilians. As the conflict progressed, it appears that the Croatians began to capture and detain Serb civilians for the purpose of later exchanging them for Croats held prisoner.

168. Some cooperation appeared evident between the Croats of the Republic of Croatia and the Croats of the Republic of BiH. At one point, at least, Bosnian Croat forces were apparently able to transfer prisoners from the Bosanski Brod and Odžak areas of BiH to Slavonski Brod in Croatia. Some of those prisoners were later transferred back to places of detention in the territory of BiH. Others were apparently transferred to places of detention elsewhere in Croatia.

169. The Croats appear to have used numerous sites to detain and interrogate Serbs for short periods of time and maintained only a few places for long term detention.

170. It was reported that the Croatian camps were often divided into three blocks. The first block consisted of former JNA members who surrendered without a struggle. The second block consisted of elderly persons and the third block was reported to have consisted of military police, volunteers, and individuals identified by the Croats as "Četniks".

171. In Pakrac, Croats were alleged to have maintained two "death camps" for the elimination of captured Serbs. This was the only allegation of Croats operating a place of detention for the purpose of large-scale execution. However, there were numerous allegations of Croatian mistreatment of prisoners in other places of detention, as well as numerous allegations of killings.

172. The reported maltreatment inflicted upon prisoners in Croat-controlled detention facilities consisted mainly of indiscriminate beatings, some rapes, public humiliation, and forced appearance on television. Electric shock and forced same-sex sexual acts were also alleged as common methods of torture and abuse.

173. Those who were reported to have controlled and maintained the Croatian places of detention were the Croatian armed forces, local police forces and some paramilitary groups.

174. Camp conditions were generally poor. However, in at least one instance
at Gospić Prison, it was reported that Croatian captors attempted to improve conditions when notified of an ICRC visit.

2. Serb controlled camps

175. There were also Serb controlled places of detention in Croatia which were reported to have consisted mainly of pre-existing facilities. However, the Serbs apparently found it necessary to erect a few camps in order to effectively detain their captives. The Serb camps in Croatia held both civilians and prisoners of war.

176. Prior to the war in BiH, Serb captors in Croatia transferred some prisoners to the Manjača camp in Banja Luka, Bosnia. Later, after fighting started in BiH, Bosnian Muslims and BosnianCroats were reported to have been held at Serb camps in Croatia.

177. Those reportedly responsible for the operation and maintenance of Serb-controlled camps in Croatia were a mixture of JNA officers and soldiers, SAO Krajina police forces, Serb Territorial Defence units and various paramilitary forces.

178. Maltreatment of prisoners was commonly attributed to the Serb controlled camps in Croatia. Camp commanders appear to have been well aware of the abuse that took place and often allowed Serb civilians and paramilitaries access to the prisoners in order to abuse them. In at least one case, Bosnian Serbs reportedly travelled to Knin, Croatia to participate in the abuse of Bosnian Croats and Muslims held there.

179. There are a number of reports that the guards in Serb camps consumed drugs and alcohol and in an intoxicated state subjected prisoners to different types of maltreatment.

180. As with other detaining powers, the Serbs in Croatia were reported to have attempted at times to deceive visitors interested in the condition of camps. For example, places of detention and the prisoners themselves were cleaned up before a visit and prisoners who appeared to be in satisfactory condition were shown off, whereas those who showed physical signs of maltreatment were hidden.

181. There were also reports of prisoners coerced to appear on Belgrade television to describe their supposed offences against Serbs.

3. Reported camps by location

182. Of the reports of 201 camps alleged in Croatia, 100 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and 101 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Croatia:

183. Beli Manastir: Total camps: 6
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
   Unknown: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1

184. Benkovac: Total camps: 5
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 5
185. **Bjelovar**: Total camps: 6  
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1  
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

186. **Daruvar**: Total camps: 8  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2  
   Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 4  
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

187. **Djakovo**: Total camps: 2  
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
   Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

188. **Drniš**: Total camps: 2  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
   Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

189. **Dubrovnik**: Total camps: 1  
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

190. **Dvor**: Total camps: 4  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2  
   Unknown: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 2

191. **Glina**: Total camps: 3  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1  
   Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

192. **Gospić**: Total camps: 5  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1  
   Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

193. **Gračac**: Total camps: 1  
   Run by: Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

194. **Grubišno Polje**: Total camps: 1  
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

195. **Imotski**: Total camps: 1  
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

196. **Ivanec**: Total camps: 1  
   Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

197. **Karlovac**: Total camps: 2  
   Run by: Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
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210. **Petrinja**: Total camps: 2

Run by:
- Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
- Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

211. **Podravska Slatina**: Total camps: 2

Run by:
- Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
- Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

212. **Pula**: Total camps: 1

Run by:
- Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

213. **Rijeka**: Total camps: 3

Run by:
- Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
- Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

214. **Šibenik**: Total camps: 7

Run by:
- Muslims: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
- Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
- Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1

215. **Sinj**: Total camps: 1

Run by:
- Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

216. **Sisak**: Total camps: 3

Run by:
- Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

217. **Slavonska Požega**: Total camps: 5

Run by:
- Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2
- Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

218. **Slavonski Brod**: Total camps: 7

Run by:
- Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2
- Muslims/ Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
- Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1

219. **Slunj**: Total camps: 3

Run by:
- Serbs: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
- Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
- Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1

220. **Split**: Total camps: 4

Run by:
- Croats: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 1
- Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
221. **Vinkovci**:  Total camps: 2
    Run by:  Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1
               Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

222. **Varaždin**:  Total camps: 1
    Run by:  Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

223. **Vojnić**:  Total camps: 3
    Run by:  Serbs: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
               Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated:

224. **Vrbovec**:  Total camps: 1
    Run by:  Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

225. **Vrginmost**:  Total camps: 1
    Run by:  Croats: Corroborated: Uncorroborated: 1

226. **Vukovar**:  Total camps: 44
    Run by:  Serbs: Corroborated: 7 Uncorroborated: 27
               Croats: Corroborated: 9 Uncorroborated: 1
               Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:

227. **Zadar**:  Total camps: 7
    Run by:  Croats: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated: 1
               Unknown: Corroborated: 3 Uncorroborated:

228. **Zagreb**:  Total camps: 8
    Run by:  Croats: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
               Unknown: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated:

E. **Camps reported in FRY**

229. The reports reviewed alleged a total of 71 camps within FRY. Among those camps, 56 (78.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Bosnian Serbs or forces of FRY; and 15 (21.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.

1. **Serb/FRY controlled camps**

230. A combination of JNA personnel, police forces and Serb paramilitaries, reportedly operated and maintained the camps in FRY.

231. A significant number of Croats, probably at least several thousand, were reported to have been captured by Serb forces in Croatia and transferred to what is now known as FRY. The majority of those imprisoned in various prisons and camps in FRY were apparently captured at the battle of Vukovar in approximately November 1991.

232. Those captured were a mix of soldiers and civilians. Apparently, the Serbs first regarded their Croat prisoners as insurgents and rebels and later, as the independence of Croatia was recognized, to a certain extent regarded
their captives as prisoners of war. It was also reported that when the Republic of Croatia was internationally recognized, Croat prisoners in FRY were severely beaten as a result.

233. It was reported that Serb authorities tried and convicted a number of Croat prisoners for various offences. Those prisoners were often transferred to other detention facilities. Serbs also commonly transferred other prisoners between detention centres.

234. Treatment of prisoners at the FRY camps was commonly reported as very poor. Violent interrogation, and reports of beatings and sadistic treatment of prisoners were common. For example, it was reported that prisoners were forced to participate in various "games", the rules of which inevitably led to the abuse of the participants. It appeared that Serb authorities in FRY transported local Vukovar Serbs to FRY in order to identify certain prisoners and participate in their maltreatment. Personal vendettas were allowed to occur. Drunk guards were also reported to have inflicted great harm upon those imprisoned. There were also reports of women who were held and exploited for sexual purposes.

235. Living conditions for the prisoners were also reported as very poor. Common complaints included a lack of food, insufficient access to toilet facilities, and an inadequate opportunity to bathe and change clothes. Facilities were often cold and damp, and inmates were often left without sufficient bedding. The wounded and sick often suffered without adequate medical care.

236. It appears that the majority of Croat prisoners in FRY were exchanged by late summer of 1992.

237. It was also reported that prisoners captured in BiH were transported to camps in FRY. A number of the Bosnian Muslims held in such camps were reportedly captured around Višegrad and Bosanski Šamac.

238. A number of Bosnian refugees in Montenegro, from Foča, were reportedly arrested by FRY police forces, held in various prisons, and later turned over to Serbs maintaining camps in Foča where they were then imprisoned. It was also reported that a significant number of Muslim prisoners held in Bileca, were transferred to a camp in Subotica.

239. Upon investigation by third party teams, certain alleged concentration camps for Muslims in FRY were found to be refugee centres where living conditions were poor.

2. Reported camps by location

240. Of the reports of the 71 camps alleged in FRY, 42 were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources), and 29 were uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in FRY:

241. Kosovo: Total camps: 1

Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated:
242. **Montenegro:** Total camps: 9

Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 5 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2

243. **Serbia:** Total camps: 27

Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 13 Uncorroborated: 13
Unknown: Corroborated: 1 Uncorroborated: 2

244. **Vojvodina:** Total camps: 25

Run by: Serbs/FRY: Corroborated: 10 Uncorroborated: 13
Unknown: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 2

245. **Unidentified Locations in FRY:**

Total camps: 9

Run by: Unknown: Corroborated: 9 Uncorroborated: 1

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D. **Camps reported in Slovenia**

246. The reports reviewed alleged a total of seven camps within Slovenia. Among those camps, three (42.9 per cent) were alleged to have been controlled by Slovenian forces and four (57.1 per cent) by unidentified forces.

247. As the various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia erupted and unfolded, detention of soldiers and civilians reportedly became commonplace. In June and July 1991, Slovenian forces reportedly captured and imprisoned a few hundred soldiers of the JNA and some civilian personnel of SFRY, including internal police, for a short period of time after Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991.

248. The Slovenes reportedly held the prisoners in various places including mining facilities and a penitentiary. The captors allegedly subjected the prisoners to beatings, verbal humiliations, and threats. Since the prisoners' release and the subsequent conflicts in Croatia and BiH, there were no reports concerning detention in Slovenia.

249. Of the reports of the seven camps alleged in Slovenia, six were corroborated (i.e., reported by a neutral source or multiple neutral sources) and one was uncorroborated (i.e., reported either by multiple non-neutral sources, or not corroborated by a neutral source). The following is a numerical breakdown of the camps reported to have existed in Slovenia:

1. **Reported camps in Slovenia**

250. **Slovenia:** Total camps: 7

Run by: Slovenians: Corroborated: 2 Uncorroborated: 1
Unknown: Corroborated: 4 Uncorroborated: 1
III. ANALYSIS BY GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION

A. BiH

1. Banja Luka

251. Banja Luka County is in the north-west quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 195,139. Bosnian Serbs comprised the majority at 54.8 per cent, 14.9 per cent were Bosnian Croat, 14.6 per cent were Bosnian Muslim, 12 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", and the remaining 3.7 per cent were classified as "others".

252. Manjača camp: The existence of this detention facility as well as the alleged number of individuals hereby detained has been corroborated by multiple sources, among them: the ICRC, the US Department of State and the UK Defence Debriefing Team.

253. Location: According to reports, the Manjača camp was located approximately 25 kilometres south of the city of Banja Luka. Manjača is the name of a mountain and there is no village by that name. The camp was reportedly located in a mountainous area controlled by Serbian forces, on or near an unidentified former JNA base which had been a farm and had later been used as a training facility. Tanks, rockets and other military equipment were reported just below the site.

254. Description of the Manjača camp: Reports describe the Manjača facility as consisting of one section of a large farm which was surrounded by a fence and used as the camp. An ex-prisoner at the camp provided a diagram of the grounds and stated that the camp was located in a former JNA training area. He added that the camp itself was a former military cattle farm, a section of which had been fenced off for use as the camp.

255. The camp's perimeter is described as forming an area of approximately 240 by 260 metres. According to reports, the Manjača camp was surrounded by a single fence and divided into two sections by a central fence. These fences were reported as being between two and three metres high. An ex-prisoner who was transferred to the camp in 1992 reported that while the camp was divided into two separate sections, one was not used until August 1992.

256. There were reportedly three detention buildings in each section of the camp which were described as unheated, former livestock stables arranged in two rows of three. These structures appeared to be more or less the same size which was estimated in different reports as 80 by 12 metres, 60 by 18 metres, and 70 by 20 metres. Each of the six structures reportedly had six stalls, three on each side of a corridor.

257. Several reports estimate that each of the main structures housed between 600 and 700 prisoners. One report stated that between 600 and 650 prisoners were accommodated internally in each structure in three rows of six. Another report stated that detainees occupied a space, approximately 6.5 feet by 30 inches, in six long rows of approximately 80 persons per row. It was also reported that there was a walkway, approximately two feet wide between the rows and that the estimated total occupancy per stable was 500 persons.

258. One subject reported that each of the camp's two sections had a separate entrance with a gate guarded by soldiers. Another subject described two gates into the camp, one on the north-western, and another on the south-western side of the camp. Reports also describe an unknown number of
guard dogs tied to a post near the north-western gate 23/ and patrolling the periphery of the camp's centre. 24/

259. According to the reports reviewed, mines were laid between the two fences surrounding and separating the sections of the camp. 25/ One subject described a one-metre-wide strip of mined earth which separated the two rows of stables and encircled the entire camp. 26/ Another subject described a three metre mined section of earth, running from one end of the camp to the other, effectively dividing the camp structures into two groups. According to the subject, an unidentified male prisoner was killed by an explosion when he ventured too close to the centre mine strip. 27/ It was also reported that mines had been placed in a one metre wide strip of earth immediately inside the fence separated from the camp's interior by a single strand of wire suspended one metre off of the ground. 28/

260. One subject reported that the interior fence had signs posted to warn of the minefield. 29/

261. Reports also describe two smaller sheds which served as kitchens in each of the prison sections. 30/ One report describes high roofed shelters which were used as the food preparation and serving and eating area. 31/ Another report said that one of the camp's sections had a small building used for storing food taken from relief organizations and for torturing inmates. 32/

262. Reports describe a camp building where prisoners were taken for torture, calling it the Samica (meaning single cell). 33/ One subject reports that the Samica was located approximately 50 metres from the barn where he was held. 34/ Another subject similarly reported that on 28 August 1992, he witnessed prisoners being beaten in an area that was used for solitary confinement of prisoners, about 100 metres from the barn. 35/

263. The area outside the camp compound: One subject described the area to the east of the fenced in compound as containing another seven buildings which were used by the camp administration. Each of those buildings were reported to be approximately 12 metres by 50 metres in size. According to the description, the buildings on the outside of the camp included a doctor's office and a structure utilized by Serbian police interrogators. 36/ Three of the buildings on the outside of the camp were reportedly used as housing for the camp's guards. 37/ One of the buildings was reportedly occupied day and night by approximately 10 soldiers from a nearby tank unit, which one source believed was a security reinforcement. 38/ One subject reported that there was also a building which was used for food storage and as a medical clinic for prisoners and guards. 39/

264. Another report describes buildings as being located in the western section outside the camp, including a hospital, sleeping accommodations for the guard force, a large administration building, and a gatehouse and checkpoint at the entrance to the fenced area. 40/

265. One former prisoner said that 20 soldiers/camp guards were permanently quartered in a building called the "Krug" (circle), located outside the camp compound. The subject said that the same building contained a kitchen and a canteen where the guards ate three times a day. Two female cooks from Banja Luka reportedly cooked for the guards and two prisoners were reportedly detailed daily to clean their quarters and assist in the kitchen. 41/

266. Guards were reportedly posted outside the fence surrounding the camp. 42/ Reports also describe bunkers immediately outside the camp's perimeter. One subject described the bunkers as having wooden walls with one metre high earthen mounds containing openings to accommodate small arms.
Another subject described several ground level bunkers. Manned watchtowers were also reported in the area outside the camp. One subject described four guardhouses inside and outside the camp. One of these guardhouses was said to be a 10 metre high watchtower.

267. Number of prisoners: Reports indicate that during its peak operation period, the Manjača camp held approximately 3,700 prisoners. The ICRC reported that from mid-July 1992, approximately 3,600 persons were detained at the Manjača camp and had been regularly visited and registered. The ICRC specifically reported in mid-August 1992 that there were 3,737 prisoners visited at Manjača on 14-16 July 1992, 28 July 1992, and 12-14 August 1992. A CSCE Mission to the Manjača camp reported that on 30 August 1992, there were 3,640 prisoners at the facility.

268. Other reports estimate a higher number of prisoners at Manjača. Some sources state that the camp held approximately 4,000 Bosnian Muslim males. One subject who was transferred to the camp from Omarska camp in Prijedor, estimated that the camp contained about 5,500 prisoners. Another report, citing estimates by refugees from the Kozarac area, claimed the number of prisoners at Manjača at 8,000.

269. Reports indicate that prior to mid-June 1992, the Manjača camp had a lower prisoner population, which rose dramatically in early-August 1992. It was also reported that in order to accommodate the influx of prisoners from Omarska camp in Prijedor and other detention facilities in August 1992, a second compound of the Manjača camp was opened. One subject estimated that when he arrived at Manjača in mid-June, the camp had a population of 1,700 male prisoners, and that on 23 August 1992, the camp held 4,500 prisoners. Another subject who was detained at the camp in 1992 stated that prior to August 1992, the camp held a total of 1,759 prisoners and that after August, and the opening of the second compound, an additional 1,710 prisoners were brought in.

270. Sex and age of the prisoners: Most reports indicate that the camp contained male prisoners of all ages but mostly between the ages of 18 and 60. However, there are allegations that in the early spring of 1992, a small number of women were held at the camp and raped.

271. Ethnicity of prisoners: Manjača's prison population was in most reports described as predominantly Bosnian Muslim and Croatian. Some subjects estimated the prisoner population at Manjača at approximately 80 per cent Bosnian Muslim and 20 per cent Croatian. One report estimated the camp's population at 96.4 per cent Muslim, 3.4 per cent Croatian and .01 per cent Serbian.

272. At one point, several Serbians from north-western Bosnia were reportedly detained at the camp for several days because they refused to go to the war front. Each of the men was reportedly older then 45 years of age. The men reportedly slept in a separate room but received the same food as the other inmates.

273. Status of prisoners: Reports indicate that the majority of the prisoners at the Manjača camp were civilians. CSCE mission member John Zerolis, a U.S. Foreign Service officer assigned to the US Embassy in Zagreb, inspected the Manjača camp and reported that he observed several thousand prisoners, none of whom were wearing any type of uniform. He stated that he was told by the prisoners that they were non-combatants and that they had been arrested from their homes. The CSCE Mission further reported that the vast majority of the Manjača's prisoners claimed to be civilians or were arrested at their homes for no apparent reason except as an integral part of
"ethnic cleansing" operations. 59/ One subject who was held at the camp said that Manjača was not a POW camp as claimed by Serbian authorities and that an estimated 95 per cent of the prisoners there were civilians. 60/

274. According to a report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,

"the administrators of this [Manjača] facility who are officials of the army of the Bosnian Serbs, maintain that the prisoners are prisoners of war. However, other observers consider that most of them probably never bore arms, and were detained simply because their age and Muslim ethnic origin made them potential combatants in the eyes of the Serbian authorities." 61/

275. The leader of Merhamet, the Muslim charitable organization in Banja Luka, reportedly stated that most prisoners at Manjača had no connection with the military clashes. 62/

276. One unidentified subject who was transferred to Manjača from another detention facility reported that he saw several Imams at the camp. He did not know their names but said that they were from Prijedor and Kozarac. 63/

277. Organization of prisoners: Reports indicate that Manjača's prisoner housing was allocated according to place of prisoner origin. For example, an ex-prisoner stated that prisoners were assigned to buildings by region (Doboj, Grapska; Ključ; Prijedor; and Sanski Most). He said that he was housed in the building designated for all those from his north-west BiH municipality. 64/ Another ex-prisoner stated that one side of the camp was filled with men from Ključ, Sanski Most and Prijedor. He said that there was one stable in his part of the camp which was filled with men from Sana (i.e. Sanski Most), and that another contained prisoners from the Kozarac and Prijedor area. 65/ A third ex-prisoner reported that he was in a section of the camp with 186 prisoners who had been accused of possessing arms and 50 others who did not have documents and were put in with that group. He said that most of the people in his area of detention were from Sanski Most. 66/

278. According to one report, there were a number of Muslim prisoners who were responsible for order and smooth operation of the camp. The prisoners called them the "camp commanders". They reportedly slept together with the other prisoners on the concrete floor and were not permitted to leave the camp. Their function was reportedly to maintain a liaison with the administration office and with the medical office, to supervise the Bosnian cooks and the "trustees", 67/ and to present any problems to the camp commander. It was also alleged that these individuals cooperated with the Serbs and caused the death of at least one Bosnian Muslim prisoner. 68/

279. Prison ledger: An ex-prisoner stated that a prison ledger contained the names of every prisoner and the various categories to which he was assigned. Specifically, the subject reported that the prisoners' disposition was noted in the last column of the ledger and that if this was written in pen, as opposed to pencil, it was irrevocable. The subject said that those who had "VIZ" (Military Investigation Centre) written in pen after their name always disappeared. 69/

280. Dates of operation/camp opening: According to reports, the Manjača camp was first used as a prisoner of war camp in the summer and autumn of 1991. Croatian soldiers were reportedly held there during the war. However, since the early spring (April or May) of 1992, the same facility was reportedly used to hold both Croat and Muslim prisoners and it was believed that most of those individuals were civilians. 70/ According to reports, Manjača's prisoner
population rose dramatically in early August, 1992, when an estimated 1,200 to 1,800 prisoners were transferred there as a result of the Omarska camp's closure.

281. Visits to Manjača by outside organizations: From mid-July 1992 until its closure in December 1992, Manjača was closely monitored by the ICRC and other organizations. As a result, it is possible to get a fairly clear picture of the camp's conditions and the number of prisoners held there during that time.

282. ICRC monitoring of the Manjača camp: the ICRC reported that about 3,600 persons detained at Manjača had been regularly visited, registered, protected, and assisted by the ICRC from mid-July 1992. 71 However, the ICRC noted that it was refused access to Manjača and Trnopolje from 18 to 26 August 1992. 72

283. Reports indicate that after the ICRC's first visit on 14 July, Manjača's conditions improved, and there was more food and fewer beatings at the camp. 73 However, one ex-prisoner said that much of the food was diverted there from ICRC deliveries. He added that a half-hour before each visit, a senior guard would inform the Manjača prisoners of the pending visit and state that if the prisoners complained about conditions, they would be punished. 74 Another ex-prisoner stated that prior to a 13 August 1992 ICRC visit to the camp, prisoners were instructed to tell the ICRC that they were treated well. The ex-prisoner noted that some prisoners did manage to tell the representatives about ill-treatment, despite the fact that each ICRC representative was accompanied by two Serb soldiers. 75

284. One ex-prisoner who had been transferred to Manjača from another detention facility said that food and conditions improved considerably at Manjača after the ICRC visit. He said that winter clothing and boots were also issued as the weather turned cold and the first snow arrived in November. He said that the ICRC was present everyday between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. He also said that the ICRC visited on Tuesdays and came with search lists. 76

285. Amnesty International reported that ex-prisoners stated that beating ceased for the first visit of the ICRC to the camp in mid-July, but that prisoners were systematically beaten the day after the departure of the delegation. 77 Helsinki Watch quoted an ex-prisoner who had been detained at the camp from 6 August to 1 September 1992 as saying that after the ICRC visit in mid-July, conditions in the camp improved but that beatings continued. 78

286. Sources also reported that although the camp was under ICRC supervision during the day, the Serbs beat the prisoners at night when the ICRC workers left. It was also reported that on one occasion trucks arrived in the middle of the night and took away 300 prisoners who were later replaced by 300 new inmates so the ICRC would not become suspicious. 79

287. The ICRC reported that it conducted the following activities at the camp from 14 July 1992 to 18 December 1992: 80

(a) On 14 July 1992, it visited detainees held at the camp. Each detainee was registered. Since then, there were visits two to three times a week by ICRC delegates.

(b) On 17 August 1992, it introduced relief programs and a specific food emergency program.

(c) It distributed 2.7 metric tons of drugs and medical equipment; mattresses, jerry cans, blankets, plastic sheeting, polystyrene, lime, detergent, soap, and clothing and 427.2 metric tons of food weekly.
(d) On 15 September 1992, under the auspices of the ICRC, 68 medical cases were transferred directly to the United Kingdom for medical treatment.

(e) 1 October 1992, under ICRC auspices, there was a meeting of plenipotentiaries from the three parties involved in the conflict in BiH and the signing of an agreement on the release and transfer of detainees.

(f) On 14 November 1992, 755 detainees to were evacuated to Karlovac Centre, a refugee camp in Croatia.

(g) After 2 December 1992, approximately 3,000 persons still held at the camp were regularly visited by ICRC delegates. 81/

(h) On 9 December 1992, there were bilateral talks between ICRC President Sommaruga and leaders of the parties involved in the conflict. Additionally, they confirmed the previous commitments concerning liberation of the detainees.

(i) On 13 December 1992, 532 detainees were transferred by camp authorities to a destination unknown to ICRC. The ICRC undertook to localize those detainees and obtain their freedom.

(j) On 14 December 1992, the ICRC transferred 1,009 detainees to the Karlovac Centre refugee in Croatia.

(k) On 16 December 1992, the ICRC transferred 1,001 detainees to Karlovac.

(l) On 18 December 1992, the remaining detainees 426 were transferred to Karlovac.

(m) On 20 December 1992, the ICRC visited Batković camp, where 401 detainees originating from Manjača were imprisoned. According to reports, the other 131 prisoners remained missing for more than a month. The ICRC was ultimately informed that the missing 131 were at the Kula camp near the Sarajevo airport in preparation for an exchange of prisoners. However, the ICRC did not confirm this information for security reasons. 82/

288. Visits to Manjača by other organizations and individuals: In addition to the ICRC, other organizations and individuals visited and monitored the Manjača camp.

289. On 19 July 1992 (on the occasion of the first ICRC inspection), one reporter was said to have made the first western press visit to Manjača. The reporter said that he was unable to enter the camp but that eight interviewees were marched in formation into a small plaza near the camp entrance. He described the prisoners as wearing prison uniforms and appearing pale, weary, and under duress. When interviewed in the presence of army guards, the prisoners expressed little criticism for their captors and made only a few indications of mistreatment. The reporter said that during that visit he was told by the deputy commander of the Bosnian Serbian Army's Krajina corps at his nearby headquarters that: "We are concealing nothing". However, the reporter noted that former prisoners interviewed away from the camp described a regime where beatings were routine. 83/

290. A chapter of Caritas from Banja Luka reportedly visited the Manjača camp on approximately 17 August 1992. Thereafter, other relief agencies visited. One ex-prisoner said that prior to the visits, food was moved from the kitchen used by the guards and camp administration and put into the kitchen used for feeding prisoners. 84/
291. The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was reported to have attempted to visit the Manjača camp during the last week of August 1992. The mission arrived at the camp and was informed by the officer in charge that 3,000 prisoners of war were being held there. The mission, however, was denied permission to visit the camp. The officer said that the prisoners were "tired of being visited by international missions" and that it was too late in the day for a visit (it was reportedly more than an hour before sunset). The officer thereafter indicated that he could not allow the prisoners to be seen because the mission had not requested permission from the central authorities to enter the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina". The mission failed to see the prisoners at the camp but said that it was provided with information, including photos by a person who it said had visited the camp a few weeks earlier. The mission said that there were signs of malnutrition and in some cases torture. A man also informed the Special Rapporteur that a man detained at the camp had recently been taken to a hospital and weighed only 34 kilograms. 85/

292. The CSCE Thomson Mission reportedly visited the Manjača camp on 30 August 1992. 86/ And, according to a Helsinki Watch report, that organization visited the camp on 13 December 1992. 87/

293. Release of prisoners/camp closing: The Manjača camp was reportedly closed on 18 December 1992 after the above-mentioned series of prisoner releases performed under the auspices of the ICRC. 88/ The following organized prisoner releases took place at Manjača:

(a) The ICRC reported that on 14 November 1992, 755 detainees (including 729 BiH Muslim and 26 Croatians), were released from the camp and transferred to the Karlovac transit camp. 89/

(b) On 14 December 1992, 1,008 90/ prisoners who had been held at Manjača, were released under the auspices of the ICRC. A 9 December 1992 agreement between ICRC President Sommaruga and Bosnian Serb leader Karadžić stipulated that all of the prisoners visited and registered by the ICRC at the Manjača camp were to be released by 18 December 1992. 91/

(c) On 16 December 1992, another 1,001 persons who had been held at the Manjača camp were released. The ICRC, however, requested information about 529 detainees transferred from the camp without its delegates' knowledge and whose whereabouts were unknown at the time. 92/

(d) On 18 December 1992, the Manjača camp was proclaimed closed and the 418 detainees still held there were released under the auspices of the ICRC. The ICRC commented that the camp was totally unsuitable for holding detainees and it trusted that the camp would not be used for that purpose again. Eight other detainees being treated at the Banja Luka hospital were also freed. In a related development, during a visit to a camp in Batković in north-eastern BiH, ICRC delegates found some of the 529 detainees who had been transferred from Manjača on 13 December 1992 without the ICRC's knowledge. 93/

A press report quoted the Batković commander as stating that 532 Manjača detainees were brought to Batković, and that 130 of them were taken to Sarajevo and freed in an exchange. 94/ Another report stated that the ICRC was informed that the missing 130 prisoners were at the Kula camp near the Sarajevo airport in preparation for an exchange of prisoners. However, the ICRC did not verify this information for security reasons. 95/

294. Control of the Manjača camp: Reports describe the Manjača camp as being under the control of the Bosnian Serb Army. 96/ One report generally described the camp as being under the control of the "army". 97/ An ex-
prisoner stated that the camp was under the control of Bosnian Serb irregulars calling themselves "Martičevci". Their headquarters were reported to be in Banja Luka. 98/

295. Guards at the Manjača camp: 99/ Soldiers and guards at the Manjača camp reportedly referred to themselves as "Martičevci". 100/ Several reports also stated that the guards referred to each other by Muslim names to hide their identities. 101/ According to one ex-prisoner, the guards used code names to conceal their identities. He added that none of the guards were from the same region as the prisoners. 102/ Another subject said that military police guards were used on the perimeter area of the camp and that these guards were assigned to the camp from either Prijedor or Ključ. 103/

296. One subject who was transferred to Manjača from another detention facility said that the guards at Manjača wore a mixture of JNA uniform, with some wearing the "četnička kapa", and others wearing headbands. The subject also reported guards wearing the "White Eagles" badge of the Arkan Tigers paramilitary group. 104/

297. According to reports, there were approximately 50 soldiers assigned as guards at the camp. 105/ One subject, who was imprisoned at Manjača for several months, reported that the overall camp personnel at no one time exceeded 60. 106/

298. A subject who was transferred to the camp from another detention facility, reported that the guard force at Manjača worked a 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift during the time he spent there until November 1992. The subject also reported that a shift consisted of 30 guards. He added that, unlike Omarska where the guards were drawn from the immediate area and arrived and departed on a daily basis, the guards at Manjača were largely from outside the Manjača area including Ključ and Sanski Most. 107/ The subject said that the guards lived in accommodation outside the fenced area of the camp in the remaining sheds and barns, and that they were replaced every seven days by a new batch of guards. He reported that the guards were armed with automatic rifles, pistols, and clubs. 108/

299. Another subject reported that buses brought in numbers of guards to the camp on a rotating basis. He said that there were 15 guards on duty at a time and that the guard force changed every two hours. He said that the guard force was comprised of soldiers from the Ključ and Sanski Most areas. 109/

300. It was also reported that 20 soldiers/camp guards were permanently quartered in a building called "Krug" (circle), located outside the camp compound. According to one subject, the guards were changed every two weeks. The subject added that the guards wore JNA field uniforms. 110/

301. One ex-prisoner who was transferred to Manjača from another detention facility, said that the "police" at Manjača were mobilized and rotated every month and that camp duty was regarded as their leave period from the front line. He said that when the "police" knew that they had to return to the front line they took it out on the prisoners. 111/

302. Many of the camp's prisoners were transferred to Manjača from other camps.

303. Banja Luka in April/May 1992: One subject reported that he was arrested by Serbian forces in Banja Luka in April 1992 and was sent to the Manjača camp where he was held for a number of days. He said that he had been accused by his captors of participating in subversive activities. 112/
304. Gornja Sanica in May/June 1992: On 28 May 1992, 135 male prisoners from Gornja Sanica were reportedly taken by trailer truck to Manjača from a transit camp in a school approximately two kilometres west of the Gornja Sanica village centre. It was similarly reported that in Gornja Sanica on 31 May 1992, Bosnian Muslim males between the ages of 18 and 60 were taken to the town's only school and as large groups were formed, were moved out. According to one subject, some of the males were taken to the city of Ključ for one day, then to Sitnica for five days, and then to the Manjača camp.

305. Doboj in May 1992: It was reported that 240 Muslim prisoners were brought to Manjača from Doboj in May 1992.

306. Stara Gračka in June 1992: One subject reported that on 7 June 1992, 224 BiH Muslims were transferred from Stara Gračka to the Manjača camp.

307. Stara Gradiška in May/June 1992: One subject reported that prisoners were transferred from the Stara Gradiška camp to Manjača in May or June of 1992. The subject said that Yugoslav soldiers escorted them during the transfer and beat them severely. Other reports describe the transfer of prisoners from Stara Gradiška in June 1992. On 12 June 1992, a prisoner was reportedly transferred from a camp at Stara Gradiška to Manjača. It was also reported that 450 prisoners were brought to the camp from Stara Gradiška in mid-June 1992.

308. Bosanska Dubica City Jail in late June 1992: One subject reported that he was held at the Bosanska Dubica city jail for interrogation. He said that he was held at the jail until he was transferred with 46 prisoners to Manjača. The subject stated that nine of those transferred were considered to be Muslim extremists.

309. Ključ in June/July 1992: One subject reported that between June and July 1992, approximately 1,300 prisoners were brought to Manjača from a camp in Ključ. Additional reports describe the transfer of prisoners from a sports hall in Ključ to Manjača. One subject reports that approximately 120 men from the village of Kamičak, near the town of Ključ on 31 May 1992 and loaded into three coaches and taken to Ključ. After being beaten and detained in an unidentified sports hall there, the subject stated that on an unspecified date, they were forced to march 25 kilometres to the Manjača camp, escorted by armed soldiers. He said that the prisoners were marched through an unidentified Serbian village and abused by the villagers. He stated that once the prisoners arrived at the Manjača camp, the soldiers beat them systematically at the entrance. It was also reported that on 27 June 1992, between 110 and 120 persons were transferred from a detention facility in a sports hall in the town of Ključ to the Manjača camp. A subject said that upon arrival at Manjača, they were stripped naked and their belongings were taken away. He added that they were then beaten for five hours in front of a barn with at least 10 guards present at a given time.

310. Sitnica in June 1992: Other reports describe the transporting of prisoners from a sports hall or other detention area in the village of Sitnica, in June of 1992. On 31 May 1992, people from the village of Vrhpolje were reportedly taken to the neighbouring village of Kamičak where 80 of the men were separated from the women and abused for two days while their village and parts of Kamičak were destroyed. Thereafter, it was reported that the prisoners were taken by bus to the village of Sitnica where they were held in a sports hall with about 350 other persons. The prisoners were reportedly held at Sitnica for about seven days after which they were forced to march 14 miles to the Manjača camp. One subject also reported that on 7 June 1992, prisoners arrived at Manjača after being transferred by bus from Ključ to the town of "Sitnice" where, after being abused and initially held for one week,
they were forced to walk another 20 miles to Manjača. 126/

311. Camp in Sanski Most in July 1992: One subject said that were taken from their homes in Ključ on 27 May 1992 and were first held in Sanski Most for 12 days. He said that thereafter, six covered trucks, each packed with 150 people or more were transferred to Manjača. He said that 18 people died on the way as a result of asphyxiation since there was not enough air to breathe. 127/

312. Other reports describe the transport of inhabitants from Sanski Most to the Manjača camp on 7 July 1992. 128/ In one report, a subject stated that on 7 July 1992, he and approximately 600 other men originating from the village of Sanski Most were taken from a large indoor gymnasium at a school in the district of Narodni Front where they had been detained for 42 days. The men were loaded onto trucks and relocated to the Manjača camp. According to the report, each truck held approximately 160 men who were crammed into the vehicles. As each man entered the truck he was reportedly beaten severely by armed military escorts with police batons. The subject reported that by the end of a nearly six hour journey to Manjača, 20 prisoners had died from dehydration, heat stroke, or severe injuries. 129/ A subject reported that in July 1992, 1,000 to 1,100 Muslims were transported from a camp in Sanski Most and 100 from Prijedor. 130/

313. Another subject reported that on or about 14 July 1992, all of the prisoners held at a gymnasium in Sanski Most were transferred to Manjača via four large livestock transport trucks with trailers. He said that the prisoners were loaded onto the trucks with their hands tied behind their backs and that the convoy was guarded by military police who were identifiable by their belt buckles. He added that the civilian police handed over accountability lists to the military police and that one trailer had a regular JNA soldier armed with an assault rifle. He reported that conditions on the truck were very bad and that approximately 18 prisoners died en route to the Manjača camp. He added that the corpses were left on the trucks. 131/

314. Omarska camp, Prijedor in August 1992: There are numerous reports describing a mass transfer of prisoners from the Omarska camp to the Manjača camp on or about 6-8 August 1992. Another transfer of the remaining prisoners at the Omarska camp was also reported at the end of August.

315. One document purportedly sent to the United Nations by the Banja Luka City Council, stated:

"On 7 August 1992 we had received a report that about 35 buses, filled with camp inmates, who were simply hidden by the police, [were] moved from their location in Omarska camp to another area, this time going towards Manjača." 132/

316. Below are summaries of reports which allege that there was a mass transfer of prisoners from the Omarska camp to Manjača during the period of 6-8 August 1992. There was also a smaller transfer of Omarska prisoners to Manjača in late August 1992. Most of the early-August reports describe prisoners jammed onto buses on a hot summer day, with the heat turned up and the windows sealed shut. The reports also describe physical abuse, men dying from the heat and lack of water, and cases of killing of prisoners en route and upon arrival at Manjača. 133/ The reports vary as to certain details, but appear to establish that such a mass transfer of prisoners did occur:

(a) A subject stated that about three days after a group of journalists arrived at the Omarska camp, the prisoners began to be dispersed to other camps. He said that Omarska authorities prepared lists of three
categories of prisoners. He added that it was unclear how these lists were
divided but said that it seemed that Category 1 may have been the active-duty
military people and intellectuals; Category 2 consisted of about 1,700
prisoners, who were sent to the Manjaća camp and; Category 3 prisoners were
sent to Trnopolje. He said that the trip to the Manjaća camp began with a
guard reading off a list of prisoner names. He said that those prisoners
boarded approximately 24 buses which would take them to Manjaća. He reported
that the convoy set off at about 5:00 p.m. but that it got a flat tire and did
not arrive until about 11:00 p.m.. 134/

(b) Likewise, an ex-prisoner who was held at Omarska said that lists
of names were read out, and that prisoners were placed in three categories: 1)
those who had fought when Serbs invaded; 2) those in some way connected with
1; and 3) those, who had a clean sheet. The subject said that categories 1
and 2 were sent to Manjaća while those in category 3 were sent to Trnopolje
and subsequently released. 135/

(c) Another subject similarly reported that on 6 August 1992, there
was a roll call at Omarska and approximately 1,200 prisoners were loaded onto
11 buses which departed at approximately 4:00 p.m. for Manjaća. Each bus
reportedly carried between 110 and 115 prisoners and four camp guards.
Subject stated that each guard had a seat while prisoners sat in the remaining
seats and on the floor and were required to keep their heads bent between
their knees. He said that there was no water and that the bus windows were
shut tight and covered with curtains. He said that the bus did not stop and
arrived at Manjaća at about midnight. The subject stated that no one was
allowed off the bus until 8:00 a.m. on 7 August. He said that the temperature
inside the buses reached approximately 32 degrees centigrade. He added that
at least 16 elderly men died en route to Manjaća. 136/

(d) One subject who was part of the transfer, stated that on 6 August
1992, the prisoners were divided into two groups and 30 buses arrived from
Prijedor to transport them to Manjaća. He said that he was placed, together
with 97 other persons, in a bus with tightly sealed windows and that the
passengers were given no water and drank urine to survive. 137/

(c) Another subject reported that on 5 August 1992, Serbian camp
authorities from the Omarska camp transported most of the prisoners to
Manjaća. He said that at 1:00 a.m., on 6 August, the armed Serb guards who
escorted the buses took 10 prisoners off the buses and killed them. 138/

(d) A subject 139/ stated that on 6 August 1992 he and approximately
1,800 other prisoners were transported by buses containing 80 to 100 prisoners
each. He said that during the journey he and the others were made to sit with
their heads bowed, and that the windows were closed despite the mid-summer
heat. He added that during the journey they were subjected to ill-treatment
including robbery by the guards from Omarska and Prijedor who accompanied the
convoy. According to the subject, the convoy arrived at Manjaća at 2,200.

(e) Another subject reported that on 6 August 1992, approximately
1,000 prisoners were transported from Omarska to Trnopolje and that another
1,300, including the subject, were transported in 17 buses to Manjaća. He
stated that during the transport there were constant beatings and that the
heat in the buses were turned on with the windows sealed shut. He said that
the drive to Manjaća lasted between 16 and 21 hours. The subject stated that
the prisoners on the bus were dehydrated and that three died from a lack of
oxygen. He said that nine prisoners on the buses died from severe beatings
and that one was thrown from a moving bus. 140/
(f) One subject who was included in the transfer reported that on 7 August 1992, 2,300 prisoners were transferred to Manjača from Omarska. He said that Manjača camp officials had what appeared to be a computerized list of the incoming prisoners’ names when they arrived. He stated further 2,000 of the prisoners were admitted and that an additional 300 were taken elsewhere. Subject said that the remaining prisoners later concluded that those 300 prisoners were all residents of Kozarac. 141/

(g) Another subject who was part of the transfer to Manjača stated that he and the other prisoners had to sleep in the buses during the first night. He stated that they were next brought to a field and that a person who he identified as the camp commander brought a list of names. The subject stated that those who were called had to stay on their knees, head down, for hours. They were thereafter brought to the former stables. 142/

(h) One subject who was already at Manjača, stated that on 7 August 1992, a 23-bus column containing around 1,300 prisoners from Omarska arrived. He said that prisoners were forced to kneel and were kicked during transport and that six dead were removed from the buses. 143/

(i) One report quotes a subject who was brought to Manjača from Omarska on an unidentified date. According to the subject:

"During the ride we had to sing Serbian songs. We got nothing to drink and we had to keep the windows closed. Furthermore, the Serbian soldiers also beat us during the ride. They stopped at every inn; the soldiers went off and drank . . . Before arriving in the camp we stopped, eight persons were brought out of the bus and knifed by the Serbian soldiers . . . One of the prisoners died in the bus because he couldn't stand the heat and thirst". 144/

317. One subject said that on 6 August 1992 he was transferred with several other prisoners to the camp at Manjača. He recalled that after his departure, some 180 prisoners remained at Omarska. He reported that en route to Manjača, 18 prisoners were killed and another 12 were killed in front of the Manjača camp upon arrival. He said that the prisoners were escorted by members of the irregular police called "Martić's Unit" and two camp guards from Omarska. 145/

318. A subject who was held at the Omarska camp from late May 1992, reported that he was transferred to the Manjača camp in August 1992 with an estimated 184 remaining men at Omarska. 146/

319. Jajce and Kotor Varioš in October 1992: A subject who had been at Manjača from June through the end of 1992, stated that 100 persons were transported to the camp from Jajce and that 300 others were brought in from Kotor Varioš. 147/

320. Intake procedures: Prisoners were reportedly brought to the Manjača camp at night by closed freight trucks and buses. The vehicles were reportedly parked on the outside corner of the camp and were guarded until daylight, when the passengers were unloaded and processed into the camp. 148/ Thereafter, the prisoners were reportedly in-processed, accompanied by searches and beatings. 149/

321. One subject who was transferred from Omarska to Manjača in early August 1992 stated that he and the other prisoners had to sleep in the buses during the first night at the camp. He stated that they were next brought to a field and that a person whom he identified as the camp commander brought a list of names. The subject stated that those prisoners who were called had to stay on their knees, head down, for hours before being brought to their housing. 150/
322. Another subject who was included in the transfer from Omarska to Manjača in early August stated that Manjača camp officials had what appeared to be a computerized list of the incoming prisoners' names when they arrived. He stated further, that 2,000 of the prisoners were admitted and that an additional 300 were taken elsewhere. The subject said that the remaining prisoners later concluded that those 300 prisoners were all residents of Kozarac. 151/

323. Abuse and killings during intake: One subject who arrived at the Manjača camp from an area in western BiH in early 1992, said that en route to their detention building, prisoners were forced to pass one-by-one through a double row of guards who beat them as they passed. 152/ Another subject reported that on 7 July 1992, he and other prisoners were beaten as they exited buses upon their arrival at Manjača from another camp in Sanski Most. 153/

324. A subject who had been at Manjača from June through the end of 1992 reported that on the evening of 19 July 1992, 1,200 Muslims from the Omarska area were brought into Manjača by bus and parked outside the perimeter. The next morning the captives were unloaded and formed into groups for processing. The subject reported that 24 of the prisoners were attacked with knives and killed. He said that the corpses were loaded onto trucks and taken away. 154/

325. One subject who was transferred from Omarska in August 1992, reported that after spending the night on the buses, three prisoners were called out by the guards, who ordered them to kneel down. The guards thereafter slit the prisoners' throats. The subject reported that the camp commander arrived thereafter and stopped further killings. 155/

326. Likewise, a subject who was reportedly transferred from Omarska in August 1992 stated that after their arrival, they spent the night on their buses. During the night he said that 15 men were called outside and killed with bayonets. He said that in the morning, a Montenegrin man who he identified as the camp commander, arrived and stopped further killings. 156/

327. Another subject who had been transferred from Omarska to Manjača in August 1992, reported that the first group of prisoners were kept in buses overnight. He reported that on the following day, six of the prisoners in the group were killed by guards who had escorted them from Omarska. He said that these men had been owners of enterprises who had held positions of responsibility. He described the killing of one man who was called by guards from about 10 metres away, made to kneel and had his throat cut. 157/ Likewise, one subject who was transferred to Manjača from the Omarska camp (this appears to have occurred in early August) reported that when the prisoners came to Manjača, eight to 10 men had their throats cut in front of his eyes. 158/

328. One subject reported that during his transfer from Omarska in early August 1992, the prisoners were made to stay on the buses until 7:00 the following morning. He added that they were ill-treated and that nine prisoners were taken off the bus by guards and beaten to death. He identified four of these men and stated that they were killed for no apparent reason other than the fact that they had raised their heads. According to the subject, the first of the identified individuals was beaten to death after first begging to be killed swiftly. Subject said that after beating this victim to death, guards urinated on the body. The subject also described and identified another prisoner who was stabbed to death after looking out of the bus window. 159/ The subject stated that the prisoners were thereafter called out of the buses by name and formed into groups of 100. He said they were marched into barns outside of the fenced camp area where they were made to
strip naked and adopt the Islamic position of prayer and shout blasphemies. He added that their clothing was searched and items such as razor blades and toothbrushes were confiscated. 160/

329. One subject who was transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August stated that on the morning of 7 August, the guards at Manjača called out the names of about eight prisoners who were taken from the buses and shot or beaten and slashed to death. He stated that several prisoners inside the bus were able to peek through the curtain and witnessed the killings. He stated that once removed from the buses, the prisoners were seated on the ground in two groups of 600 men each. Each group reportedly formed 60 rows of 10 men. According to the subject, there was no water and each prisoner was required to sit with his head between his knees. He said that the first 600-man group entered Manjača at about 3:00 p.m. and that the second group followed two hours later. Once inside the camp, he stated that for the first time prisoners received medical attention. He added that those who were sick, very old, very young, or injured, were sent to Trnopolje in two buses. 161/

330. One subject stated that after being transferred on buses from Omarska on an unspecified date, he and the other prisoners were given no water for 26 hours and no food for almost 40 hours. He added that after removal from the buses, some of the men were forced to crouch in a prayer position on the gravel for a few hours, and that those who did not crouch "properly" were hit with rifle butts. 162/

331. Surrender of valuables during intake: In mid-June 1992, a group of 450 prisoners from Stara Gradiška were reportedly lined up along the road before entering the camp and were ordered to undress completely as the guards searched their personal belongings, reportedly taking all valuables from them including rings, watches, gold, money, etc. 163/

332. One subject who was reportedly transferred along with other prisoners from Omarska in early August, 1992, said that once the prisoners were removed from their bus, they were registered and "robbed". 164/

333. Camp conditions: Almost all sources confirm Manjača's harsh conditions. According to a report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights:

"Despite being denied access to the Manjača prison camp, the Special Rapporteur had received ample information about conditions there. Most sources give the number of detainees as being approximately 4,000 men who are housed in large, open buildings formerly used as stables. Physical conditions were especially bad during the first several months after the detention facility was opened. Evidence of serious malnutrition, harsh discipline, strictly rationed water, poor sanitation, overcrowding, lack of proper medical care and beating of prisoners has been received from a variety of credible sources. Physical conditions have improved somewhat since the camp began to be visited by international bodies in August". 165/

Another report by the Special Rapporteur states: "[C]onditions at the Manjača camp before it was closed were reliably reported to have been extremely poor, with life-threatening neglect of prisoners, lack of food and inadequate hygiene". 166/

334. Subjects who were transferred from Omarska in early August 1992 reported that conditions were difficult at Manjača but were more bearable than they had been at Omarska. Some noted that this was especially true following the visit by the ICRC. 167/ One subject who had been transferred from Omarska in early
August 1992 commented that although they were housed in former stables at Manjača, they were treated fairly during their stay there and were visited by the ICRC until the camp closed in mid-December. 168/ Another subject who was transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August said that those prisoners who volunteered for work got better food and that guards sometimes beat prisoners but much less than at Omarska. 169/

335. A subject who arrived at Manjača in mid-July 1992 stated that he was told by other prisoners that during the three-month period prior to the ICRC's arrival at the camp, many prisoners were killed either individually or in groups and that they were buried in fields surrounding the Manjača camp compound. 170/

336. Meals/Nourishment: According to The Thomson CSCE report in September 1992:

"A major concern in this centre [Manjača] involves the lack of proper nourishment provided to detainees until two to three weeks ago, which has resulted in seriously malnourished states. A majority of detainees exhibit obvious signs of cachexia, alopecia (hair loss), gross muscle wasting and 'sunken eyes' and all have lost 10 to 40 kilos in weight during two to three months of detention. A meal was served during our visit, a thick bean soup and bread, and the authority and detainees all told us that more nourishing meals have been available during the past two weeks than formerly." 171/

337. According to reports, there were two meals served per day at the camp. 172/ Reports described meals being served between 6:00 to 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 to 5:00 p.m. 173/ The meals were said to improve after the ICRC visits in July-August 1992. 174/

338. It was reported that food was prepared by prisoner-cooks in each of the two sections of the camp in three field kitchens standing outside the mess hall. 175/ One subject confirmed that the prisoners worked in the kitchens. 176/

339. Each housing building was reportedly divided into six groups which proceeded separately into the mess hall. Each building reportedly had one prisoner trustee (Poverenik) who was responsible for getting everyone out fast and for keeping order. 177/

340. One subject who arrived from Omarska in early August 1992, stated that prisoners at Manjača were taken one "hut row" at a time (approximately 200 prisoners) for eating and that prisoners were given 15 minutes to eat their meal. He estimated that it took about three hours per sitting. He said that the food upon his arrival was very poor but that it improved both in quantity and quality after the ICRC visited Manjača on 25 August. 178/

341. There were various descriptions of the content of meals served at the Manjača camp. One kilogram of bread reportedly was divided between 40 prisoners for each meal. 179/ For breakfast, a small jar of meat spread was reportedly divided between six prisoners. For dinner there was sometimes kasha, potatoes or rice. Tea was seldom served. 180/

342. Likewise, a subject who was transferred to Manjača from Stara Gradiška in May/June 1992, said that 30 prisoners split one loaf of bread, five tins of liverwurst for breakfast, and that each prisoner received 1/2 litre of tea. He said that for lunch the prisoners were given one kilo of bread per 30 prisoners with a helping of boiled potatoes or beans per prisoner. 181/
343. Another subject who was held at the camp from May to November 1992 reported that in the morning each prisoner was given one cup of tea and that 30 prisoners shared one loaf of bread. The subject reported that at around 4:00 p.m., each prisoner received a slice of ham and bread and also one loaf of bread for every 30 prisoners. 182/

344. It was also reported that: one loaf of bread was shared by 22 prisoners daily; 183/ each prisoner's daily food ration consisted of two small slices of bread and a small quantity of tea daily (from June to November 1992); 184/ in the morning the prisoners got a thin slice of bread and plain tea, and lunch consisted of another slice of bread and a small amount of cooked food, usually soup or gruel (in early August 1992). 185/

345. One subject who was transferred from Omarska in early August said that upon his arrival at Manjača the food was very poor. He added, however, that after the ICRC visited the camp on 25 August, the food improved both in quantity and quality with cocoa/milk and a tin of fish between two prisoners and a quarter of a loaf of bread for the first sitting. He said that for the second sitting the prisoners received a plate of stew of greater variety and substance than had been previously served. He added that every two weeks each prisoner was given a packet of 20 cigarettes and a half kilo of biscuits. 186/ Another subject who was transferred from Omarska in early August said that about a month after his arrival the ICRC started feeding the prisoners, and they were given vitamin tablets. He alleges, however, that the camp guards stole much of their food. 187/

346. Water: The Thomson CSCE Mission reported that in September 1992 there was no local water supply at Manjača and that portable containers were trucked there regularly, permitting only "five litres of water per day" for each prisoner. The report said that this ration was to be used for consumption, personal washing, and laundry. 188/

347. It was also reported that water had to be brought in daily by the prisoners in plastic containers from a lake located 600 metres from the camp. 189/ Another subject who had been transferred to the camp from Omarska in early August and remained there for several days, reported that water was available from a cistern. 190/

348. One subject reported that water was rationed and available only in small quantities at Manjača. In the summer, only 10 litres of water was reportedly provided to each building with an estimated 700 prisoners. It was reported that two faucets were located in each section of the camp outside of the buildings, and that the prisoners were unable to get to the water since they were strictly forbidden to leave the buildings. Any prisoner who asked for more water reportedly received beatings. 191/

349. Other reports varied as to the amount of water provided to Manjača's prisoners. One subject reported that 60 litres of water was provided for all occupants of each stall between the periods including July through December 1992; 192/ another subject who had been transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August estimated that the prisoners would get 3,000 litres of water for 2,000 men, working out to about one and a half litres of water for each man per day. He said that some of this water was used for ordinary cleaning. 193/

350. Sleeping facilities: Reports describe conditions at Manjača with men living in un-insulated cattle barns. Despite being cold, the prisoners stated that the conditions were much better than at Omarska. 194/ Reports also stated that Manjača's prisoners were forced to sleep on concrete floors. 195/

351. One subject who was transferred to Manjača from the Stara Gradiška camp
in May or June of 1992 said that upon arrival the prisoners had to first clean manure from the sheds. He said that when they cleaned the sheds they were given straw to make themselves beds on the concrete floor. 196/ A subject who had been transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August stated that wet grass was used as bedding rather than hay or straw and that they "would probably have been better off without it". 197/

352. According to one report, in mid-June 1992, new arrivals slept on the concrete floor without blankets. For the next 15 days, three prisoners reportedly slept under one blanket. 198/ Other reports in June and July 1992, said that four detainees were required to share each blanket. There was, however, reportedly some straw or ferns on the concrete ground where the prisoners slept. 199/ Only after a ICRC visit in July 1992 did each prisoner receive his own blankets. 200/

353. The CSCE Thomson Mission in August 1992 reported that detainees occupied a blanket-covered concrete or earth floored space, approximately 6.5 feet by thirty inches, in six long rows of approximately 80 persons per row. It said that there was a walkway, approximately two feet wide between the rows. The total occupancy per stable was estimated at 500 persons. 201/

354. Medical treatment: The CSCE reported that at Manjača "[m]edical services are very basic, provided by detainee physicians, who have little with which to work. Drugs and other medical supplies are very limited, whereas medical records are scrupulously maintained. The 'hospital ward' is housed in a small stable, accommodating approximately 15 ill or injured detainees on a concrete floor, with only a blanket each for comfort. We were told that the more seriously ill and injured were taken to the Banja Luka hospital for treatment." 202/

355. One subject reported that a Serbian medical doctor used to come once a week to the camp to "superficially" check sick prisoners. He said that no medicine was available for the prisoners. He also stated that there were three Muslim prisoners who were medical doctors and were permitted to move freely, when accompanied by a guard, to help prisoners. 203/ Another subject reported that there was no medicine at the camp and that the only medical treatment was provided by two doctors who were themselves prisoners. 204/

356. One subject who was transferred to Manjača from Omarska reported that upon arrival at Manjača, prisoners were taken 10 at a time into a room for a medical inspection. He said that the prisoners had to strip to their underwear and socks and that any belts, shoelaces, or documents were removed. The subject reported that despite having a "black back" from prior beatings and a stab wound in his side, he was admitted as having nothing wrong with him. 205/

357. Electricity: One subject reported that there was no electricity in the camp. He also reported that he observed no generators and that the camp was in virtual darkness throughout the night. 206/

358. Toilets: It was reported that each of the two camp sections had two latrines used by the prisoners. 207/ It was also reported that "pit latrines" had been constructed in several locations of the camp, closed on three sides and apparently periodically treated with lime and regularly relocated. However, these latrines reportedly produced an "offensive" odor. 208/

359. Hygiene: The September 1992 report of the Thomson CSCE Mission stated that a "portable shower" with privacy curtain, was brought to the camp every 15 days. But the report added that personal hygiene was seriously compromised
at the camp. 209/ One subject who had been transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August similarly reported that a bath was organized for the prisoners every 15 days and that the prisoners had about 60 seconds to wash. He added that the prisoners were allowed to wash out laundry every Sunday if there was water. 210/ Another subject reported that he was unable to wash for three months. 211/

360. Weight loss: It was reported that detainees at the Manjača camp lost from 10 to 40 kilograms during two to three months of detention at the camp. 212/ One subject reported that during his time at the camp between mid-June and mid-August 1992, he lost 37 kilograms. 213/ Another ex-prisoner who was held at the camp for quite a few days from May to June of 1992, reported that he lost 17 kilograms. 214/ Another ex-prisoner who was held from mid-June 1992 until mid-November 1992, stated that his weight dropped from 100 kilograms to 72 kilograms while in the camp and that his sight had been affected as a result of his diet there. 215/

361. Prisoner routine: It was reported that the Manjača camp was "run like a prison with very strict rules". According to one report, the prisoners were forced to get up at 5:00 a.m. and fold their blankets. 216/ Further, the prisoners reportedly had to engage in very hard labor. 217/ (For examples of forced labor see paragraphs 363 to 367, below.)

362. The Thomson CSCE Mission reported that they were advised by Manjača's commander that detainees were permitted out of doors for up to several hours each day, and that some agreed to various types of outside work, "all according to the Geneva Conventions". The commander reportedly added that not all detainees took advantage of these opportunities. 218/ One subject who had been transferred to Manjača in early-August from the Omarska camp said that the prisoners were allowed to walk out of their stables only with the permission of the guards. Although he added that it wasn't very hard to get permission to visit other stables. 219/

363. Forced labor: Forced labor was reported as a common practice at Manjača. One report claims that prisoners worked under observation of armed guards and dogs. 220/ One subject reported that prisoners were assigned to work 6-8 hours a day, six days a week. 221/

364. There are reports that prisoners worked in the forest near the camp. 222/ One subject reported that a group of 34 prisoners were expected to cut 40 cubic metres of wood daily and that each man received .5 kilograms of bread daily. The prisoners were also reported to have been beaten by the soldiers guarding them and were not allowed to tell the camp commander about the beatings. 223/ Another ex-prisoner said that every day approximately 1,000 prisoners carried wooden planks measuring one metre long by one-half metre wide, up a hill to trucks to be loaded or unloaded. 224/ One ex-prisoner reported that they were sent on forced labor details to cut wood to heat the offices and quarters of Serbian soldiers in Banja Luka. 225/

365. One ex-prisoner who was transferred to Manjača in May or June of 1992 said that when he first arrived at the camp the prisoners had to clean manure from the camp's sheds. He said that the guards also beat them. In addition, he reported they were forced to dig trenches around the camp and put up a barbed wire fence. 226/

366. There are also reports that several prisoners were selected to provide labor at a military base near the camp. One ex-prisoner said that in late August 1992, approximately 80 tons of guns and grenades were unloaded over a 20-day period and placed in a warehouse. According to the subject, the warehouse was a concrete structure with a red-tiled peaked roof, located near
At the edge of the forest at the foot of a slope below the prison camp. Prisoners were reportedly not allowed to work at the base more than one day for security reasons. Subject said that prisoners were not abused there. 227/ Another ex-prisoner reportedly did forced labor at the JNA base in Banja Luka. This subject claims that the prisoners built fences around the base and were often beaten during the day for not working fast enough. 228/

367. Some reports stated that prisoners worked in the fields to harvest feed corn for the livestock, cleaned and cared for the animals, repaired vehicles and roads, and performed other strenuous labor at the camp. 229/ Other prisoners were reportedly forced to dig potatoes and engage in other agricultural work, engage in heavy manual labor, and dig ditches for irrigation. 230/ According to one ex-prisoner, when not working, they were confined to their sheds. 231/

368. Abuse during detention: The Thomson CSCE Mission report stated that, 

"[w]e are convinced that the authority has little sympathy for the detainees [at Manjača] and that discipline in the centre has been maintained by extreme and unlawful measures. We witnessed the results of beatings with blunt instruments, and have good reason to believe that people who appear to have been innocent detainees were executed since late May 1992. . . . Detainees were reluctant to provide specific detail concerning atrocities, but hints were offered to that effect. There is also reason to believe that conditions are relatively improved since international delegations, the ICRC and the press have had ready access to this centre. The centre's military commandant stresses 'work, order and discipline', and he undoubtedly does so very forcefully." 232/

369. Beatings and killings during detention: There are numerous allegations of deliberate and arbitrary beatings and killings of prisoners at the Manjača camp. Below are representative examples of the types of atrocities reportedly committed at the Manjača camp.

370. One subject stated that almost everyday in the late afternoon, six to eight "Martićevci" would come to the prisoner housing and pick from five to 10 prisoners to torture them in a building which the prisoners called Samica (meaning single prison cell). The subject was never personally beaten in this manner but reported that other prisoners were made to stand at the wall and were beaten with bats, rubber clubs, metal wires, electric cables, and other objects. According to the subject, prisoners were also kicked about the head and face when they were unable to walk. The subject said that some of these prisoners died and some were shot in the Samica. He stated that prisoners who were picked up after 8:00 p.m. were almost always beaten to death and did not return from the Samica. 233/

371. A subject who was brought to Manjača in late May 1992, stated that every night after dark, several guards would come to the barn with a list of names to remove approximately five to six prisoners whose names were on a list. Those prisoners were then taken to the Samica building which was approximately 50 metres from the barn where the subject was held. The subject stated that the prisoners in the adjacent barn could hear the screams of the prisoners while they were being tortured. He said that the prisoners on the lists were generally either people of standing or members of the Party for Democratic Action (SDA--Stranka Demokratske Akcije). 234/

372. Another subject who was brought to the camp in early June said that every second day the camp guards beat him in the evening after the prisoners had gone to bed. He said that the guards walked past his housing stall and read out about 10 names. The prisoners followed the guards to a room near the
kitchen, and each prisoner was beaten for 20 minutes to a half-hour. He said, "We were beaten until we fell over. It was best to stay up as long as you could. It was easier to take body blows than to be kicked." It was also reported that one prisoner earned the nickname "rubber man" because he never let himself be knocked down. 235/

373. One subject described beatings at the camp with high voltage wire. The subject said that once the prisoners fell, they were kicked until they died. 236/

374. Another subject reportedly witnessed the guards at the camp shoot a man and then jump on his head. The prisoner decedent was not identified. The same subject also reported prisoners being forced into genital biting. 237/

375. One report quotes a subject who said that prisoners at the camp were frequently beaten. He reportedly lost 11 teeth in three days due to beatings. He alleged that Serbian soldiers were "taking out" the skilled people and the "intelligentsia" from a list. He alleged that when a new group of prisoners arrived at the camp the soldiers selected 10 persons at random and cut their throats. 238/

376. One subject who was transferred to the camp from Ključ in late June 1992, said that on 27 August 1992, he was severely beaten. He said that on 28 August 1992, he witnessed the President of the Party for Democratic Action in Prijedor and two other men being killed. He said that the prisoners were beaten in an area that was used for solitary confinement of prisoners, about 100 metres from the barn. 239/

377. Another subject, who was transferred from Omarska in August 1992 stated that by the time of his arrival, the killing of prisoners largely ceased at Manjača. He added that beatings were confined to the body so that they would not be visible. Another subject who had been transferred from Omarska in early August said that the conditions at Manjača were far better than those at Omarska, that there were no incidents of cruelty, and that the food was better. 240/

378. One subject stated that during his nine-plus weeks at the camp, he counted 50 prisoners killed by beating, torture or shooting. 241/

379. Another subject said that during his time at the camp from June to December 1992, nine detainees were killed. 242/

380. One report described the discovery of 25 bodies of emaciated men, believed to be prisoners at Manjača in August 1992. 243/

381. Disposal of bodies: One subject stated that a civilian ambulance from Banja Luka marked with Red Cross signs was used to pick up dead bodies and transport them. He said that the van was always operated by civilian drivers. 244/

382. One subject said that after the killing of 24 prisoners who had just arrived from Omarska on 20 July 1992, the corpses were loaded onto trucks and taken away. 245/

383. One unidentified subject who was transferred to Manjača from Stara Gradiška said that the bodies of the prisoners killed at the Manjača camp were taken to Banja Luka by truck and placed into freezers there. 246/

384. One subject who had been transferred from the camp from Omarska said that he did not personally know, but heard that bodies from Manjača were
threw into the river Vrbas. 247/

385. Local residents reportedly found the bodies of 25 prisoners near the camp in July 1992. 248/

386. Torture during detention: One report quotes a subject who stated that every day guards took him and the other prisoners out of the stables at 7:00 a.m., and forced them to sit in the sun holding their heads down with their hands behind their backs. He stated that Serb guards forced them to stay in that position until 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. He added that Serb guards, soldiers and civilians came to beat them with bats, pieces of wood, metal bars, hoses, wire cables, and that they kicked them, and hit them in the kidneys, across the neck, back, and over the head. He stated that Serb civilians were let into the camp, including women and children, and that they spit on the prisoners, stone them and beat them with various objects. He stated that some of them even cut fingers from the prisoners' hands, leaving only three fingers (the Serb salute). 249/

387. One subject who was held at the camp from approximately June 1992 to 15 September 1992 said that at Manjača, a list of names would be read out by the Serbs and that the persons on the list would be tortured, some to death. He said that the accusations made against those persons were "vague misdemeanors". 250/

388. One subject who was held at the camp from approximately June 1992 to mid-September 1992, stated that in one incident an Imam was given a half glass of water mixed with urine to drink. 251/

389. Interrogation During Detention: One subject who was transferred from Omarska said that only those prisoners who were former policemen were subjected to interrogation. 252/

390. One subject described his interrogation at Manjača in mid-June, a few days after arrival. He was reportedly interrogated twice by the same official, dressed in a blue SUP uniform, who had interrogated him three weeks earlier in Stara Gradiška. Each interrogation reportedly lasted one to two hours and was conducted in a neutral manner with the same routine questions: whether he possessed a home or weapons; if he voted for an independent BiH in the recent referendum; if he was a member of a political party and; whether he wanted to return to his home after the war was over. 253/

391. One report quoted a subject as saying that unidentified individuals came daily, taking people for interrogation and that many prisoners did not return. He stated that this went on for seven months. He identified a person who was a judge of the Regional Court in the subject's town of Sanski Most. The subject stated that this person was a Serb who along with others would interrogate approximately 100 persons daily. The subject further stated that prisoners were beaten and tortured to admit that they were part of a movement against the Serbs. 254/

392. One subject stated that there were far fewer interrogations at the camp than at Omarska. 255/

393. Rape during detention: Although most reports indicate that only males were held at the Manjača camp, there are allegations by at least two women who say they were held at the camp and raped. One female subject claimed to have been held at the camp for 16 days with her daughter and son. She reported that both she and her daughter were raped and tortured in different ways. 257/ Another report described what appears to be the same woman who was interrogated, tortured and, along with her daughter, raped by guards.
The woman also said that she watched as guards questioned another mother and raped her daughter in front of other women held at the camp. The young girl reportedly died soon afterward. These rapes were reported to have occurred between 12 and 18 April 1992. 259/ Another female subject, 260/ said that she was held at Manjača where she was raped. She was reported to be 25 weeks pregnant at the time of a subsequent examination. This report did not detail when the woman was alleged to have been held at the Manjača camp. 261/

394. It was also reported that during an unspecified time period, Bosnian Muslim men were forced to rape females as young as 15 years old at Manjača. It was further alleged that in one case, a 14 year-old boy was forced to have sex with a 60 year-old woman. 262/

395. Special treatment of Croat prisoners: One witness stated that Bosnian Croats were treated more poorly than were Muslims at the camp. He reported that Croats at Manjača were under strict restrictions and could not move anywhere. It was also reported that each time Serbs forces were beaten in the battlefields, Serbs then took Croat detainees, broke their fingers and arms, and cut them repeatedly. 263/

396. One subject stated that a Croatian prisoner of war was shot and killed by one of the guards/commanders in September 1992, during an interrogation in the Samica. 264/

397. One subject alleged that on 17 October 1992, authorities at Manjača reportedly loaded 120 Croat prisoners and took them to itnić (Croatia) where they were to be exchanged. The prisoners were reportedly forced to swallow large quantities of salt and were beaten with wooden clubs and forced to sing pro-Serbian songs. The prisoners were then taken to Knin and imprisoned in a building overnight where they were reportedly maltreated by persons with SAO Krajina insignia, members of the irregular police, and anonymous civilians (including women and young boys). The prisoners returned to the Manjača camp on the following morning. 265/

398. Other subjects reported a similar occurrence on 20 October 1992, when 120 Croatian prisoners at the camp were taken from Manjača for an alleged prisoner exchange. 266/ The reports said that Serbian soldiers escorting the buses forced the prisoners to lick and eat handfuls of salt and then refused them water. The reports said that the exchange did not take place and that the prisoners were placed in rooms in an unidentified military facility in Knin. The prisoners were then reportedly beaten and abused by irregular Serbian police and members of unidentified paramilitary forces and drunk civilians in Knin. On the following day the prisoners were reportedly returned to Manjača. 267/

399. Transfer of the Manjača prisoner population to other camps: Reports indicate that prisoners held at the Manjača camp were in some cases transferred to other detention facilities. The following reports detail such transfers.

400. Transfer to Batković and Kula camps in December 1992: According to the ICRC and other sources, an estimated 529 prisoners at Manjača were transferred to the Batković camp in north-eastern BiH without the ICRC's permission on 13 December 1992. Helsinki Watch reported that on that date, it witnessed 500 men (including 319 Muslims, 180 Croats and one German--numbers reportedly given by Serbian authorities administering the camp), being taken away from Manjača on buses marked "VRS" (Vojjska Republike Srbije--Army of the Serbian Republic). According to reports, the ICRC discovered 401 of the above-mentioned prisoners at the Batković camp on 20 December 1992 and was ultimately informed that the remaining prisoners were awaiting a prisoner
exchange at the Kula camp near the Sarajevo airport. 268/

401. Transfer to Trnopolje Camp in August 1992: One subject who was brought to Manjača from Omarska in early August 1992 stated that 140 prisoners 269/ who were sick, very old, very young, or injured, were sent to Trnopolje in two buses after their intake at Manjača. 270/ Another subject who was transferred to Manjača from Omarska in early August stated that after 15 days, some prisoners, mostly very old or very young men, were transferred from the camp to Trnopolje. The subject was reportedly among this group of more than 150 prisoners who boarded two buses and were taken to Trnopolje. 271/ One subject reported that after he was brought to the Manjača camp from Omarska in early-August, he was told that he had been found "not guilty" 272/ and was thereafter transferred to Trnopolje. 273/

402. Bistrica: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Debriefing Team. It is reported that Bistrica was a "temporary" or an "improvised" camp set up at some time before the 14-15 December 1992 ICRC visit to Manjača. The camp was reportedly part of a Serb ploy designed to mislead ICRC officials. It is reported that some 529 prisoners were moved to the new camp at Bistrica while it appeared that the Manjača camp was being closed down. 274/

403. The camp is not described, however the report locates the camp approximately 10 kilometres west of Banja Luka city. A map search identifies a village by the name of Bistrica in that locale.

404. Dubička Gora: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.

405. Reportedly a "sub-camp" of Manjača, holding 300 to 400 men, 275/ this camp is located approximately 15 kilometres from Manjača toward Mrkonjić Grad and past the village of Stričići. Research of available maps does not reveal a Dubička Gora, and also shows two Stričići within 20 kilometres of Manjača on the road to Mrkonjić Grad.

406. According to prisoners at Manjača, Dubička Gora was considered to be a "hidden camp" where the treatment of prisoners was worse than at Manjača. 276/

407. One subject reports that prior to one of the ICRC visits (he thinks it was in July) 277/ three named prisoners were removed to Dubička Gora because their physical condition was so bad. According to the subject, the ICRC officials insisted on seeing these prisoners and the camp officials relented. While it is reported that ICRC representatives spoke privately with the men, it is not clear whether the alleged meeting was held at Dubička Gora or Manjača. 278/ According to the subject, after the ICRC visit the men disappeared. 279/

408. Mali Logor: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State and the ICRC.) Reportedly a Serb-run detention camp situated in the Borik section of the city of Banja Luka, this camp was said to be located in a former JNA barracks. 280/ The ICRC first visited the facility on 3 May 1993 and described the facility as a military prison. 281/ The number of prisoners detained at this camp is not known. Torture was alleged to have occurred there. 282/

409. Dates of this camp's operation are not reported. One subject reports that beginning in September 1992, uniformed "officials" apprehended non-Serbian residents (especially young Muslims who had refused mobilization) and sent them to Mali Logor, Manjača, and to the Tunjice Prison. The subject reportedly could not determine from their uniforms if the "officials" were
regular Serbian soldiers. He also reported that he heard from his wife that some of the Mali Logor prisoners were people who had been picked up at the city market and found to be without a permit to leave their houses. According to the subject, police frequently surrounded the market and checked permits. 283/

410. Banja Luka Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Helsinki Watch and the ICRC.) Reports describe a detention area for injured Muslim and Croat prisoners located in the Banja Luka Hospital. 284/

411. There are no available dates of operation for this detention area. However, the ICRC reportedly first visited the hospital on 22 September 1991. 285/ In late August 1992, six survivors of a regional skirmish 286/ who had been captured by Serb forces, were reportedly brought to the Banja Luka hospital. The prisoners were detained at the hospital for approximately 25 days. 287/

412. Reportedly in late August 1992, during the detention of Bosnian Muslim survivors of the skirmish, a single police officer guarded the room during each of three shifts per day. 288/ However, when a named member of the Croatian army (HV,) from Croatia proper, was brought into the room in late August or September 1992, the number of guards was reportedly increased to four. 289/

413. The detainees were reportedly beaten by members of the army, police, and unidentified Serbian patients. One subject claims that he was beaten more often than throughout his entire detention at Trnopolje camp. The subject reports that the guards let anyone into the room, even if they carried truncheons and cable wire. 290/ This mistreatment was reportedly carried out with the knowledge and consent of the hospital staff and Serbian armed forces. 291/

414. A member of the Croatian Army was reportedly brought to the detention area while the survivors of the area skirmish were held captive. According to the report he was badly beaten while in the hospital and died from injuries sustained during the beatings. 292/

415. The ICRC reportedly visited the hospital on the 23rd day of the skirmish survivors' detention and registered the prisoners. 293/ The ICRC representatives were not allowed to see the prisoners on their second visit the following day. Subjects believed that this was because of the Croat's beating. 294/ After their 25th day of detention the skirmish survivors were reportedly taken to the Banja Luka police station where the prisoners gave their statements to a magistrate and were released to workers of the Muslim relief agency Merhamet. The men were eventually evacuated from BiH. 295/

416. It was also reported that some injured prisoners from the Manjača camp were sent to Banja Luka hospital. 296/

417. City Hospital, Banja Luka: (It is unclear from the source information if a detention facility existed at each of two hospitals identified in Banja Luka. It is, for that matter, unclear if two hospitals existed in Banja Luka. The existence of at least one hospital and its use as a detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.)

418. City Hospital in Banja Luka was reported to have detained injured Croatian POWs, during 1992. 297/ The ICRC has only one listing for a detention area in a Banja Luka hospital 298/, and it is unclear if City Hospital is another name for Banja Luka Hospital.
419. Reportedly, in early April 1992, following clashes between Croatian and Serbian forces in the villages surrounding Derventa, in northern Bosnia, injured Croatian soldiers captured in fighting were taken to the Banja Luka city hospital for treatment. 299/

420. Prisoners were reportedly held in a special detention area on the third floor of the hospital, in a part of the building separate from the rest of the hospital patients who were Serbs. 300/ It is reported that at least two guards were posted at the door. 301/

421. The medical treatment given the Croatian soldiers reportedly was crude, despite the subject's belief that there was no apparent shortage of medical supplies in the hospital. The subject reported that one prisoner had two open bullet wounds which were stitched to control the bleeding, but that anesthesia was not administered prior to this procedure. 302/

422. Paprikovac Optical Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.)

423. Located in the outskirts of Banja Luka City, the Paprikovac Optical Hospital was reportedly used by Bosnian Serbian forces as a military hospital. The hospital was also used as a detention area for wounded Bosnian Muslim and Croat prisoners. 303/

424. Four survivors of the regional skirmish who were found separately and recaptured by Serb military forces were brought to Banja Luka. 304/ These survivors were reportedly held at the surgical hospital between 24 and 27 August 1992, and then transferred to the Optical hospital, across town, where they remained until September. 305/

425. Eighteen Muslim males were reportedly detained at the hospital during the period from 27 August through 16 September 1992. There were two other rooms accommodating four Muslims each. 306/

426. The door to Room Number 11, wherein the skirmish survivors were housed, was reportedly always locked and the hallway wall of the room was made of translucent glass, permitting the guard stationed outside to see inside. 307/

427. According to one report, wounded Serbian soldiers from elsewhere in the hospital, as well as guards, beat the prisoners daily. The prisoners were beaten with cable wires and police batons. 308/ One of the survivors of the regional skirmish, a 16 year old Muslim student claims that he was beaten 20 times on his kidneys by the military police in attendance at the hospital. His weight was said to have dropped substantially. The youth claims he could identify the military commander of the hospital. 309/

428. The prisoners' daily meal reportedly consisted of a slice of bread and some broth. They were given almost no pure water to drink, and were reportedly forced by the guards to drink urine regularly. 310/

429. The subjects all had hospital discharge papers which stated that they had been treated for internal injuries and chronic heart diseases, however they claimed that they never received so much as an aspirin while in detention. 311/

430. Duboki Potok: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Duboki Potok was reportedly a Serb-run rape camp located on Kozara Mountain, near the Moštanica Monastery. 312/ There is no exact location information or description of the camp. A search of the available maps did not reveal a Duboki Potok, but a Moštanica Monastery
is located about 15 kilometres north-east of the city of Prijedor, near the border between Bosanska Dubica and Prijedor counties.

431. Duboki Potok reportedly held women from Banja Luka and the surrounding villages. According to a report, the detained women were of no specific age group but the majority were of reproductive age. 313/

432. There is no information on the dates of operation of this camp, however, according to one report, as of September 1992, there had been women held at the camp for over a year. 314/

433. Novoselija: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Novoselija reportedly was a Serb-run camp in the village of Novoselija, approximately three to five kilometres south of Banja Luka. 315/ There is no information on this camp regarding the dates of operation or number of prisoners, and there is no record of an ICRC visit to the facility.

434. Tunjice (Banja Luka Tunjice): (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including the ICRC.) Several sources report that a Serb-run concentration camp was established at Tunjice, apparently in an existing prison facility in Banja Luka. 316/ The ICRC lists two facilities at Tunjice: the Tunjice Prison/Penitentiary which it first visited on 5 November 1992, and the Military Prison, which it first visited on 31 August 1993. 317/

435. Karmina: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly, residents of Kozarac who fled the village during the Serb attack in late May 1992, were rounded up and detained in camps at Karmina, Omarska, and Trnopolje. 318/ The camp Karmina, reportedly located in Serb-controlled BiH, is mentioned in only one document. A search of the available maps does not reveal this village.

436. Laktaši: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A rape/death camp by this name is reported to be located in Banja Luka County. 319/

2. Bihač

437. Bihać is in north-east BiH. As of 1991, its population was 70,896 of which 66.6 per cent were Muslim, 17.8 per cent Serbian, 7.7 per cent Croatian, 6 per cent "Yugoslav" and 1.9 per cent "other".

438. Barracks, Bihać: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to representatives of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the barracks in Bihać. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 16 November 1992. No information was provided regarding the ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of the facility at this location. 320/

439. Hospital, Bihać: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to representatives of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the hospital in Bihać. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 26 November 1992. No information was provided regarding the ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of the facility at this location. 321/
440. Military Prison, Bihać: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to representatives of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the military prison in Bihać. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 15 August 1992. No information was provided regarding the ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of the facility's existence at this location. 322/

441. Prison/Penitentiary, Bihać: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to representatives of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the local penitentiary in Bihać. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 7 December 1993. No information was provided regarding the ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of the facility's existence at this location. 323/

442. Police Station, Bihać: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to representatives of the ICRC, a detention facility was established at the local police station in Bihać. ICRC representatives visited this facility on 14 December 1993. No information was provided regarding the ethnicity of the inmates or controlling parties nor the conditions or duration of the facility's existence at this location. 324/

443. Račić: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral.) Račić is reported to be a Serb-run camp near the city of Bihać. 325/ Apparently, it is run by some of the same Serbian "extremists" who established the camp at Ripač. These individuals are identified in the source materials.

444. Ripač: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Thomson CSCE Mission.) Ripač is a village just south of Bihać on the Croatian border. The Serbian "extremists" named above (in connection with the camp at Račić) are said to have also established the camp at Ripač in May 1992. 326/ Apparently, at this time the entire village was closed off and segregated by ethnic background. In this way, the entire village functioned as a detention camp. 327/ Members of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) participated in the arrest of activists of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and local Muslim police officers. They also employed strict traffic controls and curfews.

445. Thomson Mission representatives visited the Muslim section of Ripač in late August 1992. The Mission found this Serb-run detention facility and identified some 60 Muslim inmates in detention at that time. 328/

446. According to another source, 60 Muslims and an unknown number of Croatians from the village were reportedly detained in Ripač. 329/ At one time, the number was estimated to have reached near 200. 330/ Prisoners were tortured, raped, and sexually abused. Many of them died. One report claims that approximately 140 prisoners were kept at the "tractor station". 331/ Another alleges that much of the sexual abuse took place at a "high school centre". 332/

447. Orašac Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Orašac is located in western Bihać province on the Croatian border. There is a report that the JNA held Muslim prisoners at the primary school there. 333/
448. **Jedinstvo Soccer Stadium:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Permanent Mission of Germany.) There are a few reports that the Bosnian Government held Serbs at the Jedinstvo Stadium. 334/ Apparently, as many as 900 prisoners were detained. 335/

449. **BiH Government-run camp in Bihać:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Permanent Mission of Germany.) There are also reports from the ICRC that its representatives visited a BiH Government-run camp in Bihać. Representatives visited this camp on 4 and 5 July, 15 August, 20 November 1992, and 5 June 1993. In July, they saw two prisoners, in August they saw 13, in November they saw seven, and finally, in June 1993 they saw three. 336/

450. **Unidentified Camp:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Thomson CSCE Mission.) Thomson CSCE Mission representatives visited a detention facility in Bihać on 30 August 1992. The facility was reportedly controlled by unidentified Muslim forces. On the occasion of their visit, the Mission identified 30 Serbian detainees. 337/

451. **Croatian and Muslim "Bordellos":** (The existence of these detention facilities has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral.) Finally, there are reports of "bordellos" operated by Muslim units. 338/ Here, Serbian women and girls were raped by members of Muslim and Croat forces who visited the camps in late 1991 and 1992. 339/ Detainees who became pregnant were not permitted to leave to get abortions.

452. According to the Serbian News Agency, there were 15 bordellos in Bihać. Among them were those owned or operated by the following individuals: Mustafa Vuković, Abdullah Alijađić, Senad Hadžiabdić, Rizvan Zujkić or Zjakić, Husein Lipovača, Hasan Zirić, Alija Džefherović, Ala Besić, Smajo Murtić, Jasmin Harbas, Ekrem Abazij, Huković, Civić, Deganović, and Murtić. 340/

453. The only specific information regarding these bordellos is that 30 women were estimated to be housed at the Vuković bordello. 341/ Also, according to the Information Service of the 2nd Krajiški Corps, UN Peace-keeping forces were aware of the activities at the Lipovača camp. 342/

454. **Abdić Camp at Poultry Farm near Croatian border:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Agence France Presse.) Apparently, civilians are being held at a poultry farm near the Croatian border by Muslim secessionist forces led by Fikret Abdić. 343/ According to the Agence France Presse, between 400 and 700 civilians have been arrested and detained for opposing the war effort. These prisoners include women, teenagers and elderly people, relief officials and others. 344/ While their exact ethnic make-up is unidentified, it has been established that a large number of them include troops loyal to the Bosnian president as well as Muslim inhabitants who have refused to join Abdić's forces.

455. Rumours have been circulating in the region of Velika Kladuša, where many Bihać inhabitants have fled, that the prisoners of Abdić are being mistreated and deprived of food. 345/ Relatives say that they are being forced to dig trenches on the front lines. At the end of June, a group of civilians were seen on the front lines near the hamlet of Hasić with picks and shovels. There were soldiers watching over them, but there was no way to confirm there status as prisoners. 346/

456. A member of the ICRC gained access to the camp in early June after nearly a week of pressuring authorities. Following his visit, he related that
"[The prisoners] are men who refused to serve in the military, and political dissidents, but what is worse, their relatives have also been arrested, including women, adolescents and elderly people." 347/

457. Apparently, many of the detainees were arrested and taken away from their homes when they would not actively support Abdić's secessionist effort. One report claims that the arrests began on 10 June, the day that the BiH Army launched a strong military offensive against Bihać. These troops have been attempting to defend the Bihać enclave against attacks by the BiH Army since this time.

458. They are commanded by Fikret Abdić, a millionaire businessman who broke with the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo over his willingness to negotiate with BiH's Serbs. 348/ He declared the region of Bihać autonomous in September of last year, and fighting between his forces and the army began a month later. The one-month cease-fire agreed to by Muslims and Serbs on 10 June does not cover Bihać since Abdić did not sign the truce. Abdić's forces are reported to be highly outnumbered in the fighting -- 500 versus 15,000 army men. 349/

459. The speaker of Bihać's self-proclaimed parliament, Božidar Šicel, admitted that 150 people had been arrested, but dismissed them as "spies or agents spreading disinformation". 350/

460. In addition to these reports, there is also an earlier press release that these forces and troops loyal to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović participated in a prisoner exchange around 25 April. 351/ This exchange followed the signing of an agreement between the two sides on 23 April. According to the ICRC, forces led by Abdić freed 280 prisoners and troops loyal to the BiH government freed 76. 352/

461. The report does not positively identify the poultry farm as the place of detention for the prisoners held by Abdić, so it is possible that there is another camp. At the same time, it also failed to include information about where the 76 prisoners of BiH government forces had been held. 353/

3. Bijeljina

462. The municipality of Bijeljina is located in eastern Bosnia and is bordered by Vojvodina and Serbia to the north and east. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the population of Bijeljina was 96,796; of which 59.4 per cent were Serbs, 31.3 per cent were Muslims, 0.5 per cent were Croats and the remaining 8.8 per cent were described as "other".

463. Batković: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the UN Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki, Helsinki Watch, and the US Department of State.) Allegedly, Batković camp was established in mid-June, 1992. 354/ It was located approximately 12 kilometres north of Bijeljina, three kilometres north of the town of Batković, 355/ two to three kilometres from the Sava river, 356/ in what used to be an agricultural facility.

464. The main detention buildings were described as two barns 357/ or warehouses used for grain storage 358/, 50 metres by 20 metres. 359/ They were described as hangars by one witness. 360/ Two tents were used to feed prisoners. 361/ Showers and field toilets were located outside. 362/ The facility was surrounded on three sides by a barbed wire fence two metres high, and on the south side was a sheet-metal wall. 363/ People were kept from looking either into or out of the compound by piles of hay and straw. 364/ The main pedestrian entrance was
situated on the west side, adjacent to a building which was used both as a barracks and as an administrative office. A vehicle entrance was located on the west side. A guard tower with spotlights was situated within the perimeter, on the eastern side of the compound. According to a different prisoner, this seven metre tall tower, and one outside as well, were always occupied by guards.

465. The camp was operated by paramilitary forces involved with the Serbian Democratic Party, with "Četnik" guards. It is claimed that on 13 July 1992, the director of Batković was an officer, who is identified in the materials. The Batković director's superior was alleged to be JNA Colonel Petar Dmitrovčić, the camp commander. It is reported that as of late August 1992, one Major Mauzer was the camp commander. It is also reported by the US State Department that Ljubiša Savić was known as "Mauser". In a US State Department submission, it is claimed by a former prisoner that one Lieutenant Colonel Vasiljević became the commander of the camp in August or September. On 1 September Major Savić, an information officer, introduced a Lieutenant Colonel as the director of the camp, but did not give the Colonel's name.

466. In addition to guards, witnesses also described Muslim trustees, or "Kapos", the term used for German prisoners who assisted guards in World War II.

467. Prisoner movements to and from Batković occurred both often and on a large scale. Because of this, and probably because of faulty estimates, the reported numbers of the population vary widely. Prisoners from the Sušica River valley were alleged to have been detained in Batković as early as 30 June 1992. It is reported that there were 740 prisoners in the camp on 1 July. On 3 July, 84 of the more healthy prisoners in a facility in Zvornik were transferred to Batković. Approximately 450 Muslims and Croats were brought to Batković on 9 July from Zvornik. There were reported to be 700 prisoners already there on that date. On 15 July, another group was transferred in from Zvornik, this time numbering at least 60. It is claimed that three buses, with 70 to 80 men from elopek, also arrived on this date. This transfer was arranged by Zoran Rekić, a Serb military leader, and reportedly improved the situation of these prisoners. About this time, the population was estimated to be between 1,500 and 2,000 prisoners. It was reported by one man, held there from 18 July until 20 August, that 1,200 men were kept in his building, and the total population during his stay was about 1,700. Early in August, there were reportedly 1,600 detainees. In late August, 1,200 prisoners were held, according to by Major Mauzer himself, two-thirds being former combatants, and the rest being held "for their own protection". On 1 September, there was reported to be 1,280 men held because of their ethnicity. There was a reported population of 1,000 on 19 September.

468. Food was scarce. One former detainee reported that for breakfast, prisoners received bread with butter, or an egg. Lunch and dinner were bread with soup or stew. Although they were served three meals, the witness claimed that the meals consisted only of one and one-half to two portions. Another prisoner reported that the soup was "funny smelling" and watery.

469. Abuse is invariably indicated in accounts regarding treatment of prisoners prior to September. According to one detainee, prisoners were forced to perform sexual acts with each other, and sometimes with guards. Detainees were beaten regularly until new guards arrived in September. Reports of the frequency of beatings vary from daily beatings to beatings 10 times each day. Prisoners arriving from Sušica were beaten upon exiting their bus. Upon arrival on 15 July, another group of prisoners were beaten with sticks. Thereafter, they were beaten regularly. Thirty-five guards "had a go" at each member of a group brought in July. Beginning in July,
15 Muslims, considered to be extremists, were beaten every day until they were transferred to Doboj in September. 403/ In one incident, four men were beaten outside of the camp. Two of them managed to get into the camp, one was beaten so much that he could later not recognize his own father (a fellow prisoner), and the fourth man, about 20 years old, was killed. 404/

470. Prisoners were also forced to labour. This did not excuse them from other abuse, and, as one prisoner reported, they were beaten while at work to make them work harder. 405/

471. One detainee reported that it was not the guards, but rather soldiers going to or coming from the front that abused the prisoners. 406/ This same man claimed that POWs received that worst treatment, whereas civilian prisoners were not treated as badly. 407/ Another prisoner alleged that those prisoners from areas in which Serbs had suffered losses were most harshly treated. 408/

472. Because of the level of mistreatment, many prisoners died. One man stated that during his stay, mid-July to mid-August, 13 prisoners were beaten to death. 409/ Another prisoner died because he had gangrene which went untreated. 410/ Five more may have died from hunger. 411/ Allegedly, 20 prisoners died prior to September. 412/

473. The ICRC visited Batković twice between 15 July and 23 September. One of these visits was on 15 August. 413/ US Congressman Frank Wolf visited on 1 September. 414/ Allegedly, guards hid prisoners under 18 years of age or older than 60 before delegations visited. 415/ The ICRC could not register prisoners. 416/

474. However, beginning in September, the situation changed. Local Serb villagers, hearing reports and rumours of activity in the camp, protested. 417/ The villagers, led by Ilija Gajić, owner of a vegetable farm and leader of the village assembly, demanded that the prisoners in Batković be treated as they wished Serb detainees were treated. 418/ Reports claim that by January 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Petar Dmitrović was the camp commander. 419/

475. Prisoner movement continued. Dmitrović admitted that all of the detainees were civilians. 420/ On 1 October 1992, there was a prisoner exchange. 421/ Another reportedly took place on 6 October. 422/ There was an exchange of approximately 600 prisoners on 17 October for Serb POWs. 423/ Late in October, the UN Special Rapporteur reported the camp held 1,000 Muslims. 424/ Upon one prisoner's departure, on 24 November, there were reportedly 800 detainees. 425/ This prisoner claimed that 150 prisoners were exchanged on this date. 426/ On 1 December, a 450-prisoner exchange took place. 427/ On the same day, 174 prisoners arrived at Batković, making the total number of detainees reportedly 620. 428/ All of the prisoners were male, except two females who refused to leave their husbands and sons. 429/ On 13 December, 532 prisoners arrived from Manjača. 430/ These prisoners were 159 Croats, 242 Muslims from Kozarac, Prijedor, and Ljubija, and 131 Muslims from Grapska and Doboj. 431/ Serbs claim that 131 of these were immediately taken to Sarajevo and exchanged, leaving 401 in the camp at Batković. 432/ However, as of January 1993, the ICRC was unable to confirm this exchange. 433/ On 27 December, 700 prisoners from Bosanski Šamac came to Batković. 434/

476. On 7 January 1993, in Dragolić, 30 prisoners were exchanged as the result of direct negotiations between Croatian and Bosnian Serb forces. 435/ As of 10 February, there were allegedly to have been 1,163 prisoners. 436/ Another 18 were brought from Zvornik on 12 February. 437/ It was claimed by one prisoner that he was transferred to Batković on 21 February from a prison in Zvornik. 438/ After he spent 10 days in Batković, he was exchanged with 47 other Muslims for 24 Serbs imprisoned in Ženica. 439/ It is also reported by him that there were
2,000 prisoners in Batković.  

On 15 March, there were said to have been 700 prisoners in the camp.

Treatment of the prisoners by the camp authorities apparently improved. The Special Rapporteur noted that, during his visit to Batković in October, the prisoners did not complain of ill-treatment and appeared well. One newspaper article claims that the prisoners complimented the new guards. 

Detainees could wash with the faucets outside if the weather permitted. In December, prisoners were not forced to work, but generally agreed to do so in order to combat boredom. On New Years Day, they received slivovitz, and soon also had televisions in the warehouses. Reportedly, several hundred prisoners were working six days a week in January, because they would receive better meals at work sites. By March, 300 were working outside of the camp. Some prisoners who had received money from relatives shopped in local stores. By March, any fence that had enclosed the camp was gone. However, it may have died on 26 March when their vehicle was ambushed on the way to work.

None the less, conditions at the camp were still lacking. The Special Rapporteur described the buildings as "cavernous" and "unheated," and there was no electric lighting. Dysentery raged, and sanitation was poor.

There was no medical attention given to the prisoners. One source estimated average weight loss among the prisoners to be 20 kilograms. An elderly man died, and both prisoners and guards, unaware, left his body lying in the building for two days. Allegedly, eight prisoners died due to lack of medical attention, including one diabetic who did not receive any insulin. However, medical personnel appeared before ICRC visits.

It is not known if the camp was closed, nor what happened to the prisoners who were last reported to be there.

Agricultural School, Bijeljina: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) On Tuesday, 6 July 1993, 48 Muslims were taken from Doboj to Bijeljina. They had volunteered to be exchanged in order to be reunited with their families. They were fed and well treated in an agricultural school on the outskirts of town, where they spent three to four days. They were locked up only at night and were guarded by policemen during the day. Those who could afford to spend the night in a hotel were allowed to do so.

On Saturday, 10 July, they each had to pay 50 to 60 deutsche marks to leave, instead of the 30 that the Red Cross in Doboj had indicated. They paid Major Vojkan Djurković, the representative of the Government Commission for Exchange, who was reportedly working with Arkan.

From Bijeljina they were taken to the front at Šatorovići, where they had to walk across the front-line. There they were met by the BiH Army.

It is also reported that another group of 11 came as far as Bijeljina with the group of 48. These 11 paid DM 200 to go to Hungary. Major Djurković reportedly also received this money. They crossed into Serbia at Rača. Nothing further is known.

Village School, Donja Mahala: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) There is alleged to be a Muslim-run "private prison" which held nine prisoners in the village school in Donja Mahala, near Orašje. It is also claimed that a body of a man
imprisoned on 28 December 1992, is buried behind the school. 466/

486. **Village Camp, Janja:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The village of Janja is 12 kilometres south of Bijeljina. It is reported that in May 1992, the whole village was turned into a camp, guarded by Serbian "Četniks". 467/

487. Allegedly, there were approximately 5,000 people there, mostly women and children, held in poor conditions. There was a lack of medicine and clothing. There was also a severe shortage of food. Pregnant women received a piece of bread and a glass of water for the day. The old gave their rations to children. Radio Sarajevo reported that 18 people had died from hunger and/or cold. Reportedly, women also suffered rape. One 65 year-old woman, after being raped, bled to death. There were also cases in which foetuses were cut out of wombs. 468/

488. A source reported that a Serbian man charged DM 1,000 to get people out of the camp. He, in turn, had to pay the soldiers at both Janja and Raja. Another "contact person" was a Muslim doctor. 469/

489. **Storage Facility, Klis:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) It is reported that a former agricultural produce storage facility in Klis was used as a detention facility. The camp was opened at least as early as 26 September 1992. The only information provided about the guards is that they wore solid green uniforms. 470/

490. One prisoner was a Bosnian Muslim male, who was arrested in his hometown of Bijeljina at the end of September. On the second night that the 48 year-old was there, guards took several prisoners at different times to an adjacent facility, from which there came much screaming. All but one man, a coffee trader, eventually returned. The witness' neighbor, a gold trader, died from his wounds on the fifth night. According to a man imprisoned with the witness, another "wealthy" man died from beating. It appears that these men were singled out because of their wealth. 471/

491. **Military Barracks:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) It is reported that the old military barracks on Maršala Tita street near the bus station was used as a detention facility from at least 8 April to 8 May 1992. Four or five buildings were used. 472/

492. Although no group is explicitly named as being in control of the barracks, Serb forces were in control of the town at that time. Between 8 April and 8 May, 200 to 300 people were held at any one time. The facility was also reported to be notorious for torturing prisoners. 473/

493. Members of the Thomson CSCE Mission visited the Stepa Stepanović Casern (Military Barracks) on 2 September 1992 and, after walking the length of the grounds, found no evidence suggesting that detainees were being held in the army barracks in Bijeljina. 474/

494. **Petkovići:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral.) It is alleged that Serbian forces detained people in the village of Petkovići. On or about 13 May 1992, 120 people were taken to Petkovići from the Luka camp in the Prijedor region. 475/ The women's group "Trešnjevka" also named Petkovići in a list of rape-death camps, but gave no details. 476/

495. **Popovi:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated
by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) There was reported to
have been a camp between the villages of Popovi and Jasmajlice, in the
Bijeljina area. 477/ It was a new facility 478/, built specifically to be a
detention centre and capable of holding up to 1,000 prisoners 479/.

496. Although no group was explicitly named as running the camp, a US
government report says that Serbian forces were in control of the area.
Allegedly, Muslims were held hostage there, and would be killed if the
Bijeljina area was attacked by Muslim forces. 480/

497. **Secondary School Centre**: (The existence of this detention facility has
not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The women's group "Trešnjevka"
names a secondary school centre in Bijeljina in a list of rape-death camps.
However, they give no further information. 481/

498. **Slaughterhouse**: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.)
Allegedly, a slaughterhouse located between Caffee Sezam and the Serb village of Obarska, 12
kilometres north-west of Bijeljina, was used as a detention facility. The
building, 70 metres by 20 metres, reportedly held at least 200 Muslims and
Croats, probably residents of Bijeljina. The guards were Serbs. 482/

499. **Španac JNA Barracks**: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.)
According to the US government, the Španac JNA Barracks, located in Bijeljina,
was used as a detention facility from 5 May 1992 until 13 May 1992. The
barracks supported an unidentified armor unit and an unidentified pontoon unit.
The barracks' sports hall held the prisoners. 483/

500. The guards at the barracks were allegedly JNA military police. An
unnamed Lieutenant Colonel interrogated the prisoners. He was from Tuzla, and
wore a camouflage uniform with a Serbian flag on his arm. 484/

501. Forty-seven males from Bosanski Šamac were brought to the JNA casern in
Brčko after Bosanski Šamac fell to Serb forces. 485/ These prisoners were
Muslim, with perhaps a few Croats. 486/ There were four unidentified prisoners
in the Brčko casern when the group from Bosanski Šamac arrived. On 5 May, all
51 of these prisoners were transferred to Španac. 487/ In the group of 51, one
70 year-old man was a member of the Croatian Democratic Union. 488/

502. When the group left Brčko, an unidentified man was placed in the trucks
with the prisoners. This man was accused of raping Serbian girls. When the
group arrived at the barracks, this man was thrown from the truck and shot
dead. 489/

503. It is reported that at the camp, prisoners were forced to clean the pontoon
unit's equipment, including the boats. For food, the prisoners were given
leftovers from the soldiers' kitchen. They were interrogated. They were also
made to sit with their heads bowed and were beaten while in this position. 490/

504. On 9 or 10 May, six prisoners were transferred out of Španac. Five were
sent to a camp in Batajnica, and one was sent to the prison in Sremska
Mitrovica. 491/ On 13 May, the remaining prisoners were bused back to Bosanski
Šamac, where they were allegedly held in the Secondary School centre. 492/

505. **Velika Obarska**: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) It is
reported that a former slaughterhouse in Velika Obarska was used as a detention
facility. 493/ The prisoners were kept in one four metre by five metre room.
494/ One guard was always stationed outside the room. 495/ There may have
been one or two office rooms in the same building, which were occupied by
guards. 496/

506. The room held 15 to 20 Muslim prisoners. 497/ The number often changed.
One prisoner was arrested on 25 June 1992, held for 15 days, and released on
10 July. 498/ He still suffers back pains and has poor memory because of
torture. 499/

507. The prisoners were forced to sleep on the concrete floor without any
blankets. They were served two pieces of bread and one cup of weak soup once
each day. Diarrhea was caused by the water that was available. Several
prisoners were interrogated each day. The interrogations lasted about 10
minutes, and the prisoners were beaten regardless of what their answers were.
The questions were generally about political and military affiliations. One
prisoner from Bijeljina died in July as a result of torture. 500/

4. Bileća

508. Bileća is located in eastern Herzegovina. Pre-war population of the
county of Bileća was reported as 13,269. Approximately 80.3 per cent of the
population was Serb, 14.7 per cent Muslim, and 5 per cent "others". 501/

509. Apparently, in May 1992, an American witness stated that he saw Serbian
soldiers torture a Croatian soldier to death in a camp near Bileća. He saw the
same soldiers torture another group of Croatian prisoners resulting in the
death of one of those prisoners. 502/

510. Unidentified Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Büro für Notleidende Menschen in
Osteuropa.) One witness reported that on or about 9 June 1992, six prisoners
captured by Serb forces in Mostar and held in the North Camp for a night were
thereafter transferred to Bileća. They were first taken to some sort of hall.
The captors, who had threatened to cut their throats, placed them against a
wall and questioned them. After this questioning, they were detained in the
building basement for one week. 503/

511. The guards told those detained that there were prisoners being held in
rooms upstairs. The above-mentioned witness pleaded with the guards to be placed
in such a room. Finally, the captors placed them in the above-stated room. 504/

512. There were approximately 50 individuals detained in one room. The guards
would move the prisoners between rooms and the basement from time to time.
Groups of three to four men described as "Cetniks" would occasionally question
and beat individual prisoners in the presence of the other prisoners. The
prisoners were forced to participate in group exercises and were required to
follow orders exactly as instructed. 505/

513. This routine continued until 4 July 1992, when the reporting witness and
others heard their names called out and told they could go home. While being
transported to Stolac, they were required to keep their heads down or they
would be beaten. 506/

514. One source reported that there appeared to have been three rounds of
arrests by Serbs in Bileća from June to December, 1992. The first round took
place the week of 10 June 1992. The second around 5 October (apparently after
the release of the Sutomore group). The third round of arrests occurred during
the first week of December when, for the first time, women and children were
detained. 507/
515. Police Station/Detention Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) The Serbs reportedly took many to the police station first. The captors never told those detained the purpose of their arrest and many believed they were arrested because they were Muslim. Apparently, during the first round of arrests, Muslim men were detained at the police detention centre in small groups of six to seven for about a week and were then transferred to a boarding school that had been converted into a detention centre. It seems that the majority of those detained in June were later transferred back to the police detention centre about four months later after the release of what was referred to as the Sutomore group on 15 October 1992. Many complained of severe beatings and interrogation.

516. Boarding school: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a detention facility existed at an unspecified boarding school in the region. No information was provided regarding the location of this facility, however the report suggests that the Muslim detainees were transferred to this location from the police station, detained here for an unspecified period of time and then transferred back to the police station detention facility.

517. The same source describes the treatment of prisoners in Bileća. However, the exact place of detention, whether the police station or boarding school, is not clear. Some detainees were reportedly held in cells measuring nine square metres and others were held in cells measuring 12 to 16 square metres. The smaller cells contained 13 people, the larger held 16. The captors did not provide food. Family members and friends were allowed to bring meals directly to the detainees except when the detainees had been subjected to harsh beatings. On those occasions the guards brought the meals.

518. Harsh beatings were apparently not uncommon. Many stated that most of the beatings took place on the first day of detention. Most were kicked on the chest and back after being pushed to the floor. They were also beaten on the head with plastic pipes and were hit in the face. Several showed signs of such beatings and others complained of lasting physical trauma caused by such beatings.

519. It was reported that in August, 1992, just prior to a visit of Conference on European Security and Cooperation representatives, individuals who had been the most severely beaten were hospitalized for a period of seven to 10 days.

520. According to the ICRC, Red Cross representatives first visited the police station on 19 August 1992.

521. Apparently, one 30 year-old man died of injuries suffered as a result of beating. Although fellow detainees brought the victim to the hospital, there was no doctor to treat the man.

522. A few of the detainees claimed they were tortured with electric shock. Their thumbs were tied to wires and electricity to shock them was generated manually with a telephone like apparatus.

523. The report states that on 18 November 1992, some detainees suffered harsh physical treatment during a visit of uniformed personnel from Trebinje.

524. One former detainee stated that some detainees were asked to load food and personal possessions from Muslim homes onto trucks and unload the same at a Red Cross warehouse. Allegedly, the goods were then transferred to the army.

525. On 5 December 1992, women and children were reportedly rounded up and detained for three days. Several men turned themselves in to be with their families. The men, however, were not released with the women and children.
526. After meeting with an individual unidentified in the report collected, the prison commander on 17 December 1992, informed the detainees that they were free to leave if they wished but that he could not guarantee their safety outside the detention centre in Bileća. 519/

527. It seems that on 19 December 1992, 51 detainees who had been held at the police station and boarding school were transferred from Bileća to Montenegro under ICRC supervision. 520/

528. Civilian jails: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the US Government.) Another individual reported that her husband, a Muslim, had been impressed into military service, later escaped and returned to Bileća. There, in mid-June 1992, he was arrested and detained in what is described as one of two civilian jails in Bileća. He was detained there for five months and released on 5 October 1992. 521/

529. According to the same individual, Muslim civilians from all over eastern Herzegovina were being held at the jails in Bileća. Allegedly, the Bileća chief of police, Miroslav Duko, was responsible for the jails. 522/

530. The prisoners' families were allowed to bring them food. Women made daily treks to the jails in order to feed the men there held. They would have to stand in line and remain silent, or else, their husbands would not receive the food that they carried. 523/

531. One wife declared that she witnessed cells designed to hold five people holding 50. On one visit she noticed a bruised prisoner. 524/

532. Apparently, the women of Bileća banded together and requested the ICRC in Trebinje to inspect the prison. ICRC representatives visited twice. In June, 1992, the ICRC representative was turned away at the Opština President's door and told that no camps existed in Bileća. The same thing happened the second time. The women continued to report the existence of detention camps for Muslim men in Bileća and demand that the ICRC visit them. In August, 1992, the individual reports that the European Peace Union visited the jail and managed to get all of the sick, wounded and tortured prisoners transferred to the hospital. 525/

533. In July, an ICRC representative was able to visit the jails, register the prisoners and issue them refugee cards. 526/

534. Reportedly, between this representative's first and second visits, White Eagles teargassed and fired into the Bileća jail cells with automatic weapons. Some of the prisoners were apparently wounded and taken to a hospital but returned to the jails after two days. ICRC representatives were not allowed to visit the wounded in the hospital. 527/

535. A document received 27 May 1994, states that the ICRC first visited a prison/penitentiary in Bileća on 7 November 1991. 528/

536. Another source reported that as of 12 June 1992, the Militia Station in Bileća held 38 prisoners. The militia commander was identified in the source materials. The source also states that a prisoner was killed during captivity. 529/

537. Djački Dom (Students' Home): (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) A camp was reported to exist here as of 12 June 1992. 530/
538. A CSCE mission to detention camps in BiH visited a student dormitory on 2 September 1992 and found 74 Muslim detainees held by Serbian authorities. 531/

539. **Cellar:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Mazowiecki.) Serbs reportedly imprisoned 170 Croats and Muslims in a cell in Bileća. The cellar measured 120 square metres and had three small windows. 532/

540. The Serb guards reportedly beat the detainees three times on the night of their arrival. One detainee was reported to have died as a result 10 days later. Detainees were also beaten by three or four soldiers as they went to the toilet. The witness reporting claimed that from 1 June to 10 August 1992 he was allowed to bathe once and never allowed a change of clothes. Apparently, at night, the guards closed the cellar windows and turned on 2,000 watt reflectors. The stifling heat caused the prisoners to dehydrate. The prisoners' dehydration was aggravated by the fact that they would not receive water until late in the afternoon on the following day. Supposedly, one prisoner went into a coma and died as a result. The witness also reports that everything improved when the ICRC arrived and the detainees were registered. 533/

541. **Unidentified Camp:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the National Organization for Victim Assistance.) There are a few reports of a number of Muslims taken prisoner in Gacko by Serb forces then later transferred to a camp in Bileća. 534/ One witness claims that he was included in a group of 100 prisoners being held in Gacko and transferred by truck to a camp in Bileća around 4 July 1992. According to this witness 200 young people from Bileća had been taken to this camp 10 days prior. Immediately upon arrival the prisoners were maltreated. Eighty were held in a small room. They had three meals a day, though the witness complains that the food was awful. No medical help was available. The witness also claims that they were allowed to bathe only twice in 37 days. The room was stuffy because the windows were locked at all times. The prisoners were allowed to use the toilet twice a day, at 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Over a period of 38 days the witness claims that three prisoners in his room died because of malnutrition, the living conditions and torture. Apparently, he was in a room with elderly men, while the younger men were held on the ground floor. 535/

542. After a visit by representatives of the ICRC, he reports that conditions at the camp improved. After 38 days in the camp, the witness reports that the captors placed those detained in two buses and drove them to a place 78 kilometres from Stolac where they were left. 536/

543. Another individual reports being arrested at Gacko and transported by truck to a camp in Bileća where he was held for 80 days. He describes being held in a barrack with 160 men. The barrack measured approximately 120 square metres. On the floor were wooden planks covered with thin office carpeting. He describes being packed so tightly that their legs dove-tailed into each other when they all lay down. 537/

544. They received meals three times a day: one boiled egg in the morning and at 2:00 p.m. a mixture of potatoes and mackerel. The witness did not provide a description of the third meal. Other inmates, assigned the task, delivered the meals to the gate. The captors provided each prisoner a half a litre of water per day. The water was provided at about 5:00 p.m. when the prisoners were allowed to go to the latrines. 538/

545. Prisoners were allowed about five minutes in the latrine. The witness claims there was no time for any ablutions. In the barracks, there were two tin cans to urinate in. The cans were constantly overflowing. 539/
546. Prisoners were not allowed to exercise outside. They were often required to assume a crouching position on the floor. 540/

547. At one point, about 10 prisoners were taken out for questioning. The people taken were from the surrounding villages and were suspected of possessing weapons or arms deals. They returned at the end of the day with signs of a severe beating. 541/

548. A guard once kicked the witness in the ribs for no apparent reason. Once, the guards beat the entire barrack population when they found the latrine dirty. The guards ordered the prisoners to stand against the walls with their arms and legs outstretched. The guards then reportedly beat the prisoners indiscriminately with belts, sticks, and gun butts. 542/

549. The witness believes that two inmates died from causes unrelated to the treatment received. He also reports that 12 men once taken for questioning never returned. He claims that the Serbs listed those 12 as having escaped from custody at a POW exchange when he was liberated. 543/

550. Reserve Officers School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Reported to be located on the west side of the road from Bileća to Trebinje at the "entrance" to Bileća and in use as a camp as of 12 June 1992. This facility was surrounded by a wall. 544/

551. A source claims that the commander of the camp in January 1992 was an ex-State Security Service (SDB) officer. He was reportedly scheduled to return to Belgrade after his tour of duty as camp commander. However, he was allegedly killed by his own men because they believed he may reveal atrocities to Belgrade authorities. 545/

552. Another commander of this camp was reported to be a General Stubičević. He was allegedly succeeded by a General Stanković. Supposedly the original designee to replace Stubičević was a General Vujević who refused to serve after seeing women and children in the camp. He supposedly pretended to have suffered a heart attack and withdrew. 546/

553. The camp was apparently controlled by a paramilitary group. 547/

554. Approximately 130 prisoners from this camp were reportedly moved to Sutomore on the Adriatic Coast, south-east of Titograd. Thirty-eight were reportedly moved to the militia station in Bileća. 548/

555. The ICRC reported that on 5 October 1992, 109 detainees from Bileća were transferred to Montenegro. 549/

556. Army Barracks/Former Yugoslav Army Officer Training School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A British Defence Debriefing team assessed that reports of camps at the army barracks and a former Yugoslav Army officer training school were referring to the same camp, although, the reports of prisoner treatment vary significantly. 550/

557. In relation to the training school, it reportedly held at least 3,000 Muslim and Croat men and was heavily guarded. 551/ Serbs reportedly used the training school only to hold prisoners to be exchanged for Serbian prisoners of war. In July 1992, a large number of the detainees there were supposedly transferred to Titograd.

558. According to another source, the Serb prisoner of war camp in the army barracks at Bileća was the site of gross prisoner maltreatment. Allegedly,
prisoners were beaten in their cells. They were frequently beaten to death. In order to conceal the screams, camp personnel would park trucks at the back of the camp and rev the engines. 552/

559. Supposedly, 13 people were beaten to death in their cells on the night of 27 April 1992. The bodies were then taken to a bunker and put in large plastic sacks which were weighted with stones. Helicopters reportedly arrived early the next morning and carried the bodies to be dumped in the sea off of Dubrovnik.

560. Prisoners reportedly slept in their underwear on cement floors with no mattresses or blankets. Those prisoners being prepared for exchange for Serb prisoners were held in the fitness centre. 553/

561. A BBC monitoring unit provided the text of a transmission apparently from Bosnia Hercegovina Radio, Sarajevo Studio that included the claim that 170 Muslims were imprisoned in one military and two civilian prisons in Bileća from the beginning of June until mid-December 1992. 554/

562. That transmission declared that the Bileća mayor Milorad Vujović and the head of the public security station Goran Vuković authorized the torture of prisoners in Bileća. 555/

5. Bosanska Dubica

563. A United Nations memorandum states that mayors, police and local territorial defence units in Serbian controlled areas in Croatia have been cooperating with their counterparts in Serbian controlled sections of northern Bosnia, including Bosanska Dubica, in an effort to ethnically cleanse the area of non-Serbs, primarily Muslims. 556/

564. Additional reports suggest that the population of this northern BiH county has been reduced by one-third since the beginning of the conflict. 557/ Many residents fled the area with the onset of the aggression between the warring factions. Still others were coerced into captivity. As Serbian forces advanced they began arresting area residents and interning them in detention facilities, including: the local gymnasium, the Kooper building, the sports hall, and a bordello established in nearby Mesetnica-Duboki Jarak. Reports from the Bosanska Dubica area allude to the complete dehumanization of the area's non-Serbian population facilitated to a large degree by the establishment of these concentration camps. 558/

565. United Nations personnel report that individuals have been fleeing northern BiH and seeking protection in UNPA's. A UN memo dated 3 July stated that "one Mustafa Ogorinac swam across the river Una at 8 in the morning on 2 July from a camp in Bosanska Dubica . . . he showed signs of physical abuse and punishment". 559/

566. Gymnasium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The local gymnasium's purpose appears to have been the containment of non-Serbian prisoners of war following interrogation at the local police headquarters. 560/ Specifics as to the operation and length of average detention was not made available.

567. Kooper Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) While very little information regarding this location was available, the communication that was provided suggests that internment at this facility necessarily included severe physical mistreatment. Reportedly the citizens interned here were
brutally beaten, most commonly with iron rods. Following the beatings the
victims were reportedly taken to the medical centre where they were allegedly
given infusion solutions and then returned to the Kooper facility.

568. Sports Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has not been
corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly a number of inmates were held at
this location but only for a few hours at a time. Reports suggest that they
were occasionally used as forced labour in the town and for other tasks desired
by Serbian forces. Allegedly the inmates were given no food or water and
on some occasions were reportedly forced to stay in the sports hall through the
night.

569. Mesetnica-Duboki Jarak bordello: (The existence of this detention
facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are
neutral.) Following the occupation of the Bosanska Dubica area by Serb forces,
a bordello was established which reportedly housed 11 year-old girls. The
girls were reportedly subjected to sexual abuse throughout their detention.
The report accuses the Serbian forces of premeditating the acts of rape
in an attempt to humiliate and degrade a race of people while simultaneously
destroying its biological reproductive potential.

6. Bosanska Gradiška

570. On 18 August 1992, the Bosnian town of Bosanska Gradiška was attacked by
Serbian forces using multi-rocket launchers, artillery and tanks. The
bombardment started early in the morning and after several hours of vigorous
shelling, the poorly armed defenders of the town were captured by the Serbian
forces.

571. Within a few days, the Serbian corps, going house-to-house, rounded up
civilians and divided them into groups. Women and children were sent to
camps in Uskoci and Donja Varoš. Men were sent to locations throughout
Bosanska Gradiška including: the Stara Gradiška prison--where as many as 200
prisoners were interned at once, the Red Cross building, a local school, a
facility called the Praktikum, a school in Podgrace and a facility in Donja Nova Topola, which also reportedly interned some 300 individuals.

572. Stara Gradiška Prison: (The existence of this detention facility
has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.)
Following skirmishes between Croatian and Serbian forces in northern BiH
villages, and the ensuing capture of Croatian forces by the Serbs, Croatian
soldiers were taken to the Serb-run prison at Stara Gradiška, formerly known as
Bosanska Gradiška.

573. The Serbs organized the facility for optimal control. The anterior
building of the facility was designated the administrative quarters as well as
the lodgings for Serbian forces. The prison was a single, two-story, L-shaped building with approximately 17 rooms.

574. The Serbs compactly contained their prisoners in the left side of the
building. Those cells intended to accommodate two inmates were filled with as
many as 10. Other cells which measured approximately eight by 10 metres
were filled with almost 50 men each. The inmates had to sleep on their
sides on the concrete floor and were reportedly fed a piece of bread every four
to five days.

575. The reports state that although only half of the prison was full, prisoners
were separated into two groups with one group occupying rooms on the second floor
and one group occupying rooms on the first floor. According to the reports,
the prisoners were either Muslim or Croat, and all were men. 579/ There appears, however, to have been no clear criteria used in separating the prisoners. 580/

576. On their first night in the prison, inmates were commonly held in a tiny room on the second floor called a Samica. The Samica measured approximately two by three metres and was allegedly used to emotionally and psychologically weaken the prisoners, thereby decreasing their capability to resist interrogations. 581/

577. Thereafter, the prisoners were interrogated two times per day, once in the morning and once at night. Prior to each interrogation, they were usually put into a Samica. 582/ The investigations lasted an average of 30 minutes and consisted of beatings with hands and sticks, especially on sensitive areas such as recently obtained battle wounds. 583/

578. The Serb in charge was a former corrections officer at the pententiary and currently a unit leader of the paramilitary White Eagles (Beli orlovi). This individual reportedly told the prisoners that they would all be killed. 584/

579. Additionally, the identified leader allegedly ordered the torturing and killing deaths of three Croatian brothers. Their bodies were thrown into the facility's well which was located between the buildings. Fifty to 60 corpses were reportedly also thrown into the camps' well. 585/

580. Among the methods utilized by the Serbs in torturing their victims at the facility was the setting of guard dogs upon the inmates and watching the ensuing destruction of helpless victims. 586/ Reportedly, the Serb commander claimed that those killed in this manner were to be cut into small pieces and force-fed to other starving inmates. 587/

581. Red Cross Community Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) During the assault on the villages in northern BiH, a group of Bosnian Serb soldiers known as the Scorpions occupied the Red Cross building in Bosanska Gradiška and reportedly operated a camp at this location. 588/ This group wore a combination of camouflage and JNA uniforms and appeared to have been Bosnian Serbs who had been mobilized into paramilitary units. 589/ This paramilitary group was comprised of 200-300 Bosnian Serbs, organized in April 1992. These soldiers wore a patch depicting a scorpion on the left shoulder of their uniforms. 590/

582. The Scorpions were commanded by a former JNA. 591/ Local unidentified police personnel assisted the Scorpions in the apprehension and detention of Muslims and Croats in Bosanska Gradiška from April to December 1992. 592/ Detainees were first brought to the facility for screening and interrogation. They were held at this location for up to four days, after which they were either released and told to leave or taken to area detention facilities. 593/

583. Local school: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) A detention facility was established at a school just north of the Red Cross building and some 400 metres from the town's Roman Catholic Church. 594/ This facility was operated by the above-mentioned Scorpion paramilitary unit. 595/ The school was reportedly used for internment during those times when the students were on holiday. 596/

584. The Praktikum: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Another facility which may possibly have been an internment facility was located adjacent to the above-mentioned school. This site known as the Praktikum was said to have been used for interrogations which involved torture. 597/ It was also allegedly used for the training of individuals in the operation of various textile
machinery. 598/

585. Podgrace School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The Scorpions also operated a facility in the village of Podgrace, which was just east of Jelići on the way to Bosanska Gradiška. The detention facility was located at the village school. 599/ The seven by eight metre, two-story school building used as a detention facility was called the old school and was adjacent to the main road. A newer, larger, three-story school building which had an asphalt playground existed just south of the old building. 600/

586. Approximately 10 soldiers from Bosanska Gradiška were transported to the old school building on a daily basis to relieve the previous day’s guard component. An unknown number of Muslims were routinely detained at the facility. 601/ Some Muslim residents of Bosanska Gradiška believed that many of the detainees were sent to other camps in Bosnia from Podgrace, and that Muslims were being held in the building as of late December 1992. 602/

587. Donja Nova Topola Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The Scorpions were said to operate yet another facility just 10 kilometres south of Bosanska Gradiška in the town of Donja Nova Topola. Approximately 300-400 individuals were housed at an unidentified location in the town in December 1992. Reportedly some of the prisoners were transferees from the camps in Podgrace, Omarska, and Prijedor. 603/ Reports suggest that the majority of the citizens before April 1992 had been of Muslim nationality. 604/

7. Bosanska Krupa

588. Bosanska Krupa is located in north-western BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 58,212. 74.5 per cent were Muslim, 23.6 per cent Serb, and 1.9 per cent "other".

589. There are reports of six Serbian-run camps in this region. They are as follows: Bosanska Krupa, the elementary school at Gorinja, Jasenica, the camp in the forest near Jasenica, Petar Kočić Primary School, and the elementary school at Suvaja. These camps allegedly contain Muslim civilians who were unable to escape the region upon Serbian attacks of their villages in May, June, and July 1992. Apparently, those that were able to escape fled to the villages of Cazin and Bužim. 605/ There is also one report which suggests the existence of a detention facility in the village of Bužim. The source is silent with respect to information regarding the identity of those controlling this facility.

590. Military Prison, Bužim: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) This report was provided by the ICRC, whose representatives visited this detention facility on 7 January 1994. No information was provided regarding the conditions at this facility or the identity of those in residence. 606/ This is the only report of a facility in this village, the remaining sites of detention appear to be located within the city limits of Bosanska Krupa.

591. According to witness testimonies, prisoners were transferred between the camps of Bosanska Krupa, Jasenica and the Petar Kočić School. The camp in the forest near Jasenica and the elementary schools in Gorinja and Suvaja are not mentioned in connection with any other camps.

592. Unidentified Facility, Bosanska Krupa: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) This camp is located in the city of Bosanska Krupa. Its specific whereabouts and dates of existence
are not reported although one witness describes his short detention at Bosanska Krupa following the attack of his village in early June 1992. 607/ He was taken to Bosanska Krupa from the camp in the surrounding area, and later transferred from there to the Petar Kočić Elementary School. 608/  

593. This unidentified facility is reportedly run by Serbs, yet the only group specifically named in connection with the camp are the White Eagles, a Serbian paramilitary organization. 609/ While there is no evidence that the White Eagles actually managed the camp, there is witness testimony that they actively participated in the beating of prisoners there. 610/  

594. In one instance, the White Eagles beat prisoners with sticks, baseball bats, metal rods, and a thick rope soaked in water. Then, after letting the prisoners rest a bit, they took them to a place where 20 men beat them again, this time to the point of unconsciousness.  

595. Gorinja elementary school: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There are reports that a Serb-run camp was established at the elementary school in Gorinjava. Apparently, Muslim prisoners were forced to do hard labor there. 611/  

596. Jasenica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however, none among them are neutral.) Jasenica is a detention camp near Bosanska Krupa which was established in May 1992. 612/ There is no indication whether it is still in existence or not. There is one report that suggests it is at a "high school centre". 613/ It is described as a "transit camp" where non-Serbs are interrogated and then sent on to Petar Kočić school for long-term detention. 614/ It is run by the Serbian Army, and apparently, Martić’s Četniks from Knin have also taken part in beatings and killings at the camp. 615/  

597. The prisoner population consists of Muslims from Bosanska Krupa, Cazin, and the surrounding region that were captured upon the Serbian attacks of their villages. 616/ One report specifically states that 100 Muslims captured at Bosanska Krupa were arrested and taken to this camp. 617/  

598. Once at the camp, prisoners were interrogated, beaten, and raped. 618/ One witness describes having his teeth knocked out and ribs broken during a beating there. 619/ There are also reports that prisoners are forced to do hard labor. 620/  

599. Camp in forest near Jasenica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Defence Debriefing Team.) There is one report of a Serb-run prisoner-of-war camp located in the forest near Jasenica. This camp is described as having been "built from nothing", and was supposedly established to hold Muslim men from Sanski Most. 621/ It is not clear from the report whether this camp is part of the central camp at Jasenica or managed by the Serbian Army. There is no further information.  

600. Petar Kočić Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however, none among them are neutral.) This school is in Bosanska Krupa. While there are no precise dates of existence for this camp, an ex-prisoner alleges that he was detained here for two and a half months starting sometime after 10 June 1992. 622/ One report estimated that at one point 4,000 prisoners were detained at this camp and an additional 3,000 had passed through it. 623/ Apparently, some prisoners were transferred to Petar Kočić from the camp at Bosanska Krupa and the camp at Jasenica. 624/  

601. Prisoners were severely beaten and raped at the school. 625/ Serbian guards extinguished cigarettes on prisoners' foreheads, chests, and other
sensitive parts of the body. They cut crosses in their backs with sticks. Finally, one report alleges they painted the prisoners at the school, dressed them in folk dresses and fezes, and made them sing anti-Muslim songs. 626/

602. Pero Sunić is alleged to be the commander of this camp. 627/ One of the perpetrators assisting here reportedly brought poison to the camp which guards then gave to the prisoners. One ex-prisoner describes the death of a man he was detained with by poisoning. 628/ This witness also reports the visit of a certain captain to the school who came with Captain Zdravko Narandžić, the commander of the military police department, and killed many prisoners. There are no further details about how either of these men were involved with the camp at Petar Kočić School. 629/

603. Suvaja elementary school: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however, none among them are neutral.) This is a Serbian-run camp in Suvaja where Muslim prisoners are reported to be put to hard labor. 630/ There is no additional information about this camp.

604. According to the Sarajevo-Radio BiH Network, Radovan Karadžić and other members of the Serbian Ministry called a meeting in response to the well-publicized human rights violations committed by the Serbian Army in February 1993. Apparently, they agreed that Miroslav Vještica should answer for the events taking place in Bosanska Krupa. 631/

8. Bosanski Brod

605. The municipality of Bosanski Brod is located in northern BiH and is bordered by Croatia to the north and the municipalities of Derventa, Modriča and Odžak to the south. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of this municipality was 33,962, of which 41 per cent were Croats, 12.2 per cent were Muslims, 33.8 per cent were Serbs and the remaining 13 per cent were described as "other".

606. Bosanski Brod Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) This facility is reportedly a Croatian-run camp with a sizeable containment capacity. Sources suggest that, at one time, as many as 1,000 Serbs from the surrounding area were contained here. 632/

607. The detainees were reportedly beaten every day and some had broken arms and legs as a result. 633/

608. The guards reportedly moved the severely beaten detainees from this location when the ICRC and UN Peacekeepers visited the camp. 634/ The ICRC visited this facility on 20 July 1992. No additional information regarding the conditions or duration of the camp's existence was provided. 635/

609. Bosanski Brod Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral.) This stadium appears to have been used by both Serb and Croatians as a detention centre when in control of the region.

610. Initially, Croatian forces exercised dominion over the stadium facility. Reportedly throughout the period of Croatian control, the Croatian Military Police arrested men and women from the Bosanski Brod region and detained them at the stadium facility. 636/

611. Male detainees were contained in the facility's men's room. 637/ At night, Croatian soldiers, who returned from the front, were reportedly permitted to take
the male detainees to the terrace, the basement, and into the corridors of the stadium where the inmates were then subjected to severe beatings. During the day, the male detainees were relegated to forced labor groups and made to perform tasks which included washing Croatian cars and digging trenches.

612. Reportedly one incident involved the shooting death of 12 male detainees and the disposing of their bodies in nylon bags and dumping them into the Sava River.

613. About 13 women were placed in the ladies' room at the stadium. The women were reportedly raped. A bathroom where the women were allowed to shower. The women were raped by Muslim and Croatians raped the women in a bathroom where the women were allowed to shower. The women were raped by as many as six or seven men in the same night. The older women were forced to perform fellatio on the soldiers. The younger women were reportedly taken off-site and raped. The victims were returned to the camp the following morning.

614. When UNPROFOR representatives came to Bosanski Brod, the women were reportedly taken to a kayak club on the Sava River for three days until the representatives departed.

615. The detainees from the Bosanski Brod stadium were transferred to the Tulek Warehouse in August and later exchanged.

616. In October, 1992, when Serbs forces succeeded in control of the Bosanski Brod, they reportedly loaded the remaining area residents onto trucks and took them to the stadium detention facility.

617. Although rather scant information was made available regarding Serb activities at the stadium, reports suggest that women were taken from the stadium to nearby apartments and raped. Sources suggest that they were also kicked and beaten.

618. Liješće: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however, none among them are neutral.) The detention camp consisted of small rooms behind a school. The camp was run by the "White Eagles" that were from Belgrade. Their commander was identified in the materials. At least a couple of Serbian women were with the White Eagles. In addition, some men from Jović and Šešelj paramilitary groups were at the camp.

620. The White Eagles entered the rooms one at a time, beat the detainees, and then interrogate them about the number of Croatians in neighboring areas. The White Eagles threatened to kill the detainees.

621. Local Serbs also beat the detainees. The beatings occurred in dark rooms.

622. Male detainees from Tulek Warehouse may have been transferred to Liješće after inquiries at Tulek by ICRC and UNPROFOR.

623. School Bosanski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the list of detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a detention facility was established at an unidentified school in Bosanski Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility on 12 August 1992. No information regarding conditions, duration, the ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling parties was provided.
624. Bosanski Brod Warehouses: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however, none among them are neutral.) This detention camp was located in a warehouse at the Tulek housing estate. 663/ Detainees interned at this located were from Novi Grad, Donja Dubica, Trnjak and Lipik. 664/ Most of the detainees were transferred from other camps in the area to this facility. 665/ The detainees slept on planks under the eaves of a shed containing lime and cement. 666/

625. The male detainees were sent to the front to dig trenches and many died. 667/ The women held in the camp were taken to the warehouse offices and were raped. 668/ The detainees were beaten, burned with cigarettes and brutalized. 669/ At least one, Milan Jagodić from Donja Dubica, died from his injuries. 670/

626. Forced Brothels: (The existence of this type of detention has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Croatian forces reportedly held Serb women in Bosanski Brod where they were physically abused and raped between January and April, 1992. 671/

627. Prison/Penitentiary, Bosanski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the list of detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a detention facility was established at an unidentified prison in Bosanski Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility on 9 July 1992. No information regarding conditions, duration, ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling party was provided. 672/

628. Hospital, Bosanski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the list of detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a detention facility was established at an unidentified prison in Bosanski Brod. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility on 9 July 1992. No information regarding conditions, duration, ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling party was provided. 673/

9. Bosanski Novi

629. The area along the Una River in north-west BiH--which includes the communities of Sanski Most, Ključ, Prijedor and Bosanski Novi--is said to have been the site of concerted Serbian action intended to bring about an undiluted Serbian Republic. 674/

630. Serb occupation in the region began in July 1991. 675/ It was then that the community of Bosanski Novi became a vital Serbian military base from which Croatian targets were attacked. 676/ By June 1992, the strategic function of the mostly Muslim area had changed and the Serbs began to rid the area of the remaining Croats as well as its large Muslim citizenry. 677/ Accordingly, on a daily basis, "unrestrained formations of SDS" engaged in looting and burning of non-Serbian homes. 678/ The Serbs then collected the citizens and, separating the men from the women and children, sent the former to concentration camps in Bosanski Novi and the latter to camps in Doboj. 679/

631. Reports suggest that men were detained primarily at the sports stadium 680/ but other detention facilities were erected throughout Bosanski Novi to facilitate the Serb expulsion process, including the police station, the Hotel Una, the local fire station, a secondary school, and an area factory. Reportedly some 6,000 inmates were processed through one facility.
632. **Stadium Mlakve:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch.) As early as May 1992, the sports stadium was used as a detention facility. Some witnesses report being held there for as few as two days while others report being held for as many as two months. The conditions at this location were conspicuously deficient. The detainees were made to sleep in changing rooms, on the floor in corridors and in other spaces under the grandstand. During daylight hours inmates were kept outside in a roughly marked area of the football pitch. On one occasion an inmate fell unconscious, reportedly resulting from the combination of heat and the lack of food.

633. According to one witness:

"We received food twice a day, usually a seventh of a kilo of bread and gruel with beans and peas; but only the luckiest got that, most of the others got just the watery soup. The men guarding us were reservists of the 'Army of the Serbian Republic'. The guards changed every seven days. When a captain of the 'Serbian Army' was killed on the front, they reduced our meals to only one a day. It was hot, conditions were bad and older men began to collapse."

634. All of the ex-inmates interviewed stated that they were poorly fed and that the stadium conditions were grossly overcrowded. The Stadium was home to both non-Serbian military and civilian police as well as civilians from the surrounding areas. One report suggests that all the men in the villages of Blagaj and Bosanski Novi, aged 15 and older, were collected by Serbian military police and taken to the sports stadium in Bosanski Novi.

635. There were reportedly more than 6,000 detainees at the sports stadium all of whom were subjected to physical mistreatment.

636. On 22 July 1992, a large number of inmates were released from the stadium and taken to Croatia in a convoy arranged by international agencies. The survivors were allegedly able to identify many of their captors.

637. **Hotel Una:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch and Amnesty International.) Sources suggest that camp inmates were transferred between the facilities following interrogations by their captors. Some were transferred to the Hotel Una from the stadium and others to the stadium from the hotel. Regardless of the location, the conditions at both appear uniformly harsh.

638. In one account, the victim was blindfolded and beaten both with truncheons and what he believes were bags of sand. The beatings occurred in conjunction with interrogations regarding the victims knowledge of the identities of "extremists" in the area as well as the reason why the victim had not been mobilized to fight against the Serbs.

639. Following a two hour interrogation, the victim was taken to a cellar where 17 other men were held in a room of about 15 square metres. All were reportedly interrogated, but not all were beaten. On 11 June 1992, the other detainees were released, and the victim was transferred to the sports stadium for further interrogation.

640. In another account, 16 inmates were transferred from the sports stadium to the hotel. The reporting inmate noted that prisoners were contained in rather poor facilities which consisted of one room in the cellar without windows and which was completely dark. The room reportedly measured four by three square metres, and four men were already detained therein when they arrived.
According to the witness, the four inmates were Muslims. One was a soldier, another had been accused of trading arms on the black market and the alleged crimes of the third and fourth were unknown.

641. The witness noted that there was a candle but not enough air to sustain the flame. It was reportedly also difficult to breathe. There was a pipe and a sink in the corner. The sink was used as a toilet and the pipe was used for water. The detainees defecated into a nylon bag and then stored the bag in the corner of the room. The bag remained in the room with the prisoners because the guards refused to remove it. The victims were also poorly fed, receiving no food for the first three days.

642. On the day after their arrival at the hotel on 23 July, they learned that a convoy had evacuated the men held at the stadium. On the seventh day of their detention at the hotel, the men were removed from the cellar and transferred to another detention facility.

643. Fire Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a Neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Reportedly, the local fire station was among the possible facilities in Bosanski Novi where men from the surrounding area were interned. According to one witness, conditions at the fire station were much better than those at other sites in Bosanski Novi. Although the inmates were required to work at this location, they were fed twice daily and received the same food as the military police. Nineteen inmates were kept in one room which reportedly measured six by four metres in size. They were given pallets of board or cardboard to sleep on but no blankets. Some of the detainees were beaten from time to time, and all were interrogated. One witness recalled that he was released from the fire station on 10 August 1992.

644. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch.) Several reports refer to a detention facility at the local police station, but specific information regarding its description, operation and control were not made available. The reports allege that only men from the villages and towns in the area of Bosanski Novi were detained at the site and that some inmates were only held here long enough to be interrogated, after which they were transferred to other area facilities.

645. Secondary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the International Society for Human Rights, British Section.) According to one report, Serbian military and Serbian police collected members of Muslim families from the area of Bosanski Novi and detained them in the local secondary school. The report states that the Muslim detainees were forced to wear white bands around their arms. No information was available as to the conditions at this site.

646. Ustaša Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is only one report of a Croatian-controlled detention facility in the Bosanski Novi area and no specific information regarding location was given. The report alludes to the activities of one of the alleged perpetrators including his culpability in torturing Serbs in this Ustaša camp. He was said to have brutally beaten four named inmates including battering one inmate about the testicles. The report also suggests his responsibility for the killing of another inmate.

647. Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Only one report makes reference to a detention facility at a factory site. This allegation was made by a Muslim girl who stated that she was detained at this site along with several other Muslim men.
and women from her village of Blagaj. She stated that while at this location she watched her Serbian captors shoot a man in the stomach and then cut off his head with a knife. She stated further that only unarmed civilian victims were detained at this facility. 720/

10. Bosanski Petrovac

648. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, this county had a population of 15,552, of which 75.2 per cent were Serbs, 21.1 per cent were Muslims and the remaining 3.7 per cent were described as "other". 721/ The village of Bosanski Petrovac is located at the intersection of two highways just 20 air miles east of the Croatian/Bosnian border. 722/ Information of reported internment facilities include camps at Jasikovac, 723/ in the village of Vrtoče 724/ and at Kozile. There is however no descriptive information regarding the operation or control of the facilities at Jasikovac nor Vrtoče. What follows are several accounts from former detainees in camp Kozile.

649. Kozile: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) This prison camp was reportedly located just east of the village of Bosanski Petrovac. The facility was erected along the site of what was formerly a horse farm. 725/ Reports suggest that the camp may have come into operation some time prior to July 1992, but was of rather limited duration. 726/

650. The report suggests that men from nearby villages were routinely sent to Kozile. 727/ Some inmates were said to have come from Sanica, others from Orašac and still others from Bosanska Krupa. 728/ The camp was very small, reportedly only capable of containing 200 men at a time. 729/ Allegedly, an identified Serbian soldier was said to have acted as chief of interrogations and torture at the facility. 730/

651. On 6 August 1992, the Serbs discontinued camp activities and transferred all prisoners directly to a camp in Kamenica. 731/ Kozile was allegedly closed because unidentified representatives from the ICRC were scheduled to visit the area the following day, and the Serbian forces were concerned that the representatives may have discovered the camp and requested an inspection. 732/

652. Another ex-detainee recalls that Kozile 733/ was situated in an old factory in the woods where some 70 Muslim men were detained. The conditions were poor. The facility contained no beds or blankets. 734/ There were no medicines to assist the infirm, and the detainees were frequently beaten and used as forced labor. 735/

653. In still another account, a former detainee recalled being arrested by militiamen of the Serbian district of the county and taken to the local police station. After a few hours, he and several other prisoners were taken to Kozile by bus. 736/ At the camp, the bus was met by 30 armed men. 737/ The prisoners were instructed to stand in a line adjacent to an iron fence while the apparent leader called the inmates one at a time. Once identified, the personal articles were reportedly removed from the prisoners. 738/

654. The former detainee recalls that the facility was essentially a "hut". 739/ The hut was made up of six rooms with an adjoining hallway. 740/ On their first evening, the inmates were placed into a small room where they remained for the night. 741/ Because of the size of the room and the lack of ventilation, the inmates experienced difficulty breathing. 742/

655. The following day, the prisoners were divided up and placed in different rooms. 743/ There were 16 prisoners in the room 744/ with the witness. They
received no food the first day. On the second day, the prisoners were beaten and eventually given food. They were, however, not permitted to use the toilet. Following the beatings, they were made to walk on all fours to a trough and to lie down in front of the trough for two hours. They were also forced to bark like dogs and sing etnik songs.

According to the witness, guards were on duty at all times. Approximately 10-15 among them were "head guards". They were professionals from the Correctional Institution of Bihać. The above-mentioned perpetrator was reportedly a warden at that institution and was, in the witness' estimation, the most abusive of the guards. The perpetrator reportedly removed from the camp some 43 prisoners whose names appeared on a list. The witness believed that a number of these prisoners were killed on his command.

The remaining 42, including the witness, were reportedly released when the ICRC announced their plans to visit the location. Following their release the detainees were required to report to the police station twice daily.

11. Bosanski Šamac

Bosanski Šamac is located in northern Bosnia on the banks of the Sava River. It is bordered to the east by Orašje and to the west by Odak. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of this municipality was 32,835. Of that number, 44.7 per cent were Croat, 41.5 per cent were Serbs, 6.8 per cent were Muslims and the remaining 7 per cent were described as "others".

The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) According to reports, approximately 800 civilian Croats, Muslims, and Albanians were detained in the Bosanski Šamac Territorial Defence Building. The detainees were kept in two large warehouses adjacent to the central police station. The buildings had previously been used to store and service territorial defence force equipment and vehicles.

When the Serbian Territory Defence entered the area, they arrested all the Muslims and Croatians who were politically active. The local members of the Bosnian Muslim political party (SDA) were all held in this facility. Next, the Serbs arrested all the intellectuals, and then everyone else who did not have working obligations. The detainees were not charged with any offences. The detainees were interrogated and beaten primarily in the police headquarters basement. After an initial period, the detainees were then moved to the T.O. Warehouse or to the School.

At the T.O., the detainees were beaten, denied drinking water, denied use of the toilet and proper food. They were given only one meal a day consisting of a small slice of bread with jam. However, some of the local Serb guards were sympathetic and would smuggle in food packets, letters and other items from the wives of local detainees.

The Serbian Special Forces beat detainees at first. Later, the local Serb police guards beat the detainees and were more brutal than the Special Forces. The beatings varied in instruments and number of perpetrators. The detainees were beaten with iron bars, wood planks, and truncheons by between one and 10 men.

For example, one perpetrator reportedly beat detainees with an old automobile shock absorber and stabbed detainees with a bayonet. This
perpetrator was also responsible for pouring salt into the deep knife wounds he inflicted. 770/ In another instance, another perpetrator killed Father Jozo Puškarić, a religious figure, by picking him up and throwing him to the ground. 771/ This perpetrator reportedly injured many detainees in this manner. 772/

666. The Serbian Special Forces usually beat the detainees during the day in the room in which they were housed or in the yard. 773/ The police guards would beat the detainees at night and attack in the dark. 774/ When the beaten detainees would fall unconscious as a result of the blows, fellow detainees would have to carry them back to the detention area. 775/ A doctor was allowed to treat some of the detainees at the camp for their injuries that resulted from the beatings and mistreatment. 776/

667. The police guards also forced some detainees to eat sand and forced one prisoner to swallow his own feces. 777/ According to one report, the police guards forced one detainee to perform sex acts on a fellow detainee. 778/

668. In April 1992, 47 detainees from the T.O. Building were transferred by two trucks to the JNA Casern Barracks in Brčko. 779/ Some detainees were sent to different detention facilities in the region but were then later returned to this detention camp. 780/

669. Farmers' Cooperative Storeroom: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Approximately 45 non-Serb people were detained in the Farmer's Cooperative Storerooms in Crkvina. 781/ Crkvina is situated about three miles from Bosanski Šamac. 782/

670. On 7 or 8 May 1992, the Serbian Special Force Squad came to the detention centre and ordered the detainees to line up along one side of the room. 783/ A soldier shined a flashlight on each of the detainees. 784/ He then hit one detainee on the head with his gun and shot the detainee as he was falling to the floor. 785/ This procedure was repeated along the line of detainees. 786/

671. When the soldiers finished going down the line killing certain detainees, they ordered the remaining detainees to line up on the other side of the room. 787/ While going down the line this time, the soldiers asked the detainees their names and occupations. 788/ The killings were based on the detainees' answers. 789/

672. After going through the line the second time, the soldiers ordered the younger detainees to place the dead bodies on a truck which was backed up to the doorway. 790/ The detainees then had to clean the blood off the floor. 792/ Fifteen from among the 45 detainees were reportedly killed. 793/ At least one of the survivors was transferred to the Bosanski Šamac Jail. 794/

673. Bosanski Šamac Elementary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) The camp was located in the Bosanski Šamac School. 795/ The camp consisted of three buildings. 796/ The gymnasium held between 300 and 500 detainees ranging in age from 18 to 85 years old. 797/ The Osnovna Škola (Primary School) Building held approximately 80 detainees that were Muslim and Croatians ranging in age from 18 to 65 years old. 798/ The third building was the Spomen Dom (Memorial) Building which held approximately 40 detainees. 799/

674. Area residents, including women and children, were taken by truck to the school gymnasium. 800/ For the first three days, the detainees were not provided with food. 801/ After the fourth day at the camp, one loaf of bread per day was distributed for every 12 people. 802/ The guards never provided any
blankets or bedding to the detainees. 803/

675. The detainees in the Osnovna Škola Building were reportedly beaten, tortured and some were killed. 804/ Although some severe beatings occurred in the gymnasium, they were reportedly uncommon. 805/

676. Initially all the guards were local civilian policemen. 806/ In July 1992, the local guards were replaced or supervised by Serbian Reserve Soldiers and the treatment of the detainees became worse. 807/ The Serbian soldiers beat the detainees with sticks and burned them with cigarettes. 808/ The soldiers threw cold water on the detainees and beat them further.

677. The detainees received one meal a day that consisted of a half slice of bread and an egg. 809/

678. The camp commander was a former civilian policeman. 810/ The camp was controlled by the military police of the Serbian army. 811/

679. The most feared individual at the camp was named in the source materials. 812/ Although this individual was not a guard at the camp, he visited whenever he wanted and would proceed to beat and kill detainees. 813/ The killings took place in the gymnasium in front of all the detainees. 814/

680. At times, Serbian Troops would take groups of 15 to 20 men to dig trenches at the front. 815/ At least three men from the camp were seriously wounded by cross-fire. 816/

681. On or about 20 August 1992, 100 detainees from the school were transferred to the T.O. Building in Bosanski Šamac in anticipation of an exchange. 817/ Some of these detainees were tied up and threatened prior to the exchange. 818/

682. Bosanski Šamac Secondary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Detainees from Bijeljina were taken to this school where they spent three days. 819/ At this time, they were the only detainees in the school. 820/ Later, 10 men and two women were brought to the school from the Bosanski Šamac Police Jail. 821/ A Red Cross visit to the jail prompted the transfer. 822/

683. The detainees were later transferred to the Bosanski Šamac School Gymnasium. 823/

684. Old Police Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) A detention facility was located in Bosanski Šamac in the Old Police Building on Titova Street. 824/ 825/ When the Serbian Territory Defence entered the area, they arrested all the Muslims and Croats who were politically active. 825/ The local members of the Bosnian Muslim political party (SDA) were all held in this facility. 826/ Next, the Serbs arrested all the intellectuals, and then everyone else who did not have working obligations. 827/

686. The detainees were interrogated and beaten primarily in the police headquarters basement. 828/ After an initial period where they were beaten every day, the detainees were then moved to the T.O. Warehouse or to the School. 829/

687. Five of the detainees were civilians who had surrendered arms to a Serbian Paramilitary Unit. 830/ Although they were told by the police that they were to be treated as POWs, these men were tortured and beaten. 831/ Detainees were forced to lie face down while guards sliced their knuckles and beat them with wooden and rubber clubs. 832/
688. The Serbian military would come to the jail at random times each day and force the detainees to sing ethnic songs for an hour. Detainees who were leaders in the political communities of the Muslims or Croats were taken out of the chorus and beaten while the others continued to sing. Those who had relatives fighting in the Croatian Army were also singled out for harsh treatment, often death. In some cases, Serbs came from the front after fighting to beat the detainees.

689. Detainees were taken to dark rooms in the upper floor of the jail and beaten from behind. Detainees were forced to eat hot chili peppers to cause additional pain to the cuts they had from the beatings. Reportedly some detainees died or disappeared during their internment at the jail.

690. The camps were controlled by the military police of the Serbian army.

691. According to the list of detention places visited by ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, a detention facility was established at a local police station in Bosanski Šamac. Representatives of the ICRC visited this facility on 13 May 1992. No information regarding conditions, duration, the ethnicity of detainees nor the identities of the controlling parties was provided.

692. House Arrest: (The existence of this type of detention has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The women and children from the Bosanski Šamac area were detained in houses in the village of Zasavica. The village was policed by Serbian Soldiers and Serbian irregulars.

693. Sources suggest that the women were repeatedly raped while detained under house arrest.

12. Bratunac

694. This municipality is located in the central eastern part of BiH, bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, there was a population of 33,575 before the war. Of that number, Muslims constituted the majority with 64.2 per cent, Serbs made up 34.2 per cent, and the remaining 1.6 per cent described themselves as "other".

695. At the end of April 1992, Bratunac was occupied by former JNA Novi Sad corps and the Šešelj and Arkan formation from Serbia. The majority Muslim population failed to resist occupation, mostly out of fear of Serb retaliatory action. Two weeks later, the process of "ethnic cleansing" began, and was reportedly completed in less than one week.

696. By early May, Serb forces had robbed, burned, destroyed, and ethnically cleansed the villages of Hrančić, Glogova, Bičevo, Krasnopolj, Miholjevići and a large part of Bratunac itself. The Serbian extremists and aggressors have effectively forced 20,332 Muslim citizens, or 92 per cent of the Muslim population from the Bratunac area, into exile.

697. Serbian extremists arrested Muslims en masse. Many were taken to the stadium or sport grounds and stripped of their possessions. The men were separated from the women and children and then transferred to other detention facilities. A camp whose location is unknown is alleged to exist in one report.

698. FK "Bratstvo" Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Austrian Mission.) According to one report, "Četniks" from Serbia instituted a manhunt throughout the area inspecting one house at a time, collecting residents and sending them to the
local stadium for "consultations with the new authorities". When the citizens arrived, their names were read off, they were divided into groups, and the men were transferred to the gymnasium of the local elementary school.

According to another report, some 6,000 to 7,000 Muslims were interned at the stadium by "Cetniks" on 10 June 1992. They were reportedly forced to serve as blood donors, and some did not survive because so much blood had been withdrawn. Reportedly, the bodies of hundreds of individuals have been burned or thrown into the Drina River. This camp is also reported in a list of camps. Other reports also allege the existence of this camp.

"Vuk Stefanović Karadić" Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Austrian Mission.) Muslim men were detained at this location in the centre of the village following "consultation" and assignment at the stadium. Many were subjected to beatings. Several were reportedly tortured and killed. Allegedly the richest among the detainees were killed first. According to one report, detainees numbered approximately 800. Four hundred among them were later transported to Pale for prisoner exchange.

Many of the allegations concerning this camp are corroborated in the Special Rapporteur's report of 10 February 1993. It was reported that after the mass arrest of about 2,000 Muslims by Serb police in Bratunac on 9 May 1992, 500 to 600 men were detained in the hall of an elementary school. Those who could not fit inside were reportedly shot with automatic weapons in front of the hall. Beatings were carried out according to lists naming the most influential in the community. Between 30 to 50 people died from injuries the first night while nine others suffocated in the crush as the 500 to 600 struggled to escape the beatings. An Imam was allegedly beaten and stabbed to death after refusing to take the Christian faith and raise three fingers in the Serb manner. After three days of beatings, the group was transferred to Pale.

In another report, some 600-700 male Muslims were brutally tortured and killed by Serb paramilitary units and local "Cetniks". Some victims were beaten with wooden and iron poles, others were taken to the "so-called investigation" room which was full of dead bodies where they were made to jump up and down on the bodies of the dead. Witnesses claimed that the corpses were "butchered", with noses, ears and genitals cut off and crosses cut into their skin.

According to another report, on 12 May 1992, several individuals from the village of Rakovac were arrested by Serb police and detained at this location. Their personal effects were removed, they were beaten and then made to remain in a squatting position without food or water for some 30 hours. Two among them were reportedly set afire. Two other detainees were also killed. In the witness' estimation, some 21 individuals were killed during the course of the evening. Some days later, several prisoners were taken to Pale where they were exchanged.

In another report, a witness/victim was brought to this location in early April 1992. Reportedly hundreds of men between the ages of 16 and 50 were interned here. Every day a group of inmates were removed from the camp, and never returned. The witness was detained at this location until mid-May, at which time he was transported to Pale. During his detention at the school, he witnessed summary executions and arbitrary killings of other prisoners. Several individuals suffered from starvation. The witness was reportedly forced to bury many of the dead and was made to clean up the bloodstains left behind with his clothing. Another witness testimony provides similar details and it is unclear if it is the same witness.
705. In another report, after being transferred to the school from the stadium, some 500–600 men were forced into one main hall. The aggressors beat the detainees to try to squeeze them all into the hall. Those who could not fit, were shot in the doorway with automatic weapons. Consequently, many died from the suffocation which resulted from individuals squeezing others into the corners of the room to escape death. According to the report, those men who survived were beaten throughout the night.

706. In the days that followed, inmates were reportedly taken outside, beaten, placed into garbage containers, and burned alive. The open containers were then placed under the windows of the containment area causing the smoke to fill the room. The dead were later transported by trucks and disposed of in the river Drina.

707. According to several reports, the Imam, Mustafa Mojkanić, from Bratunac was killed by Serb extremists on 10 June before thousands of Muslim citizens. Reportedly, the Serb extremists ordered the Imam to cross himself, when he refused they beat him. They reportedly also stuffed his mouth with sawdust, poured beer in his mouth and then cut his throat. That same evening some 200 other Muslims were also killed, but not before being subjected to extreme abuses and physical mistreatment.

708. One witness reported that he and 120 other inmates from this camp were due to be exchanged for "etnik" prisoners at Kladanj on 14 May 1992. The source believed that they were actually taken to the village of Donja Vratnica, near Visoko, where they were untied and handed over to Bosnian soldiers wearing "fleurs de lis" badges. The source did not see any of the "etnik" prisoners they were to be swapped with.

709. This camp is also reported in a list of camps. Other reports also allege the existence of a camp here.

710. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the ICRC, there is a camp in the Military Prison in Bratunac. The ICRC first visited the Military Prison on 14 October 1993.

13. Brčko

711. Serbs have used and may still be using detention camps to facilitate the destruction and expulsion of non-Serbs from Brčko. Serbian conquest of Brčko is strategically significant in that it provides one link in a chain ensuring contiguous borders and access to FRy for Bosnian Serbs. Brčko lies on the southern bank of the Sava river which serves as the boundary between BiH and Croatia. Pre-war population of the city and county of Brčko was about 87,000, 40,000 in the city. Approximately 44 per cent were Muslim, 25 per cent Croat, 21 per cent Serb, six per cent Yugoslavs and 3 per cent "others". The county is part of the Sava River valley and supports mixed farming. The city was a light industrial centre.

712. The political and military objectives of the Bosnian Serbs are clear. The creation and preservation of Serbian dominated and controlled territory within what had become BiH and its direct geographic and political link with FRy. Brčko Serbs expressed their intention toward the end of April 1992. SDS Assemblyman Ristanjić declared that Bosnia's Serbs wanted to be part of Yugoslavia. He announced that Brčko's Serbs wanted the city broken into three parts, one each for Muslims, Serbs, and Croats. This announcement was covered on local television and in the newspapers Gradiţy and Brčanske Novine. He insisted that division must take place by 3 May or there would be war.
713. Their demand for ethnic division either unanswered, unmet, or unimportant, Serbian forces destroyed the two bridges over the Sava River, on or about April 30, 1992. Fifty to 100 people were killed by the explosions. Body parts were scattered nearby and windows in downtown Brčko were shattered. The Serbs bombarded Muslim areas with artillery. After about a day, Serb forces secured downtown Brčko and the predominantly Serb areas east of the main road to Tuzla. The Serbs also began to round up Muslim residents. 887/

714. For several months before April 1992, JNA equipment (including artillery, tanks, and small arms) from Slovenia and Croatia was brought into the Brčko area for storage. Buses carrying Serb forces (probably paramilitary) reportedly moved from Bijeljina toward Brčko in the days just before the end of April. By late April, the Serb leadership in Brčko appears to have had both experienced forces and a ready stockpile of arms at hand. 888/

715. Reportedly, the JNA had begun to patrol around the city and county of Brčko in January and February 1992. The reserves were called up in February, soldiers were told they would fight in the Osijek area. Most Croats and Muslims left their units and escaped to Croatia. At that time, the JNA confiscated all of the weapons and matériel of the Bosnian Territorial Defence Force and began to arm local Serbian civilians. Small squares were placed on every house and apartment building to identify the ethnicity of its inhabitants. Ethnic lists were compiled for every village and town in the area. 889/

716. As described above, Serb forces commenced their attack upon Brčko with the destruction of the two bridges (road and rail) that cross the Sava at Brčko, on April 30 or very early in the morning of 1 May 1992. 890/ The Serbian forces proceeded to bombard Brčko with artillery. Fighting reached the centre of the city on 1 May, when Serbian reservists from Bijelina positioned artillery around the train station and began firing into Muslim parts of the city. The shells landed at a rate of 75 every 45 minutes. In some parts of town, local Serbs who had obtained weapons beforehand began arresting their Muslim and Croatian neighbors. 891/ After the bombardment, Colonel Pavle Milinković and his garrison troops occupied the city with help from local mobilized Serbs. Muslim men were placed under house arrest. 892/

717. The battle for the city of Brčko was over for all practical purposes by 4 May 1992. Victorious Serb forces began rounding up Muslim and Croat residents. The captives were taken to several holding areas, including the Brčko police station, the local bus depot, a former sand and gravel depository, the hospital, a former textile factory, a mosque, a hotel, and a pig farm south-east of the city. Killings and beatings allegedly took place in each. 893/

718. A Bosnian Serb from a village populated entirely by ethnic Serbs, who participated in the takeover of Brčko provided the following account: Bosnian Serbs in Lukavac received a shipment of weapons from the JNA base in Brčko at the end of April 1992. The weapons, mostly AK-47's and M-48's, were delivered by JNA military trucks to a house in the village. The owner of the house, his brother and their friend then reportedly distributed the weapons in Lukavac. 894/

719. On April 30, 1992, JNA forces stationed in Brčko destroyed the two bridges over the Sava. Approximately 3,000 paramilitary troops from Serbia came from Bijeljina and attacked Brčko from the south-east. Bosnian Serb irregulars from Gornji Bukvik and the surrounding area attacked from the west. The two attacking forces met at the JNA military base in Brčko to further coordinate the takeover of Brčko with local JNA forces. 895/

720. The president of the local Serbian Democratic Party then allegedly announced the mobilization of all Bosnian Serbian male residents of military age. On 7 May, about 600 gathered. According to this witness, within the next seven
days all Muslim and Croatian residents were rounded up and taken to the Luka port camp. 896/

721. Another witness reported that in the first half of May, Serbs searched for weapons, registered the local population and restricted movement in the city. 897/

722. According to the same witness, successive waves of military and paramilitary forces came to Brčko. Every few days a different group appeared to be in charge. At one time or another, the men of Dragan Kalinić, Arkan (eljko Ranjatović) or Vojislav Sešelj were in charge. Martić's people from Bosanska Krajina were supposedly the last to hold the city. 898/

723. Each weekend groups of Serbian "weekenders" (vikendaši), armed Serbian men, not necessarily soldiers, allegedly descended upon the area from Bijeljina to plunder and vandalize. 899/

724. Reportedly, during the first few days of May, the local Serbs established what was called the "War Presidency", a committee of local leaders representing important sources of authority in the region. These allegedly included: the chief of uniformed police, Veselin Veselić, the commander of the military garrison, Colonel Pavle Milinković, the commander of the Luka camp, Dokić, the commander of the fire brigade, Kristo Purić, the head of health, Milenko Vojinović, aka Dr. Beli and reportedly in the Bosnian Serb Assembly in Pale, the head of the judiciary, Todor Gavrić, the information director, Boško Lomović, the head of defence, Milutinović and the police commander, Drago Vesiljević. Djordje Ristanić was reported to be the head of the executive body. The War Presidency may now call itself the "Executive Committee". 900/

725. JNA Casern: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State and Helsinki Watch.) As stated previously, the collection and imprisonment of non-Serbian residents began immediately after Serb conquest of the city. In fact, there is at least one report of Muslim detention at the JNA casern prior to the outbreak of armed hostilities in the city. 901/

726. Allegedly, on 26 April 1992, 47 prisoners from the Bosanski Šamac T.O. Building were transferred by two trucks, one civilian and one military, to the JNA casern in Brčko. The casern was still a JNA installation and supported an unidentified armour unit and an unidentified infantry unit. Some soldiers wore a star on their uniforms, while others had a star with the Serbian tri-colour in the middle. The detention facility took up half the casern and it already supposedly contained four unidentified civilians from the Brčko area. 902/

727. The alleged camp commander was a JNA counter-intelligence major who wore civilian clothes. Guards were JNA military police. 903/

728. The prisoners were reportedly interrogated and beaten. Interrogators included the camp commander and the commander of the Bosanski Šamac fourth detachment who was also a member of the city's crisis headquarters, who traveled to Brčko on at least two occasions for the purpose of interrogating prisoners. The goal was collection of information regarding Muslim/Croatian military posture and capabilities. 904/

729. One prisoner was allegedly maltreated because he was a member of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosanski Šamac. 905/

730. On 5 May, all 51 prisoners were reportedly transferred to the Španac JNA barracks territory in Bijeljina. 906/
731. It was also reported that on about 1 May 1992 about 200 men were held in the casern movie theatre from an ethnically mixed apartment building. 907/

732. Many were placed under a sort of house arrest, ordered to stay within their homes or a small area around their homes. It was reported that bands of Serbs entered Muslim homes, took away young females, raped them and returned them after two or three days. 908/ Most who found themselves alive and subject to the authority of Serbian forces were put in a number of places for several days before being shipped to the primary detention camp in Brčko, at the Luka port facilities.

733. The number of detainees was reported to have grown so rapidly that a number of facilities in and around Brčko were designated as holding areas. Accounts of the locations of these holding areas vary, but the following have appeared in a variety of reports and interviews received.

734. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch and the US Mission.) Reports suggest the detention and execution of hundreds of people at the Brčko police station probably located on Majevička Brigada Road in Brčko. 909/

735. One man claims to have been held there for seven days in May 1992. He stated that Serbian forces used this police station as a killing centre from 7 May 1992 until 1 June 1992. He may have loaded bodies into trucks during his seven day period of incarceration at the rate of 100 bodies per day. He claims to have survived only because of the intervention of a Serbian Orthodox priest who apparently secured his transfer to the Luka camp, which was located in a quarry and brickyard outside Brčko. The witness claims that he was later transferred to a camp in Serbia; where after a period of time he obtained his release. 910/

736. Apparently, the same individual recalls the execution of several Muslim teenage boys after they had been ordered to sing a Serbian song. He was also told that specific rooms in the police station were used for torture and execution. A guard at the facility supposedly claimed that 300 people were killed each day. The majority of killings seemed to take place around a series of stalls or elevators. 911/ A second individual apparently detained at the same place declared that he was responsible for unloading bodies from an elevator. He estimated that he loaded about 500 bodies onto trucks over a three day period. 912/

737. Several individuals were also reportedly beaten, interrogated, and forced to work. 913/

738. Slaughterhouse/Abattoir: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) According to a British report, the Abattoir, adjacent to the wharf complex in Brčko, was set up as a torture camp where the slaughter equipment was used on the inmates. 914/

739. The fact is, the slaughterhouse may have been used by the Serbs in conjunction with the police station as a detention and execution complex. Apparently, a slaughterhouse is located next to the police station. 915/ Also, another individual reported that he visited a cattle slaughterhouse near Brčko, near the Luka camp. He heard screams and shots. He also spoke with an alleged survivor of the facility who said that 100-300 people were killed there each day from 7 to 14 May 1992. 916/
740. A Former Sand and Gravel Depository: 917/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Mission.) It was reported that in late April 1992, the former sand and gravel depository "Luka-Składiste Šljunka i Peska" was turned into a detention camp where, within 30 days, more than 1,000 Muslims were sent. Inmates were fed once every two or three days. Every night a group of prisoners was taken away and not seen again. In late June, this camp allegedly held over 5,000. In a two day period in late June-early July, over 2,000 people from this camp were allegedly killed. New arrivals in the camp kept the population at roughly 5000. 918/

741. Former Textile Factory Interplet: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Mission.) Over 2,000 people, mostly women, were reportedly held in a former textile factory in Brčko. About 1,000 women there were allegedly subject to constant rape by Serb gangs. 919/

742. The Fesfema Restaurant: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Fesfema restaurant was reported as a place of detention in Brčko. 920/ No additional information was provided regarding its operation or control.

743. The Fraser (or Faser) Car Service Company: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) This facility was reportedly operated as a place of detention in Brčko. 921/ No additional information was provided regarding its operation or control.

744. Sports Hall/Stadium complex "Partizan": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State and the Danish Helsinki Committee.) A sports hall and/or stadium complex called Partizan allegedly held over 500 people.

745. Reportedly a group of 96 Muslims were transported to this location immediately after which two were killed and the remainder were forced to beat each other. A Major Dragan was said to have cut one prisoners' ear off and forced another prisoner to lick the wound. A machine-gun was supposedly placed in the middle of the hall and the guards threatened to kill everybody on the spot. Allegedly some guards placed pistols in prisoners' mouths, while others combed prisoners' hair with bloody combs. The report states that of the original 96, 26 survived two days of torture. Some were then reportedly taken to Bijeljina, others to the Luka camp. 922/

746. The Hotel Galija: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Mission.) Where more than 500 female Muslims were allegedly held for the sexual entertainment of Serb forces. 923/

747. Luka: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Mazowiecki and the British Defence Debriefing Team.) The brick factory and port facilities located on the Sava River; the primary detention camp in Brčko, notorious as a death and torture camp. 924/

748. The Serbs detained prisoners at the Luka port facility from at least 8 May 1992 until late July or August 1992, when, it seems, the Luka camp was shut down, and surviving prisoners were transferred elsewhere. Reports suggest that the camp population ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 inmates with the total number of people who passed through unknown. Supposedly about 95 per cent were ethnic Muslims and the remainder Croatian; however, there are reports of Serbs held and killed at the Luka camp also. Additionally, it seems that all those detained at the Luka camp were from around Brčko. 925/
749. During the camp's operation, many prisoners were released, some bribed their way out and others were saved by personal intervention of influential Serbs. Up to three thousand prisoners may have been killed in the Luka detention complex and all inmates were subjected to inhumane living conditions and a variety of brutal assaults, including rape and torture. The perpetrators of such acts were guards, administrators, soldiers and paramilitaries. Many survivors have rendered statements and may be available to testify. 926/

750. The Luka camp had five main parts: an administration building, which included barracks, offices, interrogation rooms, and rooms where women were held to be raped; a large warehouse divided into three compartments, where the detainees were held; a police barracks; a small building used as barracks by groups of front-line soldiers who visited the complex; and a second large warehouse, where visiting soldiers could obtain small arms and equipment. (The warehouse held a new model of rifle manufactured by the company in Serbia that usually supplied the JNA; some trucks making deliveries to the warehouse had license plates from Serbia.) The visiting soldiers, especially members of Arkan's forces, appear to have been responsible for many of the beatings and killings. 927/

751. From early May, Luka's commander was reportedly Major Petar Djokić; the Deputy Commander was an identified Captain. Both men wore JNA uniforms. The Major was known by locals to be the richest man in the Semberi region of Bosnia and had a house in Dvorovi. 928/ They appeared before the prisoners sparingly. Djokić reportedly oversaw or participated in some beatings and at least one killing of prisoners. They did not inform prisoners of their rights and responsibilities, nor did they apparently take necessary steps to maintain discipline within the Luka camp. They were directly involved in arranging for the transfer to the "Serbian Republic" of the property of at least some Muslims interned in the camp, in concert with representatives of the Arkanovci. They appear to have had repeated, direct contacts with various paramilitary leaders (including Arkan, Captain Dragan, and Captain Mauser, a local paramilitary). 929/

752. Until late May, the commander of the halls in which prisoners were held was an identified individual who reportedly committed numerous beatings and killings and was present for many others. This man had keys to the second warehouse, where arms were stored. He was reportedly succeeded as commander by a young man. This young man was from Brčko, was well known to detainees, and had worked in Luka from early May. After assuming command, he registered detainees; which the former commander had not. Both men were members of the local police (SUP). Nearly all guards in the camp (and all those seen after Kosta took command) wore blue SUP uniforms. Paramilitaries, in particular the Arkanovci and Draganovci, participated in the transportation of detainees to and from Luka. 930/

753. A Bosnian Muslim from Brčko provided an account of his arrest and imprisonment at Luka from the inception of its use as a camp. He stated that Serbian forces stormed into the suburb of Novo Brčko. "Četniks", including White Eagle forces, shot rifles into the windows of residences and drove people into the street. All residents were put into six trucks, which made about three trips to ferry the people to an area where three schools were collocated. 931/

754. The residents of Novo Brčko were gathered onto the combined athletic fields of the schools. With megaphones, the captors directed Serbs to one part of the field, Croats to another, and Muslims to yet another. Members of mixed marriages and children were not permitted to remain together. Along with a group of males aged 13 and older, the witness was among the first prisoners taken to the Luka camp. He was forced to sign documents "selling" his property in Novo Brčko at a low price to a Serb. 932/

755. During his first days at the camp, the captors called out names of
prisoners from electoral rolls. All those who were members of the SDA (a Bosnian, primarily Muslim, political party) or who had held positions of leadership in business or industry were killed. Shootings often occurred at 4:00 a.m. The witness estimates that during his first week at Luka more than 2,000 men were killed and thrown into the Sava River. 933/

756. After four days of mass shootings, there was a lull. From the fifth day, prisoners who were ethnic Serbs and were accused of being disloyal to the "etnik" cause were taken for interrogation and beatings. 934/

757. The witness was interrogated on the seventh day of his captivity. This was the stage when detainees with property or money were subjected to questioning and torture. The witness, who was affluent, would not describe his own beating. By this point, all prisoners known to have been politically active had already been killed. 935/

758. Following his second week in the Luka facility, the witness saw guards torture or kill Serbs who had hidden or helped Muslims. The camp commander designated a Bosnian Serb who had been a waiter at a Brčko hotel to seek out specific ethnic Serb prisoners for interrogation because he knew most of the Brčko area residents by name. 936/

759. After the witness had been interrogated, he was taken with other prisoners to Hanger Two of the loading dock, where they were forced to look at a pile of more than 200 corpses or torsos. Most of the body parts had been chopped off: hands, arms, and genitals. The prisoners standing outside Hanger Two were told they would end up like that if they told lies while being interrogated. 937/

760. Looking out the window during one of his interrogations, the witness saw the soldiers gang-rape a woman whom he had known since his high school days, and murder her husband. A Brčko school teacher among the guards, an ethnic Serb, was shot dead for refusing to join in the torture and killing of this couple. 938/

761. The witness identified the second camp commander, among others as responsible for the atrocities at Luka. This commander showed serious concern over the fact that some guards carried out their "duties" with knives. Most other guards at Luka were also visibly afraid of the knife-wielding guards, who were regularly seen castrating male prisoners. 939/

762. He also observed the beating of "handsome" male prisoners, aged 20 to 30, on the genitals repeatedly and for extended periods of time. 940/

763. The witness reported that on Wednesdays and Saturdays, guards raped teen-aged girls. Also, certain other guards routinely lined up handsome young men, Croat against Muslim, in rows of three or four. The male prisoners were forced to perform sodomy on one another while being taunted by laughing guards. 941/

764. According to the witness, the younger handsome males at Luka suffered the most horrific abuses by far of any group of prisoners. 942/

765. This witness observed eight to 10 teen-age girls brought to the camp commander's office building on Wednesdays and Saturdays, between about 1,400 and 1,800 hours. The teenagers came only two days of the week. 943/

766. The camp commander would take his time selecting a girl, who was then escorted upstairs. Once the commander had made his choice, three or four guards selected one girl to share among them, and so on. Only the commander was permitted a girl to himself. 944/

767. The witness identified one perpetrator as the well-known daughter of
Brčko's leading prostitute. She bragged about her job of going around town to "buy and prepare" the girls, and she was assisted by three men who participated in the "delivery service", as well as serving as "police" at the Luka camp. The witness identified all of the aforementioned people, and provided names of girls known to be dead and presumed to have died from being gang-raped at the Luka camp. 945

768. The female perpetrator reportedly brought a nurse to Luka to "prepare the girls and make them calm". The girls apparently had no idea what was going to happen to them because they were only slightly frightened. The witness implied that the nurse was coerced into "treating" the girls. 946

769. The nurse, also a fellow refugee, said that this female perpetrator had stabbed one girl, who had resisted being sent to the soldiers, on the breast and in the vagina with the broken neck of a glass bottle; the girl bled to death. The nurse personally witnessed this incident. 947

770. He reported that in the first week of June, the bodies of most of the 2,000 that he estimates were killed were thrown down a well and emerged later floating down the Sava River, surfacing at Brezovo Polje and even as far away as Belgrade. As Luka guards became aware of the surfacing corpses, they took to cutting open the bodies and packing them with sand to keep them submerged. This effort did not always succeed. The third approach was to chop up corpses and burn the bodies. 948

771. It seems that upon arrival at the Luka-Brčko camp, all internees were questioned by one of the three inspectors, who then decided their fate. Internees who were members of the SDA or HDZ political parties were usually executed at the camp. The internees were also questioned as to whether they, or their neighbors, possessed any currency, gold, or weapons. Prisoners could only be released by a signature from either the police chief at the camp or from the major or captain in charge. The Inspectors themselves did not have such authority. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were released though, by having a Serbian person vouch, with his or her life, that the internee would not leave Brčko, not discuss politics, and not own any weapons, and by having these Serbian sponsors sign a document to this effect. 949

772. Allegedly, a Serbian police officer, provided his signature to authorize some executions; however, it is understood that many killings reportedly occurred without any such signature being provided, required or even sought. 950

773. The Serbian police seemed to have administrative control of the camp, and it was reported that Serbian police officers were always present when atrocities occurred. One witness, saw camp guards at Luka-Brčko wearing black berets, which at that time indicated membership in units belonging to eljko "Arkan" Ranjatović. However, the witness also described the administration of Luka-Brčko as changing at least once a month. 951

774. Apparently, the camp itself measured approximately 230 by 150 metres and was enclosed by an electrified fence constructed by the detainees. Mines were supposedly buried around the exterior of the camp. The internees lived in one of three hangers: the first, 20 millimetres by 28 millimetres in size, housed 650-700 Muslim men from Brezovo Polje; the second 20 millimetres by 40 millimetres, housed 120-180 men; and the third 20 millimetres by 40 millimetres housed 300 men, women and children. Women and children were also held in one other undisclosed area. 952

775. The second and third hangers were connected by a large door through which the internees could see each other. Internees in the first hanger usually slept standing up because of the limited space. In the other two hangers the internees...
were allowed to sit along the wall, but their legs had to remain straight out along the ground. The internees were allowed to use the toilet, located in a different building, only once a day and for no longer than one minute. 953/ After 25 May 1992, each hanger was given five 10 litre buckets, which then served as their toilets. As of June 1992, goats were also placed in the hangers and lived with the internees. It was reported that combined stench of goat and human excrement, and dead internees from behind the third hanger, was overpowering. Blood was also reported to be ankle deep from behind the third hanger where the dead bodies were usually kept until later disposed. 954/

776. It was reported that in the beginning of May 1992, each intern received food rations of 50 grams of bread and .15 litres of thin bean soup each day. This ration was later changed to 80 grams of bread per day and .08 litres of spoiled bean porridge soup per week and later drastically cut to 70-80 grams of bread only every four to five days. 955/

777. Apparently, murder and torture were a daily occurrence. Such activity often appeared to be random. Reports received describe a plethora of various acts of violence and degradation. For example, witnesses reported ears and noses cut off and eyes gouged out. Some of the internees were killed for such slight infractions of camp rules as raising a leg off the ground. Many prisoners were killed by being shot in the back of the head. Such killings were usually carried out near floor drains which emptied into the Sava river. Knives were reported to be used to cut into the skin of the internees all the way to the bone and others had their fingers cut off. 956/

778. Guards regularly beat prisoners with different types of clubs. Some prisoners were reportedly beaten with clubs to the point that their faces caved in and were then simply left to die. Another form of maltreatment was to jump from tables onto internees breaking their ribs and other bones. Many men were allegedly castrated. Such atrocities were almost always reported to have been committed in front of other detainees. The bodies of the dead, or dying internees, were often taken to the camp dump or moved behind the prisoner hangars. Other internees were required to move the bodies. Sometimes the prisoners who carried the dead were killed while carrying such bodies to the dump. The dead were also taken and dumped outside the Serbian Police Station located on Majevička Brigada Road in Brčko. 957/

779. One source indicates that these daily atrocities were committed by 10-15 Serbian paramilitary soldiers and an unknown number of Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, and Yugoslavian Federal Specijalci soldiers, as well as by Serbian police. Internees were often told to sing and those that did not sing loud enough were shot point blank. After the singing started the guards would often come in and start randomly shooting the internees. In one undated incident, approximately 50 men, women and children were killed. The internees were told that this was in retaliation for the deaths of 12 Serbian paramilitary soldiers killed at the front. This type of random shooting was reported to have occurred on a daily basis with anywhere from 15-50 victims. 958/

780. There was also reported to be a torture room at the camp, and those internees taken there never returned. Those tortured were either killed immediately or left to bleed to death in pools of their own blood. No other prisoners were allowed to help them and if they did not die on their own within two to three days, they too were then shot to death. 959/

781. It was reported that dozens of Muslim prisoners had crosses engraved into their foreheads with knives and were then given Orthodox names such as Aleksander and then required to repeat, for example, "I am Aleksander". 960/

782. Apparently, several camp guards would enter the third hanger on a daily
basis and force a prisoner to drink some sort of alcoholic beverage and swallow white pills. They would then order the prisoner to beat his fellow prisoners. 961/

783. One report estimated that "Četniks" were involved with approximately 70 per cent of the tortures at the camp. Fifty to 60 per cent of the killings were estimated to be done by Arkanovci; however, other Serbian paramilitary forces such as, Šešeljovci, Specijalci, and Draganovci were also involved in the killing and torture and Serbian Police were often present. 962/

784. According to the report "Četniks" and "STDF" forces guarded the camp and internees often unloaded ammunition from civilian trucks which was stored directly next to where the detainee's were housed. This ammunition was reported to have been used by Serbian forces belonging to the Brčko garrison. 963/

785. A Bosnian Serb who joined Serb forces and worked as a guard at the Luka-Brčko port facilities provides one of the most detailed descriptions of the camp located on the west bank of the Sava River. This description both corroborates and contradicts certain aspects of other reports on the camp. He stated that the camp was approximately 500 metres long and 100 metres wide and was surrounded by a two metre high chain-link fence with barbed wire outriggers (fence appeared part of the original port facilities). 964/

786. A single gate was located on the north-west side and provided vehicular and pedestrian access. The INA-Luka gas station was located immediately adjacent to the gate and on the same side of the road as the camp. Facing the gate from the outside of the camp, the gas station was to the left of the gate. The gate was five or six metres wide and consisted of two hinged doors, made of spaced vertical metal rods mounted on a metal frame, which moved on rollers. The gatehouse was located on the outside of the gate. The camp accomodations consisted of two one-story warehouse buildings, each measuring approximately 40 metres long and 20 metres wide. Between the two warehouses but closer to the river were the ruins of a building. 965/

787. The outside perimeter was guarded by six guards who worked in pairs in two hour shifts. These guards were lodged in a nearby house outside the camp perimeter. All six were Bosnian Serbs from the Brčko area and were ordered to participate in some of the rapes, torture and killing of male and female prisoners held at the camp. 966/

788. Male and female prisoners, no children, were delivered to the camp in military trucks and unloaded in the warehouses. No effort was made to segregate the sexes. Between 300 and 400 prisoners were confined inside each of the two warehouses, where they were kept at all times. The prisoners were provided one meal a day and forced to sleep on concrete floors. No bedding or blankets were provided. 967/

789. Between 100 and 150 Serbs from Belgrade worked in shifts of about 50 men inside the camp. They wore green camouflage uniforms and green berets bearing two white eagles. They were armed with AK-47's with folding stocks and knives that they carried either at their waists or in their boots. They were the only Serbs allowed to operate within the camp. Every day, they carried out the interrogation, torture and killing of prisoners in the small office rooms at the inside end of each of the two warehouses. 968/

790. The rapes of young female prisoners were carried out in a room known as the rape room that was an annex, measuring 2.5 by three metres, at the corner of one of the warehouses. 969/

791. The screams of prisoners and sound of shots being fired from the warehouses
were very common. Bodies of killed prisoners were immediately loaded onto military trucks and taken to the Kafilerija Farm for disposal. Some were buried in mass graves; some were placed in a garbage truck, compressed, and dumped at a dump site; some were processed for use as livestock feed. 970/

792. The witness also stated that the camp was visited daily by two or three high ranking civilian officials, in civilian cars, who remained on the camp premises for approximately two hours before leaving. Twenty-four hours a day, trucks, in convoys of two to four, brought new prisoners in while other trucks took prisoners out. Some prisoners were taken in civilian cars to the JNA base in Brčko for additional interrogation. He reports that an identified individual was in charge of the "S" Local Community in Brčko. The "S" Local Community was the fourth of four administrative divisions in Brčko. The first was the Serbian Varoš Community; the second was the Tuzla Road Community; the third was the Bijeljina Road Community. Brčko camp was located within the jurisdiction of the "S" Local Community. 971/

793. One of the more notorious incidents to have occurred at the Luka-Brčko camp was related by a Bosnian Serb who joined the Serbian forces and worked as a guard at the camp. On 17 May 1992, in the afternoon, six guards at the Serb detention camp in Brčko, selected 12 female prisoners between the ages of 12 and 25 and took them to what was known as the rape room. A small room attached to the corner of one of the two warehouses used for housing prisoners at the camp. The room had no furnishings. Part of the floor was covered with cardboard. Five of the guards were from a group of guards that had come from Belgrade. The sixth was from Bosnia. Once inside the room, the girls were forced against one of the walls. Two of the guards grabbed a 12 year-old girl, removed her clothes and pinned her to the floor. One held her hands while the other held her legs. The Bosnian guard was ordered to rape her. The other guards watched to ensure compliance with the order. After the rape, the victim dressed and the prisoners were removed. 972/

794. About an hour after the rape, a group of 80 male Bosnian prisoners, Serbs and Croats, between the ages of 20 and 50 were lined up against the wall of a ruined building located close to the river and in line with a point halfway between the two warehouses. Three prisoners between the ages of 35 and 40 who were standing closest to the guards, were separated from the group and brought to the Bosnian guard about 20 metres away. One of the other guards gave the Bosnian guard a knife about 30-35 centimetres long and ordered him to kill all three by slashing their throats. The Bosnian hesitated. The other guard grabbed his hand and forced the knife through one prisoner's neck below the ear. The knife was pulled out and the victim fell into convulsions for 30 seconds before death. The Bosnian guard was ordered to kill another prisoner in the same manner, he again hesitated so another guard pushed the knife into the prisoner's neck killing the man instantly. The Bosnian guard then tried to kill the third prisoner with the knife, failed, so finished him off with his rifle. The three bodies were loaded onto a military truck. The Bosnian guard was then ordered to kill the remaining 77. He did so with his rifle. The bodies were placed on trucks and brought to the Kafilerija farm for disposal. 973/

795. A Bosnian Serb forcibly conscripted into the Reserve Contingent of the Serbian Territorial Military Police by "Specijalci" described a situation indicative of the atmosphere at the Luka camp and amongst the guards. He was assigned to the camp on 15 May 1992, because of a shortage of guards. Upon arrival at the camp, he was picked up by a "specijalci" 974/ soldier in a camouflage uniform and posted on an open street about 50 metres from the warehouses. He replaced another guard who left with the "specijalci". After about two hours on guard, around 9:00 a.m., another soldier in camouflage came to the guard post and told him to follow. This soldier appeared to be one of those in charge. About 10 metres from a hangar, the other soldier told him it was time
to have some fun. He was told that as a Serb it's his duty to rape several Bosnian Croatian or Bosnian Muslim women to show his patriotism to the government in Belgrade that had sent "Specijalci" to Brčko to liberate local Serbs. He was told that unless he got his hands dirty like the rest he would be shot as a traitor. After threatened with death, he agreed to commit rape. 975

796. He failed in his first attempt to rape a young woman about 25 who seemed to be Muslim. He successfully raped a 15 year-old girl who fought back and had to be held down by four soldiers. Ten to 12 "specijalci" stood outside the warehouse indifferent or bored, jeering and cursing the conscript when he protested. Over a period of one hour, he raped five women between the ages of 15 and 22. Not totally convinced of his loyalty and saying the rapes were just for fun the soldiers informed him that he must now do something more serious. 976

797. At about 1,000, two well dressed men between the ages of 30 and 50 were brought out from one of the warehouses and placed in front of its wall. The conscript was ordered to shoot. He resisted. He was then threatened with a pointed rifle, at which time he did the job. Then to further prove his loyalty to the Serbian cause he was told to cut some throats. He couldn't do it so the soldiers guided his hand to cut the two throats of the prisoners. 977

798. The following account of a Bosnian Muslim civilian male from Brčko who was arrested by Bosnian Serb Forces on 10 May 1992 displays the humiliation and degradation commonly reported as being suffered by prisoners at the Luka camp.

799. The man was ordered into one of a series of connected warehouses each approximately 20 by 50 metres in size. There were already about 100 prisoners there. For the first 15 minutes, the prisoners were forced to sit with their heads down while Bosnian Serb Army soldiers hit them with rifle butts and executed several of the men by shooting them in the head. After about 15 minutes, the man's name was called for a hearing. When he entered the room he saw another man on the floor pressing a cloth to his bleeding head and a pool of blood on the floor. He was immediately hit from behind with a rubber truncheon and fell on top of the other man. He was asked where his video camera was hidden. He was accused of filming events for Croatian TV. When he responded that he never had a camera, he was kicked and beaten by guards who were all from Bijeljina. The guards then asked him where they had hidden arms. He responded that he did not have any. The guards then beat and kicked him until he bled from the ears. He was next ordered to make the orthodox sign of the cross. He genuflected several times. When he made a mistake a guard kicked one of his teeth out. When he left, other prisoners were brought in. A prisoner unable to walk was killed. He was returned to the warehouse. 978

800. A policeman from Bijeljina entered the warehouse and told the prisoners to pair off and then punch one another in the face. Other policemen would stand behind the prisoners and beat them if they did not hit hard enough. This lasted about two hours. The witness was severely beaten by the younger and stronger man he had paired off with. The guards then arranged forced boxing matches. In one case a 70 year-old had to fight a 20 year-old. For the rest of the evening, so-called Četniks would enter the darkened warehouse and beat people randomly. At about 2,200, four men referred to by the witness as Četniks entered and took all valuables to be found on the prisoners. 979

801. The next night and each proceeding night for the rest of this man's time in Luka, men he referred to as "Četniks" came in with flashlights and took 20 to 30 prisoners. Shouts and screams would then be heard. In the days that followed, groups of four men were taken either to load bodies into refrigerator trucks or to throw them into the Sava River. 980
802. The witness recalled that one prisoner was beaten by 12 "Četniks" clad with black baseball bats. They systematically broke his fingers, arms and knees. Then one man, who the witness calls one of the main "Četniks" from Brčko, killed that prisoner with a pistol. 981/

803. The witness reported that two days later, the "etnik Captain", who had worked in the same factory as the witness, requested that seven men from among the detainees go over to the medical clinic to clean up broken glass. The witness volunteered. Upon his arrival at the clinic, the witness found 70, so-called, "Četniks" waiting in two rows to beat the male detainees. 982/ The witness recalled seeing a number of men already beaten who were unable to stand. One of these "Četniks" refused to allow them to be hit more than once. This "etnik" retrieved the witness from Luka on 14 May and put him under house arrest until 14 July when, the witness reported, all Muslim men from Brčko were taken in three buses to the Batković camp. 983/

804. Another alleged prisoner at the Luka camp reported that he was never registered, interrogated, beaten or tortured while there. However, the prisoner reported that he witnessed the gross maltreatment of other prisoners, including killing, on a daily basis. 984/

805. According to this witness, he was transferred from "the military headquarters" in Brčko to the Luka camp on 7 May 1992. He remained there until 12 July 1992 when he was transferred to Brezovo Polje. He states that at Luka his personal documents were taken away from him and he was placed in Hall 2. He could witness the events going on in front of the halls through a large gate in his hall that was open during the day. Because of what he witnessed he lived in constant fear. 985/

806. He reported that "Četniks" tortured and killed prisoners with an iron spiked mace. He also reported that prisoners loaded 200-300 dead bodies onto refrigerated trucks every day from 4:00 to 5:00 a.m. According to this witness the bodies were taken to the Kafilerija food factory to be burned. 986/

807. He states that he was assigned to load dead bodies twice. He claims that 80 per cent of the dead had had their throats cut while 20 per cent had been shot or had been beaten or tortured to death. He said that almost all of the victims had been inhabitants of Brčko. 987/

808. He also provided some specific examples of brutality committed in the camp. Once, guards entered Hall 2 and randomly picked five prisoners. The guards ordered the five men to stand facing a wall. A guard or some sort of military member then drove a truck inside the hall and crushed the men up against the wall. The driver put the truck in reverse and repeated this maneuver until all five were dead. While this was going on, the 150-200 other prisoners in the hall were forced to sit down and avert their eyes. 988/

809. This witness also claims that on about 10 May 1992, "Četniks" delivered a truckload of 30-40 Muslims and Croatians to Hall 2. One of the "Četniks" called out the name of a family, a husband, wife and their five year-old daughter, and took them outside in front of the hall. The "etnik" then held the daughter by the hair and allegedly cut her throat. The mother fainted. The father then had his throat cut. Other guards revived the mother, and then she was killed in the same way. When this was going on, the witness describes a sort of chaotic situation in the camp. Guards were drunk and drinking and firing shots into the air. 989/

810. The prisoner claimed that a Serbian front line soldier visited the camp almost every other day. On each visit, the soldier allegedly shot and killed four or five detainees in the back of the head with his pistol while the
detainees sat on the ground with their heads down. He describes another front line soldier visiting the camp on at least three occasions and executing prisoners he had apparently knew and had identified to be executed before his arrival. 990/

811. The same prisoner claims that his brother was also detained at the Luka camp and informed him of other acts of brutality. For example, on 12 or 13 May 1992, the brother supposedly claimed that "Cetniks" ordered about five detainees to lie down in a line on the tar road in front of Hall 1 inside the camp. A Serbian guard then allegedly drove a truck filled with sacks of sand over their necks, killing them instantly. 991/

812. The brother also supposedly reported that on four or five different evenings in the middle of May, 1992, approximately 15 young prisoners (from 15 to 20 years old) were forced to get into a closed delivery van and transported away. The next morning, prisoners who were assigned to load dead bodies on to the refrigerated trucks noticed that among the dead bodies were the 15 young men taken away three or four hours earlier. The bodies were naked and each had two openings cut into their backs. 992/

813. Many of the prisoners killed in Luka-Brčko were allegedly buried in a series of four mass graves situated behind a local drinking establishment on the road between Brčko and the village of Brezovo Polje. The road runs parallel to and is about 500 metres from the Sava River. The mass graves lie in a wooded area between the road and the river. 993/

814. The bodies of internees from the Luka-Brčko camp were also reported to have been transported to and burned at the old "Kafilerija" animal feed and rendering factory in Brčko. 994/ This factory was approximately four miles from the camp and located where Bijeljinska Cesta ended and Vase Pelagica street began. Refrigerated and TAM-110 trucks were reported to leave Luka-Brčko camp at 4:00 a.m. each morning with approximately 20 bodies each. Additional refrigerated trucks, from other unknown locations, also arrived at this factory. When the bodies arrived at the factory they were first dumped by 10-12 internees inside a building where three large furnaces were located. Unnamed Serbian paramilitary forces then stripped the bodies of valuables before dumping them into the furnaces. This facility was also guarded by unnamed "Šešelj's" forces. The burning of the bodies started in May 1992 and prior to this time the bodies had been dumped into the Sava river until the number of bodies needing to be disposed of became too high. 995/

815. Apparently, the ECMM reported an allegation that Serbs in Brčko destroyed the cadavers of their Muslim victims by throwing them into machines designed to grind up dead animals to make animal feed for cattle. Other Muslims were allegedly forced to operate this machine and later allegedly also killed. This may very well be a description of the Kafilerija plant. 996/

816. It seems that yet another source had heard that children at the Luka camp had been killed and then thrown into cement mixers; their remains used as food for poultry. 997/

817. There was also reported to be a mass grave located on the southern side of of a local street, in the eastern part of Brčko. 998/

818. Another witness who allegedly spent some time at the Luka camp claimed that from nine to 11 May 1992, he and three other Luka prisoners were taken to the Brčko hospital to load dead bodies into a furnace. According to this witness, the bodies had been cut into pieces and placed into 50 kilogram nylon sacks. He saw body parts from men, women, and children, most with civilian clothing. The sacks were brought to the hospital in small trucks. The witness claims that he
personally loaded about 200 such sacks into the furnace over the two day period. When his group left, they were replaced by another group of four men. The men were always under armed guard.

819. Other unnamed sources have stated that as of August, 1993 there were over 3,000 ex-detainees in the free territory of Brćko (not counting detainees who have left the area already), 1,200 of whom are women and 500-600 of whom are children. Approximately 500 of these women have been reported to have been raped while imprisoned. 999/

820. The Bimex Agricultural Complex: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State and the US Mission.) A pig farm south-east of the city, about three kilometres from Brćko, was reportedly used as an interrogation and torture centre for Muslims. Those sent there never returned. 1000/ However, several Luka prisoners were transferred to the pig farm where they were required to work and continued to be subject to maltreatment at the hands of their captors. One witness reported that between about 18 May 1992 and the Spring of 1993, 32 Muslims and six Croats performed forced labour there. The men worked day and night and were allowed to sleep four to five hours a night. The prisoners were often beaten. A mass grave is reported to be located there. 1001/

821. Another witness reported three mass graves on the way to the farm. He said that he often passed three large pits, at least 15 metres long, to which bodies were taken in a certain TAM truck. He passed these pits on the way to the Bimex swine breeding farm from Brćko, three kilometres east of Brćko. 1002/

822. A mass grave was also reported to be located not far from the pig farm. Refrigerated meat transportation trucks were reportedly used to haul bodies to this mass grave. 1003/

823. Unidentified Detention Facilities: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Mission.) Two other unidentified Serbian detention facilities, near the Bimex pig farm, were reportedly located about 200 metres further west of an area restaurant at a small river port on the river Sava. 1004/

824. The Laser Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) One witness was hiding with neighbors at home when Serbs came to his neighborhood with a TAM truck, saying they were to take everyone to a factory called "Laser". Because there was not room enough to carry everyone in the neighborhood, the Serbs took only men. They took them to the restaurant at the Laser factory where there were already 200 men, women and children. The next day, 7 May buses arrived. Women, children and the elderly were taken away. One bus headed toward Čelić, the other toward Brezovo Polje. That night, two individuals and a Serb from Brćko allegedly came in to the factory, took out four prisoners, beat them and took their valuables. On 8 May, the prisoners were given the choice of going to Čelić or Brezovo Polje. Most chose Čelić because it was located in the "free territory". The witness boarded a bus and was taken to the Luka camp. 1005/

825. Another witness describes a group of 100-120 people being held at the Laser factory restaurant, on or about 6 May 1992. He reports that at night a Serb arrived. This Serb supposedly called out people's names and killed those he called out in front of the building. The other prisoners were told to keep their heads down inside the building and not to look out. Those killed had their throats cut. In a room next door about 10 women of different ages were held. This Serb reportedly raped a woman in front of her mother. 1006/
826. The Hotel Bosna: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate.) Thirty-three civilians from Brčko were reportedly held in the attic of the Hotel Bosna in Brčko for seven days. Neighbors served as their guards. After seven days they were transferred to the Luka camp. 1007/

827. Three Mosques of Brčko: (The existence of these detention facilities have been corroborated by multiple sources, including US Department of State and Helsinki Watch.) The three mosques in Brčko were also reported as places where Serbs housed prisoners. 1008/ One witness reported that between 100 and 150 men ages 15-80 were held in a mosque for a night after the town fell to the Serbs. According to this witness, the prisoners were forced to sing "etnik" songs. They were ordered to squat in a single line and told that if they fell asleep they would never wake up. During the night, local Serbs from Brčko who were dressed in "etnik" uniforms would arrive and beat the prisoners with their boots. Men, including some old men, were beaten at random by groups of three or four Serbs who entered every 10 minutes. They beat each person for about 10 minutes. One man had his teeth knocked out. Seven or eight men were taken out of the mosque never to return. A paramilitary called "Mauzer" from Bijeljina seemed to be in command. JNA recruits responded to his orders and the witness reported the visit of JNA generals to the mosque who surveyed the situation and left the paramilitaries in control. The paramilitary captors also supposedly tied a white ribbon around a prisoner's arm and sent him out of the mosque to see whether he would draw the fire of a Muslim sniper. In the morning, the prisoners were taken to the basement of the local hospital. 1009/

828. Some of the women reported to have been held at the Hotel Bosna were also later transferred to a mosque. 1010/ Another witness reported that a group of 180-200 men were held in "the" mosque for four days where they were forced to go to the bathroom on the "abdesthana", a place for religious ritual. 1011/

829. Hospital/Health Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Those that were reportedly held in the mosque for a night were taken to the basement of the local hospital the next morning, where they were interrogated. According to the same witness the prisoners were questioned every two hours for two days. The interrogators were two Serb men from Brčko and two other men. The interrogators first beat the prisoners then asked them questions. They wanted to know who had weapons in the area and who had shot at Serb forces. The witness was beaten until unconscious, revived and beaten again. 1012/

830. At the time of this captivity, Muslim forces, trying to retake the town, attacked the hospital. Serb defenders placed the witness in front of a window vulnerable to fire from the Muslim forces. A Serb paramilitary held a gun on the witness at all times. The witness reports that the Muslims stopped firing after they saw him standing in the window. The witness escaped torture at the hospital by trading his watch to a paramilitary for transport to Brezovo Polje. 1013/ 831. Another witness described punishment for the smallest remarks ranging from beating on the palm of the hands with a truncheon to cutting off ears and noses and jumping from a table on to prisoners' chests. This occurred at the Brčko Health Centre. 1014/

832. Es Naselje Ghetto: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) On 13 July, 1992, Serbian forces swept through the Es Naselje Ghetto, a block of apartment buildings that they regularly patrolled, located near the casern, and that Serbs had turned into a small ghetto for Muslims and Croats. The Serbs collected about 450 Muslims and Croats and bused them to the Batković camp. 1015/
833. An Ethnically Mixed Apartment Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Local Serbs held Muslim and Croat residents of the building in the basement for six days then turned them over to Arkanovci. They were then transferred to the JNA casern. 1016/

834. The Hotel Posavina: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Serbs reportedly took some of the Muslims and Croats that they had rounded up to the Hotel Posavina in Brčko. A massacre is also reported to have occurred there. 1017/

835. The Village of Brezovo Polje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Serbs occupied the village of Brezovo Polje on 15 April 1992. Allegedly, the entire village became a concentration camp for two months, after which, on 17 June the Muslim and Croatian populations were evacuated. The Serbian force that occupied Brezovo Polje consisted primarily of paramilitary forces, Arkanovci, Šešeljovci, White Eagles and the Srpska Garda (Mauserovci). The commander of the latter and some regular JNA troops was identified in the report. 1018/

836. Serbian forces immediately declared martial law and confined the citizens to certain areas within the village. Apparently, about 2,750 Muslims were held prisoner. Male Muslims were interrogated at the local police station, where some were also beaten and one or two killed. Food in town ran low. Electricity and telephone service were cut off. 1019/

837. According to one source approximately 1,500 people were detained in Brezovo Polje from around 7 May 1992 to 1 June 1992. That witness also states that four or five people were taken away daily never to be seen again. According to two witnesses, the JNA was in charge to begin with; however, Serbian paramilitaries soon assumed command and the local JNA soldiers appeared to subordinate themselves to the paramilitaries, most of whom were members of the White Eagles. 1020/

838. Another report declares that some Muslim and Croatian prisoners first taken to the Luka camp were then selected for transfer to Brezovo Polje and there tortured. 1021/

839. Another witness claimed that about 1,000 people were held at Brezovo Polje. Some later removed to Tuzla. The witness also reports that 150 girls ages 12 and above were raped by gangs of 30 or more men at a time. 1022/

840. The greatest number of prisoners claimed was 5,000 Muslims. That report also alleges the occurrence of massacres and other violence visited upon the Muslim prisoners. 1023/

841. Apparently, On 17 June 1992, the men between 18 and 50 were transferred to the Luka-Brčko camp. Women, children and some old men were transferred to Lončari, a village north of the city of Brčko. 1024/

842. Automobile Maintenance Shop, Lončari: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Once in Lončari, 70 old men and two boys were placed in an automobile maintenance shop. All 72 slept on the concrete floor of a room five by six metres in size. 1025/

843. Elementary School, Lončari: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Twelve hundred women and children were placed in three rooms of a small
elementary school next to the car shop. The two boys mentioned above were later transferred to the school. There was not enough room for all in the school, so some had to sleep outside on the sidewalk in front of the school. Everyone else had to sleep on the floor with no blankets. 1026/

844. It was an old school with no water supply or toilet. Two latrines were set up in the field next to the school. Guards brought water for the prisoners to drink. Food was delivered twice a day from a local farm, at 1,100 and 1,900 hours. Each prisoner received a small portion of bread with butter or lard. Sometimes, boiled eggs, hot tea or hot watery soup were provided. 1027/

845. Twice, a local Serbian Orthodox priest brought the 250 children fresh milk. Otherwise, children received no special ration. 1028/

846. Prisoners were generally hungry. They were required to work in the fields of a local farm and otherwise told to remain in the car shop, school and police station. Guards warned the prisoners not to wander because mines were located outside the perimeter (A statement later discovered to be false). 1029/

847. Six guards of the local police (SUP) watched the area at all times. Captain Dragan was the SUP commander in Lončari.

848. No prisoners in Lončari were ever questioned, tortured, killed or raped. 1030/

849. On 20 June 1992, 48 females between the ages of 13 and 30 were selected and taken away by bus to Karakaj where they were reportedly raped in the Glinica factory. On the same day, approximately 900 of the remaining women and children were loaded on buses and transported to a place near Tuzla. There, about 150 girls aged 12 and older were allegedly raped by gangs of 30 or more men at a time. 1031/ After 20 June, only about 300 old men and women and some younger women remained in Lončari.

850. On 29 June 1992, Lončari was abandoned as a place of detention and all remaining prisoners were transferred to Ugljevik. 1032/

851. The Restaurant "Westphalia": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The Westphalia restaurant was reportedly located near Stolina across from the Bimex Pig Farm and Agricultural Complex on the road between Brčko and Brezovo Polje. Supposedly, Serbs began using the restaurant as a place of detention immediately after the occupation of Brčko. The detainees were reportedly from East and West Bosnia. From this camp, women and girls were reportedly distributed to other Serb run brothels. Girls as young as 15 were reported to be held and abused there. Those who resist the sexual acts are said to be tortured. For example, women's breasts were cut and crosses were carved into their bodies with knives. 1033/

852. A Coffee House Near Skijana: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) Skijana is a Brčko suburb in the direction of Bijeljina, where a large number of girls were allegedly held and abused by Serbian soldiers. 1034/

853. A Coffee House Near Stolina: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) This alleged place of detention may be the same as the restaurant Westfallia. 1035/
854. A Private House in Grčica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) Grčica is an intercity neighborhood of Brčko. A detention facility was reportedly established in a house which was located 20 metres from an unidentified paint shop. This location was reportedly a site where Serbs detained females for rape. 1036/

855. Another source describes a detention facility in a home in Grčica used as a residence and headquarters by a Captain who served as the head of the Draganovci in Brčko. She also stated that a Lieutenant Colonel who was the garrison commander, often attended parties there. She states that she was raped repeatedly and forced to keep house for the four men who lived there. 1037/

856. Dragan Training Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) One witness claims that her teenage daughter had been detained at the Dragan training camp for local Dragan supporters at a storehouse complex near the old Kafilerija. Her daughter allegedly watched repeatedly as Muslims were brought to an area in front of the camp and killed with a gunshot to the back of the head. These and other bodies transported to the area were buried in a hole called the "rupa", dug by bulldozers. The bodies were then covered with truckloads of refuse and dirt. 1038/

857. The Hotel Elvis: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) This hotel is also identified as a place used by Serbs immediately after the occupation of Brčko to hold women and girls from east and west Bosnia for the purpose of rape. 1039/

858. The Hotel Galeb: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) This facility was identified as a place used by Serbs to hold females for the purpose of rape. 1040/

859. Private House Behind SUP Headquarters: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) After a few days detention at the Luka camp, a woman reports being transferred to a house behind SUP headquarters in Brčko on 17 May 1992. There she was detained several weeks, and then she was moved to a home in Grčica. 1041/

860. She claims that the house was occupied by 14 Draganovci who were part of a special unit that carried out arrests for the SUP. 1042/

861. The Tanjug news service reported on 29 September 1992 that the Serbian leadership in Brčko denied an allegation by the United States administration that there were concentration camps for Muslims in Brčko. According to the report, the Brčko Serbian leadership requested international organizations to send their officials to the Muslim part of Brčko where, again according to the report, approximately 1,500 Serb women, children, and old people were being held prisoner. Also, the Serbian leadership of Brčko apparently asked international organizations to visit Brčko and see for themselves that there were no concentration camps for Muslims and that Muslims who remained in the Serbian part of Brčko lived normally. 1043/

862. According to another report, Radovan Karadžić rejected as completely unfounded the American accusations that 3,000 Muslims were killed at the Brčko Luka camp. In addition, the report states that an American from Brčko inquired amongst friends and family in Brčko of such allegations and discovered that they were not true. 1044/
863. A Bosnian Serb Army officer believes the initial apprehension of Muslims legitimate. He concedes that later confinement may have become illegitimate. BSA forces apprehended civilian Muslim men of fighting age. Any such Muslim man found in the "combat area" around Brčko was taken into custody and delivered over to the civilian authorities. The purpose of such detention was two-fold. First, the Serbs defended themselves against potential adversaries, and second, the Serbs protected the non-combatants from the dangers of combat.

864. The Serb Captain described a situation in Brčko conducive to lawless activity and victimization of civilians. With regular army units busy on the front lines, ill-disciplined and criminal paramilitaries were free to wreak havoc in the town. Effective and law-abiding civilian authority was absent. Arkan's men, other volunteers from Serbia and local toughs took advantage of the situation, and innocent people suffered. He corroborates the stories of several alleged victims that an identified individual murdered more than a hundred Muslims. He denies the allegation of 3,000 killed at Luka, believing perhaps 600 killed at the camp and in the town between May and July 1992.

865. Gornji Rahić: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly, Bosnian Croat forces took the village of Bukvik, county of Brčko, in mid-September 1992. Allegedly, commanders of the 108th HVO Brigade issued orders to effect the transport of the entire Serbian population there to a camp in Gornji Rahić and to other camps. They also allegedly ordered the torture and inhuman treatment of the civilians detained. The source identifies three who then tortured and beat up civilians detained at the camp in Gornji Rahić. Apparently, they inflicted severe injuries on several people.

14. Breza

866. This county is located in the centre of BiH, just north-west of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the population of this municipality was 17,266, of which 75.6 per cent were Muslims, 12.3 per cent were Serbs, 7.1 per cent were described as "other", and 5 per cent were Croatians.

867. Breza Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one report, three young women from Ilijas and Visoko were captured by 10 Bosnian Muslims on 26 May 1992, and taken to an unspecified location in Breza.

868. Initially, they were detained in a basement room of a facility containing small windows. It was reportedly cold, damp, and dirty.

869. According to the report, upon the women's arrival their captors began to rape them. The women were repeatedly raped at this location where their detention lasted two days.

870. The victims were then transferred to another room in a different building, apparently a part of the same camp, wherein five other women were interned. Conditions in the new location were almost as bleak. There was a bathroom, but the women were not permitted to shower or bathe. They were permitted to use the washbasin, on occasion, but only for very brief periods. They were fed pieces of moldy bread or macaroni, some leftovers and soup. The women were never able to speak to one another as there was always a guard present.
871. In the new location, the women were reportedly raped by as many as 20 men at a time, one after another. When the women fainted from the abuse, their captors simply doused them with water to revive them and continued the raping. 1052/

872. The women remained in the room the majority of the time except on those occasions when they were taken out to watch the male prisoners being beaten or killed. 1053/ According to the report, the mistreatment of the men consisted of beatings, drowning, or the "tearing" of their bodies "bit by bit". 1054/

873. On one occasion, they tried to make a father rape his 17 year old daughter. Both father and daughter were beaten when they refused to obey. When the Muslims put a knife to the father's throat, he relented. 1055/

874. According to the witness, the male Serb inmates were subjected to forced labour. They were frequently taken to construction sites and made to dig. 1056/ The male workers were of all ages, there were even children among them, some as young as five. 1057/ When the men were beaten, the women were brought to watch. When the women were raped, the men were reportedly also made to watch. 1058/

875. Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in a factory in Breza. The ICRC first visited the camp on 11 November 1993. 1059/ Information regarding the operation or control of the facility was not provided.

876. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the military prison in Breza. The ICRC first visited the camp on 27 November 1992. 1060/ Information regarding the operation or control of the facility was not provided.

877. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the military prison in Breza. The ICRC first visited the camp on 3 March 1993. 1061/ Information regarding the operation or control of the facility was not provided.

15. Bugojno

878. The municipality of Bugojno is located in the west-central section of BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 46,843 prior to the war. Muslims comprised the majority of the population at 47.1 per cent, Croats comprised 44.1 per cent, Serbs were 18.9 per cent, and 4.9 per cent were described as "other". One source reported that 10,000 eastern BiH refugees and several thousand refugees from Jajce arrived in Bugojno before the summer of 1993, the majority of which were Bosnian Muslims. Between 18 July and 22 July 1993, the BiH Army established control over the city of Bugojno. All HVO (Bosnian Croatian Defence Council) troops were disarmed at that time. 1062/

879. There are reports of independently verified Muslim controlled camps in Bugojno where Croatian prisoners are being held. 1063/ According to one report, 2,500 Croatian civilians and 750 members of the HVO were imprisoned in several concentration camps in the county of Bugojno. 1064/ This source did not provide the exact location or identity of any of the reported camps. There was one report of a Bosnian Croat and Muslim controlled camp where Serbian prisoners were being held. 1065/
880. BiH Hospital Bugojno: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) The town of Bugojno is located in the centre of the county of Bugojno. On 6 August 1993, UN forces reportedly visited five Croatian prisoners held in the BiH hospital in Bugojno. They observed that the prisoners had been beaten on their backs and that one had died as a result of the beatings. 1066/

881. Bugojno Brothel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) One report indicated that a Muslim and Croat controlled brothel exists in the town of Bugojno, but did not specify the location within the city. 1067/ According to this source, Serbian women are being forcibly held and subjected to repeated sexual abuse. Those who become pregnant as a result of the rapes are held captive at the brothel until they are five months pregnant, and if released, are prohibited from leaving their homes to prevent them from getting an abortion. According to this source, members of Muslim and Croatian units who are infected with the AIDS virus or other communicable diseases are deliberately brought to the brothels to rape the Serbian women. It was reported that 12 year-old girls have been raped at this brothel. 1068/

882. The 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka reported that Serbian women of all ages were imprisoned and subjected to rape in private prisons belonging to several Bosnian Muslims. 1069/

883. Iskra Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) The main detention centre in the city of Bugojno was reportedly located at the Iskra Stadium. 1070/ According to one source the camp is under the control of the BiH Army. Three hundred twenty prisoners were held at Iskra at its "peak" during the summer of 1993. 1071/ During this time 19 prisoners allegedly died or were killed at the camp. One hundred fifty prisoners were reportedly released before August 1993 due to a shortage of food. 1072/

884. The ICRC reportedly visited the Iskra camp and interviewed prisoners in preparation for a possible exchange. The report did not provide the exact date of the visit, but it is believed to have occurred between August and November 1993. As of November 1993, 150 prisoners were still being held at the camp, and no prisoner exchange had been reported. 1073/

885. According to one report, on 20 September there were 300 civilians held prisoner in the Sports Stadium in the city of Bugojno. 1074/ As of 23 August 1993, the Bosnian civil police in Bugojno continued to detain an unknown number of HVO civil police. According to this source, some of the prisoners were transferred to the Sports Stadium and the primary school. 1075/

886. Bugojno Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) As of 23 August 1993, the Bosnian civil police in Bugojno continued to detain an unknown number of HVO civil police. According to this source, some of the prisoners were transferred to the Sports Stadium and the primary school. 1076/

887. According to one report, members of the ICRC visited a detention facility at a school in Bugojno on 7 September 1993. The report was, however, silent as to the conditions existing at this facility as well as the duration of its existence. 1077/

888. Prušac Detention Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) It has been reported that the Prušac Detention Centre is located just outside the city of Bugojno. According to one source, 15 disarmed HVO (Bosnian Croatian
Defence Council) soldiers were imprisoned at Prušac from 18 July-23 July 1993. Several of the prisoners were released and allowed to return to their homes, and the rest of the prisoners were transferred to a detention centre at Iskra Stadium. 1078/

889. Another source reported that UN troops discovered the camp on 10 August 1993. At that time, approximately 40 HVO soldiers were imprisoned in the camp. The prisoners were reportedly well treated, and family members were allowed to visit the camp. 1079/

890. Privredna Banka Building Basement: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) According to one report, a temporary detention facility for disarmed HVO soldiers was set up in the Privredna Banka Building in the city of Bugojno during the summer of 1993. At the end of the summer, prisoners held here were either released or transferred to the camp at Iskra Stadium. No other information concerning the camp was provided by the report. 1080/

891. Kalin Motel: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was alleged that a brothel is located at Ravno Rostovo in the county of Bugojno. One report stated that the brothel was Muslim-controlled and the women detained there were Croatian. 1081/ No other information concerning the brothel was provided.

892. Rostovo Ski Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to a report compiled in 1992, 150 Serbian prisoners were held at the ski centre, and 30 of those prisoners were reportedly Serbian women. 1082/ This camp may be the same as the Kalin Motel brothel located at Ravno Rostovo. 1083/

893. House of Relja Lukić: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one source, the home of Relja Lukić, a Serb allegedly killed by Muslim or Croat forces, was used as a concentration camp for 50 Serbian prisoners. 1084/ One report estimated that 15 Serbian women were being held at this house. 1085/ The exact location of the camp within Bugojno was not provided. The report indicated that either the Army of BiH or the Army of the Republic of Croatia was in control of the camp. 1086/

894. Slavko Rodić Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The Commission has received a report of a concentration camp controlled by the Army of the BiH or the Army of the Republic of Croatia, located in the Slavko Rodić Factory. There are reportedly 700 Serbian prisoners being held at the factory. 1087/ According to one report, the ICRC visited a detention facility established at a factory in Bugojno on 28 September 1993. No information was provided regarding numbers of detainees or the conditions then existing at the prison. 1088/

895. Bugojno Gymnasium: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to a report compiled in 1992, approximately 200 Serbians are being held prisoner in the Bugojno Gymnasium building. 1089/

896. Coal Mine-Village of Bračenica: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to a report compiled in 1992, 250 Serbian prisoners were reportedly being held in a coal mine in Bračenica. 1090/
16. **Busovača**

897. This county is located in the centre of BiH, surrounded by Zenica, Vitez, Fojnica and Kakanj. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, Busovača's population was 18,883, of which 48.1 per cent were Croats, 44.9 per cent were Muslims, 3.4 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 3.6 per cent were described as "other".

898. **Kaonik Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) The only detention centre of note in Busovača is the Kaonik Prison. 1091/ Busovača is controlled by Croatian forces and the Kaonik Prison which is run by the HVO, is under the jurisdiction of the military court in Travnik. 1092/ Most of the information concerning this prison was provided to ECMM officials by the Director of the Kaonik Prison, Zlatko Aleksovski. 1093/ This facility is the military prison for the whole region of Central Bosnia and it apparently served this function before the outbreak of hostilities. Muslims arrested during the conflict are the charge of the Busovača and Vitez HVO. 1094/ It is an open question how long the prison has been in operation or whether the facility is still in operation.

899. On 15 May 1993, the prison held 79 military and civilian Muslim prisoners; neither women nor children were detained here. 1095/ On 19 June 1993, the ECMM secured the release of 31 Muslim prisoner from Kaonik Prison. 1096/ These prisoners were probably civilians. Soldiers that are detained are POWs, while the civilians are purportedly detained for their own protection. 1097/ The Director claims that the ICRC visits the prison regularly and that the ICRC is informed when additional prisoners arrive.

900. The Director outlined several factors affecting the quality of prison life. First, there is a lack of food for prisoners. Second, there is a lack of security at the prison because most of the prison staff was mobilized and taken to the front lines. Third, the Director claims that he is compelled by the HVO brigade commanders to put the prisoners to work (he is aware that this is a violation of the Geneva Conventions). Prisoners made statements to the ECMM to the effect that they were treated well and that they had no complaints about the conditions there. 1098/

901. There are no explicit allegations of mistreatment of prisoners. However, there are indications in the report that prison guards and Busovača residents would sometimes drink too much and abuse the Muslim prisoners. The Director claimed that it was difficult to restrain those abusing Muslim prisoners, in light of the fact that prison guards do not usually carry weapons. 1099/ The only other mistreatment alleged concerns the use of prisoners to dig trenches for military defence purposes. 1100/ The ICRC has attempted to intervene with local military officials on behalf of the prisoners to resolve this question.

17. **ajniče**

902. The municipality of ajniče is situated in south-eastern Bosnia. It borders Montenegro to the south and Gorade and Rudo to its north and east. The 1991 Yugoslav census reports that the population of ajniče was 8,919. A translation of that figure reveals that 52.9 per cent were Serbs, 44.9 per cent were Muslim, .1 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 2.1 per cent were described as "other".

903. Allegedly, four detention facilities were located in ajniče. Each facility reportedly was controlled by Serbian or Bosnian Serb forces, and the
majority, if not all of the prisoners, were Muslims. Reports indicate that at least 83 people have been detained at these sites.

904. Elementary School in ajniče: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Serbian forces allegedly used the elementary school in ajniče as a "bordello", where several Muslim women were imprisoned and raped daily. 1101/ 905. Mostina Hunting Lodge: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Austrian Mission and the US Mission.) The Mostina hunting lodge, also described as a hotel, was located in the forest between ajniče and Metaljka. 1102/ Reports indicate that Serbian forces controlled the Mostina hunting lodge and used it to detain Muslims. 1103/ One report states 50 Muslim men were held in the lodge. 1104/ Another report states that Serbian forces took 40 people to the camp, and ordered them to cut trees for the firm named Stakorina. 1105/ Following their work, it is unclear whether they were taken from the camp to another location. 1106/ Consequently, these reports may describe the same prisoners.

906. Additionally, a Bosnian Muslim from reported that a Serb from the village of Stakorina entered the lodge at about 5:00 p.m. and opened fire on the prisoners. 1107/ The firing reportedly lasted for 10 minutes; 1108/ however, the evidence does not state how many prisoners were killed or wounded. According to another report, an identified individual and his assistants killed 34 civilians at the Mostina lodge. 1109/ It is unclear whether this second report is related to the shooting incident.

907. Police Station in ajniče: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Members of the Bosnian Serb militia allegedly used a police station in ajniče to detain several Muslim villagers. 1110/ The evidence suggests that the Serbian controlled police station was used for at least several weeks to imprison Muslim villagers from Ravno and Selište. 1111/ Forces of the Bosnian Serb militia reportedly imprisoned at the police station several Muslim villagers abducted from Ravno on 16 February 1993. 1112/ At least six of these detainees were held until 17 March 1993. 1113/ However, about five other Muslims from the village of Selište were still believed to be detained as of July 1993. 1114/ While at the police station, members of the Bosnian Serb militia questioned and threatened the detainees. 1115/ The detainees also were given little to eat, and one woman was strip searched. 1116/ 908. Shipping Container: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Mission.) There are two reports of a shipping container, or simply a container, that was used as a detention facility. 1117/ One report describes the shipping container as being near ajniče. 1118/ The second report locates the container at the Mostina hunting lodge. 1119/ Both reports might describe the same container and the second report might duplicate some of the evidence from the first report. It also is possible that the container was moveable or that more than one container existed.

909. The evidence states that the container was five or six square metres in size and that there was a barrel of petrol inside. 1120/ Serbian forces controlled the container, and at least 22 people allegedly were held inside the container at one time. 1121/ Several of the prisoners were Muslim; however, it is unclear whether all of the prisoners were Muslims. 1122/ 910. According to a report, Serbian forces detained a witness and then took him to a containment area where 11 others were already imprisoned. 1123/ On 5
May, 10 more people were shepherded into the above-referenced containment facility. On both nights, Serbs reportedly tortured the prisoners, and on the second night, the prisoners kept fainting. The witness also reports that he was beaten by the brother of the town's Serbian Democratic Party leader. This perpetrator is allegedly responsible for breaking the witness' teeth and pushing a knife deep into his throat.

18. Čapljina

911. Čapljina is located in southern BiH, near Mostar. The total pre-war population of Čapljina was 27,852, of which Croatians were a majority with 53.9 per cent, Muslims comprised 27.7 per cent, Serbians 13.5 per cent, and 4.9 per cent were described as "other".

912. According to the ICRC, as of 1 October 1992 all of the detainees formerly held in Čapljina were transferred to Mostar prison.

913. One report indicated that, according to figures available from eyewitness sources and international humanitarian agencies, 4,000 men had been arrested in Čapljina since July 1993. HVO authorities told the Special Rapporteur's field officers that the arrests had been carried out for "security" reasons and admitted that due process had not been observed. From the information available to the Special Rapporteur it appears that only a small number of these detainees were prisoners of war. Most appear to have been arrested because they were suspected of hostility to the HVO, or to provide a pool of prisoners to exchange for Bosnian Croats held as prisoners of war, or for use on the front-line as forced labour or as "human shields" to protect the army's advance.

914. Detention Facility, Gabela: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) The Gabela detention camp is located near Čapljina. The Gabela camp was formerly used as a logistics base by the JNA. Bosnian Croat authorities allegedly operated the camp under the command of Boko Brević. Brević was reportedly an HVO military police officer.

915. Reports indicated that the camp was overcrowded and the inmates were physically abused and mistreated. Additionally food was scarce and facilities for personal hygiene were lacking. Many inmates reportedly suffered from malnutrition. Bosnian Croat authorities who allegedly ran the camps admitted to Helsinki Watch representatives that conditions at the camps were substandard. They blamed overcrowding as the reason for the substandard conditions.

916. Conflicting reports of the physical description of the camp were received. There are reports that at any one time between 1,500 and 3,000 men were held in two hangars. However there also are reports that the prisoners were housed in three large storage sheds and that approximately 650 prisoners were housed in at least one of the sheds.

917. The prisoners were allegedly fed once a day. The daily meal consisted of a small portion of rice, beans, macaroni soup, and bread. The prisoners received 650 grams of bread to be shared between 16 prisoners. When HVO forces suffered defeats the prisoners received no food.

918. Outside observers were not allowed to visit Gabela until August, 1993. At this time the ICRC registered 1,100 inmates.

919. Munitions Warehouse: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) Reports indicated that women were confined in an overheated metal shed that was a former munitions warehouse at an abandoned JNA barracks outside of Čapljina. The camp was allegedly run by a Major of the Croatian Defence Association of the Party of Rights (HOS). Another report stated that a former JNA ammunition warehouse in Gabela, south of Čapljina, was one of the main detention centres in Čapljina. 1141/ 920. Dretelj Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch.) The Dretelj camp is located between three and 15 kilometres outside of Čapljina and is a one and a half hour drive from Mostar, opposite Počitelj. 1142/ Prior to the war, the camp was the site of JNA barracks. 1143/ More recently, the location was used as a prison camp, first by Bosnian Croat HOS forces and then by the HVO. 1144/ 921. The camp was reportedly overcrowded and the inmates were physically abused. There was a lack of food and many inmates suffered from malnutrition. There was also a general lack of hygiene at this camp. Bosnian Croat authorities who allegedly ran the camp admitted to Helsinki Watch representatives that the camp conditions were substandard. They blamed overcrowding as the reason for the substandard conditions. 1145/ 922. Reports indicated that as many as 1,500 Serbs were detained here. 1146/ Both men and women were imprisoned at this camp. 1147/ 923. Several women initially were housed in a two by three metre cell. After a month at the camp, all prisoners, both male and female, were placed in five separate hangers where they slept on concrete floors. 1148/ 924. Available reports suggest that one of the hangars housed approximately 400 people and another hangar—which was approximately 260 square metres—housed approximately 540 people. 1149/ Some 70 women of different ages were reportedly housed in at least one other hangar. 1150/ 925. The camp's physical plant was contained under tin roofs, which became extremely hot in the warm weather months. Several prisoners died from dehydration brought on by the heat. 1151/ Others were forced to drink urine to avoid dehydration. 1152/ 926. Allegedly prisoners were also detained in four tunnels, in complete darkness. The only light seen, crept in when the prisoners were fed the slice of bread and the few spoonfuls of soup that they received each day. Up to 600 people were reported to be in each of these tunnels which were only big enough to accommodate 170 people. 1153/ 927. It is possible that the treatment of the inmates was not uniform throughout the facility. Conflicting testimony concerning whether the prisoners were fed once or twice a day was received. 1154/ For some, the meals consisted of rice, beans or macaroni, and one slice of bread. In some cases, the inmates' families were permitted to bring them food. Deprivation of food was reportedly also used as a form of control and punishment. For example, between 13 and 15 July 1993, sources suggest that none of the prisoners were fed, in response to losses suffered by HVO forces in Dubrave. 1155/ 928. There are reports that the inmates were regularly beaten and subjected to torture. 1156/ All men were reportedly beaten with sticks, wood, rifle butts and fists upon their arrival at the camp and also during interrogations. Beatings usually occurred at night. 1157/ Additionally, the prisoners were
forced to engage in fisticuffs, and if the beatings were not to the guards' satisfaction, the guards would intercede, imposing severe beatings. 1158/

929. The inmates were reportedly subjected to various forms of torture including having needles pushed under their finger and toe nails, being burned with candles and cigarettes, having their tongues impaled with knives, being forced to give guards rides on their backs, and being forced to eat grass and drink their own urine. 1159/ Other prisoners were forced to lick the toilets clean. 1160/ At least two prisoners were reported to have been scalped. 1161/ Several others were reportedly made to wear JNA uniforms when western reporters were given access to the camp, although witnesses report that none of the inmates were combatants. 1162/ During this visit, any prisoner with visible signs of abuse were hidden in separate rooms. 1163/ The soldiers reportedly threatened to kill any inmate who refused to confess to foreign reporters that the reason for his imprisonment was because he was a combatant. 1164/

930. Reports indicated that the women were also interrogated and tortured. They were allegedly beaten during interrogations. The torture included needles stuck under their finger nails and cuts to their breasts. They were reportedly raped and forced to watch the soldiers beat the men. 1165/

931. The inmates were also subjected to a variety of sexual abuses. Women, at least for a period of time, were raped daily by groups of men and were also forced to engage in same-sex sexual intercourse. 1166/ The rapes were committed in front of the other prisoners, including their relatives. 1167/ Reportedly, the rapes of the female detainees stopped after approximately 10 days, although the physical mistreatment of all inmates continued throughout their detention at the facility. 1168/ Male detainees were forced to perform same-sex sexual acts upon one another while other prisoners watched, 1169/ as well as being forced to engage in acts of necrophilia. 1170/

932. According to one report, several prisoners managed to survive detention at this facility, 1171/ although an undetermined number of prisoners were tortured and killed at Dretelj. 1172/

933. Meanwhile, another report insists that only a few of the people detained at this location survived. 1173/ This information, however, seems unlikely based upon several reports detailing the release of hundreds of prisoners. For example, in one account occurring on 10 July 1993, approximately 400 civilian men between the ages of 18 and 60 were transferred from Dretelj prison to the Rodoc detention facility in Mostar. 1174/ Other prisoners were transferred to the Grebovina prison near Mostar on 17 August 1992 and ultimately released from Rodoč camp as part of a prisoner exchange. 1175/

934. Additionally, on 28 August 1993, a group of approximately 400 prisoners were released from Dretelj and expelled to Jablanica. The sources suggest that these former prisoners were in poor physical condition resulting from the physical mistreatment and lack of food at the Dretelj camp. 1176/ Outside observers were not allowed to visit Dretelj until September 1993. 1177/ On 1 September 1993, 350 prisoners were released. 1178/ On 6 September 1993 the ICRC registered 1,200 Muslim prisoners at this camp. 1179/ The Dretelj camp reportedly was partially closed in early October, 1993 when a number of prisoners were released. 1180/

935. The Dretelj camp was allegedly run by Mr. Aničić, the commander of the HVO military police in Čapljina. 1181/ His nickname was Dida. 1182/ In August, 1993, another individual reportedly replaced Mr. Aničić as the commander of the Dretelj camp. Allegedly conditions at the camp, particularly with regard to beatings, became much better when the new commander took over.
Inmates report that this new commander tried to prevent the beatings. 1183/ There was also a report that a completely different individual was the commander of the detention facility in mid-1992. 1184/ 936. Reports allegedly that the camp was operated by the HOS who handed it over to the HVO in September, 1993. The HOS guards dressed in black Ustaše uniforms, carried Ustaše flags and saluted the way Ustaše did. They were heavily armed with machine-guns and daggers. This information is not entirely consistent with the reported change in command in August, 1993. 1185/ A commander of the Croatian armed forces from Ljubuški allegedly visited the prison often. 1186/

937. A young investigating officer, reportedly supervised interrogations at the Dretelj camp. 1187/ On his order, beatings and other abuses were inflicted upon the prisoners. The abuses included the removal of tips of the inmates' fingers or the crushing of the bones in their hands. During one period, this officer allegedly believed the prisoners had become somewhat indifferent to the beatings and the camp commander then ordered the beatings to be stopped for a 10 day period. During this period other forms of punishment were implemented. For example, one man was forced to bark like a dog while a noose was around his neck and his captors kicked him. The man then was forced to eat a pack of cigarettes and to drink a half liter of oil. 1188/

938. Several sources identified guards who allegedly participated in the torture reaper and murder of the inmates at the detention facility. 1189/

939. Tobacco Warehouse: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Serbian women and some men were arrested and allegedly taken to a tobacco processing station in Čapljina, reportedly the headquarters of the HOS. 1190/ The prisoners were subjected to torture. 1191/ Reports indicated that women were raped at this camp and subjected to daily abuse. 1192/ The guards placed a hot iron on at least one woman's bare flesh. The women were forced to walk naked in the street where they were called etnik prostitutes. 1193/ Several women tried to kill themselves. The guards told one woman that she would not die until she gave birth to an "Ustaša". 1194/

940. Several male prisoners were put in a hermetically sealed cell that was filled with tobacco dust. After a period of time, the guards entered the room and beat the men. These men were subsequently transferred to the Poduh tobacco processing plant at Metković and from there to several other camps. 1195/

941. Gasnice Camp: 1196/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly, on 3 August 1993 the entire remaining Muslim population of Stolac, including approximately 4,000 women, children and elderly were arrested and imprisoned at the Gasnice camp in Čapljina. 1197/ Although this report was provided by official sources, the veracity of this very serious allegation has not been confirmed. UN representatives attempted to verify this information, but were unsuccessful in doing so. 1198/

942. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a police station in Čapljina 1199/ on 31 July 1992. 1200/ No information was provided regarding the operation and control of this facility.
19. Cazin

943. Cazin is located in the north-west corner of BiH. As of 1991, its population was 63,406, of which 97.6 per cent were Muslim and 2.4 per cent were classified as "other".

944. Detention Facility, Cazin: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) There are reports of a Muslim-run detention facility in Cazin, but no information regarding its exact location nor dates of existence. There are simply reports that Team Hotel of the ICRC monitored the release of 25 Serbian prisoners held by "Muslim forces" in Bihać and Cazin on 3 November 1992. These 25 prisoners were ultimately transferred to Belgrade.

945. The ICRC then visited the camp on 11 March 1993; they found no prisoners at this time.

946. Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a factory in Cazin on 28 March 1992. No information was provided regarding the operation and control of this facility.

947. Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a prison in Cazin on 13 August 1992. No information was provided regarding the operation and control of this facility.

20. Čelinac

948. Čapljina is located approximately 12 kilometres east of Banja Luka in BiH. The territory had a pre-war population of approximately 7,000 residents, of whom 88.9 per cent were Serbs, 7.7 per cent were Muslims, and 3.4 per cent were Croats and others.

949. In April 1992, the Serbs took affirmative steps to completely occupy the territory. They began by firing all Muslims and Croats from their jobs. This was followed by the setting of a 24-hour curfew--the violation of which was punishable by death.

950. The Serbs also established detention facilities to effectively manage the non-Serbian population, whom the Serbs "evaluated as individuals who have been carrying out negative activities". Detention sites included "home ghettos", the Miloš Dujić Elementary School (some 1,200 individuals were reportedly detained there), the Stanari Coal Mine and the Mramor company.

951. "Home Ghettos": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ECMM.) The creation of home ghettos in the territory in Čapljina was evidence of a new method employed by the Serbs to ethnically cleanse the region of non-Serbs. The non-Serbian community was small by comparison. Muslim and Croatian homes were concentrated in one area of Čapljina with the majority of the population of both groups residing on two adjoining streets.

952. On 23 July 1992, following a meeting of the Serbian War Presidency of the Municipality of Čapljina, the War Presidency issued an official "Decision" regarding the management of the territory's non-Serbian citizenry. The decree pronounced that all non-Serbs were subject to a 24-hour curfew; that
non-Serbs were not permitted to use telephones or any telecommunications devices; that they were not permitted contact with their neighbours; that they were not permitted to walk out of doors and not permitted in the streets, restaurants or any other public places. 1216/ They were also not permitted to travel to other towns without appropriate authorization and further not permitted to communicate with relatives who were non-residents of Čapljina. 1217/ In effect, the non-Serbian population were prisoners in their own homes.

953. Occasionally the Serbs allowed the non-Serbian women to buy permission to shop for food. 1218/ The only time that Muslim and Croatian men were permitted to leave their homes was to complete "the tasks of compulsory work" assigned them. 1219/ When so obligated, the men were escorted by Čapljina police to the locations to perform their assigned tasks. 1220/ Additionally, while the men were working, masked Serbs searched the homes of non-Serbs in an effort to recover any and all possessions of firearms. 1221/

954. There was reportedly a battle in Derventa, on or about 13 August 1992, in which several Serbians were killed. Allegedly in retaliation, the Serbs burned 20 homes in Čapljina belonging to Muslims and Croats. 1222/ They reportedly also threw grenades into other Muslim and Croat homes which resulted in injury to four children and two women. 1223/ When one man tried to carry his wounded child out of the house, he and his child were reportedly killed by machine-gun fire. 1224/ Reportedly, following this incident, Muslims and Croats attempted to leave the area, however, the Serbs would not permit their departure. Instead the Serb captors detained them in the Miloš Dujić Elementary School. 1225/

955. Miloš Dujić Elementary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) According to a report issued by the United Nations, 17 Muslim homes in the village of Čapljina were destroyed following accounts that local Serbian soldiers had been killed in combat. 1226/ Due to the difficulty in fleeing the region, some 650 Muslim families were reportedly not allowed to have sought refuge in the local school. 1227/ The report stated that the ICRC was not permitted to visit the school despite their communicated concerns regarding possible starvation and famine suffered by Čapljina Muslims. 1228/ United Nations representatives visiting the area were also denied an opportunity to visit the school. 1229/

956. In one report, some 1,200 individuals were held at the local school for seven days. Reprieve was only granted to women, who were allowed to leave the school to buy food. 1230/ The report alleges that four brothers were taken away and not seen again when the Serbs learned that their fifth brother was serving in the Croatian Army. 1231/

957. At one point the detainees allegedly demanded to see the ICRC, but the Serbs refused to accommodate their request. After approximately a week in detention, the inmates were allowed to return to their homes. 1232/ Reportedly, the Serbs then permitted the ICRC to come and see the empty school. 1233/ The Serbs reportedly would not allow the ICRC to distribute food to the Muslims and Croats. 1234/

958. Stanari Coal Mine: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) A refugee from Čapljina reported the existence of a detention facility at the coal mine in Stanari. 1235/ The facility was allegedly operational "because coal was still available even though the Serbian men who had worked there were fighting at the front". 1236/ The refugee surmised that prisoners were being used as forced labour to obtain the coal. 1237/
959. Mramor Company: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to an unofficial report provided to the UN, a group of eight Serbian reservists forced all the Muslims from the village of Čapljina into the centre of town. The women, children, and the elderly, totalling 56, were forced at gunpoint to walk back and forth across the Vrbanja River. A group of the men were detained in an "improvised" facility established at the Mramor company. No further information was given regarding the length of duration, nor the operation or control of the facility.

21. itluk

960. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of itluk county was 14,709. Of that number 98.9 per cent were Croats, .7 per cent were Muslims, .1 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining .3 per cent were described as "others".

961. Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Information from this county in southern Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding the existence of concentration camps and prison camps is rather slim. One report makes reference to the existence of a prison camp in the village of itluk. The report states that on 15 September, a humanitarian team visited the prison and found no prisoners of war. No other information regarding location, operation or control was made available.

962. Gabela: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Another report indicates that on 2 July, all Muslim HVO soldiers in the area of Stolac, a reportedly Muslim-dominated community, were demobilized and interned in Gabela. The report estimates that as many as 10,000-15,000 individuals may have been interned "under very difficult circumstances" at Rodoč and in Dretelj and Gabela.

22. Derventa

963. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the municipality of Derventa had a population of 56,328. Of that number 40.8 per cent were Serbs, 39 per cent were Croats, 12.6 per cent were Muslims, and the remaining 7.6 per cent were described as "others".

964. Derventa is one among the eight municipalities which comprise the Bosanska Posavina region in northern BiH. The region is situated along the Sava river which borders the Republic of Croatia. On 11 and 12 July 1993, Serbian forces occupied Derventa, forcing thousands of Croats to flee the region and seek refuge in Bosanski Brod and Croatia.

965. Reports suggest that the Serbian objective was to control this vital northern corridor and expel or destroy its non-Serbian citizens. Accordingly, between April and November 1992, Serbs "ethnically cleansed" Croats from Derventa and the surrounding Posavina area.

966. Derventa Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Derventa was the site of one of BiH's most notorious concentration camps. Several thousand individuals were noted to have passed through this camp.

967. The inmates at this facility were reportedly subjected to severe physical abuses. Among the forms of mistreatment used by Serbian forces at this and other area camps were the summary execution and slaughter of detained civilians.
968. Shoe Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) SDS extremists and military government personnel had reportedly organized a camp for over 100 persons of Muslim descent in the shoe factory "Sloga". The factory was located in Prnjavor near Derventa. 1253/

969. Grain Mill: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) Another report alleges the existence of an additional camp in Prnjavor. This one was said to have been established in an abandoned grain mill. 1254/ Reportedly some 50 men and 10 women were initially interned at the facility. 1255/

970. The physical plant was only one level and reportedly surrounded by a fence and mines. The inmates were made to sleep on wooden pallets and were not permitted to wash for 60 days at a time. 1256/ There were no toilets, and the detainees urinated and defecated in the common area of containment. Food was also scarce. Reportedly, one tin of beans was shared between 12 to 14 people. 1257/

971. The report suggests that the facility was controlled by members of Šešelj's military police, who, one witness recalls, conducted the interrogations. The witness identified them as having had special etnik cockades and were either White Eagles or White Wolves. 1258/

972. The procedure for interrogations included beatings applied by heavy electric cable, truncheons and the flat side of swords. 1259/ The reporter witnessed the death of two fellow inmates as the result of these beatings. 1260/ One report states that a father and son were arrested. The captors forced the father to beat the son and vice versa. This witness also recalled that there was a paralysed man who was beaten until unconscious. 1261/

973. Omeragići Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) One report alleges the existence of a camp in Omeragići which interns Croatians. The village of Omeragići is located just west of Derventa. The report alleges that one inmate who was granted official permission to leave was denied exit by his Serbian captors. 1262/

23. Doboj

974. Forced deportations from the county of Doboj were not unusual. Many village inhabitants and former camp detainees were taken by train from their previous location to Doboj and forced to migrate to Croatian/Muslim controlled territories. During their trip to Doboj, many encountered a variety of hardships at the hands of Serbian soldiers and guards.

975. In May 1992, the residents that remained after the Serbians took control of Grapska and Sjenina were forced to march to Doboj. Along the way, people were periodically pulled out of the column and shot. 1263/

976. Individuals formerly held in the Sanski Most Sports Centre and Krinks Factory were loaded into freight trains and taken to Doboj. After being unloaded, the detainees were forced to walk across the bridge over the Spreča River and drop all their personal belongings and documents into the river. 1264/ At the other side, the detainees were turned over to the Territorial Defence. 1265/

977. The inhabitants of Blagaj, located in north-western BiH, were taken to Doboj in cattle cars. 1266/ The trains left at 7:00 p.m. and arrived in Doboj
the next morning. The cars were overcrowded and the air vents were closed. At Doboj, the people were given water. The women and children were allowed to flee to Travnik in south-central BiH. The men were sent to a detention facility at the stadium in Bosanski Novi, also located in north-western BiH.

978. Some former detainees from the Trnopolje detention centre in north-western BiH were put on rail cars and sent to Doboj. The first convoy that left Trnopolje consisted of five cattle trucks filled with 1,800 people. During the two day trip, the detainees were not given any food. In addition, the cars did not have any ventilation. The detainees collected money which they gave to the soldiers to purchase food for the children but the soldiers never came back. In some instances, the soldiers required that a ransom be paid by a specific car of detainees to ensure that the children contained within would not be killed. At Doboj, the detainees were marched along a mined road. Then, the detainees crossed the bridge where they were met by HVO troops and Muslim soldiers.

979. In early July, 1992, another account records Trnopolje detention centre detainees that were released and taken by cattle cars to Doboj. On the way to Doboj, soldiers stopped the train and demanded money, gold and jewelry from the detainees. Upon arrival in Doboj, the men whose ages ranged from 18 to 60 were separated from the others. The remaining detainees were told to walk over a clothing-covered bridge. Serbian soldiers used young boys as shields to stop the Croatian and Muslim gunfire in the crossing.

980. Doboj School Gymnasium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the New York Times and Helsinki Watch.) After villages in the Doboj region were taken over by Serbians, the men and women were separated and sent to different detention facilities. The women were taken to a school in Doboj. Between 600 and 2,000 women and girls were held at this detention centre. When the women arrived at the school, they were "classified" according to their education, financial status and appearance. The ugly and poor women disappeared.

981. The school centre was a three story gray building with a large sports hall, connected by a corridor to the school. The school’s second floor was designed to look down on the first floor from a railing. The third floor was comprised of enclosed classrooms.

982. The female detainees were kept in the gymnasium at the school. The gymnasium was very large with a main playing floor and various smaller courts with spectators' seats and even a balcony. Women sat in all the areas.

983. Four different types of soldiers were known to be at the camp, the local Serbian militia, the JNA, the police forces from the Knin, and members of the paramilitary group, "White Eagles".

984. Upon arrival, the young women were taken to the gymnasium where they were physically abused. The Serbian "etnik" soldiers tore off the women's clothes, cut their breasts and the bellies of women who wore traditional Muslim baggy trousers. In addition, the women were raped in front of all the other detainees. Some women were shot and killed. Their bodies were left in the gymnasium where the other detainees could see them. The next day the bodies were thrown into the river.

985. During the day, the women were forced to sit in the hall with their knees pulled up to their chests and their heads down. They were told not to look at the soldiers so that they would not be able to identify them. The women
were not allowed to talk with each other. 1301/ If a woman was caught talking, the soldiers would beat her, and more than the usual number of men would rape her. 1302/ The women were not allowed to change their clothes or to wash themselves. 1303/

986. The detainees were fed every two or three days. 1304/ The guards would just drop the food at the entrance to the hall. 1305/ The women close to the food ate and those women at the back of the hall often did not get anything. 1306/

987. At night the women were raped by as many as 10 men. 1307/ The women would be forced to have both oral and vaginal sex at the same time with the different men. 1308/ Often the local Serbian soldiers wore black stockings or paint over their faces as a disguise. 1309/

988. The women were removed from the gymnasium in groups of 40 each day. 1310/ They were led to individual classrooms in the school and raped. 1311/ The guards told the women they were being held to "make etnik babies". 1312/

989. If the Serbian soldiers were physically unable to rape, they raped the women with guns, beat them, and urinated on them. 1313/ The Serbian soldiers also brought non-Serbian male detainees to the detention centre and threatened to shoot anyone who would not rape the women detainees. 1314/

990. The Serbs who guarded the women would accept money for the release of a detainee. 1315/

991. Many of the women became pregnant as a result of being raped at the Doboj School Gymnasium. 1316/ Pregnant women were not exchanged but were transferred to a hospital and fed well so that they could bear the soldiers' offspring. 1317/

992. Occasionally, the daily routine of rapes would break when the Serbian paramilitaries went off to fight, leaving the women under the guard of local Serbs. 1318/ When the paramilitaries came back after losing a battle, they would be particularly brutal to the women. 1319/

993. Red Cross Refugee Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Government.) A Serbian Red Cross refugee centre was established at a high school in Doboj. 1320/ In the spring of 1992, the camp contained approximately 160 Serbian refugees and 20 Muslims and Croatians. 1321/ The non-Serbians at the camp were treated as prisoners. 1322/ Food was denied to the non-Serbian refugees. 1323/

994. Soldiers, in fatigues with the insignia "SMP," would come to the camp in the evening and take the non-Serbian women to apartments in the surrounding area where the women would be repeatedly raped. 1324/ Different groups of soldiers, usually four at a time, came to the camp for women every three to four days. 1325/

995. Bare Military Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) The Bare Military Barracks/Warehouse consisted of a number of military warehouses that each held approximately 200 detainees. 1326/ The detainees were primarily from the villages of Taravci, Dobruja, Oteza, and Kladari. 1327/ The camp was run by Bosnian Serbs and Montenegrins, some of whom wore yellow hats with etnik symbols. 1328/ The detainees were men and women between the ages of 30 and 55. 1329/

996. Each structure held approximately 200 detainees. 1330/ The detainees were primarily from the villages of Taravci, Dobruja, Oteza, and Kladari. 1331/ The
camb was run by Bosnian Serbs and Montenegrins, some of whom wore yellow hats with etnik symbols. 1332/ The detainees were men and women between the ages of 30 and 55. 1333/

997. At first, the detainees slept on concrete floors, but then they were eventually provided with wooden pallets. 1334/ The detainees were given meager portions of bread to eat and had to dig outside for corn to have additional food. 1335/ The detainees were allowed outside only from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 1336/

998. At night, the detainees were forced to relieve themselves inside the warehouses. 1337/ In the daytime, the detainees were permitted to construct and use latrines outside the warehouses. 1338/

999. Some former detainees describe the two Serbian camp managers as "good men". 1339/ However, on weekends when they were not present, the detainees were beaten by the Serbian prisoners. 1340/ The Serbian guards allowed the beatings but did not participate. 1341/

1000. In June, 1992, the Red Cross removed the women and children from this facility but left the men of military age. 1342/

1001. The men appeared to receive different treatment than the women. Serbs beat the male detainees with police batons, axe handles and the butts of rifles. 1343/ The male detainees were also forced to dig shelters at the front lines for the Serbian soldiers. 1344/ In addition, the detainees were forced to farm, load trucks and plunder the villages around Doboj for livestock and furniture for the Serbians. 1345/

1002. Usora Military Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The military camp was located near the Usora river and the Bosanka juice factory in Doboj. 1346/ Three hangers were established at this location to house all the people from the area that were detained when Doboj was taken by the Serbians. 1347/ The first hanger was for the Muslims and Croatians arrested by the military police. 1348/ The second hanger was for Muslims and Croatians that were arrested by the civil police. 1349/ The third hanger was for Serbians that were found to be disloyal to the occupying authority. 1350/

1003. The women detained at this camp were routinely raped. The Serbs had a man who professed to be a gynecologist at the camp to give the women medical examinations. 1351/ If a woman was found to be pregnant, she was prohibited from buying release or exchange until late pregnancy. 1352/ Women who did not get pregnant were beaten more often and their release was put up for ransom. 1353/

1004. Central Prison in Doboj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Canadian Mission.) The Central Prison in Doboj was used as a detention centre for men of the region. 1354/ Approximately 250 detainees were confined in a room that was 16 metres by 20 metres with cement floors. 1355/ The detainees had to use hand held cans for toilets. 1356/ The detainees were interrogated and beaten, usually two or three times a day. 1357/ Some men died from the beatings. 1358/

1005. Military Barracks at Ševarlije Cod Doboja: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) Starting in early June, 1992, approximately 300 men, women and children were detained in a basement under military barracks outside Doboj. 1359/ The room was about 30 metres long and 10 metres wide. 1360/ 1006. All the detainees could not sleep at the same time because the room was too small. 1361/ As a result, the men slept during the day, and the women and
children slept at night. 1362/

1007. The detainees were fed toast and sugar. 1363/

1008. The detainees were not allowed to leave the premises. 1364/ On 18 June 1992, after 18 days, the women and children were released. 1365/

1009. SUP Building Complex: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The SUP Building was the Headquarters for the Serbian Police and Investigative Service. 1366/ In the adjacent annex, the Serb police detained individuals that they deemed of high interest. 1367/

1010. The detainees were brought from the annex to the main building for interrogations. 1368/ The detainees were subjected to torture during questioning. 1369/

1011. Poljoremont Repair Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) A warehouse built as part of a plan for extending the Poljoremont Repair Plant was converted into a detention centre. Approximately 2,000 Muslims from Doboj were detained at this location. 1370/

1012. Vila Disco Bar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Serbs detained between 200 to 412 Muslims in a building/bar in Vila. 1371/ The building was owned by Kasim Perco, a Muslim who fled during the hostilities. 1372/

1013. The detainees were interrogated and beaten. At least one detainee was beaten for six hours and stabbed with a knife. 1373/

1014. Approximately 50 detainees were removed from the camp to be used as a "living shield" by soldiers. Twenty-three of the detainees were killed. 1374/

1015. etvrti Juli: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Canadian Mission.) An army barracks in Doboj called etvrti Juli was used as an interrogation and detention centre. 1375/

1016. Stanari Mine: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Committee for Refugees.) Detainees were interned at the Stanari Mine in Doboj. 1376/ They were forced to dig coal. 1377/ Even the women and children detainees had to dig coal with their bare hands. 1378/

1017. All the men up to age 55 from the village of Omeragići were taken to Stanari. 1379/

1018. Kovinotehna: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Croatian and Muslims from Grapska were detained at a detention centre called "Kovinotehna". The Serbs detained an equal number of Croats and Muslims, however, the Serbs released or exchanged a majority of the Croatian detainees. The Muslim detainees were all that remained. 1380/

1019. The detainees would get one piece of bread every three days. 1381/

1020. Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility established at a hospital in Doboj
on 25 June 1993. 1382/ No additional information was provided regarding the operation or control of this facility.

24. Donji Vakuf

1021. The municipality of Donji Vakuf is located in west-central BiH, bordered by the municipalities of Bugojno, Pucarevo, Fojnica, Prozor, and Kupres. According to the 1991 census, this county had a population of 24,232. The county was predominantly Muslim and Serb, the Muslims comprising 55.3 per cent of the population and Serbs comprising 38.7 per cent, and the remaining 6 per cent were described only as "other".

1022. Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) in Donji Vakuf: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) A civilian detention facility for Bosnian Muslim males was located in the Secretariat for Internal Affairs building in the city of Donji Vakuf. The city of Donji Vakuf is located in the centre of the municipality of Donji Vakuf. In May 1992, Bosnian Serbs reportedly took control of the city of Donji Vakuf. 1383/ According to one report, many Muslim residents fled the city at that time and approximately 700 Bosnian Muslims remained. This source stated that on 30 May 1992, Bosnian Serb forces arrested an unspecified number of Bosnian Muslim males. The soldiers took the prisoners to the building of the Secretariat for Internal Affairs where they were imprisoned from 30 May 1992 until 10 June 1992. 1384/

1023. The report indicated that the detention facility was operated by Bosnian Serbs but does not state whether the prison was run by military or civilian personnel. Two Bosnian Serbs, the Chief of the Police station and a Senior Inspector, were identified in connection with the administration of the facility. 1385/ According to the report, several Bosnian Serb "Četniks" reportedly visited the camps, carried out the executions, beatings and torture of prisoners. These individuals are identified in the source materials. 1386/

1024. The prisoners held at the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were Bosnian Muslim males from the city of Donji Vakuf arrested in late May 1992 when Bosnian Serbs conducted searches of all Muslim homes in the city. It was reported that during the 10 days the prisoners were held, an additional 21 Bosnian Muslim prisoners arrived at the prison. 1387/ An estimated 90-100 prisoners were held at the facility between 30 May and 10 June 1992. 1388/

1025. The prisoners regarded as "intellectuals" and those prisoners who had "confessed" to committing crimes against the Serbs were transferred to Manjača. 1389/ The report did not indicate the date the transfer occurred. On 10 June 1992, five prisoners were transferred to the Vrbas-Promet detention camp located in the city of Donji Vakuf. 1390/

1026. The prisoners held at the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were subjected to interrogations and torture at the detention facility. The report indicated that several prisoners were beaten to death and others were executed. 1391/

1027. Vrbas-Promet Detention Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) The Vrbas-Promet detention camp was a civilian camp in the city of Donji Vakuf. The city of Donji Vakuf is located in the centre of the municipality of Donji Vakuf. The camp was a former warehouse that had been converted into a detention facility by the Bosnian Serbs when they took control of the city in May 1992. 1392/
1028. Male Muslim prisoners that had been held since 30 May 1992 in the building which housed the Secretariat for Internal Affairs were transferred to Vrbas-Promet on 10 June 1992. The report provides no information concerning the length of time the prisoners were held. One report received by the Commission of Experts stated that 860 prisoners were held at the camp as of October 1992.

1029. Donji Vakuf Police Station: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) According to one report, prisoners were held and beaten at the police station in the city of Donji Vakuf.

1030. The report identified two Serbian police officers responsible for the arrest and beating death of at least one Muslim woman. The first officer was identified as the commander of the police station. The second officer was identified as the old Deputy Police Chief.

1031. The report indicated that at least one prisoner was selected for arrest based on her Muslim ethnicity and the fact that her son was in the Bosnian forces defending Sarajevo.

1032. House in Donji Vakuf: A report submitted by an examining physician indicated that six women were detained and raped in an unidentified house in the city of Donji Vakuf. The report stated that the house was located near a gas station in the city but did not provide any other identifying information. One young woman was imprisoned in the house and raped from 27 April to 1 October 1992.

1033. The report stated that the women were travelling by bus from Donji Vakuf to Bugojno when the bus was stopped by JNA soldiers. The soldiers ordered six young women and 10 young men off the bus and took them to a house near the gas station. The source reported that these young people were detained and raped by a Serbian civilian and a JNA soldier. Both were reported to be between 28-30 years old.

1034. Warehouse on Omladinska Street: The Commission has received reports concerning the location of a camp at an unidentified warehouse somewhere on Omlad Street in the city of Donji Vakuf where 440 prisoners were reportedly being held in 1992. The reports specify neither the ethnicity of the prisoners nor that of the controlling party.

25. Foča

1035. The city and county of Foča are located approximately 35 miles to the south-east of Sarajevo, in BiH. The Drina River runs north to south through the middle of the county which borders FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) on the west. The city of Foča lies on the eastern bank of the Drina River. Pre-war population of the region was approximately 41,000. About 52 per cent of the population was Muslim, 45 per cent Serb, and 3 per cent were described as "other". Foča is hilly and forested.

1036. The attack on Foča began in April 1992. Apparently, members of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) issued an ultimatum to Muslim representatives of the local area demanding an ethnic division of the region. The ultimatum rejected, violence ensued. After artillery bombardment, Serbian infantry forces moved in and quickly gained control of the town.
1037. Several individuals have been identified in the source materials as those primarily responsible for the attack upon and ethnic cleansing of Foća. One of them apparently called in additional forces from Nikšić, Montenegro. Bringing the total number of Serbian forces in and around Foća to about 4,000 by the end of April.

1038. Some suspect that a Major General planned the attack, or at least served as a significant actor in the planning of the attack because many residents noticed his frequent visits to the Bosnian Serb military headquarters in Miljevina, a few kilometres west of the city, in the weeks just prior to the attack. Another individual, with the same name but unrelated to the general, was present during the apprehension of many Muslims after the Serbs gained control of the area. He was, at the time, a lieutenant colonel and former JNA officer.

1039. The Serb forces (former JNA, paramilitaries, and armed and mobilized local Serbs) quickly gained control of the area and continued their assault upon the villages of the region throughout the following months as late as July and August 1992. During this campaign, Serbian forces employed the same basic strategy. They would deliver an ultimatum. That ultimatum unmet, bombardment with artillery would commence followed by infantry and/or paramilitary assault.

1040. A Muslim school teacher from Foća related the following account of events in the city. On 7 April 1992 it was unusually quiet. Serbian children did not go to school and Muslim children were turned away at school. A Serb nurse warned a Muslim colleague to go home as there would be an attack upon the city. On the eighth, unidentified Bosnian Serb units attacked. Military and civilian vehicles were used to block all roads into Foća. Muslims and Croats attempting entry were turned away. Some were apprehended.

1041. The attack upon the village of Jeleč was typical of Serbian tactics throughout the region. Bosnian Serb soldiers blocked roads leading to Jeleč and its surrounding villages on 18 April 1992. This area contained a population of about 1,200 Muslims. A Bosnian Serb delegation entered Jeleč and demanded that the Muslims turn over their weapons to the military complex in Miljevina by 12 noon on 22 April. All members of the delegation were dressed in civilian clothes except one who wore a JNA uniform with the old emblem replaced by a Serbian Republic of BiH flag.

1042. The deadline passed and no weapons had been turned in. Small arms fire was heard in the hills surrounding Jeleč on 23 April. Many Muslims fled. Most took up residence in nearby hills and waited to see if military action would actually occur. Between 1 and 3 May, the Serbian military bombarded the Jeleč area with artillery and one unidentified military aircraft dropped bombs on various targets. On 4 May, paramilitary troops from various units arrived in seven military buses and began a systematic roundup of Muslims left in the area. These units, according to a soldier involved with the witness' apprehension, included White Eagles, the Montenegro Guard, and the Vukovar unit, commanded by Pero Elez. An unknown number of Muslims were captured and transported to detention facilities. Many found in remote areas were simply lined up and shot.

1043. According to one female witness who lived in the predominantly Serbian area of ukovac, Foća located on the banks of the Drina, Radovan Karadžić's wife Linda and a Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) leader, Biljana Plavšić, visited the town and appeared at a rally in the stadium to congratulate the fighters, especially the White Eagles, responsible for the delivery of Foća. Although the town was occupied she reported that was not forced to leave her home immediately because it was a predominantly Serbian area.
1044. In July, she reported, the Serbs began killing the Muslims of ukovac. Many were allegedly killed at a "Tito" sign on a hill overlooking Foča and thrown into the Drina. Several times over a four to five day period a yellow mini-van coming from the direction of the Foča prison (KP Dom) delivered a number of men who were disposed of in like manner. This witness reported that she was later abducted and raped. She reported that she spent a number of days in a rape house. The house was owned by a man reportedly imprisoned by the Serbs in KP Dom and apparently still alive and interned there as of December 1992. 1410/

1045. Collection of non-Serbian peoples of the Foča region commenced and continued contemporaneously with the battle. In the city, uniformed Serbs, many masked, turned residents out of their homes and delivered them to various places where a screening took place. Serbian residents were advised to move to certain outlying villages for their own protection against the possibility of future fighting in the area and Muslims were transferred to various detention centres. The initial screening stations included a civil defence bunker located under a large apartment building. 1411/

1046. One witness stated that shortly after BiH declared its independence on 8 April 1992, the head of the local branch of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) ordered that the Muslim population of the city be rounded up and deported to various camps. He claimed that Muslims and Croats were picked up 100-200 at a time and held for a few hours at local high schools before being sent to various camps. He stated that the first taken were intellectuals, city officials, and police officers. 1412/

1047. Solana: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) After these screenings, a number of Muslims were moved and held in two warehouses known as Solana because they were formerly used to store salt. As Solana filled up, Muslims intended for detention there were instead held in various houses and apartments. 1413/

1048. KP Dom: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) The primary place of detention was, and may still be, the Foča Prison, also known as Kazneno Popravni (KP) Dom (House of Criminal Rehabilitaion). 1414/ The prison had been one of the largest in the former Yugoslavia with a 2,000 inmate capacity. On or about 1 April 1992, Foča prison guards allegedly set an unknown number of inmates free. All but 20 of the original inmates reportedly left the prison compound. Some time later in April, the mobilized Serbian residents of Foča took control of the prison. On or about 10 May, control was transferred to the Foča Police.

1049. About 35 people worked at the prison in three shifts. Seven guards on duty during the day and three or four during the night. Extra guards were posted when fighting increased in the surrounding area. Most guards were prison employees, although the Muslim guards had been dismissed in early April. Prison personnel traditionally wore blue-gray uniforms and caps; after April, 1992, the cap emblem was changed from a red star to the Serbian flag.

1050. The prison reportedly served as part of a "crisis headquarters". 1415/ 1051. The Foča Prison complex reportedly consists of two four story buildings and one L-shaped one story building. All three buildings are surrounded by two walls: an inner wall 3.5 metres high and an outer wall five metres high. Four steel guardshacks are positioned on the corners of the outer wall. At night the prison grounds are well illuminated with lights affixed to the outer wall and the grounds outside the wall. The westernmost building was reportedly used for administration and interrogation. Two rooms used for interrogation were located on the ground floor. The eastern building housed the detainees. The administration and detention buildings were eight metres apart. The L-shaped building was a prison workshop. The administration and detention buildings have
sloped, bricked roofs and the workshop building had a sloped aluminum roof. An inner wall separated the buildings from a courtyard that reportedly contained antipersonnel mines. 1416/

1052. One source reported that on 19 May 1992, there were 130 Muslim detainees in the Foća men's prison, and between 19 and 25 May, 400 new detainees were brought in. Inmates estimated at least 36 prisoners were killed by guards in June. Guards would typically enter a cell between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., call out inmates' names, inform them that they were to be exchanged, and take them away. These prisoners were never heard from again. 1417/

1053. Approximately 200 inmates were taken from the prison for unknown reasons in late August, most inmates believed they were killed by guards. Thirty-five prisoners were taken away on 15 September and 12 more at the end of the same month, allegedly for a prisoner exchange. Prisoners released since that time failed to locate any of these men. Prisoners on the fourth floor observed guards carrying blankets containing what seemed to be human bodies and dumping them in the Drina River. Thirty-six blankets from May to October. Muslim inmates estimated that in early August the prison held 570 inmates, and that by 13 October it held 130 detainees. 1418/

1054. Each new prisoner brought into Foća prison was interrogated and spent time in a solitary confinement cell. Periods of confinement varied but the average stay was 30 days. Some prisoners were placed in solitary before interrogation, and some afterwards. Interrogations also varied with some conducted immediately after a detainee's arrival and others conducted up to three months later. During interrogation a detainee was questioned about his political affiliation, his property holdings and the status of Muslim defence forces in his area of residence. At the end of the interrogation each detainee was required to sign a statement detailing the subjects discussed during interrogation. Personnel files, which included biographical data and circumstances of apprehension were kept on all detainees. On 30 September, Red Cross files were opened on all inmates, but the Red Cross had not visited as of April 1993. 1419/

1055. Apparently, the ICRC first visited the KP Dom on 23 June 1993 and found 70 detainees. They reportedly visited again on 4 August 1993 when they found 52 detainees. 1420/

1056. Reportedly, many Muslims who earlier fled to Serbia and Montenegro believing it was safe, were later tracked down and returned to the Foća prison. 1421/

1057. Helsinki Watch reported the stories of two men who claimed they were detained at the Foća KP Dom and not mistreated. According to one, Serbian forces arrested him and 27 other men in Foća at the end of April 1992. The Serbs told those arrested that they were being taken to a place where they would be required to make a statement. 1422/

1058. All those arrested with this man were later questioned. According to the witness, his interrogator told him that he did not know what he was supposed to ask him and that he had a paper which required an interrogation. The witness was then required to sign a document. As the man arrested walked out of the office, he reported that another guard walked into the office and asked the interrogator whether the witness had confessed. The interrogator then supposedly replied, "Did he confess to what?" The guard then reportedly said that if the special forces arrived the arrested man would confess to everything. 1423/

1059. The 28 reportedly arrested were detained at the prison four months. According to the same witness, approximately 560 men were detained in the prison throughout his detention. The number detained fluctuated depending on whether
or not prisoner exchanges took place or if new inmates were brought to the prison. 1424/

1060. This witness was detained in a room with 74 others. The room was divided into quarters. The prisoners were given a place to sleep, some socks, and sponges to wash themselves. He reported that others were held in jail cells. 1425/

1061. He reported that prisoners were fed three times a day. He stated that they received cabbage, macaroni and water daily. According to this and another witness, the prisoners also received 15 decagrams of bread a day to be shared among 20 prisoners. 1426/

1062. Helsinki Watch reported the story of another witness who stated that he was placed in room number 22 with 44 other men, after which, they were individually questioned. The questions primarily concerned membership of the SDA and the number of weapons in his village. He stated that cots and blankets were provided to the prisoners and that neither he nor his son were mistreated. 1427/

1063. Both of the above men were reportedly released from the KP Dom and deported from the region on or about 30 August 1992. One of the men claimed that 250 men remained in the prison at the time of his release. 1428/

1064. Helsinki Watch included the story of another alleged prisoner of Serb forces in Foča. He reported that detainees were beaten in the prison. This individual claims that all those interrogated were also threatened. He states that for three and a half months he was held in one room. The number of prisoners in that room, he stated, gradually increased from about 30 to 75. According to this man, a police officer would come to the room in the evening and read out the names of some men who would then be taken from the room and beaten. Although he was not beaten, he claims that some were beaten severely. Some men who were taken out reportedly never returned.

1065. The above witness was released from the Foča prison on 29 August 1992. They were to be taken to Nikšić, Montenegro. On the way, Pero Elez stopped the bus and ordered it back to the prison. There, two police officers identified 20 of the prisoners and took them away. The remainder returned to the bus and left for Montenegro. 1429/

1066. Probably the same Muslim school teacher from Foča mentioned above described the murder of prisoners at the Foča Prison. 1430/ Bosnian Serbs captured him and interned him in the men’s prison from May to December 1992, when he was released in a prisoner exchange. 1431/ Between 12 June and 20 June 1992, at least five or six prisoners were taken nightly from their cells and interrogated in the administration building opposite the detention building. Prisoners could see their fellow inmates taken into the two interrogation rooms on the ground floor of the administration building opposite and were able to see individuals from the waist up through windows looking into the two rooms. Two prisoners were taken into the interrogation rooms while the others waited outside under guard. Prisoners in the detention building heard screams for 20 minutes, after which a second pair of prisoners were brought into the two rooms.

1067. Prisoners on the third floor of the detention facility could see over the administration building to the road and the river. They watched as guards carried blanket wrapped bundles of what appeared to be bodies to the river, where they were dumped. Guards carried such bundles to the river only after such interrogation. Those brought to interrogation were never seen again. This witness identified 13 victims. 1432/
1068. Another man reported being arrested with his son and 18 other men in his neighbourhood and taken to the KP Dom on 27 April 1992. He stated that 560 Muslim men from the Poča area were interned there. He claimed that the Serbs running the camp maintained written records and biographic files on all those interned. Interrogations reportedly focused on discovering which Muslims in town had weapons. According to this man, about four prisoners were beaten each night between midnight and 1:00 a.m. 1433/

1069. A Muslim woman from Poča reported that on 18 April 1992, she was arrested by masked men calling themselves "Cetniks". She was taken to the KP Dom and interrogated. After the interrogation, she alleged that she was beaten with a rifle butt until she bled from the mouth and ears. She then states that she was thrown into a cell holding men. A half an hour later, a Muslim man who had a bullet wound and who had been beaten on the head was thrown into the cell. Other beaten prisoners were later thrown in and she was threatened and forced to surrender her wedding ring before being eventually released. 1434/

1070. Another teacher at the school in Poča was treated well as a prisoner. Unidentified individuals from Poča frequently visited this teacher, who would then relay information to the other prisoners. For example, a Bosnian Serb soldier, a former teacher at a school in Poča, told the teacher/inmate that an identified prisoner was killed on 18 June 1992. This information was then passed along to others. 1435/

1071. Several witnesses describe bodies dumped into the Drina River and washing up on the shores of Gorade. Many, former inmates of the KP Dom. 1436/ Corpses which are believed to be those of Muslims executed in Poča prison camp were seen daily in the River Drina at Gorade. Amongst them were children as young as seven. Corpses were frequently mutilated and carried signs of torture. There were seven to eight corpses a day as late as end of July 1992, although Serbs claimed Poča ethnically clean. 1437/

1072. Another source claimed that she and her daughter were arrested by Serbs in her house in the middle of August 1992 and taken to the KP Dom where they were both raped. She states that she was raped twice and her daughter several times. According to this witness, she and her daughter spent 10 days imprisoned at the KP Dom, 10 days "in another place" and seven days in a camp before they escaped. 1438/

1073. White Eagles surrounded the village of Kremaluša on 5 May 1992. They opened fire with mortars and machine-guns and continued firing until 6 May when they moved into the village and began to search the houses and round up the residents. A Muslim Kremaluša villager detained at the KP Dom until mid-December, 1992, when he was exchanged near Sarajevo, reported the greatest number of prisoners held there at one time was 586, all male, during the period of June to September 1992. 1439/

1074. According to this witness, interrogators wanted the names of people who possessed weapons, the location of weapons caches, and the identities of members of the Muslim Party (SDA). Interrogators also attempted to extract confessions of "crimes committed against the Serbs". Alleged torture was common and committed in the same building where interrogations took place. Each day three to five prisoners who had confessed to such crimes were removed to the Drina River, executed and dumped into the water. Prisoners had one meal a day. The meal consisted of water diluted leftovers from the guards' meals. This witness also provided a list of inmates as of December 1992. 1440/

1075. According to one of the teachers detained, there were 95 prisoners in Poča Prison on 12 December 1992. Ninety-three Muslims, one Croat, and one Slovenian journalist who had been on assignment for an unidentified French media
company. However, one heard rumours that as late as May, 1993 there were 500 men still detained in the prison.

1076. A BBC reporter apparently interviewed the Deputy President of the (Serbian) Municipality of Foća, Ljubomir Todović and a Muslim prisoner held at the KP Dom on 26 and 27 August 1993. The reporter saw KP Dom. He was not allowed to know how many prisoners were there. The Commandant was identified by name in the source materials.

1077. According to the Deputy President, as reported:

"Check wherever you want, but during the fighting and after the fighting in Foća, there were no prisons for civilians, i.e. for women, children and other people. Only for people who were capable of fighting . . . and I haven't heard anybody saying that they have taken in women, children and old people. . . . As far as I know, none such actions took place here, because the military/government/police didn't authorise such actions. In fact the authorities were the buffer zone for the Muslim civilians here, until the Muslims decided to go."

1078. The reporter was allowed to interview a Muslim soldier captured by Serb forces in the summer of 1993 and held at the KP Dom. Apparently, the prisoner participated in an attack upon Serb civilians in the Jošanica valley. He provides no other information relating to his incarceration.

1079. Miljevina Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the National Organization for Victim Assistance.) Miljevina is a village in the Foća province, located a few kilometres to the west of the city of Foća. Bosnian Serb military headquarters were supposedly located there prior to the conflict and witnesses often referred to the Miljevina Motel as a Serb Headquarters.

1080. As in all other villages conquered by the Serb forces, Muslims were rounded up and placed in detention for various amounts of time. Reportedly, Serbs used the Miljevina jailhouse to imprison all the men of the village on 11 June 1992.

1081. A woman reported that on 6 August 1992, a Serbian police officer took her and her 11 month old son, her mother-in-law and her two children to the prison in Miljevina. Although the others were released she was held in a cell with another man and a woman. After four hours the police officer took her to another room and raped her. He then released her.

1082. On 20 June 1992, a man was imprisoned at the Miljevina jail and held for seven days and beaten after which he was used to clear mines. He was forced to drive a car in front of a convoy to clear a path or at least ensure the location of a safe path through minefields for Serb forces. He was later imprisoned at the KP Dom.

1083. On or about 18 August 1992, 20 men in uniforms of Serbian nationality arrested five men and a girl and took them to the house of Nusret Karaman. After spending a night there, they were taken to the Miljevina police station where the girl was questioned and released. The men spent 15 days at the police station when they were transferred to the KP Dom.

1084. Elementary School in Donje epće: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 16 April 1992, Serbs ambushed a truck carrying 45 soldiers committed to the defence of Foća near the village of Donje epće. Three Muslims were wounded; the others taken prisoner and placed in the elementary school in Donje epće. The wounded were taken to
the Foča hospital. Eight prisoners were immediately released. Later, the Serb captors released another two Muslim prisoners because they looked exhausted. Those who remained in custody were reportedly beaten by three identified men. Upon request of the Muslim defence forces it was agreed to release the remaining prisoners on 18 April 1992. At the time of the release two prisoners were accidentally killed crossing the Muslim barricades. 1451

1085. Foča Police Headquarters: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One man claims to have been captured by Serbian irregular forces in the village of Zubovići and detained from 14 April to 3 May 1992 when he was paroled. According to this man, two other men repeatedly interrogated him and other prisoners at police headquarters in Foča. He states that he was not maltreated but claims that a number of inmates lost weight because they were not given enough to eat. 1452

1086. Bug/Buk Bijelo Workers Barracks/Construction Site: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) On or about 3 July 1992, some local Serbs and some Montenegrins reportedly held some women from the village of Mesaje for one night in the workers' barracks. They were interrogated about possession of weapons. 1453

1087. Various Houses and Apartments in Foča: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) After arrest by a group of 26 Serbian soldiers claiming to be Šešeljovci from Trebinje, a group of women and children were separated into four groups at the police station and taken to separate houses confiscated from Muslim owners. A soldier told one of the women that women, children and old people were being taken to these homes because they were not worth a bullet. 1454

1088. This woman was placed in a group of 28 women and kept in a house for 27 days. The prisoners ranged in age from 12 to 60 years-old. Four to five local Serbs stood guard at all times. Soldiers came to the house day and night to select women and girls for beating and rape. Frequently, the soldiers sought mother-daughter combinations. The captors also forced some of the prisoners to drink alcohol and eat pork. Many women threw up and were then beaten for getting sick. On 18 August 1992, the women were allowed to leave on a convoy evacuating Muslims from Foča. 1455

1089. A woman who had been imprisoned for one month at the Kalinovik High School was allegedly taken from there by two Montenegrins to a house in Foča occupied by an individual from Trnovača. She was held there five days then taken to the Miljevina Bordello by the same two men. 1456

1090. In Miljevina, the apartments of Zoran Samardić and Nedo Samardić were reported to be places where women and girls were detained for the purpose of rape. Each holding two or three women or girls and including at least one transfer of a prisoner from Zoran's apartment to Nedo's apartment. In fact, a number of apartments seem to have been maintained by a group of soldiers and paramilitaries led by Pero Elez. 1457

1091. Gymnasium: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One report claimed that the women and children of Miljevina were imprisoned in a gymnasium for about three days. In that time, the report alleges that all of the females between the ages of 12 and 35 were taken out every evening and raped. After three days, the women and children were taken to Gorade and left there. 1458

1092. Another source reported the story of a woman who claimed to have been held in a gymnasium in Foča with 30 women and children. She and her daughter were allegedly raped there, her daughter several times. After 10 days at the
gymnasium the witness reported being moved to a school in Kalinovik. 1459/

1093. Foća High School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) A woman from the village of Mesaje describes the typical roundup and separation of Muslim men, women and children by Serbian forces around 15 April 1992. Taking the men to prison in Foća and leaving the women and children behind. On or about 3 July, 500 "Četniks" surrounded the forest near Mesaje, where the remaining Muslims had fled, and killed and captured those within. Approximately 70 women and children and five old men were taken to a collection camp located in the High School in Foća. 1460/

1094. The witness describes the school as a woman's transit camp at the high school, Ahmeda Fetahovića Street, Foća-Aladža. All 70 were kept there from 3 July to 17 July 1992. All were forced to stay in a former classroom 10 metres by 10 metres. They were able to use mattresses and blankets left behind by Serbian soldiers who had occupied the school earlier. Toilets and water were available. The food was very bad. The first week they received no warm food. Twice a day a loaf of bread was given to 10 persons. A warm soup of potatoes or peas was occasionally received later in the day. Believed soup a mixture of leftovers from a military mess hall. The military guard consisting of two soldiers standing outside was changed every eight hours. All women between ages 15 and 45 were continuously raped by Serbian military members. 1461/ This happened in other rooms at the school or outside in empty formerly Muslim homes in the town. 1462/

1095. On 8 July 1992, the source and seven other women were raped by 10 "Četniks" in another room in the building. She resisted and therefore struck on her back with the butt of a rifle. A former acquaintance ("etnik") interfered on her behalf and rescued her from rape and any further abuse, escorting her back to the detention room. The guards frequently raped the women they guarded. 1463/

1096. Partizan Sports Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) On 17 July all those detained at the high school were transferred to the Partizan Sports Hall in the centre of Foća on Samoborska Street. 1464/ There the above witness and her relatives were detained until 13 August 1992 when all were transferred by bus to Roaj, Montenegro where they lived with local Muslim families until 9 May 1993. Almost all of the prisoners were from Mesaje with a few from Foća. They stayed in the former gym which was 15 metres by eight metres in size. They slept on the floor without mattresses or blankets. Toilets and water were available inside the building. They were unable to take a bath or shower. They had no soap or other hygienic utensils. The food situation was as bad as at the school. Children received no milk, fruit, or vegetables, and everyone was always hungry. They were forbidden to leave their billets or receive visitors. "Četniks" continued to rape women as they did earlier at the school. 1465/ As there were no other rooms available in the building, women were occasionally raped in the gym in front of all the detainees, including children, or outside the building on the meadow. Most of the time, however, women were taken out and driven in a car to empty, former Moslem, apartments or houses in town. Each time they were kept all night. On several occasions, several women were kept several days and nights at one place and raped every night by a different group of "Četniks". 1466/

1097. As far as this witness knew, no women or children were killed at either place. Women were not tortured but were beaten if they refused sex. Often, especially at the beginning, women who resisted returned in the morning with bloody faces. Many women became pregnant. Several weeks later many aborted the foetuses in Roaj. Three Muslim girls from Mesaje were not released on 13 August. They were forced to stay in a brothel in Foća as objects of pleasure for Serbian soldiers. These women were identified by name in the report. 1467/
1098. Velečevo Women's Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Serb forces allegedly used the Velečevo Women's Prison in Poča as a concentration camp for Muslim women. 1468/ Women were reportedly held there as late as April 1993. 1469/

1099. According to one source, the prison contained approximately 500 female inmates prior to the conflict; another source indicates 50. 1470/ The first source claims that younger Muslims were imprisoned with the criminals there after the Serb attack and round-up of Muslims in the area. The same source believed that most of the criminal inmates were later killed, leaving 120 females from Velečevo's original prison population surviving. 1471/ The second source reported that the 50 female inmates who had been housed in the prison before April 1992 were moved to an unidentified facility in Puz on 12 April 1992. 1472/

1100. Velečevo prison is four kilometres south of the KP Dom in Poča. It is a multi-storied building surrounded by wire fencing covering an area of about 200 by 200 metres. 1473/

1101. BiH Government authorities claimed that the girls and young women held there were tortured, raped, often killed, and otherwise maltreated. 1474/

1102. Sources reported that the mobilized Serbs of Poča set up there headquarters in or next to the Velečevo Women's Prison. 1475/ Radovan Karadžić said that he was unaware of any such headquarters. He also said he had not known that Velečevo was the sight of a women's prison. 1476/

1103. Miljevina Motel: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One girl describes being captured by three men dressed in camouflage uniforms with the insignia of Serbian Voluntary Guard. They brought her to a place she described as Serb headquarters at a motel in Miljevina where she spent one night. She was then taken to Ismet Bašić's apartment. 1477/

1104. Ismet Bašić's Apartment: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The girl mentioned above was kept in Ismet Bašić's apartment from about 10 June 1992 to November 1992. After two months of detention, Pero Elez reportedly raped her. She alleges he raped her continually until he was killed in December of 1992 when she was transferred to Nedo Samardić's apartment. 1478/

1105. Miljevina Bordello: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Several sources described a bordello in Miljevina which could be the same place described as the Miljevina Motel or Serb Headquarters in Miljevina. 1479/ According to one woman, Pero Elez was the "main etnik" in Miljevina. According to her, he knew everyone in the village and therefore did no harm; however, his soldiers were criminal, and among them the Montenegrins were supposedly the worst. She stated, though, that it was understood that Elez took five 12 year old girls from Kalinovik and brought them to what the witness reported as Elez's bordello in Miljevina where they were kept as concubines. 1480/

1106. Another woman describes being taken to a Nusret Karaman's house and held there six months with other young women and raped. 1481/ According to another woman, the Miljevina Bordello was located in a three story white house with an orange tile roof, owned by Nusret Karemman, a Muslim who worked in Germany. The bordello was 50 metres from her window across the Bistrica River. 1482/ Another woman confirmed the existence of the bordello. She, too, could see it from her home. 1483/ According to another source, by 3 September 1992, the only Muslims left in Miljevina were bordello girls. 1484/
1107. Another source reported that on or about 2 September 1992, 10 girls 12 years-old or less were being held in the brothel in Miljevina. 1485/

1108. Former Prison for Underage Delinquents: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One source reported 131 Muslims held in the former prison for under-age delinquents in Foča on or about 2 September 1992. According to the report there had been as many as 600 prisoners held there in June and July of 1992. Many had purportedly died as a result of beatings and abuse. Many were allegedly shot or taken away to the mines of Miljevina, Gacko, Montenegro, Serbia or to unknown locations. 1486/

1109. Identification of Perpetrators: The perpetrators were identified by name in the source materials.

26. Fojnica

1110. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the county of Fojnica had a population of 16,227, of which 40.9 per cent were Croats, 49.4 per cent were Muslims, .9 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 8.8 per cent were described as "others".

1111. Fojnica is located in the southern region of BiH, approximately 50 miles south of Sarajevo. One report received from this area described a Muslim controlled facility in or about which several Croatian soldiers and civilians are buried. 1487/

1112. According to the report, Croatian civilians are presently living and detained in the community, however the conditions of their detention were not specified. 1488/

1113. On 29 September 1993, a prisoner exchange between Fojnica and Kiseljak was arranged. Additional information regarding future prisoner of war exchanges suggested that five Croats would be released for Kiseljak and a team would be permitted to exhume the bodies of the buried Croats. 1489/

1114. Fojnica Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One report alleges the existence of a camp in Fojnica. There are no details provided in the report. 1490/

1115. Fojnica School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in a school in Fojnica. The ICRC first visited the camp on 3 August 1993. 1491/

27. Gacko

1116. The municipality of Gacko is located in south-eastern BiH, bordered by the municipalities of Bileća, Nevesinje, Kalinovik, Foča and FRY. According to the 1991 census, Gacko had a prewar population of 10,844. Serbs comprised the majority of the population at 62.4 per cent, Muslims comprised 35.3 per cent, and Croats 2.3 per cent. In 1992, 37 per cent of the region's 10,000 population was Muslim who formed the middle classes and constituted a majority inside the town of Gacko. 1492/ Serbian forces began arresting young men in the Gacko area in early June and July of 1992 and began to incarcerate the civilian population in camps. Approximately 136 people were killed in the town and many were sent to a camp in Bileća. 1493/ One source provided a list of all prisoners transferred from the municipality of Gacko to Bileća. 1494/
1117. According to one source, a witness from Bileća reported that over 200 refugees who had escaped from Bileća to Gacko. In Gacko, the refugees were imprisoned by commanding officers Popović and alasan. The report did not indicate the exact location in Gacko the refugees were held. The witness also recounted an incident in which a female prisoner was pushed while alive into a fire.

1118. According to one source, former detainees from Gacko and Bileća fled to the Dubrovnik area. One man, an employee of the thermoelectric power station of Gacko, was reportedly arrested on 1 June 1992 because of his ethnicity as a Muslim. He was imprisoned for 15 days, released, and then arrested again seven days later. He was then transferred to a camp in Bileća.

1119. Military Casern Avtovac: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) It was reported that a Serbian controlled concentration camp was located 4 miles south-east of the town of Gacko in Avtovac. One hundred and ten Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim males were captured by Bosnian Serb forces and imprisoned from 1-5 June 1992 at the military casern in Avtovac. On 5 June 1992, the prisoners were transferred to a processing centre in the basement of the Samački Hotel. It was reported that 1,000 people were held at this camp as of November 1992.

1120. A separate report described the ethnic cleansing and imprisonment of Muslim civilians in the city of Gacko in March through July 1992. A Muslim witness reported that the Serbian Army initially entered Gacko in March 1992 on the way to the front in Mostar. Local members of the "White Eagles" paramilitary group allegedly destroyed Muslim owned cafes, apartments and shops. In the middle of May the "White Eagles" began shooting into homes and making arrests.

1121. According to an eyewitness, on 1 June, Serbian soldiers arrested Muslim men at the Gacko Power Plant as they finished their shift. One hundred prisoners were placed in military transport and taken to the military prison in Avtovac, five kilometres from Gacko. Serbian soldiers then moved from house to house arresting more Muslim men and taking them to Avtovac and then to Hotel Terma, outside Gacko. On 4 July, Serbian forces reportedly went from house to house for any remaining Muslims. The soldiers entered the home of the reporting witness and told her that she had two minutes to leave the house. The witness and 980 Muslim residents were taken by bus and train to the Serbian-Macedonian border. A Muslim relief organization took them to Skopje.

1122. Hotel Terma: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) Male Muslim prisoners from the city of Gacko were transferred from Avtovac to the hotel. The report provided no other information concerning a camp at this location.

1123. Gacko Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the National Organization for Victim Assistance.) In the beginning of June 1992, Serbian forces in Gacko arrested 200 Muslims that had been held (the report is unclear about this point) on the ground floor of the hotel. Fifteen Muslim male prisoners were killed by the Serbian captors which caused the rest of the prisoners to panic. The witness reported that the Serbians began robbing and torturing the prisoners, extorting money and seizing property and cars. The prisoners were mistreated the entire month of June. The prisoners were reportedly beaten if they refused the demands of the soldiers. Beginning of 18 June, all the Muslim villages near Gacko were set on fire. The burning and looting continued until 1 July. Some of the Muslim inhabitants, older men and women, were brought to Gacko. Some of them were allegedly killed at Kula. On 4 July, all prisoners held
at the hotel were taken to the TE Hotel. 1514/

1124. TE Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the National Organization for Victim Assistance.) According to one report, one hundred male civilians were separated from their families and transferred to the TE Hotel from the Gacko Hotel on 4 July 1992. 1515/ Women and children were put onto 11 buses and driven to Macedonia via Montenegro. 1516/

1125. TPP Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In April 1992, the city of Gacko and surrounding Muslim villages were attacked by Serbian forces. According to one report, some of the Muslim residents were held in this hotel before being transferred to a concentration camp in Bileća. 1517/ Bosnian Muslim women and children were allegedly transported to a camp in Kalinovik where they were reportedly subjected to physical mistreatment and rape. 1518/ The report stated that 10 minor women were transferred to a bordello in Miljevina. 1519/

1126. The report provided the names of Serbians who allegedly took part in the crimes committed against Muslims in Gacko. 1520/

1127. Samački Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The Samački Hotel was located in the south-east end of town of Gacko. 1521/ On 5 June 1992, prisoners from the military casern in Avtovac were transferred to a processing centre in the basement of the Samački Hotel in Gacko. 1522/ The conditions in the basement were poor as a significant amount of water had reportedly leaked in. 1523/

1128. Male Bosnian Muslim prisoners who were captured by Serbian "White Eagles" paramilitary forces near the Košuta Motel on 18 June 1992, and imprisoned at the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Gacko were transferred to the basement of the Samački Hotel sometime after 18 June. At least six prisoners were killed at the hotel before 136 prisoners were transferred on 1 July 1992 to a prison in Bileća. Four prisoners were shot and killed by Serbian forces as they were being loaded into trucks for transport. 1524/

1129. Another report stated that the Serbian offensive in the city of Gacko began in the beginning of June 1992. The "Četniks" reportedly captured as many Muslim males as they could. Those residents of Gacko who were not captured escaped with their families into the mountains and Borovina woods on the east side of the city. The male prisoners were then reportedly taken to a "prison in the basement of a hotel in a Gacko suburb". 1525/

1130. A separate witness statement stated that Serbian forces shelled the villages around the town of Gacko on 18 or 19 June 1992. 1526/ The reporting witness fled to Basici west of Gacko after leaving Gacko. Those who survived the shelling on 18-19 June were captured by Serbian forces and taken to a prison in "a hotel in the suburbs of Gacko". 1527/ This appears to be consistent with previous descriptions of the Samački Hotel. 1528/

1131. Another witness reported that sometime in early June 1992, "Četniks" took 320 men prisoners to a prison in the basement of a hotel in a Gacko suburb. 1529/ Eleven men reportedly died within 15 days of confinement after being subjected to interrogation, physical abuse and deprivation of food and water. 1530/ The prisoners were transferred to the town of Bileća, between Gacko and Trebinje to the military camp which was converted into a concentration camp and to the police station. 1531/ On 28 June 1992 the Muslim village Patorci was destroyed.

1132. Gacko Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been
Serbian forces attacking the city of Gacko in June 1992 positioned themselves approximately two kilometres from the city on a small hill called Glavice, in a house belonging to Zejnil Tanović. The Serbian forces reportedly positioned an anti-aircraft machine-gun at the top of the hill and launched attacks on the refugees who had fled into the mountains east of the city.  

The leader of the Serbian forces at Glavice reportedly also worked at the Steam Power Plant in Gacko. He was appointed by the Serbs after the former plant director, Branko Grk, refused to give Serbian forces a list of employed Muslim males born in 1973 and 1974 during the JNA mobilization of new recruits in June 1992. Those who resisted conscription were reportedly imprisoned.

The reporting witness and family were part of a group of 200 Muslim and Croatian refugees who surrendered to Serbian forces on 12 July 1992. The refugees were loaded into trucks and taken off the mountain. At Bohuša near the city of Gacko the refugees were taken out of the trucks and detained for three or four hours. The Serbs interrogated the refugees about the location of the men from the city. One group of civilians were sent back to the mountain and the other group of refugees were taken to the Gacko police station.

The refugees were held at the police station until 4:00 p.m. on 12 July. The witness stated that the police station was filled with items that had been plundered from Muslim homes. The younger women were reportedly questioned by Vitomir Popić. The reporting witness and her cousin were interrogated regarding the whereabouts of their fathers, brothers and neighbours. The prisoners were then loaded into trucks and transported to Trebinje and then Bileća.

Another witness reported a Serbian assault on the city of Gacko in April 1992. Inhabitants of the city fled into the mountains near the village of Meduljići where they remained for 22 days. The witness and her children were captured along with 100 civilians and taken to the Gacko police station. At the police station, the prisoners were reportedly interrogated for several hours. The report did not indicate how long the prisoners were held at the police station before they were transported by truck to Trebinje.

The Commission has received a report from the U.S. Department of State that Bosnian Muslim males were held prisoner by Bosnian Serb forces at the Secretariat of Internal Affairs building in the town of Gacko. The report stated that on 18 June 1992, the Bosnian Serbs controlling Gacko announced that all Bosnian Muslim and Croat residents could leave town. One hundred men, women and children left Gacko in a convoy heading towards Montenegro. Serbian paramilitary member of the "White Eagles" intercepted the convoy approximately seven kilometres south of Gacko near the Košuta Motel in Zborna Gomila. All able-bodied male prisoners were taken from the convoy, forced to lie down on the road, and searched by the paramilitary members. The men were stripped of their valuables, and the women and children were forced into several military trucks and taken back to Gacko. An identified Serbian soldier from Gacko was allegedly responsible for the shooting death of at least one prisoner. The male prisoners were transported by military truck to the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Gacko.

An identified Serbian was reportedly in charge of the SUP in Gacko. The prisoners were interrogated and tortured by two inspectors who were identified in the materials, both from Gacko. After the prisoners had been tortured, the Serb leader transferred the prisoners to the basement of the Samački Hotel.
1138. The BiH War Crimes Commission published the names of men accused of committing war crimes in Gacko. Their identities are available in the source materials. 1552/

1139. Gacko Electric Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A Serb-controlled camp was located at the Gacko Electric Plant in the city of Gacko. 1553/ The camp was reportedly established under the direction of the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) Commander in Eastern Herzegovina. 1554/ The report stated that Muslim and Croatian prisoners were held at the camp. 1555/

1140. Gacko Power Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UN Economic and Social Council.) Muslim and Croat men were reportedly imprisoned by Serbian forces in the Gacko Power Plant in June 1992. 1556/ The prisoners were allegedly beaten repeatedly, especially at night, to prevent them from sleeping. Ten of these prisoners have reportedly disappeared after guards called them by name. One former prisoner is reported to have witnessed the arbitrary executions of five prisoners on separate occasions. 1557/

1141. Fazlagić Tower: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a Bosnian Muslim witness described the "ethnic cleansing" of a cluster of villages referred to as Fazlagića Kula in the Gacko area. 1558/ On 19 June 1992 Serbian forces from the villages Miholjače, Srdjevići and Medjulići entered Fazlagića Kula, reportedly looted the homes and stole livestock. Approximately 200 to 300 village residents fled into the surrounding mountains and remained there for 27 days. 1559/ Serbian forces allegedly bombed the mountain in an attempt to force the villagers out. On 25 July, the Serbian forces communicated with the villagers by megaphone demanding that they give themselves up and promising them protection. Approximately 200 to 300 women and children reportedly responded and came out of the mountains. 1560/ The women were taken to Gacko by Serbian forces and then loaded in four military convoys and transported through Bileća to Trebinje. The transport was rejected at Trebinje so they were dropped off at Bileća. 1561/ After 15 days in Bileća, the witness fled to Montenegro. 1562/ A Serbian controlled camp was located at the Fazlagić Tower. The report did not indicate which city in the municipality of Gacko the camp was located. 1563/

1142. Hotel Košuta: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Government.) Hotel Košuta was located 10 kilometres south of Gacko, 500 kilometres from the road. 1564/ Part of the Serbian headquarters were reportedly located at the hotel, and the other part were located at the Gacko police station. 1565/ According to one source, Muslim residents who had remained in the city of Gacko during the Serbian shelling of the city had been issued written passes from Serbian authorities which permitted them to leave the city. As a group of the Muslims attempted to leave the city, they were intercepted by members of the "White Eagles" paramilitary group. 1566/ The Muslim males were beaten and "dragged by hands, heads or legs all over the parking lot" in front of the hotel before being taken back to prison in Gacko. 1567/ The men and women were robbed of personal possessions, and their cars were stolen. 1568/ The Serbian forces set prisoners on fire after dousing them with gas and beat prisoners on their heads with rifle butts. 1569/ The women and children were forced to watch the incident from the cars. 1570/ The Muslim women were raped at the hotel and then taken into the woods a few kilometres from the hotel and murdered. 1571/

1143. One female Muslim prisoner who was among the group of Muslim prisoners ambushed by the "White Eagles" near the Hotel Košuta. 1572/ The soldiers reportedly entered the cars of the prisoners and drove the women to the hotel. The witness stated that some of the men who had been arrested by the Serbs were
at the hotel when the women arrived, and that they were so bloody and beaten that they were unrecognizable. The witness stated that the soldiers began beating the men again forcing the women and children to watch. After conducting the beatings, the soldiers began to search the women. The women were reportedly taken to a large room in the hotel and robbed of jewelry and any other valuables in their possession. After being robbed, some of the female prisoners were reportedly taken into various hotel rooms and raped. The men were taken to the Gacko prison for 10 days and the women were sent back to Gacko.

1144. Unidentified Hotel in Gacko: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Government.) Another witness was reportedly arrested at his home by one identified individual and two unidentified Serbians. According to the witness, he and his wife were beaten and robbed before being taken to a hotel in Gacko. One of the perpetrators was an unidentified Montenegrin who threatened to kill those who had not responded to the draft. The male and female prisoners were separated and the men were taken to the basement of the hotel and the women were sent to Macedonia. Several prisoners were allegedly killed in the basement of the prison. After what appears from the report to be a brief detention, the male prisoners were transported to Bileća in two trucks by military police.

1145. A separate report stated that the witness was confined in the basement of a hotel in Gacko. A Bosnian Muslim male from south of Banja Luka reported that in late April and early May 1992 Serbian infantry forces attacked Mostar. The city residents reportedly fled into the hills surrounding the city. Serbian forces captured 15 refugees and transported them by truck convoy to a hotel in Gacko on 1 June. The prisoners were reportedly beaten by the Serbian soldiers before being imprisoned in the basement of the hotel.

1146. When the prisoners arrived at the hotel, 100 prominent Bosnian Muslim citizens of Gacko were imprisoned in the basement of the hotel. These included wealthy businessmen, civic leaders and teachers. One Croat citizen was among the prisoners. Each night, eight or nine prisoners were taken upstairs and interrogated about military information and beaten for two to three hours. Fifteen prisoners disappeared. It was alleged that those who disappeared were buried in a mass grave in Gacko's World War II Partisan Cemetery.

1147. During the night of 28 June, a Serbian guard from Gacko reportedly fired into the basement killing one Muslim prisoner and wounding another. In July, 1,100 prisoners were taken out of the basement in groups of 10 and beaten as they passed through a gauntlet of Serbian guards. The prisoners were told that they were being taken for exchange. Three prisoners were shot as guards loaded the prisoners into a large truck. Instead of being exchanged, the prisoners were taken to a former JNA Reserve Officer training academy in Bileća commanded by a Serb from the Sarajevo area.

1148. Hotel Rudnik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) One report indicated that the Gacko prison was located in the Hotel Rudnik Basement and the Gacko Power Plant. Muslim and Croat men were reportedly imprisoned by Serbian forces in the Gacko Power Plant in June 1992. The prisoners were allegedly beaten repeatedly, especially at night, to prevent them from sleeping. Ten of these prisoners have reportedly disappeared after guards called them by name. One former prisoner is reported to have witnessed the arbitrary executions of five prisoners on separate occasions.

1149. One male Muslim prisoner who had been captured by the Serbs at Hotel Košuta was among male prisoners taken to the part of the Gacko prison located at Hotel Rudnik. The witness reported that the prisoners were beaten continuously and
that the worst period of the day was from 5:00 p.m. until midnight because the soldiers beat the prisoners to prevent them from sleeping. 1594/

1150. In the rooms of Hotel Rudnik the "Interviewing Platoons" which reportedly guarded the prisoners. 1595/ Their commander was an active duty officer who the reporting witness was unable to identify. His deputy was identified. 1596/ The head officers or main soldiers in the platoon were also identified. 1597/ It was reported that they acted on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior (SUP) in Gacko. 1598/ Those in charge at the SUP were an individual identified as the Chief of Police, another described as the Commander, a third who was said to be the Inspector, and one simply described as a policeman. 1599/ The witness stated that those men and another man also identified were ideological leaders of the Serbian population.

1151. A male Muslim prisoner reported that members of the "White Eagles" and JNA soldiers reportedly conducted most of the beatings at the prison. 1600/ The witness stated that the prisoners were beaten until the soldiers tired. 1601/ Prisoners reportedly began to disappear from the hotel. Some were beaten by soldiers and returned to the prison, while others disappeared permanently. 1602/ The witness reported that one evening a drunk Serbian soldier entered an area where prisoners were being held and demanded that the prisoners identify persons whose pictures he was carrying. When none of the prisoners identified these people, Sušić took out his gun and began firing at the prisoners randomly. One prisoner was shot in the head and died from his wounds and one prisoner was shot in the colon and survived. 1603/

1152. The prisoners were taken from the cellar of the hotel, loaded into trucks and transported to a camp in Bileća. Serbian soldiers beat the prisoners as they entered the truck. 1604/

1153. Gacko Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) On 19 July 1992, Serbian forces shelled the mountains east of Gacko where the Muslim and Croatian residents of Gacko had fled. 1605/ Six Muslim women were arrested and taken to the Gacko prison, interrogated and then released. The report did not provide any other identifying information concerning the Gacko prison or its location. Another report stated that the Gacko Prison was located at the Hotel Rudnik and the Gacko Power Plant. 1606/ The Serbians who had detained the women demanded that the women give the men a message to surrender. 1607/

28. Glamoč

1154. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the municipality of Glamoč had a population of 12,421. Of that number 79.3 per cent were Serbs, 18.1 per cent were Muslims, 1.5 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 1.1 per cent were described as "others".

1155. Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The one report available from this area suggests that members of Serbian and Montenegrin paramilitary units and nationalist members of the Serbian Democratic Party were responsible for the creation and control of a concentration camp in Glamoč. 1608/ The report states that some 400 of the areas most respected Muslims were imprisoned in the camp established at the stadium. 1609/

1156. The above-mentioned extremists were reportedly also responsible for abuses suffered by the Muslim detainees. 1610/ The author noted that included among the examples of atrocities committed against the Muslim people was the drawing of vital quantities of blood from detainees for use in Serbian hospitals in the
treatment of Serbs. No regard was given to the fact that this loss of blood necessarily resulted in loss of life to the donors. 1611/

29. Gorade

1157. The village of Gorade is a strategically and pragmatically important village for Serbs. It is located adjacent to a highway linking the Serbian capital of Belgrade with Serb held villages to the south-east. The village of Gorade has a population of approximately 65,000. Its status currently is that of a UN protected area and is safe haven for hundreds of refugees from some eight surrounding villages. Gorade is also one of the few remaining Muslim enclaves along the Drina river valley. 1612/

1158. In Gorade, there allegedly are four camps for detaining mainly Serb civilians, 1613/ but the evidence only provides names for three of the four detention facilities. BiH Government or Muslim forces reportedly operated the three named facilities. Reports indicate that at least 480 Serbs were detained in these camps. However, the report from the ICRC's visit to Gorade on 2 August 1993 states that the Government of BiH held 24 prisoners. 1614/ Additionally, previous Red Cross reports from 6 May 1993 and 22 June 1993 indicate that the BiH Government held 29 prisoners in Gorade. 1615/

1159. Caves de Ville: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Muslim forces allegedly operated a prison for Serbs at Caves de Ville in Gorade. 1616/ No additional information was provided regarding the location, operation or conditions at this facility.

1160. Šašići Village: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reports indicate that BiH Government forces detained as many as 100 Serbs in the village of Šašići. 1617/ No additional information was provided regarding the location, operation or conditions at this facility.

1161. Vitkovići: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Reports indicate that BiH Government forces detained as many as 380 Serbs in the village of Vitkovići. 1618/ One report also alleges that Serbs detained at Vitkovići were tortured. 1619/ Additionally, between 3 and 5 May 1992, Muslim "Green Berets" from Gorade, a former waiter among them, reportedly killed several Serbs from Vitkovići. 1620/ The report also alleges that Serbian women were raped and Serbian children were killed. 1621/

30. Gornji Vakuf

1162. Gornji Vakuf is located in west-central BiH. The pre-war population of the city and province of Gornji Vakuf was about 25,130. Approximately 56.1 per cent Muslim, 42.6 per cent Croat, and 1.3 per cent others. 1622/

1163. On 17 May 1993, UNPROFOR reported that the continued detention of 45 Muslim prisoners in Gornji Vakuf illustrated the direct control of HVO military police within brigades by the OZ commander. Apparently the MP commander refused to obey the orders of the brigade commander in Gornji Vakuf. He only took orders from the OZ Commander. 1623/

1164. After intervention by UN and ECMM teams, the above-mentioned 45 Muslim prisoners were reportedly released. 1624/

1165. The ECMM actively monitored the situation in relation to prisoners of war
in Gornji Vakuf. On 26 July 1993, BiH forces reported to an ECMM team that it held 300 to 500 POWs from Bugojno. 1625/

1166. On 10 September 1993, an ECMM team reported that after clashes between BiH troops and HVO troops, there were about 500 POWs and at that time more than 300 had been released. The Croatians however claimed that there were more than 300 POWs still being held by BiH authorities at the time. ECMM personnel expected more POWs to be released within seven days. 1626/

1167. On 10 September 1993, the "Civil Police" reported to an ECMM team that 70 Muslim POWs were being held in Trnovača. It seems that the same "civil police" admitted that they let Croat POWs dig trenches. 1627/

1168. On 16 September 1993, the ECMM reported that BiH forces continued to use POWs to build earth works on the front lines. In fact, on 15 September 1993, one HVO prisoner was wounded while digging trenches at BiH positions near Gornji Vakuf. He was evacuated to the hospital in Bugojno. 1628/

1169. Private House: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives reported the existence of a detention facility in a private home in Gornji Vakuj. Their first visit to this facility was reported to have been on 12 March 1994. No additional details were made available regarding the operation, control nor conditions of this facility. 1629/

1170. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives reported the existence of a detention facility in a private home in Gornji Vakuj. Their first visit to this facility was reported to have been on 29 March 1994. No additional details were made available regarding the operation, control, nor conditions of this facility. 1630/

1171. On 22 March 1994, the ICRC announced that BiH forces handed over six Croat captives at a camp in Gornji Vakuf. 1631/

31. Gradačac

1172. The municipality of Gradačac is located in northern Bosnia and bordered by Modriča to the west, Bosanski Šamac to the north, Brčko to the east and Srebrenik to the south. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, Gradač had a population of 56,378; of that 60.2 per cent were Muslim, 19.8 per cent were Serb, 15.1 per cent were Croat and the remaining 4.9 per cent were described as "other".

1173. Srnice Sports Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Srnice was the only Serbian village in the vicinity of Gradačac. After the HVO forces surrounded the village, most of the Serb inhabitants were evacuated. Approximately 94 Serbs remained. These individuals were taken to the Sports Hall. They remained there for a few days. 1632/

1174. Gradačac Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) A number of Serbs were arrested in July 1992 and held in the prison in Gradačac. The detainees were never charged with an offence. 1633/

1175. They were released only to labour for the Croatians, for example, agriculture, wood-cutting, and digging trenches. If the detainees refuse to work they were sent back to the prison. 1634/
1176. According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility established at a prison in Gradačac on 17 July 1993. No additional information was made available regarding the conditions or the length of the facility's existence. 1635/

1177. House Arrest: (The existence of this type of detention has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Different groups of Serbian detainees were held in homes. At first, the detainees were held in the homes under guard. Later, the detainees were placed without a guard but with certain families that kept watch over them. 1636/

1178. Gornja Tramošnjica School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Area Serbians were arrested and detained in a school building in Gornja Tramošnjica. The detainees were forced to work in the fields. 1637/

32. Grude

1179. The municipality of Grude is located in south-western BiH, on the Croatian border. It bounds Posušje to the north and Ljubuški to the south. Grude's prewar population was 15,976, of which 99.8 per cent were Croats, .1 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining .1 per cent were described as "others".

1180. Farm: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) According to reports, a farm in Grude was used as a camp to detain male and female individuals from the region. 1638/

1181. No additional information regarding this facility was made available, consequently, the identity of witnesses, victims and perpetrators as well as conditions existing during detention remain unknown.

1182. Garage: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) The Commission has received reports that approximately 300 Serbs were detained in a garage in Grude. 1639/ The camp was operated by members of the Croatian-Muslim armed forces. 1640/ The ICRC visited the Grude camp on 16 September 1993 and reported that no POWs were found. 1641/

1183. At least one Serbian man, Aleksa Janjić 1642/, reportedly died as a result of injuries incurred while detained at this camp.

33. Han Pijesak

1184. Han Pijesak is located north-east of Sarajevo. According to 1991 census data, the population was 6,346. At that time, the population was reportedly 58.3 per cent Serb, 40.1 per cent Muslim, and 1.6 per cent were described as "other". 1643/

1185. Unidentified Detention Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) Reportedly, there was a detention facility in Han Pijesak where men were killed and women and young children raped. It has been previously reported that many people are also buried there. 1644/ The reports, however, did not provide information regarding the operation, control nor the length of the facility's existence.
34. Jablanica

1186. This county is in the south-west quarter of BiH, south-west of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, Jablanica had a population of 12,664, of which 72.1 per cent were Muslims, 17.8 per cent were Croats, 6.1 per cent were described as "other", and 4 per cent were Serbs.

1187. As a result of Muslim military aggression, the HVO or Croatian forces lost a great deal of territory. Reportedly, after 14 April 1993, telephone lines were cut and the Croats of Jablanica were not permitted to work. They were reportedly assigned to "work brigades" and used as forced labour to cut wood and dig trenches.

1188. Museum of the Revolution: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Defence Debriefing Team.) According to sources, 800 Croats reportedly were, and may still be, interned in this Muslim-run detention centre. All the prisoners slept on concrete floors, without blankets, were insufficiently clothed and were reportedly kept in appalling hygienic conditions.

1189. According to another report, as of 28 June 1993, some 200 Croatian civilians have been imprisoned in the museum. The new detainees are, reportedly, in addition to the 500 civilians already said to have been detained here by members of the BiH Army.

1190. One report was offered by an employee of the power plant in Grabavica who was detained in the area for several days. The witness was transported to this location in the afternoon of 11 May 1993. The witness was interrogated and reportedly not physically mistreated. By 9:00 p.m. that evening, he was allowed to leave. Reportedly, because he was unable to return to his home, he remained overnight in the prison. Throughout the night, he heard others being beaten. It was his opinion that the individuals being beaten were members of the HVO. He recalled that the people administering the beatings were from Sandak.

1191. According to one source, 500 Croats have reportedly been interned at Jablanica since March 1993. There is strong evidence of a food shortage in the area which brings into question the fate of those detained. There are also reports of the detainees being used as human shields and forced labour.

1192. Jablanica Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is only one report which refers to a detention facility at this location. According to the report, two of four HVO soldiers, who were in Doljani at the time of the Armija attack, were reportedly incarcerated in the Jablanica prison.

1193. Jablanica Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in a factory in Jablanica. The ICRC first visited the camp on 21 April 1993.

1194. House in Doljani: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) It was reported that during a battle between Muslim and Croatian soldiers in the village of Doljani on 27 July 1993, about five armed and uniformed HVO soldiers, an armed male civilian and five unarmed civilians fled the village. Upon reaching a meadow they were shouted at to lie on the ground and as the group dropped they were shot at from two opposite directions. They were then approached by about 20 Muslim
soldiers. The wounded and an HVO soldier were ordered to remain behind while the two women and a civilian man were taken to a house by two of the Muslim soldiers, where they were imprisoned on the ground floor. A wounded HVO soldier was already being detained in the house when the three civilians arrived and the four remained incarcerated in the same room. 1661/1662

1195. Unknown Jablanica Camp(s): (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including an official UN source.) The Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, reported being aware of appalling conditions in a detention camp in Jablanica where many civilians are held. Reportedly, among the detainees are a number suffering from psychiatric illness. There is no specific location given and no details are provided. 1663/1664

35. Jajce

1196. Jajce is located in west-central BiH. The pre-war population of the city and province of Jajce was 44,903. Approximately 38.8 per cent Muslim, 35.1 per cent Croat, 19.3 per cent Serb, and 6.8 per cent were described as "others". 1665/

1197. Old Town Fortress: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) There were reports that Muslim forces ran a camp holding about 500 Serbs in the old fortress or Old Town Fortress in Jajce. 1666/

1198. The ICRC reported a place of detention in Jajce under common Bosnian Croat control as of 1 October 1992. 1667/

1199. On 11 August 1993, the President of the LRC Jajce met with an ECMM team in Livno and asked for assistance in relation to a group of Croats probably being held prisoner by Serbs, who occupied Jajce, in the Berta Kučar School in Jajce. 1668/

36. Kakanj

1200. This county is located in central BiH, north-west of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the county had a population of 55,847. Muslims constituted 54.5 per cent of the population, Croats were 29.8 per cent, Serbs were 8.8 per cent, and the remaining 6.9 per cent were described as "other".

1201. House in Kakanj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A number of sources refer to an incident involving a young woman from Kakanj who was detained for almost a month in her grandmother's home by two Muslim soldiers. The soldiers reportedly raped her on a daily basis, eventually impregnating her. 1669/

1202. Power Plant in Katići-Termoelektrana: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) According to one report, more than 500 Croatian men are being detained at this location just outside of Kakanj. The report suggested that the location was being monitored by UNPROFOR, but that the detainees were not permitted to leave the facility. 1670/

1203. Kakanj Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in a factory in Kakanj. The ICRC first visited this camp on
37. Kalesija

1204. The county of Kalesija is located in north-eastern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 41,795, of which 79.5 per cent were Muslim, 18.3 per cent were Serb, and 2.2 per cent were described as "other". 1672/

1205. Caparde "Bordello": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International.) It is reported that 40 young Muslim women from the town of Brezovo Polje were held and systematically raped in a makeshift bordello in a furniture warehouse in Caparde following the capture of the town by Serb forces in early summer 1992. 1673/ On 17 June 1992 1674/, about 1,000 women, children and old people were taken away from the village by Serbian forces, arriving in the town of Caparde several days later. 1675/ At Caparde, the older women were separated from the younger women (15-25) 1676/. The younger women were then held for several nights in a furniture warehouse and repeatedly raped before rejoining the older women and later being released. 1677/

1206. Warehouse, Gornje Vukovinje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) A woman 1678/ was beaten and raped in her home on 18 May 1992 by two Muslim men. 1679/ She was then taken to Gornje Vukovinje where she was detained for seven days without toilet or washing facilities and without bedding. 1680/ She was questioned about having a radio station in her house to contact the Serbian Army and was threatened but was not mistreated. 1681/ There is no indication that there were others held here.

1207. Osmaci Village Camp: 1682/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A camp is reported to exist or have existed in Osmaci Village in Kalesija. 1683/ No additional information was provided regarding operation, control nor the duration of the facility's existence.

1208. Camp at Unknown Location in Kalesija: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A Muslim woman 1684/ from Zvornik reported being taken by Serbs on Sunday, 31 May 1685/ with about 150 women and children in two buses in the direction of Tuzla. 1686/ The woman and two others were sent to Tuzla and Kalesija while other women and children were kept to be exchanged for captured Serbs. 1687/

1209. Camp at Unknown Location in Kalesija: 1688/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It is reported that between 17 and 19 June, "extremists" bussed non-Serbian civilians in 12 buses from Brčko to Bijeljina. These people were allegedly tortured for several days at Majevica, and then some of them returned to Bijeljina, while some were taken to Caparde in Kalesija county, where after two days of torture, they were released and managed to flee to Kladanj and Tuzla. 1689/

38. Kalinovik

1210. The municipality of Kalinovik is located in south-eastern BiH and is bordered by the municipalities of Trnovo, Foća, Gacko, Nevesinje and Konjic. According to the 1991 census, the population of Kalinovik was 4,657. The ethnic majority in the municipality were Serbs at 60.6 per cent, Muslims comprised 37.1 per cent, and Croats 2.3 per cent.
1211. Kalinovik Elementary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) It was reported that a concentration camp was located in the city village of Kalinovik. The Serbian controlled camp reportedly held 60 civilian prisoners. The prisoners were men and women of all ages. 1690/

1212. A refugee from the town of Gacko reported that 1,000 Bosnian Muslims fled Gacko when Serbian soldiers entered Kalinovik and began destroying Muslim homes. 1691/ The refugees stayed at an unidentified location on Zelengora Mountain until "Četniks" began shelling the area on 1 July 1992. Some of the refugees were killed immediately and others were reportedly pushed down the "Previla Cliff" by Serbian soldiers. One hundred eighty-seven of the refugees were captured by the soldiers and taken to the Kalinovik Elementary School. 1692/

1213. All prisoners were allegedly physically and psychologically mistreated by the Serbian soldiers. 1693/ One former prisoner reported that he and his family were imprisoned in the school without food for one month. 1694/ before being transferred from the school to a Muslim house in the town of Foča where he was held for three days. 1695/ One former prisoner stated that women of all ages were raped in front of their relatives, and many disappeared. 1696/ On 1 August 1992, 12 young women age 12-19 were taken from the school and were never seen again. 1697/ Another former prisoner reported that young girls were subjected to severe torture at the camp and many were repeatedly raped. 1698/

1214. Two Serbian perpetrators were identified in the report. The first was identified as Pero Elez, and the second was also identified in the source materials. 1699/ This report identified a Montenegrin perpetrator who wore a camouflage uniform. 1700/ A Bosnian Muslim female from Gacko, arrested in a nearby village, along with her family, by Serbian forces at the end of June 1992, was reportedly held at the school for one month. 1701/ She reported that two armed Montenegrins dressed in camouflage uniforms came to the school at the end of July. 1702/ The witness identified one of the men by both his name and his nickname. 1703/ The second man was identified only by his nickname. 1704/ The witness stated that she and her family were taken to a house in the town of Miljevina in the municipality of Foča by the two men. 1705/

1215. Yet another report refers to a concentration camp located in a school in Kalinovik. 1706/ A Bosnian Muslim family from Jeleč was reportedly taken prisoner by "Četniks" from Miljevina. The family was detained in the police station for two hours and then taken by truck to Foča. 1707/ They were imprisoned in "Partizan Hall" in Foča for 10 days and then loaded into trucks with several other families and brought to the Kalinovik School. The former prisoner's wife and daughter were allegedly raped at the Kalinovik School. 1708/

1216. According to a female victim from the village of Berač, she and her family attempted to escape the aggression in the area by going in the direction of Konjic. 1709/ They were allegedly arrested by the Serbian army and detained for a few days in Ulog, just outside of Konjic, after which, they were taken to and detained at this school in Kalinovik for a month. 1710/

1217. The witness reported that she and others received very little food over the course of the month. The witness was reportedly then taken by two Montenegrins to a private home in Foča where she was raped repeatedly. 1711/

1218. Barutni Magazin: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The Commission has received one report of a concentration camp located in Jelašačko Polje where 150 civilians were held at the a gunpowder store called "Barutni Magazin". 1712/ One witness reported that on 2 August 1992, four prisoners were taken out of the camp. The report stated that their bodies were discovered 10
days later in the town of Rugoj. The report stated that the bodies had been mutilated and the hands of the victims were tied together. It is unclear from the report who found the bodies. The bodies were reportedly buried in the village of Dujmović. On 5 August 1992, 14 prisoners disappeared from the camp and never returned.

1219. On 5 August 1992, 23 prisoners were taken from the camp to the village of Ratine to a stable owned by Mustafa Tuzlak where they were shot by soldiers. A witness who survived the killings stated that the victims were brought in to the stable, doused in gasoline and set on fire.

1220. Camp Kalinovik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The Commission received one brief report concerning the location of a Serbian run camp in the village of Kalinovik where Muslim women were allegedly subjected to rape and torture. Local "Četniks" and members of local Serbian paramilitary reportedly controlled the camp. The female Muslim prisoners were from the municipality of Kalinovik, and from Nevesinje, Gacko, Podrinje and the Drina River valley region. According to the report, a former 12 year old female prisoner from the village of Jeleć near Foča stated on video tape that she had been raped by Serbian soldiers on nine occasions, and on each occasion she was raped multiple times.

1221. The Serbian soldiers released male prisoners from the camp and detained 50 female prisoners.

1222. Kalinovik Powder Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the BBC.) The Commission of Experts has received one report of a concentration camp located at the Kalinovik Powder Plant where 10 Muslim prisoners were held. The report mentions two "local Četniks" responsible for taking male and female prisoners from the camp.

1223. Kalinovik Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely The Independent). The only hotel in Kalinovik was used as a rape camp for Muslim women being held at the Kalinovik camp. Various reports use the names "Kalinovik camp" the Kalinovik Elementary School," the Kalinovik School" and the "school gymnasium" interchangeably so that it appears that all refer to the same camp. The witness was among Muslim refugees from the town of Gacko and other towns in the area who fled to the Zelengora Mountains after Serbian forces began arresting and murdering Muslim inhabitants. The Serbs captured 105 Muslim women and transported them in open trucks to Kalinovik where they were imprisoned in the gymnasium.

1224. The reporting witness stated that initially the women were not mistreated by the Serbian guards. However, in early August those guards were replaced by Šešelj’s "White Eagles" paramilitary forces. The witness described the men as "filthy" and stated that they shouted obscenities at the female prisoners. A woman with long brown hair who identified herself as a member of the "White Eagles" ordered the female prisoners to examine their babies to see if they had been circumcised.

1225. On 2 August 1992 the reporting witness and 11 other young women being detained in the Kalinovik Elementary School with 100 young Muslim women were taken by Serbian militiamen from the camp to the only hotel in Kalinovik where they were subjected to systematic rape. The women were allegedly chosen based upon their child bearing potential and those who were already pregnant were left alone. The witness reported that she was raped by two "Četniks" who told her she would be killed if she did not comply with their demands. She stated that she was repeatedly raped by Serbian soldiers for one month.
1226. A former prisoner who escaped being raped by convincing the Serbian militiamen that she was pregnant reported that the Serbs came to the gymnasium each night and took several young women by force to the hotel to be raped. Many of the women were in their early teens, and the militiamen selected certain girls repeatedly. The witness identified three of the militiamen responsible for the rapes. The first, who she described as the worst of the three men, was named Pero Elez from Miljevina. The second was also identified. The women held at the gymnasium were released on 28 August 1992 for Serbian prisoners in Croatian hands. At least 15 of the women who became pregnant as a result of being raped by the militiamen obtained abortions in Mostar and Jablanica.

1227. During the day, the women were forced to clean the hotel, after which they were returned to the camp. Rapes began on 2 August 1992 and by 28 August. All but 10 of the 105 female Muslim prisoners held at the Kalinovik camp had allegedly been gang-raped by Serbian soldiers. The women identified the perpetrators as Serbian members of Vojislav Šešelj's "White Eagles" paramilitary group. Several of the victims stated that Serbian militiamen placed four and five-year old children on a table with knives held to their throats to persuade the mothers to relinquish jewelry and money.

39. Kiseljak

1228. The county of Kiseljak is located in central BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population of Kiseljak was 24,081. At the time, the population was 51.7 per cent Croatian, 40.9 per cent Muslim, and 7.4 per cent were referred to as "other".

1229. Kiseljak Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) It was reported that ICRC has been denied access to the prison in Kiseljak. The ICRC provided a list of camps visited including a camp in a prison which was first visited on 28 February 1994.

1230. Barracks, Kiseljak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility established in a barracks on 25 April 1993. The report was silent as to the identity of both the detainees and the controlling party as well as the conditions at the facility.

1231. Hospital, Kiseljak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility established in a hospital on 20 July 1993. The report was silent as to the identity of both the detainees and the controlling party as well as the conditions at the facility.

1232. Duhri Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It is reported that all males are detained by the HVO in the Muslim village of Duhri near Kiseljak. They were taken to a municipal building in Kiseljak on 7 July where they are forced to dig ditches at night.

1233. Concrete Hangar: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Deputy Commander of 3 Corps in BiH, Ramiz Dugalić, reported a camp holding 150 Muslims in a concrete hangar in the HVO barracks in Kiseljak.
1234. Unknown Camp in Kiseljak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Five people are reported to be detained by Croatian forces in an unidentified camp in the area of Kiseljak. 1746/

1235. On 10 June 1993, an "Agreement among the parties to halt the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina" was signed. Article II concerned the release of prisoners/detainees and displaced persons. A Joint Humanitarian Commission (JHC) was established on 14 June. The JHC agreed to release all prisoners and displaced persons step by step, and it was agreed that BiH should start to release all prisoners from the prison in the Zenica area, presuming that HVO would release all prisoners from Kiseljak, Busovača, and Vitez. 1747/

1236. Town Jail, Kiseljak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) It was reported that on 20 June 1993, a total of 66 prisoners were released from the town jail. 1748/

1237. It was reported that on 23 June 1993, a convoy of 19 buses was observed crossing from Serb-held territory to Kiseljak. It is felt that the most likely explanation is that they were prisoners being released in the latest example of BSA/HVO liaison. 1749/

40. Kladanj

1238. The municipality of Kladanj is located in eastern Bosnia. The pre-war population of Kladanj was 16,028. Muslims comprised the majority of the population at 73.3 per cent, Serbs comprised 23.9 per cent, and 2.8 per cent were listed as "other".

1239. The Commission received a report that stated that 95 Serbian civilians and one child were imprisoned since May 1992 in the village of Stupari, eight kilometres north of the town of Kladanj. 1750/ The report quoted the Mayor of Kladanj, stating that the prisoners were being held "for their own security, to protect them from retaliation by the Muslim population." 1751/ A team from the ECMM reported that they visited the three buildings in the town of Stupari where the prisoners were held. 1752/

1240. According to the report, the prisoner's homes had been burned by Muslim forces. The prisoners were guarded by five armed soldiers who allowed them to go outside for one hour a day. The prisoners sometimes were not given anything to eat for three days. The prisoners reported that guards were frequently violent toward them and that no medical care was provided. The ICRC reported that the prisoners appeared to be "psychologically worn out and very weak". 1753/

1241. Stupari Elementary School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In early August 1992, Serbian prisoners who had been exchanged in Malinjak, reported that approximately 1,000 Serbs from the villages of Lupoglava, Matijevići, Majdan, and Kočajevići were detained in the Stupari Elementary School. 1754/ Conditions in the camp were reportedly very poor. According to the report, an identified physician forcibly took blood from the Serbian prisoners for wounded Muslims and Croats. 1755/

41. Ključ

1242. Ključ is a province in north-west BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a total population of 37,233, of whom 49.5 per cent were Serbian, 47.6 per cent Muslim, and 2.9 per cent were described as "other".
1243. There are reports of four Serb-run camps in the region: the sports hall at Ključ, the Jedinstvo School in Tomina, Jezerce, and the Sanica Elementary School. Many of the prisoners from these camps were ultimately sent on to the Manjača Camp in Banja Luka. Others were sent to Sanski Most and Stara Gradiška, Croatia. 1756/

1244. There is also one report of a camp controlled by the BiH government in Ključ, but no precise information about where it is located or who it holds. 1757/

1245. Sports Hall at Ključ: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Defence Debriefing Team.) The sports hall located in the centre of Ključ was established by Serbian forces. The prisoners kept there are Muslim villagers from the region who were arrested upon the siege of their villages. In particular, there are reports that men, women and children from Velagići and Vukovska Brda were taken to the sports hall in May and June 1992. 1758/ It appears that the camp was first founded somewhere near this time. 1759/

1246. These reports describe the sports hall as a sort of "collecting centre" where prisoners were interrogated and stripped of their valuables before being sent off to another camp. 1760/ Apparently, men between the ages of 16 and 60 were to be taken to Manjača. 1761/ The ex-prisoners of the reports here describe being detained for only one or two days before they were sent somewhere else.

1247. One report describes the shelling of the village of Velagići and the arrest of its inhabitants on 27 May 1992. 1762/ At this time, many women and children escaped by foot to the nearby village of Pastajre. Those that remained were arrested and taken to the sports hall at Ključ. Approximately 70 men and a number of women, children and the elderly were captured. According to the witness, the men were interrogated at the sports hall during the evening of 28 May and the morning of 29 May. They were asked about the locations of weapons and positions of Croatian and Muslim special forces. During these interrogations, they received harsh beatings with wooden and rubber sticks. They were also beaten and kicked by a group of civilians and soldiers who lined the corridor leading to the interrogation room. 1763/

1248. The Serbs in charge of the camp are not named, but it is reported that the local Serbs responsible for the attack of Velagići itself were assigned to the Sixth Krajina Brigade based two kilometres north of Velagici along the Sanica River. 1764/

1249. In this case, the male prisoners were transferred to the prison at Stara Gradiška in Croatia after interrogation. 1765/ In the late afternoon of 28 May 1992, about 400 of them were put on three buses and left for the camp. The women and children remained at the sports hall for another two days and were then released. 1766/ Apparently, those that remained at the camp were forced to work in the fields. 1767/ The exact character of their duties is not explained.

1250. A second report about the camp at the Ključ sports hall comes from a man who was arrested on 26 June 1992. 1768/ He was arrested with 14 other men and brought to the sports hall. There, he and the others were interrogated and beaten. Three men died as a result of these beatings.

1251. The witness does not mention precisely who ran the camp but claims that the men who arrested him were either members of the Serbian police or army. 1769/ They wore camouflage or olive uniforms and were accompanied by men in civilian clothes with beards.
1252. After one day at the sports hall, the witness was transferred with 120 other prisoners to the Manjača Camp in Banja Luka. 1770/

1253. Jedinstvo School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) The Jedinstvo School is in Tomina. Tomina is in between Sanica Donja and Sanski Most in the Ključ province. Apparently, this school held Muslims who had been defending the towns of Tomina, Vrhpolje, and Hrustovo, yet it is also described mentioned in some detail in a report about the Muslim prisoners of Sanica Donja. 1771/

1254. Apparently, the 6th Krajina Brigade of the JNA started shelling the village of Sanica Donja on 29 May 1992. The Muslim villagers successfully defended themselves for about a month, but were ultimately defeated in late June. They were arrested and taken to Jezerce. 1772/ From there, they were sent on to Sanski Most by truck. En route, they stopped at the Jedinstvo School. Here, the driver of the truck talked to a camp guard and told him that he was bringing more prisoners. The guard told him that they should be taken to Sanski Most.

1255. Before continuing on their journey, the prisoners waited outside the camp. During this time, they witnessed the decapitation of nearly 100 prisoners in front of the school. Male prisoners were brought out of the school three at a time. They were walked over to three soldiers who laid them down and cut their heads off with a curved knife about 30 centimetres in length. Four men in civilian clothes, presumably prisoners, then loaded the heads onto one truck and put the decapitated corpses onto another. 1773/

1256. The prisoners in the truck described Jedinstvo School as a three-story building with all of the windows covered over or opaqued. Two livestock transport trucks were parked on the square at the time that they were there. 1774/

1257. Jezerce: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Jezerce is a village near Sanica Donja. Villagers of Sanica Donja were initially detained at Jezerce upon their arrest in late June 1992. They were accounted for by name and loaded onto a truck heading for Sanski Most. 1775/ They stopped en route at Jedinstvo School as described above.

1258. Sanica Elementary School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is also a report of a camp at the Sanica Elementary School. 1776/ From the report, it appears that the school is somewhere in the Ključ region, but there is no indication of its exact whereabouts. Apparently, villagers from Batonjići, Crnošići, and Gornji Budelj were held there. The witness explains that sometime near the end of June 1992, every man from the village of Gornja Sanica was arrested by "Serbian soldiers" and taken to Sanica Elementary School. There, they were held for two nights. During this time, they were not given any food and were beaten and tortured. Then, he and 250 other men held at the school were transferred to Manjača. 1777/

42. Konjic

1259. The county of Konjic is located the central part of BiH. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of Konjic was 43,636. Of that number, 54.5 per cent were Muslim, 26 per cent were Croatian, 15.2 per cent were Serbs and the remaining 4.3 per cent described themselves as "other". While the Serbs comprised a minority of the total population in the district, they made up the majority in the following villages: Bjelovčina, Blace, Borci, Bradina, Cerići
Čičevo, Dolovi, Donje Selo, Dubravice, Jezero, Kula, Sitnik and Zagorice. 1778/

1260. By Bosnian Serb historical accounts, several aggressive measures have been taken since the second World War to discourage Serbian presence in the area. 1779/ On 30 October 1990, the desecration of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Konjic marked the beginning of what Serbs believed to be renewed attempts to reduce Serbian presence even further. 1780/

1261. Reportedly, on 19 April 1992, joint Bosnian Croat-Bosnian Muslim forces attacked the JNA military facilities at Čelebići. 1781/ The grossly outnumbered Bosnian Serb forces were rendered powerless and compelled to retreat. Serbian soldiers were then arrested, paving the way for full Croat-Muslim occupation of Čelebići and, from there, of the greater Konjic municipality. 1782/

1262. According to Bosnian Croat chronicles, in early 1992, Serbs began shelling Konjic from the villages above the region. 1783/ As the battles with Serbs developed, Croats organized themselves, forming the HVO, and shortly thereafter Muslims organized into the BiH Army. 1784/ The HVO and BiH forces positioned themselves in the hills above the villages of Konjic and, by joint effort, successfully resisted Serb occupation. 1785/

1263. Regardless of which historical position is adopted, by March 1993, the political rampart constructed by Croat and Muslim forces had begun to crumble, and on 14 April 1993, fighting broke out between Muslim and Croatian forces in Klis. 1786/ The Muslims, assisted by Mujahedin, were a formidable force in the region, and Croatian villages came under siege and eventually under Muslim occupation. 1787/

1264. By 16 April, BiH forces attacked Croatian HVO positions in Konjic, resulting in the overthrow of Croatian forces and the complete Muslim occupation of Konjic. 1788/

1265. In the following accounts, the first 16 camp descriptions detail those locations cooperatively controlled by Croatian and Muslim forces. The subsequent 11 accounts describe facilities controlled solely by Muslims, and the two remaining locations fall under undetermined authority. There are also several reports that allege the existence of a camp or camps in Konjic without supplying enough detail to determine the exact location or by whom they were controlled. 1789/

1266. Čelebići Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the Thomson Mission.) In May 1992, following the withdrawal of the JNA from its barracks in the village of Čelebići, Croatian-Muslim forces assumed control of the barracks and transformed them into a detention centre for Serbian prisoners. 1790/

1267. Immediately after its creation on 4 May 1992 and continuing through to the suspension of operations in December 1992, camp Čelebići interned several hundred citizens from the municipality of Konjic. 1791/ The number of detainees changed regularly.

1268. Men and women were separated, with men interned in several locations including a concrete tunnel called hangar Number 9, a sheet metal hangar called Number 6, a depot called Number 22 and, on occasion, in concrete manholes believed to be oil storage sites. 1792/ Women were imprisoned either in an administrative building, located at the camp entrance, or in a shaft excavated in the ground next to the tunnel at hangar Number 9. 1793/

1269. The detainees were brought to Čelebići from all corners of Konjic. 1794/ On 22 May 1992, Croatian and Muslim forces allegedly attacked the Serb villages
of Bjelovarina, Cerovici, and Donje Selo. Reportedly all surviving members of the Serb population in these villages were taken to camp Čelebići. In another report, members of the "TO B-H" invaded the village of Brdjani on 15 June 1992 and ordered all the men to surrender. Forty-eight Serbian prisoners were put on trucks and taken to Čelebići. Some 200 individuals from Bradina were already in residence when they arrived.

1270. In another report, a Serbian resident from the village of Bradina recalled that he and some 50 other men were instructed by Croatian and Muslim forces to report to headquarters in Podorašac. Upon arrival, the witness and others were loaded onto a tarpaulin-covered truck and transported to Čelebići concentration camp.

1271. According to several reports the conditions at the camp were deplorable. Hangar Number 9, which was an abandoned atomic shelter/ventilation tunnel, measured approximately 120 centimetres in width, 30 metres in length and 2.5 metres in height. Air entered through a small glass window in the door, and there was absolutely no illumination. Reportedly, because of the construction of the tunnel, it was impossible for an individual to stand upright.

1272. The 50 or so detainees in the tunnel defecated in a bucket that was emptied infrequently. Human waste accumulated up to 10 centimetres at one end of the tunnel. The detainees were not permitted to wash during the first 20 days of their internment, and for the first three days they were not provided with food.

1273. According to one inmate, throughout the first one and a half months of detention, the inmates were fed small pieces of stale bread and some vegetables three times daily. In the two months that followed, they were fed only bread. He recalled that the men had no choice but to perform all bodily functions in one corner inside the hangar. Muslim soldiers often placed the prisoners food in the same locations and often times dropped the plates, spoons, or bread into the excrement.

1274. The several reports detailing the initial acts of mistreatment suffered by the inmates at the hands of their captors appear to be in agreement. Upon arrival at Čelebići, Muslim soldiers were lined up at the entrance in two rows. The detainees were made to pass between the rows of soldiers with their hands clasped behind their necks. As the inmates passed, the soldiers beat them with blunt objects, iron bars, shovels, pickaxes, thick electric cables, and rubber truncheons.

1275. The prisoners were then placed in manholes for several hours at a time. These manholes were formerly oil storage reservoirs. The lids were replaced on the manholes serving to cut off the flow of air. As a consequence, men collapsed from suffocation.

1276. For those inmates assigned to hangar Number 9, once removed from the manholes they were subjected to additional beatings at the entrance to hangar Number 9. In one report, the guards beat 25 inmates with shovels so severely that 12 shovels were broken in the process. After a period of time spent in Number 9, the inmates were then transferred to Number 6. In some cases, due to the space limitations in hangar Number 9, some detainees were sent directly to Number 6.

1277. For those assigned to hangar Number 6, the guards came and collected all the valuables from the inmates. The inmates were then taken in groups of 10 to a nearby building called "the Command"—which was so-called because the JNA command had previously been located there. Once inside the Command, the prisoners were ordered to stand on tip-toe facing the wall with their hands
raised high above their heads. Muslim soldiers then conducted interrogations regarding alleged "etnik" activity, strategy and weapons locations. 1810/

1278. Following the initial, somewhat routine abuses, the specific acts of mistreatment appear from the reports, to some degree, to be haphazard. The variation on the methods of mistreatment included beatings with batons, wooden clubs, truncheons, chains, iron rods; imprisonment in drainage shafts; scorching and cutting by hot knives pressed to the inmates' faces, bodies and chests; spraying with gunpowder and setting alight; binding male genitals with low-burning fuses, the breaking of ribs, arms and legs; and the cutting off of ears and fingers. 1811/ Some inmates report being detained in manholes filled with water for 24 hour periods. Occasionally, using their feet, the Muslim guards forced the inmates under water and held them there to near suffocation. 1812/

1279. The inmates detained in the sheet metal hangar, Number 6, noted that in August 1992, when the day's heat was at its worst, the doors and windows of their containment facility remained closed. Temperatures reportedly reached 50 degrees Celsius or 148 degrees Fahrenheit. 1813/

1280. In another report, two male detainees had their trouser-legs—below the knee—doused with a flammable liquid and then ignited. As the men's legs began to burn their Muslim captors reportedly forced them to sit down and forbade them to extinguish the flames. 1814/

1281. Reports also suggest that all imprisoned women were systematically raped. Women were usually raped by more than one guard. 1815/ Serbian women were reportedly housed in or near the Command building and ushered to the appropriate locations when required. 1816/ Male prisoners were also sexually molested by forcing them into same-sex anal intercourse or oral sex. 1817/

1282. The entire Čelebići facility was initially controlled by Croatian forces and manned by Muslim guards. Due to shifting political winds, Muslim forces later assumed control. However, before this change, Croatian, "S", was the commander of the camp, and "F" 1818/, a Muslim, was his deputy. A number of reports suggest that "F" was directly responsible for the mistreatment, torture and murder of a great many of the inmates. 1819/ Prisoners were abused or killed on the orders of deputy commander "F". "F" ordered prisoners to fight each other. If "F" did not feel satisfied that the blows were severe enough, he ordered the guards to beat both prisoners. 1820/

1283. Reportedly, prisoners were forbidden to sleep. "F" selected one prisoner to keep the others awake. If "F" found anyone asleep the prisoner in charge was severely punished. 1821/

1284. In another report, a female prisoner at Čelebići alleged being raped by "F". She alleged that she was beaten and kicked during several interrogations regarding the whereabouts of her son and husband. 1822/

1285. Additionally, the witness alleged that she was stripped naked by young men who held knives to her throat and held lit cigarettes to her eyelashes, burning her eyelids when she screamed. 1823/ She was subjected to multiple rapes by a variety of men, many of whom she was unable to recognize because of the dark night. She alleged that she was taken to an office where the rapes lasted from three to four hours at a time. 1824/

1286. The witness stated that she was detained in a room near hangar Number 9. 1825/ She recalled that some 39 men were held there, and she witnessed the men being beaten, kicked and tortured. She recalled that the tunnel was poorly lit and poorly ventilated. She stated further that she witnessed "F" kill one of the inmates. 1826/ It was her understanding that "F" raped every woman brought
into the prison. She alleged that some 120 women were raped by "\\text{...}". Women were reportedly set aside solely for his pleasure.

1287. Several reports note that although "\\text{...}" was notorious for his cruel actions, a young guard called "\\text{s}" 1830/ was worse. 1831/ He was said to have participated in all the murders and a great many of the rapes in the camp.

1288. "\\text{s}" reportedly beat prisoners with baseball bats and made them kneel while he beat them about their breasts and stomachs.

1289. "\\text{s}" is noted for wrapping slow-burning fuses around the legs or waist of inmates, putting another end between the inmate's legs or in his pants and then lighting the fuse. 1833/ The burning fuse which was wrapped in plastic, clung to the victim's body as it melted. The victim's family was usually forced to watch this torture.

1290. Another inmate was made to wear a gas mask with the air filter sealed so that he was unable to breathe. 1835/ "\\text{s}" forced him to wear it for an hour while standing in the hot summer heat. Consequently, the victim collapsed several times.

1291. In still another report, prior to a visit by an Arab TV crew, "\\text{s}" selected three prisoners to tell about their "crimes" against Muslims. One among them was ordered to say that he had killed Muslims and Croats in Mostar and burned down their homes. 1837/ When the man refused, "\\text{s}" beat him with a soldier's belt until he bled. 1838/ "\\text{s}" reportedly doused the prisoners with gas and gunpowder and then set them alight, causing severe burns and wounds. 1839/

1292. In another incident, "\\text{s}" subjected two young brothers to severe mistreatment. He reportedly deformed their faces, then put gas masks over their heads and closed the air filters. 1840/ Thereafter, he compelled the brothers to engage in oral sex with one another and also to strike each other about the genitals.

1293. In one report a detainee from \text{Čelebići} witnessed "\\text{...}" and "\\text{s}" beat 15 or 16 Serbs to death. 1842/ Another witness reported that the two ordered inmates to run away. When the inmates complied and attempted to escape, they were beaten. If an inmate continued running after receiving the beating, he was killed.

1294. \text{Čelebići} camp was temporarily closed in December 1992 and was re-opened on 20 April 1993, with a smaller number of Serbs in detention at the camp and a greater number of Croats imprisoned as a result of the collapse of the Croat-Muslim coalition and the ensuing conflicts that arose between the two groups throughout BiH.

1295. Several other reports corroborate the existence of the camp at \text{Čelebići}.

1296. Members of the Thomson Mission visited this facility on 3 September 1992. Mission members identified 109 Serb individuals detained in the oil storage area of this Muslim-controlled facility. The majority of the detainees were reportedly from the villages of Bradina and Donje Selo. The report goes on to state that "neutral sources report executions in Konjic, and a wooden wall at the entrance with extensive bullet holes suggests a sinister purpose."

1297. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ICRC.) According to one report, an elderly Bosnian Serb farmer was arrested on 9 May 1992, in his village of Idbar, near Konjic. He was taken to the police station in Konjic where he was detained for 21 days. Thereafter, he was removed to the camp at \text{Čelebići}, some six
kilometres away. No additional information was available regarding his treatment, the facility nor its operation or control.

1298. The ICRC reported the existence of the camp in the Police Station in Konjic. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 4 November 1992.

1299. Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Although all relevant reports agree that this facility was controlled by Muslim forces, there is considerable disagreement regarding the inmate composition. According to one report, all arrested Bosnian Serb civilians from Konjic and Bradina were taken to this location and later transferred to the camp at Čelebići. Another source suggests that only in some cases were detainees brought to this facility, beaten, and then transferred to designated detention facilities. Another report suggests that only women, children, and the elderly were interned at this location.

1300. Village of Donje Selo: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reports suggest that on 22 June 1992, Croat and Muslim authorities transformed the village into a prison camp for Bosnian Serbs. Guards were set up around the periphery of the village to discourage Serb detainees from leaving the area. The reports suggest that although men were resident prisoners at this location, women and children were either interned in greater numbers or abused in greater numbers. While no specific numbers were made available, the vast majority of the documented accounts of atrocities have been offered by or concern women and children. These sources suggest that women were raped on a daily basis.

1301. One report from a male detainee at Donje Selo reveals that men were subjected to considerably less abuse and mistreatment than women. Each night the Muslim soldiers arrived in groups and barged into the homes containing women, raping all the women and girls. According to the witness, during the day the guards did nothing more than walk around "monitoring" the situation. Quite frequently ex-camp inmates were re-arrested and sent back to one of the camps in Konjic without warning or provocation. Reports also alleged the existence of a detention facility in the village of Donje Selo.

1302. Devetka Tunnel in Bradina: (The existence of this detention facility as well as the number of alleged individuals hereby detained has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch.) Bradina was reportedly the largest Serbian village in the Konjic area with 750 inhabitants. Following the taking of this village on 25 May 1992 by Croat-Muslim forces, the village was renamed Donji Repovci and a great many of the Serbs were expelled. Many of the Serbs who steadfastly remained were reportedly either killed by paramilitary forces or interned in various detention camps.

1303. One of the largest Serb inhabited detention facilities in the Konjic area was located at the Devetka Tunnel. According to reports, some 3,000 Serbs were detained at this location. The Serbs were reportedly lined up against the wall, made to remove their clothing, and then tortured and beaten for several hours at a time. The detainees were reportedly forced to participate in Muslim prayer and song and to learn the Koran. Those who refused were beaten and in some cases killed. Although no dates were provided, several reports suggest that the facility was eventually closed and the prisoners were released. Another report also alleges the existence of this camp.
1304. Musala ("Sportska sala") sports centre: According to several reports, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat prisoners were detained at this facility. Reports suggest that as few as 110 and as many as 170 Serbs were detained at the sports hall beginning in May 1992.

1305. On 15 June 1992, 13 Serbs were reportedly killed and 12 wounded when Muslim forces from the hills above Prevalj shelled the sports hall. The attack on these prisoners was reportedly wilful.

1306. By May 1993, following the eruption of fighting between Muslims and Croats, the total number of Bosnian Croats detained in the sports hall reached 400. Bosnian Croat prisoners detained here were organized into forced labour groups. One such group was reportedly made to dig trenches for the BiH Army across from HVO lines south of Konjic. Other Croatian detainees were made to serve as human shields and still others were forced at gunpoint to serve as blood donors. One report suggests that over the course of two days, some 50 detainees were forced by Muslim medical personnel to serve as blood donors.

1307. Sources suggest that conditions at the sports hall were insufferable. The prisoners were poorly fed, some even went without food for weeks at a time. When they were fed, one report suggests that half the meal of one Muslim guard was used to feed as many as eight inmates. There were no beds. The prisoners were made to sleep on carpets that originally belonged to the gym.

1308. There are also reported incidents of rape at the facility. One report states that on the night of 27 May 1992, Muslim soldiers raped five young women. According to one report on the night of 29 May 1992, 10 girls and women imprisoned in the camp were raped. In other report, on 31 August 1992, a Serb man and woman were forced to engage in sexual intercourse while as many as 15 prison guards looked on. In still another report, a 25 year-old woman was brought to the camp and raped repeatedly by some 15 Muslims. Her captors apparently then led her, naked, up and down the camp, drew "lilies" on her breasts and stomach with a lit cigar, chopped off her hair, disfigured her and then forced another male inmate to rape her and shove a rifle barrel into her vagina.

1309. Of the 400 Croats detained, 50 were reportedly exchanged in June 1993, 50 more were exchanged in August 1993 and the remaining 300 were exchanged in Jablanica on 19 October 1993.

1310. Thomson Mission members also visited this detention facility on 3 September 1992. According to their report, some 167 Serb individuals were detained in the gymnasium. Most were reportedly from the surrounding villages. The conditions of hygiene appeared to be normal.

1311. "Zvonimir Beliša Nono" Elementary School, Bradina: The detention facility at this location primarily housed women, children and the elderly. Several reports allege that female Serbian inmates were regularly subjected to severe mistreatment and threats of death.

1312. Brothels: Reports suggest that Croat and Muslim-run brothels have been established throughout Konjic. Reports allege the existence of a brothel in Buturović Polje and another at the "Amadeus" Cafe. Serbian women reportedly were forcibly brought to and
detained in these facilities. The women are impregnated and held captive until the fifth month of their pregnancy and then not permitted to leave the area. One report suggests that "members of Muslim and Croatian units who have contracted AIDS and other communicable diseases are deliberately sent to brothels to sexually abuse Serbian women" and young girls. 1887/

1313. House in Depa: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a house in the village of Depa in the municipality of Konjic, was turned into a rape camp operated by Muslim Green Berets. Women were reportedly tortured at this facility and forcibly impregnated. 1888/

1314. Unidentified facility, Ljuta: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Following the attack on the Serb village of Bradina on 25 May 1992 by Muslim forces, a great many Serb citizens were captured. 1889/ One Serbian male reported that he was taken to Ljuta and that some 50-100 uniformed men came to interrogate him and those detained with him. 1890/ According to the witness, two or three of the detainees were pushed to the ground and beaten. 1891/ Thereafter their Muslim captors screamed verbal abuses and insults at them. Next their hands were tied behind their backs with wire and they were made to walk four to five hours to Trnovo. 1892/ Each prisoner reportedly had one guard, with the remaining 50 to 100 men following. Upon arriving at Bjelašnica mountain, they were put into two trucks and driven to the Muslim village of Šabići. 1893/

1315. School in Šabići: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report Serb civilians were detained in a school in Šabići. The report alleges that the Serbian inmates were insulted and humiliated by the Muslim guards. From there, they were transferred to Hotel Famos in Bjelas. 1894/

1316. Konjic Detention Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, several prisoners were transferred to this facility on 31 August 1992 from camp Čelebići. The detainees identified Hebibović Iset, called "Brojeta", as the camp commander. The report states that "Brojeta" was commonly regarded and described as "good". None of the inmates spoke of the conditions at this location. The inmates were released from this facility on 23 December 1992. 1895/

1317. Hotel "Famos": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to reports, civilian prisoners from Bradina were transported to the hotel located in Bjelas 1896/. They were beaten and interrogated in a room in the basement of the hotel by both uniformed and civilian Muslims and Croats. 1897/ The detainees were forced to admit that they were "Četniks", "registered" and then forced to walk through a path with approximately 20 men on either side. 1898/ As the detainees passed, the men beat them with rifle butts. The detainees were then placed on trucks with their hands tied behind their backs and transported to Čelebići. They were reportedly interned at this location from June through 31 August 1992. 1899/

1318. According to another report, upon the arrival of Serb detainees at the hotel, they were made to lie on the floor in a line and beaten and kicked with the soldiers' heavy boots and pistol butts. Some detainees had guns shoved into their mouths and had their lives threatened. 1900/

1319. Following the beatings, they were taken to some sort of dark concrete cellar, where they were beaten by Muslim and Croat guards. 1901/ When they lost consciousness they were revived and beaten again. The next day, the prisoners' hands were again bound, they were blindfolded, and loaded onto trucks. 1902/ As
they boarded the trucks, they received beatings with shovels, blunt objects, iron pipes, or anything that their captors could find. They were then transported to Tarčin. 1903/

1320. Buturovići Polje Prison: 1904/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Serb civilians were reportedly detained by Croat-Muslim forces at this location. 1905/ The report does not, however, provide additional information regarding either the conditions or the operation of the facility. Other reports alleged the existence of a detention facility in the village of Buturovići Polje. 1906/

1321. Technical High School in Konjic: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Serbian civilians were detained in the gymnasium of the high school. The facility was reportedly controlled by Croat-Muslim forces. 1907/ The report does not provide additional information regarding either the conditions or the operation of the facility.

1322. Hrasnica: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reports of the existence of a Muslim run camp in this village were not supplemented by information regarding the specific location or duration of existence. The camp was reportedly composed of Serbian prisoners. 1908/

1323. Konjic Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) One report cites the existence of a Muslim-controlled facility at this location as of 11 April 1992. 1909/ However, no additional information was made available regarding conditions or operations at this facility. This detention facility is also alleged to exist in another ICRC report. The ICRC first visited this place of detention on 4 November 1992. 1910/

1324. Konjic Military Police: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) One report cites the existence of a Muslim-controlled facility at this location as of 11 April 1992. 1911/ However, no additional information was made available regarding conditions or operations at this facility.

1325. Gornje Višnjevice: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) According to reports this village is situated just outside of Konjic. One report alleges that some 192 Croats were or are currently detained at this location. 1912/ No additional information was available regarding the operation or control of the detention facility in this village.

1326. Nevizdraci Prison: 1913/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, civilians from several Croatian villages including Crni Vrh, Donja Vratna Gora, Gornja Vratna Gora, Došica, Homatlije, Solakova Kula, Lukšije, Donji Prijelog, Gornji Prijelog and Bušak have been imprisoned at this location. 1914/ Members of the BiH Army were said to be responsible for the operation and control of this facility. 1915/

1327. Parsovići Prison: 1916/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, civilians from several Croatian villages including Crni Vrh, Donja Vratna Gora, Gornja Vratna Gora, Došica, Homatlije, Solakova Kula, Lukšije, Donji Prijelog, Gornji Prijelog and Bušak have been imprisoned at this location. 1917/ The identity of the detainees at this prison is unclear, however one report suggests that primarily women and children were interned at this location. 1918/ Members of the BiH Army
were said to be responsible for the operation and control of this facility. 1919/

1328. Salko Sultić's House: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Following the attack on the village of Trusina, members of the BiH Army detained civilians at the home of Salko Sultić. Army members forced inmates to carry the bodies of dead Croats and threatened detainees with harm for non-compliance. 1920/

1329. Building in Homolj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) On 11 April 1993, approximately 200 men, women, and children from the village of Ovčari attempted to reach the three remaining Croat-controlled villages by crossing the Neretva River at Donje Selo when they were detained by members of the BiH Army. 1921/ Thirty men from among the refugees together with 40 Croats from another group were taken to Homolj, just north of Konjic. 1922/ When the group reached a location just outside of Homolj, 10 prisoners were segregated from the ranks, beaten and shot. 1923/ Those remaining continued on to Homolj and were housed for the evening in the basement of one of the buildings. 1924/ No information was provided regarding the exact location of the building. The following day, the prisoners were removed from the basement and taken to Podorošac where they were later transported to Tarčin. 1925/

1330. Unfinished House in Homolje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Muslim forces reportedly invaded the village of Donje Selo and forced citizens to emigrate to the village of Homolj. The more than 200 Croatian civilians were forced to carry the soldiers weapons and walk to the village of Homolj. 1927/ Once there, the report states that the men were placed in an unfinished house and subjected to severe physical mistreatment. Shortly thereafter, the men were transferred to the village of Podorosac. 1928/

1331. House in Trusina: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Following an infantry attack, reportedly launched by the BiH Army in the Croatian village of Trusina, Muslim forces detained 28 Croatian civilians in Vida Drljo's home and forced the detainees to carry ammunition and the bodies of the wounded to a nearby hill. The detainees were reportedly fired upon while they performed their required tasks. 1929/

1332. Turija Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ECMM.) According to one report, following the Muslim occupation of the municipality of Konjic, some Croats were expelled from the city and placed in a detention facility in the village of Turija. 1930/ No information regarding exact location, operation or the demographics of the inmates was provided by the report.

1333. Zabrdje i Zaslivlje Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ECMM.) According to one report, following the Muslim occupation of the municipality of Konjic, some Croats were expelled from the city and placed in a detention facility in the village of Zabrdje i Zaslivlje. 1931/ No information regarding exact location, operation or the demographics of the inmates was provided by the report.

1334. Boračko Jezero: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One report alleges the existence of a detention facility at this location. No information regarding operation, duration, prisoner composition, or control was made available. 1932/ Other reports also alleged the existence of a camp at this location. 1933/
1335. New Residential Suburb, Konjic: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reports alleged the existence of a detention facility in the new residential suburb of Konjic holding approximately 1,500 Serbs.

43. Kotor Varoš

1336. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of the county of Kotor Varoš was 36,670. Of that number, 11,161 were Muslims, 13,966 were Serbs, 10,640 were Croats, and 883 were of other nationalities. Between April 1992 and July 1992, some 3,000 citizens, or 8.2 per cent of the population were displaced. The expulsion doubled in the months that passed.

1337. This displacement is most notably the result of the Serb aggression which occurred on 11 June 1992. JOS paramilitary groups from Banja Luka and Knin in cooperation with local Serbian paramilitaries layed siege to and occupied the territory of Kotor Varoš.

1338. Reports suggest that the Muslim village of Hrvani was completely destroyed by artillery fire; the Croatian villages of Bilice, Velići and Viševci were devastated by toxic and scatter bombs; and the town of Kotorište was destroyed by incendiary grenades.

1339. One source suggests that on June 11 300-400 corpses were seen laying in the streets. Another suggests that over the course of a several days of Serbian occupation, more than 500 people were killed. A large number of dead are reportedly buried in mass graves at Donji Varoš and Vrbanji. According to one of the gravediggers, the estimated minimum number of people buried at one location is 1,000.

1340. In addition to the wave of bombing and mass killing, the Serbs also established detention facilities throughout the area. With respect to the numbers of individuals interned, and the number of existing detention facilities, the information is unclear.

1341. The reports suggest the establishment of detention facilities at the Kotor Varoš Prison, Pilana, Maslovare Camp, Koza Proletaria Fur Factory, Osnovni Sud Court House, Vrbanja Lumber Factory, the local police station, Bratstvo i jedinstvo primary school, the Kotor Varoš High School, in an open field, at the Borik Hotel, and also at the Kotor Varoš Hospital.

1342. Koza Proletaria Fur Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Between 11 June and 10 October 1992, several Bosnian Muslims were arrested and detained in concentration camps throughout Kotor Varoš. Among them was a Bosnian Muslim who recalled the events of that time.

1343. On 11 June, the witness was captured by 12 Serbian soldiers wearing the insignia of the White Eagles. He was taken to the fur factory, interrogated and beaten. The victim recalled that one guard forced a rifle into his mouth, and another pulled out two of his teeth with a pair of pliers.

1344. According to the witness, he and the 100 other men, also held captive, were forced to perform sexual acts upon one another. He recounted how he had been "sadistically beaten" on several occasions and forced, at gunpoint, to participate in the gang rape and killing of a Muslim woman.
1345. Osnovni Sud (local courthouse): (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The above referenced Bosnian Muslim was transferred from the fur factory to the local courthouse. He was detained at the courthouse for three and a half months. He recalled that some 170 other men were similarly detained in conditions which he described as "extremely oppressive". 

1346. The witness and 70 other men were kept in a room which, in the witness' estimation, measured only three metres by four metres. Reportedly, the Serbian guards played loud music while prisoners in adjoining rooms were beaten. 

1347. According to the witness, the conditions were deplorable. The inmates were compelled to eat spoiled or moldy food and were not permitted access to toilet facilities. Reportedly, 10 to 15 men experienced diarrhea at any given time. Several suffered from jaundice. The witness recalled that he was not allowed to bathe nor was he given a change of clothing for over three months.

1348. On 10 October, the witness and two other Muslims were exchanged for one Serb in the village of Vojni but not before being subjected to further degradation. They were reportedly tied like captured game to the back of a vehicle and dragged through the streets to the hospital; forced to eat grass like animals and to make animal noises; forced to ingest gun-cleaning fluid; and were subjected to the extinguishing of cigarettes in their skin.

1349. Vrbanja Lumber Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Mission.) According to a factory worker from a small village between Banja Luka and Doboj, Serbian forces rounded up the residents of her Muslim village, separated the men from the women and children and then killed the men.

1350. The women and girls, 60 in all, were taken to the lumber factory in Kotor Varoš where they were subjected to gang rape. The witness noted that Serb irregulars came to their containment area at night and, by match light, selected women to be taken, and then led them away at knife point.

1351. According to the witness she was taken to a room where she was raped by two men, released briefly and then taken to another room with a cement floor where the raping continued for several hours. The witness estimated that some 20 other women were similarly abused that evening.

1352. The following day the entire group of 60 women were expelled into the forest. They then made their way to Travnik. The witness suffered permanent internal damage as a result of her abuse.

1353. In a similar report, a Bosnian Muslim from a nearby village recalled that on 13 August 1992, her community, was taken over by Serbian forces. The women and children, who numbered 60, were segregated from the men and transported to the Kotor Varoš lumber factory in a large tarpaulin covered truck. She believed it to be the Vrbanja factory. The witness recalled that the women and children were forced into the factory's cafeteria. A similar sized group from another village arrived a short time later, and the two groups were consolidated and moved to an unfinished hall.

1354. After dark, the guards began selecting women and removing them from the hall. The women selected ranged in age from 16 to 35.

*Some women were taken to an alcove or room off the large hall where she and the others were being held. Though she could not see what was*
happening, she said the cries and screams of women were clearly audible, as was the laughter of the guards." 1968/

1355. At one point the witness was taken away and raped by five or six guards. When she was finally returned to the hall, bleeding, she noticed that some 15-20 women were in a similar physical state. 1969/

1356. On another occasion, the witness was taken to the second floor offices of the factory where she was raped by 10 men. She recalled that some of the men were wearing camouflage suits, some were in the local police uniform, and some wore special forces uniforms. She also recognized a high school classmate among the rapists. 1970/

1357. In the evenings, the witness noticed a steady stream of uniformed men coming into the factory. These men went to the alcove or, she believes, into the factory offices. The men were clad in uniforms that differed from those worn by the factory guards. 1971/

1358. The witness and the others detained with her were transferred from Kotor Varoš on the afternoon of 14 August. Two buses transported them to Mount Vlašić from where they were forced to find their way to Travnik. 1972/

1359. The Local Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a Croatian man and his wife were arrested and taken naked to the police station. While there, the man was beaten and the other prisoners were forced to rape his wife. The two were released two days later. 1973/

1360. Bratstvo i jedinstvo Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) At least 100 men from the Kotor Varoš region were rounded up at the Bratstvo i jedinstvo School. 1974/ According to one report, at some point following the outbreak of violence in the region, all the non-Serbian men were taken to the primary school. 1975/ According to a Croatian witness, the prisoners were reportedly beaten so severely that one young man, known as Peća, died as a result of these beatings. 1976/

1361. Kotor Varoš Secondary School Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Several reports refer to the existence of a concentration camp facility at the secondary school. 1977/ One report suggests that just after its creation, the facility was immediately saturated with prisoners. This camp was characterized as one of the three transit camps in Kotor Varoš. 1978/

1362. Open Field: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) According to foreign relief workers and press reports, Serbian Red Cross officials exercised dominion over an internment facility in an open field somewhere in Kotor Varoš. 1979/ The construct of the facility was essentially 6,500 Muslim civilians held within the confines of a barbed wire fence. 1980/

1363. Reports suggest that the facility was formed in mid-October 1992 as a containment area for Muslims awaiting evacuation by international agencies. 1981/ Serbian authorities claim that the camp was an "open reception centre" and that the Muslim civilians came of their own free will in search of an "easy route" to Western Europe. 1982/ When questioned by journalists about why they had left their homes in and around Prijedor, many of the civilians of the camp stated that their villages had been burned down. They made gestures which suggested that they were encouraged by the guns that were pointed at their heads and knives which were put to their throats. 1983/
1364. Sixteen busloads of women and children left the make-shift facility for the town of Travnik. 1984/ Reportedly 60 men on the buses were taken away by armed Serbian guards to an unknown destination. 1985/

1365. Hotel Borik: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was not unusual to find make-shift brothels or rape camps set up in hotels throughout BiH. 1986/ In one report, a 17 year old girl was taken to the Hotel Borik by special duty soldiers. She was detained there overnight and returned the next day in "terrible physical and mental condition." 1987/

1366. Kotor Varoš Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Two reports refer to the existence of an internment facility at the local hospital. 1988/ One report's findings of peculiar activities occurring at the hospital were supported by the fact that the Muslims and Croatians who were admitted to the hospital rarely came out alive. 1989/ Furthermore, that non-Serbians tended to fall from third and fourth floor windows by, what was always characterized as an, accident. 1990/

44. Kreševo

1367. The county of Kreševo is located in central Bosnia. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 6,699. At that time, 70.7 per cent of the population was Croatian, 22.8 per cent was Muslim and 6.5 per cent was referred to as "other". 1991/

1368. Unidentified Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, three detention facilities were identified in the Kreševo community. One detention centre was reportedly located in a factory and was said to contain Muslim civilians. Some of the inhabitants of this facility were displaced persons who were in the region when the fighting broke out. 1992/ The ICRC reported visiting this facility on 22 September 1993. No information was provided regarding the conditions existing at the site nor the identity of the controlling party. 1993/

1369. Unidentified School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, three detention facilities were identified in the Kreševo community. One detention centre was reportedly established in a local school and was said to contain Muslim civilians. Some of the inhabitants of this facility were displaced persons who were in the region when the fighting broke out. 1994/ The ICRC reported visiting this facility on 22 September 1993. No information was provided regarding the conditions existing at the site nor the identity of the controlling party. 1995/

1370. Unidentified Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, three detention facilities were identified in the Kreševo community. One detention centre was reportedly located in a local prison and was said to contain Muslim civilians. Some of the inhabitants of this facility were displaced persons who were in the region when the fighting broke out. 1996/ The ICRC reported visiting this facility on 8 January 1994. No information was provided regarding the conditions existing at the site nor the identity of the controlling party. 1997/
45. Kupres

1371. The county of Kupres is located in western BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population Kupres was 9,663. At that time, the population was 50.7 per cent Serbian, 39.6 per cent Croatian, 8.4 per cent Muslim, and 1.3 per cent were referred to as "other". 1998/

1372. Unknown Camp in Kupres: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A rumour was reported on 22 December 1992, that 529 people from Manjača are held in camps in three different places including one in Kupres. There is no other information provided concerning this camp. 1999/

46. Laktaši

1373. This county is located in north-central BiH. It is bordered to the west by Bosanska Gradiška and to the east by the municipality of Srbac. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of this county was 29,910, the majority of which were ethnically characterized as Serbs.

1374. High School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Very little information is available regarding possible camps in this county located in northern BiH. The one available report refers to the existence of a detention centre which was established at the high school centre. The information suggests only that the centre has been implicated in reports of sexual abuse. 2000/

1375. Unknown Rape Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One report cites the existence of a rape/death camp for girls and women up to the age of 25 in Laktaši. 2001/ According to the report, the rape camps were set up as part of an organized system of liquidation or "ethnic cleansing" of Muslims and Croatians. 2002/ The report is, silent as to the current status of the camp as well as the operation and control of the facility.

47. Lištica

1376. Lištica, now known as Široki Brijeg, is located in southern BiH and had a reported 1991 population of 26,437. According to the 1991 census 99.2 per cent of the population was Croat. 2003/

1377. Lištica Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Debriefing Team.) Reports were received which indicated that a camp was established in Lištica, approximately 20 kilometres west of Mostar. Apparently one of three jails in the town was run by Muslim militia and the HOS. 2004/

48. Livno

1378. This county is located in the central-western part of BiH, bordered on the west and south-west by Croatia. Information from the 1991 Yugoslav census suggests that out of a total population of 39,526, 72 per cent of the residents were Croatian, 15 per cent were Muslim, 9.6 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 3.4 per cent described themselves as "other".

1379. Reports regarding this municipality suggest that there were at least three main detention sites: one at a brothel, another at the police
station, and the third at the local school. According to sources, the brothel is said to have been controlled by Alija’s warriors—a Muslim paramilitary group—and peopled with Serbian women and children.

1380. The report regarding the location at the police station suggests that Croatian forces controlled the site, but is silent as to the ethnicity of the detainees. The report regarding the school facility is silent as to the ethnicity of the controlling group but notes that it was peopled with Serb males.

1381. Another report declares that 200-300 Muslims were or are being held by Croatians at an unstated location. Still another report states that over 500 Serbs were or are detained and mistreated at an unstated location controlled by Croatian paramilitary units.

1382. Large Luxurious House in Livno: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) In April 1992, a Bosnian Serb woman was taken from her home to a home in Livno by members of Alija’s Warriors. 2005/ According to the witness she was the exclusive servant of one soldier, who happened to be her former classmate. 2006/

1383. The witness noted that there were several other women detained at this location. They ranged in age from 18 to 40 and all were Serbian except one, who was Ruthenian. According to the report, very young girls were raped by seven or eight Muslim soldiers at one time. 2007/

1384. The witness was transferred with her former classmate when he was assigned to new locations. Each time the Muslim front moved, she moved. According to her statement, she was finally sent to a brothel in the Ciglane area where she was again reserved solely for her former classmate’s purposes. 2008/

1385. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) According to one report, Croatian paramilitary forces were in control in the Livno area in April. The forces allegedly forbade Serbian citizens to leave the area. 2009/ Several citizens were reportedly detained at the police station in three rooms which were overcrowded and lacked heat as well as other basic necessities. The report states that official sources acquired evidence that the detainees at this location were being beaten. 2010/ The ICRC also reports the existence of a camp in the Livno Police Station. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 16 May 1992. 2011/

1386. Evidence of this camp’s existence was also corroborated by members of the Thomson Mission who visited this location on 1 September 1992. Mission members found 40 Serbian detainees in this Croatian controlled facility. The detainees had an average age of 55 and most had been detained at this facility for several months. Mission members saw signs of beatings and abuse. 2012/

1387. Livno School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) According to one report, this location was the site of the military interrogation centre. 2013/ Some 39 Serbian men and one Serb woman were detained and interrogated here. According to testimony from former detainees at the police station, the conditions at the Livno school were severe. 2014/ The ICRC also reports the existence of a camp in a school in Livno. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 9 September 1993. 2015/ Another ICRC report also mentions the existence of a camp in the Livno school. 2016/

1388. Unidentified Location: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ECMM.) According to one report, the Imam of Livno claimed that some 200-300 Muslim prisoners were being held by
HVO military police in Livno. 2017/ The military police confirmed that some 100 prisoners were being detained, but did not permit United Nations forces to visit the detainees. The information available suggested that the prisoners were being mistreated by their captors. 2018/ Amnesty International reported a camp in Livno. 2019/ Other reports also allege the existence of a camp in Livno. 2020/

1389. In another report, over 500 Serbs including women, children, and the elderly were being mistreated and tortured by Croatian paramilitary units. 2021/ The report suggests that these paramilitary groups detained the individuals at a camp in Livno and another camp in Tomislavgrad. 2022/ The ICRC reported that on 16, 19, and 21 July ICRC delegates supervised the simultaneous release in Čelebići and near Tuzla of some 800 persons detained in Batkovići, Kamenica, Livno, Tuzla and elsewhere. 2023/

1390. Livno Village: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in Livno village that was first visited by the ICRC on 4 September 1992. There are no details concerning this camp. 2024/ Many different reports provide differing numbers of people in detention at various times. These people are said to be "in assigned residence" or under "house arrest". 2025/

1391. Livno Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the Livno Hospital. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 7 April 1992. 2026/

1392. Livno Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the Livno Prison. The camp was first visited by the ICRC on 8 November 1992. 2027/

1393. Livno Fortress-Old Town: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that about 950 Serbs were held in a fortress in the old town. 2028/

1394. Livno Brothel: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that information provided by the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka indicates that a brothel in which Serbian women are held exists in Livno. 2029/

1395. Čelebići Village: 2030/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to several reports, an entire village of Serbian males are in detention. The males were reportedly used for prisoner exchanges between the BiH and Serb armies. 2031/

49. Ljubinje

1396. Ljubinje is located in Herzegovina. The pre-war population of the city and county of Ljubinje was 4,162. Approximately 89.9 per cent Serb, 7.9 per cent Muslim, and 2.2 per cent others. 2032/

1397. Unidentified Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) A Serb source reported to the British Defence Debriefing Team that (s)he had heard of a Serbian run camp at Ljubinje where Bosnians were held. A second source may also have made the same report. 2033/
50. **Ljubuški**

Ljubuški is located in Herzegovina and had a reported 1991 population of 27,182. According to the 1991 census 92.6 per cent of the population was Croat, 5.8 per cent Muslim, and 1.6 per cent other.  

**Ljubuški Police Station:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A camp reportedly exists at Ljubuški, approximately 25 kilometres south of Mostar. It is one of three jails run by Muslim militia and the HOS. The detention facility was described in one report as the prison at the Ljubuški police station. Conflicting testimony concerning the camp commander were received. Either a man from Mostar or a Croat was the commander of the jail. It is unclear whether these men were in power at different times or whether one acted as deputy commander to the other. Another source indicated that a man from Vitk was the warden of the prison as well as other detention facilities in BiH.  

Appropriately there were 12 cells at Ljubuški camp, and up to 80 Serbs have been detained there allegedly awaiting trial. However, when the ICRC visited the Ljubuški camp on 10 June 1993 only six prisoners remained. Before the arrival of the ICRC, the guards dressed the Serbs in JNA uniforms so that it would appear that only soldiers were imprisoned here. However, many of the detainees were reportedly civilians.  

Reports were received indicating that the guards did not abuse the inmates and that medical treatment was available for the prisoners. However, statements from several witnesses indicated that they were subjected to beatings. At least one witness reports that guards would come at night at 10:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. and beat the prisoners. Another witness claimed that he was beaten five or six times upon his arrival to the detention facility. The guards made the prisoners lie down on top of one another to form a pyramid and beat the prisoner on top so those under him would feel the weight of those above.  

The prisoners were also forced to sing "Ustaše" songs and salute by raising the right hand and shouting "Ready for the homeland". The prisoners were exercised almost every day, allegedly in a humiliating manner such as behaving like animals. They were also forced to write statements that they had taken part in massacres and killings. Reportedly inmates were also forced to work.  

The inmates received food in mess kits that went unwashed for months.  

**Tobacco Station:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) Reports stated that the former tobacco station in Ljubuški was used as a transit camp. A plan revealed by Bosnian Croat leaders indicated that Muslim citizens of BiH were to be shipped to Ljubuški and from there, sent to other countries. Approximately 500 detainees were transported to Croatia from 16 July to 18 July 1993 and additional deportations were expected.  

**Ljubuški Prison:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In May 1992, a witness was captured as a JNA soldier, he and other members of the JNA were taken to the prison at Ljubuški and held for three weeks. The witness was beaten while in custody with truncheons and umbrellas. He also claimed that he was kicked and punched. The prisoners allegedly received no food for several days and were forced to kneel for hours in the sweltering heat. They were reportedly beaten every time they left the cell to go to the toilet.
51. Lopare

1406. The municipality of Lopare is located in north-eastern BiH, bordered by the municipalities of Ugljevik, Zvornik, Kalesija, Tuzla, Srebrenica, Brčko, and Bijeljina. The pre-war population of Lopare was 32,400. 55.5 per cent of the population were Serbian, 37.7 per cent Muslim, 3.9 per cent Croat and 2.9 per cent categorized as "other".

1407. Unidentified Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Chicago Tribune.) According to one source, a concentration camp was located in the municipality of Lopare. 2054/ The report did not provide additional information concerning the camp in this community.

1408. ICRC sources reported that Bosnian Serbs took 100 Muslim men from Bijeljina, and imprisoned them in a labour camp in Lopare. 2055/ However, the report gives no further information.

1409. As late as 5 September 1994 Serbs were reported to have imprisoned Muslim draft-age men from Bijeljina in labour camps in Lopare. 2056/

52. Lukavac

1410. The municipality of Lukavac is located. The pre-war population of Lukavac was 56,830. The majority of the population was Muslim at 66.7 per cent of the population, Serbs comprised 21.6 per cent, Croats comprised 3.8 per cent, and 7.9 per cent were categorized as "other." 2057/

1411. Lukavac-Karanovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A detention facility was reported to have existed in Lukavac containing 800 prisoners. 2058/

53. Maglaj

1412. The municipality of Maglaj is located in north-eastern Bosnia and is bordered by Tesanj to the north-west, Gračanica to the north-east, Lukavac to the east and Zavidovići to the south. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the population of Maglaj was 43,294, of which 45.4 per cent were Muslim, 30.7 per cent were Serb, 19.3 per cent were Croat and the remaining 4.6 per cent were described as "other".

1413. Tunnel: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In August 1993, the Bosnian Muslim forces surrendered to HVO in the village of Novi Šeher. Surrounding residents were assembled in front of the Catholic Church in Novi Šeher. From the church, the Muslim residents were transported by HVO trucks to a tunnel near Perkovići. The HVO soldiers separated the men of military age from the other detainees. The HVO instructed the women, children and elderly detainees to walk to Zenica. The male detainees of military age were held in the tunnel. 2059/

1414. Male detainees that were kept in the tunnel were reportedly taken to Teslić and Doboj. 2060/
54. **Modrić**

1415. The municipality of Modrić is located in northern Bosnia, bordered by Bosanski Brod to the north-west, Odak to the north, Doboj to the south and Gradačac to the east. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, the population of Modrić was 35,413; of that, 35.5 per cent were Serb, 29.5 per cent were Muslim, 27.3 per cent were Croat and the remaining 7.7 per cent were described as "other".

1416. **Sutjeska Junior High School:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) Approximately 100 to 200 Muslim detainees were interned at the Sutjeska Junior High School on Ulica Maksima Gorka in Srpska Varoš. 2061/

1417. The school was composed of prefabricated buildings that were linked by a corridor. 2062/

1418. Men of military age were held in classrooms. Women, children and the elderly were detained in the school sports hall. 2063/

1419. Local Serbians guarded the detainees; however, Serb paramilitaries from Knin came to the camp for interrogations. 2064/ The detainees were questioned about weapons and political activities. Some detainees were beaten during interrogations. 2065/

1420. The school was hit by shell in mid-May, 1992. The detainees were then transferred to the Doboj military barracks camp. 2066/

1421. **Modrić Police Station:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Serbs imprisoned 40 predominantly Muslim policemen from Modrić. 2067/ The policemen were detained in the police station basement. These detainees were interrogated, tortured and, reportedly, later shot. 2068/

1422. **Metal Processing Plant:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Metal processing plant in Modrić was converted into a detention camp for approximately 800 Muslims. 2069/

1423. At least some of the detainees were reportedly tortured and killed. 2070/

1424. In late May, 1992, Modrić was retaken briefly by the 102nd Voluntary Brigade who released all the detainees in Modrić. 2071/

1425. **Other Modrić Camps:** (The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Camps that contain Muslim detainees in the surrounding area of Modrić are identified as: Miloševac, Garevac, Pelagićevo, Lončar, Turić, Slatina, Vranjak, Ledenice, Donji abar, Crkvina, and Gornji Skurgić. 2072/

55. **Mostar**

1426. Mostar is located in western Herzegovina and had a population of 126,067 according to the 1991 census. The population was 34.8 per cent Muslim, 33.8 per cent Croat, 19.0 per cent Serb, 10 per cent Yugoslav, and 2.4 per cent "other". 2073/ The Neretva River flows through the city. Before the war, Mostar was an ethnically mixed city. 2074/ Commencing in early 1993, however, Bosnian Muslims in Mostar were dismissed from their jobs. In May, approximately 10,000 of the Muslims who had arrived from other cities and who were occupying flats vacated by fleeing Serbs were ordered to leave the city. There are now two
separate sections—a Croatian section on the left bank of the river controlled by
the Bosnian Croat Militia (HVO) and a Muslim section controlled by Muslim troops
on the right bank. 2075/ Several camps were established in this region. UN
Military Observers were allowed access to the Mostar camps in May, 1993. 2076/

1427. Central Mostar Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch.) HVO forces operated
a detention facility in the Central Mostar Prison. The Central Mostar Prison is
also the site of a heliodrom. 2077/ After HVO assumed control over HOS forces in
western Bosnia, many prisoners held by HOS forces were brought to the Mostar
prison. Similarly, most of the prisoners held by HVO forces in smaller jails in
the area also were transferred to the Mostar prison at approximately the same
time. 2078/ Valentin ori is the chief of the HVO military police in
Mostar. 2079/

1428. In September 1992, approximately 392 prisoners were interned at the Central
Mostar Prison. 2080/ The jail detained mostly men but also a few women. 2081/ In
October, 1992 between 51 and 54 women were held in the main Mostar prison. Most
of these women were between 30 and 40 years of age. 2082/

1429. Approximately 90 per cent of the prisoners were Serbian civilians. 2083/
However, a number of Croats and Muslims accused of military offences also were
detained at this jail. 2084/ The prisoners were divided into five categories:
Serbian combatants; enemy Collaborators; prisoners kept for exchange purposes;
civilian criminals accused of having committed crimes other than war crimes; and
Croatian soldiers serving time for disciplinary infractions. 2085/

1430. Some reports indicate that the prisoners slept in two large rooms and have
access to a living room. 2086/ There were about 30 men in a room. 2087/

1431. The prisoners at this camp reportedly had more freedom than at some of the
more notorious Serbian-run camps. They could freely move about and were allowed
to go to the toilet. 2088/ The prisoners were allowed to walk outside for 30
minutes each day. 2089/ However, none of the prisoners had any visitors. 2090/
Some women have children and husbands but were not allowed to contact them unless
it is through the ICRC. 2091/

1432. Officially, the prisoners were required to work at least eight hours every
other day. 2092/ However, some prisoners state that they were forced to work
every day from seven in the morning until nightfall, and occasionally at night as
well. 2093/ Guards were present while the prisoners work. 2094/ The work
assigned includes miscellaneous labour in the villages, in the city, and in the
prison itself, cleaning buildings, loading and unloading various materials, and
building bunkers at the front lines. 2095/ Three or four women were responsible
for cleaning the Mostar jail. The rest of the women were required to do various
other tasks. 2096/ Croatian prisoners did not have to work like the other
prisoners. 2097/

1433. The prisoners were fed three small meals a day including breakfast which
consisted of two slices of bread and tea, coffee or cocoa; lunch, which consisted
of two slices of bread and soup or a souplike food; and dinner, which consisted
of two slices of bread and about five or six spoonfuls of soup. 2098/

1434. An investigatory judge, a warden, and others oversaw the main Mostar
prison. 2099/ There were between 20 and 25 soldiers on duty at the Mostar
prison. 2100/ The guards were reportedly not allowed to talk to the prisoners
concerning the reason for their imprisonment. Most of the guards had recently
returned from the front lines. Anyone with a criminal record reportedly was
disqualified from being a prison guard. 2101/ The commanders at the main Mostar
prison did not allow the guards to beat the prisoners. However sometimes
individual guards on duty violated this rule. 2102/ Several prisoners report that they were beaten while imprisoned at the Central Mostar Prison. 2103/ Reportedly, one or two guards would make the prisoners stand at attention and then would randomly beat them. 2104/

1435. The guards at the Mostar jail reportedly treated the women properly; however, two among them reportedly beat at least one woman while they interrogated her. 2105/ However, it was reported that some of the younger women were forced to perform same-sex sexual acts while the others watched. On one occasion, the women were then tied together and ordered onto a truck which reportedly contained a pile of bloody civilian clothes. They were driven through Mostar and beaten and forced to sing Ustaše songs. 2106/

1436. The military prisoners and the civilian prisoners are guarded by the same men. 2107/ Female guards attended the female prisoners in an area separate from the male prisoners. 2108/

1437. Thomson Mission members inspected this facility on 1 September 1992. According to their report, 75 Serb detainees were held at this Bosnian Croat-controlled facility on that date. Thirty-seven of the inmates were women who were classified as political prisoners. The inmates were reportedly detained under fairly good conditions. 2109/

1438. Former JNA Clinic: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) HOS paramilitary forces operated a detention facility in a former JNA clinic in Mostar. 2110/ HVO troops subsequently closed the HOS operated detention facility and transferred the prisoners to the central Mostar jail. 2111/

1439. Aluminum Factory and Gymnasium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Reuters.) It was reported that Bosnian Croat forces are holding about 1,300 Muslim men, women and children in a factory and gymnasium outside of Mostar. 2112/ This former aluminum factory is located at the foot of a mountain three miles west of Mostar. 2113/ On one occasion, a group of men, women, and children who had been evicted from their homes and bused out of the city were forced at gunpoint to walk to the camp approximately 2.5 miles away. 2114/ HVO forces admitted that they had bused Muslim civilians out of the city but insist that it was for their own safety. 2115/ The Croat commander of this detention camp said approximately 1,000 of these people are civilians, while 300 are being treated as prisoners of war. 2116/ Indications are strong that the people were being held against their will. 2117/ Nevertheless, the detainees said they were being treated well.

1440. The gymnasium houses women and children on one floor and men on another. The prisoners had mats to sleep on but they lacked blankets. The food was scarce, consisting of bread, milk and some army rations. 2118/

1441. Unidentified Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There are reports that the Croat forces have established at least one detention facility exclusively for the Muslim civilians of Mostar. 2119/ This camp reportedly has more than 2,000 men, women, and children who are detained by armed guards said to be wearing black uniforms (resembling the uniform of the Croat troops that sided with the Nazis during World War II).

1442. Šantićeva Street Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) There is a report that at one time the HOS operated a prison on Šantićeva Street. This jail previously was used to house common criminals. 2120/
1443. The HOS soldiers reportedly dress in black uniforms with their own insignia. 2121/ It is alleged that during the night guards sometimes beat the prisoners. 2122/ The prisoners were reportedly also mistreated upon arrival at this camp. 2123/ It was reported that the women kept in the Santicova jail were raped and abused by their HOS captors. 2124/

1444. The prisoners are provided three meals a day but do not receive any meat. 2125/

1445. According to the source, three female detainees remained incarcerated at the jail in Šantiço Street at the time the report was prepared. 2126/

1446. University:  (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) There is at least one account that prisoners were also detained at a university in Mostar. Upon arrival there, they are said to have been beaten. One woman reported that the guards at this facility ordered three male prisoners to rape her. She was almost raped a second time but one of the commanders came in and prevented this. 2127/

1447. District Prison:  (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one source, approximately 300 Serbs were held here in November, 1992. 2128/

1448. Cemetery Building:  (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) It was reported that the Serbian irregulars operated an interrogation centre in a building that belonged to the cemetery in Sutine, which is several kilometres north of Zalik and adjacent to the Sutine landfill. The building was used as an interrogation and processing centre for Bosnian Muslim and Croatian prisoners. Two rooms in the building were used for interrogation and torture of the prisoners. It was reported that after the prisoners were interrogated they were summarily executed and their bodies were thrown into the landfill. 2129/

1449. Aircraft Factory:  (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) It was reported that Croat forces operated a prison for a large number of Muslim and a smaller number of Serbian civilians at a disused aircraft factory south of Mostar town. 2130/ The camp is located one kilometre south of Mostar in the Buna area. The fence surrounding the premises was reinforced and there were bars on the windows. 2131/

1450. In May 1993 outside observers allowed into the camp estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 men and women were imprisoned here. 2132/ The prisoners for the most part are from Mostar and are Serb civilians. They include university professors, doctors, journalists, and students. However, there also are people from some of the surrounding towns imprisoned here. 2133/

1451. The camp consists of four buildings. 2134/ The prisoners are held in a former military prison and two adjacent gymnasium buildings. 2135/ The women and children are housed separately from the men and no communication between the groups is allowed. 2136/ The women are kept downstairs and the men are kept upstairs. 2137/ The conditions at the camp are poor particularly for the male inmates. Up to 60 people are held in one room usually without mattresses or blankets to sleep on. Some rooms in the men's quarters have insufficient space for the men to sleep fully outstretched. 2138/ There are allegations that some of the detainees are being held underground and tortured. However, no investigation of this has been possible. 2139/

1452. The Croat forces running the camp argue that the women and children are free to leave and were brought to the camp to protect them for the heavy fighting
in the city. The Croat forces running the camp have stated that those whose homes have not been destroyed by the fighting will be able to return there when the fighting ceases. The others would be kept at their current location. However, the Croatian neighbours of these inmates were not arrested and the inmates were forcibly removed from their homes and were not allowed to take any possessions with them. The inmates reported to the investigators however that they were kept in locked doors and were only allowed outside moments before the investigators arrived. The camp is under heavily armed guard and at least some detainees are said to be in fear for their lives. The guards wear black uniforms. Some of detainees have been removed from the camp and remain to be accounted for.

Food is reported to be a couple of biscuits and a glass of milk or water per day. Basic hygiene necessities such as soap or toilet paper have not been provided. The toilet facilities are very small.

On 12 May 1993 between 1,500 and 2,000 people were held at this camp. Conditions at the Rodo camp reportedly were difficult but not life threatening. There are isolated reports of abuse but for the most part the inmates state that they were treated kindly by their captors. The most difficult problems facing the inmates are due to overcrowding, insufficient food, and inadequate hygiene.

It was reported that as of 14 June 1993, Bosnian Croat authorities were detaining 506 prisoners at this camp. In July 1993 as many as 2,000 civilians were housed in two buildings at the Rodo heliport detention facility. An additional 400 civilians were scheduled to be transferred to Rodo from Dretelj prison on 10 July 1993. The ICRC registered 1,900 inmates at the Rodo camp in August, 1993. Most of the inmates were Muslim men between the ages of 18 and 60 although there also were soldiers and common criminals who are being disciplined at camp. In September 1993, the camp commander reported 1,300 inmates including two women who refused to leave.

The heliodrom is a three story building. The men were housed in the basement and on the first and second floors. The number of prisoners in each room varied depending on the size the room. At least in August 1993 the prisoners had bed mattresses to sleep on and also had blankets.

Prisoners also were housed in a gymnasium. This had two large halls with approximately 250 inmates housed in each hall. The space for each inmate was limited to the area covered by his blanket. There were two shower halls for the entire facility but some showers did not work. There was only one toilet for the entire facility.

Approximately 1,200 additional prisoners were housed in a four story school building. Three stories of class rooms were used to house 400 people including women and children per story with approximately 15 to 30 people per class room. There were eight toilets functioning on two floors and toilets on the first floor which did not function. There were no showers. However, it was reported that in general the sanitary conditions at this camp were sufficient.

The detainees were given tea and a slice of bread each morning and occasionally macaroni soup in the afternoon. On at least one occasion they were given beans. It was reported that the prisoners were not maltreated with the exception of the lack of food.
1461. The male prisoners regularly were forced to dig trenches and fill sand bags on the front lines. Reportedly the prisoners receive more food if they volunteered to dig trenches on the front lines and thus many inmates were coerced to these tasks because they are hungry. 2161/

1462. It was reported that HVO forces gave approximately 200 male inmates four hours to decide whether they would leave BiH for a third country. These prisoners were forced to sign papers that stated they were leaving for a third country. They were then given an hour and a half to go to their homes to gather their families and their belongings. The HVO police then took these prisoners and their families to the Croatian border where they were met by Croatian buses and police who escorted them to Gašinci. Several of these prisoners were interviewed in Gašinci. They were in bad physical and mental health. They stated that during their first two days of internment they were not given anything to eat. They were forced to work on the front lines and many stated that although they were not beaten they felt threatened. They agreed to leave Mostar because HVO forces advised them that they could no longer guarantee their safety. They also said that the Mostar Croats were nicer to them than the HVO Croats. 2162/

1463. Mostar-MUP: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) It was reported that as of 14 June 1993 Bosnian Croat Authorities were detaining one person at this camp. 2163/

1464. Mostar-Left Bank: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) It was reported that as of 14 June 1993 the Government of BiH held three prisoners at this camp. 2164/

1465. Musala: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that as of September 1993 60 Croatian civilians were being held in the Musala in Mostar. 2165/

1466. Lipno Detention Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A detention facility was reported to exist in the village of Lipno and at least one individual was detained between 7 May 1992 and 11 May 1992. A retired JNA soldier was arrested in his apartment, location unknown, in May 1992, by a Muslim and taken to Lipno. There he was detained in an old school and beaten by the same man who arrested him and HOS members. He was punched, kicked, and beaten with truncheons and rifle butts. Cigarettes were extinguished on his body, and he was forced to eat plaster from the wall and cigarette butts. His hair was set on fire and he was forced to perform fellatio on one of his guards. 2166/

1467. Former Military Dispensary: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A report stated that a Serb female was detained in the former military dispensary in Mostar between 21 July 1992 and 24 July 1992. She was incarcerated in the basement of the building in a three by 3.5 metre room with five or six other women. On the first night of her detention she was taken for interrogation at 2:00 a.m.. The interrogator cursed her and threatened her with a knife. The next night she was taken to the same interrogator and he asked her if she would be his mistress. She declined and was transferred to the Dretelj detention facility. 2167/
56. Mrkonjić Grad

1468. Mrkonjić Grad is located in west central BiH. Its neighbours to the west include Titov Drvar and Glamoć, and its neighbours to the east are Skender Vakuf and Jajce. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the municipality of Mrkonjić Grad had a population of 27,379. Of that number 77.3 per cent were Serbs, 12.0 per cent were Muslims, 7.8 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 2.9 per cent were described as "others".

1469. According to reports, a policy of "ethnic cleansing" was effectively instituted in Mrkonjić Grad, which the controlling Serbian extremists considered to be their "sports borough". The bizarre lightheartedness of the activities carried on this area was exemplified on one occasion by what appeared to be a sort of pep rally like convention of military units held at the local sports stadium. Reportedly, a Serbian commandant and various members of the Serbian government in attendance at the convention promised the soldiers that upon the return of the Serbian troops from the front, all remaining Muslims would be "expelled or liquidated. Along with this, they promised war booty in the form of real property of the Muslim citizens of Mrkojnic [sic] Grad".

1470. "Kula Barracks": (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one witness, in early June 1992, members of the Serbian paramilitary group Beli orlovi took 11 young men captive. They were bound with rope and transported to the "Kula" barracks in Mrkonjić Grad. The sojourn at the Kula barracks appeared to have been for no other reason that to administer beatings to the men before transporting them to yet another concentration camp. No additional information was made available regarding the condition or operation of this facility.

1472. Lake Balkan Area: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reports suggest the existence of a concentration camp in the area above Mrkonjić Grad, specifically above Lake Balkan. This was reportedly the site for the containment of women and children. One witness recalls seeing some 30 buses and trucks with women and children going through Manjača in that direction.

1473. Unidentified Camp, Mrkonjić Grad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the National Organization for Victim Assistance.) Medecins Sans Frontieres, the French charity organization, reportedly acquired information from refugees regarding the existence of a camp in Mrkonjić Grad. The French organization conducted filmed interviews with refugees who stated that their Serb captors were responsible for widespread atrocities including "systematic torture, sexual mutilation, rape and violence against children". The report was, silent as to specific information regarding the location, operation or control of the facility.
57. Nevesinje

1474. The municipality of Nevesinje is located in Herzegovina and is neighboured by Mostar to the west and Gacko to the east. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of Nevesinje was 14,421, of which 74.5 per cent were Serbs, 23.0 per cent were Muslims, 1.3 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 1.2 per cent were described as "others".

1475. Bačko Jezero Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Following the victory by the Muslim and Croatian defenders of Mostar, Serbian forces plundered the municipality of Nevesinje. Several villages including Sopilja, Hrušta, Lakat, Kljuna, Gornja Bijenja, Donja Bijenja, Postoljani, Presjeka, Borovići, Luka, and Kruševljani i Odak were burned to the ground. 2181

1476. According to one report, at least five women from Nevesinje were taken to a camp in Bačko Jezero. The women reportedly were raped during their internment. 2182 There was no evidence that men also were detained at this camp. The ICRC visited the camp on 21 October 1992 and reported that all prisoners had been released. 2183

1477. House in Gaj: 2184/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Following the outbreak of tension in late March 1993, in the village of Seonice in Konjic, Croatian women and children were captured by Muslim troops. 2185/ The captives were taken by approximately 60 Muslim soldiers to a home on the periphery of the village of Trusina, in an area known as Gaj. 2186/ The women and children were robbed of their personal possessions and ordered to carry crates of ammunition and weapons to Muslim military personnel in the village. 2187/ The detainees were later released but were told that if they tried to leave the area, they would be shot. 2188/

58. Odak

1478. The municipality of Odak is located in northern BiH. It is bordered by the Sava river to the north, Modrića county to the south, Bosanski Šamac to the east, and Bosanski Brod to the west. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census the population of Odak county was 30,651; 54.2 per cent of which were Croats, 20.3 per cent were Muslim, 19.8 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 5.7 per cent were described as "others".

1479. Odak Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A primary school in Odak was turned into a detention centre. 2189/ The Serbian residents of the villages nearby were rounded up and taken to the school. 2190/ The men were kept in the gymnasium. 2191/ The women and children were kept in classrooms and then later interned in Muslim and Croatian houses in Odak. 2192/

1480. When the men arrived at the camp, they were forced to run through a gauntlet of non-Serbs who beat the Serb detainees as they entered the gymnasium. 2193/

1481. The gymnasium was crowded. 2194/ Approximately 700 men were detained at this camp. 2195/ The floors were very hard and the detainees had only coats or blankets for comfort. 2196/ When permitted, the detainees had to line up for the toilet or a bath. 2197/ Many detainees did not bathe for four months. 2198/ In at least one instance, prior to an ICRC visit, the guards brought a fire truck in and hosed the detainees down so that they appeared clean. 2199/ Many of the detainees fell as a result of the force of the water. 2200/
1482. The food in the camp consisted of one slice of bread and one cup of tea per day. Occasionally, prisoners were fed macaroni. The guards forced all the detainees to eat spoiled, stale macaroni. The detainees were beaten if they raised their heads before they were finished eating the macaroni. The detainees suffered from dysentery as a result.

1483. During the day, the detainees were forced to sing Ustaše songs for two or three hours at a time. The detainees had to greet the Croatian army or members of the paramilitary formations with the greeting "Ready for the Homeland!"

1484. Some detainees were taken to the front and forced to dig trenches for the Croatian soldiers in the areas of Bosanski Brod and Orašje. Many detainees were wounded or killed.

1485. On 26 May 1992, a group of Croatian National Guards came to the camp, picked out a group of detainees and beat them. This incident triggered the beginning of nightly beatings. The guards beat the detainees with their feet, rifles, truncheons and other solid instruments. The guards would appear in the hall and single out a dozen detainees at random or call out a year from 1962 to 1972 and all those men born in that year would have to suffer.

1486. The guards would force the detainees to face a wall and then they would smash the detainees' heads against the wall from behind. In addition, the detainees were forced to run up and hit their own head against the blackboard or wall. If they did not do it hard enough, they were beaten in the head with a gun. After these beatings, the detainees were ordered to lick their own blood from the floor.

1487. A member of the National Guards of the Republic of Croatia, would usually be the guard to order the detainees to hit their heads against the wall. He also carved the letter "U" in the detainees' chests.

1488. In addition, other specific mistreatment included forcing the detainees to hold up their fingers as if making a cross and then beating those fingers. The guards also forced the detainees to beat each other, including relatives. Additionally, the guards forced men to kiss each other.

1489. The guards beat the detainees until they were too tired to continue. The soldiers and guards who beat the detainees were usually drunk.

1490. The guards then turned to torturing with threats. The guards would order the detainees to pull down their trousers and would threaten to remove their genitals. The guards would put guns to detainees' heads and pull the trigger, however, the guns were not loaded.

1491. Detainees who were able to give money to one of the captors could buy a night without a beating. This captor later confiscated all the detainees' money and jewelry.

1492. Approximately 30 women were interned at this camp. These women were taken to adjacent offices and raped. If they resisted, they were beaten. The women were raped by a different man each night. Serbian male detainees of various ages were occasionally brought to the women's area after the rapes and forced to lick the women.

1493. In one instance, the guards, including two women from the National Guards of the Republic of Croatia, brought a mentally handicapped girl, to the camp and forced some detainees to rape her. The male detainees who raped her were
promised a good dinner in exchange. 2233/ The guards also forced detainees to rape a girl who had previously worked at a restaurant in Novi Grad. 2234/

1494. The camp guards also organized a "wedding". They took a women and man, both detainees, and forced a false marriage ceremony. 2235/ The guards made the detainees who played musical instruments play for the "wedding". 2236/ The detainees were then taken to another room where as "newlyweds" they were forced to perform sexual acts. 2237/

1495. A group of pregnant women from another rape camp were sent to Odak. 2238/ The women continued to be raped, but when they reached an advanced stage of pregnancy the Croatian men would leave them alone. 2239/ The men allegedly considered this respect for the growing Croatian child. 2240/

1496. At least some of the women were allowed to buy their freedom. Members of the "Black Legion" or "Black Coats" came to the camp and told the women that if they turned over money or jewelry they would be freed. 2241/ The women who had money or jewelry sewed in the hems of their clothes were exchanged. 2242/

1497. The soldiers from the 101st Bosanski Brod Brigade, 106th Osijek Brigade, 108th Slavonski Brod Brigade also mistreated the detainees. 2243/ One individual from Donji Hasić was infamous at the camp. 2244/

1498. This camp operated until the ICRC and UNPROFOR representatives began to make inquiries in August 1992. 2245/ The women were then sent to a stockings factory and the men were evacuated to other detention facilities. 2246/

1499. A Serb teacher from Derventa who informed an ICRC representative about the women held at this camp was beaten to death by the guards. 2247/

1500. House Arrest: (The existence of this type of detention has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The Serbian residents of Donja Dubica, Struka, Novi Grad, and Trunjak attempted to negotiate a peaceful departure for Bosanski Šamac. 2248/ Instead they were taken into custody. 2249/

1501. The Serbian women and children from the villages surrounding Odak were rounded up with the men and taken to the Odak camp. 2250/ They were then released and detained in Muslim and Croatian homes in the area of Novi Grad. 2251/

1502. While detained in these homes, the women's ordeals began. 2252/ The Serbian women were repeatedly raped. 2253/ They were raped in the detention homes and taken from the homes and raped at other locations. 2254/ Many of the women were raped by their neighbours. 2255/

1503. Paramilitaries/soldiers would come at night and order all the women out of the detention home. 2256/ The soldiers would line them up, shine flashlights on their faces, and choose a few of the women to be taken away and raped. 2257/ The women would be returned in the morning, some naked. 2258/ The rapists told the women that they were to give birth to a young Ustaša. 2259/ Some of the rapists told the women that they were abusing them as the Serbs had abused their women. 2260/

1504. The women were raped by multiple men. 2261/ A few of the alleged rapists were identified as the guards at the detention facilities at Orašje, Donja Mahala, and Odak School. 2262/ The paramilitaries "Horses of Fire" were also identified as perpetrators. 2263/
1505. The Croatian police and other military officers attempted to curb the actions of these roaming groups of paramilitaries, such as the "Horses of Fire," but when arrested or questioned they were equally threatening to the officers. 2264/

1506. Strolit Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Strolit Factory was a detention centre in Odak. 2265/

59. Olovo

1507. The municipality of Olovo is located just north of Sarajevo county, to the east of Vares and the west of Han Pijesak. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of Olovo was 16,901. Of that number, 75 per cent were Muslims, 18.9 per cent were Serbs, 3.9 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 2.2 per cent were described as "others".

1508. Unidentified Village: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Defence Debriefing Team.) According to Muslim refugees and BiH Army officers, Serbian soldiers have detained several men from Rijeka, a village in Olovo. It is unclear where the men were taken, or if they were released. Additionally, there also are reports that Serbian soldiers killed and raped an unspecified number of people in the village. 2266/

60. Orašje

1509. Orašje is located in northern BiH and had a population of 28,201, according to the 1991 census. The population was 75.3 per cent Croat, 6.7 per cent Muslim, 15 per cent Serb, and 3 per cent "other". 2267/

1510. Donja Mahala: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Defence Debriefing Team.) Donja Mahala was a Croatian run camp located in the Bosanska Posavina region near Orašje. 2268/ The camp was a school before the hostilities. 2269/ Detainees were Serbian men from the surrounding regions and captured Serbian milita. 2270/ Many of the detainees had been previously interned in camps located in Odak, Bosanski Brod, and Slavonski Brod. 2271/ Donja Mahala has been described as "the death camp". 2272/ The camp operated from at least May 1992. 2273/ On 9 December 1992, ICRC delegates found 161 detainees at the camp. 2274/

1511. The detainees were fed the same food as the guards, however, they got only one meal every one or two days. 2275/

1512. The detainees were kept in groups of approximately 15 people in different rooms at the camp. 2276/ The detainees designated one room as the "solitary confinement cell". 2277/ Detainees that were moved into this room were killed. 2278/ In the solitary cell, the detainees received only a cup of tea and slice of bread a day. 2279/

1513. The detainees at Donja Mahala were routinely tortured and executed. 2280/ To muffle the screams of those beaten, the guards would stuff rags in their mouths. 2281/

1514. An inmate at the camp described various instances of torture that he endured. One perpetrator burned the inmate's beard off his face and drove screwdrivers through his hands onto a board. Another perpetrator beat him with a heated rod, a wooden oar, stabbed him in the back, and drove a power drill into his head. Still another tied the inmate's testicles with wire and then beat his
genital region. Yet a fourth crushed his fingers so that the inmate would not be able to make a cross in religious services. The inmate considered himself fortunate compared to other detainees at Donja Mahala. 2282

1515. In another account, the guards removed skin from one detainee's head every day so that he had only bloody wounds instead of hair. This detainee also had his right hand broken. 2283

1516. The detainees were forced to clean up the blood from the floors, tables and walls after the beatings. 2284/ The guards further punished the detainees if any blood was found. 2285/

1517. While in the camp, some detainees were forced to dig trenches at the front for the regular army of the Republic of Croatia and for paramilitary Ustaše formations. 2286/ Fifteen men were killed while digging trenches at the front. 2287/ At the front, the detainees were forced to climb out of the trenches and shout abuse at the Serb soldiers. 2288/ In addition, the detainees pulled out dead and injured members of both armies. 2289/ The Serb trench diggers were forced to watch as the Serb soldiers' bodies were mutilated. 2290/ In one report, the guards killed a POW when he was too weak to dig a trench; he had been denied food for 13 days. 2291/

1518. Detainees were also beaten on the head, knifed in the legs, arms, and back, and burned with cigarettes. 2292/ On occasion, one of the perpetrators allowed a detainee to see a doctor concerning injuries sustained from a harsh beating, however, the guards would confiscate the medicine given to the detainee. 2293/

1519. Among those particularly butalized were Serbian militia from Vukovar, including their commander and deputy commander. 2294/ The deputy commander died on the torture table. 2295/ Only eight of the Vukovar militamen survived the camp. 2296/ The guards pulled wire through the POWs earlobes and hung heavy wooden boards of the ends of the wires. The guards also slashed the tongue of one POW. 2297/ While the men were tortured, the guards laughed. 2298/

1520. Some of the detainees were moved to Donja Mahala when the Croatians pulled out of an area. Approximately 100 men were moved to the camp when the Serbs took over Bosanski Brod. 2299/ When the detainees arrived, they were met by one of the captors and then taken to the yard where they were beaten all day. 2300/ These detainees were not allowed water or toilet facilities. 2301/ Some of the men were beaten in the genitals. The guards told them they looked best as corpses floating along the Sava River. 2302/

1521. To further humiliate the detainees, the guards relieved themselves on the detainees' boots and refused to allow the detainees to remove the boots. 2303/ As a result, at least one detainee had open wounds on his feet that subsequently turned into gangrene. 2304/

1522. On the Orthodox Christmas, six or seven members of the Croatian National Guard arrived at Donja Mahala to further victimize the detainees. 2305/ The Croatian soldiers lined up the detainees and beat them. 2306/ The soldiers forced the detainees to admit to killings and rapes of Croatian and Muslim people. 2307/ The soldiers had the detainees repeat the forced confessions to German reporters. 2308/

1523. The guards also coerced some detainees to confess to certain crimes to reporters from Globus and Reuters and to English, Australian, and German reporters by offering an exchange for the confession. 2309/

1524. The camp also held suspected war criminals. 2310/ The alleged war criminals were first held in Bosanski Vlasti and then moved to Orašje. 2311/
They claimed that the Arkan's and Šešelj's Četniks forced them to torture and kill people. 2312/ An exchange was reportedly offered to the suspected war criminals, however, they declined. 2313/ The Serbs feared being considered informants. 2314/

1525. Orašje School: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Civilians were detained in a school in Orašje while they waited for prisoner exchanges. 2315/ Some of the detainees had been previously interned in different camps. 2316/

1526. Rape Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) From at least April to October 1992, a detention centre housed women in Orašje. 2317/ The women interned in this camp were repeatedly raped by Muslim militiamen. 2318/

1527. Many women who were raped became pregnant and suffered further as a result of their experiences. 2319/ Women sought abortions or adoptions at a number of hospitals and women's clinics. 2320/

61. Posušje

1528. The county of Posušje is located in south-western BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population of Posušje was 16,659. At that time, the population was 99.5 per cent Croatian, and .5 per cent were referred to as "other". 2321/

1529. Posušje Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It is reported that in January and February 1993, draft age men were picked up in various parts of Croatia by the Croatian police, detained in Rijeka, and then being sent to Posušje. From Posušje they were transferred to Tomislavgrad, where they were allegedly beaten and tortured by the HVO, and finally released to the BiH Army in Jablanica. There are various examples cited in the report with numbers of detained ranging from 10-130. Most of the men detained were Muslim, but at least three were reported to be Serbian. 2322/

62. Prijedor

1530. The province of Prijedor is located in north-western BiH. It is surrounded by the provinces of Bosanski Novi, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Banja Luka and Sanski Most. According to a 1991 census, Prijedor's ethnic composition was 44 per cent Muslim, 42.5 per cent ethnic Serb, 5.7 per cent Yugoslav, 5.6 per cent Croat, and 2.2 per cent "other", of a total population of 112,000.

1531. It is reported that although the urban areas and Prijedor town in particular in this part of BiH had largely Muslim majorities, the surrounding villages were mostly ethnically Serb. 2323/

1532. The following excerpt appears in the report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. 2324/ It is helpful background information when addressing the issue of the camps located in the Prijedor area:

"On 30 April 1992, armed men from Banja Luka took control of strategic positions in Prijedor. Identity checks began, allegedly because of the failure of Muslims to turn in their arms. The elected head of the
district, Mr. Čehajić, a Muslim, was obliged to make a statement on the radio indicating that the political authority had changed, and calling on the populations not to resist and to surrender their arms. He was then removed from office, and his place was taken by a Serb.

The following week most Muslim police and military officials surrendered their arms. The television and radio began to broadcast only programmes from Belgrade. Police identity checks intensified, and Mr. Čehajić and his staff were detained. Threats by armed men became more frequent, and for the first time some Muslims suffered beatings. Later in May many leaders of the Muslim community, such as teachers, physicians and religious leaders, had their homes searched and were detained.

Between 23 and 25 May, the Muslim village of Hambarine, 5 kilometres south of Prijedor, received an ultimatum: all weapons must be surrendered by 11:00 a.m. Then, alleging that a shot was fired at a Serbian patrol, heavy artillery began to shell the village and tanks appeared, firing at homes. The villagers fled to Prijedor. Witnesses reported many deaths, probably as many as 1,000.

Shortly afterwards, on 26, 27, or 28 May, the Muslim village of Kozarac, 20 kilometres east of Prijedor, suffered a similar fate. Citing the same pretext as Hambarine, Serbian heavy artillery began to shell the town, following which an attack was launched by tanks and infantry. Some inhabitants, anticipating the attack, had dug shelters, and a few of them tried to resist with the meagre arms at their disposal. The combat lasted some seven days. Those who fled the village, including women and children were detained in camps in Karmina, Omarska and Trnopolje. Mass arrests also took place, and those arrested were taken away in buses and trucks. The population, estimated at 15,000, suffered a great many executions, possibly as many as 5,000 persons, according to some witnesses.

The night of 29 May, tanks and infantry took up position around Prijedor, citing the same pretext as at Hambarine and Kozarac. When the attack began, Serbs from the village guided the tanks to the homes of certain Muslims, and the inhabitants were asked to come out and show their identity documents. Many of those who did were summarily executed. According to witnesses, some 200 residents of a single street (Partisan Street) were executed, and a hundred homes were destroyed. During the attack the local radio continued to call for the surrender of arms, yet not one shot had been fired by the Muslims.

When the artillery barrage stopped around noon, groups of extremists, probably under the control of the paramilitary leader Arkan, began executing people, taking their victims to the street and slitting their throats, according to witnesses. The bodies of the dead were carried away by truck, which left a trail of blood. Those who were not killed on the spot were taken to hotels, where they were transferred to a convoy which left in the direction of Omarska. In the aftermath, houses which had been too badly damaged were bulldozed, and their foundations covered with fresh earth. Five mosques were destroyed, and the Muslim cemetery was razed.

In mid-July, more villages in the Prijedor area were attacked. Bišani and Rokovšati, located some 5 kilometres to the west of Prijedor, were attacked by artillery and mortars, followed by tanks and infantry. There were many casualties, and the survivors were sent to Omarska and Keraterm. Ljubija, a Croatian village, also suffered many casualties, as did Vugovići-Selo, a Muslim village which was shelled before being
attacked by tanks and infantry. The population of Gornja Puharska was forced to leave by repeated searches, which sometimes culminated in summary executions; the destruction of its mosque led to panic, and caused the population to flee their homes and seek shelter in other buildings until such time as their departure was organized; in contrast to the fate of other villages, few homes were destroyed . . . ."

a. Omarska Camp

1533. (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch, US Department of State, UK Defence Debriefing Team, Austrian Government, ICRC, and Newsday.)

1534. Location: Omarska is a predominantly Serbian village in the Prijedor region. The Omarska camp was reportedly established on the site of a former iron mine near the village of Omarska, which was surrounded by open-pit iron mines. The camp was located west of the road leading from Prijedor to Banja Luka, approximately two kilometres south of Omarska, 17 kilometres east of Prijedor, and 25 kilometres west of Banja Luka. Office buildings, halls, garages, and tunnels were reportedly used for detention purposes. The camp was said to have consisted of several large and smaller buildings formerly used by the mine.

1535. Location: Omarska is a predominantly Serbian village in the Prijedor region. The Omarska camp was reportedly established on the site of a former iron mine near the village of Omarska, which was surrounded by open-pit iron mines. The camp was located west of the road leading from Prijedor to Banja Luka, approximately two kilometres south of Omarska, 17 kilometres east of Prijedor, and 25 kilometres west of Banja Luka. Office buildings, halls, garages, and tunnels were reportedly used for detention purposes. The camp was said to have consisted of several large and smaller buildings formerly used by the mine.

1536. Description of the Omarska Camp: Reports vary regarding a physical description of the Omarska camp's facilities, including the number, size, location and use of buildings at the camp. The following descriptions are representative of accounts which appear in the reports reviewed.

1537. One subject who was a prisoner at the Omarska camp and had reportedly worked at the iron ore mine as a young man, described the camp as being comprised of four buildings: two large buildings each of two floors, approximately 60 metres by 30 metres in size; and two smaller buildings each about 12 metres by six metres in size. The camp's structures were reportedly surrounded by fences two metres by two metres high, enclosing an area of about 1,000 metres by 600 metres.

1538. Reports indicate that a large two-story building was used for the camp's headquarters, a prisoner holding area, a prisoner mess hall, and food storage. The subject who worked at the Omarska mine as a young man described this building as being approximately 50 by 30 metres in size. Management and administrative office space had formerly been located on the top floor and worker feeding and changing facilities on the ground floor. The ground floor was reportedly divided into sections, comprising a large kitchen, a changing area for the former mine workers, toilets, and an internal garage 5.5 by 5.5 metres square. There was also an area marked "Garderoba" which was formerly the ore miners' changing room, and a small glass-walled or partitioned room in the centre of the ground floor. The top floor was reportedly divided into eight rooms.

1539. Other reports reviewed commonly refer to the above structure as the
"administration" building, which was described as a glass and brick structure. 2346/ According to one report, the building had a wing which was a kitchen and another larger two-story section. The ground floor of that section contained vehicle garages and an approximately 30 by 30 metre room in which an estimated 800 prisoners were kept. 2347/ The second floor of the building reportedly contained eight interrogation rooms. 2348/

1540. Reports indicate a second two-story building at the camp, located next to the administration building. 2349/ The subject who had worked at the Omarska mine, described this structure as containing a large hangar on the ground floor, approximately 60 by 30 metres in size, which had previously been used for the storage of four very large, wheeled excavation trucks used in the mine. The top floor of the building reportedly contained office space. According to the subject, the southern end of the ground floor of this building was closed off by a wire fence and was about 150 square metres in size. The northern end of the hangar was said to be similarly fenced-off. The top floor of the building in the south-west corner reportedly contained a 40 square metre room. 2350/

1541. Other reports reviewed commonly refer to a large garage or "hangar-like" building where a great deal of torture took place. 2351/ The reports also describe the hangar-like structure's first floor which contained former vehicle workshops and the second floor, which contained an office and four rooms numbered 26, 15, 24, and 23. 2352/

1542. The third structure at the Omarska camp was referred to as the "red house" and was located across from the main camp building. 2353/ The structure was described as being some distance from the main structures, and it was reported that prisoners did not return alive once they entered the building. 2354/ The subject who had worked at the Omarska mine described this structure as approximately six by seven metres square in size. The structure was also reportedly called the Klaonica (abattoir or slaughterhouse) by the inmates and had previously been used to store the mine's fire fighting equipment. 2355/

1543. The fourth structure, a one-story, 12 metres by six metres building known as the "white house" was reported as being located across from the main camp building. 2356/ It was also reported that the "white house" contained four rooms and a bathroom. 2357/ Two of the rooms were said to house prisoners who were professionals and intellectuals, one room was reportedly for prisoners who had been injured during beatings, and the fourth room reportedly housed prisoners who had possessed weapons and those who were to be exchanged. 2358/ This structure, was reportedly located some distance from the main facilities and was said to be used to torture and kill prisoners over long periods of time. 2359/ The subject who had worked at the Omarska mine similarly described the structure known as the Bijela Kuća ("white house") which was located to the centre-left (west) of the two main structures. He stated that the building was divided into four rooms and contained a central corridor. 2360/

1544. Reports also describe a tarmac area outside the main structures which was used as an open-air detention area, where large groups of men were forced to lie on their stomachs throughout the day. 2361/

1545. Reports conflict as to whether the Omarska camp was surrounded by a fence or barbed wire. One subject reported that the camp was surrounded by fences two metres high, topped with barbed wire. 2362/ It was similarly reported that a two-metres-high barbed wire fence with machine-gun emplacements at unspecified intervals surrounded the entire camp. 2363/
1546. One ex-prisoner who arrived at the camp during the first week of June 1992, stated that at that point the Omarska camp had not yet been built up. He stated that no fencing had been constructed. Another subject reported that there were no defined camp perimeters, no barbed wire, watch towers, or any such installations normally associated with prison camps.

1547. Number of Prisoners: It was generally reported that the camp held between 3,000 and 4,000 men. Reports also indicated that between 33 and 38 women were held at the camp.

1548. One female prisoner reported that the women at the camp were tasked with kitchen work and were in a position to know how many prisoners were being fed at the camp. According to the prisoner, the women drew lines on paper for every group of thirty men who were brought in to eat. She stated that on 14 June 1992, they counted 2,736 men and 33 women.

1549. There were reports which estimated that the Omarska camp contained a greater number of prisoners. Those estimates which varied greatly in number, included: 4,000 to 5,000; 5,000 to 6,000; 6,000 to 7,000; 8,000; and 11,000 prisoners. Other reports estimated the total number of women held at Omarska at 58; between 50 and 70; and approximately 300.

1550. Sex and Age of the Prisoners: According to reports, men from approximately 16-60 years of age were held at the Omarska camp. The camp was also reported to hold some boys, well under the age of 18. The camp also held women, most of them belonging to the intellectual upper class: judges, teachers, engineers.

1551. Ethnicity of Prisoners: Reports generally described the Omarska prisoner population as consisting mainly of Bosnian Muslim and some Croat prisoners.

1552. Status of Prisoners: The prisoner population at Omarska has been referred to as the political and cultural elite of the city of Prijedor. Reports indicate that after Bosnian Serb forces came to power in Prijedor, in the spring of 1992, gradually, the Muslim and Croat upper class were taken to the Omarska camp, including: doctors, high government officials, and businessmen.

1553. The reports also indicate that at least some of the detainees at Omarska took up arms and fought the Bosnian Serb forces which attacked their towns and villages. It was also indicated that the camp was a place where the Bosnian Serb authorities, with the backing of the army, had taken thousands of Bosnian Muslims to be killed.

1554. Categories of Prisoners: According to Helsinki Watch, Serbian military officials in Banja Luka acknowledged that prisoners were divided into three categories. The first category reportedly included leaders of the predominantly Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and those "who organized the rebellion against the Serbs". The second category reportedly included Muslim combatants. Both categories of prisoners were reportedly interrogated at the Omarska camp and subsequently transferred to the Manja’a camp. The third category of prisoners reportedly included "those who could not be found guilty". Those prisoners were reportedly held at the Trnopolje camp and included women and children, who were interned with other non-Serbs who had sought refuge from actual or potential Serbian attacks on their villages.

1555. Other reports describe the categorization of Omarska's prisoner
population. One subject reported that inmates at Omarska were divided into three distinct categories: Muslim politicians, who were all shot; those who had either possessed or confessed to having had weapons; and professionals. 2385/

1556. Another subject reported that camp authorities prepared lists of three categories of prisoners, but that it was unclear how those lists were divided. He stated that Category 1 prisoners may have been active-duty military people and intellectuals who were reportedly killed. Category 2 reportedly consisted of about 1,700 prisoners, including the subject, who were sent to the Manjača camp. People in Category 3 were reportedly sent to the Trnopolje camp. According to the subject, the prisoner transfer to Manjača in early August began with a guard reading off a list of prisoner names and, once at Manjača, the commander there would not allow prisoners off the buses until names were available and a roll call could be made. 2386/

1557. In late July 1992, Omarska's guards reportedly began a census of camp inmates. Lists of names were reportedly read out, frequently including names of those who had died, and prisoners were placed in 3 categories: (1) those who fought against the Serbs; (2) those in some way connected with (1); and (3) those who had a "clean sheet". Subject stated that Categories 1 and 2 were sent to the Manjača camp while those in Category 3 were sent to Trnopolje and subsequently released. The subject stated that at the time, there were only a few prisoners left who were in Category 1, since most had already been killed at the camp. 2387/

1558. Organization and Treatment of Female Prisoners: Women at the Omarska camp were reportedly housed on one end of the second floor of the administration building which also contained the camp commander's office 2388/ Other reports confirm that the camp's female prisoners slept in rooms in the administration building. 2389/ The women reportedly slept in two rooms, 2390/ numbered 102 and 103. 2391/ It was reported that those rooms were where the daily interrogations of male prisoners were held. 2392/ It was also reported that female prisoners had special access to the camp command and administrators because they were confined near the camp offices next to the interrogation rooms. 2393/

1559. Many of the women who were detained at Omarska were said to be prominent professionals, including a judge from Prijedor County, a Deputy District Attorney, a County Court Judge, and a member of the Party for Democratic Action Council. 2394/ The women held at the camp reportedly slept on the floor with one blanket for every two women. 2395/ As the women tried to sleep they reportedly heard the screams of prisoners being tortured next door in the interrogation room. 2396/

1560. The women were reportedly woken up at six in the morning and two of them were randomly chosen to clean the interrogation rooms which were covered with blood each morning. 2397/ The women were also reported to have cleaned the commanders' offices on occasion. 2398/

1561. It was reported that women at the camp were also forced to work in the kitchen. 2399/ According to one report, each day the women would see over a hundred new detainees arrive, while the same number vanished. 2400/ After completing their daily kitchen duty, the women reportedly returned to their rooms at night. 2401/

1562. There are reports that the female prisoners at the camp were raped. 2402/It was reported that male prisoners held in rooms below the women's rooms could often hear cries, shouts, and loud weeping from the female prisoners. 2403/
1563. One male subject stated that the women at the camp were raped nightly by Serb guards and others coming to the camp for that purpose. He added that one Muslim woman was forced to perform oral sex with other prisoners, and that prisoners were also forced to perform sex with her. When they refused she was beaten. 2404

1564. Women held at Omarska stated that the camp commander would organize the rape and abuse of women at the camp. They stated that he would rape individual women himself, and organize an audience for the others. 2405/ One woman stated that at night they were taken out one by one. She stated that she was taken out four nights running and that the women were exposed to physical, mental, and sexual violence. She stated: "Every guard would pick a woman he was going to abuse. I had the bad luck to be chosen by the head of security at the camp, [name deleted]." 2406/

1565. One woman reported that on 15 June 1992, she and other female prisoners were returned from the "restaurant" to Room 102 at 7:00 p.m. (where they were assigned) and discovered that the room was covered with more blood than before and broken clubs and needles. At about 9:30 p.m. the women in Room 102 reportedly heard shouts in the hallway, calling for two prominent male Croatian Democratic Union Prijedor County officials, and the sounds of beatings. The door to Room 102 was then reportedly opened and a guard grabbed one of the women into the next room. One of the male Croat officials was reportedly laying on the floor in the next room, bleeding about the face. Guards then reportedly beat the woman with the butts of their weapons, mostly on her back, breaking her ribs and injuring her thorax. After she fell, the guards reportedly resumed beating the male prisoner. The woman then reportedly fainted, came to and saw the male official unconscious, was beaten again, fainted, and regained consciousness in the early morning and saw the male official being dragged out of the room by his feet. The woman was reportedly warned by identified perpetrators that she should not tell anyone about the incident. At approximately 6:30 a.m. on 16 June 1992, the woman was reportedly returned to Room 102. Two weeks later the same woman was reportedly called into the camp commander's office and told to be smart and obedient, that a decision was still pending on her future, and that her name was on a list of persons to be interrogated. She was then reportedly ordered to make coffee and thereafter was reportedly dragged into a bathroom, pistol whipped, beaten and raped by an identified officer, and subsequently brought back to the commander's office to finish making coffee. It was reported that this procedure was repeated for three more nights. On the fifth night, the commander asked her if she had ever been mistreated, and out of fear she said nothing. 2407/

1566. One woman, however, stated that she knew of no rapes or extreme beatings of the women at Omarska, although she reported that they were terrorized and used as forced labour. 2408/

1567. Another female prisoner stated that in the beginning, the killing of the prisoner population would be hidden from the women and that bodies would be deposited far away. She stated, however, that at the beginning of July, prisoners were killed before their eyes. 2409/

1568. One male subject reported that it was commonly known among prisoners that at least two identified women at the camp were killed. 2410/

1569. Dates of Operation-Camp Opening: Reports indicate that the Omarska mine was converted into a detention camp in late May 1992. 2411/

1570. Origin and Movement of Prisoners: The following is a summary of reports which indicate the dates of transfers and the points of origin of Omarska's
prisoner population.

1571. Kozarac-Brezićani-Late May-Early June 1992: Reports indicate that on approximately 27 May 1992, following a two-day attack on Kozarac by Serb forces, Muslim survivors from the city were transported to the Omarska and Trnopolje camps. One report stated that after the capture of Kozarac by former JNA troops on 25-26 May 1992, the city's Muslim inhabitants were ordered to report to the city centre, and those in possession of weapons were ordered to turn them in. After reporting to the city centre, the Muslim women were reportedly separated from the men and taken by buses to Trnopolje. The men were then reportedly transported to "Brezićani", where they were beaten, kept overnight, and then moved to the Omarska camp. Other reports describe the transfer of men from Kozarac to Omarska and to Omarska via Brezićani in late May.

1572. Keraterm Camp, May-June-July-August 1992: It was reported that following shelling of the village, Serb forces rounded up 200 male inhabitants men from Kozaruša and transported them in buses to the Keraterm camp for two days. According to the reports, on or about 23 May 1992, the Serbs emptied Keraterm and bused about 300 captives to Omarska.

1573. One subject reported that on 27 May 1992, at 10:00 p.m., Keraterm prisoners were ordered out of their cells and onto buses which had previously arrived at the camp. (There were reportedly 17 empty and six full buses) The subject stated that he heard that the prisoners in the occupied buses had been detained at the Brezićani school. At approximately midnight, the buses reportedly departed from the Keraterm camp and later arrived at the Omarska camp. The subject estimated that on that day, a total of 2,000 prisoners were brought to Omarska, 90 per cent of whom were Croat and Muslim civilians, and the remainder of whom were members of the regular and reserve police in Prijedor, and were of Croatian and Muslim nationality. Another subject who had been taken to Keraterm from his village on approximately 25 May 1992, stated that on 27 May 1992, he and dozens of other prisoners (including his son), were transferred to Omarska. It was reported that prisoners were severely beaten during the transfer of prisoners from Keraterm to Omarska.

1574. Another subject who had been transported from his village Kozaruša to the Keraterm camp on approximately 24 May 1992, was reportedly interrogated several times, and was then taken to the Omarska camp on 28 May. According to the report, the Keraterm prisoners were taken in crowded and deliberately overheated buses to the Omarska camp.

1575. One subject stated that after hiding in the woods with several groups after the attack on Kozarac, he and others gave themselves up to Bosnian Serb forces and thereafter were taken by bus to the Keraterm camp. He stated that 120 people spent two nights on a bus parked at the camp gate without fresh air or water and after being abused, spent two nights at the Keraterm camp. On the third day, subject and many other men were called out at 1:00 a.m., told to keep their heads down, and were driven to the Omarska camp. Another subject who was involved in the armed resistance of Kozarac, stated that on approximately 29-30 May 1992, he and his "friends" were captured by Serb forces in the nearby woods while sleeping. He stated they were taken to the Keraterm camp for the first night and were transported in a police wagon to the Omarska camp the next day. The subject stated that on the way to Omarska, they passed through Kozarac where an elderly Serbian man was allowed to beat the young prisoners with a stick.

1576. One subject from Kozarac stated that on 4 June 1992, he was taken to the Keraterm camp, and that on 6 June he was transported to the Omarska camp, and
along with 20 other prisoners, was beaten severely. 2423/

1577. One subject priest stated that he was taken on 16 June 1992, to Keraterm and the next day transferred to Omarska. 2424/

1578. One subject reported that he was transferred to Omarska from Keraterm on approximately 5 July 1992. 2425/ Another subject stated that on 9 July 1992, 30 men, most of whom were Croa[t], were transferred by bus to Omarska. 2426/

1579. One subject stated that the night before he was transferred from Omarska to Manja[ća on approximately 4 August 1992, a new group of about 70 prisoners were brought from Keraterm and put into the "white house". He claimed that this was done in order that the ICRC would not see the prisoners who had been more severely abused. 2427/

1580. Prijedor-June-July 1992: It was reported that on 3 June 1992, three large buses carrying Muslim and Croatian male prisoners left the main police station in Prijedor and transported prisoners to Omarska. 2428/

1581. One female attorney reported that on 14 June 1992, she was arrested by armed Serbian police officers, taken to the Prijedor police station, and told to wait in a small, blood-spattered room. She stated that another Prijedor lawyer, a member of the Croatian Democratic Union and two unidentified males were also detained in the room. At about 5:30 p.m. they were driven by auto along back roads to Omarska. They were at one point confronted by paramilitary troops and were taken to the Omarska camp. She stated that upon their arrival at Omarska, the prisoners were pushed out of the vehicle by men in "etnik" and JNA uniforms. 2429/

1582. A subject from Briševo stated that after Prijedor fell on 30 June, he and approximately 20 other men were arrested, taken to the local police station, and then to Omarska. 2430/

1583. One subject reported that he was arrested for the second time in Prijedor and was transported to the Prijedor police station where he was 'slapped about' by two unknown policemen. After two days, on 6 July 1992, the subject was reportedly transported to the Keraterm camp. He stated that he remained at Keraterm for only five hours before being taken by police car to the Omarska camp. 2431/

1584. A subject from Rizvanovići, near Prijedor, stated that on 21 July 1992, the Serbian army surrounded all of the villages in the area and took all of the adult males prisoner. The men were subsequently marched out, abused, and an hour later, one-half of them were transported by bus to the Keraterm camp which was full. The prisoners were then driven 30 minutes to the Omarska camp which was also full, and they were thereafter transported to the Trnopolje camp. At Trnopolje, the subject was reportedly abused by a guard during his intake, and after one night, he was thereafter transferred to the "Serbian police headquarters" in Prijedor where he was questioned for five hours. 2432/ The subject was thereafter transported to the Omarska camp with an unknown number of other prisoners. 2433/

1585. Kevljani (via Prijedor and Keraterm)-Late May 1992: Reports indicate that on approximately 26 May 1992, Kevljani was attacked by Serb forces, and the villagers fled to the woods, but after spending the night under heavy shelling, then surrendered to a Serbian officer 2434/ and other identified individuals. The Croatian and Muslim villagers were taken by bus to Prijedor where the women and children were taken to the youth centre. At 4:00 p.m. the men were taken in 24 buses to the Keraterm factory at the edge of the town. Keraterm, however, was full and the convoy proceeded in a round-about way
through Tomašica to the Omarska Camp where they arrived at 11:00 p.m. 2435/ Another subject repeats essentially the same fact scenario, stating, however, that 400 of the villagers fled to a nearby river bank to escape the attack and that those men who came to the village school to surrender were beaten by Serb fighters and subsequently taken to the Omarska camp. 2436/ Other reports indicate that the transfer of persons from the village of Kevljani to the Omarska camp occurred at the end of May 1992. 2437/

1586. Donji Garevci-Late May 1992: According to one report, at the end of May 1992, Serbian irregular soldiers entered the village of Donji Garevci (six kilometres from Prijedor) and rounded up all of the Bosnian Muslim men for incarceration. The irregulars reportedly told the men that they were going to march to a camp at Trnopolje. They allegedly forced the men to sing patriotic Serbian songs and beat those who refused. Eventually the group reached Trnopolje where they were immediately put on buses and driven to the Omarska camp. En route, uncooperative prisoners were beaten. Upon arrival at Omarska, they found that the camp was "full", and the group was put back on buses and finally off-loaded at the Keraterm camp. 2438/

1587. Gornja Puharska-May-June 1992: It was reported that Gornja Puharska had a population of about 300 Muslim families and six Croat families. On 27 May 1992, JNA forces reportedly surrounded and besieged the village and on about 29 May 1992, Serbian "Red Berets" reportedly entered the village with tanks accompanied by non-uniformed irregular forces. The village's defenders reportedly surrendered, and on 1 June 1992, all of the men were reportedly taken prisoner and transported 23 kilometres south-east to Omarska on two buses and one large cattle truck. 2439/

1588. One subject reported that on 29 May 1992, the people of Gornja Puharska put white flags outside their homes to indicate their surrender. He said that the next day, on 30 May, four to five tanks and 500 soldiers came into the town and rounded up all of the men of military age (about 250 in total). The town's men were reportedly walked to the local mosque and abused. The subject stated that political leaders, policemen, and educated persons were immediately identified and put separately on a bus, along with former soldiers. The subject stated that in total, three buses transported a total of approximately 250 men to the Omarska camp. 2440/

1589. Ljubija-Early June-July 1992: On 10 June 1992, in the village of Kalajevo (approximately three kilometres north-east of Ljubija), "armed Serbs" in uniform reportedly arrested a man and drove in a lorry to the "Rudar" stadium in Ljubija where he was held in a locker room with another six prisoners. He stated that after being held in Ljubija for five days he was transferred to the Omarska camp. 2441/

1590. Another subject stated that he was arrested on 10 July 1992, in his father's yard and taken with two others inside a moving van to the police station in Ljubija where he was held with 15 other men. The men were reportedly interrogated by named individuals and were then taken away in the moving van to the Omarska camp. 2442/

1591. Matrići-4 July 1992: One subject reported that on 4 July 1992, he was arrested in Matrići and subsequently taken to the Omarska camp. 2443/

1592. Bišanji-July 1992: One subject reported that on approximately 20 July 1992, Muslim males were taken by Bosnian Serb forces to Omarska from the village of Bišanji. However, it was also reported that after arriving at Omarska, the convoy left for Trnopolje after those in charge of transportation were told that no more prisoners would be accepted at Omarska. 2444/
1593. It was reported that on 24 and 25 July 1992, approximately 300 civilians from the villages of Bišani, Rizvanovići, Rakovani, Hambarine, Čarakovo, and Zecovi were brought in at around 4:00 p.m. and severely beaten. 2445/

1594. Rizvanovići-July 1992: One subject stated that on 20 July 1992, he was taken to the Omarska camp from Rizvanovići. 2446/

1595. Donja Puharska-July 1992: On 13 July 1992, all of the Muslim men who remained in Donja Puharska were reportedly arrested and taken to the Omarska camp. According to one subject, he and at least eight other Muslim men were summoned to the local police station to make a declaration of loyalty and to volunteer for work. The men were reportedly beaten by soldiers, locked in a cell, and later transported to Omarska. 2447/

1596. Transfer of Prisoners-Camp Closing: One subject reported that on approximately 30 May 1992, a group of 168 prisoners were selected for a "prisoner exchange". 2448/

1597. One subject reported that on 3 June 1992, three buses filled with older prisoners were transported from Omarska to the Trnopolje camp. 2449/ Another subject reported that on 3 June 1992, at 7:00 p.m., two buses were brought into the Omarska camp and loaded with 120 prisoners. The prisoners were reportedly told that the first bus was going to Kozarac and the second to Prijedor, but both buses reportedly went to the Trnopolje Camp. 2450/

1598. It was reported that on 25 June 1992, approximately 100 prisoners were transferred to the Trnopolje camp. These prisoners were reportedly called by name and included many weak individuals. 2451/

1599. One subject reported that in early July, 200 prisoners, all of whom were considered by the Serbs to have been "important", were taken away from the Omarska camp on a supposed prisoner exchange. Subject stated that none of the prisoners had been seen or heard from since. Other sources reportedly believed that those prisoners were killed. 2452/

1600. It was also reported that in mid-July 1992, camp authorities transferred 30 elderly and infirm patients to the Trnopolje camp. 2453/

1601. Reports indicate that the Omarska camp was closed at the end of August 1992. The closing was attributed to the attention drawn there by the media and the international community. 2454/ The detainees were, however, not released but transferred to other camps such as Trnopolje and Manjača. 2455/

1602. Manjača-Early August 1992: According to most reports, on approximately 6-8 August 1992, a mass-transfer of Omarska's prisoners took place when buses arrived to transport prisoners to the Manjača camp. 2456/ Each of the buses was reportedly crammed with prisoners, with the heat on and the windows sealed shut. The reports of this transfer included accounts where prisoners were abused and killed en route and upon arrival at the Manjača camp: 2457/

1603. Trnopolje-Early August 1992: Subjects reported a mass transfer of prisoners to the Trnopolje camp. One subject stated that 1,000 prisoners were transferred to the Trnopolje camp while 1,300 were transported to Manjača. 2458/ According to one subject, on 6 August, approximately 1,200 inmates of the second category (those who had possessed or confessed to having possessed weapons), were transferred by bus to the Manjača camp and at the same time, 700 prisoners of the third category (professionals) were sent to the Trnopolje camp. The subject was reportedly transferred to Trnopolje. He added that guards killed inmates at random during both of these transfers 2459/ Other reports describe what appears to be the same transfer. 2460/
1604. It was reported that on 3 August 1992, the women at Omarska were transferred to the Trnopolje camp. 2461/ One female prisoner stated that on 3 August 1992, 29 of the camp's 33 women were told to hurry and gather their things and were then taken outside and put onto buses for transfer to Trnopolje. 2462/ A similar report stated that before the camp was closed, 33 of the camp's female prisoners were taken to the Trnopolje camp, while 5 others were left at Omarska. 2463/ Other reports describe what appears to be the same transfer. 2464/

1605. Manjača-Late August 1992: It was reported that while prisoners were transferred to the Manjača camp in early August, approximately 180 prisoners remained at Omarska for another 15 days, after which they joined the others at Manjača. According to one report, the men who remained at Omarska were moved to a room near the kitchen where they were provided with beds and bedding and were given two meals a day of so much food that they could not eat it all. These prisoners reportedly had to clean up the "white house" and the area around it and paint the building white in preparation for a visit by the Red Cross and television crews. According to the subject, some women at the camp were kept out of sight when the Red Cross and the television crew came, but were returned to Omarska after the visit. 2465/

1606. One subject similarly reported that in early August, the Omarska guards became unsettled and moved men from room to room. The subject stated that he and 183 other men were transferred to a garage about 25 metres square, and after three days, 88 of them, including the subject, were taken to the "white house". The subject stated that on 6 August 1992, mass transfers to Manjača and Trnopolje took place, but that 184 men singled out before were left at the Omarska camp. Those prisoners were reportedly led to a large room where they had to assemble and make army beds. Subject stated that he was led away to a nearby room, beaten severely, and made to eat a cockroach. The subject believed that he was the last man severely beaten at the Omarska camp. The subject added that although the prisoners had made 120 beds, they were not allowed to sleep on them, but had to sleep of the floor of the hallway in that building. 2466/

1607. One report stated that of the 179 prisoners left at the Omarska camp, five were women. 2467/ One woman stated that she was among the last five women (out of 38) to leave the camp several days after Omarska was emptied of its last male prisoners. 2468/

1608. It was reported that on 21 August 1992, camp authorities roll-called 172 prisoners who were taken to the Manjača camp. Seven other prisoners, some of whom were women, were reportedly taken to an unknown destination. 2469/ Other reports confirm that the remaining prisoners held at Omarska were transferred to the Manjača camp. 2470/

1609. Visits to Omarska by Outside Organizations and Individuals: It was reported that in early August, a group of journalists arrived at the camp, but that camp officials did not allow them directly inside. One subject stated that the Omarska camp authorities prepared a group of 10-15 prisoners to talk with them. The prisoners were given some bread and were ordered to tell the reporters that conditions at the camp were good and that Omarska was not a concentration camp, but a reception centre. According to the subject, about three days after the visit, prisoners began to be dispersed to other camps. 2471/ Other reports described the process by which Omarska was prepared for the journalists' visits. Almost all of the female prisoners were reportedly transferred, the corpses on the lawn disappeared, and so did the prisoners marked by torture. 2472/ One subject reported that he remained at Omarska to take part in a clean-up of the camp while most of the other prisoners were transferred to the Manjača camp. The subject stated that there had been blood
everywhere, and that marks of shooting on internal walls were covered with cupboards. The subject also reported that those involved in the clean up were told to tell journalists that nobody stayed in the camp for more than a day, and that Omarska was only a transit centre. He added that beds arrived the day before a visit from journalists but that prisoners were not allowed to use them. 2473/ Other reports contain similar descriptions of the events during this time period. 2474/

1610. It was reported that before the first journalists arrived at Omarska, about 200 men in one sleeping room were moved to another room already at overcapacity. The prisoners were then told to remain quiet and to keep their heads below the window. According to the report, there was only enough room for the men to sit with their knees against their chests. The other room was reportedly cleaned and 30 new prisoners from the Keraterm camp were reportedly put there and shown to reporters. 2475/

1611. On the 5th or 6th of August 1992, Independent Television News (ITN) reporters Penny Marshall and Ian Williams visited the Omarska and Trnopolje camps. 2476/ In their report they visited the camp and were shown only several hundred of the camp's prisoners, all Muslim men. ITN was reportedly told by authorities that those men were there to be interrogated. The authorities stated further that those men found guilty of fighting Serbs were sent to prisoner of war camps, and the innocents, to refugee camps. Reporter Marshall spoke to a woman identified as Nada Balaban, 2477/ the camp's administrator, who stated, "No, this is not a camp, this is a centre, a transit centre, Omarska and Trnopolje, both centres, not camps." When Marshall asked to see the prisoners' living accommodations, 2478/ the request was denied by Ms. Balaban. 2479/ When Marshall visited Omarska's cafeteria, she commented that the prisoners were silent and that the only voices heard where those of guards ordering the men to eat faster and leave. When a prisoner was asked by Marshall how he was treated, he reportedly responded, "I don't want to tell lies. I can't speak the truth. Thank you for coming." Marshall reported that ITN was told that the army did not control the Omarska camp and that its prisoners were the responsibility of the civil authorities and the local militia.

1612. Helsinki Watch reported that after the ITN television crew filmed the Omarska camp, the Serbian military began taking journalists and others on arranged tours of the camps in the area. The military reportedly drove the journalists from Banja Luka to Trnopolje and three other camps in the area: Omarska, Keraterm, and Manjaća. Helsinki Watch reportedly visited the four camps in August 1992, and saw that they had recently been painted and cleaned. Most of the prisoners were reportedly terrified and refused to speak to the visitors. One prisoner, however, reportedly stated: "Don't believe what you see. They have made this place into a tourist attraction." 2480/

1613. One press report described the observations made by journalists who visited the Omarska camp: "Western journalists arrived at Omarska this week, only 175 men were still there. Crude attempts had been made to clean up the camp. Bunk beds were lined up in a room in which inmates said as many as 1,300 men had slept before." 2481/

1614. The ICRC was reported to have first visited the Omarska camp on 12 August 1992. 2482/ It was reported that due to the mass-transfer of prisoners to the Manjaća and Trnopolje camps in early August, the ICRC was able to register only 173 prisoners during its visit. 2483/ One subject reported that on 12 August 1992, international journalists arrived at Omarska and that camp authorities told them that the prisoners there had been held for two or three weeks for interrogation. The journalists had reportedly brought ICRC registration cards and registered all of the prisoners. The subject stated
that the reporters told them that they were now citizens of the United Nations. 2484/

1615. One subject reported that on 15 August 1992, the ICRC registered only male prisoners because camp authorities had hidden female prisoners from the ICRC representatives. 2485/

1616. Link Between the Omarska Camp and the Authorities in Prijedor and Banja Luka: Milomir Stakić, the man identified as the mayor of Prijedor after Muhamed ehajić was removed, reportedly acknowledged the link between civil authorities in Prijedor and the Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje camps. Stakić stated in a translated statement that "[T]hose places like Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje were the necessity of the moment and were formed on decision of the Prijedor civil authorities." With regard to the issue of beatings at the camps, Stakić reportedly stated, "According to the information there was no mistreatment and physical violence in the centres themselves." Specifically addressing reports that persons had been killed at Omarska, Stakić said, "There were cases as the commander let me know—natural deaths with the medical documentation of death, not murder." Stakić stated that he did not know how many persons had died, but that there were "not many". 2486/

1617. Milan Kovačević, the Prijedor city manager in Prijedor, reportedly stated that the Omarska camp was an investigative facility set up "to see who did what during the war, to find the guilty one, and to establish the innocent so that they didn't bear the consequences". He reportedly said that the camp was closed when the investigation was completed. 2487/

1618. A man identified as "Drljača", who reportedly became the Prijedor police chief when Serb forces took power, reportedly stated that 3,334 persons were arrested on suspicion of resisting or plotting against the new authorities and were taken to Omarska. He reportedly insisted that no one had been killed at Omarska, and that only two prisoners died between 25 May and mid-August, both of "natural causes". He also stated that another 49 had "disappeared", including the lord mayor of Prijedor, Muhamed ehajić, and were presumed dead. He stated that detainees were interrogated for four days and shipped out. He said that 800 detainees who were alleged to have "organized the whole thing", among them "rich Muslims who financed" the Muslim SDA political party, were taken to Manjača, which was operated by the Bosnian Serb army as a prisoner-of-war camp, to await criminal trial. Taken with them were 600 people who reputedly commanded units of the Muslim and Croat resistance. The remaining 1,999 were found innocent and taken immediately to Trnopolje, which officials said was a transit camp, Drljača reportedly said. 2488/

1619. Reports indicate that the civilian and police authorities of Prijedor administered the Omarska camp. Helsinki Watch reported that during its visit to the camp in August 1992, Serbian authorities acknowledged that approximately 3,500 persons had entered and left the camp. The authorities referred to the camp as an "interrogation centre". The camp authorities claimed that, although the "centre" was guarded by soldiers of the "Army of the Serbian Republic", prisoners were interrogated by the local police. 2489/

1620. One news report contains a photograph of the camp's alleged administrator, Nada Balaban, who was pictured with a man identified as the Prijedor chief of police. 2490/ Another report contains the same photograph of the same two individuals, with the man who was said to be the chief commander of all camps in the region. 2491/

1621. One subject reported that in early July 1992, two prominent Serbian politicians from the Banja Luka council visited the camp. He said that a man who he identified as Vojo Kuprešanin and his deputy by the last name of
Glamocanin, arrived in a limousine escorted by a blue colored APC. 1622. One subject reported that in mid-July 1992, the prime minister of the Serbian Republic, identified as Brdjanin, came to Omarska that the prisoners were paraded before him and made to sing a Serbian national song and do the three-finger salute. Brdjanin reportedly arrived in luxury car which was followed by helicopters. 1623. One woman who was held at the camp characterized the guards as uneducated persons from the hills around Omarska. She stated that everything was done on orders from the Prijedor police. She stated that they got their orders directly from Prijedor. She added that most of the inspectors at the camp came from Prijedor and that she knew them personally. 1624. One former prisoner stated that the strategy at Omarska was to beat prisoners who were considered privileged. He added that there was a camp priority for execution, which was: a) To execute those Muslims with party affiliations when the parties did not include Serbs; b) to execute those Muslims who had been caught in battle or had been arrested in possession of guns; c) to execute civilians; and d) random killings. He stated that at Omarska, legal cases were opened up against prisoners. One such case reportedly involved 35 Muslims and Croats from Prijedor. The subject stated that all 35 were found guilty of unknown charges and were forced to sign statements admitting their guilt and accepting their fate. Those papers were then reportedly filed away, and the individuals were executed. 1625. Two reports from Prijedor lawyers who were held at Omarska also alleged that a "court" was used to legitimize the executions at the Omarska camp. The subjects identified and implicated a Serbian judge and a lawyer who reportedly headed the "court". The subjects also identified and implicated two other men who were involved in the "court", the chief prosecutor and his deputy. One subject stated that court also consisted of a lawyer and a secretary. One subject stated that on the days that the judge came to Omarska, liquidations and executions began. He commented that the judge and the other man heading the court, came to Omarska to sign "death warrants". 1626. According to one report from a prisoner who was a lawyer from Prijedor, the "war court" members came to Omarska to oversee findings of the MUP inspectors on an irregular basis. The subject reported that the Prijedor MUP inspectors handled most of the interrogations at the camp; however, on occasion, either inspectors from Banja Luka or the army reportedly came to conduct interrogations on unidentified important cases. The subject identified the alleged Prijedor MUP inspectors and staff. 1627. One subject reported information on the organization of the Prijedor Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), including the organizational relationship to the camps (including Omarska) and the police. The Prijedor MUP reportedly fell under the control of the Banja Luka MUP. However, parallel with the Prijedor and Banja Luka MUPs were their respective Emergency Operation Centres. Under the Prijedor MUP's control was reportedly the Prijedor Civilian Police, the Omarska Civilian Police, the Omarska Camp, the Trnopolje camp, the Keraterm camp, the "war courts", and the MUP inspectors. The subject stated that the Prijedor Chief of Police was a member of the MUP and possibly its director. 1628. According to one report, permission to enter the Omarska camp in early August was granted by local police officials and not by the military
authorities. It was reported that the camp was run by a mix of militias and that no one group seemed to be in charge. Some of the most extreme of the local Serb population was said to be at Omarska.

1629. Intake Procedures: It was reported that upon arrival at Omarska, prisoners were forced to run through lines of soldiers, during which time they were beaten and abused. A youth from Kozarac, who was reportedly taken to the camp one evening at the end of June 1992, described how he and other prisoners with him had to pass through two lines of soldiers who formed a passage between the bus and the shed into which they were first taken. He said that they were beaten with rifle butts, truncheons and a whip as they ran the distance of about 10 metres between the bus and the shed. Another subject similarly reported that upon disembarkment from the bus, the prisoners were brought through a 30 metre "corridor" where all were seriously beaten and abused. He stated that this "ceremony" was called the "wedding party" by the prison guards and that the prisoners were forced to the ground and badly beaten, following which they were forced to sing Serbian nationalistic songs.

1630. One subject reported that after being transported to the camp on approximately 31 May 1992, he and other prisoners were made to pass through a "gauntlet" involving beatings by Serb soldiers. He stated that the garage facility in which they were going to be taken already held about 700 prisoners and that he and the others had difficulty pushing their way in. The subject stated that at least one prisoner was killed as the result of a beating by an identified guard. Another subject who was transported to the camp on 31 May 1992, described a similar scenario, whereby prisoners had to pass through a corridor and were beaten by guards with rifle butts along the way to a sleeping area.

1631. One unidentified prisoner stated: "When arriving in Omarska, we had to leave the bus. We were only allowed to look on the ground. I personally was not beaten, but those men who rose their head were beaten by the Ćetniks". Another unidentified witness stated: "When we arrived (28 May 1992) we had to walk to the tunnel through a row of soldiers who hit us with rifle butts, rubber sticks and fists".

1632. An unidentified 53 year-old ex-prisoner stated that upon his arrival at Omarska on 28 May 1992, the first and the last five men who left his bus were shot by Serbian soldiers.

1633. A subject who had been transferred to Omarska from Keraterm on 28 May 1992, stated that after getting off the bus in Omarska, the guards took out a health care provider; a school teacher; a health care provider; and a restauranteur and beat them severely. They were not seen thereafter.

1634. A subject who was brought to the Omarska camp on approximately 30 May 1992, stated that two prisoners were killed immediately upon arrival at the camp and that they were told that this was to avenge the death of a Serbian soldier who was killed in battle. It was reported that the prisoners then forced to lay on the "runway" the entire day.

1635. One subject reported that after being transferred to the camp from Kevljani in late May 1992, he and other prisoners were taken to a warehouse where trucks were repaired. He said that about 20 guards received men who emerged from the buses, and beat them. The subject reported that four of the men who observed this tried to escape, and three of them were killed with rifles.

1636. One subject reported that in early July 1992, new arrivals were
transported in and subjected to beatings with rifle butts. The subject reported that one of these prisoners were killed as a result of the beatings.

1637. Confiscation of Valuables: It was generally reported that Serb guards would force prisoners to give up all of their belongings and to sign documents giving away their property. Subjects similarly reported that upon arrival at the camp, they were battered by guards who took their money and other valuables.

1638. Upon their arrival at Omarska, prisoners were reportedly searched and beaten, and all items of value were confiscated. One former prisoner who arrived at the camp in early June 1992, reported that upon leaving the buses on which they were transported to the camp, prisoners were spread-eagled against and brick wall and searched. He noted that the wall was pock-marked with bullet holes and that the ground in front was covered with large blood stains onto which a soldier in a JNA uniform spread lime powder. Another subject stated that after arrival at the camp on 29 May 1992, he and 35 other prisoners were subjected to a thorough search by guards who took all of their possessions, including personal identity documents. The guards then reportedly registered each of them by taking their names and other personal data. The prisoners were subsequently placed in a "large hall" on the first floor of the administration building, together with 500 other prisoners. According to the subject, they received no food for four days and had to sleep on a concrete ground without any mattresses or blankets. The prisoners were reportedly interrogated three days later.

1639. One subject reported that in late May 1992, personal effects were not taken from the prisoners upon intake, although anything resembling a weapon was. The subject stated, however, that during the night, guards would steal whatever they could from the prisoners. He said that a favourite method of obtaining money was for a prisoner to be selected and told to produce a sum of money in deutsche marks in one hour. If the prisoner did not, he would be severely beaten. The subject added that in the early days other prisoners would help to raise the money, but later there was little money and many were beaten.

1640. One subject said that after arriving at the camp on 4 July 1992, he was met at the entrance by five camp guards who battered him with batons and kicked him with boots. The guards also reportedly took all of his money. He stated that he was interrogated a couple of days after his arrival at the camp.

1641. Organization of Prisoners: The following are representative accounts of where prisoners were placed, and their subsequent treatment, after their arrival at the Omarska camp.

1642. One subject who was brought to the camp from Kozarac stated that he and 160 other persons were put into a five metres by five metres room and kept there for days. He reported that they were not fed and were not allowed to use the toilet. The prisoner also reported that he was beaten by soldiers using shoes, guns, and electric cables. Another subject who was brought to the camp from Kozarac, similarly reported that they were put into five by five metre rooms and were not fed until "much later". He added that the prisoners were not allowed to go to the toilet and were forced to relieve themselves in the room.

1643. One subject who was transferred to Omarska from Brezničani stated that he and 450 other prisoners from Kevljani-Kozarac were kept in a 20 metres by 20 metres room in a truck garage where they lived for two-and-one-half months. He
stated that for eight days the prisoners were given only water, for which they were required to pay and that each day five to six prisoners were called out and beaten. He stated that on the ninth day they were given some bread and on the 10th day, they were able to go to the kitchen for their meal. 2531/

1644. One prisoner who was transferred from Keraterm to Omarska stated that prisoners arriving at Omarska were lined up chest to chest or back to back in numerous tight ranks in an open area in front of the two-story buildings. He said that they were not allowed to sit down, and whenever their ranks exceeded their captors expectations, some prisoners were taken to the side and beaten and shot. It was further reported that no prisoner was assigned quarters prior to an interrogation which took place in separate rooms on the second floor of one of the two-story buildings. He said that the interrogators asked the same questions as had been asked previously at Keraterm (regarding hidden weapons, incriminating documents, gold, and any affiliation with Muslim resistance forces), as well as additional questions regarding why Muslims had not joined in the efforts against Croats, and about the employment and property of each person. According to the report, every answer was accompanied by numerous blows from a rifle butt or iron rod. He stated that the majority of deaths among inmates were caused by injuries from rifle butt blows. He also stated that it appeared that every inmate was interrogated at least twice, and noted several inmates were suspended from an overhead crane to scare them into making confessions. 2532/

1645. One subject who was transported to Omarska from Gornja Puharska stated that upon arrival at the camp, the "special cases" were immediately separated, and most were killed shortly thereafter. He said that the new arrivals were kept on the tarmac, known as the "pista", in the open between the two large buildings. For the first four days, the prisoners reportedly received no food or water. The subject estimated that there were approximately 800 prisoners on the tarmac. During that time, the prisoners were reportedly interrogated, and after being interrogated, they would be moved to a large hangar that had been used for the repair of big dump trucks used for mining. That building reportedly had six entrances for trucks and was divided into small rooms holding 120 men each. The building reportedly held 1,500 prisoners in total. The rooms there were reportedly very hot, with walls of corrugated iron and doors of steel. Each room reportedly had one very small window. On the other side of the tarmac was more of an administrative building that held what had been a canteen. The interrogations reportedly took place on the upper floor of that building which the subject estimated held about 2,000 prisoners. All of the buildings reportedly had a steel structure. 2533/

1646. One subject stated that upon arrival at Omarska after being transferred from Keraterm in late May, approximately 500 prisoners were put in a single room for five days. 2534/ He reported further that each day they were given a one and one-half litre bottle of water to share. 2535/ Another subject stated that upon arrival at the camp he was taken along with other prisoners to a garage, where 65 persons were held. The prisoners there were frequently interrogated. 2536/

1647. An imprisoned priest stated that upon his arrival at the camp he was subjected to beatings and held in one of the rooms of the "white house". He stated that 20 prisoners, all injured and some with broken limbs were crammed into this four metres by two metres space and that they were deprived of water and forced to drink their urine. He stated that his condition was such that he remained unconscious for several days before rejoining most of the camp's general population. 2537/

1648. One subject who was transported to the camp on approximately 13 July 1992 stated that he was kept in a so-called hangar building that contained
truck repair workshops and garages on the ground floor. On 21 July 1992, he was reportedly transferred to a building identified as the "white house" where he was kept for seven days. 2538/

1649. Upon arrival, the prisoners were reportedly taken to what has been described as the two-story administrative building of the former mining company. 2539/ One prisoner stated that they were not provided with any food for four days but that water was available. He stated that Bosnian Serbs began to interrogate the prisoners on their sixth day at the camp. 2540/ Another prisoner reported that in early June 1992, he was given only water with a high rust content. 2541/

1650. One subject reported that after arrival at the camp, he and other prisoners were placed in room number 15. According to the subject, Muslim policemen and local businessmen were taken out and killed the same night and the rest of the prisoners were registered in the morning. The subject added that for the first 60 hours, the prisoners were given no food or water and had to relieve themselves in the same room. 2542/

1651. Interrogation Procedures: Reports indicate that prisoners were singled out for questioning and were subsequently tortured or killed. 2543/ According to reports, interrogations at Omarska were typically accompanied by beatings, torture, abuse, and killing. 2544/ One subject who arrived at the camp in late May 1992, stated that intellectuals and better-educated prisoners were usually interrogated several times and killed afterwards. 2545/

1652. According to one subject, every Muslim prisoner held at the camp was interrogated at least three times during his stay there. He stated that most of the abuse, beatings and torture occurred during interrogations, when the interrogator and the guards hit the prisoner with rifle butts and iron bars, kicked him with their feet, and cut and stabbed him with their knives. 2546/

1653. It was reported that the interrogations of prisoners were held on the top floor of the administration building and that a team of interrogators numbering over 16 worked a day shift from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily. Those interrogators were reportedly called "inspectors" who were assisted by two "assistants" or guards. According to the subject, the guards had a list of those selected for interrogation, and those selected were brought to the administration building and held on the ground where they were made to stand, arms outstretched with the Serb three-finger salute, and that beatings were usually administered by the guards at this point prior to the actual interrogation. Thereafter, prisoners were reportedly taken to the interrogation rooms on the top floor one at a time. The prisoners reportedly stood or sat in front of a table facing the "inspector" with two guards standing behind the prisoners. According to the report, if the inspector was not happy with a prisoner's answer, he nodded at the guards who beat the prisoner. 2547/

1654. An interrogation room was reportedly located next door to where the women in the camp slept. According to one of the women who was forced to clean the room on the mornings after beatings, the floor was often covered with fresh blood each morning. She stated that the interrogation room had three tables pushed against the walls and contained whips made from heavy cable. She also stated that the women who cleaned that room were, under threat of death, told to put back everything exactly as they had found it. 2548/

1655. Women who were held at the camp stated that the interrogators at Omarska were not professional policemen, but had held positions such as movie directors and teachers. 2549/ One of the women held at the camp estimated that 40 per cent of those killed at Omarska died during, or as a result of
interrogations. She stated that she witnessed prisoners being brought back in blankets while they had walked there under their own power. She stated that she heard screams from the investigation rooms "above the restaurant", and that the camp authorities tried to drown this out with noise and music. She added that the women were sleeping in the rooms in which the interrogations took place during the day and had that they had to wash down the room before going to sleep because it was "blood-smeared". 2550/ Another woman who was held at the camp stated that after the interrogations, the women found metal bars, heavy plastic objects, pipes with iron wires and metal balls at the end, and objects made of heavy wood. She stated that the women would return these objects to the guards. She also stated that she heard screams from the room all day and that afterward the walls, closets and floors would be covered with blood. 2551/

1656. It was reported that when one prisoner was brought in for interrogation, the interrogators had prior knowledge of his military service, knowledge of weapons, and ability to play the accordion. According to the report, the goal of interrogation was to gain information on the organization of the defence of the village, the identity of wealthy persons and the location of any valuables. 2552/

1657. It was reported that interrogations carried out at night were "unofficial" and were conducted by the guards, the motive often being one of personal revenge. In addition to the unofficial beatings by the guards, the prisoners were also reportedly subjected to beatings and killing by a group which referred to by the subject as the "night visitors". 2553/

1658. One unidentified subject reported:

"Only those were repeatedly questioned who seemed to be the suspicious in some way. When they returned, they always were seriously injured . . . Most of them were questioned and tortured until they died from their injuries." 2554/

1659. Other reports similarly describe the interrogation of prisoners accompanied by beatings, torture and killings. A priest who was held at the camp from mid-June through August 1992, stated that he was tortured to make him denounce "extremists" from his village and admit that lorries delivering food for Caritas International were transporting arms. 2555/ One unidentified witness stated: "When we were questioned, we were beaten, I was beaten with a rubber stick." 2556/

1660. A subject who arrived at the camp on 28 May 1992, stated that several interrogations centred around weapons bought on the black market. He stated that one reserve policeman and another man who had bought an automatic weapon were killed in the interrogation room. 2557/

1661. One subject reported that five soldiers would approach the prisoners and one would read the names of five prisoners. Those prisoners were then required to stand, place their hands on their heads, and march to the interrogation room which was reportedly located on the second floor of the building where the prisoners obtained their food. 2558/ The subject reported that the people who were interrogated fell into three categories: 1) those who were not mistreated during the interrogation process; 2) those who were beaten but not killed; and 3) those who were killed during interrogation or later on the same day as the interrogation was conducted. He added that in at least some cases, the interrogators sought expanded biographical information on prisoners and details on participation in anti-Serb activities 2559/

1662. Other subjects stated that sometimes the interrogations used the
pretence of gathering information, determining responsibility for acts of war. One subject stated:

"Someone was a sniper, someone a machine-gun runner, someone a grenade thrower. For everyone they had a charge, which was a good enough reason to beat up a person. If we'd really had that many snipers or fighters, Prijedor and Kozarac would never have fallen." 2560/

1663. It was reported that prisoners were usually interrogated after their arrival and after a list had been made of the new prisoners' names. 2561/

1664. One subject reported that after being transported to the camp on 28 May 1992, he and some other prisoners remained in the mess hall building for the first two days of their imprisonment. On the second day, camp officials reportedly began interrogations of the prisoners in an office on the second floor of the mess hall building. A guard reportedly led the prisoners to their interrogations one by one. According to the subject, an interrogator wearing a green army uniform without rank, was already seated behind a desk. The guard reportedly sat in a chair to the right of the prisoner and the prisoner was told to take a seat in front of the desk. The guard reportedly sat in a chair to the right of the prisoner and the prisoner was told to take a seat in front of the desk. He stated that in this case he was not mistreated during the interrogation and was offered a cigarette. He stated that he was asked his name, date of birth, name of parents, other personal information, name of siblings, his profession, name of his friends, and whether he had an official function in his village. He stated that the interrogation lasted about 30 minutes. Following the interrogation the prisoner was led to his permanent cell, located in a corner room on the ground floor of the large building which contained a high-bay vehicle work area. 2562/

1665. One subject who arrived at the camp on 30 May 1992, described the process by which prisoners were called from the "pista" into their initial interrogations. The subject stated:

"During the first four days on the tarmac, we each waited for our turn to be questioned. We saw those brought back ahead of us. Each person who was questioned came back bleeding and could hardly walk. Interrogations lasted from 15 minutes to an hour and a half, depending on who did the questioning and who was being questioned. The most unlucky were those who happened to be wearing anything with the color green, the color of the SDA (Muslim political party). If you were wearing this color, you were finished. People tried to pick off that color from their clothes so as not to be killed." 2563/

1666. One subject stated that he was taken for "examination" on 31 May 1992, a few days after arrival at the camp. He stated that he was beaten and threatened with a pistol and that his interrogators demanded him to tell them who possessed weapons and what kind of weaponry they had. 2564/

1667. One subject stated that he was brought from his detention room three days after his arrival in late May 1992, and was interrogated on the second floor of the administration building for two hours. He identified his interrogator and stated that this was his only interrogation while at the camp. He stated that the guard who brought him upstairs left the room, and that during his two hour interrogation he was not beaten or abused. 2565/ The subject stated that he was asked: the names of Muslims in his town who organized resistance and who possessed weapons; the names of rich individuals in the town and where they were hiding their valuables; the names of Muslims who were active in the Muslim Democratic Party; and names and personal data of Muslims who were members of the Territorial Defence. He also had to provide an account of his own activities between 24 and 29 May 1992. 2566/
1668. Another subject who was transferred to the camp in late May 1992, stated that several days after his arrival at the camp, he was interrogated about personal data, background, political activities and attitude, and about the rest of his family. He stated that he was not beaten during the interrogation. 2567

1669. According to one report, in early June 1992, prisoners were interrogated on their sixth day at the camp. The interrogations were reportedly carried out in approximately 10 offices on the second floor of the building where the prisoners were held. It was reported that prisoners recognized many of their interrogators as members of the civilian police forces in Banja Luka and Prijedor. They also identified some as military police from Banja Luka. It was also reported that interrogators seemed especially anxious to learn about who was responsible for organizing the defence of villages around Prijedor and how non-Serbs were obtaining arms. 2568/

1670. One subject who had been transported to the camp from Prijedor in late June 1992, stated that interrogations started five or six days after his arrival and that the prisoners were asked who had organized an attack on Prijedor and who had smuggled arms. 2569/

1671. A subject who was transferred to the camp from Keraterm on approximately 5 July 1992, stated that upon arrival at Omarska he was interrogated twice, each time for approximately two hours. He said that both times he was interrogated by two men in military field uniforms who asked the same typical questions which had been asked at previous interrogations: if he possessed weapons or western currency; if he was politically active; for which western intelligence service he worked; or if he knew of other Muslims who did any of the above. Three soldiers were reportedly present who beat the subject during the interrogations with baseball bats and electric cables all over his body, especially to the head, legs and kidneys. He stated that at the conclusion of his second interrogation, one of the interrogators apologized for the rough treatment and told him that there had been a misunderstanding and that he would have no more problems. 2570/

1672. One subject reported that after being transported to Omarska in July 1992, prisoners were taken to the "white house" where about 15 soldiers wearing balaclavas questioned them briefly before putting them in the "bloody room". He stated that upon entering this room they were struck on the heads by two guards at the door, forced to kneel on the floor, were told to cross the room to the garage, and then were subjected to harsh beatings en route. The subject said that his ribs were broken, he fainted and regained consciousness four times, and each time was beaten and questioned. He said that he was taken to an office where four persons beat him with rifle butts and repeatedly subjected him to "cross-checked" questions and threatened to kill him. 2571/

1673. One subject 2572/ reported that on his 22nd day at the camp (on approximately 18-19 June), he was called out of "Building Number 11" at 2:00 a.m. and was interrogated by an individual who he knew before the war. He stated that the man was an officer with three chevron marks on his uniform, and that he repeatedly questioned the subject about the location of a large gun called a Mitraljez Breda. Subject denied any knowledge of such a gun and claimed that no one in Kevljani had owned such a weapon. The subject was then reportedly taken to "Building 10" to a room with four soldiers. He was then made to undress to his underwear and told to lie down on his stomach on the tile floor. One guard reportedly took an iron chair and put it on the subject's back and sat down as another guard took a large calibre automatic rifle and beat the subject on his spine with the butt of the rifle. A third guard reportedly kicked the subject along his legs and groin, while another guard continually pounded on his rib cage, breaking four of the subject's
ribs. The subject stated that he lost consciousness and that the beatings continued when he came to, with one of the guards reportedly taking a police baton, and beating on his back and ribs continually and another guard pulling out a knife, threatening to circumcise him, and then reportedly cutting his kneecap. He was then made to stand up and lost consciousness and collapsed. The guards then threw water on the subject, returned his clothes, and walked him back to his room. The subject alleged that he was the first prisoner at Omarska to be returned to the rooms after a beating, and not be killed or taken to the "white house". 2573/

1674. One subject stated that unlike others at Omarska, he did not undergo an interrogation until he was at the camp for about two months. The subject stated that during his interrogation, he was beaten with a stick to the kidneys and that they wanted to know which Serbs he and his friends had killed. 2574/

1675. A number of other sources described the interrogation process at Omarska. One subject stated that:

"[t]hey would ask questions like 'Where are your weapons?' 'Were you a member of the SDA?' 'Do you like Alija?' [President Izetbegović] and beating us with each questions. They beat us with everything available, hands, fists, guns, night sticks, baseball bats. I don't understand where they got the baseball bats. We were made to sing etnik songs and songs proclaiming Greater Serbia. They forced us to take off all of our clothes to see if we were circumcised. When I went upstairs for my questioning, I was surprised how much information they already had about me--my mother's name, my father's name, where I had been employed. . . . I was questioned for about an hour. There was an interrogator in civilian clothes who asked all the questions. I was seated in a chair. Behind the chair were three men in uniform. As I first sat down and the first questions were asked, the three of them were slapping their billy clubs into their open palms next to my ears. . . ." 2575/

1676. One subject stated that he and his 2 brothers voluntarily went to be questioned, hoping that they would be released and would be able to join their family in Trnopolje. The subject reported that he was interrogated on 6 June 1992, and that the interrogator asked, "Where were you during the attack [on your village]?", "Have you ever had weapons?" etc. One of the men who interrogated the subject had been his math teacher and reportedly kicked the subject in the chest. The subject stated that he was hit 15 to 20 times during the course of his interrogation. In an effort to scare the subject, one of the interrogators reportedly stated that the subject should be killed. 2576/

1677. One subject reported that on 27 July 1992, he was called out of the "white house" by two soldiers and then taken to an upstairs room in the building where the kitchen was located. He stated that in the interrogation room, the chief sat behind a table and two men sat one on each side. One of the two asked questions, and the other two wrote them down. After taking personal data, the chief said he wanted to eat his lunch, and the other two men reportedly took the subject into another room where there were other soldiers: a total of five men. Each man reportedly held an object for use in a beating. The objects were reported to be: a police stick; a whip; a rubber stick; a metal stick that was square in shape; and a metal ball on a chain. The subject was reportedly told to get on his knees and hands and each man hit him on the back, legs, and neck with one of the objects. The refugee stated that he had heard from the other prisoners that it was important not to fall flat on the floor because then all of the men would hit him at the same time. He stated that he was then hit repeatedly about the legs with the metal stick until his legs grew numb. After the beating he was reportedly returned to the
interrogation room. The chief then reportedly asked the subject if he was ready to hear his accusation, which stated that the subject was accused of having said in Donja Puharska that Muslim men would kill all Serbian men and would keep the Serbian women for use in reproduction purposes and for sexual training of young Muslim boys. 2577/

1678. Camp Conditions—Meals—Nourishment: Reports indicate that during their first days at the camp, prisoners were generally given no food or water. 2578/ Reports indicate that the food supply at the camp was insufficient. In addition, Omarska's prisoners were given only a few minutes for the consumption of their meal. 2579/ It was generally reported that Omarska's prisoners were fed one meal per day and that the meal generally consisted of some bread and a bowl of soup or other substance. 2580/ Other reports indicate that on some days, prisoners received no food. 2581/ It was reported that the food at the camp was delivered by truck from Omarska. 2582/

1679. The following are representative accounts confirming that prisoners received inadequate and infrequent meals at the Omarska camp. One unidentified 27 year old witness stated: "The Serbs gave us one piece of bread and a little bit of water once a day. Sometimes we got warm meals, but it was rather hard to determine what it was." 2583/

1680. An ex-prisoner who arrived at the camp in late May 1992, stated that a meal consisted of 90 grams of bread and sometimes some soup broth or a cabbage leaf. He added that often, 24-60 hours would pass between meals. 2584/ Another subject during the same period of time described a similar meal including a cabbage leaf. 2585/

1681. A woman who was held at the camp stated that the male prisoners at the camp were once a day fed one-eighth of a loaf of bread and a small plate of food. 2586/ A male prisoner who was brought to the camp during the first week of June 1992, stated that prisoners were fed one meal per day consisting of a half slice of bread and one cup of soup with white beans. 2587/ Another prisoner who was brought to the camp in late May 1992, stated that every two days, they received about 100 grams of bread and a small cup of soup with a bit of rice or potato. 2588/

1682. One subject reported that many prisoners were accused of smuggling biscuits into camp. According to the subject, a pack of biscuits could be purchased from soldiers for 10 deutsch marks and that sometimes, this was the only food the prisoners would have for 36 to 48 hours. He stated that on one occasion, he bought biscuits from a soldier and was thereafter severely beaten by two other soldiers who accused him of smuggling the biscuits. 2589/

1683. Prisoners were reportedly taken to the mess hall in groups of 30. 2590/ It was reported that prisoners were ordered to leave their rooms and line up outside in their groups of 30, with heads bent down, facing the wall. They were also reportedly forbidden to turn their heads, and had to wait until ordered by a guard to walk fast, or run, to the mess hall. 2591/ A woman who was held at the camp stated that there were eight tables in the cafeteria and that the prisoners were given three minutes to eat, enter and to leave. She said that guards were positioned on both sides of the door and that prisoners had to run so as to not be beaten. 2592/

1684. There are numerous reports of abuse and daily beatings of prisoners entering and exiting the kitchen area. 2593/ There are reports that prisoners were beaten with heavy sticks, pipes, cables, and rifle butts when lining up for their meals. On their way to the "kitchen", prisoners had to go through rows of soldiers who tripped and beat them. 2594/ One ex-prisoner stated that they were made to run a type of obstacle course when they were fed (entering
and exiting the cafeteria) and that they had to pass single file between Serbian guards who tripped and beat them as they ran by. Benches and tables were also said to have blocked their path and if prisoners stumbled, they were reportedly beaten even more. Oil and water was also reportedly poured on the eating-area's floor to make it slippery.

1685. One unidentified 29 year old witness reported: "When heading towards the kitchen to get our meal, we were often beaten by the soldiers. On both sides of the way, Četniks were standing who beat us with heavy sticks." Similarly, an unidentified 46 year old ex-prisoner stated:

"When returning to the garage after the meal, we had to go through a row of soldiers. The Serbs beat us with heavy sticks and rifle butts. In the middle of this row, there was a table which we had to climb up. The Serbs tilted the table over when a person was standing on it and beat again . . . After meal, we had to lay on the ground. When a prisoner rose his head, he was beaten." 2598/

1686. One subject reported that on 6 June 1992, an identified prisoner looked through the camp's kitchen window when eating and was shot dead for doing so by a guard on the outside. The subject also reported that on the same day an identified prisoner was eating by the kitchen when he was asked by a guard what he was doing. The prisoner reportedly replied "I am eating cheese [Bojrum] would you like some?" As the word "Bojrum" was of Turkish origin the guard reportedly took exception to its use and began to beat the prisoner. He was thereafter joined by two other guards who reportedly beat the prisoner to death. This same incident was reported by another source who stated that several prisoners witnessed the beating and killing of an identified prisoner. According to the source, the prisoner-victim received his daily slice of bread after which a guard said "Dobar Tek" (good appetite) to which the prisoner spontaneously replied "Bujum" (the Muslim equivalent). According to this source, several guards beat the prisoner senseless. He thereafter lay on his back and vomited and suffocated as guards reportedly prohibited others from turning him over. Another source reported that on 6 July 1992, a prisoner said "bujoarum" to one of the guards was then beaten until he died ("they were jumping on his chest until they broke his breast plate").

1687. Water: Reports indicate that on occasion, prisoners did not receive water for days after their arrival at the Omarska camp. In one example, a prisoner who was taken to the camp in late May 1992, stated that the prisoners did not receive any water for three days after arrival at which time they were given only about 10 litres to drink for 450 men.

1688. It was also reported that the water provided to the prisoners was unfit to drink. One subject stated that the water came from two sources: directly from a well and from the river. He reported that the water was red from iron oxides and had been used to rinse the iron ore. He added that prisoners suffered from dysentery and typhoid fever. Other subjects reported that the water provided at the camp appeared to be contaminated with oil.

1689. It was reported by one ex-prisoner that the authorities at Omarska would let prisoners drink as much water as they wanted, but due to its poor quality, the prisoners would get diarrhea or dysentery, which would force them to use the toilet and subject them to beatings.

1690. It was further reported that prisoners who stashed money away were able to buy a litre of water for 100 deutsch marks.

1691. One subject reported that the camp's prisoners were forced to sing "Četnik" songs to be given drinking water. He stated that they did not know
the words and were helped by soldiers. 2607/

1692. One subject reported that in late June 1992, water became more plentiful at Omarska. 2608/

1693. Sleeping Facilities: For lack of space in some rooms, prisoners were reportedly forced to sleep in a sitting position. 2609/ In at least one severely cramped room, prisoners had to take turns sleeping. "Sleep shifts" were reported to have continued throughout the night. 2610/

1694. According to one ex-prisoner, in late May 1992, he was held in "building Number 11", in a room which was 15 by 15 metres large. He stated that approximately 450 men were forced into the room which was too small for everyone to lie down, so they took turns sitting and standing. 2611/

1695. Another subject reported that after arriving at the camp from Keraterm in late May, he and other new arrivals were taken to a room that was formally used by miners as a changing room. The prisoners were reportedly housed there until 25 June 1992. 2612/

1696. One subject stated that in late May 1992, 200 persons were initially held in a room measuring 250 square metres, but on subsequent occasions, the room contained 400 to 600 prisoners. He added that there was no furniture or bedding and that they slept on a tiled floor. 2613/

1697. One subject who was brought to the camp in late May stated upon arrival at the camp he was placed, along with 150 prisoners, into a garage where they could barely stand. Three men reportedly suffocated to death there. 2614/ Another subject stated that "[t]here was a garage where 124 men were kept [three by three]." 2615/

1698. One subject stated that on 28 May 1992, he was led to his permanent cell which was located in the ground floor of the large building which contained a high-bay vehicle work area. He said that this was the building located closest to the "white house". He described his room as a former electricians' workshop and stated that the room was about four by five metres large, with an iron door and a barred window as its only ventilation. He stated that at one point the room housed 186 men and that the men were forced to sleep on their sides on the concrete floor, without blankets, in a partial foetal position. He stated that at night guards would open the door and walk over the prisoners, and that if they found a prisoner lying in any other position, he was beaten. 2616/

1699. One subject stated that after his only interrogation, he was escorted from the administration building to "Room 15" which was located on the "second floor of the largest building where the majority of male prisoners were kept". The subject stated that the room was six by four metres large, and most of the time held 104 men 2617/ He stated that the prisoners slept on the concrete floor and had no blankets. 2618/

1700. Another subject described Room 15, which he stated held 300 to 350 men (some time in July 1992). The subject stated that the room had a small bathroom area with long, cement, trough-style sinks. The subject stated that for lack of space, prisoners slept in and under the sinks. The subject said that three faucets worked, so it was the only room available with water available to the prisoners. He stated that he slept 10 days in the room and was then moved across the hall to the shower stalls. Two prisoners reportedly slept in each stall, one metre square. The subject stated that he could only stretch his legs if he extended them up the side wall, and stated that he stayed there until early August. 2619/
1701. According to one report 475 people were accommodated in a single room estimated to be only eight metres by 14 metres in size. A priest who was held at the camp from mid-June to August 1992, stated that the prisoners were held 100 to a room.

1702. Reports quoted ex-prisoners as stating that they were held in various areas of the camp, including: an outdoor pit; metal cages which were part of an ore loader; a toilet area.

1703. Medical Treatment: Most reports indicate that there was no health care provided by the Omarska camp administration. However, some doctors among the prisoners reportedly tried to take care of the sick and wounded, without any instruments or medicine. One unidentified subject reported that "there was no doctor in the camp. If someone was injured seriously, the Serbs let him die without any treatment". Similarly, one subject stated that after severe beatings, the prisoners were given no medical treatment and had to use their shirts for bandages.

1704. However, one subject reported that there was a doctor and a nurse at the camp, in the "white house". Another subject stated that during the first four to five weeks in late May-early June 1992, a Serb military doctor would visit the camp a few times a week and hold a two to three hour surgery in the "white house".

1705. It was reported that a typhus epidemic broke out in the camp at the end of June-July 1992, and that the camp's authorities did not try to stop it. One subject stated that he never saw a medical doctor at the camp and that sick prisoners were not treated. He added that those who had typhus received no medicine and were not separated from the other prisoners, and that 100 prisoners died of the disease. Another subject added that dozens of prisoners died of an epidemic which was probably typhus, and that healthy prisoners had to carry out dead prisoners and place them in front of the "white house".

1706. It was reported that dysentery at the camp was rampant and that conditions were so unclean that some prisoners counted 10 types of lice or vermin on their bodies. One ex-prisoner stated: "We had lice on our eyelids. They'd fall out of your beards".

1707. It was also generally reported prisoners became sick with diarrhea and that they received no medicine. One subject estimated that at least 10 prisoners died as a result of diarrhea. Another subject estimated that at least five died as a result of the ailment.

1708. When the Omarska camp closed down, camp doctors at Manjaža reportedly estimated that of the prisoners transferred there, at least one in 10 had contracted dysentery. Other prisoners reportedly suffered from untreated and festering wounds from their beatings.

1709. Toilets: Each prisoner was reportedly allowed to occasionally use a toilet for two minutes or less. However, it was reported that prisoners who attempted to relieve themselves or use the toilet were subjected to beatings. One subject reported that some guards would not permit prisoners to use the toilet for 10 to 15 hours. According to one report, one latrine served about 800 inmates. There was reportedly no toilet paper at the camp.

1710. One subject reported that there were always two to three guards stationed in the toilets, and that on one occasion, they kicked and beat him as he tried to relieve himself. He stated that he was made to pray in the
Serbian Orthodox way, and that they put his head into the toilet bowl. 2643/1711. One subject reported that the camp initially had four toilets in "block A" and another in "block B". A few weeks after his arrival in late May 1992, one of the toilets reportedly became blocked and was inoperable. The subject stated that after this, the toilets were used only at night; and during the day the prisoners urinated into a concrete ditch running along the side of the compound and defecated on the grassy banks. The subject noted that the prisoners were always under guard. 2644/

1712. One subject who was held in "Room 15" stated that the room had no bucket where prisoners could relieve themselves during the night and they were therefore permitted to go to the toilet. However, the subject added that prisoners who asked for permission to use the toilet at night were beaten. The subject reported that on 10 July 1992, a prisoner who was sick and needed to use the toilet, was beaten by an identified guard wielding a rubber club and a wooden table leg. The prisoner reportedly defecated and had to sleep in his own waste. He was, however, allowed to clean himself at the toilet the next day. 2645/ Another subject reported that there was no toilet bucket in the room where he was held, and that people in the room were defecating blood. He stated that prisoners were not able to ask to use the toilet. 2646/

1713. Hygiene: It was reported that prisoners at the camp did not receive soap and were unable to shower or wash themselves. 2647/ An unidentified former prisoner stated that he couldn't wash for 70 days. 2648/ Another subject stated that in 72 days at the camp he did not get a change of clothes or a chance to wash, except for his hands and face. 2649/

1714. One subject reported that prisoners were allowed to bathe only twice all summer. The guards on one occasion reportedly ordered prisoners to disrobe in groups of 50 and then aimed fire hoses at their genitals. 2650/ A subject reported that on one occasion he and other prisoners were taken out to a field and hosed with cold water. 2651/ Another subject reported that occasionally prisoners were allowed to use a hydrant for bathing and washing clothes. During that time, they would strip naked and dry their clothes in the sun. 2652/

1715. It was reported that after being denied the use of the toilet, some prisoners had to wear their soiled garments for days, without having the possibility to wash them. 2653/

1716. One subject reported that all of the prisoners had lice and had to share a single comb per 100 persons. 2654/ Another subject confirmed that the prisoners at Omarska were infested with lice and other vermin. 2655/

1717. One subject reported that some prisoners received soap from their families and that they were allowed to wash in the same trough from which they drew their drinking water. 2656/

1718. Weight Loss: Numerous reports describe weight loss suffered while at the Omarska camp. One subject reported that during his 77-day confinement at Omarska from late May 1992, his weight dropped from 86 to 52 kilograms. 2657/ Other reports by ex-prisoners claim the following weight loss: 71 kilograms to 49 kilograms; 2658/ 85 kilograms to 49 kilograms; 2659/ 86 to 40 kilograms; 2660/ a total of 25 kilograms; 2661/ a total of 30 kilograms. 2662/

1719. Prisoner Routine: Reports indicate that prisoners were allowed out of their housing only once a day, in order to run to their meal at the mess hall building. 2663/
1720. One subject reported that in his case, he and the other prisoners spent most of the day in the same room in which they slept. He said that in order to get to see a friend in another building he had to bribe a guard. According to the subject, prisoners slept until 7:00 a.m. when they were allowed outside to relieve themselves. Occasionally, the guards reportedly allowed the prisoners to sit outside, but at 8:00 p.m., the doors to the "garderobe" were reportedly shut. 2664/

1721. A priest who was held at the camp from mid-June to August 1992, stated that prisoners spent the days lying face-down on the road, with guards trampling on anyone who moved. 2665/

1722. Forced Labour: One subject reported that on 30 June 1992, a group of eight prisoners was assigned to a daily work and cleanup detail, working from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. at a slaughterhouse located 300 metres from the camp. The subject reported that their task each morning included washing interiors of between 10-15 blood-spattered trucks used to transport the bodies of prisoners who had been killed or died the previous night. The subject added that blood-stained and bent iron rods inside the trucks were also replaced with clean ones each day. The subject also stated that the prisoners also helped out at the slaughterhouse where four cows and six sheep were slaughtered to feed the guards. 2666/

1723. Another subject reported that prisoners would be picked two or three times a week to clean the camp and on several occasions qualified welders would be given the task of building up the worn teeth on the excavator buckets on the site. Those jobs were reportedly welcomed because prisoners selected received two meals daily. 2667/

1724. Special Treatment of Certain Prisoners: Reports indicate widespread killing at the camp and that political and religious leaders and professionals were particularly singled out for execution. 2668/ It was further reported that prisoners were abused every day, especially at night. The guards at the camp would reportedly pick out ten people, take them out and beat them. It was reported that the wealthier or more educated persons were usually the victims of such beatings. 2669/

1725. Reports state that prisoners were grouped into categories such as "guilty" and "innocent", depending on their level of education and wealth. According to many of the reports, mostly (but not exclusively), wealthy persons and intellectuals were executed. 2670/ One unidentified ex-prisoner reported that many people who were politically active or wealthy were killed or at least tortured. 2671/ Another unidentified subject reported the separation of prisoners at Omarska into three groups: "The first group were those who had been politically active. These people, about 1,000, were immediately shot by the Serbs". The second group reportedly consisted of civilians and the third group of prisoners who had participated in the war on the BiH side. 2672/

1726. An unidentified former prisoner who had been held at Omarska from 30 May 1992, stated:

"It often happened that the Serbs called persons by name and brought them away. During the 73 days I stayed in the camp, I saw 1,200 to 1,400 dead bodies. Every morning, there were 15-20 dead bodies in the fields of the camp . . . . A great part of the victims was rich or educated." 2673/

1727. It was also reported that at both Omarska and Keraterm, Muslim men who had been policemen were targeted for special abuse, and that many were shot to
death immediately upon arrival at the camps. 2674/ One subject reported that
majority of active and reserve police members at Omarska were killed at the
camp. He cited one example of such a killing occurring on 27 May 1992. 2675/

1728. One subject reported that 150 persons from Kozarac were held in a
garage, which was big enough to hold only 30 persons. The subject stated that
persons from Kozarac were singled out for special treatment because they had
put up a fight in defence of their village. 2676/

1729. Abuse During Detention: According to most reports, severe maltreatment
of prisoners occurred at Omarska. 2677/

1730. One subject stated that there was a pattern to which prisoners were
abused, taken away and killed. The subject stated that,

"after about 10-15 days, we understood their logic, and then one could
more or less guess who would disappear from the Omarska camp. The logic
was like this: first, the people who had been accused of having fought
with arms against the Serb government would disappear. So the first ones
they finished off were those who had weapons. When they no longer
existed at Omarska, the intellectuals began to disappear. Among the
intellectuals, no doctor has survived to my knowledge. After that,
renowned citizens disappeared. By that I mean above all, rich people
with enviable possessions. When they too had disappeared, they started
to kill at random." 2678/

1731. Reports further indicate that detainees were often beaten with rubber
and iron sticks, rifle butts and fists. It has also been noted in reports that
many of the camp's prisoners were questioned about wealthy Bosnian Muslims and
that wealthy and intellectual Bosnian Muslims were a main target of abuse,
torture and killings. In this context, an unidentified subject stated:

"The soldiers often came with a list of names. Those whom they read out
had to go with them. They never came back. Most of the people on these
lists were in good positions before the war, like managers, owners of
restaurants etc." 2679/

1732. One subject reported that at 10:00 p.m. on 15 July 1992, a couple of
camp guards came to Room 15. The guards reportedly read from a list of
approximately 33 prisoners, and escorted them to the former car repair shop,
called the "garage" which was located on the first floor in the same building.
For the next half-hour, subject and his fellow prisoners were reportedly
abused by 10 men in JNA uniforms and five camp guards. Prisoners were
reportedly struck with rubber clubs, made to lick the dirty garage floor and
eat dirt. Other prisoners were reportedly made to smash subject's head into
the concrete floor while he was laying on his stomach. The subject was
thereafter kicked and trampled by two "Četniks" and was also hit in the face
with a pistol. Subject reportedly broke his nose and received other injuries.
Another prisoner reportedly died of his injuries. 2680/

1733. It was reported that a prisoner who had been a professor was beaten
severely by an Omarska guard who was a former student. The professor had
reportedly given the guard poor grades while he was in school. According to
the report, the professor returned from one beating, barely conscious,
spitting blood, and with double vision. 2681/

1734. One subject stated that while guards called out names from lists, many
of those killed or beaten were selected at random. He stated: "the guards
would come in at 3:00 a.m. and take five people out, telling us they were
going to be exchanged. Where they took them, God only knows." Another subject
stated that often the guards did not know whom they had beaten to death. The subject recalled that "sometimes they would call them by name. But sometimes they would ask me afterwards, 'Do you know who this is?'" The subject said that he identified many friends who had been beaten to death. 2682/

1735. One subject who arrived in the camp in late May 1992, stated that each night guards randomly selected five to 10 persons to torture and kill. The subject commented that guards would hold torture competitions, for example, to see who was the most proficient at breaking bones. 2683/

1736. One subject who was held at Omarska, compared the facility to a camp where he was held in 1945: "I was the oldest prisoner in the camp (Omarska). I know what a camp means. In 1945, I was in a camp as well. I know the rules of a camp, but there were no rules in this camp." 2684/

1737. It was reported that there were two ways to avoid beatings at Omarska: 1) Never look a guard in the eye; 2) If called to an interrogation, confuse the guards by saying that you had just come from one. To this effect, prisoners sometimes reportedly smeared themselves with blood from newly beaten detainees. 2685/

1738. Reports indicate that ill-treatment worsened when the camp's guards were drunk. 2686/ One subject reported that the violence at the camp also worsened in time as the guards "had already taken everything of value". 2687/

1739. One subject reported that he had personally been beaten only a few times by blows from a gun butt. He said, however, that he was part of only a tiny minority (some 10-15 per cent) who "got away lightly". 2688/

1740. Forced Abuse By Prisoners: There are numerous reports that Omarska's prisoners were forced to abuse one another. One subject reported that he was forced to beat his own brother and if he did not, they both feared that they would be killed. He described an instance when a police truncheon was placed into his mouth and he was told to bite it or face having it shoved down his throat and have his head smashed against a wall. He said that he was struck repeatedly about the head with a gun and when he fell, was stamped on. He said that when the "police" became tired, they forced the other prisoners to continue the beatings. 2689/

1741. According to one report, in about mid-June, guards collected prisoners who had organized defences in various villages. Those prisoners were reportedly forced to strip and were forced into vats of a chloric acid solution which caused their skin to turn a vibrant pink. The prisoners were then reportedly ordered to beat each other with metal bars and were thereafter taken away and never seen again. This scenario was reportedly repeated with at least five other groups of men. 2690/

1742. One subject reported that on one occasion a guard cut off a prisoner's ear and forced another prisoner to eat it. The subject stated that a guard also cut a piece of flesh from a wounded prisoner and told the man to eat it. 2691/

1743. See also reports of castrations below.

1744. Beatings by People from Outside the Camp: Reports also indicate that beatings at the Omarska camp were not only administered by the shift guards, but also by individuals who were allowed into the camp after dark. 2692/ One source reported that sometimes Serb civilians would come into the camp for a "little sport". He identified one of those persons who was reported to have called out the names of three well-known prisoners (formerly wealthy
individuals) in the source's room and beat them for two hours with a metal pipe. The source stated that the prisoners would come back with broken wrists, battered faces, and were barely able to walk. 2693/

1745. Music During Beatings: Reports indicate the presence of music to accompany some of the abuse at the Omarska camp. One subject reported that music accompanied beatings on many occasions at Omarska. He said that while the music was played loudly, he could still hear the screaming of prisoners. 2694/ It was similarly reported,

"[w]hile they were killing, they had the radio on. The tapes, those songs on all night long. The radio was always on. While they were beating the radio was always on. But you could hear the screaming over the radio. It was louder." 2695/

1746. The "White House: and the "Red House": According to reports, the Omarska camp had two buildings used exclusively for the purpose of torture: the "white house" and "red house". According to reports, conditions at the "white house" were terrible, but on occasion, prisoners returned from it. 2696/ However, it was reported that no one sent to the "red house" ever returned. 2697/

1747. The "Red House": It was reported that the building referred to as the "red house" was where prisoners were taken to be beaten and that many of them were mutilated and killed. 2698/ It was also reported that educated persons tended to be sent to the "red house". 2699/ It was reported by some that no prisoner was known to survive the "red house". 2700/ According to reports, corpses were often dumped on the grass near the structure, where they were left out for days. 2701/

1748. It was reported by one subject that from mid-July until Omarska was closed, starting at 8:00 p.m. each evening, guards collected men from different locations in the camp and took them to a holding area at the "white house". Guards then asked the prisoners for their names and family details, and then marched them away individually. At about 4:00 a.m., prisoners would reportedly hear a truck drive up to the "red house" to collect the corpses. 2702/

1749. One subject reported that it was "normal" for up to 40 prisoners to be killed and mutilated in the "red house" in one night. 2703/ One subject who arrived at the camp in July 1992, stated that he did not know what went on in the "red house" but that he saw bodies lying outside the building among old automobile tires. He stated that the victims had obviously been killed with knives. He stated that he had observed the bodies each day when the guards escorted the prisoners outside to relieve themselves. He stated that he noticed that the dead outside the "red house" had arms or legs missing and that there was one body of a man with a slit throat. He added that the stench was unbearable. 2704/

1750. Another subject reported that he kept a count each night (for his final 20 nights at the camp) of inmates taken to the "red house". He stated that on some days there were as few as 17 taken, and on others, as many as 42. He stated that none ever returned. 2705/

1751. One report stated that three prisoners tried to buy their way out of the "red house" and that two were shot and killed in one of the compounds by a guard. 2706/

1752. One subject reported that a prisoner was suspended by his wrists in the Red House, after which the subject was forced by drunken camp guards to bite off the prisoner's genitals. This reportedly caused the death of the prisoner.
The subject was then reportedly suspended by his wrists, while a third prisoner was forced to bite off the subject's testicles. The subject reportedly lost his right testicle in this manner. He reported that an interruption to the torture prevented further injury.  

1753. The "White House": The "white house" (bijela kuća) is identified in photos contained in television news reports. Reports indicate that the "white house" was a place at Omarska where prisoners were tortured and killed.  

1754. One subject described the "white house" as the "most infamous" structure at the camp. He stated that the building was where the camp authorities held those they called "extremists". According to the subject, the first room to the left was the punishment room, where "hardly anyone came out alive".  

1755. Another subject stated that the "white house" was referred to as the "Abattoir". A subject who had been taken there, said that the "white house" was also known as the "killing house". He said that prisoners estimated that only 1 per cent of those taken there remained alive.  

1756. One subject reported that 10 to 15 days after being transported to the camp in late May from Kozarac, torture and executions began, mostly at the "white house". Reports stated that no one was killed with a gun at the "white house", only by beatings and the like. According to reports, in the morning prisoners would see bodies piled up next to the white house.  

1757. There are reports that prisoners could on occasion buy their way out of the "white house" by bribing guards.  

1758. It was reported that every evening, soldiers would stand before the prisoners where they lay or sat on the concrete pad between the buildings and read out names from pink-colored cards. Those whose names were called were reported to have been usually taken to the "white house". According to one subject, the men on the concrete pad could see the men being severely beaten, usually to death, in front of the "white house".  

1759. One subject reported that on average, 15 prisoners were killed each night at the "little white house". He added that prisoners in the high-bay building whose detention building faced the "white house" could see the corpses piled outside. Another subject stated that from his room behind the "white house", he could see the place where corpses were disposed of and that they could see eight to 10 new bodies brought there every day. Another subject reported that during one month at the camp, he witnessed some of the killings in a room "next door" at the "white house" and the subsequent removal of bodies. He estimated that guards killed five to 10 men per night, and up to 30 prisoners on some nights. He added that guards sang as they beat prisoners to death and sometimes sang nationalistic and religious songs. Another subject stated that he helped to load between five to 10 corpses daily from daily from the "white house" into a small yellow pick-up truck.  

1760. There are reports that one woman who was separated from the other women at the camp from the onset, was held at the "white house". The woman was reportedly raped by other camp inmates who were coerced by guards. In a related report, three female subjects stated that they witnessed the killing of a local politician. They stated that the man was ordered to rape a girl who was kept in the "white house". When he refused, he was reportedly castrated, had his throat cut, and his eyes gouged out.
1762. The following are representative accounts of some of the abuses which occurred in and around the "white house". One subject who was transferred to Omarska from the Prijedor police station in late July 1992, stated that upon arrival he was put into the "white house" where he was kept for about 15 days. He stated that he was locked in a room with dozens of men, many of whom he recognized from his village of Rizvanovicici. He stated that every day prisoners were taken into one of five interrogation rooms and beaten with iron bars and wooden sticks. The subject added that many nights guards would come and call prisoners out of the rooms and that those prisoners would never be seen again. On one occasion, when the guards came a prisoner reportedly "lost his nerve" and began to shout, whereupon the guard shot and killed him on the spot. According to the subject, he once watched through the window as guards took prisoners out of the "white house" and told them to run, shooting them in the back as they fled.

1763. According to one subject (on an unspecified date), three identified prisoners were taken into the compound area outside the accommodation block and beaten until their limbs were broken. Three unidentified Serbs then reportedly blinded the prisoners and forced knives into their mouths, thereafter turning the blades. Two of the men were reportedly killed and a third was taken that night to the "white house". According to the subject, the surviving prisoner was still alive the next morning but was loaded onto a truck with 50 dead persons who had been killed at the "white house" that night. The subject estimated that it was normal for trucks to pull up and take 40-50 bodies away from the "white house" every morning.

1764. One former prisoner estimated that four to five prisoners were killed in the "white house" per night by beatings with baseball bats, steel balls on chains, whips, and rifle butts. Afterwards, these prisoners were carried outside by other prisoners and laid on the ground. Some of those prisoners were reportedly still alive when they were loaded onto a yellow truck that came each morning to transport the dead and dying. One subject stated that he was part of a group of prisoners who had to carry bodies of dead prisoners from the "white house". He stated that in five days in early July 1992, he carried 10 bodies out into the field behind the structure.

1765. One subject reported that prisoners were killed 20 at a time, and that those prisoners would be taken to the "white house" after 9:00 p.m., to be killed, and that the bodies were left behind the building for other prisoners to see.

1766. One subject reported that each morning, prisoners laid out corpses on the tarmac in front of the "white house". He added that others then loaded them into the small yellow truck that had just been used to deliver food to the camp's kitchen. The subject added that a four-man burial detail would accompany the truck, but only one would return alive.

1767. One subject reported that on one occasion he saw three prisoners being killed without provocation next to a ditch in front of the "white house" and that on another occasion he saw another seven men being killed in the same manner.

1768. Castration Reports: A young Bosnian Muslim subject who owned a Suzuki motorcycle was reportedly tortured in front of the other prisoners, after which time his teeth were knocked out. According to one subject, the guards then tied one end of a wire tightly around the prisoner's testicles and then tied the other end of the wire to his motorcycle. A guard then reportedly got on the motorcycle and sped off.

1769. According to one subject, a prisoner on an unspecified date asked an
extreme guard if he could sneak him a bit of bread. The prisoner reportedly said "I'm hungry" to the guard. The guard then reportedly ordered another prisoner to take off his pants and then told the first prisoner to kneel in front of the other man. "If you're hungry, now you'll eat eggs", the guard reportedly said. "If you don't eat, I'll cut your throat", the guard added. The subject said that the prisoner bit off the testicles of the other man who died shortly thereafter. 2734/

1770. Another subject reported that an identified prisoner was castrated after three days of torture. The subject stated that he saw the castration through a gap in a door and that he heard crying from outside. The castration was reportedly performed by "a Serb". The subject added that a friend of the victim was made to cut his body with a knife, kiss him, and lick his blood. 2735/

1771. A television media report featured prisoner eyewitnesses and a prisoner participant in an often reported castration incident alleged to have occurred on approximately 17 June 1992. The report contained interviews with a witness who reported that Serb guards started the incident by calling up names. Q, the participant, confirmed that at around 5:15 p.m., Serb soldiers in camouflage uniforms came in to pick out a cafe-owner and active policemen to beat them up. He also reported that the guards later dragged out two truck-owners and thereafter beat them and carved crosses on their bodies with bayonets mounted on automatic rifles. Q stated that he was then told to go outside with the other prisoners and that he had to drag them through the hall, half-dead. One witness reported that he witnessed as the guards first forced Q to jump into a duct filled with waste oil and shout, "I am a pig, I love pigs!" Q confirmed that he was forced to drink motor oil from his hand and later from a beer bottle. Another witness stated that while Q was doing this, the guards were beating the others and trampled them. Q reported that he was then forced to tear off the testicles of the other prisoners with his teeth and that the men were screaming in pain. The witness stated that one victim died immediately and that two others gave some final screams and that they were thereafter taken away in a truck. The witness stated that he and others had to clean up the blood. Q stated that he was ordered by men to tear off the other prisoners' testicles. The witness stated that the guards at the time were under the command of one who was a supervisor at the camp and whose shift was said to have been the worst. The witness stated that there were about 15 guards on this individual's shift. Q stated that the guards witnessed the incident and were laughing, and the next day they told in the "galleries" what he had done. 2736/

1772. Other reports appear to describe the same castration incident, though they vary as to details. One subject reported that Q was subjected to "genital atrocity" at the hands of a coerced friend and then killed by knife at the "White House". 2737/

1773. One subject reported that a fellow prisoner, was forced to drink a litre of motor oil and survived. The same prisoner was also reportedly forced to take part in genital biting and to at least three other prisoners. 2738/

1774. An unidentified 31 year old witness who was at the camp from 29 May to 6 August 1992, described the following incident:

"Four Muslims were taken out of the hall. Two of them were forced to tear off the genitals of the two others with their hands. Then two other Muslims were brought and they also had to tear off the genitals of the other two. Then the four Muslims were taken away by truck. When they were taken away, they were still alive." 2739/
1775. Another subject who was held at the camp from 29 May to 6 August 1992, stated that,

"three Četniks, among them [an individual] from Kozarac killed four young men. They first beat them up until they were laying on the floor, they cut their testicles . . . One of the victims was [B] . . . A Četnik cut three crosses into his body, two in his head and one in his belly."

1776. Other reports described what appears to be the same incident. One such report identified two individuals, who often visited the camp at night. According to the report, they entered the sleeping quarters carrying pistols and automatic rifles and called for B, who was frequently abused, and two other individuals (G and R) to come forward. The three were reportedly beaten with rifle butts and police batons in full view of the other prisoners. The perpetrators then forced G to drink a glass of motor oil and then the urine of the two other prisoners. He was next beaten until unconscious and then awakened with cold water. G was thereafter forced to take his pants off and then the perpetrators reportedly forced B and R to bite off his testicles. G thereafter died of his wounds that night. These acts were reportedly committed on the shift of one of the perpetrators.

1777. Other descriptions of what appear to be the same castration incident were contained in many of the reports reviewed. Many of these reports vary as to detail, but appear to describe the same set of facts.

1778. Torture: According to reports, prisoners were forced to lay in the sun on a concrete area known as the "pista" (track) during the summer and were not allowed to move for hours, consequently suffering from sunstrokes and sunburns.

1779. One subject stated: "We spent day after day stretched out on our stomachs on the concrete of that parking area."

1780. Another subject stated:

"After 28 days, they put me on the 'pista' which was an asphalt parking lot. Here I was with another 600-800 people. Most of the time we were forced to lay motionless on the asphalt on our bellies. If anybody moved the Serbs opened fire in that direction from the anti-aircraft four barrel machine-gun mounted on an armoured car by the 'white house' (Bijela Kuća), usually killing 4-5 people daily and wounding others. . . ."

1781. One subject reported that after some public beatings, he saw guards pour acid on the fresh wounds of prisoners.

1782. Number of Prisoners Killed During Detention: Numerous sources referred to "lists" of prisoners to be killed or abused. However, one source reported that the Omarska authorities did not keep track of which prisoners were killed, which often caused confusion. One subject stated:

"They wanted to kill me too, but their greatest mistake was they were killing but had no records, nothing. They'd call out names of people they'd already killed. Later, when we realized what was going on, we didn't answer. They missed me. We'd no papers, they didn't know who we were."

1783. An unidentified witness who was held at the camp from 29 May to 6 August 1992, stated that he had seen about 50 executions. He further reported:
"Once they shot 20 people who had tried to flee . . . They wanted to demonstrate that it was useless to flee. They arranged that all prisoners had to watch the execution." 2749/

1784. It was reported that guards at the camp selected seven or eight victims each night using a flashlight in a darkened warehouse, where 600 to 700 prisoners were packed together. According to one subject, the only apparent trait the victims shared was their muscular build. 2750/

1785. One subject stated that seven to eight days before Omarska's closure, the rate of killing increased at the camp. 2751/

1786. A woman who was held at the camp and worked in the cafeteria stated that every day during lunch they would check how many people had been killed. She stated that as early as 7:00 a.m., the women would start counting those alive and check if they knew of someone who was missing. 2752/

1787. A number of reports estimated that 10 to 15 prisoners were killed at the camp per day. 2753/

1788. An unidentified 31 year old ex-prisoner stated:

"Every day, together with other men, I had to clean the room in which detainees were beaten with heavy metal sticks from blood. When we had finished, we had to clean two small trucks from blood, too. The trucks were full of blood because dead bodies were transported. I suppose that in this camp, every day 10 to 15 people were killed. In the evening the soldiers called these people and took them away. They never returned." 2754/

1789. A priest who was held at the camp from mid-June to August 1992, estimated that between 10-15 persons were executed at the camp every night and alleged that 1,300 prisoners were killed, mostly intellectuals. 2755/

1790. Other ex-prisoners stated that each day, 10-15 new corpses lay in the field next to one of the "dormitories". 2756/

1791. Other reports describe a higher number of daily killings at the camp. One subject reported that each night the guards at the camp would select 10-20 prisoners, beat them up, and then shoot them with pistols. He said that on the following morning, the prisoners would have to get up early to load the bodies on a "Combi" truck. The subject was not sure where the bodies were taken. 2757/ Another subject estimated that on many occasions, 20-40 prisoners were killed at night by "knife, hammer, and by burning". He stated that he witnessed the killing of one prisoner by seven guards who poured petrol on him, set him on fire, and struck him upon the head with a hammer. The subject reported that there were about 100 such killings at the camp. He stated that the intelligentsia of the camp were selected first for killing. 2758/

1792. One subject reported that:

"The guards would come and take away men, at random, it seemed. Each night gun shots would be heard and each morning at 6 o'clock we would see 20-30 dead men loaded on a truck and taken away to an unknown destination. . . ." 2759/

1793. Another subject report that 40-50 bodies a day were taken for mass burial in a nearby open mine pit between 26 June to 21 July 1992. 2760/

1794. One subject estimated that well over 1,000 prisoners died at Omarska. He
stated that most died during and from beatings although shooting was heard during the first two to three weeks. He said that then he heard machine-gun fire in 30 round bursts followed by a break "as if to change magazines". He said that this would be repeated two or three times. 2761/ Another ex-prisoner estimated that between 28 May and 6 August, at least 1,000 inmates were killed at the Omarska camp. 2762/ Similarly, another subject estimated that approximately 1,300 persons who arrived at Omarska disappeared without a trace during a 75-day period beginning in late May 1992. 2763/

1795. Other estimates of the number of prisoners killed at Omarska include: "well over" 1,000; 2764/ 1,200; 2765/ 1,400; 2766/ 1,700; 2767/ 1,800 between 25 May and 6 August 1992; 2768/ 2,000; 2769/ and 3000. 2770/

1796. Specific Killing Incidents Reported: According to one subject, a prisoner begged to be killed by a gun and the answer was "no", a bullet is too expensive. According to the subject, the victim was thereafter tortured to death. 2771/ Another subject similarly reported that executions at the camp were usually carried out with knives or by beating and seldomly with firearms. He stated that a BiH Muslim prisoner survived three beatings and after the fourth beating he lay dying on the floor. One of the guards reportedly asked "what is your last wish?" The prisoner reportedly first asked for some water and then to be killed with a bullet. The guard reportedly gave the man water and let the man die from his beatings. 2772/

1797. One subject who arrived at the camp in late May 1992, from Kozarac reported that at one point guards called out a dozen people a day for five days and decapitated them with chain saws near on of the main pits. 2773/

1798. One subject reported that he witnessed as a guard at the camp used a car battery (usually used to light the hallways), to electrocute a prisoner. 2774/

1799. In late June 1992, 120 were reported to have been executed to the east side of the "white house". The men were reportedly brought in buses one night and were allegedly shot. The next morning their bodies were reportedly loaded by a bulldozer onto two trailers and taken to an unknown location. 2775/

1800. Subjects reported that during the Serbian holiday of Petrodan (St. Peter's Day) in 1992, prisoners were beaten and then thrown alive into a fire made from the large rubber tires from the excavating trucks previously used at the mine. 2776/ It was reported that on that day, volunteers from the town came to the camp to participate. There was reportedly a lot of singing, drinking, and at one point the guards had the idea to set fire to the big truck tires in the yard and to throw the prisoners onto the bonfire. 2777/ One subject reported that on 12 July, prisoners saw through a window that the guards had made a fire with old rubber tires and were trying to force prisoners to jump into it. He stated that when the prisoners resisted, the guards pulled them by their hair and beat them with shovels. He described continued beatings and abuse by the next guard shift. 2778/ Other reports appear to describe the same or similar incidents described above. 2779/

1801. It was further reported that on St. Peter's Day, a Serb religious holiday, 2780/ Serbs at the camp killed an estimated 170 prisoners in the evening. 2781/ Another subject stated that on a "holiday" in early August 1992, a group of guards arrived at the camp drunk and herded approximately 15 Muslim prisoners into the centre of the camp compound and ran them over with a bulldozer. 2782/
1802. An unidentified 27 year-old subject reported that one night, around 12 July 1992, a mass execution took place in the course of which about 60 persons were killed. 2783/

1803. According to one subject, in late July as detainees lined up for lunch, a prisoner emerged from an interrogation and had a confrontation with a guard during which the prisoner reportedly grabbed a gun, but later gave it up. According to the subject, the guards shoved the prisoner towards the "white house", poured gasoline over him and set him on fire. 2784/

1804. One unidentified ex-prisoner stated that a mass killing took place in July, when 200 prisoners were shot in one night. He stated that he and two other prisoners were taken out of their hall to load bodies onto a truck. 2785/ It was similarly reported that following the arrival of 300 prisoners from Bistani, Rizvanovici, Rakovani, Hambarine, Čarkovo, and Zecovi, a number of prisoners were beaten and killed and those who survived were taken into a hangar at around 11:00 p.m. and were killed as well. In total, approximately 230 prisoners were said to be killed and at approximately 4:00 a.m., were loaded onto a truck. It was also reported that two trucks were filled with bodies and that those bodies were taken to the mines in Omarska and buried in mass graves. 2786/ Another subject similarly reported that on the night of 24-25 July 1992, between 11:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m., 180 people coming from the village of Čarkovo were killed. The subject stated that 300 persons from that village had been brought to Omarska and that all that night he heard the screams of prisoners being killed on the open ground between the "white house" and the "red house". The subject stated that on the following morning he observed a mechanical digger putting the bodies into two large trucks and that both trucks then left the camp in the direction of the mine shafts. 2787/

1805. One subject reported that on 26 July 1992, at about 3:00 p.m., a Serbian irregular came into the "white house" and declared that he had come from the front where nine Serbian soldiers had been killed. According to the subject, the irregular stated that three Muslim men would be killed for each of the Serbian soldiers and that he would return at midnight to kill them. The irregular reportedly returned after midnight on 27 July with a soldier and a truck. According to the report, the irregular and the soldier entered the room where 50-60 men were held, grabbed one prisoner and took him outside. The sound of a beating and screams for help were reportedly heard, which soon became less audible. This same routine reportedly took place until they had taken 27 prisoners. According to the report, at 5:00 a.m., the men came back and asked for four volunteers to load the dead bodies on the truck. The bodies were then reportedly taken to an unknown location. 2788/

1806. Disposal of Bodies: Reports indicate that prisoners were selected to haul away, bury, or stack-up the bodies of those killed at the camp. 2789/ It was also reported that some of the prisoners who loaded the bodies onto trucks were later executed. 2790/

1807. Reports indicate that dead prisoners were loaded onto trucks and taken away early in the morning. 2791/ It was specifically reported that small yellow trucks came to the camp each morning to load the dead and dying from outside the "white house". 2792/ It was similarly reported that following killings, prisoners were forced to throw dead bodies into a two ton yellow truck and that every day the truck was loaded about four times with dead bodies. 2793/ One subject identified an "ethnic Serb" who was charged with the daily task of carrying away the bodies of prisoners, and identified the vehicle used as a "yellow Tamic 2001 truck". 2794/ One subject described one of the trucks as being 11 metres long. 2795/ Other prisoners generally reported corpses being driven away in small trucks which often had blood
stains all over them. 2796/

1808. Reports described mass killings at the camp and the process by which bodies were loaded by a bulldozer onto trailers and then taken to an unknown location. 2797/

1809. Other reports described mass graves near the camp: It was reported that the camp had one mass grave and that the dead were taken to an open mine pit near the camp by truck, and thrown into it. After the bodies were dropped in, dump trucks reportedly came and placed dirt over them. 2798/ One report stated that since the facility had been an open-pit mine, there were parts where previous digging had occurred and clay was hit instead of iron ore. Those spots were reportedly abandoned, and that was where prisoner bodies were taken for burial. 2799/ Other reports stated that the surrounding ore-pits were used to bury corpses. 2800/ One report stated that some of the Omarska camp's victims were dumped in the fish farm lakes south-west of Trnopolje. 2801/ 1810. It was also reported that sometimes bodies were not even buried, but were thrown on a scrap heap. 2802/ It was further reported that frequently, corpses would lay out all day in the sunshine, before being picked up by truck. 2803/

b. Keraterm Camp

1811. (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including Helsinki Watch, US Department of State, Medicins Sans Frontieres, UK Defence Debriefing, Government of Austria, and ABC News.)

1812. Location: The Keraterm camp was located on the site of a ceramics factory, just outside the city of Prijedor. 2804/ According to reports, prisoners were kept in four halls, formerly used as storehouses at the ceramics factory. 2805/

1813. Description of the Keraterm Camp: The Keraterm camp's main building was described as a single two-story rectangular brick structure, measuring approximately 200 metres long by 80 metres wide. 2806/ This structure was reportedly visible from the highway. 2807/ It was reported that there was also a small building located inside the gate, which had formerly been used as a guard shack. 2808/

1814. It was reported that the rooms used to house the prisoners faced the highway and were numbered 1 through 4. One pair of rooms was reportedly separated from the other by a common bathroom. 2809/ The rooms reportedly had no ventilation, but had high, narrow windows that could not be opened and through which nothing could be seen without standing on an object. 2810/ The only way prisoners could pass from one room to the other was reportedly by going outside and along the building to the next door. 2811/

1815. On both ends of the factory building were reportedly grass-covered areas. A concrete-paved area was reportedly in the area in the centre of the yard. 2812/

1816. The camp was said to be surrounded by a one-and one-half metre high chain-link fence topped with "concertina" wire. 2813/ This fence was alternatively described as a two-metre high barbed wire fence. 2814/

1817. It was reported that there were three machine-gun posts to guard the prisoners. 2815/
1818. Number of Prisoners: The estimates of the number of prisoners held at the Keraterm camp range between 1,000 and 3,500. The reports of the number of prisoners held at the Keraterm camp vary greatly. One reason for this could be due to constant turnover of prisoners due to transfers to other camps, as well as other circumstances. For example, one subject reported that when he arrived at the camp in early July 1992, Keraterm contained an estimated 1,500 prisoners. In making this estimate, the subject noted, there was a constant turnover of prisoners, as the dead and infirm were removed and replaced with new detainees.

1819. One subject reported that when arrived at the camp from Prijedor on approximately 25 May 1992, the camp contained approximately 100 prisoners who had been arrested one day earlier. However, it was reported that the camp filled rapidly and on the day of his transfer to Omarska on 27 May 1993, there were approximately 3,500 prisoners held at the Keraterm camp. It was similarly reported by prisoners who were brought to the camp in later May 1992, that the camp held 3,000 prisoners.

1820. The following are representative examples of the number of prisoners reported at the Keraterm camp: 1,000-1,200; 1,500; 1,500-3,000; 1,600-1,700; 2,000; 2,000-2,800; 3,000. The following are representative examples of the number of prisoners reported at the Keraterm camp: 1,000-1,200; 1,500; 1,500-3,000; 1,600-1,700; 2,000; 2,000-2,800; 3,000.

1821. Sex and Age of the Prisoners: It has been generally reported that the Keraterm camp's prisoner population was all male. Most of the men at the camp were reported to be between the ages of 15 and 60.

1822. It was reported, however, that in mid-July 1992, approximately 12 to 15 Bosnian Muslim women were brought to Keraterm, raped, and transported to the Omarska camp. One woman reported that she was held at the camp for one evening and was raped by a man who she identified as Keraterm's commander.

1823. Ethnicity of Prisoners: It was generally reported that most of the prisoners at the Keraterm camp were Bosnian Muslims, with most of the remainder being Croatian. One subject who was held at the camp from 26 June 1992 until 5 July 1992 estimated that 85 percent of the prisoners held at the camp were Bosnian Muslims and 15 percent were Croatian.

1824. Categorization and Organization of Prisoners: One subject from Trnopolje who was held at the camp from 27 May to late July 1992 reported that there was a system at the Keraterm camp to process, identify, and house three categories of prisoners. The subject stated that at the end of May 1992, newly arrived prisoners were taken into a room to be interrogated individually. According to the subject, the questions most frequently asked during interrogation concerned the names of persons selling and buying weapons; persons who had fought against the Bosnian Serbs; persons who were members of the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (SDA); policemen; professionals and highly educated individuals such as doctors, lawyers and teachers, and engineers. After the interrogation was completed, the prisoners were reportedly classified into one of the following three categories: Category A: Prisoners who had not confessed to any crimes, were not members of the SDA, and were not professionals or highly educated individuals. (Category A was reportedly entered on their administrative records and their clothing was marked with green paint); Category B: Prisoners who had confessed during their interrogation to having fought against the Serbs, or who were members of the SDA, and were not policemen, or were professionals or highly educated individuals. (Category B was reportedly entered on their administrative records and their clothing was marked with black paint); Category C: Prisoners who were female, men over the age of 65, and boys under the age of 14 or 15. (Category C was reportedly entered on their administrative records and their clothing was marked with yellow paint).
According to the subject, once the prisoners were categorized, they were sent to the holding area for their assigned category. The first section was reportedly the holding area for the Category C prisoners, the second section, the holding area for the Category A prisoners, and the third the holding area for the Category B prisoners. According to the subject, each day a group of between 30 to 40 prisoners from holding area three containing the Category B prisoners were led away with their hands tied behind their backs with wire and placed onto military trucks. The subject reported that the trucks would leave at night and return empty several hours later and the prisoners were not seen or heard from again. 2831/

1825. Room 1: It was reported that in late May 1992, the prisoners were usually placed in Room 1, which was described as approximately 80 square metres in size, with a ceiling approximately three metres high. 2832/

1826. One subject who was held at the camp from late May 1992 to August 1992 estimated that 250 prisoners were kept in Room 1. 2833/

1827. Room 2: It was reported that once Room 1 became too crowded, prisoners were moved into Room 2, which was twice as large, measuring approximately 160 square metres. According to one report, the room routinely held between 700 to 800 men and was generally used as a holding cell for prisoners awaiting interrogation. 2834/ Once Rooms 1 and 2 were full, prisoners were reportedly taken from Room 2 in groups of 10 and lined up in the corridor, where they waited for interrogation. 2835/ It was reported by one subject that up until 10 July 1992, the only prisoners at the camp were from Prijedor and they were concentrated in Rooms 1 and 2. At one time, it is alleged, there were approximately 1,200 prisoners crammed together into the two rooms. 2836/

1828. One subject who was held at the camp from late May 1992 to August 1992 estimated that about 500 prisoners were held in Room 2. 2837/

1829. Rooms 3 and 4: One subject who was held at the camp from late May 1992 to August 1992 estimated that about 300 prisoners were held in Room 3. 2838/

1830. It was reported that prisoners in Room 3 were given the worst treatment. 2839/ It was further reported that Room 3 was used for torture and killings. 2840/

1831. It was reported that on the afternoon of 10 June 1992, Keraterm's commander ordered all prisoners to be transferred to Rooms 3 and 4. It was also reported that after the arrival of busloads of prisoners from the outskirts of Prijedor, beatings at the Keraterm camp became more harsh for all of the camp's prisoners. The day of 10 June 1992 was also reportedly significant because, from then on all of the new prisoners were reportedly sent first to Room 3 upon arrival instead of Room 1. 2841/

1832. It was also reported that before the arrival of approximately 10 busloads of prisoners from villages southwest of Prijedor, prisoners at Keraterm were not killed by bullets, but by beatings and other means. One subject reported that on 16 July, mass-scale murders began at the camp. 2842/

1833. Dates of Operation-Camp Opening: It was reported that the camp opened between approximately 20 and 26 May 1992. 2843/

1834. Origin and Movement of Prisoners: The Keraterm camp was described in one report as a kind of a collection-transit camp where most detainees were delivered upon arrest and were kept only a few days. The prisoners were usually brought to Keraterm for interrogation or until space was found at the other camps in the area. 2844/ There were, however, a significant number of
prisoners who were reported to have remained at the camp for extended periods of time.

1835. Kozaruša, May 1992: One subject reported that on 20 May 1992, Serb forces began to shell the village of Kozaruša and continued to do so for two days. Thereafter, 200 male inhabitants were reportedly rounded up and packed into buses to be taken to camps, including Keraterm, Omarska and Trnopolje. An undisclosed number of villagers were taken to the Keraterm camp, where they reportedly remained for two days. According to the subject, many of the prisoners were beaten and abused by camp guards there. The subject reported that on or about 23 May, Keraterm was emptied, and about 300 prisoners were transported to the Omarska camp. 2845/

1836. Another subject reported that on 24 May 1992, Kozaruša was attacked and Muslim men were either killed or arrested. The subject reported that within hours, the men who had been arrested were taken by truck to a "makeshift" camp at the Keraterm factory. The subject stated that after being interrogated for an unspecified period of time, prisoners were transported on crowded and overheated buses to Omarska, where they arrived on 28 May 1992. 2846/

1837. Prijedor, May-June-July 1992: One subject reported that he was arrested and brought to the Prijedor police station on approximately 24 May 1992, and kept overnight in the street there with other men, women and children. The men in the group (approximately 50) were reportedly registered and abused. The next day the women and children were reportedly taken to the Trnopolje camp and the men were taken to Keraterm camp. Subject reported that he, his son, and dozens of other prisoners, were transferred to the Omarska camp on 27 May 1992. 2847/

1838. Another subject reported that he was arrested in Kozarac on 25 May 1992, and along with 50 to 60 men, women and children, were put on buses to the Prijedor police station. The men in the group were thereafter separated and abused for an undisclosed period of time. A small bus thereafter arrived and transported some of the men to the Keraterm camp. The subject reported that he was transported to the Omarska camp at 2230 hours on 27 May 1992. 2848/

1839. One subject reported that on 26 May 1992 at 8:00 p.m., JNA soldiers and armed members of the Prijedor branch of the Serbian Democratic Party began arresting residents of Kozarac and the neighbouring villages and until 3:00 a.m., over 200 persons from Kozarac and Prijedor were imprisoned at the Keraterm camp. The subject reported the number of prisoners at the camp grew with every hour, and that eventually, a large number of prisoners were held there. 2849/

1840. It was reported that on 31 May 1992, approximately 300 Bosnian Muslim men were arrested in the new section of Prijedor and were kept in the street until about 4:00 p.m.. Five buses then reportedly transported the men first to the Omarska camp where they got off the buses and re-boarded. The prisoners were then reportedly taken to the Keraterm camp where they arrived at about 10:00 p.m.. 2850/

1841. One subject reported that he and his sons and nephew were taken into custody in June 1992 by four well-armed soldiers, and interrogated at the "SUP" base. All except the subject's nephew, who was taken to another location, were let go. The subject reported that he was released on the condition that he report to the authorities via telephone daily. The subject reported that on 4 June 1992 he was arrested and taken to the Keraterm camp. 2851/ In a similar report, a subject reported that in June 1992 he was arrested along with his sons and their cousin by four Serbian "special militia" and taken to the Prijedor police station by truck. The subject stated
that after his arrest he was interrogated and verbally abused. The subject that he was accused of aiding Muslim forces and buying weapons for them. The subject reported that he was thereafter released with his sons but was re-arrested by the "specijalna militija" and taken back to the Prijedor police station where he was physically abused by two policemen. The subject stated that after two days, he was transferred to the Keraterm camp at about 8:00 p.m. on 6 July 1992. The subject stated that he remained at the Keraterm camp for only five hours before being taken in a police car to the Omarska camp, which was about a 30 minute drive. 2852/

1842. One subject reported that after being transported to the Omarska camp from Kozarac on approximately 3 June 1992, he was abused, and after nine days was eventually taken to the Prijedor hospital, where he reportedly spent 11 days without medical treatment. The subject was thereafter taken to the Keraterm camp. After being subjected to abuse, and being "interviewed" for an undisclosed period of time, the subject was reportedly taken to the Omarska camp again. 2853/

1843. One subject, reported that on 13 June 1992, he was taken to the Keraterm camp from his home by six Serbian policemen. 2854/

1844. A subject reported that he was arrested in Prijedor on 26 June 1992 and interrogated and beaten by a military official and a SUP official. The subject reported that on the same day, he and seven other Bosnian Muslims were taken to the Keraterm camp where their interrogation protocols were handed over to the camp administration by the accompanying guards. The subject reported that he and the other prisoners were beaten by guards upon arrival at the camp, and that three of the other prisoners were stabbed with a knife and injured. The subject reported that he was not interrogated at Keraterm and remained there until he was transferred to Omarska on 5 July 1992. 2855/

1845. Kozarac, May 1992: It was reported that on 24 May 1992, irregular Serbian forces entered Kozarac, shooting tanks and guns. One subject reported that on 25 May 1992 he began to evacuate a group of persons through the woods towards the Croatian border, and thereafter decided that the group should give itself up. After some members of the group were reportedly killed during its surrender, the subject reported that he was taken on a bus to the Keraterm camp. The subject reported that 120 persons spent two nights on a bus parked at the camp gate, without fresh air or water, and that on the third day, the men were taken off of the bus single file, whereupon, Serbian soldiers beat them on the back and limbs with police batons. According to the subject, the group spent two nights at Keraterm, and on the third day, he and many others were called out at 1:00 a.m., loaded onto buses, told to keep their heads down, and driven to the Omarska camp. 2856/ It was similarly reported that after the attack on Kozarac on 24 May 1992, forces entered the city with a list of religious officials, policemen and other persons of special interest. It was reported that those on the list were killed if found, and the others were taken to camps including Keraterm. 2857/

1846. One subject from Kozarac reported that on 26 May 1992, after hiding for two days during attacks, 1,500 persons were escorted back to Kozarac by JNA-Serbian soldiers. In Kozarac, the men were reportedly separated and informed that they were being taken for an investigation. Subject reported that two buses of men were taken to the "Keroterm" camp where they were locked in the buses for an hour, with the heating turned up to the maximum. The prisoners were then reportedly transported to Omarska via "Brešāni". 2858/

1847. On approximately 29 May 1992, a subject and his friends (who were reportedly involved in the Bosnian Muslim armed resistance in Kozarac), were captured in the nearby woods and taken to the Keraterm camp for the first
night. They were thereafter transported to the Omarska camp in a police wagon. 2859/

1848. It was reported (by persons already at the camp) that 300 prisoners arrived at Keraterm from Kozarac on 20 July 1992. 2860/

1849. Various Villages, May-June 1992: One female subject reported that shortly after 23 May 1992, following the attack on her village, she and other women were captured and taken to the Keraterm camp. The women appear to have been transferred relatively quickly to the Trnopolje camp. 2861/

1850. One subject reported that on 21 May 1992, he and eight other men from Trnopolje were rounded up and taken to the Trnopolje camp where they were held until 27 May 1992. The subject reported that on that date they were taken by truck at noon to the Keraterm camp. 2862/

1851. One subject reported that in late May 1992, Serbian "irregular" forces arrested him and the rest of the Muslim male inhabitants of Donji Garevci (six kilometres from Prijedor). The men were reportedly marched to the Trnopolje camp and put on bused to the Omarska camp. Once at Omarska, they found that the camp was full and the prisoners were thereafter transported and imprisoned at the Keraterm camp. 2863/

1852. It was reported that on 10 June 1992, the first busloads of prisoners from the outskirts of Prijedor arrived at the Keraterm camp. One subject reported that nearly 400 men were brought to the Keraterm camp from the villages of Trnopolje, Kozarac, Garevci and Kamići. All had reportedly been beaten prior to their arrival. 2864/

1853. It was reported that villagers from Sivci were taken to the Keraterm camp on 14 June 1992. 2865/

1854. It was reported that on 14 June 1992, male Muslim inhabitants of Trnopolje were taken prisoner by Bosnian Serb forces in the city who stated that the men were to be arrested for routine questioning. The 550 men were then transported in 15 buses to the Keraterm camp and incarcerated. 2866/

1855. It was reported that on 24 June 1992, Serbian irregular forces transported a busload of male civilians from Zecovi to the Keraterm camp. The prisoners reportedly arrived at the camp at about 3:00 hours. 2867/

1856. It was reported that on approximately 16 July 1992, 10 busloads of men arrived at Keraterm from villages southwest of Prijedor, including Hambarine, Rakovani, Čarakovo, Bišani, Zecovi, Ljubija, and Ravska. 2868/

1857. One subject reported that he was arrested by Serbian soldiers on 20 July 1992 and taken to the Keraterm camp via bus. 2869/ Another subject reported that on 20 July 1992 he was bused to the Keraterm camp along with hundreds of other prisoners from his village of Hambarine. 2870/

1858. Subject reported that adult Muslim males were rounded up in Matrići and marched to Trnopolje. Serb "irregulars" reportedly beat and killed some of the men along the way. Upon arrival at Trnopolje, the men were bused to the Omarska camp (which was reportedly full), and thereafter taken to the Keraterm camp. 2871/

1859. One subject reported that Serb forces captured him and others from the area of the village of Rizvanovici (and other villages near Prijedor) and forced them to lie in ditches near a road. The soldiers then reportedly abused the prisoners for one hour until buses arrived. Half of the men were
reportedly transported to the Keraterm camp. At Keraterm, they were reportedly led off the bus and lined up in front of a wire fence where a group of civilian women abused them verbally and allegedly pelted them with stones. Thereafter, the prisoners were informed that there was no room for them at Keraterm, and they were thereafter loaded back onto their buses and brought to the Trnopolje camp via the Omarska camp (which was also reported to be full). 2872/

1860. Transfer of Prisoners-Camp Closing: Reports indicate that the Keraterm camp was closed during the first week of August, 1992. It was reported that Keraterm and the Omarska camps were closed during the first week of August 1992 following an international outcry after media reports on conditions in camps in the region. 2873/

1861. According to one subject, on 2 August 1992, several prisoners were loaded into buses and taken away. The subject alleged that most of the prisoners were killed as they got onto the bus and that blood was seen running from the bottom of the vehicle. 2874/

1862. Other subjects reported that on 3 August 1992, the last remaining 700 prisoners at the camp were transferred to the Trnopolje camp, along with several of the camp's guards. 2875/

1863. A number of subjects reported that the Keraterm camp closed on 5 August 1992. Some prisoners were reportedly taken to Omarska, and 1,200 were taken to the Trnopolje camp. 2876/ One subject reported that in early August 1992, Keraterm's prisoners were dispersed to other camps. The subject stated that two buses were to transport a total of 120 prisoners (who were called off a list), to the Omarska camp, but possibly because it too was closing, the two buses instead took the prisoners to the Manjaa camp. The subject stated that the rest of the prisoners (totaling approximately 2,000 men, including subject), were all sent to the Trnopolje camp. 2877/

1864. One subject reported that he was transferred to the Trnopolje camp on 15 August 1992. 2878/

1865. One subject reported that prior to the camp's closing, some prisoners being held there were moved to the Omarska camp in the middle of the night of 27 May 1992. 2879/

1866. Visits to Keraterm by Outside Organizations and Individuals: One subject described the preparations made in anticipation of the arrival of television journalists at the Keraterm camp. The subject stated that camp authorities:

"[f]ound wooden pallets and forced us to take them out and wash. They disinfected the camp. They selected those who were ill and loaded them into trucks and they did not come back... We and others from Keraterm were transferred to Omarska and Trnopolje when they heard that the journalists would come. There was no shooting by cameras in Keraterm." 2880/

1867. According to reports, in August 1992, western journalists visited what was represented to be the Keraterm camp. The facility which they viewed was described as very clean. When Bosnian Serbian authorities were questioned by journalists about whether anyone had been beaten or killed at the facility, they reportedly stated that those were only stories which were not true. However, after seeing the videotape of the journalists' visit to the facility, former risoners stated that the site viewed by journalists was not the Keraterm camp, but was a brick factory located about 300 metres from the actual camp. 2881/
1868. Helsinki Watch reported that it visited the Keraterm camp in August 1992, and that Serbian military authorities showed them one part of the factory which was empty. The area had reportedly been cleaned, and the walls freshly painted. There was reportedly a large ceramic baking kiln in the hall. Helsinki Watch stated that none of Keraterm's ex-detainees interviewed remembered a kiln in their place of detention. Based on this information, Helsinki Watch believed that it was not shown all or any of the areas in which prisoners were kept. Helsinki Watch also reported that its representatives observed that the outside wall in front of one of the rooms had been repaired.

1869. Other sources reported that western journalists who visited the Keraterm camp in August 1992 were prevented from examining the location where the July 1992 mass killings took place. Two unidentified journalists reportedly stated that it appeared that local authorities there were cleaning a wall and adjacent area where prisoners had allegedly been shot.

1870. Another report stated that while western journalists were not shown the room where the shooting was said to have taken place on their first visit in early August 1992, a return trip approximately a week later found the doorway and the outside wall of the room where the alleged incident took place, pocked with what appeared to be bullet holes. New panes of glass had reportedly been installed on the window panes which still had their masking tape across them.

1871. Intake Procedures: Prisoners arriving at the Keraterm camp were reported to have been subjected to a variety of abuses. One subject reported that upon arrival at the camp on 24 June 1992, the prisoners were met by a group of soldiers and camp guards who proceeded to beat them with baseball bats and rifle butts as they came off the bus. The subject reported that prior to entering their detention rooms, the prisoners were subjected to a registration process, which included demands for all valuables. A man in civilian clothes reportedly asked the subject his full name, date of birth, and place of residence and wrote this information into a large record book.

1872. One subject reported that prisoners who arrived at the camp in late May 1992 were formed into three groups and were administered a beating before being put into a crowded room with over 200 people.

1873. It was reported that during intake, prisoners had to leave their buses in groups of five and were beaten with heavy sticks to the head. It was also reported that after arriving in the evening, the prisoners had to walk to the camp building through rows of soldiers who beat them. One subject who arrived on 9 July 1992 reported that two prisoners died the same night due to their injuries. Another subject, who also arrived at the Keraterm camp on 9 July 1992, reported that the arriving prisoners had to line up and sing Serbian songs, and that soldiers shot around in order to make them sing louder.

1874. It was reported that upon their arrival at the camp, prisoners were registered and frequently searched for valuable items and money. Ill-treatment upon intake was also reported. One subject reported that upon arrival at the camp, his personal possessions, documents, belt and bootlaces, and other items were removed.

1875. According to one subject, when prisoners were initially processed at the camp they were first checked by a guard upon arrival. The subject identified one guard who was almost always on duty at night during the prisoner arrival and described the young man as especially brutal. The subject reported that when processing prisoners, the guard would routinely strip them of their
jewelry and money, and then beat them using metal pipes or thick wooden sticks, often breaking their bones. 2890/ Another subject described a process, by which all of the prisoners got off their bus and put their hands up in the air. One-by-one, the men went to a porter, who took all of their belongings. The prisoners were then reportedly brought to their accommodations. 2891/

1876. It was also reported that when prisoners arrived at the camp, they were first checked by guards to ensure that they did not possess weapons. The prisoners were then reportedly taken to one of the four rooms used for accommodation. 2892/

1877. One subject reported that when his group arrived at the camp in late May 1992, one of the prisoners asked an identified guard for a cigarette and was told to come down from the truck to get it. The guard reportedly fired a single rifle shot and killed the prisoner. 2893/ Another subject reported that upon arrival at the camp from Prijedor on 26 June 1992, he and seven other prisoners were beaten, and three of the prisoners were stabbed with a knife and wounded. 2894/

1878. One subject reported that upon arrival at the Keraterm camp in early July 1992, the guards formed a gauntlet, and the prisoners had to walk singly into the building. The guards reportedly beat the prisoners with various implements. 2895/

1879. Another subject reported that after they were registered in late June 1992, the prisoners were beaten and brought to their respective detention rooms. The subject reported that Room 1 was filled with men, many of whom were begging for help. After a short time, four or five Serb guards reportedly opened the door to the room and asked: "Who is new?" The approximately 20 newly arrived prisoners to Room 1 reportedly responded and were taken out into the courtyard where the guards arranged them into a circle and once again demanded money and valuables. About 10 more guards were said to have come to the circle, and then all of the guards reportedly beat the prisoners' heads, ribs, backs and legs with the butts of their M-48 rifles. Five of the prisoners were reportedly killed by the beating and the rest of the prisoners were returned to Room 1. According to the subject, the guards then moved on to another detention room and repeated the process of calling for newly arrived prisoners. 2896/

1880. Interrogations: It was reported that all of the prisoners at the Keraterm camp were interrogated and that the interrogations were held in rooms on the second floor of the main camp building. 2897/ It was further reported that during the interrogations, most everyone was severely beaten. After interrogations, educated and wealthy prisoners were reportedly beaten to death. Those individuals who confessed to having weapons at home were reportedly taken to the Omarska camp. The others reportedly remained at the Keraterm camp. 2898/

1881. A subject who was taken to the camp in late May 1992, and was transferred to the Omarska camp three to four days later, stated that the prisoners at Keraterm were interrogated and that none of them remained at the camp for more than four days. The subject added that every Muslim detained at the camp was subjected to several interrogations accompanied by beatings. The interrogators reportedly questioned inmates about hidden weapons, incriminating documents, and gold. The interrogators also reportedly accused prisoners of being members of or having affiliation with Muslim resistance forces. 2899/

1882. A subject who was held at Keraterm from 13 June to August 1992 reported that one day, all of the inhabitants of Kamiani detained at the camp were
called out:

"We had to line up in front of the building, face to the wall, and they asked us if we knew somebody who owned a weapon. Those who said 'no' were beaten on the head, the neck and in the ribs with a wooden stick. Whoever dared to resist or just to turn his head was beaten to unconsciousness."

Another witness reportedly confirmed that it was a common practice for guards to single out a group of men from the same region. 2900

1883. One subject similarly reported that on his second day in the camp in mid-June 1992, 40 prisoners from the village of Kamiani were called out by an identified guard, who screamed at them and beat them outside the dormitory with a baton. The subject reported further that the prisoners were asked who had kept firearms at home and that the subject was identified and was beaten repeatedly with thick electric cables and truncheons. The subject reported that three days later, two of the guards who had beaten him, yelled at him about his supposed involvement in the attack on a Serb village. The subject reported that he tried to defend himself and that an identified guard pulled out a knife to gouge out his eyes, but that subject managed to push away the guard's arm and instead had the right side of his neck slashed. The subject reported that the guard then pulled the trigger of an un-loaded pistol points-blank at subject's temple, whereupon the subject confessed to having fired on the Serb village, although he had not done so. The subject reported that the identified guard then unsuccessfully attempted to cut off his ear and thereafter stabbed both of the subject's thigh and twisted the knife, taking out pieces of flesh. 2901

1884. Another subject reported:

"I was questioned and beaten . . . I also saw how others were beaten with heavy objects. They were beaten with rifle butts and heavy sticks. Some of them died of their injuries. Once I saw how a soldier stabbed a knife into the leg of a prisoner." 2902

1885. It was reported that prisoners were questioned about who had fired upon them from villages and who had weapons and other materials. One subject reported that interrogators attempted to coerce them into joining their forces. 2903

1886. One subject reported that during his nearly three month stay at the camp, he was interrogated on three occasions, each time for 20 minutes. He stated that two Bosnian Serb police interrogators in blue uniforms questioned him about his relatives, his last employment in Croatia, the names and activities of co-workers, if he knew other Muslims or Croats who possessed weapons, and if he was a member of a political party. The subject reported that during the interrogations he had to keep his hands crossed behind his head and was beaten with clubs and fists. 2904

1887. Camp Conditions—Meals—Nourishment: Numerous reports describe a situation in which prisoners were denied food and drink for extended periods of time and during their first days at the camp. 2905

1888. It was generally reported that prisoners at the camp received one meal per day, composed of two slices of bread and a kind of soup. 2906/ It was similarly reported that prisoners received daily rations consisting of two pieces of bread and a couple of scoops of beans or peas. 2907
1889. One subject who was held in room number three, stated that prisoners in his area of detention were fed one meal a day, usually outdoors. 2908/ It was also reported that on occasion, food was withheld as a punitive measure. He stated: "Sometimes, we were not fed. We were being specially punished. The men in the other rooms were fed but we were not." 2909/

1890. It was reported that prisoners at the camp were abused during mealtime. 2910/ Prisoners were beaten on their way to the place where food was handed out. Guards reportedly lined up to beat the crowd of prisoners arbitrarily and some subjects described oil and water being poured on steps to cause prisoners to fall and suffer further beatings. 2911/ Other examples of abuse during meal-time was reported. 2912/

1891. Water: It was reported that the prisoners were not routinely given water but that they were given containers which they could fill themselves in the bathroom, if given the chance. 2913/ One subject reported that the "second section" had a water faucet which permitted prisoners to drink water whenever they desired. 2914/

1892. Other subjects described low quality water. One subject who arrived at the camp on 20 July 1992, described being given "some type of polluted water to drink." 2915/ The water was also described as: "river water which had been formerly used as cooling water for the factory circuits". 2916/

1893. Sleeping Facilities: It was reported that the prisoners at the camp were held in overcrowded rooms, where it was often impossible to sit or lay down. 2917/ One subject described the conditions at the camp on 20 July 1992, when he was placed in room number three. He reported that the room had about 400 men occupying it. The subject stated that people were standing on top of each other; that there was no air to breathe, and that it was very hot. 2918/

1894. One subject reported that in early July 1992, he was brought to an unidentified room which held an estimated 550 prisoners. The subject reported that the prisoners were packed so tightly into this and other rooms that they could sit, but they could not lie down. 2919/ Another subject described a similar room holding 550 prisoners. According to the subject, the room was so crowded that the prisoners had to take turns standing so some could lie or sit. However, the subject noted that there were beds in the room for the oldest and sickest prisoners. The room was reportedly the largest at the camp. 2920/ Another subject similarly described a room in the second "section" which held 550 prisoners. He estimated that the third and fourth "sections" held approximately 250 or more prisoners each. The subject reported that in the second "section", three prisoners were made to share a one square metre space. He added that they hardly had any room to stand and move, and when sleeping they had to lay over each other. 2921/

1895. One subject reported that after arriving at the camp on 20 July 1992, the prisoners were processed and taken to a larger room which already housed prisoners. According to the subject, there were about 300 prisoners in the room, but as buses kept arriving, more men were put inside. The subject stated that although prisoners were already crowded against the walls of the room, an additional 100 prisoners were placed there. Eventually, 400 men were crowded into the room. 2922/

1896. It was reported that although there were often stifling hot temperatures in the rooms, prisoners were not allowed to open the windows. 2923/

1897. Prisoners at the camp reportedly slept without blankets on concrete floors. 2924/ It was further reported, that the prisoners slept partly on pallets. 2925/ One subject reported that the oldest and sickest prisoners had
1898. Medical Treatment: It was reported that the Keraterm camp had no medical infirmary, no medical personnel and that the prisoners at the camp received no medical care. Some prisoners, however, were reportedly cared for by a doctor who was imprisoned with them. 2927/

1899. It was reported that prisoners at the camp suffered from diarrhoea, fleas, and serious weight loss. 2928/

1900. It was reported that the bathroom had no functioning plumbing and that dysentery resulted, though not at an epidemic proportion. 2929/

1901. Toilets: It was reported that a common bathroom area separated the two pairs of rooms at the camp, and was located between Rooms 2 and 3. 2930/ The bathroom reportedly had no functioning plumbing. 2931/ Each latrine was reported to have used buckets or barrels. 2932/ It was also reported that there was no toilet paper in the bathroom. 2933/

1902. Prisoners were reportedly not allowed to use the bathroom at night, but were given containers which they could use in their holding areas. 2934/ One subject reported that in one corner of each room was a metal barrel to be used by prisoners as a toilet during the night. According to the subject, the container in the second room frequently overflowed and the feces spilled onto the floor. 2935/

1903. During the day, the prisoners were allowed to use the bathroom, but as they passed outside from their rooms, they were reportedly kicked and severely beaten by the guards using metal pipes and rifle butts. 2936/ A number of reports describe the beating and sometimes killing, of prisoners going to or returning from the toilet facilities. 2937/

1904. Hygiene: It was generally reported that Keraterm's prisoners were unable to wash and were not provided with soap. 2938/ One subject reported that he went for 53 days without washing, shaving or washing his clothes. 2939/ Another subject reported:

"[w]e had lice. I couldn't wash for 55 days. We couldn't shave . . . . In the hall in which I stayed there was a barrel for relieving nature. When it was full, the excess was laying around." 2940/

Other subjects report that they did not wash for extended periods of time. 2941/

1905. One subject reported that at 6:00 a.m., the prisoners were allowed to remain outdoors for about an hour, during which time they could clean themselves. The subject added that if a prisoner had to use the bathroom at another time, he had to relieve himself in his room. 2942/

1906. Weight Loss: One source reported that prisoners held at the camp for longer periods of time, suffered weight loss of 20 kilograms on the average. 2943/ Others reported a weight loss of up to approximately 30 kilograms after 50 days at the camp. 2944/

1907. Individual subjects reported the following weight loss: 32 kilograms from late May until August 1992; 2945/ 23 kilograms from late May to August 1992; 2946/ 17 kilograms in 29 days from late May 1992; 2947/ and 10 kilograms from late June to early August 1992. 2948/

1908. Prisoner Routine: It was reported that prisoner exercise was limited to
a few minutes a day in a small, paved courtyard off the northwest side of the building. 2949/

1909. It was also reported that guards tolerated occasional visitors at the camp who would talk with prisoners through the fence surrounding the courtyard. 2950/

1910. Members of a family, whose home was reportedly located in the vicinity of the Keraterm camp stated that they witnessed people bringing food to their relatives who were imprisoned at the camp. It was reported that on one occasion, an old man who brought food for his three sons was not allowed to give food to them and was denied access to the camp. According the report, the man was stopped approximately 50 metres from the camp by two drunk soldiers who beat him to death. 2951/

1911. Forced Labour: One subject reported that in late July 1992, he and nine other prisoners in his room, volunteered for the "wheat harvest" detail at the camp. The subject stated that camp guards seized an additional 20 prisoners at random to complete the work detail. According to the subject, the prisoners were driven to the village of Tukovi, where they collected firewood "for the wives of Serb soldiers at the front", and then to Sredeci where they began the three-day task of collecting corpses. The subject reported that the prisoners were also taken to other villages and that "[t]he most corpses were in Bišani, Zecovi and arakovo." 2952/

1912. One subject reported that prisoners called for work duty never came back. According to the subject, those who helped to load corpses onto trucks never came back. The subject also reported that soldiers would come to the camp to collect prisoners for work duty and that those prisoners never came back either. Another subject reported that while he was at the Keraterm camp, over 100 prisoners were taken out for work duty and never came back. He stated that his brother was taken away for work duty on 26 July 1992 and never reappeared. 2953/

1913. Special Treatment of Certain Prisoners: It was widely reported that mostly wealthy and educated prisoners were singled out for abuse at the camp. One subject reported that after arriving at the camp in early July, 1992, there was an initial systematic removal and killing of all educated individuals and those who had held any sort of civic or leadership role in their communities. The camp guards reportedly used registration lists initially obtained in May 1992 to identify individuals to be killed. The subject reported that guards followed this procedure nightly and that about 10-15 prisoners would be beaten severely and return to their rooms. The subject stated, however, that most of the other prisoners taken would not return and that shots were often heard. 2954/

1914. One subject recalled that guards would ask prisoners to give their professions, "and if they found someone with a high position or a higher educational degree, they would execute them. I think the intelligentsia of Prijedor has just disappeared", he said. 2955/

1915. It was also reported that at both the Keraterm and Omarska camps, Bosnian Muslim men who had been policemen were targeted for special abuse. 2956/

1916. One subject reported that identified guards would single out prisoners for beatings who received packages from their wives and families. 2957/

1917. It was also reported that victims also appeared to be chosen arbitrarily. 2958/
1918. Abuse and Killing During Detention: A family who lived near the camp reported that at night, they could hear the sounds of people being tortured at the camp. 2959/ One subject reported that in his 55 days at the camp (from 14 June to 5 August 1992), he could recall only five days when beatings did not occur. 2960/

1919. It was reported that new prisoners were given the "rules of the house" by other prisoners, which was to hide at the back of the room if at all possible to avoid beatings when a guard entered. 2961/

1920. Subjects reported that camp guards and visitors to the camp used lists to call their victims. One subject reported that every evening, "irregular" soldiers came to the room and called out names from a list. Those prisoners were reportedly brought to a room and beaten severely. The prisoners were then returned to their original rooms where they in some cases, died. 2962/ Another subject similarly reported that every evening, a truck of drunk soldiers would arrive at the camp and that the soldiers would beat the prisoners. According to the subject, the soldiers would call out people by name and sometimes administer fatal beatings. 2963/

1921. It was widely reported that prisoners at the camp would be beaten by drunk guards and other individuals at night. 2964/ One subject reported that identified guards would come to the dormitories at night and call out prisoners, and that inevitably, one or two of the tortured prisoners died. He stated that the guards used rifle butts, batons with spike balls, heavy wire cables, and baseball bats for the beatings. 2965/

1922. One subject reported that every night, guards would read 10-15 names from a list. They would read out the person's first name, his surname and his date of birth. The men were then taken from the room and returned later in very poor condition. The victims were reported as bloody, with broken bones, falling down, vomiting blood, and fainting. According to the subject, by the morning some would die. 2966/

1923. One subject reported that he was subject to beatings almost everyday at the camp. He stated that a group of drunken "etniks" were at the camp each night. He stated that raw cattle "offal" was thrown to the prisoners and in their hunger people tore it up and ate it. He also stated that "Serbians" would cut strips of flesh from the arms of dead prisoners and force other prisoners to eat it. 2967/

1924. One subject reported that about two days after his arrival in late June 1992, a new group of guards arrived with a handwritten list containing the names of the approximately 15 newly arrived prisoners from Zecovi having the same last name as subject. The subject reported that he and the other prisoners were taken to a "special room" and on the way were again asked to turn over their valuables. The prisoners were then thrown into the room and told to lie on their stomachs on the floor. They were then reportedly kicked and beaten with rifle butts, and baseball bats. Some of the guards reportedly wore gloves without fingers, but with metal knobs inserted in the knuckle area. The subject reported that thereafter, a military truck arrived to take some of the victims away. A guard then reportedly arrived and rounded up four or five prisoners from Rooms 2 and 3, whose names were on a list he carried. The prisoners were then ordered to kneel on the ground and were reportedly shot and killed. The bodies were then loaded by prisoners and transported out of the camp. The same subject also reported that after about 15 days in the camp (in early July 1992), about 16 prisoners (including a doctor and a teacher) whose names were on a list, were taken from their rooms and were divided into two groups of eight, and were forced to kneel, facing each other. After a while, a group of guards then came over with baseball bats and one
guard reportedly said to the teacher: "You are the person who planned the killing of 40 Serbs". Six or seven guards then reportedly concentrated their beating on the teacher, who was knocked unconscious, and died. 2968/

1925. It was reported that prisoners at the camp were frequently attacked with knives and other objects. One subject who was held at the camp from 14 June to 6 August 1992 reported:

"Several times I saw that Serbian soldiers used to stick a knife into the legs of prisoners. Other prisoners' arms were broken. Some were beaten with iron and rubber sticks. If they died from their injuries, the soldiers just threw them on the rubbish heap." 2969/

1926. One subject reported that he was cut attacked by an identified guard at the camp who cut his left foot with a knife and forced him to sew it with a "twist". The subject further alleged soldiers cut a "U" for "Ustaše" into his back. 2970/

1927. One subject reported that the camp guards would often torture prisoners by extinguishing cigarette butts on naked parts of their bodies, or on their faces. 2971/

1928. Another subject who arrived at the camp in mid-June 1992, reported that he witnessed as one brother was forced to bite the testicles off of another brother. The subject also reportedly witnessed a prisoner who was forced to sit naked upon a one litre Coca-Cola bottle and was beaten upon his shoulders until blood poured out of his anus and he bled to death. 2972/ Other subjects similarly reported that prisoners had to take off their clothes and sit on bottles and were subjected to other "games" by the guards. 2973/

1929. It has been widely reported that on approximately 20-24 July 1992, a mass execution of prisoners took place at the Keraterm camp in Room 3. According to one representative account taken from former prisoners who claimed to have witnessed and survived the attack, the following events occurred up to and including the incident: Subjects reported that on 20 July 1992, 300 new prisoners from Kozarac arrived at the Keraterm camp. It was reported that the men were tormented, abused and beaten for the next four days by soldiers in the camp's parking lot. Thereafter, the prisoners were put back into Room 3. The temperature outside was reportedly 38 degrees Centigrade (100 degrees Fahrenheit), and it was also sweltering inside Room 3 where the men were locked up. According to reports, the men in Room 3 had not been given water for three days, and started to lost their minds. The men reportedly were running out of air in the room, hallucinating, and taking off their clothes. As they lost control, soldiers from the outside reportedly warned: "We're going to kill you if you don't stop." According to a subject who was in Room 2, machine guns were lined up next to the door of Room 3. Another subject reported that he was near the door in Room 1 and saw five machine gun bays, all shooting into Room 3. It was reported that there was blood everywhere, and that prisoners were lying on the ground. In the morning, soldiers reportedly recruited prisoners to dispose of the dead bodies in Room 3. According to a subject, the bodies were piled like wood into a truck which was eight metres long. One subject estimated that 120 prisoners had been killed and 67 others wounded. The wounded were reportedly loaded onto the truck along with the dead. As the truck started to pull away, it was noted that there was a sound like water was spilling. According to a subject who reportedly saw the truckload of corpses drive by his home in Prijedor, the vehicle's tarp was rolled halfway back, and he could see corpses naked to the waist with bruises on their backs, thrown onto the truck like pieces of wood. 2974/

1930. Other reports appear to describe the same incident. While the accounts
vary as to detail, they appear to describe the same series of events. 2975/

1931. As noted in the some of the accounts above, it was reported that in the
days following the alleged mass-execution at the Keraterm camp, groups of men
were reportedly taken out and killed by machine-gun. One source reported that
former prisoners estimated that from 30 to 40 prisoners were killed on those
occasions. 2976/

1932. Number of Prisoners Killed During Detention: Various reports estimate
that between five and 10 prisoners were killed at the Keraterm camp per night.
According to one report, between five and 10 prisoners "disappeared" every
night at the camp. 2977/ One subject reported that in Room 3 alone, five
prisoners were taken out and shot every night from approximately 20 July until
5 August 1992. 2978/ A subject who was held at the camp from 19 June to 5
August 1992 reported that five to six prisoners were killed every night at
Keraterm. He stated that those prisoners were taken out of the halls and
killed. He stated that when the soldiers at the camp were drunk, they killed
even more. 2979/

1933. One subject who was held at the camp from 9 July to 5 August 1992
reported that every day over 10 prisoners were killed at the camp. He stated
further that severely wounded individuals were brought away by truck and never
came back. 2980/ Another subject reported that at least 10 prisoners were
killed per day at the camp. However, the subject added that there were days
when as many as 200 prisoners were killed. 2981/

1934. One subject who was held at the camp from late May to August 1992,
estimated that 15-20 prisoners died daily as a result of beatings and
torture. 2982/

1935. One subject reported that during his time at the camp from 25 to 27 May
1992, 50 to 100 prisoners were killed by shooting or beating. 2983/

1936. A subject who was held at the camp from 26 June until 5 July 1992 stated
that during the days of his detention, 200 to 300 prisoners died as a result
of beating and torture, and direct killing. 2984/

1937. One subject reported that between early July to 5 August 1992,
approximately 400 to 500 prisoners were killed at the Keraterm camp as a
result of beatings, torture, or execution. 2985/

1938. Disposal of Bodies: Subjects reported that after prisoners were abused
and killed, the bodies would be taken to an area for trash disposal, and in
the morning, the bodies would be transported to unknown sites. 2986/

1939. It was generally reported that prisoners killed at the camp were
transported away by truck and that prisoners at the camp were forced to load
the bodies onto the vehicles. 2987/ A family who lived near the camp reported
that after mass killings, their street would be red with blood. 2988/

1940. It was reported that prisoners at the camp had to remove the bodies of
those killed. 2989/ It was also reported that often, those in charge of
picking up bodies of prisoners killed or wounded at the camp often went
missing after carrying out their duties. 2990/

1941. Subjects believed that bodies from the camp were buried in the village
of Tomašica, near Omarska; 2991/ one of three mass graves in areas near
Prijedor: Tomašica, Omarska or Kurovo; 2992/ the Tomašica, Omarska and Ljubija
mines in the vicinity of Prijedor; 2993/ a mass grave in a cemetery in the
Pašinac area of Prijedor; 2994/ near a former brickyard in the vicinity called
"Bajr"; 2995/ and Lake Ribnjak. 2996/

1942. Forced Beatings by Prisoners: One subject reported that from approximately 21 to 30 July 1992, prisoners were randomly selected and forced to strip and fight one another outside until one of the two men died. 2997/ It was also reported that sometimes 10 to 15 prisoners were made to fight against each other. 2998/

1943. One subject reported that guards would force prisoners to run in a circle and kick the person in front of them in the kidneys. 2999/

1944. One subject reported that each day prisoners were forced to beat each other with wooden tool handles for about 20 minutes and that guards would also pick out a group of approximately 40 prisoners to be beaten at random. The subject added that a group of prisoners was then given the task of cleaning up the blood. 3000/

1945. One subject reported that every night guards would come into the room with about five soldiers and beat prisoners to death. The subject stated that the men would line up 50 prisoners and force them to fight each other with their bare hands. The soldiers would reportedly stand nearby with metal bars topped with a sort of ball and if anyone fell down, they would strike them on the head. Survivors of this ordeal were reported to have been killed later. 3001/

1946. It was reported that food was allowed from the outside, though it was first handed to the guards and then given to the prisoners. 3002/

c. Trnopolje

1947. (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State, Helsinki Watch and ICRC.)

1948. Location: Trnopolje is a small village within the municipality of Kozarac, about five or six kilometres south of the town of Kozarac. The village lies just to the north of the railroad line running between Prijedor, Omarska and Banja Luka. The station itself is reportedly called "Kozarac station." 3003/ Across the tracks, a few hundred yards south of the village, is Lake Ribnjak, which is used as a fish hatchery. 3004/

1949. Prior to the Serb occupation, according to one subject, Trnopolje village had a population of about 950 families (approximately 5,000 people) of which 704 were Muslim, 10 Croat, the remainder being Serb, Ukrainian, Albanian, and others. The population primarily worked in agriculture, and a large number worked in various countries of western Europe. 3005/

1950. The village was reportedly occupied by Serb forces in late May 1992. 3006/ According to one subject, later that day approximately 20 buses arrived with Bosnian Muslim "refugees" under the escort of about 50 Serbian Territorial Defence and Serbian Regular army soldiers. 3007/ The refugees were placed in the Trnopolje school. 3008/

1951. The village was attacked at a later date. Trnopolje is described as a burned wreck in October 1992. 3009/

1952. One subject reports that after the occupation of Trnopolje in late May, non-Serb villagers were allowed to remain in their own homes. However in mid-June and early July, the Muslim villagers with homes in and around Trnopolje
were forced into the camp. 3010/

1953. According to a another report, the town of Trnopolje was ethnically cleansed on 4 July 1992. 3011/

1954. Reportedly, the town was controlled through checkpoints around it, and barbed wire was placed around the central public buildings. 3012/

1955. Description: One report described the camp as being "hastily set up." 3013/ The camp reportedly had three entrances, and seven guard posts 3014/ and was about 300 square metres. 3015/

1956. Trnopolje was referred to as a "refugee reception centre" or an "open camp" by Serb authorities. 3016/ However, according to one report, Trnopolje was actually run like a detention centre from May to August 1992. 3017/

1957. When the camp was "discovered" by international journalists and later visited by the ICRC, 3018/ one subject reports that the camp guards and administration became more lenient. 3019/ The barbed wire was removed from the perimeter of the camp and the local Serbian Red Cross gave out identity cards. However, after the wire was removed the guards reportedly patrolled the camp with automatic weapons. 3020/

1958. The detainees were allowed to leave the camp for work or seeking food if they left their identification papers with the guards. 3021/ However, many detainees feared attack once they left the camp and preferred to remain within the compound. 3022/

1959. While the reports are not consistent in their descriptions of the camp there is a basic consensus that the camp consisted of a school building and another public building, possibly a community building ("dom"). 3023/ Reports describe the makeshift tents where a large number of the detainees live as produced from scraps of wood and wire fencing covered with pieces of cloth or other material, with little waterproofing in evidence. 3024/ However, one subject reports that a number of white nylon tents, each housing 20 people, were set up west of the school and community building. 3025/ According to another subject, approximately 40 prisoners shared each tent and did their own cooking. 3026/ One report states that the yard behind the community hall was full of the vehicles in which people had driven to the camp. 3027/

1960. One report states that the

"larger camps, such as those at Omarska, Banja Luka and Trnopolje, had almost identical construction features. For example, one metre spacing from the barbed wire with guard dogs in between, watchtowers at regular intervals with spotlights and mounted machine-guns. . . . [The] camps had separate groups of interior and exterior guards. The perimeter guards were regular line troops whose duties were confined to guarding the camp". 3028/

1961. Reportedly village houses were also incorporated into the camp due to the increasing number of detainees. According to one subject, houses around the camp are reported to have held at least 70 to 80 people. 3029/ One subject reported that after 10 days at the camp she and others were allowed to move into a house. She states that the doors were required to be unlocked and that people were taken from the houses and women were raped. 3030/

1962. The camp administration offices are reported to have been located across the road from the camp (the community building and school). It is also reported that offices of the local Red Cross were at the same location. 3031/
1963. While it is reported that the camp had been ringed with barbed wire, whether the wire surrounded the various buildings or just the camp perimeter is not clear. 3032/ Reportedly the barbed wire fencing was removed in early August, in response to the first visits by international journalists and the ICRC. 3033/

1964. With the removal of the fencing, Trnopolje gave the appearance of an open camp. 3034/ However, guards with automatic weapons reportedly made patrols around the camp limits. 3035/ One report describes the camp as

"more or less an open area, without wire enclosures, but with strategically placed guards to keep the prisoners from escaping. To discourage flight at night, shots were constantly fired over the heads of the people sleeping in the field after the 2100 hours curfew." 3036/

1965. For the most part the men were detained separately from the women and children. 3037/ Some of the detainees, mainly the women and children, slept in the schoolhouse and in the community building. However, it is reported that many of the detainees slept outside in the yard, in the open air. 3038/

1966. Camp Population: Helsinki Watch has identified what it believes were the three categories of Trnopolje detainees: 3039/

(a) Forcibly displaced persons from the area, such as non-Serb women, children, and elderly men. (Most forcibly displaced men were detained at Omarska, Keraterm, or Manjaa.)

(b) Prisoners who were transferred to Trnopolje after the Omarska and Keraterm camps were closed. These people were separated from the rest of the detainees at first, frequently interned in the school, and some were beaten.

(c) Muslim and Croats who voluntarily abandoned their villages in Serb-occupied areas, and who thought it would be safer to be in the camp than to remain in their homes. These people believed that they would be registered by the ICRC and resettled in another country.

1967. The majority of the detainees were Muslims from north-west Bosnia, however Croats and other non-Serbs were also held at Trnopolje. The camp population consisted for the most part of women and children who had been expelled from their homes and whose male family members had been detained in other locations. Reportedly the residents of a village would be gathered at a one location and then the women and children would be separated from the men and transported to Trnopolje. 3040/ Many of the men held at Trnopolje had been brought there from other places of large-scale detention. There were also people who were seeking safety from the violence in the surrounding area 3041/ and those hoping to qualify for third country resettlement. 3042/ One subject reports that he was brought to the camp in a military vehicle after having paid 100 DM, because he didn't know where else to go. 3043/

1968. Because Trnopolje served as a transit camp the camp population fluctuated throughout its operation. Women, children, old men, and injured or sick younger men were taken in organized convoys to Muslim or Croatian-controlled areas. 3044/

1969. While one subject reports that the camp housed approximately 1,500 prisoners, 3045/ the majority of reports place the number of detainees at between 1,500 and 6,000 during the summer and early fall of 1992. 3046/ Other reports place the number higher, up to 10,000. 3047/ One subject estimated the number of people at Trnopolje at about 5,000; of these 300 were children, 3,000 women, and the balance consisting mainly of elderly men. 3048/
1970. Organization of Prisoners: It is reported that the men and women were housed separately, and that women and children primarily were housed in the school, while many detainees slept outside in the yard. Some were able to improvise coverings or home-made tents.

1971. It is reported that men transferred from other camps were held for the first few days at the school building.

1972. Length of Detention: It is reported that groups of people "constantly" arrived and departed from the camp. And that while some of the detainees (primarily women and children) were held only a short time before being transferred out of Serb-held territory, some detainees were held for as long as four months.

1973. Prison Records: Reportedly people were called from lists and taken away and never seen again. According to one report the people called from the lists were professionals, teachers, the wealthy and those who had were suspected of having held arms.

1974. One subject reports that he was among the two busloads of prisoners transferred from Omarska on 3 June. The subject claims that when the buses arrived at Trnopolje, one of the Serbian guards had a list from which he called out names. Approximately 20 men were taken and none returned.

1975. Dates of Operation-Camp Opening: Testimony from former detainees indicate that Trnopolje camp opened some time in late May. There are some reports, however, which put the opening date as April. The camp was reported to still be in full operation 1 October 1992.

1976. Visits by Media and Outside Organizations: The international press visited Trnopolje in early August 1992, and photographed prisoners in the fenced area. However, prisoners reportedly could not talk freely because the visitors were under Serb military escort, and prisoners feared reprisals if they spoke frankly about conditions and treatment.

1977. Camp officials had the wire removed in early August after the first visits from the media and outside organizations. Reportedly, also at this time, the men sleeping outside were also allowed to erect makeshift tents.

1978. ICRC Monitoring: According to an ICRC report, representatives of that organization first visited Trnopolje on 27 August 1992. According to one report Serb officials refused to allow the Red Cross visit until that date.

1979. According to one report made in September 1992, the Red Cross had recently been delivering prepared meals, one for each detainee. Another subject reports that Red Cross food was distributed to many prisoners, however the representatives would stay for only 30 minutes and when they left the food was taken from the prisoners. According to another report Serbian soldiers, and not the detainees, received the packets with red crosses on them.

1980. One subject claims that detainees told ICRC representatives that the Serbs were stealing the food supplied by the ICRC, but were told that the ICRC was powerless to do anything about it. The subject says that the ICRC food appeared in the open market in Prijedor.

1981. Another subject reports that the ICRC came once a week to inspect the camp but that in between ICRC visits the tortures continued. One day a week
they would let up because the prisoners requested the ICRC not to arrive at the same time of day on the day of their visits. 3069/

1982. Command Structure: Reports claim that there is no clear authority organizing the camp. 3070/ One subject suggests that the prison was possibly subordinated to the JNA from Crna Gora, (Montenegro) since the guards came from unidentified units from that area. 3071/

1983. Another subject reports that the camp was visited almost daily by a Serbian official named Mirko Mudrini, who wore a JNA uniform. Mudrini was a former politician and Serbian Democratic Party Member. The subject did not know the purpose of the visits or Mudrini's role at the camp. 3072/

1984. Serbian Red Cross: The local Red Cross was reported to have been in the camp the entire time of its operation. 3073/ Their offices were reportedly in the same building as the camp administration. Some subjects reported that the camp authorities were located in the local Red Cross offices. 3074/

1985. According to one report, the local Red Cross knew about the rapes and that inmates were beaten but did nothing to stop it. The subject claims that it even withheld important medication from the Muslim doctors in the camp clinic. 3075/

1986. Control of Camp: It is corroborated by many reports that the camp commander was Major Slobodan Kuruzovi. (Other spellings of the name: Kurzovi, Koruzovi, Kurozovi, Kuduzovi, Rudovi.) He was described as being between 40 and 50 years old, approximately 180 centimetres, 80 kilograms, with graying brown hair. Reportedly he wore a military uniform. 3076/ He was reported to be an ardent Serbian nationalist, and it was thought that he had participated in the war against Croatia in 1991. 3077/

1987. According to several subjects, Kuruzovi had been a teacher and school administrator. One subject reports that Kuruzovi was his former elementary school principal from Prijedor. 3078/

1988. While it is reported that Kuruzovi was not observed to have personally mistreated or killed prisoners, it is alleged that his guard force did so upon his orders. 3079/ Other reports claim that his guard force refrained from mistreating prisoners while he was around. 3080/ One subject says that Kuruzovi took an interest in the prisoners and treated them with kindness. It was at night, after Kuruzovi had left that the terror began. 3081/

1989. One subject reported that Kuruzovi had informers among the prisoners. 3082/

1990. Guards: The reports vary on the number of guards on duty at the camp. The estimates range from 10 to 50 per shift. 3083/ One subject reports that during her detention during June 1992, the area of the camp was guarded by approximately 100 Serb etniks who were in groups of two or three, spaced 25-30 metres apart. 3084/

1991. After the barbed wire was removed from the perimeter of the camp in early August, it is reported that the guards patrolled the camp with automatic weapons. 3085/ According to one subject, to discourage flight at night, shots were constantly fired over the heads of the people sleeping in the field after the 9:00 p.m. curfew. 3086/

1992. The detainees reportedly felt threatened by the militia guarding the camp. 3087/ Specifically, according to some reports, it was at night, after camp commander Kuruzovi had left that the terror began. 3088/
1993. According to one report the guards would walk about the camp, among the
detainees, and take people away from time to time, including women. 3089/

1994. One subject reports that harassment occurred mostly with the changing of
the guards. They would swear at the detainees and insult them. 3090/

1995. One subject, recognized two of the guards as former students at the
school. Now, both in their early 20s, they had been placed in the class for
maladjusted children. One of them was very aggressive and would beat several
detainees every day. 3091/

1996. One subject claims that the guards wore masks, and that they beat and
killed people. 3092/

1997. According to one subject the majority of the guards changed over time,
except for those known for their cruelty. These guards also appeared to the
subject to be on duty more than other guards. The subject speculated that
these guards had volunteered for extra duty. 3093/ The most notorious guards
are identified by some subjects in various source documents. 3094/

1998. While one subject reports that the guards were not Bosnian Serbs, 3095/
most report that the guards were from local towns. 3096/ According to one
subject the guards were Serbs from Prijedor and were part of the "Zoran
Karlica" unit. 3097/

1999. Apparently, Serbs who were not part of the regular Trnopolje guard force
were responsible for some abuse of detainees.

2000. According to one subject, there was a special unit that acted as
"escorts" for those being evacuated from camp. They wore camouflage uniforms
and the Beli Orlovi (White Eagles) insignia. They were also called the
"cleaners" because they would shoot or kill you if you did not hand over your
money or gold, or if you tried to get out of line. 3098/

2001. Another subject reports that etniks who called themselves "Rambos" would
abuse the prisoners. One irregular unit's members had various details to their
uniforms such as "reticular" masks on their faces, black gloves and black
ribbons on their foreheads. 3099/

2002. According to one subject the local Serbs appeared to be in fear of the
etniks, who were better organized and armed. 3100/

2003. Origin of Prisoners: Large numbers of people would be brought to
Trnopolje from towns which Serb forces had occupied. According to one report
the majority of the camp detainees came from the town of Kozarac and the
surrounding villages. 3101/

2004. One report claims that about 5,000 or 6,000 people were brought to the
camp in late May from the following villages and towns: Sanski Most,
Jakupovii, Kamani, Softii, Kozaruša, Mahmuljini, Sušii, Kozarac, ivii, Suhi
Brod, Kevljani, Hadii, Bešii, and Brdjani. 3102/

2005. Former detainees interviewed for one report were all from the region of
Prijedor in northern Bosnia: Donji Garevci, Hambarine, Hrnii, Kevljani,
Kamian, Kozarac, Kozaruša, Prijedor, Rakovani, Raškovac, Rizvanovii, Sivci,
Trnopolje, Tukovi, Zekovi. 3103/

2006. According to one subject, houses in Trnopolje village were used to hold
people from the surrounding villages (such as Jakupovii, Kevljani, Hadii,
Kozaruša, Mahmuljini, Kunani, Kozarac, Krnci, Duraice, and Duraci.) 3104/
2007. It is reported that the entire non-ethnic-Serb population of Trnopolje village were interned at the camp. 3105/

2008. Bišani: The town was attacked on July 20, although the Muslim residents had been generally harassed by Bosnian Serb soldiers and other officials since May.

2009. One subject reports that most of the male villagers were shot dead immediately. The women and children were kept in a houses in the village until 27 July when about 35 women and children and 15 men (subject believes that they were the remaining surviving villagers) were forced to walk to a roadblock near the entrance of Prijedor (location unknown). At about 8:00 p.m., a bus arrived and transported the entire group to Trnopolje. 3106/

2010. Another subject reports that two buses from Autotransport Prijedor were brought to his part of the village. Residents were randomly divided into two parts. The subject was put onto the first bus with about 80 people. This bus was driven to the Prijedor police station where the prisoners were loaded onto another Autotransport bus with a different driver and guard. They were taken first to Keraterm which was full, then to Omarska which was also full, finally the prisoners were brought to Trnopolje. 3107/

2011. Kevljani: The village was attacked on 24 May.

2012. One subject reports that on 25 May 1992, all 300 residents were brought by bus to transit camp at Breziani. On 27 May the prisoners were separated into groups: women, children, and old men put on buses and sent to Trnopolje; men were sent to Omarska. 3108/

2013. Another subject reports that on 26 May the men were separated from the woman and children, and that the villagers forced to walk to Trnopolje camp. 3109/


2015. One subject reports that he and all the Kozarac civilians were forced to walk in the direction of Prijedor. Subject estimates that the column was 12 kilometres long. At a checkpoint on the outskirts of town Serbs made prison assignments. On 27 May, a group of about 50 Muslims, including the subject, were loaded on a bus for Trnopolje. 3110/

2016. One subject reports that on 26 May the women and children were separated from the men. Some of the women and children were released others transferred to Travnik, Zenica or Trnopolje. The men were divided into two groups: those who had been armed and the unarmed. Serb soldiers used a radio to determine which camps had room. The men were taken to Trnopolje, Keraterm and Omarska. 3111/

2017. One subject reports that her group of approximately 15 women and eight children hid outside for three days and then gave themselves up to "etniks" on 26 May and were subsequently taken to Trnopolje. 3112/

2018. According to one subject, men were taken to Keraterm and Omarska, women and children to a large sports hall (location not reported), then to Trnopolje. 3113/

2019. One subject reports that he and 40 other men were held behind when the others were bused out of town, and on 26 May they were forced to walk to Trnopolje. 3114/
2020. Kozaruša: The village was attacked on 24 May, and some villagers were bused at that time to Trnopolje; others were taken to Keraterm or Omarska. One subject hid for 24 days was caught and was put into an existing group of 300 prisoners and marched to Trnopolje. 3115/

2021. Matrii: According to one subject, on 9 July 1992, local and outside Serbs collected all Muslim males into groups and marched them to Trnopolje. Upon arrival at Trnopolje the men were bused to Omarska and then to Keraterm. 3116/

2022. Prijedor: According to one subject, most of the population fled to forests, but surrendered en masse to Serb forces on 26 May 1992. Most of the prisoners, about 10,000, were sent to Trnopolje, but were quickly released to their own homes and then re-interned at the camp later. 3117/

2023. Rakovani: According to one report, Serb units entered the village on 22 July 1992, with deportations taking place from this date. Women and children were taken to Trnopolje. The men were taken to different camps, mainly to Trnopolje and Omarska. 3118/

2024. Rizvanovii: According to one subject, on 20 July 1992, Serb soldiers entered the village. Nearly all the men were rounded up and executed. The women and children were ordered to leave their homes and walk approximately three kilometres east to a main road where buses from Prijedor picked them up and transported them to Trnopolje. 3119/

2025. Trnopolje: Reportedly the village was occupied from late May 1992, but Serb troops did not enter the village until early July.

2026. One subject reports that Serb troops entered the village on 9 July 1992. At that time women and children were taken away by train and the men were brought either to Trnopolje or Omarska and Keraterm. 3120/

2027. One subject reports that after the occupation of Trnopolje in late May, non-Serb villagers were allowed to remain in their own homes. However in mid-June and early July, the Muslim villagers with homes in and around Trnopolje were forced into the camp. 3121/

2028. According to a another report, the town of Trnopolje was "ethnically cleansed" on 4 July 1992. 3122/

2029. One subject reports that he was among those arrested by Bosnian Serb neighbours on 21 May 1992, and detained at the Trnopolje camp until they were transferred to Keraterm on 27 May. 3123/

2030. Tukovi: One subject reports that on 24 July she and the rest of the villagers were taken to Trnopolje. 3124/

2031. Transfer from Other Camps: Trnopolje received prisoners transferred from other camps in northwestern Bosnia throughout its period of operation.

2032. According to one subject, on 3 June 1992, two buses were brought in to the Omarska camp and loaded with about 120 prisoners. They were told that Bus 1 was going to Kozarac and Bus 2 was going to Prijedor. However, both buses went to Trnopolje. 3125/

2033. It is reported that on 25 June 1992 approximately 100 inmates were transferred from Omarska to Trnopolje. 3126/ One subject reports that the prisoners were selected by the Serbs by name, and these people included many weak individuals. 3127/
2034. One subject reports that he was captured in late July. He was interned at Ljubija soccer stadium and was among a group of minors who were transported to Trnopolje on 1 August. The subject reports that all the other prisoners at Ljubija were murdered. 3128/

2035. One subject reports that she had been held in a camp in Jajce. One day (possibly in November 1992), without warning, she was taken by truck along with some other women and children to Trnopolje. 3129/

2036. One subject reports that in mid-August 1992, he was transported to Trnopolje from Manjaa in a group of 150 prisoners, most of whom were very old or very young. 3130/

2037. While prisoners were transferred to Trnopolje from the Omarska and Keraterm concentration camps throughout the summer of 1992, their numbers increased in the first week of August when those camps were preparing to close operation.

2038. One subject reports that on 5 August about 1,500 prisoners from Keraterm were transferred to Trnopolje, due to the impending visit from the ICRC. 3131/

2039. One subject reports that he was transported buses from Omarska to Trnopolje in late July. He states that the weaker inmates were taken out of Omarska because the ICRC was expected. 3132/

2040. Reportedly many prisoners were transferred from Omarska to Trnopolje on 3 August. According to one subject the camp was emptied of most of its prisoners on that date. Prisoners were directed to stand in two groups, one group of about 780 was sent to Trnopolje, the second group of about 1,200 left for Manjaa. 3133/

2041. One subject reports that on 3 August, she was among the group of 29 women who were transferred from Omarska to Trnopolje. 3134/

2042. On 4 August, detainees interviewed by journalists said that several hundred of them had arrived at Trnopolje that morning from Omarska or from another detention camp. 3135/

2043. It is reported that on 6 August, prisoners from Omarska were shuttled by bus to Trnopolje. 3136/

2044. According to one subject, he and approximately 850 prisoners were transferred from Omarska to Trnopolje when the camp closed on about 7 August 1992. 3137/

2045. Intake: Reportedly many detainees were beaten and required to turn over their money and valuables upon arrival at the camp. 3138/ Another subject reports that his group was searched. 3139/ One subject reports that personal documents were taken from the men brought to Trnopolje. 3140/

2046. Reportedly, new arrivals were kept separate from the other detainees for a period of time. Subjects report that male prisoners transferred from other camps were held for the first night in the school building. 3141/ Another subject reports that his group spent the first three nights outside of the school building. 3142/ One subject reports that a busload of men from Prijedor were initially held in a small shop. 3143/

2047. Reportedly many newly arrived detainees were not given food for the first few days. 3144/ According to one report the prisoners who were transferred from Keraterm on 3 August 1992 were not fed for the first four
days. The subject claims that he boiled grass for tea and made bread out of flour given to him by a resident of Kozarac who brought some from his home. 3145/

2048. One subject reports that once, when the camp was full, a new group of incoming prisoners were unloaded. They were told that there was no room for them so they were all shot on the spot. Young Muslim males were forced to bury them and were told that they themselves would be shot if they told anyone. 3146/

2049. Camp Conditions: Reportedly conditions at Trnopolje were as bad as the other camps before the arrival of the ICRC in early August. 3147/

2050. One subject reports that when he arrived, in late May, nothing was organized at the camp; there was no food and the water pumps did not work. The detainees were allowed to leave the camp to scavenge for food. They organized a communal kitchen for themselves. The ICRC later arrived with supplies. 3148/ 2051. After visits by the international media in early August 1992, treatment of prisoners at Trnopolje reportedly improved immediately with no more starvation, torture, rapes. However, the detainees still feared attack by the Serbs in the surrounding villages and were concerned by the lack of attention by international relief workers. 3149/

2052. Other comments on the confirm that the condition at the camp were not good.

2053. One report claims that in October 1992 prisoners lived in conditions of "unspeakable squalor" sleeping on lice-infested straw and thin blankets, drinking contaminated water, and surviving on minimum rations of bread. 3150/

2054. Another report described the camp as very crowded, and that the yard outside as a mixture of mud and human waste. 3151/

2055. One report states that the grounds of the camp were relatively free of litter but the single garbage container was overflowing onto the surrounding mud courtyard. There was an extensive garbage disposal area in one corner of the camp which was also used as a latrine. 3152/

2056. Food: It is reported that little or no food was provided by the authorities, 3153/ and that detainees were dependant upon food brought from outside the camp 3154/ or bought from guards or the Serbian Red Cross. 3155/

2057. One subject reported that the detainees would pool their money to buy food from the local Serbian Red Cross. Detainees who had no money would go hungry unless others shared with them. Muslims and Serbs living outside the camp would sometimes bring food to the detainees. 3156/

2058. However, another subject reports that food was received twice a day from the local Red Cross; usually just boiled macaroni and a slice of bread, 3157/ and another subject reports that during his detention from late June until late July each prisoner received one quarter loaf of bread and a plate of food. (The frequency of this meal was not discussed.) 3158/

2059. Some of the detainees were reportedly allowed to leave the camp, either to go home and retrieve food or to the village and neighbouring fields to forage. 3159/ However, other reports claim that those caught foraging were executed. 3160/
2060. Another subject reports that the detainees were allowed to leave the
camp to search for food, blankets, water, etc., however only by themselves and
for short periods. 3161/

2061. One subject reports that detainees from the nearby village of Kozarac
were occasionally given permission to go home and get food from their gardens.
These prisoners were in better physical condition than those transferred from
Keraterm and Omarska. The Kozarac detainees would occasionally share their
food with other prisoners. 3162/

2062. One report claims that the detainees received more food after the visit
to the camp by journalists on 6 August 1992. 3163/

2063. Reportedly, during the initial ICRC visit, ICRC representatives were
shown a high quality lunch which did not represent the typical lunch. 3164/

2064. According to one subject, Serbian soldiers, and not the detainees,
received the packets with red crosses on them. 3165/ One subject says that
detainees told the representatives that the Serbs were stealing the food
supplied by the ICRC, but were told that the ICRC was powerless to do anything
about it. The subject says that the ICRC food appeared in the open market in
Prijedor. 3166/

2065. Visitors: Reportedly the Trnopolje detainees were allowed contact with
family and friends. 3167/ Detainees could receive food and blankets from the
visitors. As Muslims were not allowed to ride on buses by that time, the
visitors would walk to the camp. One subject reports that if wives came to the
camp by bike, the guards would steal their bikes. 3168/

2066. According to one subject, on 7 August 1992, a radio broadcast announced
that Trnopolje detainees would be allowed direct contact visits by family
members in the fenced off area of the camp. Hours were set from 10:00 a.m. to
2:00 p.m., from 7 through 12 August, and family members were allowed to go to
the camp on foot, as no transportation was authorized. However, on 9 August,
some women arrived at the camp with bicycles. These women were raped and had
their bicycles stolen. Also on that day visiting women and children were taken
from the fenced-off area and beaten while the prisoners looked on. 3169/

2067. Water: Reportedly, while food was in short supply there was sufficient
water for all the detainees. 3170/ However, another report claims that there
was not enough water for the detainees. 3171/ And, one report describes the
water as contaminated. 3172/

2068. According to a report from September 1992, water for consumption and
washing of self and clothing was brought to the centre in a tanker truck most
days, and remained while the detainees filled whatever containers they had
available. The report commented further that, under such circumstances, it was
impossible to maintain personal hygiene. 3173/

2069. Other reports say that the women were allowed to get water from a well
outside the camp compound. 3174/

2070. Sleeping Facilities: Reportedly there was no bedding provided by the
camp authorities. Detainees slept directly on the ground, or the floor if
housed inside one of the camp buildings. 3175/ One subject who was nine months
pregnant was given no special treatment, and also slept on the floor. 3176/

2071. Health and Medical Treatment: Trnopolje was reportedly the only
detention camp in BiH with a functioning medical clinic. 3177/ However,
according to one report the doctors had no access to medicine. 3178/
2072. The inmates reportedly did not show the clear signs of starvation like those at Omarska. 3179/ However, according to one subject, reportedly one of the clinic doctors, the worst problems encountered among his patients were diarrhea and beatings. He said that he also had pulled many teeth when chronically bad teeth were aggravated by malnutrition and beatings. He claims that he had examined some of the raped women but that he was not allowed to indicate on any documents that they had been raped. 3180/

2073. Reportedly upper respiratory infection was wide-spread in the camp. Adults and children suffered from diarrhea, presumably due to contaminated water and a near-total absence of sanitation. 3181/

2074. It is reported by one subject that due to her son suffering from pneumonia, she was transferred from the camp following a certificate issued by the Serbian Red Cross suggesting a "temporary release" for medical reasons. 3182/

2075. One subject reports that those detained in camp were weak from extreme loss of weight, diarrhea and some had typhus. She claimed that she knew of six deaths caused by typhus. 3183/ Another subject claimed that babies and little children died from the lack of water and food; the subject heard of three buried on one day. 3184/

2076. One subject claims that her daughter had chronic hepatitis which she contracted while at Trnopolje. 3185/

2077. Reportedly one of the doctors photographed a prisoner who had been beaten at Trnopolje, and was able to smuggle the film out of the camp. This doctor also reports that the beating was done in a room next to where the doctor was, and that he could hear the beating and the crying. 3186/

2078. The clinic doctors reportedly obtained permission for seriously ill detainees to go to hospital in Prijedor. However, when patients returned severely beaten and claiming that they had received no medical treatment, the doctors stopped requesting transfers to hospital. 3187/

2079. The doctor reports that the prisoners transferred from the Keraterm and Omarska camps were sick and suffered from diarrhea. He said that on average these prisoners had lost about 15 kilograms in 40 days. The most extreme case he saw lost 35-40 kilograms in that time period. 3188/

2080. According to one report, prisoners transferred from Omarska in mid-June reportedly were kept separate from the other detainees because they were lice-ridden. 3189/

2081. Electricity: According to one report the camp had no electricity. 3190/

2082. Toilets: According to reports there were insufficient toilets for the number of prisoners. 3191/ One report states that the camp was serviced by a two person pit latrine which was not maintained, and that there was an extensive waste disposal area in one corner of the camp which was also used as a latrine. 3192/ Another report states that in August 1992, the camp smelled from the open toilets dug in an adjoining field, and that the camp was plagued by flies. 3193/

2083. Interrogation During Detention: There are reports of interrogations of detainees at Trnopolje. 3194/ Reportedly, an office in one of the main camp building was used for interrogations and torture. 3195/
2084. One subject reports that he was interrogated by a man wearing a black hat with the letters SDS affixed. He was interrogated and beaten by this man and three others who were present. They beat him with steel rods, table legs, and truncheons. He was even hit over the head with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, and was stabbed with a knife in his left leg. 3196/

2085. One subject reports that every day various males were taken to one of the houses near the camp that were used for interrogation. There they were interrogated and often had their achilles tendons cut. The subject speculated that since the men were of fighting age, this was done so they would be physically unable to fight Serbs in the future. 3197/

2086. Another subject reports that the office used for interrogations was locked when not in use, and at night the prisoners could hear the screams coming from the room. He claims that none of the men taken for interrogation would return to the camp as all were killed from beatings. 3198/

2087. According to one report women were sometimes interrogated at night about their husbands and fathers. The subject claims that women taken from the sleeping rooms at night were brought to a room for questioning. 3199/

2088. Reportedly, camp commander Slobodan Kuruzovi, conducted the interrogations.

2089. One subject reports that he and several other minors were caught by Serbian troops in the woods and interned at the Ljubija soccer stadium. They were interrogated during their detention at Ljubija and then were transferred to Trnopolje on 1 August. The next morning, the boys were interrogated by Maj. Kuruzovi, who asked questions about their destination and men who the Serbs were searching for. No records were made. 3200/

2090. Another subject reports that Kuruzovi and members of the Serbian Army used to interrogate the inmates. 3201/

2091. According to some of the reports some of the men interrogated at Trnopolje had already been previously interrogated in other camps. 3202/

2092. Temporary Release: Reportedly some of the detainees were released from the camp either to go home or to live with relatives or friends, but were captured later and re-interned at Trnopolje. 3203/

2093. One subject reports that on 26 May 1992, residents of Kozarac were sent to Trnopolje, Keraterm, or Omarska. Those who were sent to Trnopolje (about 10,000) were quickly released to their own homes and then re-interned later in smaller groups. 3204/

2094. Another subject reports that she fled the village of Kozaruša on 24 May and stayed at the camp for 10 days. She was able to leave the camp and stay with her daughter (town not recorded) until they were "run out", and forced to return to Trnopolje camp. 3205/

2095. Forced Labour: According to one subject, many people were taken for work, such as during the potato harvest. The subject reports that commonly 10 people would never return, and as it was impossible to flee it was supposed that they had been killed. 3206/

2096. Rape During Detention: Reports corroborate the claims that women from the camp were beaten and sexually abused by Serbian men. 3207/ However the numbers of victims and the frequency of incidents are not consistently recorded. 3208/
2097. The incidents are usually reported as occurring at night when drunk soldiers entered the rooms where the women and children slept and by the light of flashlights choose the women who would be taken away. 3209/

2098. One subject reports that Serb soldiers with flashlights came around midnight every night for at least 20 nights in July. Approximately 10 young women were taken each night, and were raped across the hall from where the women slept. Subject claims that she submitted because five girls who refused were shot in front of her. 3210/

2099. According to one subject every night at about 9:00 p.m., drunk soldiers would come into the camp and take two or three young girls over 12 and rape them. They would bring the girls back after a few hours or early in the morning. Many of the girls were taken to a hospital in Prijedor after being raped. Some were never returned; after being raped they were killed and buried near the lake located a few hundred yards from the village. 3211/

2100. Some reports state that it was the camp guards who raped the women. 3212/ However, other reports attribute the rapes to Serb soldiers who were not associated with the camp. 3213/ Several reports describe the perpetrators as tank soldiers. 3214/

2101. According to two subjects drunken tank drivers came into the camp on 6 June 1992, between 10:00 p.m. and midnight. They took iron rods with them and used flashlights to choose women, especially girls up to 18 years old. This group of girls were returned at around midnight and the soldiers went into the hall and got more. The women told the subjects that the soldiers had threatened them if they reported what had happened. 3215/

2102. According to one report, on an unrecalled date in mid-July, two T-55 tanks with about 20 drunken soldiers on each, arrived at Trnopolje from the direction of Kozarac. Four soldiers (one described as wearing a hat with a cockard displaying a two-headed eagle) entered the former Community Hall and selected three females (identified). They were taken away and returned the next morning by car. 3216/

2103. Another subject reports an incident in late August when two T-54 tanks from a unit in Omarska arrived at the camp. Approximately 10 tankers, wearing blue uniforms, selected several young women and raped them in the central heating plant of the school building. One of the tankers (identified in report) was reportedly feared by the camp guards. 3217/

2104. Some subjects report that the women were taken outside of the camp for raping. 3218/ One subject report that the raping would take place in the camp. 3219/ Another subject reports that her daughter was taken every night and raped in a different tent. 3220/ And there are reports of subjects having heard the sound of women being raped on at least one occasion. 3221/

2105. One subject reports that she was picked up by guards when returning to the camp after getting water from a well about 50 metres from the prison gates. The subject and nine other girls were taken to a house across the meadow out of site of the roadway where they were sexually abused and raped by 30 Serb soldiers, some dressed like a tank crew. 3222/

2106. Another subject claims that she was raped on 7 June, by two soldiers while out of the camp to get food. She was then compelled to return regularly because the soldiers threatened to rape her in front of her husband and then kill her husband and children afterward. 3223/
2107. There are reports of attempts to protect the women. One subject reports that when drunken soldiers burst into the hall to choose a few of the women to take away, some of the local Serbs working as guards at the camp had tried to intervene. 3224/

2108. Another subject claims that a Bosnian man who was present when the soldiers came for her tried to protect her by saying "leave her alone." He was shot immediately and she was dragged to the room over his bleeding body. 3225/

2109. One subject reports that a grandfather tried to keep his girl from being taken, and that he was beaten so badly that he couldn't stand. 3226/

2110. One subject says that the detainees never told the ICRC about the rapes. They were afraid he says because Major Kuduzovi [sic] was there when the ICRC came. 3227/

2111. However, other accounts state that the rapes in early June were brought to the attention of the camp authorities. 3228/

2112. One subject reports that after the mass rape the camp commander apologized the next day and personally guaranteed the future safety of the women. For the next few nights armed guards were posted around the women and the incident was not repeated. 3229/

2113. The girls' parents reported the incident to camp commander Major Kuruzovi who told them that it would not happen again, and it did not. 3230/

2114. Reportedly one soldier was jailed by the commander on rape charges, but he was let out after drunken soldiers in his regiment threatened to open fire on the military barracks unless he was released. 3231/

2115. One subject reports that sometimes women were kept until they became pregnant and released when it was too late for them to terminate the pregnancy. 3232/

2116. Reportedly young girls were also raped. 3233/

2117. Beatings, Torture and Killings During Detention: It is reported that beatings and killings occurred at Trnopolje. 3234/ However, the number and frequency of incidents is not consistently reported. 3235/

2118. Prisoners who were transferred to Trnopolje from other camps (Omarska, Keraterm, Manjaa) said that there was much less abuse at Trnopolje. However, one subject who was transferred to Trnopolje on 5 August, attributed the restraint of the guards to the arrival of the ICRC. 3236/

2119. According to another subject, the ICRC came once a week to inspect the camp. He says that in between ICRC visits the tortures went on. One day a week they would let up, because the prisoners requested the ICRC not to arrive at the same time of day on the day of their visits. 3237/

2120. One subject reports that toward the end of June, he was one of at least eight men chosen to dig graves. He says that non-Serb men were killed in one of three scenarios: 1) leaving the Trnopolje camp to scavenge for food, 2) after being "disappeared" from the camp, 3) and during the ethnic cleansing of the villages in the area. 3238/

2121. One report states that people were being mistreated in a room near the camp's health clinic. 3239/ Another report claims that one of the clinic doctors photographed a prisoner who had been beaten, and was able to smuggle
the film out of the camp. This doctor also reports that the beating was done in a room next to where the doctor was, and that he could hear the beating and the crying. 3240/

2122. Personal vendettas appear to be the reason for some of the abuse perpetrated against the prisoners, rather than the random beatings reported at other camps. 3241/ One subject reports a reprisal for a supposed war-related incident. 3242/ Another subject explains that Muslims married to Serbs were subject to particularly harsh treatment. 3243/

2123. According to reports, some prisoners would be taken away and never be seen again. 3244/ Reportedly the guards would sometimes read from lists the names of those prisoners to be taken away. 3245/ There are also reports of some men shot at random by guards. 3246/

2124. Beatings and killings were also reportedly perpetrated by Serb soldiers who came in to the camp. 3247/

2125. One subject reports that on an unrecalled date in July, men who had been sleeping in the school were required to sleep outside (2,500 women and children from the Kozarac area were being held one night at the camp). At around 1:00 a.m. four or five soldiers came to where the men were sleeping and took away six men from Kamiani, all with the same surname. 3248/ The next day seven prisoners were selected to dig the mass grave. According to the men who dug the grave, the men from Kamiani had had crosses carved on their chests, knives pushed through their chin and tongue with wire inserted through the hole in the tongue. 3249/

2126. Another report describes what might be the same incident. In late June or early July, a group of seven or eight Bosnian Serb irregulars (identified in report) entered the camp. Six men (three sets of brothers, all from Donji Forii near Kozarac) were called from a list, and accompanied by the camp commander, taken to the administration building which was located in a house near the camp. The men were tortured there within hearing range of the other prisoners. After the torture the six were led by the same group of Bosnian Serbs to a watermill about 400 metres from the camp. The next day a group of men who had been let out of the camp to forage told the subject that they had seen the mutilated bodies of the six men, and that their eyes were gouged out and their tongues were pierced with wires and tied together in pairs. 3250/

2127. One subject reports that many people were killed by shooting or having their throat slit. He also reports witnessing two little children killed by etniks, by being thrown into a rotating cement mixer while the mother watched, and a prisoner led around by a wire driven through his tongue. 3251/ 2128. Reportedly one woman was killed at the camp, apparently unintentionally, on the stairs in front of the school. 3252/ One subject claims to have seen soldiers kill a mentally disturbed man who had taken food from another man at the camp. 3253/

2129. Disposal of Bodies: According to reports prisoners were ordered to bury the bodies of those killed at the camp. 3254/

2130. One subject reports that those killed at the camp were usually buried at the cemetery in Sivi, a small town two kilometres from the camp, in the park in Trnopolje one kilometre from the camp, or in the fields around the camp. The graves were not marked and the names not registered. 3255/ Another subject reports that many of the prisoners were buried in backyards of homes near the camp. 3256/
2131. Mock Attacks: Reportedly, Serbian forces filmed their defensive actions against supposed Muslim attacks. According to two subjects, upon arrival at the camp the prisoners were forced to lie in the mud with their heads down for two hours while Serbian soldiers shot rifles and claimed to be protecting the prisoners from an attack by Muslim Green Berets. Another subject reports that a woman was killed, apparently unintentionally, during a mock defence filmed for Banja Luka TV.

2132. Transfer of Prisoners to Other Camps: Most of the transfer of prisoners appears to have been to Trnopolje rather than from Trnopolje to other camps. However, according to one subject, on 9 July, the men from Matrii were collected and were marched to Trnopolje. Upon arrival at Trnopolje, the men were bused to Omarska and then to Keraterm. Another subject, a Muslim female from Trnopolje village and a detainee at the camp, reports that on 9 July 1992 the Bosnian Serb army from Banja Luka came and took all men between the ages of 15 and 70 to Keraterm.

2133. Release of Prisoners: Trnopolje served as a transit camp for many of the detainees. Women, children, boys under 16 men over 65, and the very sick would be taken and released into Muslim and Croat controlled areas. Apparently, in the beginning, the convoys consisted of suffocating cattle cars on trains bound for Doboj. Later the detainees were transported in large trucks bound for Travnik.

2134. One subject reports that women and children tended to be held at the camp for three to five days until their numbers swelled to a few thousand, at which time the Bosnian Serbs then arranged to deport them, mostly to Travnik.

2135. According to one report thousands of people were released from Trnopolje at the end of June 1992 and allowed to go to Croatia.

2136. One subject reports that on 25 and 26 July 1992, all of the women and children were removed from the school and transported on trucks to a location near the BiH controlled refugee transition centre in Travnik.

2137. One subject reports that she was held at Trnopolje until 18 August 1992, when she was released to Travnik.

2138. According to one report detainees judged harmless by the Serb authorities could "buy" their way out.

2139. One subject reports that he was released from Trnopolje when he bribed an ethnic Serbian doctor.

2140. One subject reports that she was able to secure the release of herself and her two daughters by giving a guard her last savings of 1,000 DM and her jewelry, on 26 June 1992.

2141. Another subject reports that on 21 August 1992, he was able to secure a release with a bribe of 100 German Marks.

2142. One subject who had been transferred to Trnopolje from Omarska in late July, reports that he was among 30 people who were released because they were so thin and weak. He claims that camp officials were afraid that journalists would take pictures of them.

2143. One subject reported that on 10 August 1992, camp administration announced that for the next two days any prisoner who could prove that he had donated blood to the Red Cross 10 times in the last year would be released.
Many wives were able to bring blood donation cards and secure release of their husbands. 3271/

2144. One subject reports that on approximately 13 August 1992, he was given a permit to leave the camp because his aunt guaranteed to take him in. 3272/

2145. According to one subject who reports that he was one of 780 prisoners transferred to Trnopolje from Omarska on 3 August he was released from Trnopolje on 15 August. 3273/

2146. It is reported that 1,000 prisoners had been released from Trnopolje in the second week of August 1992. 3274/

2147. As a result of negotiations between the ICRC and Bosnian Serb authorities during peace talks in London in August 1992, the Bosnian Serb authorities promised to close down the camps. 3275/ The ICRC arranged the transport of thousands of detainees.

2148. Reportedly the ICRC arranged for the release of 1580 detainees to Karlovac, Croatia on 17 September. 3276/

2149. One subject claims that the ICRC negotiated with the Serbs for a conditional release of most prisoners, and on 30 September, a convoy was formed and left Trnopolje for Karlovac to continue from there to Zagreb. 3277/

2150. Reportedly, the ICRC supervised the transport of 1,500 people to the Karlovac transit camp in Croatia in early October 1992. 3278/

2151. According to one subject, on 1 October 1992, the ICRC took about 1,600 detainees to Karlovac, leaving about 1,000 in Trnopolje to pick up later. The subject states that the Serbs got the idea that they could have the ICRC the ethnic cleansing for them. So Serbs went from house to house rounding up people to bring to Trnopolje. When the ICRC returned, instead of 1,000 there were 3,500 detainees. This subject reports that when the Serbs realized the ICRC wasn't going to take these detainees from Trnopolje, two buses of Serb special soldiers, with special helmets, came to beat and drive the people out. Some people were killed. Everyone had to go on foot from Trnopolje to Prijedor. The subject's home was gone so he and his family moved on until they were helped by a Serb friend who paid the "tax-bribes" to get the family into Croatia. 3279/

2152. It is reported that some prisoners were required to sign waivers to secure their release.

2153. According to one report, in order to be brought to Karlovac under the patronage of the ICRC and the UNHCR, the camp authority required all detainees to sign a document stating that they would not return to BiH before the end of the war. In addition, by signing this paper, they disclaimed all property rights in their country. 3280/

2154. One subject reports that on 12 August prisoners were ordered to sign over all their possessions to the Serbian forces. He claims that those who would not sign were taken to a camp in the Travnik area. 3281/

2155. According to one subject, he and approximately 850 prisoners were transferred from Omarska to Trnopolje when the camp closed on about 7 August 1992. He stayed at Trnopolje for seven days until his release. They were offered their freedom in return for signing a certificate in which they relinquished all personal property and all claims against the Bosnian Serb Government. 3282/
2156. Another subject reports that many detainees signed forms stating that they would leave the Serb-held area of BiH. 3283/

2157. Reportedly some detainees were released in prisoner exchanges.

2158. One subject who reports that she was raped at Trnopolje in July 1992, claims that shortly thereafter she and her relatives were among a group of Trnopolje prisoners released in exchange for Serb prisoners in Maglaj. 3284/

2159. According to one subject, after spending two months at the camp she was exchanged on the night of 1 January 1993. She states that she and two other girls were taken outside and given over to Croatian soldiers in exchange for seven Serbs. Her group was taken to the town of Novska from where she left for the Karlovac camp. 3285/

2160. Vlaši Mountain Mass Murder: Reportedly, as many as 250 Muslim (and perhaps also Croatian) men were removed from a prisoner release convoy travelling from Trnopolje camp to BiH-controlled Travnik and were shot at a cliff near Vlaši mountain. 3286/

2161. On 21 August 1992, approximately 250 men and 150 women and children from Trnopolje camp were loaded into four buses and told they would be transferred to Travnik and set free. 3287/ Other vehicles carrying mostly women and children from the surrounding area were added to the convoy. 3288/ According to one subject the buses were escorted both at the front and rear by police cars from Prijedor. Several Serb paramilitaries boarded the subject’s bus when the convoy went through Banja Luka toward Skender Vakuf. 3289/

2162. Reportedly the people on the bus were ordered to give up their valuables to one of the guards on the bus. 3290/

2163. One subject reports that about 18 kilometres southeast of Skender Vakuf on the road to Travnik, the convoy crossed a bridge over the Ilomska River. Passing the bridge, the convoy stopped. 3291/

2164. Reportedly the convoy stopped at approximately 5:00 p.m., and between 150 and 350 male prisoners were removed from the vehicles and grouped beside two buses. 3292/ They were told that they were to be exchanged for Serb prisoners. 3293/ Women and children were removed from these buses and were put into other vehicles. 3294/

2165. One subject reports that during this stop, the men were beaten at random by a very large, dark complexioned policeman. The men were then loaded into the buses "in layers, one atop the other". Five policemen also boarded his bus. 3295/

2166. The convoy then resumed with the two buses holding the men at the rear. After travelling a short distance the buses pulled off the side of the road (about 100 metres apart), while the rest of the convoy continued. 3296/ The road there was bordered by a hill on the east and a steep ravine on the west which ended in a slope descending to the Ilomska River. 3297/

2167. Reportedly, the men in the rear bus were forced out and ordered to kneel at the edge of the cliff. The guards then opened fire with automatic weapons and continued to fire for about five minutes. Some prisoners jumped over the cliff to avoid being shot. 3298/ The guards continued to shoot down at the bodies in the ravine. 3299/ One subject claims that the soldiers also dropped hand grenades down the ravine at the bodies. 3300/
2168. One report states that the men in the front bus were then taken off the bus in groups of three and led to the west edge of the road where they were shot and their bodies thrown off the cliff. 3301/ 

2169. Names and descriptions of the alleged perpetrators are listed in some of the reports. 3302/ One subject reports that the guards in the vehicles wore blue uniforms. 3303/ According to another subject, soldiers wearing blue camouflage uniforms and red berets were waiting at the gorge site. 3304/ 

2170. According to one report Bosnian Serb military and police officials acknowledged that the incident had occurred. 3305/ 

d. Other camps 

2171. Bistrica or Lamovita: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) This is one of several small camps reportedly set up within 20 kilometres of Omarska. Each of these camps is reported to hold from 200 to 250 prisoners. 3306/ 

2172. This camp is reportedly located in a school or local government social centre approximately two or three kilometres from Omarska, straight across the Banja Luka-Prijedor road. 3307/ A search of maps locate towns by the names of Lamovita and Bistrica north of Omarska. 

2173. Bojić: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) This is one of several small camps reportedly set up within 20 kilometres of Omarska. Each of these camps is reported to hold from 200 to 250 prisoners. 3308/ 

2174. This camp is reportedly located in the village primary school, located approximately two kilometres northwest of the village of Jaruge, north of the Kozarac-Prijedor road. 3309/ 

2175. Jaruge: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) This is one of several small camps reportedly set up within 20 kilometres of Omarska. Each of these camps is reported to hold from 200 to 250 prisoners. 3310/ 

2176. This camp is reportedly located in a fruit storage shed or stables, north of the Kozarac-Prijedor road. 3311/ A map search locates the village of Jaruge approximately four kilometres west of Kozarac, north of the main access road between Kozarac and Prijedor. 

2177. Marica or Gradiška: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) This is one of several small camps reportedly set up within 20 kilometres of Omarska. Each of these camps is reported to hold from 200 to 250 prisoners. 3312/ 

2178. This camp is reportedly located in a school in the village of either Marica or Gradiška, southwest of Omarska. 3313/ A map search turned up two villages approximately five kilometres southwest of Omarska called Marika and Gradina. 

2179. Breziani: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) It is reported that a Serb-run camp was located in the former school in the village of Breziani, three kilometres northwest of Prijedor. 3314/ One report refers to Breziani as a transit camp. 3315/ There is an estimate that 2,000 persons were detained at Breziani as of 22 August 1992. 3316/ Dates of
operation for this camp otherwise are not known.

2180. Reportedly on 25 May 1992, all the residents approximately 300 men, women and children of the village of Kevljani were brought by bus to Breziani. There were reportedly about 1,000 people already held at the camp when they arrived. On 27 May, Serbian soldiers identified as military police from Breziani and Sudon separated the detainees into groups, with old men, women and children taken by bus to Trnopolje camp, and about 500 men forced into buses and sent to Omarska.

2181. Reportedly, after the capture of Kozarac by Serb forces on 25-26 May 1992, the Muslim residents were ordered to report to the city centre. From there, the women and children were bused to Trnopolje and the men were transported to Breziani. The men were reportedly held overnight at Breziani before being transferred to Omarska.

2182. A subject reports that the Kevljani residents were mistreated by Serbian forces as soon as they arrived in Breziani: beaten as they exited the buses and subjected to verbal abuse and taunts. He says they were held at the camp for two days and two nights without food, water or toilet facilities.

2183. ela: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including an official UN source.) Reportedly a Serb-run camp. While there is no specific location reported, a town by this name is located south of the town of Prijedor.

2184. It is reported that 200 persons were detained at ela as of 19 November 1992. Another report estimated the number of detainees as 220, as of 22 August 1992.

2185. Ciglane: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Roy Gutman.) There are reports of a Serb-run camp, Ciglane ("brickyard") next to the former Keraterm tile works, near the town of Prijedor. The majority of the people imprisoned were reportedly from the village of Kozarac, the surrounding area of Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi.

2186. One subject reports that during his detention at the camp in late May 1992, there were about 1,000 people of all ages, including entire families, incarcerated there. Reportedly the men were separated from the women and children.

2187. The detainees reportedly slept outside on the concrete under the eaves of the brickyard. A subject states that people would urinate in a spot only 10 metres from the rest of the prisoners.

2188. The guards at the camp were reportedly all "White Eagles" (described in the report as an "ultra-fascist etnik paramilitary formation") from Serbia, and wore cockades (the "etnik" insignia) but had no beards.

2189. Acts of abuse and murder are reported as having occurred at this camp.

2190. One subject reports that women were raped at this camp, and that children were thrown into ovens and burned. He claims that one day 15 children, ranging from babies to five year olds, were thrown into ovens by the guards. Those mothers who resisted giving up their children were killed on the spot. Reportedly an order came that this activity should stop and it was not done any more.
2191. Another subject reports having witnessed a policeman from Kozarac burned alive after a beating. First his bones were broken and then a piece of clothing was put into his mouth, he was drenched with gas and set on fire. 3330/

2192. The guards would reportedly choose a group of five people and would kill them with pistols or knives, 3331/ or machine-gun fire would be heard. 3332/

2193. At least 20 of the detainees from Ciglane were reportedly transferred to Omarska camp. 3333/

2194. Gorni Garevci: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) It is reported that a detention centre was located at Gorni (Gornji) Garevci. 3334/ A village by this name is located approximately five kilometres northeast of Kozarac. No further information is available on this reported camp.

2195. Jajce: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) Reportedly, a camp at this location held approximately 500 detainees, mostly women and children, although there were some families. 3335/

2196. The subject reports that the camp was a very large barn, with two big rooms without a full partition between them. There were no beds. On her first night she heard shooting and found out later that most of the men in the camp had been killed. 3336/

2197. The subject reports gang raping of the female detainees by Serbian men wearing masks. She describes the raping of girls as young as seven or eight years old. The females were often beaten during the rape episodes. The subject reports that in the living quarters there were always many injured women, and young girls who would bleed profusely after their rapes. The subject claims that about 10 women and several girls died after being raped. 3337/

2198. According to the subject, the women's jewelry was ripped from their ears, and in one incident a girl's finger was torn off in removing her ring; the girl died the next day of this and other injuries. 3338/

2199. The subject reports that new arrivals were brought to the camp approximately every 10 days, from Biha, Prijedor, and some from Sarajevo. (There is no information as to whether these were women and children only.) 3339/

2200. According to subject, food was limited, and the detainees were always hungry. The detainees were given bread, rice, vegetables and beans but in small quantity only. The detainees were so hungry that they resorted to eating grass. 3340/

2201. The subject reports that without warning she was transferred to Trnopolje by truck along with some other women and children. She states that the trip took eight hours because the road was very bad. 3341/ 2202. Karan: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report this was a Serb-run camp in Prijedor county. 3342/ The report gave no specific location, however, and a search of available maps did not show any locations by this name in Prijedor. There is however a location by this name in Serbia.
2203. Kebljani: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report this was a Serb-run camp in Prijedor county. It is possible that this is a typographical misspelling of Kevljani.

2204. Keramica (Keramika) Firm: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) It is reported that the Keramika camp was based in a former large ceramics factory. Location coordinates for the camp are not given but the camp was reportedly associated with the Omarska camp.

2205. A subject reports that at the beginning of the war the camp was at its fullest and detained approximately 1,500 Muslims and Croats. As of 31 December 1992, the date of the subject's statement, it was not known if the camp was still active.

2206. Kevljani: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) A subject from the Prijedor area reported that some people had disappeared from the school at Kevljani. A search of available maps, however, does not identify a location by that name. It may be a different spelling of Kevljani.

2207. Kevljani: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including a UN Civil Affairs Report.) Reportedly 2,000 persons were detained at "Kevljani, Breziani" as of 19 November 1992. The village of Kevljani is located southeast of the town of Prijedor.

2208. Kevljani Youth Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) Reportedly after the residents of Kevljani surrendered to Serb forces, the women and children were taken to the youth centre in town; the men were taken to the Keraterm factory on the edge of town.

2209. Kratelj: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, about 3,000 persons were held in Kratelj as of 22 August 1992. However, a search of available maps does not identify a town by that name in any of the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

2210. Ljubija Mine: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) Reports state the existence of a Serb run camp located in an iron mine at Ljubija, southwest of the city of Prijedor. It is reported that this was one of the camps set up by the Serbs to avoid international scrutiny, after the involvement of the ICRC at the Manjaa and Omarska camps. Reportedly 2,300 persons were held at the Ljubija Mine as of 22 August 1992.

2211. Ljubija Soccer Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Reportedly, Muslim prisoners were detained here and recount incidents of severe abuse by the Serb soldiers guarding the location. Reports claim that the majority of the prisoners were either killed, or only held briefly at the stadium. One report describes a dressing room in the stadium which was used as a "prison" and interrogation area, for extended detention.

2212. According to one report the stadium is located just east of the main road through Ljubija, north of the town. This report describes the stadium as surrounded by a rough brick wall forming a square, with each side measuring from 120 to 130 metres. The buses carrying the prisoners entered through a
gate at the southwest corner. Along the south wall of the stadium were buildings that housed locker rooms. The playing field was surrounded by a low, wire mesh fence. The subject of this report also claims that there were approximately 600 to 800 Bosnian Serb soldiers forming a ring around the outer perimeter of the stadium.

2213. This subject described the treatment received by one group of prisoners held at the stadium in late July 1992. The prisoners were removed from the buses immediately upon arrival at the stadium. They were required to stand in a spreadeagle position with their faces against the rough brick wall forming the western edge of the stadium. The prisoners were each forced to the ground and beaten with rifle butts or kicked. The prisoners' heads and faces were also slammed with great force against the brick wall.

2214. The subject estimates that 60 of the prisoners were taken to the locker room buildings and mutilated and killed. He says that the remaining prisoners could only see about seven or eight unidentified Bosnian Serb soldiers carrying out the mutilations and killings. The tools used in the mutilation were openly displayed and consisted of hammers, bolt cutters, pliers, and one medical instrument that was designed to remove the top of an individual's skull. This instrument consisted of a combination of screw-set pins and a scoring and sawing device held in a metal ring that fit over the head.

2215. The subject claims that the surviving prisoners, who numbered at this point at about 30 or 40, were forced to carry the corpses of the victims from the locker rooms to one of the buses. (This bus was an accordion bus with a flexible segment at the centre to help it to negotiate curves, and some of the seats had been removed.) Some of the bodies were headless or had missing limbs, and some had their abdomens cut open and the abdominal cavity exposed.

2216. At about 10:00 p.m., after spending approximately four hours at the stadium, the surviving prisoners were placed on the same bus with the approximately 60 to 70 corpses and were taken to a strip mining area south of Ljubija. Here the subject claims that he escaped a mass killing of the remaining prisoners.

2217. Another subject describes his experience of what is apparently the same incident: Approximately 100 Muslim prisoners of war were brought by bus to the stadium from Miska Glava in late July 1992. This subject reports incidents of abuse inflicted by between 100 and 120 local Serbs wearing camouflage uniforms with Serb flags or "etnik" symbols on them.

2218. Upon arrival at the stadium the prisoners were lined up in two rows. Two men were killed immediately. Then the prisoners were beaten and punctured with rods, described as being round with pointed tops. One of the prisoners was beaten while he was being forced to lick up the blood of those killed.

2219. Sixteen minors, including the subject, and 15 other prisoners were separated from the larger group and were placed in the stadium dressing room, referred to as the "prison". The youngest of these detainees was 13 years old.

2220. During their detention in the dressing room, the 31 prisoners were interrogated by the same men who had participated in the beatings outside the stadium. Every half hour prisoners were taken to a separate room where they would be seated on a chair and interrogated. The detainees were questioned about who had hidden in the woods and about the participants in the attack on Prijedor. The subject reports that while the prisoners were kicked and hit with gun butts during the interrogations no one was killed. After an unidentified period of detention at the stadium, the prisoners were
transferred to Trnopolje. 3362/

2221. Majdan (Mine) Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, this camp was located in Prijedor. 3363/ A search of available maps does not identify a town by that name in Prijedor, however there are locations by that name in other counties of BiH.

2222. Miska Glava Village Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Reportedly, on or about 26 July 1992, a group of at least 100 Bosnian Muslim males who had attempted to evade Serb forces by hiding in the woods, were captured and detained in a public building in the village of Miska Glava. 3364/ While a search of available maps did not locate this village, a postal listing of towns in the former Yugoslavia indicates that the village of Miska Glava uses the Ljubija town post office. 3365/

2223. According to one report, 114 Muslim paramilitaries were captured by Serb paramilitaries in the village of Miska Glava 3366/ and held overnight in the Miska Glava village hall. The prisoners were then transferred by bus to the Ljubija soccer stadium. 3367/

2224. The subject reported that some of his captors were dressed in YPA uniforms but most wore camouflage uniforms. The soldiers abused the prisoners throughout the night, taking them in groups of two or three, beating them and forcing them to sing Serb songs. One of the soldiers demanded 10 volunteers from the village of Rizvanovii, or else all the prisoners would be killed. These 10 men were thrown to the ground, their hands tied with barbed wire, they were battered and finally the subject heard machine gun fire. He is not certain what happened to them. After this incident the soldiers reportedly continued as previously, to take a few prisoners at a time out to beat and force to sing Serb songs. 3368/

2225. Another report claims that 117 Muslim males were held in the cafe portion of a public building in the centre of the village of Miska Glava. The prisoners included some, like the subject, who had been captured in the woods, and residents of local villages who had been rounded up in the sweep of the previous day. 3369/

2226. The subject says that the room was cramped and very hot. He says that during the three days that he was detained, the prisoners were given no food or water, nor were they allowed to use the toilet. The prisoners were reportedly interrogated and beaten with rifle butts. The subject says that at some point 10 men were taken from the group as "volunteers" and were never returned. 3370/

2227. According to the subject, seven prisoners were killed in front of the other men by one of two methods. 3371/ The prisoners would either be forced to kneel and would have his throat cut by one of the perpetrators standing behind him. Or the prisoner would lie face up, his arms and legs held down by soldiers, and one or more of the perpetrators would open the prisoner's abdomen and remove his internal organs while the prisoner was still alive. In both cases, the prisoners would be left on the ground until they died.

2228. The subject reports that the remaining 100 prisoners were taken from the cafe late in the afternoon of 30 or 31 July 1992, put on two buses and taken to a sports stadium in Ljubija.

2229. Mrakovica Mountain Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing
Team.) It is reported that Bosnian Muslims were held in a toilet block at the small barracks on the site of a World War Two memorial on Mt. Mrakovica. 3372/

2230. According to one subject there were about 100 men of various ages detained in the structure. There was no lighting in the block and for the three days that the subject was detained there, his hands and legs were tied together. The prisoners were reportedly given no food during the subject's detention. 3373/

2231. The subject reported that the detainees were eventually transferred to Omarska camp. He says that on the way to the bus, the men were forced to pass through two rows of Serbs who beat them. 3374/

2232. Mrakovica Mountain Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) Reportedly a Serb-run camp detaining Croat and Muslim women from villages on the slopes of Kozara Mountain. 3375/ According to one report the camp was located in a 100 room hotel next to a World War memorial. 3376/

2233. One report characterizes the camp as a rape-death camp. This report claims that the camp was established at the beginning of 1992. The number of detainees is not known. 3377/

2234. Prijedor Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Reportedly some seriously ill or injured detainees of the Trnopolje and Omarska camps and the Prijedor Prison were taken to the Serb-controlled Prijedor Hospital, where the patients from the camps were reportedly mistreated. 3378/

2235. One report says that patients from the Trnopolje camp were returned from the hospital having been severely beaten there, and claimed that they had received no medical treatment. 3379/

2236. According to another report a subject and his brother were injured in their detention cell at Omarska by bullets randomly fired by drunken soldiers. The subject reports that he had a compound fracture with a protruding bone. The brothers were taken to a doctor who said that they needed hospital treatment and they were admitted to the Prijedor hospital. (The subject has not seen his brother since they were admitted to the hospital.) At the hospital he was told that he needed an operation, but received only a cast around his leg and was in traction for over a month. The subject claims that the Serbs in the hospital (it isn't clear if these were patients or staff) objected to his being there and wanted him thrown out. The subject believes that these people were plotting to kill him at night. The subject was returned to Omarska camp on 7 July 1992. 3380/

2237. Another subject who reportedly had been severely beaten and left for dead at Prijedor Prison was brought to the hospital on 29 May 1992. He was put in a large ward in the hospital with other Muslim and Croat patients. The subject claims that a Serb nurse put him on an intra-venous solution which he believes saved his life. This subject reports that on 6 or 7 June, a Serb doctor announced that all Muslim and Croat patients (about 100) had to leave the hospital immediately. The Muslim and Croat staff also had to leave. The subject was moved by truck to Keraterm camp. 3381/

2238. Prijedor Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Reportedly Bosnian Muslims were held for as long as two days at the Prijedor police station. 3382/ Interrogations reportedly were conducted here by the
militia and the military police and mistreatment of the prisoners was also
initiated by both the militia and the police. 3383/

2239. One subject reported that on 25 May 1992, 50 to 60 men, women, and
children were taken from Kozarac to the police station. There, the women and
children were separated from the men. The subject reports that he was beaten
and cursed as soon as he got off the bus. The soldiers laughed and drank while
beating the prisoners. Later, a bus came and took the men to Keraterm. 3384/

2240. One subject reported that he was arrested on 2 June 1992 by the
"Specijalna Milicija" and brought to the station, where he was interrogated.
He claims that he was not physically mistreated during the interrogation,
however he was subjected to verbal abuse. After his interrogation, the subject
was released. He was again arrested and brought to the police station on four
July. At this time he was slapped by two policemen. After two days at the
prison he was taken to Keraterm camp. 3385/

2241. On 14 June 1992, a Bosnian Croat woman was reportedly detained for
several hours in the Prijedor Police Station with two other women (named) and
two men. The detainees were held in a small, blood-splattered room. They were
eventually driven by police to Omarska where, they were told, they were to be
interrogated. 3386/

2242. Reportedly, on 21 July 1992, a Bosnian Muslim from Rizvanovii and two
other Muslim men were taken from Trnopolje camp to the Serbian Police
Headquarters in Prijedor. 3387/ The subject says he was questioned there for
five hours after which he and the other two men were taken to Omarska
camp. 3388/

2243. Prijedor Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government.) A
former member of the Muslim Territorial Defence Force reports that he was held
overnight at this prison. The subject reported that he and two other Muslim
prisoners were severely beaten by three Serbs, who were not guards, with fists
and metal pipes. He says he was left for dead and was taken the following day
by other Serbs to the Prijedor Hospital. 3389/ No further information about
the prison is reported.

2244. Prijedor Sports Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.)
Women and children from the village of Dera who had surrendered to the Serbs
on 26 May 1992 were brought to the sport hall in Prijedor for a couple of
hours before being transferred to Trnopolje. 3390/ According to one report
2,600 persons were held at the Prijedor Sports Centre as of 22 August
1992. 3391/ Another report also says that the Prijedor Sports Centre held
2,600 detainees as of 19 November 1992. 3392/

2245. Prijedor SUP building (Secretariat of Internal Affairs): (The existence
of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely
the Canadian Government.) It is reported that on 30 May 1992, when the town of
Prijedor was under attack by Serbian troops, a number of men were detained at
the SUP building. The detainees were reported to have been beaten, tortured
and some killed. 3393/

2246. One subject reports that he and the other men were all severely beaten.
That there were about 100 Serb soldiers in the room "interrogating and beating
them". The prisoners were forced to face the wall so that they couldn't see
who was beating them. The subject says his skull was pierced with a gun
breech. 3394/
2247. Puharska District, Prijedor: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) Described by one report as the ghetto into which the Prijedor Muslims were herded after Serbs took control of the town and burned down Muslim houses. 3395/ The account does not give the details or characteristics of the detention.

2248. Šenkovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report this was a camp located in Prijedor. 3396/ A search of available maps does not identify a town or area by this name.

2249. Sivac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report this was a camp located in Prijedor. 3397/ A search of the available maps does not identify a town or area by this name in the county of Prijedor, however, there is a town by this name in Serbia.

2250. Tukovi: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report this camp was located in the vicinity of the town of Prijedor. 3398/ A search of available maps does not locate a town by this name, however, a directory of towns in the former Yugoslavia indicates that Tukovi uses Prijedor's post office. 3399/

2251. Tomašica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including a UN Civil Affairs Report.) Reportedly a camp located in Prijedor. 3400/ A search of available maps does not identify a town or area by this name. According to one report 4,000 people were detained at "Tomašica, Trnopolje" as of 19 November 1992. 3401/

2252. Trnopolje area: "Survivors [of Trnopolje camp] testify about the establishment of a number of smaller local residences for the purposes of sexually abusing females." 3402/

2253. Dip Jela Sawmill: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A location where, reportedly, women detained at Trnopolje camp were brought for raping by Serb soldiers. 3403/ The report states that the sawmill is about three miles from Trnopolje. Reportedly the women were raped in the 17 offices attached to the sawmill. 3404/

2254. The suspects claim that about five girls and women from each of the 30 classroom where detainees were held at the Trnopolje camp were taken to the sawmill nightly (about 100 every night).

2255. One subject and three other witnesses relate that their treatment was worse when the Serb soldiers had lost a battle. Reportedly, conditions were particularly bad on the night of 9 or 10 June, after the Serb commander Vojvoda Karlica was killed near Foa. 3405/

63. Prnjavor

2256. Prnjavor is located in northern BiH. According to 1991 census data, the population was 46,894. At that time, the population was reportedly 71.6 per cent Serb, 15.3 per cent Muslim, 5.7 per cent other, 3.7 per cent Croat, and 3.7 per cent Yugoslav. 3406/

2257. Village of Prnjavor: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the United States Government.) According to one source, the village of Prnjavor was turned into
a concentration camp where all Muslims were confined to their homes. A source also heard rumours that refugees fleeing from Odak and Modria had been rounded-up by Serbs and sent to two camps, one of which was located at Prnjavor, which was reportedly made to contain women and children. 3407/

2258. Another report offered by a Muslim man taken to "Prnjavor Camp", and apparently held there from 16 May to 14 July 1992, described beatings by Serbian military police. Reportedly, he saw one man die during a beating on 17 May 1992 and another die on 6 June 1992. The alleged killers were members of groups called White Eagles or White Wolves. 3408/

64. Prozor

2259. Prozor is located in the central part of BiH. The pre-war population of the city and county of Prozor was 19,601. Approximately 62.3 per cent was Croat and 37.7 per cent was Muslim. 3409/

2260. Prozor Detention: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) In October and November 1992, there were reports of arbitrary detentions of Muslims by Croat forces during clashes between Croat and BiH forces in and around Prozor. In one such incident, a Muslim boy was reportedly detained by HVO (Croatian Defence Council) military police and was reportedly only released four days later when his father and others surrendered their arms. 3410/

2261. Apparently, the ICRC regularly visited prisoners held by Bosnian Croat authorities in Prozor at some time in the early part of 1993 and/or earlier. Although, the ICRC reported finding no prisoners detained by Bosnian Croat authorities in Prozor on 13 April 1993, 3411/ just three months later, on 10 July 1993, another ICRC report suggests that Red Cross representatives visited 22 prisoners held in Prozor by Bosnian Croat authorities. 3412/

2262. According to another report, on 26 August 1993, an ECMM team observed 25 prisoners or civilian internees digging trenches close to the front line in Trnovaca. The team protested, in vain, to HVO authorities in Prozor. 3413/

2263. On 30 August 1993, a meeting took place in order to arrange an exchange of prisoners that would include HVO prisoners captured by the BiH Army at Prozor. 3414/

2264. Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported visiting a prison/penitentiary in Prozor on 30 January 1993. 3415/ Their report was, however, silent as to the conditions, treatment and number of detainees present at the facility.

2265. Technical School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) On 9 September 1993, an ECMM team visited an HVO POW camp located at the town's technical school, 100 metres from HVO headquarters. This camp was not a military detention camp but a detention camp for civilian internees. At the time of the visit, there were reportedly 228 civilians imprisoned at this facility. 3416/

2266. Reportedly, the prisoners had to dig trenches almost every day in the area of Trnovaca. At least four of the prisoners had reportedly been killed in the process. In the absence of the camp guards, the internees mentioned that they thought that approximately 40 to 60 people had been killed while working in the trenches. That assertion remained unconfirmed. 3417/
2267. The ECMM team reported that in general the prisoners had been treated well. They were not lacking food or water. Their living conditions appeared to be fairly reasonable. They had adequate washing and sanitary facilities. 3418/ The ECMM team reported that they occasionally picked up and delivered mail for the detainees. 3419/

2268. Local authorities reportedly promised to provide members of the ECMM team with a list of names of all war prisoners detained as well as the names of all of the Muslims who remained in the area. 3420/

2269. In a letter dated 19 August 1993, the BiH Ambassador to the United Nations reported that Bosnian Muslim men were being held by HVO militiamen in a concentration camp in a Prozor High school complex. 3421/

2270. Additionally, the ICRC reported visiting a school in Prozor on 8 October 1993. 3422/ Their report was, however, silent as to the conditions, treatment and number of detainees present at the facility.

2271. Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) According to one report, representatives from the ICRC first visited a detention facility established in a factory in this area on 19 October 1993. 3423/ The report was silent with respect to conditions and the operation of the facility.

2272. The ECMM team also reported a visit to two factories where some 40 internees are working and living. Their living conditions were reportedly quite good and they were permitted limited free access to the city. 3424/

2273. Atomic Shelter: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In a letter dated 19 August 1993, the BiH Ambassador to the United Nations reported that Bosnian Muslim men were being held by HVO militias in a concentration camp in Prozor at an Atomic shelter. 3425/

2274. UNIS: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In a letter dated 19 August 1993, it was alleged that Bosnian Muslim men were being held by HVO militias in a concentration camp in Prozor at UNIS. 3426/

2275. Fire-fighter's House: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Also in the letter dated 19 August 1993, the BiH Ambassador to the United Nations reported that Bosnian Muslim men were being held by HVO militias in a concentration camp in Prozor at a Fire-fighters' house. 3427/ Additional information regarding procedures and conditions at this facility were not provided.

65. Rogatica

2276. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, Rogatica had a population of approximately 22,000 before the conflict: 60 per cent were Bosnian Muslims and 40 per cent were Bosnian Serbs. Currently, very few Bosnian Muslims remain in Rogatica. 3428/

2277. The fighting in Rogatica apparently began on 22 May 1992, 3429/ and lasted approximately two months. 3430/ Once the fighting started, Muslims could not leave the city. 3431/

2278. There were allegedly as many as 12 detention facilities in Rogatica. Reports suggest that mainly Serbs controlled these facilities, and that the
prisoners were primarily Muslim civilians. As many as 4,513 people allegedly were detained. 3432/

2279. Under the leadership of the commander of the local Serbian paramilitary forces, Serbs apparently began detaining Muslim civilians in late May 1992. 3433/ It is unclear how long this process continued, but there are reports that Serbs still were detaining Muslim civilians in late July and early August 1992. 3434/

2280. Witnesses report that in late May 1992 Serbian forces told Muslims to come to the city stadium or the high school. 3435/ Those Muslims who refused to leave their homes were taken to the stadium by force. 3436/ Serbian forces then sent Muslims to various detention facilities. Men and women were separated and sent to different locations. 3437/ There are also reports that some men were forcibly conscripted into the Serbian irregular forces. 3438/

2281. Allegedly, large numbers of these detainees were released or exchanged from late June 1992 through early August 1992. 3439/ According to reports from September 1992, it is estimated that 500 prisoners were exchanged from Rogatica, Foa, Kalinovik, and Miljevina. 3440/ Presently, it is unclear how many people, if any, are still detained in Rogatica.

2282. Witness statements allege that people detained in Rogatica were killed, raped, and beaten. In particular, there are several reports that Serbian forces raped Muslim women and girls while they were in detention. 3441/

2283. Church/Priest's Garage/Priory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Several reports indicate that Serbian forces operated a detention facility on the grounds of a church in Rogatica. 3442/ These reports described this facility as a church, a priest's garage, and a priory. 3443/ It is unclear how long Serbian forces have used this facility. However, one woman stated that she and her family were imprisoned in the priest's garage from 20 July through 23 July (presumably 1992). 3444/

2284. One report states that at least 23 people were imprisoned at the church. 3445/ Men may have been separated from women. Upon arrival, one witness stated that her father was taken away immediately to an undisclosed location. 3446/ The present status of the detention facility is unclear. Reportedly, on 23 July, 23 of the remaining prisoners were taken to the high school centre. 3447/

2285. Girls and women detained at the church were reportedly raped. 3448/ Another report claims that Serbs also brought women detained at other facilities to the church in order to rape them. 3449/ Functionaries of the regional Serbian paramilitary headquarters allegedly used the church grounds to rape young girls and women they abducted from a school detention facility. 3450/

2286. Donje Polje Cellar, Garage, and House: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Serbian forces allegedly held at least 40 Muslims in a large cellar, garage, and house in the Serbian community of Donje Polje. 3451/ Purportedly, many of the Muslims reported to Donje Polje after being ordered by Serbs to do so to avoid the possibility of hardship which could befall them during this transitional period. They were assured that they would be safe while Serbian forces searched their houses. 3452/ Upon the group's arrival in Donje Polje, Muslim citizens were allegedly locked in an unidentified cellar. 3453/
For the first hours of their detention, the Muslims appeared to receive good treatment. According to one report, two women offered the adults coffee and gave the children bread and jam. A representative of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) also visited the detainees to reassure them of their safety.

However, the treatment of the prisoners seemed to worsen. Later that first day, two Serbian soldiers arrested 15 Muslim men who were in the cellar and took them away. It is unclear where they were taken. In the evening, another man moved the remaining prisoners to a garage on the same street. He then moved them into a house because it was cold that night. For the remainder of their detention, the Serbs gave the Muslim children some biscuits, but did not give any food to the adults. The following day, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the remaining Muslim detainees were bused to the Sladara factory. However, they were made to remain on the bus. After some time, the detainees were transported to Kaljina, near Olovo, and released.

Malt Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One report states that men were detained at a Malt Factory in Rogatica. The report's detail suggests that the Malt Factory, the Sladara Factory, and the Sarajevo Brewery may be different names for the same location. Allegedly, over 500 detainees at the factory were executed and 100 people remain imprisoned.

Old Primary School in Borike: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none neutral.) Some reports state that a detention facility is located at an old primary school in Borike. Other reports, which describe a detention facility at an unidentified primary school in Rogatica, also may identify the old primary school. According to one witness statement, the old building, presumably the old primary school, has two floors, and four or five classrooms on each floor.

Penitentiary/Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The International Committee of the Red Cross states that its representatives visited a detention facility established in a prison in Rogatica on 27 July 1993. Their report provided no other information on the conditions or control of the prison facility.

Podosoje Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) Reports indicate that Serbian forces operated a detention facility at Podosoje. According to several reports, including one dated October 1992, approximately 2,300 people are detained at Pososoje. Allegedly, Serbian forces transferred several of the men detained at the Sladara Factory to this facility.

Ptiiljak Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Allegedly Serbian forces detained Muslim men at this location. A report states that several men who were first taken to the Veljko Vlahovi High School immediately were transported to this location.

Ragib Djindo Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none neutral.) Allegedly, the Ragib Djindo school was used to detain over 500 people. Ragib Djindo, Rogatica's new primary school building, is located near Sladara.
2295. One report states that local Serbs were the parties that used a primary school to detain Muslims. However, it is unclear whether this report refers to Ragib Djindo, Borike, or another school in Rogatica. This same report also states that Serbs beat, raped, and burned prisoners at the school. Other reports, which describe a detention facility at an unnamed primary school in Rogatica, also may identify the Ragib Djindo school.

2296. Sarajevo Brewery: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Serbian forces allegedly used a silo at the Sarajevo Brewery as a detention facility. The report concerning this facility was silent regarding prisoner identity, conditions of detention or length of the facility's existence.

2297. Sladara Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none neutral.) Serbian forces reportedly operated a detention facility for Muslim men at the Sladara Factory. It is possible that as many as 500 people were detained at this location. According to some reports, Serbian detention of Muslims followed a pattern in which men were separated from their families and sent to the Sladara Factory. Then, after spending an unspecified length of time at Sladara, some detainees were allegedly transferred to another detention facility at Podosj.

2298. Sugar Refinery: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none neutral.) According to reports, a detention facility was identified at a sugar refinery in Rogatica. No additional information was provided regarding the facility's operation or control.

2299. Veljko Vlahovi High School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Serbian forces operated a detention facility for Muslims--primarily women and children--at the Veljko Vlahovi High School in Rogatica. Reports indicate that Serbian forces used this high school as a detention facility from at least May through August 1992.

2300. It is likely that local Serbian paramilitary forces initially controlled the high school. Reports indicate that in late May 1992, the commander of the local Serbian paramilitary forces, issued an order for Rogatica's Muslims to gather at the high school. At about the same time, Serbian forces allegedly placed an identified person in charge of the detainees. Additionally, the Serbs allegedly obtained the cooperation of some local Muslim families.

2301. However, following the arrival of Arkan's soldiers toward the end of June and approximately 150 members of a Serbian paramilitary force from Baka Palanka in mid-July, it is unclear whether this person still controlled the high school. From July through August 1992, various groups of Serbian soldiers appear to have been able to harass the detainees without any restrictions.

2302. In addition to recognizing Arkan's soldiers among the high school authorities, witnesses reported that they saw members of Šešelj's White Eagles at the high school.

2303. From late May 1992 through early August 1992, Serbian forces allegedly ordered Muslim civilians in Rogatica to gather at the high school. Reports state that Muslim men then were taken to the Sladara factory. There are also reports that upon arrival at the high school, Serbian forces separated
the men and took them to Potiljak. 3495/ Serbian forces supposedly intended the high school to be a detention facility for mainly Muslim women, children, and elderly, as well as prisoners from Graanica. 3496/

2304. Beginning 25 May 1992, the commander of the local Serbian paramilitary forces, allegedly used loudspeakers to warn all Muslim civilians to gather at the high school. 3497/ Apparently about 300 people responded. 3498/ Shortly thereafter, on 6 June 1992, Muslims again were warned to gather at the high school. 3499/ At that time, Serbian forces began to arrest Muslim civilians who had not responded to the previous announcements. 3500/

2305. Toward the end of June, there were approximately 300 people at the high school, about 50 of whom had come there voluntarily. 3501/ However, the number of detainees quickly decreased. At the end of June 1992, Serbian authorities allegedly decided to transfer about 250 of the 300 remaining detainees to Olovo and neighbouring villages. 3502/ Reports state that 57 people remained at the high school. 3503/

2306. Serbian forces continued to take Muslims to the high school throughout July and the early days of August. At the beginning of July, a new group of civilians arrived from Seljani, Rakitnica, and Kovanj. 3504/ Then, in mid-July, Serbs again reportedly began to order Muslim civilians to the high school. 3505/ Serbs also consolidated prisoners from other locations at the high school. On 23 July 1992, 23 of the remaining prisoners at the church allegedly were taken to the high school. 3506/ On the same day, Serbian forces also reportedly took Muslim families from their homes to the high school. 3507/ There are also several reports that Serbs took Muslims from their homes to the high school on 29 July 1992. 3508/ Additionally, several reports state that Serbs took Muslim civilians to the high school through the last days of July until 4 August 1992. 3509/ By 7 August 1992, the number of prisoners again reached 300. 3510/

2307. In early August, the Serbian authorities again reportedly released prisoners. On 2 August 1992, several prisoners allegedly were transported to Visoko. 3511/ On 5 August 1992, reports indicate that a large group of the remaining detainees were transported to Hreša, outside Sarajevo. 3512/ Once in Hreša, reports also mention that Serbian positions fired on the detainees as they were released. 3513/ In Vratnik, they were greeted by the armed forces of BiH. 3514/ The last report of anyone transported out of the high school is on 8 August 1992. 3515/

2308. Serbian soldiers allegedly raped many women detained at the high school. 3516/ There are numerous reports of Serbian soldiers taking women and girls from the classrooms and returning them in the morning. 3517/ One report alleges that over 100 women were repeatedly gang raped at the school. 3518/ Reportedly, some women also became pregnant after being raped. 3519/ They allegedly were taken to the ecumenical centre and released. 3520/

2309. Reports stated that Serbs from Pale, Rogatica, Sokolac, and Serbia raped women at the school. 3521/ Numerous reports identify individuals supposedly responsible for sexual assaults of the detainees in the camp. 3522/

2310. The majority of reported sexual assaults allegedly occurred sometime after late June 1992. In particular, reports point to a period of intense abuse of the detainees between 29 July 1992 and 5 August 1992 when women were raped every evening. 3523/ Many women allegedly were raped on multiple evenings as well as raped by more than one person on a single evening. One Muslim woman reported that she was raped 12 times in five nights. 3524/ Another woman reportedly was raped one night by five Serbs. 3525/
2311. Most of the sexual assaults allegedly followed a similar pattern in which pairs of Serbian paramilitary members would enter the detainees' classrooms at approximately 11:00 p.m., select certain women, and take them into other rooms of the school where they would rape them. 3526/ There also are reports of Serbs taking women from classrooms at any time between 12:45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.. 3527/ Additionally, Serbs allegedly took women from the classrooms and raped them in the cellar of the high school, local apartments, and automobiles. 3528/

2312. There is little information on how women were chosen as victims. One report states that two Serbian paramilitary members would decide who would be raped. 3529/ This report also mentions that some Serbs would request women as victims based on their photos. 3530/

2313. In many instances, the victims also were beaten as they were raped. 3531/ One woman reports that her assailants beat her with boots and guns, and threatened her with a knife. 3532/ Another Muslim woman reports that she was beaten and kicked while she was raped. 3533/

2314. Rape also was used as a tool of interrogation. One Muslim woman states that she was raped while being interrogated by an identified commander. 3534/

2315. Beyond the reports of sexual assault, witnesses also allege that detainees at the high school were killed, beaten, robbed, threatened, and forcibly converted to Serbian Orthodox. Like the rapes, the mistreatment of the prisoners increased after the end of June 1992. 3535/

2316. There are a few reports of murders and disappearances. On 8 June 1992, three people allegedly were executed by members of the Serbian irregular forces. 3536/ It is unclear whether they were killed at the school or some other location. 3537/ In particular, one witness states that an identified man killed an identified woman. 3538/ Additionally, at the end of June, one person was taken away and never seen again. 3539/ An identified man also allegedly had burned and killed. 3540/

2317. According to reports, the detainees at the high school were physically assaulted. There are several reports of Serbian forces beating women, often when these women were trying to protect others from being raped. 3541/ The detainees were beaten without weapons and with rifle butts. 3542/

2318. The high school authorities also forced the detainees to perform dangerous and degrading acts. One woman reports that she was spared from being raped, but forced to commit various "immoral acts". 3543/ Two men allegedly forced another Muslim woman to sit on an anti-tank mine and to jump from a third floor window. 3544/ One of these made women drink alcohol, deciding how much and how fast they had to drink. 3545/ He allegedly forced women try to commit suicide. 3546/

2319. There are reports that the high school authorities looted the detainees. Several detainees report that they were forced to surrender their jewelry. 3547/ Two identified men were most often reported as the perpetrators of these crimes. 3548/

2320. There are several reports that the prisoners were exposed to various threats and psychic tortures. 3549/ In particular, there are several reports of high school authorities, most often the two men mentioned above, trying to force prisoners to convert to Serbian Orthodox. 3550/ Additionally, three identified people reportedly would ask people to convert, and tell them that those who converted would stay alive and that the others would die. 3551/
2321. Despite the reports of rape, murder, and battery, there are several reports that some of the Serbian paramilitary guards treated prisoners well. Reportedly, the person who originally was responsible for the security of the inmates, treated all of the detainees well. However, the conditions, and his control, of the camp allegedly deteriorated with the arrival of about 150 paramilitary Serbs from Baka Palanka in early July.

2322. Witnesses also report that a number of guards protected some of the detainees. A guard who was a friend of one Muslim woman's husband, allegedly allowed her to sleep at a nearby apartment, in order to prevent her from being raped. He also are reports that he provided food for the detainees, and gave Muslims Serbian travel passes so that they could flee to safety. Lastly, he allegedly saved some detainees from a plan to execute them. Another woman's testimony states that one of the men accused of war crimes at this location protected her from attacks by other guards. Lastly, one woman claims that another man protected her from being raped and beaten.

2323. Although some guards may have respectfully treated the detainees, the conditions at the high school were generally poor. The detainees allegedly were held in classrooms containing anywhere from 17 to 57 people. Some groups of detainees allegedly were prevented from having contact with other inmates.

2324. Sleeping conditions at the camp were very simple. One group of 21 people allegedly were detained in a classroom where they slept without blankets on cement floors. Other reports also stated that detainees had no place to sleep, or could only sleep on the floor.

2325. Apparently, food at the high school was scarce. One group of detainees states that there was no food or medicine at the school when they arrived. There also is a report which states that there was no water, and another which claims that some guards refused to give water to prisoners. Other reports stated that they did not receive food for several days, and described the supplies that they did receive as insufficient.

2326. However, there also are reports that the Serbian authorities provided some supplies. Between 8 June and 24 July 1992, one group allegedly was given small amounts of food every 15 days. These supplies included 110 kilograms of flour, five litres of oil, three to four kilograms of rice and beans, and approximately 50 packages of pasta. Another group of 21 people reports that on 1 August 1992, the fourth day of their captivity, the prison authorities provided them with 20 kilograms of flour, one-half litre of oil, and one-half kilogram of rice. Lastly, one witness states that between 30 July 1992 and 5 August 1992 a group of several detainees was given one-half kilogram of rice, one-half litre of cooking oil, and 20 kilograms of flour. This witness also reports that there was a stove at the high school, and that some of the detainees were allowed to cook meals.

2327. The prison authorities also allowed the detainees to find their own food. Between 8 June 1992 and 24 July 1992, approximately 50 detainees who lived close to the school were allowed to go home to get some food and clothing.

2328. Nonetheless, the supplies at the high school may not have been sufficient. There were a few reports that detainees died from lack of food or medicine. One woman who originally was not allowed to bring her medicine to the school may have died from starvation. There also is another report that a woman starved to death, but it is unclear whether she died while she...
was in detention. 3574/

66. **Rudo**

2329. This municipality is located on the eastern border of BiH, adjacent to Serbia. Its neighbour to the north is Višegrad and its neighbour to the south is aijnie. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, Rudo county had a population of 11,572; of that 27.2 per cent were Muslims, 70.8 per cent were Serbs and the remaining 2 per cent were described as "others".

2330. Reports indicate that there may have been as many as four detention facilities operating in Rudo; however, information regarding Rudo prison and Rudo camp may, in fact, be describing the same location. Bosnian Serb authorities allegedly operated Rudo prison, but the evidence does not indicate the ethnicity of the parties who operated the other facilities.

2331. Although one report states that Bosnians were detained in Rudo prison, other reports lack any information about the ethnicity of detainees. Even though there is no information about the number of detainees at two of the three sites, at least 22 prisoners were reportedly detained in Rudo.

2332. **Barracks**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly, the barracks in Rudo has operated as a detention facility. 3575/

2333. **Old Railway Station**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A detention facility allegedly was located at the old railway station in Rudo. 3576/

2334. **Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) One report indicates that Bosnian Serb authorities have operated a detention facility at Rudo prison, where as many as 18 prisoners were held. 3577/ Other reports describe a Serbian operated detention facility called Rudo camp, which has held as many as 21 Bosnians. 3578/ These reports may describe the same facility.

2335. One report about Rudo camp details abuse of detainees. A Muslim who was detained in Rudo camp with 21 other Bosnians said that all of the men in his camp had been beaten regularly. 3579/ Men allegedly would be taken from their room for interrogation and would return disfigured, in some cases with ears, fingers, or noses cut off. 3580/

67. **SANSKI MOST**

2336. Sanski Most is located in north-west BiH. In 1991 its population was 60,119. Of that, 47 per cent were Muslim, 42.2 per cent Serbian, 7.1 per cent Croatian, and 3.7 per cent were described as "other".

2337. There are reports of 11 Serbian-run detention facilities in this region. They are as follows: Betonirka, the concrete factory at Sanski Most, Hasan Kiki Primary School, Kamengrad, Krings Factory, Kriva Cesta Police Station, Narodni Front Primary School, the police station in Sanski Most, Sana camp, Sportski Centar, and Vrhopolje. These camps held both Muslim and Croatian prisoners, many of whom were later sent on to Manjaa and Doboj camps.

2338. Camps were established and prisoners detained as part of a greater campaign of "ethnic cleansing" in the region. This campaign began in December 1991 and continued until the complete shelling of the city in late May 1992.
At first, Serbian authorities demobilized all Muslim and Croatian militia, police, and security forces that were then active in the area. Then, in April, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) requested that the Department of Internal Security (SUP) divide along ethnic lines and form completely separate departments. The Croatian and Muslim officers of the SUP refused the proposed division.

Soon after, 500 uniformed Serbian reservists from the 6th Krajiska Brigade arrived in the city. They surrounded the SUP administration building, took over the radio station, post office, bank, and power station. Non-Serbian police officers were told to leave their jobs and go home. All surrounding police officers were also targeted for "ethnic cleansing". Civilians were asked to surrender their weapons and all movement in the region was closely monitored.

Then, on 23 May 1992 Serbian inhabitants were evacuated from the city. A couple days later Sanski Most was completely blockaded by tanks, armoured vehicles, and Serbian troops. On the afternoon of the 27th, non-Serbian inhabitants were given an ultimatum to vacate their homes and gather in an open field or risk being killed. Then, white sheets were put on the roofs of their houses. At about 10:00 p.m., mortars were aimed at these homes, and anyone who had not left them were killed. Apparently, a number of elderly civilians died during this initial bombing.

This campaign of "ethnic cleansing" was carried out by the 6th Sanski Most Brigade or Krajiska Brigade, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), and local Serbs. Organizers that are specifically named include: the head of the SDS and later installed as the president of Sanski Most County; the man in charge of all camps and detention centres established in the region, commander of the 6th Sanski Most Brigade which was responsible for executing the plans developed by the other two men; commander of the paramilitary organization called Srpske Oruane Snage (SOS) which was made up of local Serbs; and the local leader of the Serbian radical party loyal to Vojislav Šešelj.

Fifteen other men were named.

Betonirka: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none neutral.) One report states that 500 Muslim prisoners, mostly from the city of Sanski Most, were detained at this camp. During their captivity, they were severely beaten, and some were killed. Another report refers to this camp as one of "evil repute" where a certain Marti from Uljevci was well-known for taking part in activities against prisoners. Many of the prisoners from here were ultimately sent on to Manjaa camp.

Concrete factory in Sanski Most: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Government of Denmark.) Another report claims that 120 Muslim men from the Mahala suburb of Sanski Most were detained at a concrete factory near the police station in Sanski Most beginning 27 May 1992. They were ultimately transferred to the Manac or Manjaa camp, yet some died upon their arrival at Manac because they had been beaten so severely during their stay at the concrete factory.

Hasan Kiki Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Muslim prisoners were brought to this school upon the attacks of their villages. Men were kept here while women and children were transferred.
to Velika Kladuša. Approximately 1,200 men were held here for a 50-day period. During this time, they were interrogated and tortured before being transferred to Manjaa camp.

2346. The school had no toilets or other facilities, and prisoners were not given food. Some outsiders were allowed to bring food to the camp, but most of it never reached the prisoners because it was stolen by Serb guards. Prisoners were often beaten and forced to beat each other. One man reports that he was beaten regularly with chair legs and rubber batons during his detention between 27 May and 7 July.

2347. Frequently, unidentified "bearded and blood covered" Serb irregulars came to the school with knives demanding to kill prisoners, yet they were unable to get to them because police guards would not let them in.

2348. Kamengrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Government of France.) Kamengrad is reported to be a "mixed camp" in Sanski Most. Women were allegedly raped and sexually abused at this camp. There is no further information.

2349. Krings Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) The Krings factory building is located 2.5 to five kilometres west of Sanski Most. This factory is described as both a former fabric hall and an iron works factory and is in the industrial zone of Sanski Most on the road to Bosanska Krupa. An auto factory called Famos is to the west of it, and a factory that use to make elevators is to the east.Apparently, the building was previously used by military forces. The ICRC reported visiting the detention facility at the Krings factory.

2350. The facility is surrounded by a one metre high wire fence, its perimeter comprised of an area about 160 by 100 metres. There are two structures in the compound: a small office and the detention facility itself. The single story office building is approximately eight by six metres and is in the north-west corner of the compound. It has five small rooms which were used for interrogations.

2351. The detention facility is 50 by 100 metres and is 10 metres high. It is built of brick with glass-paned windows and has two entrances. The one on the north-western front consists of two large doors which open outward. These doors are large enough to let cars in. A second entrance on the east end of the building is smaller and permits only individual access. Its doors open inward. There is a third entrance which also has auto access on the south side, but its doors were kept locked at all times. Finally, there is a dog pen attached to the north-eastern corner of the building.

2352. Muslim and Croatian prisoners from Briševko, Sanski Most, Hrustovo, Vrhpolje, and Stari Majdan as well as those transferred from the Kamengrad and Sportski Centar camps were held at this factory. There is one report that claims that wealthy, intellectual, and professional individuals were singled out to be brought to Krings. Two thousand of the prisoners from Sanski Most came in summer 1992. They had been ordered to gather at the marketplace in front of Sanski Most town hall sometime in June. At that point, military buses took them to Krings. When they arrived, prisoners from Hrustovo and Vrhpolje were already at the factory.
2354. There are two reports of prisoners coming from Stari Majdan. One states that 150 prisoners arrived on 7 June 1992. Another claims that men from Stari Majdan also arrived on 30 July or 1 August with prisoners from Briševo. It is not clear when prisoners from the other camps were transferred to the factory, but it is certain that they were detained at the factory during this same time. All in all, approximately 1,000 people are said to have been held at the camp, and an additional 3,000 to 5,000 passed through it during the period from May to September 1992.

2355. At the factory, men were separated from the women, children, and elderly. The men were put in the large detention building, lined up, and registered by name. They received no food or water. People were beaten with clubs, canes, thick knotted ropes, chains, army boots, and rifles. Apparently, many people choked from internal bleeding as a result of the beatings. Also, the prisoners were forced to sing Serbian nationalist songs. Those from the villages of Hrustovo and Vrhpolje were beaten particularly severely while singing. Furthermore, they were told that their daughters had been raped in order to humiliate them in front of the other men. Well over 100 people are reported to have been killed at the factory.

2356. Prisoners were interrogated throughout their detention. Apparently, there were always at least five guards and five interrogators at the factory. The interrogator squad consisted of three military personnel and two policemen. During questioning, prisoners were asked about their private lives, political views, places of work, ownership of weapons, and positions of Muslim units and arms. Two individuals were named in connection with the interrogations.

2357. The camp was guarded by men wearing JNA uniforms, presumed to be members of the reserve army. The leader of the camp was identified by one name. Later on, in July the army soldiers were replaced by men in dark blue police uniforms. The police force was led by an identified man from Sanski Most. Five other policemen were named.

2358. In addition to these individuals, there were other unidentified military personnel who were present at the camp. One such figure came at night to inspect the camp. He wore a plain green uniform, with an "unusually tall hat similar to that of the cossacks." On the hat was pinned a "etnik" symbol unknown to the witness and other prisoners. The man carried a machine-gun with him. Another individual identified only as "Marti" came to the camp in early August dressed in an army uniform and started kicking all of the prisoners.

2359. It appears that Krings closed down sometime near September 1992. Men were either released or transferred to Manjaa. One witness relates that he was released on 20 August with 250 other prisoners. The men were let go two at a time and were allowed to move freely around Sanski Most. They were issued written permission by the 6th Krajiška Brigade. This permission was signed by an identified man.

2360. The mayor of Sanski Most and founder of the SDS and the chairman of SDP, are named as having full knowledge of the activities at the factory during its operation.

2362. Kriva Cesta Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) One witness explains being held at a police station called Kriva Cesta three
kilometres outside of Sanski Most on the road to Kluji.  It is not clear whether this is the central Sanski Most station described in more details by others or not. See Police Station in Sanski Most below for more information.

2363. Narodni Front School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Government of Denmark.) Two thousand civilians of the Mahala suburb of Sanski Most were brought to the gym of this school upon the severe shelling of their neighbourhoods on 27 May 1992. Women and children were immediately released, but the men stayed for up to two weeks. It appears that the school was a sort of collecting centre because the names and addresses of all men were registered by the local police, and then they were released.

2364. Another source reports that only 500 prisoners were actually "detained" at the school.

2365. Police Headquarters at Sanski Most: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) Upon the attack of Sanski Most by Serbian forces, men were arrested and taken to the basement of police headquarters. There, they were interrogated and beaten for days. Thirty-three non-Serbian police officers were brought to police headquarters. Seventeen of them were killed during interrogations; eight were sent on to Manjača, and four managed to escape.

2366. Some men were brought from other camps at night to be interrogated and beaten. One ex-prisoner claims that men were taken two a night from Sportski Centar to the police station. There, they were beaten with shovel handles and hit in the stomach.

2367. The ICRC reported visiting the Sanski Most Police Station twice, once on 6 August 1992 and another time on 10 October 1992. In August, representatives reported seeing 13 prisoners, and in October they saw only one.

2368. Sana camp: The existence of this camp has not been corroborated by multiple sources. This camp was located in a workshop of the ceramic factory at Sanski Most. Many prisoners came to Sana from aplje and Tomina and stayed for a short period before being transferred on to Kozarac or Doboj.

2369. At the Sana camp, men between the ages of 15 and 60 years old were separated from the women, children, and elderly. The women, children, and elderly usually spent one night at the camp before being sent on to Doboj while the men stayed for a bit longer.

2370. There are reports that some people were killed arbitrarily during their initial detention. Others died during their transfer to other camps because they received no food or water on the truck cargos. Many, particularly the elderly, died from lack of air and water at this time.

2371. One report describes the transport of a particular group of men from Sana camp to Tomina where they were killed at the bridge near the entrance of town. Apparently, the cargo trucks stopped at the bridge, and the men were ordered off. Then, the prisoners were told to undress and were fired on as they scrambled underneath the bridge.

2372. Sportski centar: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State. Muslim prisoners from Sanski Most were forced to gather at the sports centre...
on the outskirts of town in late May 1992 when the Serbs took over the city. From that time on, thousands of people passed through this camp, and it is estimated that up to 3,000 people were detained here at one time. 3655/ Again, women, children, and the elderly were immediately separated from the men and let go after one night. 3656/ Most of the men were ultimately transferred to Manjača.

2373. Family members that were released were allowed to bring food to the camp, but this food was often stolen by guards and never reached the detainees. Furthermore, those bringing it risked being beaten and killed because they would be falsely accused of smuggling in weapons. 3657/ The prisoners received no other food at the camp, and one witness reports that a man died of starvation during his detention there. 3658/

2374. Apparently, the sports hall was divided into two sections, one larger than the other. 3659/ There is also alleged to have been a "special interrogation house" where detainees were beaten and tortured. In this "house," prisoners were asked where all of their possessions were, and many were executed. 3660/ 3661/ The centre was guarded by Serbian police, military personnel, and local Serb civilians. 3661/ They beat people with bats, rifle butts, and kicked them with steel-toed boots. 3662/ One specific perpetrator in activities against prisoners was named. 3663/ Apparently, he ordered many of the beatings at the centre.

2376. During their short detention, two prisoners a night were taken from the sports centre to the police station to be interrogated. 3664/

2377. Vrhpolje: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team Report. Vrhpolje is a village approximately 12 kilometres south-east of Sanski Most. An unknown number of prisoners were held at a camp there. 3665/

68. Sarajevo

2378. Sarajevo consists of several distinct counties or areas. They include, Centar, Hadić, Ilida, Ilijaš, Novi grad, Novo, Pale, Stari grad, Trnovo, and Vogošća. There were many camps in the Sarajevo area, run by all three ethnic groups and housing all three ethnic groups. However, the majority of reports concern Muslim-run camps, housing Bosnian Serbs.

2379. Fighting broke out in the area on 5 April 1992, the eve of a meeting of European Community Ministers, who were expected to recognize BiH as an independent state. At 2:00 p.m. a deadline set by Serbian leaders for cancellation of a full mobilization of the Republic's Territorial Defence and police reserve forces 3666/ expired. As the deadline expired, thousands of people reportedly took to the streets in spontaneous peace marches, and Sarajevo television began running appeals for ethnic amity. One group of marchers was shot at by unidentified gunmen. 3667/ At that point, full-scale fighting broke out. 3668/

2380. Shortly after fighting broke out, many detention centres reportedly sprang up. There are multiple reports of private prisons run from basements of apartment buildings, shopping centres, offices, and in garages all around the region. There were also several larger camps run by the BiH government and the Bosnian Serb Army.
2381. As of August 1993, the Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Commission estimated that 100 to 150 people were detained in the government controlled area of Sarajevo, and a similar number were detained by Bosnian Serb forces in the area controlled by them. He stated that the ICRC learned of detention months after such detention began or took place, because the authorities on all sides notify the ICRC only after they have been specifically ordered to do so. 3669/

a. Small detention facilities in Sarajevo

2382. There were reportedly many humanitarian law violations at the private detention facilities. Some of these small facilities were allegedly "bordellos", or sites where women were kept and raped and sexually assaulted for the gratification of the soldiers. 3670/ Many of these allegations were very general, though some sources identified specific sites which were reportedly used for such purposes. 3671/

2383. Premises at Danila Ozme Street: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International. The BiH Government allegedly detained Serb women here for the purpose of rape. There is no information on when the site was opened, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were, but the site was closed at the end of August 1992. 3672/

2384. Premises at engi Vila: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International. The BiH Government allegedly detained Serb women here for the purpose of rape. 3673/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there or what the conditions were.

2385. Railway Station: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Serbian girls were reportedly held here and raped. The submitting source stated that Muslims ran the site as part of a plan to get rid of all Serbs. 3674/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were.

2386. Primary School Petar Djoki: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Serbian girls were allegedly held here and raped. The source stated that Muslims ran the site as part of a plan to get rid of all Serbs. 3675/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were.

2387. Sports Centre Skenderija: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Serbian girls were allegedly detained here and raped. The source stated that Muslims ran the site as part of a plan to get rid of all Serbs. 3676/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were.

2388. The Hotel Zagreb: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. The BiH Territorial Defence allegedly ran a "bordello" for Serbian girls and women here. 3677/ In a separate submission the same source stated that Muslims ran the site as part of a plan to get rid of all Serbs. 3678/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were.
2389. The Hotel Evropa: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. The BiH Territorial Defence allegedly ran a "bordello" for Serbian girls and women here. Muslims reportedly took one identified girl here in July 1992 from Breka after they killed her mother and father. 3679/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there or what the conditions were.

2390. The Mladen Stojanovi Dormitory or Youth Hostel on Radieva Street: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International. This site was located near the Sarajka department store. It was allegedly converted into the Security Service Centre Department in Sarajevo and was the first step for prisoners on the way to either the Viktor Bubanj barracks or the Central Prison. 3680/ BiH Government forces reportedly operated the facility, where Serb women were allegedly detained and raped. 3681/ According to one source, the Muslims strategic plan was to rid the area of all Serbs. 3682/ There is no information on when the site was opened or closed, how many detainees were there, or what the conditions were.

2391. School of Civil Engineering: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. The Republika Srpska identified a man who ran a camp here where 100 Serb women were allegedly detained and raped. 3683/

2392. Aerodrom: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Women were allegedly detained, raped, and killed here. 3684/ No additional information regarding control or length of the facility's existence was made available.

2393. Student Hostel in Vraca: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely The Guardian. Women were allegedly detained and raped here. 3685/ No additional information regarding control or length of the facility's existence was made available.

2394. Houses in Souolac: 3686/ (The existence of these detention facilities have been corroborated by a neutral source, namely The Guardian.) Women were allegedly detained and raped here. 3687/

2395. Other small prisons housed both men and women. In these, the detainees were allegedly beaten, some killed, and some women were raped. 3688/ There is little information on many of these sites.

2396. Premises on Oktobarske Revolucije Street: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to a statement by two named witnesses, Serbian men were held here, one identified Serbian man was beaten to death with a mallet, and prisoners were used as live shields. 3689/

2397. Basement of Apartment Building at Trg Zavnobih-a: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A named Bosnian Serb witness stated that there were prison cells at this location two metres wide by 20 metres long. 3690/ In one cell were 57 prisoners, 17 of whom were women. They lay on wooden pallets along the wall. Some reportedly had broken limbs and ribs, broken teeth, or head wounds. The witness stated that he was beaten because he was from Pale. During the day, he stated that dogs were brought in and forced to bite the prisoners. The witness identified two of the men who beat the prisoners as Senad and "Kruško." 3691/
2398. Mladost, Trg Zavnobih-bb: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to a witness, in April, about 20 Serbs allegedly were arrested, mistreated, and tortured at a detention facility established in this public building. Two identified men were allegedly killed. The witness stated that the commander of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo, was one of the perpetrators. 3692/

2399. Coca-Cola Plant, Raskršće: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to a witness, this camp, located half way between Ilida and Hadil, was used as a processing plant for Bosnian Muslims before they were shipped to the stadium camp in Hadil. 3693/

2400. Cafe Borsalino: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to one source, a detention facility was established in this Sarajevo cafe. This facility was reportedly run by the Bosnian Muslim commander of the Territorial Defence in Sarajevo. Individuals detained here were allegedly tortured and denied food and water. 3694/

2401. School of Electrical Engineering: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A witness stated that after being brought here, the guards confiscated his documents and all of his money. He reportedly later learned that Green Berets were found on a mountain with all of his personal documents. 3695/

2402. Unidentified basement prison: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A named witness reported that he was arrested 6 May 1992 by Muslim Green Berets. He recalled witnessing the torture and forced confession of a fellow detainee. The witness stated that the prisoner was, thereafter, killed by an identified man. There were reportedly other Serbs present, who were also physically abused. 3696/

2403. Unidentified facility on Tetovska Street: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. In October 1992, a woman was allegedly taken from her home to a basement, which had been transformed into a containment area, in Tetovska street. During her detention, the woman was reportedly interrogated and raped by members of the Muslim army. 3697/ She became pregnant and received an abortion in March 1993, in her 22nd week of pregnancy. 3698/

2404. Unidentified military prison: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Paris Daily Liberation and the ICRC. According to Francois Didier of Paris’ Daily Liberation, Serbian prisoners, who appeared to be civilians, were kept at a military prison for exchange. They reportedly had visible injuries. 3699/ Another account involved a Serb man who saved a Muslim Imam during an attack on Dobroševi and Ahatovci in June of 1992. This man stated that he was arrested by Territorial Defence Forces on 29 June 1992, and taken to this prison. He stated that he told the people who arrested him that he had saved the Imam, but he was taken to the military prison anyway. He gave no further details. 3700/

2405. Unidentified School: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A witness reported that her son's school in Sarajevo was now a prison and a bordello. She said that she never saw women, and could not say if Serb or Muslim women were held there. She stated that she saw members of the Muslim army enter the school and heard screams of women and men. 3701/
2406. Ramiz Salin: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. According to one report, representatives of the ICRC visited a detention facility in Ramiz Salin. The facility was established in a local prison/penitentiary and was in existence on 27 December 1993. No information was provided regarding the operation and control of this facility. 3702/

b. Other areas of Sarajevo

2407. Alipašino Polje: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International. There was at least one site of detention in this area in Sarajevo. Three Bosnian Serb male witnesses describe events occurring at "the prison at Alipašino Polje", indicating that there may have been only one. 3703/ The fourth report states merely that Serbian women were raped by BiH Government forces on premises in this area. 3704/ Because the other witnesses do not allege that women were raped at the prison where they were held, this may be another site.

2408. The three witnesses each state that they were held in a prison run by the Muslim Territorial Defence Forces of BiH. The facility was reportedly used primarily for housing Bosnian Serbs. They also reported that both women and men were held there. 3705/ One stated that there were 72 inmates. 3706/ The witnesses did not describe conditions at the prison, but all three described beatings and killings. One man stated that he witnessed Muslim guards kill three men and saw guards interrogate another young man about weapons. When the young man replied he knew nothing about weapons, the guards allegedly tied him to a table and worked his anus over with a rasp. The witness stated that he saw the young man later in a pool of his own blood, still alive. 3707/

2409. The most detailed testimony was from a Serb man who said he was detained in a basement prison--called block B--for eight days. He claimed he was imprisoned for being a Serb. He said he was interrogated and beaten. The prison inspector questioned the witness about the names of other "etniks". When the witness stated that he knew a man with a particular name, he was beaten for 12 hours. The prison inspector reportedly watched the beating from a bed, rising from time to time to participate in the beating. The witness stated that he was put in a straight jacket twice and beaten with boards and a wooden stick. When he lost consciousness, the guards threw water over him. 3708/

2410. The witness also reported that the prison inspector urinated on his head and tried to force the witness to perform fellatio on him. When the witness refused, the prison inspector threatened him and took a stick, forcing it in and out of the witness' mouth, saying that this was what he did to Serb women with his penis. 3709/ The witness stated that he was beaten again, and when returned to the other prisoners, was unable to move for three days. 3710/

2411. The witness was called two days later to sign a written statement. He wrote his original story and was beaten again. The prison inspector reportedly came to him, saying that he would be released if he would tell who collaborated with the "etniks". The prison inspector also said that many people were interceding on behalf of the witness including the management of the firm where he was employed. 3711/ After eight days, the commander of the Territorial Defence came to the prison. He called out the names of each of the 72 detainees, one by one, and released them. The witness identified five guards who beat prisoners, and two guards he said did not beat prisoners. 3712/
2412. Electrotechnical School, Bua Potok: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. This prison was allegedly located at the Electrotechnical school in Bua Potok, on Prvomajska street. 3713/ The prison was reportedly run by members of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary group the Green Berets and the Territorial Defence of BiH. There were eight male detainees, seven of whom were Serb and one of whom was a Muslim, who allegedly intended to give a Serb a list of Muslims who should be killed. 3714/

2413. The sole account of this detention facility was provided by a Serb male. He stated that he was arrested on 17 May 1992, beaten and taken to the school. He recalled that there were some 30 armed individuals positioned in front of the facility. They reportedly ordered the prisoners to stand facing the wall, after which they were beaten. 3715/ The witness and the six others arrested with him were taken to the basement. They were reportedly the only detainees there. The detainees were accused of owning radio transmitters and guiding Serb shells. One man, between 75 and 80 years old, died after being beaten for half an hour. Another man, about 75 years old, was brought in and killed by being beaten for an hour. The bodies of these two men were put into a sewer which emptied into the Miljacka river. 3716/

2414. The witness reported that the perpetrators stated they were from Foa, Gorade, and Zvornik. The witness also stated that he overheard beatings of other prisoners by what sounded like elderly women. The witness did not describe other conditions at the prison, nor did he describe his release. 3717/

2415. Central Prison (National Prison): The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC. This prison was allegedly run by an identified man. 3718/ An actor reportedly helped manage the prison, though he left at the beginning of August 1992. 3719/ The commander of the fifth floor, where women were allegedly held, was also named. 3720/ Ten other guards were identified. 3721/ Finally, one source added that the commander of the Territorial Defence visited the prison. 3722/ The reports regarding this site state that Serb detainees were held here from May 1992 until at least July 1992. 3723/ One source stated that part of the prison was opened in September 1992 for inspection by humanitarian organizations. 3724/ Both men and women were held at this site, and one report stated that even children were detained here. 3725/ There is no indication of how many civilians and POWs were held here, or whether the detainees, whose statements were provided, were civilian or military prisoners. However, one report stated that a witness was kept in one room with 30 other Serb prisoners. 3726/

2416. Hygienic conditions were described as terrible. 3727/ One report stated that detainees were fed tea, bread and a little bit of pasta. 3728/ Another report stated that detainees were fed only once per day. 3729/ Allegedly, detainees were given one litre of water every four days. 3730/ One witness, who was held in solitary confinement, reported that toilet facilities consisted of an outhouse outside. It was open and had no water. The same witness stated that he received no medical attention for wounds from beatings. 3731/

2417. Detainees were reportedly beaten and tortured. Several reports state that Green Berets, Mujahedin warriors, police officers, and criminals were allowed to enter the prison and beat the detainees. 3732/ Women were allegedly raped there. 3733/ Women were allegedly raped there. 3734/ One report alleged that the commander of the women's floor extorted jewelry under the threat of rape. 3735/ Another report stated that women were raped every night. 3736/ Some detainees reported that they were forced to sign false confessions saying that they were "etnik"
sympathizers or snipers, and some said they were forced to testify on Sarajevo television. One report stated that every night five to six Serbs died, and more were brought in to take their place. One man was allegedly abducted and taken to the Central Prison because his brother was willing to exchange 100 Muslim prisoners for him.

2418. According to another report, representatives of the ICRC visited a detention facility in a prison in Sarajevo. The report notes the existence of this facility as late as 3 March 1993. No additional information regarding operation or control of the facility was provided in the report.

2419. Ciglane: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. There were two places in this area of Sarajevo where people were detained. One was allegedly a "bordello," holding Serb women and girls as young as 10 to 12 years old. The only account of this location came from a Serb woman who was held there. She stated that drunk Croatian and Muslim forces came to the site and raped the girls there. She alleged that many young girls were gang raped, and that none of the detainees were allowed to talk to each other. A former schoolmate of the witness brought her to this location. He had kidnapped her in Livno and brought her along when he was transferred to Sarajevo.

2420. Unidentified Tunnel: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. Another site in this area where people were allegedly detained was an unidentified tunnel. At this tunnel, Serbs were reportedly detained by Muslims beginning in mid-May. The site was run by an identified commander. He is suspected by the Government of FR Yugoslavia to be involved in crimes committed at the camp. The Government does not specify what these crimes were.

2421. Dečić: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. On 7 July 1992, Muslim and Croat forces allegedly attacked the village of Presjenica. Some were killed, and about 50 were taken prisoner. They were taken to a Muslim-run camp in Dečić and held for two months. A Serb witness alleged that there was malnutrition, beatings, humiliations, and threats to kill. Younger women were allegedly taken away for forced prostitution and rape. The witness was exchanged in Kalinovik, 31 August 1992, through the Yugoslav Red Cross. She stated that five Muslims were exchanged for every Serb.

2422. Digitron Firm: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. This was allegedly a Serb run site, holding about 20 girls, aged 13 to 18. There is only one witness statement regarding this site, and that did not discuss the general conditions of detention. According to the witness, beginning with the attack on the SUP school in Vraca on 5 April 1992, unidentified "Četniks" came to Grbavica every day to intimidate the civilian population. They allegedly searched the houses for arms. At the end of April, some came to a building and abducted about 20 girls, aged 13 to 18. These girls were reportedly taken to the Digitron firm at Buje. There, the "Četniks" threatened to rape all the girls and keep them pregnant, allegedly saying that they should prefer giving birth to Serbs rather than "Bajije". About 20 May the "Četniks" began taking away two or three girls at a time to rape them. The witness was allegedly raped by two men while two others held her down. She stated that she was not raped every day, but some of the girls were. At the end of August, some of the girls were released. The witness was released in mid-September. She was five months pregnant. She believed that the perpetrators were Serbs, but not from the area by their accents.
2423. **Dobrinja**: There were allegedly several sites of detention in this section of Sarajevo. The Republic of Serbia reported that in mid-June, there were mass arrests of Serbs, beginning with the intellectuals. 3750/ The prisoners allegedly were first taken to the Territorial Defence Staff or to the Military Police Staff and then put into basement prisons in the area. 3751/

2424. **Sunce Storehouse, Dobrinja**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. One of these prisons was **Sunce Storehouse**, located under Privredna Banka. 3752/ The site was reportedly run by the Territorial Defence forces and housed Serb men and women. 3753/ One report described the prison as three cells and a guard room. 3754/ A witness stated that there were 63 men and women kept there in one room. 3755/ There was a lack of food and light, and detainees were reportedly heavily beaten. 3756/ One witness stated that the commander of the prison was a Muslim man, identified by nickname. 3757/ Some prisoners were reportedly moved from this location to the Viktor Bubanj barracks or Central Prison. 3758/

2425. **Unidentified Basement Prison, Dobrinja**: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. There may have been another basement prison in this area of Sarajevo. A witness described his detention in a basement prison with about 100 other Serbs. He stated he was arrested on 23 June 1992 by the Territorial Defence and put into an unidentified basement. He was interrogated, beaten, and forced to throw two Molotov cocktails at Serb houses in Nedaril. He identified the commander at the site, and also identified two guards. 3759/

2426. **Atomic shelter, Dobrinja**: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Serbs were also allegedly held at an atomic shelter in the area for three months. 3760/ The Serbian Government identified a Muslim man named Barakovi from Trebinje as an alleged perpetrator at unnamed private prisons. 3761/

2427. **Primary school, Dobrinja**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the International Society for Human Rights. Additionally, one report alleged that Muslims from Dobrinja and nearby villages were rounded up, taken to an unnamed primary school, and beaten on 5 May 1992. 3762/

2428. **Unidentified shelter Camp**: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One report alleged that in August 1992, a Serb woman was taken by members of the Muslim army to a camp in a shelter, set up to detain Serbs. This woman was detained for five days, during which she was beaten, humiliated, and raped by three members of the Muslim army. She became pregnant and gave birth to a child in Belgrade in May 1993. 3763/

2429. **Unidentified location, Grbavica**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the **New York Times**. There was at least one site of detention in this area of Sarajevo, and may have been more. At one particular unidentified location in May 1992, a 15 year-old Muslim girl reported that she was abducted by Serbian fighters. Her abductors reportedly took her to a small room with about 20 other girls, where she was ordered to undress. She was beaten and raped by two men while two others held her down. They allegedly said they wanted to "make sure [she gave] birth to a Serbian baby". She stated that she was raped often. She was released in September or October. 3764/
2430. Unidentified camp, Grbavica: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Another witness, held in an unidentified camp in Grbavica, stated that on 8 July 1992, two men sent a message through the detainees at the detention camp in Grbavica. They allegedly said that all Muslims and Croats may leave the area if they want to because it would be hard on them later. The Serbs then allegedly evacuated the area. 3765/

2431. Unidentified detention facility, Grbavica: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC. According to one source, as of 20 August 1993, Bosnian Croat HVO forces held about 15,000 Muslims in several detention camps and prisons, including one in Grbavica. The ICRC negotiated for access beginning in late June and were given access in August and early September. 3766/ Over 1,500 Muslim detainees were released from detention centres controlled by the HVO during the week of 29 August but hundreds or thousands may have remained in prisons. 3767/

2432. Hadži, community building: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One witness reported that this site was used as a temporary camp for Muslim men. The witness was arrested with a friend on 23 May 1992, by six armed men as he tried to enter the village to shop. He was taken to a small garage near the community building. He reported that there were 45 Muslim men already there, some of them from Foča. Serbs ran the site. The detainees allegedly received only one meal per day, slept on the floor, and had no toilet facilities. The witness stated that there was constant turnover at the site. Some of the detainees were beaten. The witness was held there for two weeks. On about 8 June he was transferred to the Sports Centre. 3768/

2433. Hadži sports centre: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State. This site was allegedly run by Serbs and housed Bosnian Muslims. The witness who was first taken to the community building testified that the population of the camp was about 180, all male Muslim civilians. He stated that the guards were local Serbs, who allowed six men to beat the detainees. When another village was "cleansed" by Serbs from Serbia, the witness said, the population increased by another 40 Muslim men. The witness stated that the detainees were subject to beatings, sexual abuse, and forced labour. They were allegedly given only one piece of bread and one "can" 3769/ per day. On 22 June more civilians were brought in from the village Kucici, and the witness' group was transferred to Lukavica. From there they were sent to Kula and were finally exchanged at Vrbanja. 3770/

2434. Three other reports briefly describe this site. One witness identified six family members who she alleged were kidnapped from Grbavica, taken to the sports centre, and later transferred to Kula. 3771/ Another report stated that the sports centre was a camp for Muslims from Hadži and nearby villages, kept mainly for exchange purposes. This source stated that the population was about 2,500 in November of 1992. 3772/ The last report stated only that Bosnian Muslims were taken to this site after processing at the Coca-Cola plant at Raskrše. 3773/

2435. Hadži prison: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC visited this place of detention on 11 April 1993. No information was provided regarding conditions, treatment of detainees or length of detention. 3774/
2436. **Grude Prison, Hadji:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Despite the forced expulsion of Serbs from Celebici on 22 April 1992, Muslim and Croat forces reportedly found 13 Serbs who refused to leave. The Serbs were imprisoned in Konjic for a period of two days during which they were beaten and mistreated. On 8 May the Serbs were taken to Grude prison. The prison was reportedly a Croatian-run facility. The Serbs were allegedly tortured on arrival, a consequence of which, one Serb was reported to have lost his life.

2437. **"Bordellos" in Hadji:** The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources. In late 1991 and 1992, Muslim and Croat forces allegedly ran "bordellos", housing Serb women and girls as young as 12. These women were reportedly kept in the "bordellos" until the fifth month of pregnancy, and they were detained, but apparently not raped, after that to prevent abortions. Additionally, men with infectious diseases including AIDS were allegedly "deliberately allowed" to rape the women. This source further alleged that over 1,000 Serb women were exposed to this in seven counties.

2438. **Hrasnica Prison:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC. According to the Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights Commission, the BiH Interior Minister admitted that this site was controlled by the government and held men of all ages and backgrounds. The men were reportedly forced to do dangerous work like digging trenches on the front line. Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were allegedly at particular risk of this detention because they could be exchanged for Bosnian Muslim prisoners of war.

2439. **Igman, Hotel Famos:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. This site was described by one witness as a temporary camp. The witness, a Serb man, was arrested in Konjic with 13 friends by members of the Croatian and Muslim army. The witness stated that they were taken to the Hotel Famos at Mount Igman. The soldiers beat the detainees at the hotel entrance. The soldiers ordered the prisoners to lie on the ground and beat them with boots, pistols and feet. The soldiers then took the prisoners to an unlit concrete cellar. Eight soldiers followed the prisoners and beat them again in the cellar. When the prisoners lost consciousness, the soldiers allegedly threw water on them to wake them up. The next day, the prisoners' hands were tied, and they were forced to walk between two lines of soldiers, who beat the prisoners with shovels, blunt objects, iron pipes and rubber truncheons. The prisoners were taken to the Silos at Tarin.

2440. **Igman Prison:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC reported that it visited this place of detention on 27 May 1993. No information was provided regarding the treatment of inmates, the length of the facility's existence nor its exact location.

2441. **Ilida:** The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources. There allegedly were at least six separate sites of detention in this area of Sarajevo: Sports Hall, Old Health Centre Building, Luani Camp, Red Cross Building, Energoinvest Storehouse at Blauj. There are no real details about these sites, but they were allegedly all run by two identified men. Another source stated that Arkan's "etniks" were most active in this region. Allegedly, nearly 35,000 people have passed through this area, reportedly 30,000 of them were Muslim.

2442. In mid-May 5,000 to 7,000 men, women, and children, travelling with a Children's Embassy convoy were allegedly detained at the
sports centre for two to three days. 3786/ There, three children reported that
several men were taken away and tortured, and one child reported that the
detainees were given nothing to eat. 3787/

2443. Ilida Police Station: The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The sixth reported
detention site was at the local police station. This facility was also
reported to have been operated by two identified individuals. 3788/ The ICRC
reported that it visited this place of detention on 28 May 1993. No
information was provided regarding the treatment of inmates, the length of the
facility’s existence nor its exact location. 3789/

2444. Ilijaš: There are several general reports regarding the detention of
civilians in this area. Prisoners were reportedly transported here from other
locations and killed. In April, 30 men from Gornja Bioa were brought here and
killed for refusing to surrender. Their bodies were burned at the eljezara
factory furnace. 3790/ Additionally, 56 civilians, captured at Ahatovii and
imprisoned at Rajlovac, 3791/ were also brought here in mid June. Forty-eight
of them were killed. 3792/

2445. Reports suggest that the primary school was used in April or May by
Serbs to house Muslims. A number of civilians from the villages of Gornja Bioa
and Kralupa were captured and detained at this location in Gornja
Bioa. 3793/ Three other sources support allegations of the existence of some
sort of camp for Muslims in the area. A witness reported seeing 600 men,
women, and children taken from Batajnice in June or July 1992 and assumed that
they were brought to Ilijaš. 3794/ Another report stated that after attacks on
Lješevo, Ahatovii, Dobroševii, Svrake and Hreša, civilians were taken to camps
there. They were allegedly tortured, some were exposed to poison
gas, and some killed. 3795/ A number of sources report that women held in
facilities in Ilijaš were allegedly taken away to the military barracks and
private homes and raped. Some reportedly did not return. 3796/

2446. Gornja Bioa School, Ilijaš: The existence of this detention facility
has not been corroborated by multiple sources. All of the information on this
site came from the confession of Borislav Herak. He reported that in April of
1992, his company of the JNA took 120 Muslim civilians from Gornja Bioa and
the village Kralupa and put them into the primary school in Gornja Bioa. The
soldiers separated the men from the women and children. 3797/ About 30 men,
who had refused to surrender, were kept in a separate group. They were taken
under the orders of an identified man, by army truck, to Ilijaš Forge, where
they were killed. The bodies were then burned in a furnace. 3798/

2447. Herak stated that he was encouraged by his commanding officer to select
girls and rape them. He confessed to raping four young women at a nearby
house and identified the four. He stated that he raped them at gunpoint and
beat them. 3799/ The young women all screamed, but no guards came to stop
him. Herak also stated that two other men raped six women at the men's house.
Herak further reported that an identified man from Serbia, a commander of a
unit from Ilijaš, killed three Muslim men and one Muslim woman "for no
reason". An identified man ordered the bodies buried at the Muslim
cemetery. 3800/ After 10 days, all the prisoners were transferred to the
Primary school at Ilijaš. 3801/

2448. Podlugovi, Ilijaš: The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. There
are only two references to this camp. According to one, this camp housed 200
Muslims from Ilijaš, Luka, Bioa, and Mioa. At some point the detainees were
allegedly transferred to Semizovac. 3802/ The other source stated that Lješevo
village was attacked and burned in early June 1992. Some villagers were killed
and some were taken under the orders of an identified man to camps in Podlugovi. This source alleged that the same occurred for the Muslim villages of Ililjaš, Gornja Misoa, Donja Luka, Hadii, Karaula, and Gajice. 3803/

2449. Koševlo Hospital: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One witness alleged that his father was held by Muslim authorities for nine months in the hospital. 3804/ There are no other accounts of people held in the hospital.

2450. According to another report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a hospital in Sarajevo. No information was provided regarding conditions or prisoner treatment at this facility. 3805/

2451. Koševlo stadium: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government. The information regarding this camp is somewhat conflicting. Two sources reported that 6,000 Serbs were detained in this camp in 1992. 3806/ Most were allegedly released, but some may still be held there. 3807/ One source alleged that the Muslim police responsible for the detention were under orders of the BiH Presidency. 3808/ Though conditions at the camp were not described, one source alleged that in July, members of the Bosnian Muslim paramilitary group, the Green Berets, threw live Serb children into the cages of wild animals at the zoo. 3809/

2452. A third source stated that several hundred Serb civilians had been detained in the stadium. This source also alleged that the BiH Government intervened for the release of these civilians from the stadium. 3810/

2453. Kula: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International and UNPROFOR. This camp was located in the suburb of Butmir, near the airport. 3811/ The prison was opened as early as May 1992 3812/ and remained in operation until at least January 1993. 3813/ The population was estimated to be between 50 in May 1992, 3814/ and 500 to 850 in November 1992. 3815/ One source alleged that a total of over 30,000 prisoners passed through this facility; 3816/ however, most accounts place the population at 130 to 200. 3817/ According to one report, representatives of the ICRC visited a detention facility in Kula Butmir. The facility was established in a local prison/penitentiary and was in existence on 19 February 1993. No information was provided by this source regarding the operation and control of this facility. 3818/

2454. The prisoners were allegedly Muslim men, women, and children, and some elderly Serbs, Serb women, and young Serbian males who refused to fight in the Serbian army. 3819/ However, some sources allege only that Muslims were held at the camp, 3820/ and one source claims that only Serbs were held at the camp. 3821/ The sources are also split on whether civilians or POWs were held there. 3822/ One detainee was a Serbian writer, who spoke out against Radovan Karadi and was allegedly a detainee at this facility in September. 3823/ Finally, one source named one man as the commander, 3824/ while a second named another as director of the prison. 3825/

2455. Prisoners were allegedly fed one cup of tea and one slice of bread one 3826/ to two times per day. 3827/ It is possible that conditions improved slightly over time since the accounts stating the detainees were fed once per day were from prisoners detained in May 1992, while the one account describing two meals per day was from a person detained in late June. There was no electricity, or running water, and buckets were used for toilets. 3828/ Prisoners received no medical attention. 3829/
2456. People were not detained for very long at the camp. The shortest period of detention reported was 24 hours and the longest period was about eight or nine days. All detainees released from the camp were released through exchanges. The detention appears to have gone in stages. There are two witness reports concerning a group of people detained at the camp from 12 May 1992, to about 20 May. Both of these witnesses were taken from Dobrinja, and both describe the same general events. Another witness was interned in late June after an attack on the airport district. Because populations from different areas were in the camp at different times, and exchanges were conducted in large numbers after relatively short periods of time, this camp seems to have been used as a way to remove large groups of people from particular areas.

2457. While they were detained at the camp, witnesses consistently stated they were interrogated and that some people were beaten. The beatings took place in front of other prisoners, and those who were beaten were beaten so severely they lost consciousness. One source alleged that some women were raped.

2458. Lesnina Furniture Store: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. From at least mid-April to December 1992, a camp was in operation in the basement of the Lesnina Furniture Store. There were about 20 girls aged 15 to 20 there, one woman in her thirties and this woman's young daughter. There is one witness account from the older woman regarding this camp. She was a Muslim woman married to a Croat. In April, four men from the SDS broke into her house, demanded money and killed the witness' husband. Ten days later, three men brought the woman and her daughter to this camp. There were about 20 girls--aged 15 to 20--already in detention here, the majority of whom were Muslim. The witness stated that one man took her to a flat where five men raped her. Three of them were SDS and had Čakavian dialects. The witness stated that the alleged perpetrators ate and drank during the rape and beat her, saying that they liked raping bloody "Balije". The witness stated that from June to December, she was taken every night to a different place and raped each time by four to five different "•etniks". She stated that this happened to the other prisoners as well, except for her daughter. The women were returned at 3:00 or 5:00 a.m., each morning. During their detention, the detainees received only bread and beans to eat.

2459. Lukavica: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely UNICEF. The only witness account of this site came from a young girl. She and her mother were held for about a month in April and May of 1992. She said that the camp was run by "•etniks". She described the conditions, saying only that there was little food and that people were beaten. The witness stated that she saw soldiers kill old people and put them in mass graves. She also stated that she saw women raped. In one instance, she alleged that the commandant ordered several women and girls brought to a room. There, he allegedly ordered a Serb woman to stab the witness' mother in the chest or stomach. The witness was then ordered to stand against a wall. The Serbs allegedly shot at her, but she turned at the last minute, the bullet just nicking her ear. The witness and her mother escaped by running away. Another source stated only that women from Kula camp were also brought to this camp and raped. Some of these women were allegedly killed.

2460. Unidentified Home, Lukavica: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC reported that it visited a detention centre at a private home in Lukavica in 1993. No information was provided regarding the treatment of inmates, the length of the facility's existence nor its exact location.
2461. Barracks, Lukavica: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC reported that it visited a detention centre at the barracks in Lukavica on 30 September 1993. No information was provided regarding the treatment of inmates, the length of the facility's existence nor its exact location. 3847/

2462. Pale: After Serb losses at Orahovica, Renovica and epa, the residents of those killed staged a protest, threatening to kill or expel all the Muslims. One identified man allegedly forcibly evicted Muslims, and two other identified man organized arrests. Police forces from Sok allegedly carried out the arrests. An identified commander allegedly assisted in some unspecified way. Another identified man armed and dressed a paramilitary force. This paramilitary group allegedly looted Muslim property and cooperated with "weekend •etniks." Another man, affiliated with Arkan, was also allegedly involved in the persecution of Muslims. Finally, yet another man organized a paramilitary group. Forces active in the area included Arkan's paramilitaries, Šešelj's "•etniks", White Eagles, and "weekend •etniks". 3848/

2463. There were several sites in Pale where Muslims were allegedly detained by Serbs. It appears that there was one main site, and other satellites where prisoners were detained.

2464. Police Station, Pale: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. A site of detention was the police station. 3849/

2465. Sports Hall, Pale: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. A site of detention was a sports hall. 3850/

2466. Cinema, Pale: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral. A site of detention was a cinema. 3851/

2467. Cultural Centre, Pale: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A site of detention was in a cultural centre. 3852/

2468. It is unclear where the majority of detainees were housed. Two identified men, one a commander, allegedly ran all of these camps. 3853/ One source stated that over 20,000 prisoners went through this area and as of November 1992, there were still 2,500 held there. 3854/

2469. Some prisoners were arrested and brought straight to the camps, while others were transferred in from other camps. Detainees were brought from Bratunac 3855/ and Manjaa. 3856/ At least one transfer from Bratunac occurred in mid-May. 3857/ Estimates of the number of prisoners were near 400. 3858/ Another source stated that 500 to 600 detainees were transferred from Bratunac to Pale, but did not specify the date of this transfer. 3859/ It is unclear whether this was the same transfer as the one in mid-May. The camp was opened as early as May 1992, 3860/ and may have been in operation as recently as May 1993. 3861/

2470. There is little information on the living conditions for most of the sites. A witness detained in the sports hall stated that about 50 people were kept for 12 days in a space the size of a volleyball court. They received one piece of bread and one-eighth of a 200 gram can every 24 to 36 hours. 3862/ At all the sites, prisoners were allegedly interrogated and beaten. They were reportedly beaten upon arrival, during detention, and as they waited for exchange. As they waited for exchange, prisoners were tied in
groups of 10 and forced to walk between two lines of guards who beat them. They were also forced to sing "etnik" songs. Guards used electric cables, police batons, and iron batons. Some detainees allegedly died from beatings. Additionally, two sources stated that women were raped in Pale. Finally, one source alleged that the Serbs forced detainees to give blood.

2471. One source stated that about 50 "extremists" were responsible for beating all of the prisoners. Fifteen of those guards have been identified. Two of these men were allegedly former employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security Services, and a third was allegedly a member of Arkan's forces.

2472. Pofalii, unidentified cellar: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. An identified 20-year-old Serb woman alleged that she was held in a private prison in a basement in Pofalici for 25 days in the spring or summer of 1992. The private prison was allegedly run by an identified man. The witness stated that she was abducted on the way home from work by four Green Berets. She was taken to a cellar. It was a small hall, partitioned with wood. There were no windows or ventilation. She was placed in a very small room with another woman, 16 years-old. This other woman had been there for two days before the witness, and her father was a colonel. The room held only a blanket and a spotlight on the ceiling. It was only a little larger than the witness was tall. The guards brought in chairs when they needed them, such as for oral sex. The first night the witness was raped by 12 men in black coveralls and the commander. Among the men was a man identified by nickname. The commander raped her first that night, both orally and vaginally. The witness was raped every night. She stated that she heard cries of other women in the adjoining spaces. She was released through the intervention of a Muslim friend. The commander advised her to forget what had happened.

2473. Pofalii House of Correction: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Another site where people were allegedly detained was the basement of the House of Correction in Pofalii. A witness testified that he was held there for three days and two nights. He stated that he was interrogated and beaten by two members of Special units. The beat him with their hands, feet, sticks and rifle butts. They also allegedly called him a "etnik" and asked how many Muslim women he had raped at u mountain. An identified man was allegedly a guard at this site.

2474. Pofalici Cultural Centre: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One report states merely that a great number of Serb women are held at this site.

2475. Rajlovac: There appear to have been several camps in this area, and it is unclear from reports what happened at which camp. Regardless, they appear to have been run as one unit. They were run by Serbs and housed Muslims. The camp or camps were described as barracks, hangars, storehouses, and tanks. One camp was described as the Military airport barracks, where people were tortured by being placed in cisterns and containers. Another camp was reportedly a distribution centre. Another of the camps was located at Jugopetrol or Energopetrol warehouses or storage tanks. Nearby was another detention area at the Tehnogas company. It is unclear of these are the same or different camps. Other sources identified the military barracks as a site of detention, and another, a distribution centre. All of these sites were in the area of Rajlovac. A majority of the reports concerning this area concern attacks on Ahatovici and Dobroševici. The villages were allegedly attacked in early June. Either just before or after, men, women, and children
were taken away. 3883/

2476. Jugopetrol Warehouse, Rajlovac: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Two witnesses describe events at this camp. One witness reports that on 30 May 1992, Serbs began shelling Dobroševići. The next day, infantry attacks began. The third day, Nikola Stanišić and Vaso Skoo called for the surrender of the population. The soldiers separated men from the women and children and took all the detainees to the old storehouse of Jugopetrol at the airport Rajlovac. One witness stated that not everyone was beaten there, but he saw people beaten every day. He identified two men who died from beatings. Detainees were allegedly forced to dig graves, load and unload munition, and do other work. On 12 June, 10 men were taken from the camp and not seen again. On 13 June, 60 more detainees were taken away in similar fashion. The witness, his wife, child, and mother were released that day in a prison exchange. 3884/

2477. A Serb witness confirmed that Serb soldiers took villagers to Rajlovac and Jugopetrol. He identified two women who were allegedly raped at the camp, one publicly. The witness intervened on behalf of a woman and three children, securing their release from the camp on 11 June 1992. A few days later, all of the women and children were released and the men reportedly sent to Ilijaš and Srednje. 3885/

2478. Bojnik Barracks, Energopetrol, and Tehnogas (Rajlovac): The existence of these detention facilities have been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. According to one witness, two or three days before the attack on Ahatović and Dobrošević, Serb soldiers captured about 150 men, women, and children in Dobrošević, Bojnik, and Mihaljević. The witness was taken to barracks in Bojnik with about 15 other men. There they were beaten. The men were then transferred to Rajlovac, where the witness stated he was kept in large tanks of the Energopetrol company. He stated that there were about 80 people in the tank with him and about 130 in the other. There were about 400 people kept at the Tehnogas company.

2479. The witness identified the man in charge, and stated that he was interrogated by a Serbian mercenary from Kosovo. The witness identified another man who died from beatings. He had told the witness that the Serbs had demanded one million DM as ransom. 3886/ The witness also said that 10 men on a list made by the camp commander were taken away by the driver of the leader of the SDS and four armed men. The 10 disappeared. At a later time, this driver allegedly threw an asphyxiating liquid into the tank where the witness was to suffocate the prisoners.

2480. On the 13th day of the witness' detention, the leader of the SDS came to the camp to take the witness and 54 other men for exchange. The men were loaded onto a bus and were beaten if they moved. After about an hour, the bus stopped at Sokoline. The driver and guards left the bus, and the bus was fired on with rocket launchers, bazookas, machine-guns, submachine-guns, and grenades for 15 minutes. Four non-wounded men helped two wounded escape. The witness later heard that three more also survived. 3887/

2481. Another source described this attack. This source stated that the attack occurred on 14 June that 56 men were on the bus and that 48 survived. 3888/ Another source stated that the attack was ordered by the leader of the SDS and another identified man. 3889/ Other sources also described this mass killing, but did not provide details. 3890/ There may have been another incident, according to one witness. He stated that on 14 June at about 10:00 a.m., 86 detainees were put on two trucks. At about 12:30 p.m., an identified man ordered soldiers to fire at the trucks. Six people reportedly survived. 3891/
2482. Unspecified locations: The earliest account of prisoners came in a statement of a former policeman, arrested with another on 1 May 1992 in Vogošća. The witness stated that he and his companion were beaten by turns between 4 May and 13 May. On the 13th, they were transferred to Sonja's by one man identified by name and the body guard of the leader of the SDS. 3892/

2483. Detainees were brought to the camps over a period of time. Some were apparently brought there before the attacks and some just after. One witness reported being taken to a camp on the same day of the attack or the next day. 3893/ The men and women were separated. The witness claimed he was beaten until he lost consciousness. Cold water was poured on him to awaken him. The witness then saw 68 more prisoners arrive at the camp. Six military policemen ordered them to take off their clothes and lay down. The six men beat these 68 on the genitals. Two men were also sent into a minefield, and the witness heard explosions. The witness stated that detainees received one piece of stale bread two times per day. On 13 June, 11 detainees were taken away, and they disappeared. On 14 June the witness stated that 86 detainees were taken for an exchange. An identified man allegedly ordered soldiers to fire on the trucks the detainees were in. Six allegedly survived. 3894/

2484. Another witness was taken from her home in conjunction with the attack. The attacking forces were all dressed differently. Some wore disguise uniforms, some ordinary uniforms, and some no uniforms. However, they all wore white armbands. The elderly men, women and children were separated from seven men of fighting age. Those seven were taken to Rajlovac barracks. Because they did not have any arms, they were told nothing would happen to them. However, the witness' husband stated that they were beaten and two were killed. The remaining five were exchanged. 3895/

2485. Finally, one witness stated that four days after the attacks, soldiers arrested everyone in the village of Ahatovici. There were about 53 women, children, elderly people, and sick people. They were taken to storehouses in Rajlovac. The witness saw an identified man beaten by a camp guard. This man died the next day. 3896/ The witness stated that women and children did not suffer while she was in the camp. On 13 June she and her children were released in an exchange. 3897/

2486. Semizovac: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. It is unclear how many camps were in this area. Two sources indicate that there was one main camp, 3898/ while another indicates that there were several camps. 3899/

2487. The camp was allegedly in operation from 5 June 1992, 3900/ through at least November 1992. 3901/ It reportedly housed Muslims. 3902/ In June there were at least 33 prisoners, who had been transferred here from Podlugovi. They were allegedly used as human shields and forced to remove mines. They were released by being ransomed through HVO Kiseljak for 1,000 DM each. 3903/

2488. Other detainees were from Vogošća. 3904/ The leader of the SDS, allegedly ordered the "ethnic cleansing" of Vogošća. Muslim workers were fired, Muslim shops were confiscated, and then Muslims were given an ultimatum to leave. Serb forces then allegedly destroyed the villages of Svrake and Krše, killing some villagers, and taking the rest to camps at Semizovac. According to this source, over 7,000 prisoners passed through camps in this area, and 840 were still held in November 1992. 3905/ The last source also stated that the detainees of this camp were from Vogošća, primarily Svrake and Sovrle. This source concurred that over 7,000 prisoners passed through the area, adding that hundreds were killed there, died from torture or from hunger. 3906/
2489. **Unidentified Facility, Svrake:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. The only information on a site of detention in this area comes from the confession of Borislav Herak. He referred several times to using prisoners from Svrake for various tasks. He did not state where the prisoners were held, but stated that they were used by the Bosnian Serb Army, Kremeš Company, at Vogošća and u mountain. Herak stated that prisoners were used to dig trenches, used as live shields, and used to light the torch for a giant flame thrower, consisting of a kerosene truck and a long hose. Herak also confessed to killing five men. A man allegedly ordered him to do it, saying that Herak could always say the men were shot trying to escape. Other prisoners were forced to bury the dead in a nearby Muslim cemetery.

2490. **Tarin:** There are a number of reports of camps in Tarin, the largest among them located in the local grain silo. Some reports described only "a camp" or "the camp" in Tarin. Regardless, the camp or camps were allegedly run by the BiH Government. In the Spring of 1992, armed Muslims from the village of Tarin attacked their Serbian neighbours. Some of the Serb villagers were taken to the silos. The armed groups were allegedly led by a retired police officer, and a military school student. The arrested villagers were allegedly tortured and beaten before they were taken to the camp. Bradina, Konjic was attacked 25 May 1992. The men were reportedly taken to camps at Tarin and elebii, while women and children were imprisoned in the primary school building or sent to the Sports hall Musala.

2491. Later, between 15 April and 17 April 1993, the BiH army and Muslim paramilitary forces took control of Konjic. They allegedly detained over 1,000 Bosnian Croat civilians at the Sports Hall in Konjic and the silos at Tarin. On 9 July, ECLO Kiseljak reported that HVO sources claimed 20 prisoners were held at Tarin. On 7 September 1993, an HVO representative for HUMPB said that 30 Bosnian Croats were still held in Tarin and Pazari, but that they were about to be liberated. Finally, at an unspecified point in time, 150 Bosnian Croat civilians from Podorašac and Konjic were imprisoned at Tarin by the BiH Army and civil authorities.

2492. **Tarin, Silos:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ECMM and the ICRC. This camp was a concrete grain silo with 11 small compartments 25 to 35 square metres each. Between each compartment were walls about four metres high and about one half metre to one metre wide. Guards walked along these walls. There was a long corridor between the cells, and there were no sanitary facilities, water or light. The camp was encircled by barbed wire. The detainees slept on the concrete. The guards called each other only by their last names. Their place of command was a small "premise" within the Silo. The commander was a named Muslim, and four of the guards were identified.

2493. Two witnesses were at the camp at about the same time, in early June 1992. One stated that the camp was full and that his cell had 15 other Serb males in it, all from Konjic. This witness also stated that Serbs were brought in every day, after having been beaten at the Health centre nearby. This witness was transferred to elebii on 4 June. The other witness stated that his cell contained about seven or eight Serb males from Tarin. This witness stated that the guards beat only some of the prisoners, and those not too hard. He was transferred to elebii camp about 3 June, then to Donje Selo on 17 November. On 8 February 1993, the witness was taken to Tarin for an exchange. A Muslim woman was in charge of exchanges there, and she took about 100 Serbs in three trucks over Igman Mountain to exchange them in Hrasnica. Two men were returned because there were not enough Muslims to exchange for.
Those two remained at Kula camp. 3925/

2494. A fourth witness did not state when he was at the camp. He was transferred with 13 others from the Hotel Famos at Mount Igman. He stated there were about 50 Serbs imprisoned there. There were about 15 men in over 12 small, damp filthy cells. The witness stated that three to four Muslim guards took each Serb one by one for interrogation. The Serbs were beaten during this interrogation, especially by the four named guards discussed above. After only a day at this site, the witness and 24 others were taken to elebii. 3926/

2495. In the second half of August, 20 to 25 prisoners from the silos and Krupa were taken out and killed. 3927/ The prisoners were local Croats and Serbs. The murders were organized by a Bosnian Hill Brigade Commander, a Tarin HP Commander, and the Konjic Civil Police Commander. The murders were committed by an identified man. 3928/ The men were killed in the middle of the night at a slaughterhouse owned by Redo Bari, on the Tarin-Kreševo road. The bodies were disposed of between the slaughter house and the river. The grave was dug by Muslim prisoners from the silos. 3929/

2496. Other reports of the area of Tarin did not specify to what camp they referred. Several sources just stated that there was a camp at Tarin. 3930/ Three reports alleged that women were detained at the camp. 3931/ One of these alleged that girls and women were raped there. 3932/ The ICRC allegedly visited a camp in November of 1992, and found it lacking in heat, with insufficient coverings for detainees. 3933/ Finally, a camp was still allegedly in operation in late 1993. 3934/

2497. Health Centre in Tarin: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to one report, Serbs were severely beaten by Muslim soldiers at the health centre which was located some 200 metres from the silo. 3935/ Many of those mistreated at the health centre were reportedly taken to the grain silos. No additional information was made available regarding the duration of prisoner internment, nor the conditions attendant at the facility. 3936/

2498. Trapare: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government. According to one witness, on 9 May or 10 May 1992, military units wearing the insignia of Serbian "•etniks" and the JNA entered an area near the Sarajevo airport. The soldiers allegedly ordered all of the residents to come out of the cellars where they had been hiding. The soldiers then separated the Serbs from the Muslims. One 50 year old Serb male refused to be separated from his Muslim neighbours. The witness stated that five to six soldiers beat him to death for his refusal.

2499. The witness and about 40 other Muslims were used as human shields, made to march through a combat zone to vehicles 300 metres away, and thereafter taken to a detention facility called Trapare. 3937/ This site was a camp or assembly area three kilometres from the Sarajevo airport. When the witness and the other prisoners arrived at the camp, the witness reported, the soldiers took a 12 year-old girl from her father. About six men allegedly took her behind a bunker, and the witness heard her screaming and crying. The father collapsed, at which point he was forced over to the bunker at knife point, and forced to watch as soldiers allegedly repeatedly raped his daughter for about an hour. The witness never saw the father and daughter again and believed they were killed. 3938/

2500. Trnovo: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. This area was generally used as a point of exchange of prisoners. Two witnesses reported that they were taken to Trnovo
for unauthorized exchanges. One witness stated that he had been imprisoned by joint Muslim and Croat forces at elebii camp in May 1992 and was transferred to the Sports hall in Konjic in August 1992. He stated that on 6 November 1992, he and about 29 other Serbs were taken to Trnovo for an informal exchange. The detainees were kept in stores next to the police station for two months, during negotiations. The guards did not beat the prisoners, but some prisoners of war were killed. Additionally, the witness alleged that the detainees were required to do physical labour. The site where the witness was kept was a bare space with wooden pallets for sleeping. When the witness was finally exchanged, 10 prisoners remained. Three from Konjic were exchanged later, and the witness did not know what happened to the remaining seven from Kalinovik. He stated that there was a constant turnover in Trnovo because prisoners from Konjic were sent there for exchange regularly.

2501. Viktor Bubanj Army Barracks: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the CSCE, UK DDT, and the ICRC. This site was formerly a prison for 5th Army Division soldiers. It was turned into a camp housing both Bosnian Serb men and Bosnian Serb women, all civilians, though some were accused of informing or signalling the Serb army. It was allegedly also called "Juka's Prison". It was run by a local army official. However, another report stated that the camp was run by a man identified by nickname. The population was estimated at over 200, the men housed in 12 cells and the women in seven cells. The main foreman for the women was identified by only one name. Some of the women were allegedly wives of former or current JNA members. One report alleged that four captured Serb soldiers were brought to this camp in September of 1992 and executed in front of other detainees. One part of the prison was allegedly in better condition for visits by journalists and the ICRC. Also, detainees were allegedly forced to make false statements to journalists.

2502. Prisoners were beaten, and denied medical assistance, and women prisoners were raped. One witness was arrested by Green Berets and taken to the prison. She was put into a small room with seven other women, some young and some elderly. More women arrived later. The floor was covered with a mattress and blankets. The witness was interrogated, beaten, and raped. She stated that the other women were raped frequently also, but each by the same Muslim man—one man for each woman. The women were raped in front of each other, and a small room next door was used only for oral sex. The witness was helped by a Muslim woman, who supplied her with contraceptives. Other women became pregnant, and were allegedly told they could receive abortions if they testified that Serbs had raped them. The witness became pregnant when the Muslim woman could no longer supply her with contraceptives. The witness stated that several people were killed, and the guards performed mock executions. The witness escaped in mid-December with the help of an identified person.

2503. The Thomson Mission visited this Muslim-run facility on 1 September 1992. Mission representatives located some 127 Serbian detainees, eight of whom were young to middle aged women. Male detainees ranged in age from early 20's to well over 60 years. The vast majority claimed to be innocent civilians, including an oral surgeon who was arrested as an alleged threat to BiH peace and security. Two among them said they were members of Karakjic's SDS.

2504. Health related conditions appeared to have been satisfactory, although there was evidence of head and body lice infection among the inmates. The detainees were reportedly held here for close to three months.
2505. **Vogoša**: There were several sites run by the Serbian SDS where Muslims were allegedly detained in Vogoša. Among them were Sonja's motel and restaurant, the Neuropsychiatric clinic, Ernest Grin Hospital, private houses, the police station, the Hotel Park, and an unidentified hotel. There are no specific allegations regarding the Neuropsychiatric clinic, Ernest Grin Hospital, and the private houses. 3954/

2506. **Hotel Park, Vogoša**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government. According to Borislav Herak, about 100 of Arkan and Šešelj's soldiers stayed at this hotel, traveling daily to the front lines. 3955/ Several women were allegedly brought to this hotel and raped there by soldiers. 3956/ It is not clear if women were held here for a period longer than for the rape. However, one woman was taken multiple times to the hotel and raped by several men. She was a prisoner, though her movement was not limited to the premises of the hotel. 3957/

2507. There was also an unidentified motel described by one witness account. This site could be the Hotel Park, Sonja's, or another site. The Muslim witness stated that she was taken with other women and children from her neighbourhood to a motel in Vogoša. There were about 40 Muslim women there, aged 18 to 40, and two 16 year-old girls. The witness was detained from 20 August through 10 December 1992. All the women slept in one room. Soldiers allegedly came in at night drunk, selected victims randomly, took them upstairs and raped them. The witness believed that every woman at the hotel was raped more than once. The witness was raped twice and was also interrogated and beaten. She and her son were released in a prisoner exchange. 3958/

2508. **Police Headquarters, Vogoša**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. Two men were arrested on 1 May 1992, and taken to the police station at Vogoša for interrogation. The commander was identified as a local army official. One of the men was allegedly beaten by the commander. Later the same day, the prisoners were taken to Rajlovac. 3959/ Another source alleged only that Muslim prisoners were kept in the police station. 3960/

2509. **Sonja's Kon-Tiki Restaurant (aka Kod Sonje), Vogoša**: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Newsday and the New York Times. This site was an abandoned restaurant and motel complex in Vogoša, located about seven miles north of Sarajevo. 3961/ The motel housed women, while an attached bunker housed men. According to one source, the motel held 50 to 60 Bosnian Muslim girls. 3962/ The commander of the bunker section was identified, 3963/ while two other men allegedly ran the motel section. 3964/

2510. The motel was allegedly run as a "bordello", the commanders allowing the frequent rape of the detainees. 3965/ A detailed allegation of how this "bordello" was run was provided by Borislav Herak. He stated that he visited the site at least once a week on the suggestion or orders of his commanders or his platoon leaders. He stated that he was told it was important for his morale to rape Muslim women. 3966/ A colleague of Herak's did not assert that he was ordered to go to the camp, but instead said that he had heard that a lot of the army went there. 3967/

2511. Herak confessed to raping 11 women from the site. He also confessed to killing them or participating in their killing on Jau mountain. He identified five men who were with him, also raped some of the women, and killed some of them. 3968/ One of Herak's commanders allegedly knew and approved of the rapes and killings. He and the other commander handed out the keys, and they told
Herak they had new girls coming in daily for whom there was not enough room or 
food. Herak also stated that he was present when French and Canadian 
UNPROFOR soldiers came to take women away in UN APCs. One of Herak's 
commanders said that UN soldiers raped women and returned them to the 
restaurant. Herak added that once he saw General McKenzie, the commander of 
UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, with four girls. He said he recognized the general from 
television. UNPROFOR allegedly denied the allegations that UNPROFOR 
soldiers and Serb soldiers rape Muslim women.

2512. Other sources alleged that at this camp, a group of 20 "etniks" raped 
two girls, aged seven and 13 in front of their mother. The girls died from 
their injuries.

2513. There is only one witness account of the bunker section of the camp. Two 
Muslim men were allegedly arrested in Vogoša on 1 May 1992. They were first 
taken to the police headquarter, then to Rajlovac, and on 13 May, they were 
taken by members of the Serbian irregular forces to the bunker. That night, 
the men were interrogated by a former colleague. The witness stated that they 
were beaten severely during questioning and on another occasion. On 29 May, 
the men were exchanged, but were arrested 24 hours later by the order of two 
inspectors.

2514. Another source alleged that the commander of the Viktor Bubanj prison 
and his "etniks" took prisoners to this site. They allegedly tortured and 
interrogated the detainees.

2515. Unidentified camps: The existence of these detention facilities have 
not been corroborated by multiple sources. According to one source, 218 
Muslims were taken hostage 24 May 1992. BiH radio reported that they were 
being tortured and deprived of food. The location of this site was not 
mentioned. Another source alleged that prisoners taken from an 
unspecified camp in Vogoša were taken in July 1992 to work at a mountain for 
Serbian forces. Allegedly a Serbian volunteer told Borislav Herak that five of 
them should be killed. Herak killed them with gunfire as the prisoners had 
their backs to him.

2516. Vrace: This was allegedly an area where several informal sites of 
detention existed, and one large camp was located. Two sources claimed that 
Muslim women were held in houses and flats where they were beaten and raped 
repeatedly.

2517. Student Dormitory: The existence of this detention facility has not 
been corroborated by multiple sources. The large camp was located at a former 
student dormitory. One source claimed that over 27,000 people passed through 
this camp, and over 500 civilians were killed. The prisoners were allegedly 
interrogated by SDS and the Serb Secretariat of Internal Affairs, under the 
direction of a named man. The prisoners were allegedly mistreated, but the 
source did not describe that mistreatment. The camp authorities also allegedly 
set up a court with "proper" punishment to deal with charges against the 
inmates. The detainees were exchanged or transferred to Kula, Lukavica 
garrison, Slaviša Vajneria in Sokolac, or to Pale.

2518. Unidentified school: The existence of this detention facility has not 
been corroborated by multiple sources. A BiH witness stated that her 
neighbour was taken to a school in April of 1992 for interrogation. There, 
Serbs allegedly beat him and threatened to kill his brother if the detainee 
did not pay them 500 DM within an hour. The detainee escaped with his family, 
and the Serb soldiers allegedly demolished the brother's house and raped two 
women suspected of hiding the two men.
2519. Drvo-Rijeka Shop: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One witness reported that in mid-June 1992, during the evacuation of the Maršal Tito barracks, three armed "etniks," identified by name, came to her apartment. They had cockades on their caps and allegedly told the witness that they were coming to take away Muslims and slaughter them. The men took the witness and her father to Vraca in a luxury car, stopping on the street Petrovaka Cesta. The two detainees were put into a garage, and then taken to a room. The witness was forced to watch while the men beat her father and tried to cut him. The witness was beaten too and the men threatened to cut their throats. Batko took the witness to another room where he raped her. He tried to get the other two men to rape her also, but they refused. The two men, Zoran and Mijo, took the witness to their headquarters in the shop Drvo-Rijeka, where she spent the night. The men questioned the witness about her brother, and who would win the war. The men sent her home in the morning, saying that Batko had looked for her that night. The witness has not seen her father since this time. Later, she found out that someone had called her brother from Vraca, saying that they had tortured and killed the witness and her father.

2520. Huts in Zovik: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United Kingdom. This site was just south-east of Hadži. A witness stated that in January 1993, he knew of a prisoner of war camp holding 30 to 40 Serbian males in "nissen type" huts.

2521. Šekovij: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. This was reportedly a site where women from Sonja's were taken and killed. Also, Borislav Herak confessed that several people living in Sarajevo were taken here and killed by him and his colleagues so that they could confiscate the apartments of those killed. Finally, a witness stated that Serbian men broke into Muslim houses, took girls and women to this mountain and raped them there. He also stated that when the area was retaken by Muslim troops, they found mutilated bodies of women.

69. Šekovij

2522. The county of Šekovij is located in eastern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population of Šekovij was 9,639. At that time, the population was 94.3 per cent Serbian and 5.7 per cent Muslim.

2523. Women's camp: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the French Government. It was reported that there was a camp for women in Šekovij where more than 800 Muslim women and girls were imprisoned. It was alleged that women and girls as young as seven years old were raped and otherwise abused in this camp. Another report also refers to a camp for women in Šekovij.

2524. Vuinovij camp: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Approximately 20 men were taken from a camp in Sušica to a camp in the village of Vuinovij in the county of Šekovij. The men were reportedly treated very badly by their Serbian captors. It is alleged that the men were subjected to forced labour such as digging shelters and other heavy work. They received very little food and had to sleep on the ground in a ruined house. Their possessions were stolen and they were often beaten.
2525. Logging Camp/Sawmill: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United Kingdom. A source reported that a detention camp at "Sekovice" was located at a former logging camp/sawmill in the woods near the town. The source believed that it was still in use.

2526. Unknown Šekovii Camp: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC. Several reports refer to a camp existing in Šekovii. None of the reports provide any details concerning the camp or camps.

2527. The municipality of Šipovo is located in the west-central section of BiH. According to the 1991 census, Šipovo had a total population of 15,553. Serbs comprised the majority of the population at 79.2 per cent, and Muslims comprised 20.8 per cent. Four documents refer to camps located in Šipovo.

2528. Camp Šipovo: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One report referred to a "Camp Šipovo" where prisoners from Manjaa were transferred in late May or early June 1992. The source did not indicate the exact location of the camp. "Camp Šipovo" was controlled by Serbs and the prisoners were Muslim according to this source. The report provided no further information concerning the camp.

2529. Mlinište: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. It was reported that a concentration camp was located at Mlinište in the municipality of Glamo which extends to the city of Šipovo in the municipality of Šipovo. The camp was originally used as a work camp for Serbs from Mrkonji Grad and Klju who refused to serve in the Serbian army. The camp was geographically separate from the town of Mlinište and located in a thick forest. The report stated that the ICRC searched for the camp, but was unable to find it as it is concealed by thick trees and not visible from the air. The camp allegedly opened in June 1992 and there was no indication in the report that it had been closed.

2530. This Serb controlled camp reportedly housed 3,500 prisoners. The camp commander was identified in the report by name. The camp prisoners were reportedly Muslims and Croatians from Klju, Bosanski Petrovac, Jajce, Mrkonji Grad, and Šipovo. The prisoners were allegedly captured by Serbian soldiers at home or work, or were arrested by former JNA soldiers and "etniks". Many were taken to Manjaa first and then to Mlinište.

2531. The municipality of Skender Vakuf is in north-western BiH and is bordered by the municipalities of Kotor Varoš, Travnik, Jajce, Mrkonji Grad, Banja Luka, and elinac. According to the 1991 census the population of Skender Vakuf was 19,416. The majority of the population were Serbs at 69.6 per cent, Muslims comprised 24.8 per cent, and Croats 5.6 per cent.

2532. Skender Vakuf Post Office: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch. Five men were reportedly held captive by JNA officers soldiers in the basement of a post office in the city of Skender Vakuf. The city of Skender Vakuf is located in the central part of the municipality of Skender Vakuf. During the middle of May 1992, JNA soldiers brought the five male prisoners to the Babanovac Hotel near Travnik to the post office in Skender Vakuf. It is
unclear from the report whether the prisoners were Muslim or Croatian, but the report did state that the men were stripped of their uniforms after being captured near the lower part of the Vlaši plateau. 4000/

2533. According to one prisoner, two of the men were wounded when captured. The prisoners who were transported from the Babanovac Hotel were held at the Skender Vakuf Post Office were held until Sunday 17 May. During their detention, the prisoners were deprived of food, water, blankets or clothing. According to this source, the prisoners were beaten by a "group of men" many times. Those who performed the beatings were probably JNA soldiers although the report did not state this. The witness stated that the men were subjected to beatings each time they requested to use the bathrooms. The men were subsequently taken to a prison in Stara Gradiška, a town bordering northern BiH in the Serbian occupied area of Croatia. 4001/

72. Sokolac

2534. The county of Sokolac is located in eastern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 14,833. At that time, the population was 68.6 per cent Serbian, 30.2 per cent Muslim, and 1.2 per cent were referred to as "other". 4002/

2535. Sokolac Camp: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. A Muslim man 4003/ reported being arrested along with his wife, mother-in-law, brother and his brother's wife in Rogatica by Serbs and being held in Sokolac as a war prisoner. He was held for 21 days and then exchanged in Sarajevo. The man believes that his brother was held in Sokolac for five days and then released. The man was subjected to beatings while being detained. He does not know the fate of the others arrested. He reported that the arrests were organized by two named men. 4004/ A Muslim woman reported that her husband was taken to a camp in Sokolac. 4005/ It was reported that a camp referred to as the "Sokolac Concentration Camp" was a supplementary camp for the one located in Pale. Most of the prisoners are said to have come from Bratunac. 4006/

2536. Primary School, "Slaviša Vajner ia": The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A Muslim woman 4007/ reported that in May 1992, a group of armed "ethnics" from surrounding Serbian villages began searching Muslim houses and intimidating the civilians in Sokolac. Many young women were taken to a camp in a primary school, "Slaviša Vajner ia" in Sokolac. There were 13 women and about 400-500 men. All of them were Muslim except two Serbian women. The witness was held in the camp from May until September and reported that all of the women, including herself, were repeatedly raped. 4008/ She also reported that the men were beaten and forced to dig trenches. 4009/

2537. KTK Visoko Plant, Kneina: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. It was reported that the KTK Visoko Plant at Kneina, in Sokolac county was turned into a labour camp for non-Serbs. 4010/ This camp is also included in a list of camps in another report. 4011/

2538. Psychiatric Clinic: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. Allegedly, civilians were held and tortured at the psychiatric clinic in Sokolac. The clinic was renamed "Serbian Hospital". 4012/ This camp is also included in a list of camps in another report. 4013/
2539. **Gym, Sokolac:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. It was reported that three named "extremists" held prisoners in a gym at Sokolac. 4014/

2540. **Sports Hall:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A camp in a Sports Hall in Sokolac was included in list of camps. It is unclear whether this is the same camp referred to as the "Gym" camp above. 4015/

2541. **Winter Service Point:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. It was reported that the three "extremists" named above held prisoners at the Winter Maintenance Service at Podromanija. 4016/ A camp referred to as the "Winter Service Point at Romanija" was included in a list of camps in another report. 4017/

2542. **Unknown camp:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. An unknown Sokolac camp is referred to in a list of camps. 4018/

73. **Srebrenica**

2543. The county of Srebrenica is located in eastern BiH on the Serbian border. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 37,211. At that time, the population was 74.8 per cent Muslim and 25.2 per cent Serbian. 4019/

2544. **Sase Mine:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government. A detention centre is reported to exist in an unused mine in the town of Sase, near Srebrenica. It is further reported that four identified Serbs took 52 men from this detention centre and killed them all in a place called Bjelovac, near the river Drina. 4020/

2545. **Nova Kasaba:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. A list of camps reports the existence of a camp in Srebrenica known as "Nova Kasaba". There is no detailed information. 4021/ This camp is also referred to in another report containing a list of camps. 4022/

74. **Stolac**

2546. The municipality of Stolac is located in Herzegovina. It is bordered by apljina, Nevesinje, Mostar, Ljubinje, and Neum. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of this municipality was 18,845; of which 44.5 per cent were Muslims, 32.4 per cent were Croats, 20.8 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 2.3 per cent were described as "others".

2547. It was reported that four camps were established in Stolac including the **Stolac Ironworks** 4023/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.); the **Army Barracks** 4024/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.); the **Tobacco Station** 4025/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.); and the **Crnii School** 4026/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.). No additional details regarding these camps have been received except that during an inspection conducted by ECMM teams on 15 September 1993 no prisoners were found in any of the camps in
Stolac. 4027/

2548. It was reported that since June 1993 approximately 1,350 Muslim men "of fighting age" from the Stolac region have been arrested by HVO forces. Testimony has been received which suggests that a number of young and elderly men have been arrested. 4028/ HVO authorities claim that the men were arrested for security reasons but acknowledge that due process was ignored during their arrest. 4029/ Bosnian Croat forces reportedly detained these men at Dretelj and Gabela camps but their current location remains unknown. 4030/

2549. On 3 August 1993 the entire remaining Muslim population of Stolac, including approximately 4,000 women, children and elderly, reportedly was arrested and imprisoned at the Gasnice camp in apljina. 4031/

75. Tešanj

2550. Tešanj is located in northern BiH, south of Doboj and has a population of 48,390 according to the 1991 census. At that time the population was 72.2 per cent Muslim, 18.5 per cent Croat, and 6.4 per cent Serb, with the remaining 2.9 per cent described as "others". 4032/

2551. Tešanj Rape Camp: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Dallas Morning News. This detention area is located in Tešanj. 4033/ Approximately 20 Muslim women were held by Serbs for at least four months. 4034/ They would rape the women detainees every day and night. 4035/ On some occasions, the detainee would be raped by several men on the same night. 4036/

2552. Unidentified Camp: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One woman, apparently of mixed ethnicity, claimed she was held in the detention facility from October 1992 to March 1993. She appears to be part Muslim and part Serb. During her imprisonment she was raped several times every day by various members of the Muslim armed forces. She was beaten, had cigarettes extinguished on her body and had her anus injured. The witness claimed that a 70 year-old woman was detained and raped in this detention facility. One Muslim soldier refused to rape a woman and was allegedly killed by his fellow soldiers. 4037/

2553. Military Prison, Tešanj: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC reported that their representatives visited a detention facility at the military prison in Tešanj on 24 November 1992. No information was made available regarding the length of detention or conditions at this facility. 4038/

2554. Hospital, Tešanj: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. The ICRC reported that their representatives visited a detention facility at the military prison in Tešanj on 24 November 1992. No information was made available regarding the length of detention or conditions at this facility. 4039/

76. Tesli

2555. Before the conflict, Tesli county, situated in north central Bosnia, had approximately 60,000 inhabitants, of whom approximately 45 per cent were Muslims, 25 per cent were ethnic Croats, and 30 per cent were ethnic Serbs. With the onset of the war, the majority non-Serbian population was ordered to surrender and relinquish all weapons to the Serbian insurgent forces. 4040/
2556. Serbian extremists established several detention facilities which reportedly interned more than 600 individuals. The inmates in these facilities were said to have been under the despotic control of members of the Serbian militia, the Armada Forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the "Red Beret" formations--all of whom had reportedly come from Banja Luka to assist in "cleaning the terrain".

2557. **Unidentified camp:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One report acknowledged the existence of a facility which was said to have processed over 300 Muslim inmates. Several other reports refer to the existence of an exclusively female rape camp, with a rather sizeable containment capacity. A former refugee from this camp recalled that women were transported to the camp in trucks, the trucks each contained approximately 24 women and the witness observed a great many trucks preparing to transport women to this facility. One room in the facility was said at one time to have accommodated over 100 individuals.

2558. **Unknown facility outside Tesli:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. There are several sources which refer to an exclusively female camp in a wooded area just west of Tesli. The former female inmates who provided the information for these reports were all from the village of Kaloševi.

2559. In one report, a Muslim victim alleged that her village was overrun by Serbian forces in mid-March 1992 and the women and children were collected and taken to this facility in the woods. She noted that the building in which she was contained appeared to be a newly erected brick structure. She was placed in a room with 12 other girls and a guard was posted in front of the door to prohibit movement or escape. The victim recalled five of the other girls as having also come from the village of Kaloševi.

2560. The victim reported that all the girls who shared the room with her were raped. The soldiers came to the room on a daily basis and sexually assaulted them. They were told that they were to give birth to Serbian children.

2561. After being held captive for three months, a Serbian from the village of Kaloševi, dressed in "etnik" uniform and assisted by friends from the Croatian Defence Council, facilitated the escape for 12 of the inmates.

2562. In a similar report a female victim recounted that women and children from her village were thrown into JNA trucks, with approximately 24 of them per truck. She identified the perpetrators as "etniks" wearing uniforms of the former JNA as well as militiamen clad in uniforms with skull and bones insignia.

2563. The "etniks" took the victims through Tesli to an unidentifiable wooded location and "began taking us to some kind of rooms which were for the most part dug out of the ground, resembling mining areas or spaces; there was no light. There were over 100 of us in this space." There was reportedly no exit from the room. According to the witness, the room was always dark, the only illumination came from a light burning in the hall. Inmates, she recalled, were fed bread and water two times daily.
2564. The detainees were divided once again and the witness was put in a hut with 23 other women. The witness and some 11 others were repeatedly raped in the hut in front of the other women. Reportedly some women's hands were bound before they were raped. Others were kicked and beaten. The perpetrators were camp guards as well as "etniks" from outside the camp. In addition to the rapes, the Serbs occasionally took women from the group and executed them by random firing squad.

2565. The witness remained in detention at this facility for three months, until the end of July at which time a named Serb helped several victims escape.

2566. Another female victim stated that the "etniks" who invaded her village of Kaloševi wore masks and White Eagle insignia on their uniforms. They rounded up all the women and young girls and led them on foot. The women were required to walk for some five hours; shepherded through the forest, to a clearing. Upon arrival, they found a place that the witness characterized as "some kind of forest motel." The cabins were designated as sentry-boxes, and the entire encampment was fenced with barbed wire.

2567. The witness was placed with the girls and younger women. She was raped every night. The White Eagles took their victims every evening and brought them back in the mornings. There were nights when more than 20 of them came. The women were reportedly also made to cook for the guards and to serve them naked. The perpetrators reportedly also raped and killed some of the girls in front of the other victims. Those women who resisted had their breasts cut.

2568. Stara Opština: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government. On 12 July 1992, a victim and his friend were arrested by four or five soldiers wearing red berets and green uniforms. The witness identified these soldiers as belonging to the so-called Serbian militia, "Crveni Barek." The two were singled out apparently because of the appearance of their names on an unidentified Serb generated list.

2569. The detainees were taken to what was described as a large local government building, called Stara Opština. According to the witness, all of the rooms, including the area in the cellar of the facility, were filled with Croatian and Muslim prisoners. During his internment, the witness was both beaten and compelled into forced labour. His detention at this facility was concluded on 14 July 1992, when the witness and his fellow prisoners were transferred to the local stadium.

2570. "Proleter" Stadium: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. This location was reportedly under the control of Serbian soldiers, presumably with some connection to the "Crveni Barek". While no information regarding the layout or physical condition of the facility was made available, a clear impression of the attending circumstances may be had. According to one witness' recollection, a rather grim incident took place on 22 July 1992. Early that morning, some 25 drunken soldiers lined up a number of Muslim and Croatian prisoners. The soldiers called the individuals, one-by-one, from the line. When the prisoner responded, the soldiers—as many as 10 at a time—beat and stabbed the victim to death. Some 50 prisoners were killed in this manner over a period of about three hours. If the victims refused to step forward when called, as was the case with the witness' friend, the soldiers simply machine-gunned them down.
where they stood. 4087/

2572. **Police station:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government. According to one report, after Serb forces took control of the county of Tesli, all non-Serb families who had family members working in Western Europe were ordered to pay 300 DM per month to Tesli County. 4088/ Those who refused had their homes raided at night, their families beaten and the eldest paternal family member taken to the police station for interrogation. 4089/ These interrogations, called informative talks, lasted two to four days. 4090/ The Muslims were reportedly beaten by three to four policemen at a time. 4091/

2573. **Banja Vruica Sanatorium:** 4092/ The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral. Only a few reports referred to a detention facility at this location, however with very little detail. One report notes that over 300 Muslims between the ages of 16 and 60 were interned here and subjected to the whims and terrifying fancies of the Serbian militia, the Armada forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Red Beret" formations. 4093/

2574. **Pribini:** The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. One report cites to the existence of a concentration camp in the Borija mountains. 4094/ At the time that the report was authored, some 500 individuals were reportedly interned at this facility. 4095/ No further information was available regarding its operation and control.

77. **Titov Drvar**

2575. This municipality is located in western BiH, on the border of Croatia. It is bounded to the north by Bosanski Petrovac and to the south by Bosansko Grahovo. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the Titov Drvar municipality had a population of 17,079. Of that number 97.3 per cent were Serbs, 0.2 per cent were Muslims, 0.2 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 2.3 per cent were described as "others".

2576. In the Titov Drvar community, the Serbian goal of Muslim extermination reportedly continued unabated. The full scale expulsion of Muslim citizens and the establishment of concentration camps were reported throughout the area. 4096/

2577. **Kamenica:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC. Several sources suggest the existence of a Serb controlled camp in Kamenica, in the area of Drvar. According to one report, 29 people were arrested in mid-July in Bosanski Petrovac and transported to this camp in Kamenica. The identification of the individuals interned in Kamenica was included in the report. 4097/

2578. Another report alludes to the United Nations' efforts to obtain the release of some 61 Muslims held by Serb forces at the camp in Kamenica. 4098/ The report states that he Muslim prisoners were released and transferred by ICRC members to the United Nations protected shelter of Karlovac (Republic of Croatia). 4099/

2579. **Elementary School:** The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United States Government. Reportedly following the closing of camp Koziile in Bosanski Petrovac, 4100/ the prisoners were transported to the elementary school in Kamenica. The school had an estimated maximum capacity of 1000. The facility was presumably
operated by military police units from Drvar. It is unclear if guards from camp Kozile were also transferred here for duty. 4101/

2580. Prekaja: The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. Reportedly just near Drvar, in the village of Prekaja is an alleged Serb controlled concentration camp. 4102/ Allegedly operated by extremists, the interns were purportedly tortured and killed at this camp. 4103/

2581. Titov Drvar: The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Medecins Sans Frontieres. Medecins Sans Frontieres reportedly acquired evidence of two Serb controlled concentration camps in Titov Drvar. 4104/ The French source interviewed several Muslim refugees from the town of Kozarac who had been interned in the Serb controlled camps. 4105/ The French agency reported that more than half of the refugees had reportedly been tortured. 4106/

2582. Drvar Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). Another report alleges the existence of a Bosnian Serb controlled camp at the prison. 4107/ This location was identified as of May 1993. 4108/ The source, however, did not provide additional information regarding either operation or prisoner identification.

78. Tomislavgrad

2583. This municipality is located in central BiH, bordering Croatia to the west. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the county had a population of 29,261. Croats constituted 86.6 per cent of the population, Muslims 10.8 per cent, Serbs 1.5 per cent, and the remaining 1.1 per cent were classified as "other".

2584. Tomislavgrad has operated as a major transit area since the beginning of the conflict. Some 35,000 people, mostly Croats, have reportedly passed through the region, collecting exit visas, on their way to other lands. 4109/ There are, however, several non-Croats who have not departed the area. And according to area officials, the non-Croatian population of Tomislavgrad, who remain in the region, are not prisoners. They are only "subject to restricted movement", and such restrictions are primarily for their own protection. 4110/

2585. To that end, all of the Serbs, approximately 320 individuals from the Tomislavgrad area 4111/ were dismissed from their employment and taken to and detained in various Croatian-run camps. 4112/ While the details regarding the management of the Muslim population was not made available, there are several reports regarding Muslim-populated facilities.

2586. Old School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch). According to one report, a man from the village of Eminovo Selo recalled being taken to a school in Tomislavgrad, being detained there for one and a half months and then being transferred to another school in Tomislavgrad. It was his understanding that the location was controlled by HVO civil police. 4113/

2587. This, the first school location, reportedly had three big rooms. According to the report, for the first month and a half, some 300 people were interned here. The detainees were fed three meals per day and the food was, according to one former inmate, "decent". 4114/

2588. The men were put on work detail in a field some two kilometres away for approximately nine hours per day. The report described the treatment by the
guards as "excellent". The detainees reportedly came into contact with civilian police and occasionally HOS members. 4115/

2589. House in Tomislavgrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). The ICRC reported that it visited a place of detention at a private house in Tomislavgrad. 4116/ No additional information regarding operation, control or length of detention was made available.

2590. House in Eminovo Selo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) One report suggests that members of HVO civil police detained everyone in a house in the village of Eminovo Selo for the purpose of holding "a conference". The "confeerees" were detained at this location for four days before being transferred to Tomislavgrad. 4117/ 2591. Tomislavgrad School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and Helsinki Watch.) According to one report, the Serb men detained at this location were all apprehended with weapons in their possession. The report suggests that the men are detained in three large rooms, two on the first floor and one on the second. The head of military police, and his guards were quartered in another room on the first floor, just near the first containment area. There were reportedly some 50 men detained at this location. 4118/ 2592. The inmates were reportedly permitted to have visitors and some were even allowed to walk about the halls. The containment rooms themselves had big windows but were unheated. The men slept on platforms covered with blankets. 4119/ 2593. Inmates in cell/room one were kept there for four to seven months. The men were finally allowed to bathe after four months of detention. 4120/ 2594. Cell/room 2 contained six men from mixed marriages. There were wash basins available to these inmates, and they were permitted to go home twice in six months. 4121/ The men were made to work in the fields digging potatoes. They reportedly had "excellent relations with the guards." 4122/ According to an ICRC report, member representatives visited a place of detention at a Tomislavgrad school. The report was, however, silent as to details concerning the facility. 4123/ 2595. Tomislavgrad Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). The ICRC reported that it visited a place of detention at a hospital in Tomislavgrad. 4124/ No additional information regarding prisoner treatment, operation, control or length of detention was made available.

2596. Šekoviji Camp: 4125/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a Muslim-populated rape facility existed in Tomislavgrad. Three hundred women were said to have been raped at this location. No information regarding its operation, control or location was provided. 4126/ 2597. Unknown Prison-Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In another report, prisoners were detained in a prison camp in Tomislavgrad. At this camp, the prisoners were taken one by one to the office where they were separated from their valuables and money and thereafter placed into one of two large rooms. The rooms reportedly contained six small cells which were full of Bosnian males. They were reportedly beaten and abused day and night and those who possessed BiH
Army identification were allegedly made to eat their identification. 4127/

2598. The HVO soldiers forced the men to fight each other. They shaved the prisoners with knives and burned the prisoners' hair with cigarette lighters. The men were used as forced labour to cut firewood and to clean the soldiers' shelter. 4128/

2599. Unknown facility in Duvno: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to a report, hundreds of Serbs including women, children and the elderly were detained in a camp in the village of Duvno in 1992. 4129/ The detainees were reportedly mistreated and tortured. The report suggests that the Croatian paramilitary forces prevented Serbs from being evacuated from the area so that they could be used as hostages. 4130/

2600. Camp-Village in Rašani, Duvno: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC, Helsinki Watch, and the United States Government.) Rašani lies in south-west BiH and is reportedly the smallest Serb village in the Tomislavgrad municipality. It is approximately one kilometre long, located on a ridge of stony ground which resembles the typical highland area. 4131/

2601. Along the ridge are several stone houses, which came under Croatian control and are now peopled with displaced Serbian families--approximately 15 individuals per house. There were reportedly as many as 261 people interned in the village when the camp was initially established in March 1992. 4132/

2602. According to reports, a Croatian guard was placed on patrol at the end of the road which empties into the valley below. The detainees were not permitted to leave but were reportedly permitted to seek and receive medical care. 4133/

2603. According to another report the 250 individuals detained here are primarily women and children who were expelled from villages in Tomislavgrad and Rašani. The camp-village itself is surrounded by HVO guards and Croat police. 4134/ There is reported to be no communication with the outside world whatsoever and no freedom of movement. The inmates were reportedly used as human shields to prevent possible Serb attack against the region. 4135/

2604. The camp initially also detained men from the region, however according to one report, many of the male relatives of the women held in Rašani were released from HVO camps at the end of 1992. 4136/

2605. Still another report suggests that the majority of individuals detained in the camp-village were subjected to physical abuse and mistreatment including shootings and rape. 4137/

2606. Members of the Thomson Mission visited this location on 1 September 1992 and located some 250 Serb detainees. The Mission confirmed the control of this camp as being had by Croatian forces. 4138/

79. Travnik

2607. The municipality of Travnik is located in central BiH, just east of Zenica. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, Travnik had a population of 70,402; of which 45.3 per cent were Muslim, 36.9 per cent were Croats, 11 per cent were Serbs and the remaining 6.8 per cent were described as "others".

2608. Several reports describe prisons and detention centres in Travnik;
however few details are available as to each of these facilities. For the most part, the reports do not specify the parties in control of the various camps, nor do they specify the dates of operation of these camps. Two prisons located in Travnik area are identified by name and are as follows:

2609. **Travnik Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In June-July 1992, Serbians were detained in the Travnik Prison. It is alleged that Serbian prisoners were "ill-treated and tortured." \(^{4139}\)

2610. **Travnik Barracks**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported that it visited a place of detention at the Travnik Barracks on 1 December 1992. \(^{4140}\)

2611. **"Bratstvo" Factory**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Serbian prisoners are allegedly held in large tanks at a chemical factory in Novi Travnik. Prisoners must cling to a ladder leading into the tank to avoid falling into the chemicals below. The tanks are covered and locked so as not be seen by the public. \(^{4141}\) This detention centre may be the same as the "chemical factory" near Vitez (discussed below) that is said to house prisoners.

2612. Reports identify several other, unnamed camps in the Travnik region. These camps are described as follows: \(^{4142}\)

(a) One report claims that the ICRC confirmed the mistreatment of 180 Croatians captured by Muslim forces and held in a "concentration camp" near Novi Travnik. \(^{4143}\)

(b) The ECMM reports that approximately 500 Croatian men aged 16-60 are held in a Serb-run concentration camp. \(^{4144}\)

(c) The BiH Army claims that 350 Muslims are held in "secret camps" in Travnik and that 700 Muslims are held in Travnik altogether. \(^{4145}\)

(d) According to the Tanjug news agency, 350 Croats are detained in a "concentration camp" in Travnik. \(^{4146}\)

(e) A report submitted by the Serbian Republic alleges that Serbs from Travnik (and other villages in the vicinity) were captured by Croatian-Muslim forces. Prisoners were subsequently taken to "concentration camps" where they were allegedly tortured. It is not clear if these camps were located near Travnik. \(^{4147}\)

80. **Trebinje**

2613. The county of Trebinje is located in eastern Herzegovina. According to 1991 census data, the pre-war population was 30,879. At that time, the population was 69.3 per cent Serb, 17.9 per cent Muslim, 8.8 per cent other, and 4 per cent Croat. \(^{4148}\)

2614. **Military Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to the Republic of BiH State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of BiH, a military prison in Trebinje held 1,490 prisoners as of October 1992. \(^{4149}\)
2615. Unidentified Detention Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Thomson Mission.)
A CSCE Mission reported a place of detention under Serbian authority in Trebinje closed as of 2 September 1992. 4150/

81. Tuzla

2616. The municipality of Tuzla is located in north-eastern BiH, bordered by the municipalities of Zvornik, Kalesija, ivinice, Lukavac, Srebrenica and Lopare. The pre-war population of Tuzla was 131,861. Muslims comprised 47.6 per cent of the total population, Serbs 15.5 per cent, Croats 15.6 per cent, Yugoslavs 16.6 per cent and 4.7 per cent referred to as "other."

2617. According to the ICRC, as of 5 November 1992, 197 prisoners were reportedly held by the Bosnian government. 4151/ According to another ICRC report, 183 prisoners were held by the BiH government as of 5 April 1992. 4152/

2618. "Dr. Mustafa Mujbegovi" Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A report was received which alleged that wounded members of the JNA were imprisoned in this Tuzla hospital before being transferred to the Tuzla Prison. 4153/ According to two reports JNA forces leaving the "Husinska Buna" barracks in Tuzla, evacuating soldiers and equipment in accordance with a prior agreement, were ambushed by BiH Territorial Defence Forces on 15 May 1992. A reserve lieutenant was wounded in the leg as he drove one of the JNA trucks. He and two members of the JNA were wounded when the truck veered off the road. They were captured by members of the Territorial Defence. The wounded men were reportedly beaten all the way to the hospital. 4154/ The report indicated that other members of the retreating JNA forces were captured and beaten by members of the Territorial Defence as they were being transported to the hospital.

2619. An identified physician allegedly tortured JNA prisoners at the hospital. 4155/ JNA prisoners were placed in various departments of the hospitals along with wounded members of the Territorial Defence Forces. This arrangement reportedly gave the Territorial Defence members an opportunity to take out their personal vendettas against the JNA soldiers. 4156/

2620. The JNA soldiers were later transported to the Tuzla Prison where they were tortured by a named man. 4157/ he allegedly stated that his "greatest pleasure" was to "kill Vlach babies in cradles". 4158/ Another guard identified only by nickname from the eastern part of Tuzla, allegedly tortured the JNA prisoners also. 4159/

2621. Military Hospital: ICRC representatives reportedly visited a detention facility at a military hospital on 14 March 1994 in Tuzla. No information regarding treatment of prisoners, identity of prisoners nor length of detention was provided. 4160/

2622. Hospital: ICRC representatives reportedly visited a detention facility located in a hospital in Tuzla on 10 August 1993. No additional information regarding treatment of prisoners, identity of prisoners nor length of detention was provided. 4161/

2623. Tuzla Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) A report was received that Serbian prisoners have been detained in the Tuzla prison. 4162/ Serbians from the village of Stupari were allegedly detained without trial. Two
Serbian prisoners interviewed in the Tuzla prison reported that they had been detained in an unidentified building by authorities in Stupari on 28 May 1992. These prisoners stated that they were never informed of the legal justification for their detention. They were reportedly transferred to Tuzla in February 1993 and tried and convicted for illegal possession of weapons. A judge sentenced the prisoners to one year's imprisonment beginning on 17 February 1993. During sentencing, the judge informed them that he was unable to take into consideration the 9 months they had spent in detention because no records existed of their detention.

2624. The Serbian civilians in Tuzla were subjected to forced mobilization into the Bosnian government army. Those who refuse to be drafted were reportedly tried and sentenced to three to 10 years in prison. Serbian civilians from the surrounding areas who refuse to respond to the draft, particularly those from Banovci, were allegedly mobilized by force and taken to the front lines to dig trenches.

2625. Members of the ICRC reportedly visited a detention facility in Tuzla on 28 May 1993. No additional information regarding the operation of this facility nor the duration of its existence was provided.

2626. In an open letter, Serbian Orthodox Bishop Vasilije of Tuzla asked the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church to protest the treatment of Serbs in Tuzla on 11 March 1993. The letter reported that 300 Serbs were imprisoned in the main prison and that the Tuzla Serbs were subjected to physical abuse and forced conscription into the Bosnian army.

2627. The letter also reportedly stated that trials were rigged and that many Serbs had been sentenced to 15 years hard labour. Most prisoners were allegedly executed shortly after imprisonment, and others were so debilitated from physical and psychological torture and starvation that it took them several months to recover.

2628. Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Members of the ICRC reportedly visited a detention facility in a barracks in Tuzla on 15 September 1993. No additional information regarding the operation of this facility nor the duration of its existence was provided.

2629. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Members of the ICRC reportedly visited a detention facility at the military prison in Tuzla on 23 September 1992. No additional information regarding the operation of this facility nor the duration of its existence was provided.

2630. Private Muslim Prisons: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A report concerning the existence of Muslim prisons in the town of Tuzla was received. The BBC reported that Serbian sources reportedly had information concerning the owner of private prisons for Serbs who is also allegedly in control of a private Muslim militia in Tuzla. According to Vojislav Djurkovi, head of the State Commission of the Serbian Republic of BiH, another man allegedly ordered the execution of many Serbian families in Tuzla working in conjunction with the man who owned the private prisons. Also according to Djurkovi, Tuzla's Mayor allegedly organized a training centre for Islamic terrorists in Tojzi near the town. Djurkovi accused the Bosnian Muslim authorities of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid.
2631. **Tuzla Brothels:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A report was received concerning the existence of Muslim and Croatian run brothels in Tuzla. 4178/ Another source reported that "bordellos" for Serbian women were reported in Tuzla in late 1991 and 1992. 4179/ The BBC reported that Serbs who escaped from Tuzla reported that young Serbian women were forcibly taken to brothels by Muslim soldiers. 4180/ In his letter, Bishop Vasilije stated that the Muslim soldiers had a "schedule" for kidnapping the Serbian women. 4181/

2632. According to another source, 60 women, three to four months pregnant, were sent away from a Serbian run camp in the Tuzla region in 1992. 4182/

2633. A separate report indicated that members of Croatian and Muslim forces were sexually abusing Serbian women in Tuzla brothels. 4183/ The women were captured by soldiers and allegedly imprisoned at the brothels until their fifth month of pregnancy. After release, they were reportedly kept under house arrest to prevent them from obtaining abortions. 4184/ The report estimated that more than 1,000 Serbian women were imprisoned in such brothels. The report also alleged that members of Muslim and Croatian forces that had contracted AIDS or other communicable diseases were purposely sent to the brothels to rape the women. 4185/

2634. **Lomnica, near Šekovij:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A 1992 report establishing the existence of a rape/death camp in Lomnica where over 200 girls up to 15 years old were held. 4186/ No additional information was provided regarding this facility.

2635. **Tusanj Stadium:** 4187/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A report that 4,000 Serbian civilians were imprisoned at the stadium was received. 4188/ This rather astounding figure, while cited in several other reports, has not as yet been corroborated.

2636. **Sloboda Football Stadium:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A report was received which suggested that a detention facility existed at the Sloboda Football stadium in Tuzla where at least 25 to 30 women were held. The women were raped in front of an undetermined number of other prisoners. 4189/

2637. **Secondary School Brothel:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A report was received indicating that 100 Serbian women were held in a brothel in the Tuzla Secondary School. 4190/ No additional information was made available regarding this facility.

2638. **Private House:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A report received indicated that 15 Serbian women were imprisoned in a private house located on the road towards Srebrenik, near Previla. The report did not provide the dates that the women were imprisoned or the identity of the owner of the home. 4191/

2639. **Tunnel Prison:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, however none among them are neutral.) A report was received containing testimony from a Serbian woman held taken to a prison in the city of Tuzla and imprisoned for five months in a what she described as a tunnel. 4192/ The witness was a peasant farmer from the village of Brezje on Mount Majevica. She stated that Muslim soldiers attacked her village in early June 1992, taking 36 Serbian children and dividing the
women and girls into groups. 4193/ During the attack on the village some of
the women were reportedly raped outside their homes. The witness reported
that one Serbian man committed suicide when his wife and daughter were raped
outside their home. 4194/ The soldiers were reportedly armed and wore green
patterned disguise uniforms. 4195/ The soldiers killed village residents and
robbed their homes.

2640. The witness reported that the soldiers separated the men and women and
then loaded the prisoners into covered trucks that resembled vans. 4196/ The
reporting witness and other female prisoners were transported to a camp in the
city of Tuzla where she was confined in a "dark tunnel" with nine other
women. 4197/

2641. During five months of imprisonment, the witness reported that the women
were never taken outside. They were fed and given water in plastic bowls.
She stated that none of the female prisoners were allowed to take showers or
wash their clothes. She stated that the guards separated the girls from the
women and allegedly subjected the women to rape. 4198/ The guards reportedly
concealed their identity while committing the rapes by blindfolding the
victims. 4199/ The women were allegedly subjected to repeated sexual assault
and on some occasions were gang raped by the guards. The witness reported
being subjected to interrogation concerning the location of her husband and
children by guards in camouflage uniforms. She was allegedly told that
Serbian women would no longer bear Serbian children, only Muslim and
Croatian. 4200/ The witness was released in late October in a prisoner
exchange at Piper. 4201/

2642. Cellars in Tuzla: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) In an
interview, a Serbian psychiatrist reported that Serbian women were imprisoned
in some type of cellars controlled by Muslims in the town of Tuzla and
subjected to repeated rape for the purpose of forced impregnation. 4202/ The
physician worked with Serbian women who had allegedly been imprisoned in a
dark room. Three to five men entered the room on a daily basis to rape the
women. 4203/ According to the patients who related their stories of
imprisonment to the reporting physician, the Muslim soldiers intended to
impregnate the Serbian women. The men reportedly told the women that the
Koran stated that a child is a Muslim if the father is a Muslim. The women
were generally released after the third month of pregnancy and, because of
their advanced state, had to obtain the approval of the psychiatric commission
for an abortion. 4204/

2643. In a separate report, the same Serbian psychiatrist reported
examinations of four Serbian women who had allegedly been raped by Muslim and
Croatian soldiers while imprisoned in a cellar in Tuzla. 4205/ According to
these reports, the women were raped on a daily basis and later released in
advanced stages of pregnancy. 4206/ JNA prisoners were reportedly beaten
about their heads with the vacuum-cleaner hose which was used to clean the
sewer daily. 4207/

82. Ugljevik

2644. Ugljevik is located in north-eastern Bosnia, bordered by the
municipalities of Bijeljina, Zvornik, Lopare, and Brko. The pre-war
population was 25,641, with Muslims comprising 40.6 per cent, Serbs 56.2 per
cent, and 3.2 per cent listed as "other."
2645. **Fabrika Kurjak:** (The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A report was received concerning a Serbian run camp in the town of Ugljevik. The town had a population of 5,000 and is located 23 kilometres south-west of Bijeljina. The camp was located in a newly built hall in the textile factory compound. Male Muslim prisoners were held at a hall surrounded by a barbed wire fence. Warning signs stated that the fence was charged with an electric current. On 29 June 1992, approximately 230 women and children and 72 men from Lonari arrived at the Ugljevik camp where only male prisoners were detained. The women and children were separated and placed in a camp for women located at a school in Ugljevik. Approximately 120 male prisoners were in the camp at that time. The reporting source stated that the many Muslim prisoners had been killed at the camp by Serbian soldiers before the witness arrived. Because the witness was detained for only three days, learned few details about the camp.

2646. According to this report, there were no beds in the camp and prisoners slept on the concrete floor. The witness reported that during the three days that he was detained the camp was surrounded by Ministry of Internal Affairs (SUP) personnel. According to this witness, the SUP personnel did not mistreat or kill prisoners. The witness also described an incident in which two drunk Serbian "etniks" entered the camp one evening and stated that they had killed many Muslims at "the stadium" in Brko. The soldier ordered the SUP guards to kill the Muslim prisoners, offering each guard 100 DM. The guards refused and told the soldiers that they could not kill the prisoners. On 1 July 1992, the witness was transferred to a camp located three kilometres north of the town of Batkovi.

83. **Vareš**

2647. This municipality is located in central BiH, between Kakanj and Olovo. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of Vareš was 22,114; of which 40.6 per cent were Croats, 30.4 per cent were Muslim, 16.4 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 12.6 per cent were described as "others".

2648. Reportedly, there are four locations in Vareš where people are detained. However, there only is testimony describing two specific detention sites. Additionally, there are two reports of United Nations soldiers being held hostage and released, a report that women and children were detained and raped in a house, and a report that men were detained in Zubeta. Allegedly, over 270 people, mainly Muslim men, have been detained in Vareš. The only detainees who reportedly were released were the United Nations soldiers and the rape victims.

2649. **Schoolhouses:** (The existence of these detention facilities have been corroborated by multiple sources, including ECMM and the ICRC.) Bosnian Croat forces allegedly have detained as many as 232 Muslim men, including at least eight from Stupni Do, in two schoolhouses in Vareš.

2650. Muslim women from Vareš reported that on 23 October (presumably 1993) members of HVO Kiseljak in cooperation with the local HVO began arresting all Muslim males who were at least 16 years old. In addition, a catholic priest alleged that 350 Muslim men initially were arrested and that approximately 200 then were detained in the two schools. The priest further reported that the mayor of Vareš, who has since disappeared, had stated that these individuals were arrested because they were believed to be storing weapons.

2651. Reportedly, the detainees at the schools were abused. A Red Cross representative reported that some men at one of the schools were beaten.
A United Nations officer who entered the school buildings confirmed that the detainees had bruises on their faces and bodies. 4220/ The officer added that most detainees were so scared that they said their conditions were fine. 4221/ However, one detainee who spoke to him in Swedish said that they screamed all night. 4222/ Additionally, the visiting United Nations officer learned that 25 detainees had disappeared, and that 30 other detainees had been so badly beaten that he was not allowed to see them. 4223/

2652. Allegedly, conditions inside the school buildings were also poor. The United Nations officer who visited the schools said that the detainees were held in filthy conditions. 4224/ One of the school buildings allegedly was cold, dark, and damp. 4225/

2653. Factory, Vareš: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported that it visited a place of detention at a factory in Vareš on 9 February 1994. 4226/ No additional information was made available regarding prisoner treatment, length of the facility's existence nor its operation and control.

2654. Vareš House: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Washington Post.) Muslim BiH Government soldiers stated that five women and two children had escaped from a house in Vareš where they had been taken and raped. 4227/

2655. Zubeta Detentions: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Chicago Tribune.) According to Muslim refugees and BiH Army officers, Serbian soldiers detained several men from Zubeta, a village near Vareš. 4228/ It is unclear where the men were taken or if they were released.

84. Velika Kladuša

2656. Velika Kladuša is a province in the north-western corner of BiH. Its pre-war population was 52,921, of which 91.8 per cent were Muslim, 4.3 per cent Serb, and 3.9 per cent "other". There is little information about detention camps in the region.

2657. Prison in Velika Kladuša: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The only evidence of a camp comes from the ICRC. It reports that representatives visited a camp at a prison in Velika Kladuša. Their visit took place on 28 February 1994. 4229/ There is no indication of who was running the camp or who was detained there.

85. Višegrad

2658. Višegrad is in south-east BiH. As of 1991, its population was 21,202 of which 62.8 per cent Muslim, 32.8 per cent Serb, and 4.4 per cent other.

2659. The Uice corps, a JNA corps from Titovo Uice, Serbia, first entered Višegrad in April 1992. 4230/ One report alleges that they came on 4 April, but others contend that their occupation did not begin until 17 April. 4231/ The corps is estimated to have numbered 8,000 troops. 4232/ They remained in Višegrad for one or two months during which time they "picked up" many civilians for interrogation. There was no fighting reported at this time other than some exchanges between the Uice corps and unidentified forces on "a place on the hill" in Višegrad. No one was killed. 4233/
2660. Apparently, the Ulice corps had been ordered by Milošević to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina altogether on 28 April, but it took them several weeks to get out. When they did depart, they left all of their weapons with the Serbian Territorial Defence, partly transforming it into the "Serbian Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina." 4234/ At this time, the White Eagles, Arkan's and Šešelj's men, and a group called the "Johnsons" came to the region. They, along with the newly established army and local "etniks", then launched an aggressive campaign of "ethnic cleansing" throughout the area. 4235/

2661. Early on, many Muslims fled to the woods and the neighbouring region of Gorade. 4236/ Yet, since travelling was considered very unsafe many civilians simply stayed put. 4237/ These people were systematically ordered to leave their homes and forced to hand over their valuables; they were then arrested and detained in camps.

2662. There are reports of 21 Serb-run camps established in the Višegrad region as part of this "ethnic cleansing" campaign. They were first created in April and May 1992 and appear to have run throughout July and August, although most of their precise dates of existence are unspecified. These camps are as follows: Banja Suse, Bikavac Hotel, a building above a tunnel, a factory in Višegrad, the fire station at Višegrad, the former police station in Višegrad, Hasan Beretovac Primary School, Hasan Veletovi Primary School at Gućine, Poarnica Barracks, Prelovo Camp, stable of Guso Salko, Varda Sawmill or Plant, Vardište Barracks, Vilina Vlas Hotel, Višegrad Electric Plant, Višegrad High School Centre, Višegrad Sports Centre, Uzemnica or Uramnica Barracks, the elimir Đuričić Primary School in Preleva, and Zamjenica Garrison. There are also reports that prisoners were held in private homes and apartments.

2663. These camps held Muslim inhabitants from Višegrad and the surrounding villages. Several of them were specifically established to detain women for the purposes of rape. Members of Serbian military and paramilitary forces as well as local civilians would regularly visit these camps. Rape was apparently so common in the region that one nurse at a refugee shelter in Zenica stated, "Virtually every young woman who fled (Donji Vakuf, Foa, or) Višegrad after Serb extremists began what they call "ethnic cleansing" was raped." 4238/

2664. Inhabitants from the region were also transferred to camps outside the province, two of which were in Serbia. There is a report that some people were sent by bus to Olovo in central BiH. 4239/ Another report states that nearly 6,600 inhabitants were transferred to Ulice by the Serbian Territorial Defence, and an unknown number of girls were captured and sent off to Zlatibor, Serbia. 4240/

2665. Two men are said to have organized this campaign. 4241/ Sixteen others were initially involved. 4242/

2666. Banja Suse: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is one report that during the initial attack on Višegrad in April, a man and his two sons were taken to a camp at Banja Suse. 4243/ Apparently, this camp was near the River Drina. All the report describes is that a unit of the Serbian Territorial Defence stationed on the other side of the river suddenly opened fire on the camp. The man and children detained there escaped by swimming along the river. 4244/

2667. Bikavac Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Bikavac was a detention camp where Muslim women were held for the purposes of rape and sexual abuse. 4245/ There are alleged to have been girls under the age of 14
at this camp. 4246/

2668. This hotel was also the headquarters of the Serbian Territorial Defence and the White Eagles. It appears the hotel may have been the combined headquarters of the two armed forces. 4247/ An identified man was the manager of the hotel and was alleged to be involved in activities there. 4248/

2669. Building above tunnel in Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is one report that girls were taken by "ethniks" and detained in "a building above the tunnel" in Višegrad. 4249/ There is no further information about this camp.

2670. Factory in Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Defence Debriefing Team.) The Defence Debriefing Team reported the existence of a camp at a factory in Višegrad in December 1992. 4250/ No other details are included.

2671. Fire Station in Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The fire station at Višegrad was one of the main detention facilities in the area. There are no indications of exactly where in Višegrad this fire station is located; it is only described as having a "big open area" below it. 4251/ Most prisoners at the station came from lijeb and Višegrad although there is a report that a group of young girls came from Kuke. 4252/ Those from lijeb arrived sometime in June after the attack of their village by Arkan's units. 4253/ The exact dates of the other groups' detention are unknown.

2672. The fire station was a holding facility from where prisoners were often taken and returned. During detention, prisoners were temporarily taken to the police station, Vilina Vlas Hotel, and private homes for the purposes of interrogation and rape. While at the station, prisoners were also raped, beaten, killed, and made to do hard labour. 4254/

2673. The most detailed description of the station comes from an ex-prisoner who was held there for five days in late May 1992. 4255/ In her testimony, the witness refers to the camp as the "Fireman's Society". She was a particular target for rape and interrogation by the "ethniks" because she was originally from epa, and they wanted information about Muslim military activities there. 4256/

2674. While she was at the station, 130 people were also detained, 20 of them men. Upon her arrival, the "ethniks" lined up 15 kids and told everyone, "If anyone does anything against us, all 15 will be killed, and we will line up another 15." 4257/ Thereafter, the prisoners were separated by gender and taken in groups of five to a "receiving area" where they were stripped naked and searched by guards. They were told that if they withheld any valuables, they would be killed. 4258/

2675. She reports that on the first night, an unknown number of "ethniks" came and took away two young girls to be raped. The mother of the children tried to give them some previously hidden money, but this did not stop them. Instead, they simply took the mother and forced her to watch the rapes. 4259/

2676. On the second day, another female detainee was taken away. Apparently, she was brought to the police station for questioning and returned later that day. On this same day, the witness was also taken from the station and brought to a house in the Bikavac quarter of Višegrad by a named man. There, 20 men awaited her. They gang raped her and then the man drove her back to the station. 4260/
That evening, two men came to the camp with eight other men. They took away the male prisoners in groups of five and six. Approximately, 21 men were taken in all, their destination unknown. This left about 100 to 110 women and children remaining at the station. 4261/

Sometime after the men were taken, the others went to sleep, but were later awakened when about seven or eight "etniks" showed up again with socks over their heads and "with colours and dirt on their faces". 4262/ They wore plastic gloves and were shouting that they wanted to test something in the building. First, they took two girls to be raped. Then, they chose from the other women using a flashlight in the dark room to see their faces. 4263/

The witness was one of the women chosen. She was taken upstairs with two others. Upstairs in the hallway, they were grabbed at and kissed by several men. Then, they were brought into a small office with four men and forced to strip naked. First, the other two women were raped. Then, they were sent into the hallway and she was left alone with the men. 4264/

One of them told her to sit down "in the Turkish way" in front of him. He made her kiss the cross he wore around his neck three times and cross herself. When she told him she did not know how, another of them showed her and made her do it. He then told her that she had changed religion and that she was now a Serb. 4265/

After this time, the three other men left the room. She had to perform fellatio on the perpetrator while he held a knife to her throat. He ejaculated inside her. Then, the second man came in, and she was forced to do the same thing to him, then the third, and the fourth. 4266/

While upstairs, the witness noted that there were three rooms: two smaller offices and a big room where a lot of folders and paperwork were stored. The two smaller rooms were empty. She reports that only one of these rooms, the one in which she was raped, was used for rape. 4267/

On the third day, she was again taken away from the station at around 2:00 p.m. The "etniks" took her to the "New Bridge" where they interrogated and kissed her in front of the Muslim men being killed there. 4268/ She was met by a named man and brought to the Vilina Vlas Hotel. Though she had never met this man, she knew him to be one of the main perpetrators of crimes in the area. He raped her at Vilina Vlas all that day and night and brought her back to the fire station at 12:00 a.m. 4269/

Only five minutes after she was returned, the "etniks" came for her again. This time there were three of them. They took her to an empty house not far from the station, interrogated her about epa, and raped her. 4270/

After five days of detention, the witness was transferred with her two children to Kalina near Olovo. During her transport, the convoy was stopped three times as various "etniks" continued to look for her. She successfully evaded them by hiding underneath other prisoners during their searches of the convoy trucks. 4271/

Among the perpetrators she reports were involved in activities at the fire station were three identified man, one man identified by nickname, and many of Arkan's and Šešelj's men. 4272/ She states, "They all had beards, black dresses, all in black with hats and Serbian crosses, long hair." She adds that she did not know any of them from before the war but learned that some were from Ulice, Bijolje, and Višegrad. 4273/
2687. Other reports indicate that two other men were also present at the station. In addition, a man identified by one name only from Višegrad was there. One witness specifically alleges that she and three other women were raped when they had no valuables to give him.

2688. Hasan Beretovac Primary School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) There is a report that a Serb-run camp was established at this school. There is no further information.

2689. Hasan Veletovi Primary School at Guine: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is also a report that a camp was established here. There are no details about it other than the fact that the entire population of Crna was brought here, stripped of their valuables, and detained. This may, in fact, be the same camp reported above as Hasan Beretovac School.

2690. High School Centre at Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A camp was established at the high school in Višegrad. There is no indication exactly where the high school is located, and no other information is included.

2691. Former JNA Garrisons at Vardište: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) There are reports that a camp existed at the former Vardište military garrisons. No additional information was provided regarding this facility.

2692. Former Police Station at Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The police station is alleged to have been established as a holding centre for Muslims from Višegrad upon the Serbian occupation of the area. Inhabitants were initially arrested and interrogated at the station from 14 April to 18 April and continued to be brought there throughout the summer. Here, prisoners were interrogated, beaten, tortured, and starved. According to one report, at least five prisoners were taken out a day to be killed.

2693. Poarnica Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is a report of a camp at the Poarnica Barracks. No information regarding operation or control, duration or existing conditions was provided about this facility.

2694. Prelowo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The existence of a camp is reported in Prelowo. Apparently, it was created upon the initial attack of Višegrad by Uice corps troops in April and run by an identified man. At the camp, prisoners are alleged to have been shot and burned.

2695. Sports Centre at Višegrad: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is a report of a camp at the "sports centre" in Višegrad. As of October 1992, it was reported that 1,000 prisoners had been detained there and 1,630 killed.

2696. Local Stable: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Muslims are said to have been arrested by an identified man and held in the stable of a certain other identified man. They were arrested and brought to the stable on 24 June 1992, but
there is no indication as to how many were there or how long they stayed.

2697. Uramnica or Uzemnica Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Upon the initial attack of Višegrad, Muslims were ordered to gather at the Uramnica Barracks where they were held for three days. 4290/ The report does not give a precise date of their arrest, but it was near 17 April 1992. Their destination after Uramnica is unknown.

2698. Varda Electric Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) There was allegedly a camp at Varda, a place described both as a sawmill and a plant. 4291/ Over 1,000 people are estimated to have been killed there. In specific, seven people were reported killed on 11 June and 22 killed several days thereafter. 4292/

2699. Apparently, this camp was run by an identified paramilitary group. This group reportedly took Muslims to the plant, locked them in rooms, killed them, and then threw their bodies in the River Drina. 4293/ Two other men are also mentioned in connection with activities there. One was seen by a witness taking workers to the sawmill on 10 June 1992. 4294/ The other was known to take prisoners from Varda and have them killed at the "Old Bridge." 4295/

2700. Vilina Vlas Hotel: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International.) Vilina Vlas was one of the main detention facilities in Višegrad. It was located in a hotel/spa about seven kilometres south-east of Višegrad proper, on the way to Gorade. 4296/ This camp was established with the coming of the Ulce Corps in the end of April. 4297/ It held Muslim women for the purposes of rape, serving as a camp "brothel". Apparently, women detained here were picked up by police officers, members of the White Eagles and Arkan's and Šešelj's men. 4298/ Many of them were not yet 14 years old. 4299/

2701. Vilina Vlas was well-known as a camp which detained only young, beautiful women. One witness was told that the women brought to Vilina Vlas were chosen to bear "etnik" children. Hence, they were "selected" carefully and brought only here. 4300/ Another relates that Muslim women who had previously brought food or other supplies to the Green Berets paramilitary troops were also brought here. 4301/

2702. One detailed report outlines the arrests of several girls from Višegrad on 9 June 1992. These girls were arrested by an identified man active at many camps in this region and taken to the hotel. 4302/ One of them describes being interrogated and raped by this man. While in the room where she was raped, members of the White Eagles tried to get in to rape her as well, but the man would not let them. 4303/

2703. When the mothers of these and other girls reported their arrests to the Serbian Secretariat of International Affairs, they were simply told "the Turks also do nasty things to Serbian kids" and sent away. 4304/

2704. One witness offers a detailed description of her 24-hour stay at the hotel. At the time she was brought to Vilina Vlas, she was being detained at the fire station in Višegrad, but was taken here to be raped by a "etnik" known only by nickname. 4305/

2705. She describes the hotel as big, with a basement and two floors. Upon their arrival, the reception area was dark. The "etnik" got a key from an unidentified man at the reception area and brought the witness to the second floor. The hallway was large and ran to the left and right from the top of
the stairs. There were rooms everywhere with the doors open, so she could see that they were all occupied by women prisoners and "etniks". 4306/

2706. Once in a room, the witness was forced to take a cold shower as this man pointed a rifle at her. Then, he left her there to get a bottle of whiskey. He returned and raped her for two hours. 4307/ Afterward, she was raped by eight other men. 4308/

2707. According to this witness, the women detained at the hotel had sufficient food and drink because they were the "selected women" meant to later give birth to "etnik" babies. 4309/ She relates that during her stay, the women and men in the rooms were hugging and kissing. She suspects that the women behaved in this way because they had given up resisting the repeated rapes. 4310/

2708. Yet overall, reports of the treatment of women at the hotel are not good. The prisoners were raped repeatedly and beaten with batons. 4311/ One report alleges that some were even killed by suffocation in a system of gas pipes at the hotel. 4312/ Many sent there were never seen again. 4313/ Apparently, certain soldiers at the camp were taking revenge for dead Serbs at EPA. 4314/

2709. One report describes the fate of 200 girls brought to the camp. Of them, five committed suicide by jumping from a balcony at the hotel, six others escaped and the rest were killed after multiple rapes. 4315/

2710. Once this camp became well-known it was moved. 4316/ There are no details as to when this move took place or to where the camp relocated.

2711. Twelve people are named in connection with activities at the camp. 4317/ "etniks" from Prevelo were also said to be there. 4318/ 2712. There is also a report about an unnamed soldier. 4319/ 2713. Zamjenica Garrison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A camp at the former Zamjenica Garrison was established after the Uice troops entered Visegrad. 4320/

2714. elimir Djuri eljo Primary School at Prelovo: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is alleged to have been a camp at this primary school. 4321/ This may be the same camp described above as Prelovo Camp.

2715. Private homes in Visegrad: (The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There are two reports that Muslims were also held in private homes and apartments in Visegrad for varying lengths of time, but there is no information about where these homes were located. 4322/

2716. The ICRC reports visiting one camp in the region, but it is not clear which of the above-mentioned camps it was. Representatives visited "Visegrad camp" on three occasions: 12 June, 15 June, and 2 July 1992. On 12 June, they reported the detention of 58 prisoners at this camp; on 12 June, they reported 20, and on 2 July, they also reported 20 prisoners. 4323/

2717. A number of people are alleged to have participated in an ethnic cleansing campaign in Visegrad. 4324/
86. **Visoko**

2718. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census the municipality of Visoko contained 46,130 individuals. Of that number 74.5 per cent were Muslims, 16 per cent were Serbs, 4.3 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 5.2 per cent were described as "others".

2719. There are several reports which allege the existence of a camp or camps in Visoko. 4325/

2720. **Ahmed Fetahovi Military Barracks:** (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) In early June 1992, the Visoko area came under attack by Serb forces. The existence of a detention facility at the local barracks was, however, not controlled by the aggressing Serb forces. 4326/

2721. In one report, a Serb recalls being the first, and for a short time, the only prisoner detained by Muslims at the local barracks. 4327/ According to the report, the Serb male was captured in the basement of his home by Muslim forces on 6 June 1992. 4328/ He was taken to the military barracks and placed in a chair with his arms tied behind his back with ropes. He was reportedly beaten and interrogated by soldiers and police for four hours. 4329/ According to his statement, whenever he lost consciousness, the police threw water on him to revive him and then continued the interrogation. 4330/

2722. He recalled that after some time, the inmate population grew to 150 individuals—all of whom were detained in two rooms. 4331/ The witness recalled watching as two inmates were beaten to death by the camp guards with the participation of the camp commander. 4332/ The report suggests that in addition to camp guards administering beatings, Muslim civilians from Zenica and Visoko were also permitted to enter the barracks and beat the prisoners. 4333/  

2723. According to another report, on the first day of the conflict, six individuals were detained at this facility. Approximately three weeks after the fighting began, the facility's population swelled to more than 150 individuals. 4334/ Interrogations were initially severe and disorganized. Following the appointment of an investigator, the physical mistreatment was discontinued and the general conditions at the facility improved. 4335/ All interrogations were conducted in the office of the investigator. Those inmates who were deemed guilty of some crime were transferred to Zenica while the others continued their detention in Visoko. 4336/ One witness described his containment facility as one measuring approximately 70 square metres. There were some 150 other inmates sharing the same space. 4337/ The detainees were put on work detail and used as forced labour to dig trenches around the facility. The report suggests that women were detained at other area facilities including a camp in the village of Hlapevii. 4338/

2724. The report suggests that at some point, the camp was hit by rocket-fire. 4339/ Purportedly the shelling of the camp was a "provoked response from the Serbian" forces because Muslim forces were using the roof of the barracks in tactical manoeuvres. Two inmates were reportedly killed as a result. 4340/

2725. **Kasarna Camp:** (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, between May and December 1992, Serb men, women and children were taken from their homes by Muslim forces and detained in what was reportedly described as a prison camp. 4341/ The inmates were subjected to severe physical mistreatment including beatings with mallets, hammers, iron rods, and ax handles. 4342/ The inmates were reportedly not permitted to bathe or shower for two months. Food was also in rather meagre supply. Two to three inmates were forced to share one bowl of soup per
day. 4343/

2726. The report alleges, additionally, that at one point Muslim territorial defence forces had shelled the camp, resulting in the death of two prisoners and the wounding of 14 others. 4344/

2727. Various Homes: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) According to one report, several Visoko residents were detained in their homes behind locked doors. The resident-inmates were subjected to regular shell-fire. 4345/ The report suggests that the residents' detention appears to have been sanctioned and, perhaps even, instituted by the BiH government. 4346/

2728. Veterinarian's Office: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a young Serb male and his parents were arrested and detained on 20 June after Muslim forces had surrounded their home. 4347/ They were collected in a group with some 200 similarly situated Serbs, and approximately 30 individuals from among the group (including the witness and his father) were taken to a veterinarian's office. 4348/

2729. The witness was aggressively interrogated and then shot through both arms. Following the receipt of his injuries, he was transported to the hospital and thereafter transferred to the former JNA barracks. 4349/

2730. Military/Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A source reported that he had heard from a friend that Serbs had tortured and killed 10 Muslims from the village of Vratnik, two kilometres from Visoko. In retaliation, many members of Serbian families were arrested and taken to a building in Visoko that was being used as a military and police station by the Bosnian army. The prisoners were kept in the cellars, some were tortured and subsequently died. 4350/

2731. Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the Visoko hospital. The ICRC reportedly first visited this facility on 4 June 1993. 4351/

2732. Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp in the Prison/Penitentiary in Visoko. The ICRC reportedly first visited a detention facility at this location on 6 August 1992. 4352/ No additional information was provided regarding the conditions at this location.

87. Vitez

2733. This municipality is located in central BiH, between Pucarevo and Busovaa counties. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the population of Vitez was 27,728; of which 45.7 per cent were Croats, 41.4 per cent were Muslims, 5.4 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 7.5 per cent were described as "others".

2734. Situated in the Lašva Valley, the city of Vitez is a Bosnian Croat stronghold where several detention facilities are located. In April 1993, Croat HVO forces in Vitez launched a coordinated attack on the Muslim villages and BiH Army forces around Vitez as well as on Old Vitez. Following the attacks, the Muslims in the Vitez area were forced to seek refuge in Old Vitez, Krušica (a village south of Vitez) and Busovaa. Consequently, and although little territory actually changed hands, Bosnian Croat forces have been able to establish political and military dominance in the Vitez area. 4353/ The stated
aim of the Bosnian Croat regime is to fully evict the Muslim population of this region. 4354/

2735. Reports suggest that several detention centres were established in the Vitez area. HVO forces are identified as the party in control of these facilities, though one report concerns a camp run by BiH forces. Very little information about these camps is available, although the reports demonstrate that the ECMM and the ICRC have been active in the area by arranging for prisoner releases and transfers as well as registering detainees. 4355/

2736. **HVO Brigade Headquarters**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) In April 1993, the ECMM visited a camp situated beneath the HVO Brigade headquarters in Vitez. The prison housed 62 Muslim men. 4356/

2737. **Dubravica Primary School**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the ECMM.) Several reports mention that persons have been detained at a school in Vitez. The first report, which does not identify the school, asserts that Muslim families were contained at this location however, that they were not held against their will. Although persons at the school were treated well, the report states that HVO soldiers entered the school on 3 May 1993 and threatened families in residence there. 4357/ The second report merely identifies the Dubravica primary school in Vitez as a place of detention. 4358/ It is uncertain whether the reports refer to the same school. The third report was issued by the IRCR following their visit to a school in Vitez on 28 April 1993. The report verifies the existence of such a facility but does not provide additional information about its operation or control. 4359/

2738. **Unidentified Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) In April 1993, the ECMM visited a prison, located south of Vitez, under the control of the BiH Army. 4360/ The report indicates that the prison consisted of at least two rooms. One room contained four women and two children, while a second room contained some eight men. 4361/

2739. **Cinema**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) Approximately 300 persons were reportedly held in a cinema in the area of Vitez. Additional information regarding operation and control was not provided. 4362/

2740. **Oil Station**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) According to one report, an oil station in the area of Vitez was used as a detention facility. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4363/

2741. **Chemical Factory**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) According to one report, the chemical factory in Vitez was used as a detention facility. 4364/

2742. According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a factory in Vitez. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 26 April 1992. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4365/
2743. Private House, Vitez: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility in a private home in Vitez. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 26 April 1992. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4366/

2744. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at the police station in Vitez. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 26 October 1992. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4367/

88. Vlasenica

2745. Vlasenica is located in eastern BiH. As of 1991, the municipality had a population of 33,817, of which 55.3 per cent were Muslim, 42.5 per cent were Serb, and 2.2 per cent were described as "other".

2746. The first Serbian troops entered Vlasenica on or near 17 April 1992. 4368/ These troops came from Novi Sad and were led by an unidentified lieutenant colonel. According to one Novi Sad soldier, these troops came because a telegram had been sent to them from the SDS in Vlasenica claiming that the Bosnian Muslims in the area had killed Bosnian Serbs. 4369/

2747. While there is no evidence to support or refute this claim, there are reports of increasing tension between Serbian and Muslim villagers prior to the Serbian occupation of the region. For example, during the months before April, the JNA held manoeuvres in the BiH town of Han Pijesak near Vlasenica, but only Serb soldiers were invited to take part. 4370/ Also, Serbs from outlying villages had started coming into the town of Vlasenica with rifles, getting drunk, and warning the Muslims that they would have to leave. 4371/

2748. Then in April, the troops from Novi Sad, aided by Serb forces from Vlasenica, Mišar, Donji Raji, Donji Zalukovi, Gornji Zalukovi, Milii, and Šekovii, occupied the region. 4372/ They immediately founded the "etniks' Headquarters of the Vlasenica Region" and put up Serbian flags in the villages. 4373/ All Muslim police officers were disarmed and expelled from the police station, and Muslim residents also required to give up their weapons. Tanks were installed in key positions and the bus station was fully guarded by Serb soldiers. 4374/

2749. While the troops from Novi Sad were in Vlasenica, Muslim villagers were arrested, beaten, and interrogated, and some arbitrarily killed, but witnesses nevertheless attest that everything remained relatively peaceful at this time. They assert that it was not until the departure of these troops on 2 May 1992 that conditions for the Muslims worsened considerably. 4375/

2750. Upon their departure, the Novi Sad troops left the bulk of their weapons with the local serb population who had helped them take over the region and transferred some 80,000 troops to them. 4376/ Then, this newly combined force took over the town. Soldiers established a Serbian military administration in every factory and institution. 4377/ They carried out more arrests, beatings, and interrogations at the police station. Most Muslims were immediately released although those believed to be "extremists" were detained for a longer period of time. 4378/
2751. During the month of May, these Serbs burned houses and looted property, particularly the property of Muslim SDA members. They are reported to have arrested, beat, and killed Muslims in the villages of Alihodija, Beroš, Damdija, Duraković, Drum, Demat, Esmi, Gradina, Kuljanija, Piskavice, Pustase, Sahmanovija, and Zlakopaa. In fact, one report describes the shooting of 11 unknown Muslims in the centre of Vlasenica. Apparently, the bodies were left in the street to rot as a warning to all other villagers of what was to come. 4379

2752. Many villagers thought to leave Vlasenica at this time and escaped to Kladanj, Tuzla, and other surrounding places. Yet, many were advised by Serbian authorities to go back to Vlasenica if they hoped to keep their jobs; some followed this counsel. 4381

2753. Then, in the beginning of June, the systematic eviction and execution of Muslims began. At this time, Serbian troops arrested villagers and took them to various detention facilities. As a basis for initially evacuating the village of Vlasenica, the soldiers told inhabitants that they were looking for a "very dangerous" Muslim. Then, soldiers came to village homes looking for this man and arrested and took away whoever lived there. 4383

2754. During this mass evacuation, Muslims believed to be politically influential were targeted by the Serbs. One report explains that on 15 June, 50 Muslims who were said to be "politically important" in Vlasenica were loaded onto a bus and driven to the village of Zlakavljë, approximately two kilometres away. There, a Serb opened fire on them, killing all but one. It is not clear how the one Muslim survived or where he/she is now located.

2755. Another report suggests that Muslim members of the SDA who were not immediately killed and instead brought to camps were the first to be tortured and killed. At Sušica for example, many members of the SDA had their legs and arms broken and had crosses cut into their bodies with knives. 4384

2756. By 20 June, no one could leave the region. From this time until mid-September 1992, Serbian troops carried out an aggressive "ethnic cleansing" campaign. One report states that it was the President of the SDS Party of Vlasenica, who was in charge of this campaign. Six others were alleged to be highly involved. 4387

2757. During the "ethnic cleansing", eight Serb-run detention facilities were established. They are as follows: a former chicken farm in Sesari, the high school centre in Vlasenica, the hospital at Vlasenica, Milli camp, the primary school at Cerska, the primary school at Vlasenica, Sušica Camp, and Vlasenica Camp. Muslims from the Vlasenica and the surrounding region were held in these facilities. 4389

2758. There is also an allegation that Muslim-run camps existed in this region as well.

2759. Former Chicken Farm in Sesari: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is a report of a camp at an ex-chicken farm in the village of Sesari. 4390

2760. High School Centre in Vlasenica: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is a report of a camp at the high school centre in Vlasenica. 4391
2761. Hospital at Vlasenica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives visited a camp at the hospital in Vlasenica on 21 October 1992. They recorded one prisoner at the camp at this time. 4393/

2762. Milii Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the ICRC, there is a Serbian-run camp in the village of Milii. Representatives visited this camp on 10 June 1993 and found two prisoners. 4394/

2763. Primary School at Cerska: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One eye-witness alleges that 300 villagers from Vlasenica were detained in the primary school at Cerska, and that a large number of them were killed. 4395/ Another report claims that women and children prisoners from Sušica Camp were transferred there.

2764. The ICRC visited the school on 20 October 1992 and reported seeing no prisoners. 4396/

2765. In early February 1993, the school is said to have been shelled with the remaining prisoners in it. Ten of the prisoners were killed immediately; 50 were injured. Those who tried to run to shelter were shelled again. It is reported that medical supplies were extremely limited in caring for the wounded, and it is not known how many survived. 4397/

2766. Primary School at Vlasenica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the United Kingdom.) There is a report of a camp at the primary school in Vlasenica. Muslims from as far as Brko and Bratunac were taken to this camp. 4398/

2767. Sušica Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the New York Times, US Government, an official UN source and the United Kingdom.) Sušica was the main detention facility in the Vlasenica area. It is reported to have held a few thousand prisoners--men, women, and children--from Vlasenica and the surrounding villages. 4399/

2768. Sušica was a former military depot located several hundred metres from the main street of Vlasenica. 4400/ It was situated on the west side of the highway leading to Han Pijesak. 4401/ It consisted of two warehouses and one small building within an area 50 metres wide by 100 metres long. Apparently, the two warehouses had been formerly used for military ammunition storage by the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 4402/

2769. An ex-guard, alleges that in early May 1992 he was told by a Captain to prepare to work in a prison camp. 4403/ During the rest of the month, the large hangar at the military depot was emptied and the camp surrounded with thick coils of barbed wire. He states, "15 of us were chosen as guards. We were all over 30; they wanted people with experience. The alternative was to be shot, or sent to the front line." 4404/

2770. It is estimated that the camp opened up sometime in the end of May. 4405/ One of the early prisoner groups to arrive at Sušica came on 2 June 1992. A witness from this group was arrested by two Serbs. 4406/ Another group of about 50 Vlasenica villagers were also sent to Sušica prison early on. Their homes were set afire by the Serbs, and they were made to walk to the camp. 4407/

2771. All of the prisoners at the camp were kept together in one warehouse. This warehouse was seven metres wide by 15 metres long and had a cement floor. At full capacity, it is reported to have held an estimated 560 prisoners. Yet,
witnesses attest that there were at least 600 to 700 people in the hangar at a time. The men were on one side and the women on the other.

2772. Food was virtually non-existent at the camp. Each prisoner was given only one slice of bread per 24 hour period. As the summer progressed, soup was occasionally given in addition to bread, but prisoners still commonly lost consciousness as a result of malnutrition.

2773. Prisoners who had to use the bathroom were made to run to a toilet outside the warehouse in the corner of the fenced area. In such a case, other prisoners were given sticks and forced to beat the individual while they were defecating or urinating. The prisoners were not allowed to wash, and in the summer the smell is said to have been "overwhelming".

2774. Prisoners were also beaten with timber and iron rods and slashed with knives at the camp. Men were regularly stripped to the waist and beaten. One ex-prisoner relates that he and others were called "Balija" and forced to sing Serbian songs. He states that he was beaten three and four times a day. Others were even beaten to death. One such victim died in the hangar on or near 15 June 1992. Another older man who was believed by guards to have hidden weapons in Vlasenica was also beaten to death shortly thereafter. Apparently, a dead body would sometimes lie in the hangar for hours before the guards took it away.

2775. According to witnesses, executions took place regularly at Sušica Camp. Usually, about eight men were taken away from the warehouse at a time. Shortly afterward, people inside the building would hear shooting. The men would never return.

2776. Several surviving prisoners offer detailed descriptions of the killings and other activities at the camp. One such prisoner was brought to Sušica on 22 June 1992. Upon his arrival, two men from his group died from the beatings they had sustained upon their initial arrest. Then, on 26 June, more prisoners were killed. At 1:00 a.m., two guards, entered the warehouse and forced four men outside. Immediately, thereafter four gunshots and screaming were heard just outside the structure.

2777. At 1:30 a.m., two brothers, went into the warehouse and took three women to be raped. The women returned later that morning, crying and tired. They related what had happened to them to the others.

2778. At 2:00 a.m., guards entered the warehouse again and told everyone to close the windows because four prisoners had tried to escape. These prisoners were killed, and in the early morning two other prisoners were selected to dispose of their corpses. They buried them in a mass grave near the camp.

2779. To get to this grave site, they apparently turned left onto the dirt access road that ran next to the camp, and led to Highway 19, crossed a concrete bridge and then turned right onto another dirt road that led to the villages of Luke and Zalakavlje. The bodies were buried among some evergreen trees 200 metres from the beginning of the road and 10 metres off to the left in the direction of Luke/Zalakavlje.

2780. One witness alleges that during her three-day stay sometime in June, 15 to 20 men were taken out a night and killed. The guards carrying out the killings often seemed drunk. They would enter the hangar at night and simply point to people to be taken out. There did not seem to be any system to their killing. She also alleges that there were bulldozers at the camp which were used to bury the dead.
2781. Another ex-prisoner held at Sušica between 5 July and 12 July explains that during her detention more people kept coming to the camp everyday, and room had to be made for them either by the removal of women and children to Kladanj or through the nightly executions of men. As a result, the Serbs would draw up lists of prisoners to be killed and those to be let go. One witness alleges that there were lists of old men, women, and children who were allowed to leave as long as they left their valuables.

2782. According to another witness who arrived on 10 July, there were a lot of killings and mass executions early on at the camp, but these became less frequent after she came. She learned about the high level of earlier killings from the other prisoners.

2783. Still more information about the camp comes from an ex-guard. He has related details of the activities which occurred at Sušica to international organizations and the Western media. An ex-guard was a sergeant in the JNA in the 1970s and joined the Bosnian Serb forces when the BiH war broke out. He said he deserted the Bosnian Serb army and fled Vlasenica on 1 January 1993.

2784. He claims that the confinement of Muslims in the area was instigated by the JNA of Novi Sad, and that the ultimate command of the Sušica Camp rested throughout its existence with an officer in the JNA, Major Mila Jaimović. An ex-guard states about the activities at Sušica, "There is no question that the orders came from the highest level. . . . Our army had a strict chain of command from the outset, and Major Jaimović received order from above."

2785. According to him, the camp opened on 2 June 1992 and closed four months later. During this entire time, Muslims were executed every night at the command of Dragan Nikolić, a man who now works for the Bosnian Serb secret police and was in charge of the day-to-day running of the camp. He estimates that he personally witnessed the execution of close to 3,000 Muslims from Vlasenica at the Sušica Camp and watched thousands more pass through it. He states that all of the prisoners at the camp were civilians taken from their homes.

2786. An ex-guard describes how the "selection process" for killing and transfer worked at the camp. Apparently, men suspected of having some political influence or trafficking in arms were not taken for exchange and were generally executed; others were exchanged and held for transfer to Batković camp.

2787. Despite these general guidelines, the "selection process" was often much more random than planned. Sometimes, one brother of a family was executed while another was transferred for exchange. In short, prisoners had no guarantee that they would stay alive.

2788. An ex-guard reports that the small-scale executions took place on the camp grounds. Male prisoners were generally lined up against an electricity pylon just outside the barracks and shot. The larger ones were carried out at a nearby ravine called Han Ploa on the road south toward Han Pijesak. Men were loaded into the back of a truck, taken up to the edge of the ravine about five miles away, and then shot as they got out of the vehicle. Apparently, groups of young soldiers were brought in to perform the executions. The bodies fell into the ravine and bulldozers were later used to cover them up.

2789. An ex-guard personally witnessed the mass execution of 25 people at the ravine. He claims that on this occasion one of the prisoners got away by running to the woods once he got out of the truck. In all, at least 1,000 prisoners were executed at the ravine. At first, the killings took place during the day but later were carried out only at night.
2790. Other burials of prisoners from Sušica are said to have taken place on a waste land at the "Alpro" Aluminum Factory. 4441/

2791. Sušica Camp was run by both a military and administrative commander. The military commander was Captain Dragan Nikoli from Vlasenica. He was a 30 year old former employee of the Alpro Aluminum Factory. 4442/ He was seen on numerous occasions beating prisoners with police sticks and kicking them with his boots. Commonly, he forced prisoners to sit on their knees facing the wall while he kicked the ribs under their armpits. 4443/ Another witness reports that Nikolic came into the warehouse at Sušica each night throughout the summer of 1992 and read out a list of names of men to be taken outside and shot. 4444/

2792. When asked about the motives of Dragan Nikoli, An ex-guard suggests that he was "inebriated by Serbian nationalist propaganda and was making a lot of money from his victims". 4445/

2793. The administrative commander of Sušica was a retired policeman. 4446/ The deputy administrative commander was also a retired police officer. 4447/

2794. Apparently, the guards worked directly under the supervision of the military camp commander. There were two groups of 10 guards, each of which alternated 24 shifts. Six of these guards, all from Vlasenica, were identified. 4448/

2795. An ex-guard also explains the pattern of prisoner transfers. According to him, many male prisoners were transferred to the Batkovi camp near Bijeljina. 4449/ Prisoners from Sušica are said to have moved to Batkovi to replace Brkó prisoners. 4450/ Likewise, prisoners also went from Batkovi prison to Vlasenica. One report states that 44 prisoners were "shared out" as workers from Batkovi prison to Vlasenica. 4451/ Another relates that the "remaining prisoners" at Batkovi, about 40, were sent to Vlasenica after October 1992. 4452/ It is not clear whether these reports are referring to the same group.

2796. Sušica was generally a transit camp for women and children, but some were also executed there along with the men. Usually, they were taken on to Cerska or allowed to go to Kladanj. 4453/ On the occasions that they would be allowed to go to Kladanj, they would be taken up to the front line a few miles to the west of the camp and forced to walk there. 4454/

2797. One report also claims that women and children were taken to Pelemis. 4455/ On 10 August, for example, a group of 43 men, women, and children were taken from Sušica camp. They were told they would be taken to Tuzla for exchange, but were brought to Pelemis instead. 4456/ One female witness was part of this group, but reports that about four-fifths of the other women were left behind. 4457/ Supposedly, the Serbs moved prisoners often in order to confuse the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations in assessing the camps. 4458/

2798. By the end of September, there were no Muslims left in the area and little evidence of what they had suffered. 4459/ Apparently, the camp is closed today; the road to it is barred and guarded, and a sign at the entrance to Vlasenica reads, "Any loitering by foreigners is forbidden". 4460/

2799. Sometime in July 1992, the UN apparently arranged a visit to Sušica Camp, but the prisoners were taken into the woods and forced to lie down for three hours until the UN had left. A French Red Cross team turned up at the camp unexpectedly, and a young Muslim boy in the camp who could speak French told them that it was a detention facility. The Red Cross did not do anything and shortly thereafter the boy was killed. 4461/ The ICRC made an official visit to the camp again on 21 October 1992 and found no prisoners. 4462/
2800. Sources state that the camp was officially closed on 1 or 2 November 1992, and all remaining prisoners were transferred to Bijeljina camp or Batković camp. 4463/

2801. **Vlasenica camp**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to the ICRC and UN sources, there is a certain Vlasenica Camp in the region. 4464/ ICRC representatives visited the camp on 21 October 1992 and recorded one prisoner to be there. 4465/

2802. A Serbian response to the events in Vlasenica comes from Mihajlo Bajagić, the Serbian president of the Vlasenica town council. When asked about the whereabouts of the inhabitants from the region, he states that they left the village on their own accord. He agrees that for a period of time some were imprisoned, but that all of these civilians were later exchanged. 4466/ 2803. Several reports identify perpetrators said to be involved in activities at these camps and in the region on the whole. 4467/

2804. **Police Station, Vlasenica**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at the police station in Vlasenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 15 May 1992. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4468/

2805. **Prison/Penitentiary, Vlasenica**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at the local prison in Vlasenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 29 April 1993. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4469/

2806. **Factory**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at an unidentified factory in Vlasenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 27 July 1993. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4470/

2807. **Muslim-run camps holding Serbs**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There are also allegations of Muslim-run camps in the region. These allegations come from Budimir Kosti, the head of a war crimes commission established by the Yugoslav government. When asked about events taking place in eastern Bosnia, Kosti argued that Serbs had also been imprisoned by Muslims. He insisted that Muslims "initiated whatever happened in Vlasenica by provoking and attacking the Serbs in the first three months of 1992 in several villages in eastern Bosnia." 4471/

89. **Zenica**

2808. Zenica is a Muslim-held city in central BiH and is located 70 kilometres (45 miles) north-west of Sarajevo. Before the war, the city was a centre for steel production and was a prime example of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism. 4472/ According to a 1991 census, Zenica had a pre-war population of 145,577. It has always had a clear Muslim majority (approximately 55.2 per
cent before the war) but Croats and Serbs formed a significant part of the pre-war population (15.6 per cent and 15.5 per cent, respectively). 4473/

2809. Since the outbreak of war, the city has swelled with refugees. It is estimated that approximately 50,000 refugees, the overwhelming majority being Muslim, have fled to Zenica. 4474/ In September 1993, according to the Mayor of Zenica, the city had a population of approximately 197,000, 4475/ although estimates of the city's current population hover around 135,000-145,000.

2810. The city is currently held by BiH Government forces and is considered a safe haven for Muslim refugees. Muslims now form a much higher percentage of the populations, but the local government is still comprised of Muslim's, Croats, and Serbs. 4476/ According to the mayor, there have been no organized expulsions of Serbs and Croats from Zenica. This statement belies the fact that Muslims now comprise a far greater majority of Zenica's population. In addition, he claims that there are no camps in the area; POWs are kept at the Zenica Prison. 4477/

2811. It was reported that on 1 January 1993, Muslim forces launched an attack on the Croats in the Zenica region. Croats living in the area were expelled and Muslims reportedly moved into their homes. On 18 April 1993, an overall assault was launched by the BiH Army against Croatian HVO forces, signalling an end to a loose Muslim-Croat alliance in the region. A battle persisted in the small villages in Zenica commune until 8 June 1993 when Muslim forces took control. It is reported that, as a result, 520 members of the Croat defence forces laid down their arms and were taken prisoner. These combatants were supposedly taken to the Zenica Prison. 4478/

2812. Croats were forced to leave the area. Many Croats who did not cooperate with the mobilization order were "tried" and sent either to battle or to the camps. Seventy of these persons were sent to the Zenica Prison and another 15 were sent to the music school in the centre of Zenica. 4479/

2813. It is reported that several camps or detention facilities are located in the Zenica vicinity. In general, the camps are administered by the BiH Government or Bosnian Muslim forces. Nine locations have been identified as detention centres, and estimates place the total number of persons held over 2,000; although ICRC figures are much lower and some reports claim that there are only five or six detention centres with approximately 450 detainees. 4480/ All identified detention centres are reportedly under Bosnian Muslim control. The following places have been identified as camps: The Zenica Prison, the Zenica Music School, the Bila Stadium, the Coal Mines in Zenica, as well as unidentified facilities in Bilmiše, Zening, Graanica, Arnauti, and Begov Han.

2814. There is no information regarding the possible relationship between these camps and there is little indication that prisoners are moved between facilities. One thing that is clear, however, is that the Zenica Prison is the largest detention facility and the greatest amount of available information concerns this facility. In fact, in tracking the number of prisoners in Zenica, the Zenica Prison is the only facility identified by the ICRC.

2815. Zenica Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including an official UN source, the US Government and the ICRC.) The most prominent detention facility in the Zenica area is the Zenica Prison (also referred to as the Correction Centre, KP Dom Prison, KPD and the House of Corrections). The facility is under the control of the Muslim Territorial Defence (MTD) forces. The prison is occupied by Croatian and Serbian civilian and military prisoners. The majority of prisoners are likely Serbs.

2816. The prison is divided into five pavilions. Each of these pavilions
contains cells measuring five metres by three to four metres. Pavilion five is referred to as the "concentration camp" is used to hold military prisoners and is seemingly the only part of the facility that is visited by the ICRC. The prison also has a hospital where prisoners are treated. Some prisoners claim to have been subjected to "ill treatment" by prison guards while in the hospital.

2817. Prior to the outbreak of war, this facility was used as a maximum security prison for hard core felons. Even during the war, one of the prisons pavilions (Pavilion four) continues to house criminals that were incarcerated before the war.

2818. Reports in the Commission's possession indicate that the camp was in operation before the war began as a correctional facility. The prison probably began its operations as a POW facility in June 1992. Operation seems to have been continuous until at least June 1993; one witness reports that he was released from this facility, in a prisoner exchange on 5 September 1993. It is unclear whether the camp is still in operation.

2819. The reports do not indicate the reason for the camp's existence. There are no reports that the facility was used for the purposes of interrogation, systematic torture or execution of any sort. Interestingly, however, one report states that a "military"-style tribunal is housed at the Prison. This tribunal is mainly concerned with determining if prisoners are military or civilian. There is a judge (a Serbian woman who is a professional judge) and a jury. The tribunal applies Yugoslavian law.

2820. Reports indicate that the Zenica Prison has been used to detain both Serbs and Croats. Serbian authorities estimate that 2,000 Bosnian Serbs are detained at the facility. A reporter for the Tanjug news agency estimated that in the fall of 1992 there were 300 Bosnian Serb prisoners (both combatants and non-combatants) who remained in the facility. These prisoners were both combatants and non-combatants; although he estimated that only 20 or so were soldiers. Some reports indicate that many Croats were also sent to this facility as a result of an outbreak of hostilities between Croats and Muslims in early 1993. One account claims that 520 members of the Croatian Defence Forces were sent to the prison in April 1993. This same report states that 70 Croats are being detained in the Zenica Prison. The ECMM estimates that more than 200 Croats (both military and civilian) are held in the prison.

2821. Estimates of the number of prisoners vary greatly. The ICRC has indicated a fairly consistent population of 200-300 in the prison. But one report states that while the ICRC visited the facility seven times from June-December 1992, the ICRC was only permitted to visit Pavilion 5 (where military prisoners were kept). It has also been estimated that 300 Bosnian Serbs have been detained in Pavilion 5. This figure is consistent with claims that the ICRC was only allowed to visit Pavilion 5. Most of the other prisoners, mainly the civilian non-combatants were in the other pavilions. The number of prisoners in the Zenica Prison can be summarized as follows.

2822. On 31 July 1993, Bosnian Serb officials maintained that 270 Serbians were being held in the "Zenica Special Jail". It is assumed that this is the same facility as the Zenica Prison discussed herein. Prisoners in the camp are both civilian and military. According to one report, after a group of Serbians was captured, women and children under 10 were not taken to the prison. It is not at all clear whether women and children are detained at this facility. No explicit mention is made of a female detainee.

2823. A Tanjug news agency reporter who was confined in the prison for 80 days reported that the camp conditions were horrible. Cells were generally damp and
there was a lack of sheets and blankets. He also noted that the food was
poor. 4492/ Prisoners are given one kilogram of bread every day to be shared by
18 prisoners. Some days the prisoners were given tea, and it is alleged that the
guards would put detergent in the tea. 4493/

2824. Torture and beatings were routine occurrences at the Zenica Prison.
According to a Tanjug news agency reporter who was detained there for over 80
days, almost all of the prisoners (90 per cent) were subjected to torture. He
asserts that combatants were subjected to the worst beatings. 4494/ According
to another report, every other day, two or three prisoners would be taken by
groups of five to six Muslim men. The men were typically young and were often
drunk. The prisoners were handcuffed to metal rings on the floor and were then
beaten and kicked. 4495/ A United States Department of State report contains the
allegation of a 29 year old Serbian civilian who claims to have been beaten every
10 minutes for 96 hours; he also claims that the food was deliberately
contaminated. 4496/

2825. Additional allegations concern mistreatment in the Prison hospital
committed by guards. 4497/ Finally, it has been alleged that an unconfirmed
number of Serbian prisoners were taken from the prison to an iron mill factory.
These prisoners were allegedly thrown into the furnace at the factory. 4498/

2826. Very little information is available regarding the individuals who ran the
camp and committed violations. The commander of the prison is a named man of the
MTD. He is not alleged to have taken part in any beatings or torture, but he was
often present and a witness to the beatings. It is also alleged that Muslim
refugees in Zenica (from Jajce or Travnik) would come to the prison and verbally
harass and physically assault Serbian prisoners. 4499/

2827. Zenica Music School: (The existence of this detention facility has been
corroborated by a multiple sources, including an official UN source, the ICRC and
the ECMM.) The only other camp in the Zenica area that has been the subject of
detailed allegations is the music school in the centre of the city. 4500/ Like
the Zenica Prison, this facility is under the control of Muslim forces. The
music school is believed to be controlled by the MOS, a branch of the Muslim 7
Brigade. This facility has been used to hold Croatians.

2828. The only detailed description of the facility comes from a Croatian man,
"Mr. X". 4501/ He was arrested by military police and taken to the music school.
When he arrived there, he was not registered but he was assigned a personal
number.

2829. He identified three areas of the music school where he was detained. He
identified two places where he was primarily held: 1) the cellar of the building
(held 45 days without any light); and 2) the attic of the building (12 to 15
days). In addition to these places, he was interrogated and beaten for hours at
a time on the third floor of the building.

2830. Based on the testimony of this witness, the camp operated between, at
least, April 1993 and June 1993. 4502/ It is unclear whether the camp is still
in operation.

2831. No information suggests that women were held at this facility. In
addition, there is no indication that persons other than Croats were held at the
music school. Three reports suggest a total number of detainees. First, in his
statement, Mr. X states that he was in contact with 46 prisoners. He does not
specify if all of the prisoners were Croats. Second, a document from the Zenica
Centre for Research (dated August 1993 to September 1993) asserts that 15 Croats
were detained in the music school. Third, the Croatian Information Centre claims
that 1,500 Croatian civilians are held in the music school.
2832. Mr. X reported that he was detained in a room without light for 45 days and that the military police in control of the facility played music at all hours so that the prisoners could not sleep. He was not given water for bathing for 25 days. Lastly, Mr. X was not fed during his first week of detention. A Croatian Catholic Priest in Zenica has indicated that food distribution was unable to reach Croatian detainees in the music school. 4503/

2833. Beatings and torture were reportedly also regular occurrences at the music school. According to Mr. X he was often beaten (with shovel handles, police batons and phone cables) and tortured during interrogation. Moreover, he and other prisoners were frequently removed from the cellar at night so that soldiers returning from the front could kick them and beat them with rifle butts. No information was made available with regard to who the individual in command of this camp or those responsible for violations.

2834. Bila Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Association of Serbs from BiH has identified the Bila Stadium as a camp for Serbs. They claim the camp is under the control of the Croatian Armed Forces, the Croatian Army, or paramilitary Muslim forces. 4504/ No other information is available concerning this facility.

2835. Zenica Coal Mines: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by neutral source, namely the ECMM.) One report states that POWs were moved from Bugojno to Zenica where they are imprisoned in coal mines. 4505/ No other information is available concerning this facility.

2836. Other Zenica Locations: (The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Other locations in the Zenica area have been identified as places of detention. Apart from this mere identification, no other information is available. The locations are Bilišće, Zening, Graanica, Arnauti and Begov Han; 4506/ the retirement home in Zenica; 4507/ and the Zening Building and Nemanlie are both identified as "possible" locations. 4508/

2837. Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at an unidentified factory in Zenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 24 September 1992. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4509/

2838. Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at an unidentified hospital in Zenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 26 April 1993. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4510/

2839. School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at an unidentified school in Zenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 16 May 1993. No additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4511/

2840. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one report, ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at the military prison in Zenica. The existence of the camp was confirmed on 18 February 1993. No
additional information was made available regarding the identities of inmates, the conditions of their detainment nor the length of the facility's existence. 4512/

90. Žepče

2841. This municipality is located in central BiH, between the counties of Zenica and Tesli. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the municipality of Žepče had a population of 22,840. Of that number, 47.2 per cent were Muslim, 10 per cent were Serbs, 39.8 per cent were Croats, and the remaining 3 per cent were described as "others".

2842. Žepče Warehouse: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) In Žepče, HVO assembled all civilians and took them to a warehouse called Nova Trgovina. 4513/

2843. The men of military age were separated from the other detainees and sent to a school. The remaining detainees spent a week in the warehouse. Approximately 1,200 detainees had no food for two days, no toilet and slept on the concrete floor. The HVO soldiers did not mistreat the detainees, however, on occasion the soldiers would fire their guns over the heads of the detainees. 4514/ When released, the detainees were ordered to walk to Zenica. 4515/

2844. Žepče School: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely an official UN source.) Muslim men who were separated from the other detainees at the Žepče Warehouse were taken to a local school. 4516/

2845. The detainees in uniform were beaten by the HVO soldiers. The other detainees were also mistreated. Many of them were reported to have been forced to dig trenches on the front. 4517/

2846. Later, the detainees were reportedly taken to Tesli, Doboj, and Banja Luka. 4518/

91. Zvornik

2847. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the municipality of Zvornik had a population of 81,111. Of that number, 59.4 per cent or 48,208 were Muslim, and 38 per cent or 30,839 were Serbs, .1 per cent were Croats and the remaining 2.5 per cent were described as "others". The population of the city of Zvornik was 14,660. Of that number, 61 percent were Muslim, 29 per cent were Serb, 5 per cent were Croat, and 9.3 per cent described themselves as "other". 4519/

2848. Zvornik is a strategically important border town. It is located on the Drina river in BiH and situated directly across from Serbia. 4520/ BiH and Serbia are linked at Zvornik by two bridges, a road bridge and a railroad bridge. Control of Zvornik meant securing important logistical territory between Serbia and Sarajevo. 4521/

2849. The military attack on Zvornik commenced on 8 April 1992. According to witnesses, photographs and other sources, the attack was carried out from both BiH and Serbian territories. 4522/ Despite negotiations which went underway almost immediately between officials in Serbia and BiH, efforts to thwart further aggression were unsuccessful.

2850. Military operations focused first on the medieval fortress town of Kulagrad. After the fall of Kulagrad on 26 April 1992, the town of Divi• was
attacked. Divi• was almost exclusively inhabited by Muslims. The attacks on Divi• were also conducted from both sides of the Drina river. 4523/

2851. After the fall of Kulagrad, Serb forces began to reform the local administration. 4524/ Reportedly efforts were simultaneously put in place to rid the area of its Muslim citizenry. 4525/ Muslims were required to register with the new local administration. 4526/

2852. Thereafter, forced deportations began as well as compulsory transfers of property. 4527/ Muslims were issued identification cards and documentation permitting them to relocate as part of a process called compulsory assignments. 4528/ The Muslim citizens of Zvornik were bused to locations as close as Mali Zvornik--across the river, and as far away as Subotica--which is located at the Serbian-Hungarian border. 4529/

2853. On 19 May 1992, combined JNA, Serb paramilitary, and Arkan's forces occupied Zvornik and Mali Zvornik. They reportedly abused and killed some 1,000 Muslims. 4530/ The remaining Muslims and non-Serbs were relegated to concentration camps and detention facilities throughout the area.

2854. To date some 28 detention facilities have been identified in the Zvornik area: nine in the city of Zvornik, seven in the village of Karakaj, two in the village of •elopek, two in Drinja•a, two in Divi•, and one each in the villages of Pilice, Caparde, Baljkovica, Salihovi•i, Liplje, and Novo Selo. 4531/

2855. Stadium in Zvornik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Austrian Mission.) Following the outbreak of fighting in Bijeljina, Serb forces moved south into the villages of Karakaj and Divi•. Thereafter the largely Muslim population of Divi• on the bank of the Drina was prepared by the controlling Serb forces for mass deportation. 4532/

2856. The women and children were sent to free territories and the men were taken by buses to different villages and towns in the occupied territories to be exchanged for captured Serb soldiers. 4533/ The men were eventually detained in the Zvornik city stadium for several days, during which time they were subjected to severe physical mistreatment. Reportedly those who survived at this location were later taken to detention facilities in Karakaj. 4534/ There are other reports that refers to a camp in the Stadium "Bratstvo" in Zvornik. 4535/ It is unclear if this is the same stadium.

2857. Kindergarten: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) According to one report, a Muslim man was arrested by Serb police on 14 May 1992 and taken to a kindergarten on the western side of Zvornik. 4536/ He stated that one of his Serb captors beat him with a stick for an hour, while another pointed a gun at him and a third rifled through his documents. The three perpetrators wore white belts and camouflage fatigues. They were reportedly from Serbia. 4537/

2858. Courthouse: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) According to one report, although several individuals were detained at the courthouse facility, the guards at this location in Zvornik did not molest or mistreat the inmates. The report did suggest, however, that several soldiers from outside the facility were permitted entry to the facility and allowed to beat the inmates at random. 4538/ Victims were reportedly selected quickly, beaten and kicked--sometimes to the point of unconsciousness. The inmates were transferred to a neighbouring house on 4 June. 4539/ This camp is also referred to in another report. 4540/
2859. **Unknown House in Zvornik**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) On 4 June the prisoners from the courthouse location and an additional 120 other Muslim inmates from the •elopek cultural centre were transferred to a detention facility at this undisclosed location. 4541/ Reportedly beatings occurred daily and were quite severe. The information suggests that members of Šešelj's unit participated in abusing several Muslim men at this facility over a period of some six weeks of detention. 4542/ A group of Bosnian Serb "police" also participated in the prisoner mistreatment and abuse. Reportedly on 15 July, most of the inmates were transferred to a detention facility in Batkovi near Bijeljina. 4543/

2860. **Central Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Committee for Refugees.) This was reportedly an old prison and by one account, did not even have a name. It is reportedly located near the Novi Izvor company. 4544/

2861. One ex-detainee stated that he was among 174 men detained at the stadium facility who were made to walk to the old prison. Upon arrival, the detainees were offered the chance to join forces with the Serbs. They were then taken into one large room on the second floor of the facility. 4545/ He recalled seeing some 200 prisoners detained in a room on the first floor. He and the others were held at this facility for two days. Eleven of the men were separated and reportedly sent on work detail and the remaining 163 were transferred to a theater in •elopek. 4546/

2862. According to a Bosnian Muslim man, he and 183 other Muslims were detained at the central prison on 29 June 1992. 4547/ The prisoners were beaten daily. Reportedly every two to three hours, Serb guards entered the cells and removed as many as 10 inmates at a time for interrogation. The report suggest that throughout the interrogation the inmates were physically abused by four or five guards at a time. 4548/

2863. The guards reportedly extracted several inmates and subjected them to mistreatment--beating them with rifle butts, axes, or shovel handles. 4549/ Those inmates who did not return were believed to have died as a result of the beatings. The reports suggest the existence of a systematic prisoner transfer program. Routinely, the arrival of new prisoners resulted in the transferral of an equal number of resident detainees to the Batkovi facility. 4550/

2864. **Hotel Drina**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights.) This hotel reportedly served as one of the quarters for the police. Allegedly various acts of mistreatment and abuse were reported to have occurred here. 4551/ Sources are silent as to the duration of its existence, the length of the inmates internment as well as the conditions or treatment of those detained here.

2865. **Hospital "5th of July"**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights.) Reportedly Arkan held all of the patients at this hospital hostage in mid-April 1992. 4552/ He reportedly did so with the intention of retrieving the remains of his brother-in-law. Patients and hospital staff were often abused by Arkan. 4553/ Many were forced to act as blood donors. Arkan also took individuals off the street and forced them to give blood, some reportedly did not survive the process. 4554/

2866. **SUP/Opština (Municipal Police Force)**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights.) An undisclosed number of individuals were purportedly detained at this location. Reportedly interrogations, abuses and killings
occurred here.

2867. "Novi Izvor"-owned Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Department of State.) According to one report, several citizens from the village of Divi were collected in an office building in Zvornik owned by a company called "Novi Izvor". The citizens were detained at this facility for 36 hours and were reportedly given regular food and water.

2868. "Novi Standard" Shoe Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights.) Novi Standard was reportedly a new building of the shoe factory complex in Karakaj. Shoe production had discontinued at the time of the attack on the region and this location initially served as headquarters for the Serbian police. Allegedly Arkan, Šešelj, and "volunteers" from Loznica were also accommodated at this facility. One report refers to a camp in a Karakaj factory. It is unclear if this is the same factory.

2869. This facility, located in the northern region of Zvornik, was then converted into holding areas for Muslim prisoners following the creation and institution of a mass deportation program. Individuals were reportedly detained at this location for several days and subjected to severe mistreatment.

2870. According to another report, at one time or another, some 4,000 individuals—including women and children—were detained at the shoe factory in Karakaj. The conditions at the facility were notably severe. According to one former inmate, he and seven other boys were made to share one kilogram of bread, a small can of meat and a half liter of water every other day. The boys were also forced to watch as the "etniks" beat the male inmates with metal and wooden sticks, as well as having to assist their "etnik" captors during bouts of robbing, looting and pillaging in neighbouring villages.

2871. According to the same young witnesses, there was a woman who belonged to Arkan's troops, who, on one occasion, killed a 4 year old boy by throwing him with such force that he died from the blow to his head. On still another occasion, this same woman disrobed and ordered four men to have sex with her. When they refused, she took them outside and reportedly shot and killed each one.

2872. Technical/Engineering School in Karakaj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one witness, he and some 700 Muslim citizens were detained in the building of the Technical school. Their containment rooms were small rooms and lacked sufficient air, which reportedly resulted in the suffocating death of some 20 individuals.

2873. The witness reported that the inmates were beaten repeatedly, many were constantly covered in blood. In the witness' recollection, the number of detainees steadily decreased. Reportedly the "etniks" came and occasionally removed groups of people, allegedly for exchange in Pale. However, following the removal of each group the remaining inmates could hear the sounds of rifle fire and screams. The "etniks" reportedly forced everyone to line up against a wall and began shooting. The witness/victim was fortuitously spared injury or death, managing to crawl to safety when the "etniks" left to assemble the next group of inmates. Allegedly some 400 individuals were killed.
in this manner before the witness’ escape. 4571/

2874. "Novi Izvor": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights and the UK Mission.) Novi Izvor was located in the village of Karakaj and consisted of two plants: "Kamenolom" which was a quarry and "Ciglana" which was a brick factory. 4572/ Both continued to operate throughout the conflict in the region. Reportedly captured Muslim individuals were forced to work alongside regular Serb employees in three shifts. In early June, some 70 inmates were interned here. 4573/ Some had been detained at this facility since mid-April and subjected to a variety of abuses. 4574/

2875. One report says that a source saw about 20 males of all ages, detained in a clothing store in the factory. They were threatened with guns and verbally abused and made to do "military" type physical training. They were also made to unload trucks which carried heavy building material. In July 1992, the source passed the factory again and saw two of the men he had seen in April of 1992, one he believed had lost about 30 kilogram in weight. 4575/

2876. JNA Barracks at Karakaj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Department of State.) This facility was reportedly used exclusively by regular JNA units as a detention facility. The report suggests its existence from June 1991 through August 1992. 4576/ Sources are silent as to information regarding ethnicity or treatment of those interned at this location.

2877. "Alhos" Textile Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) "Alhos" was a garment and textile factory. This facility was initially used as accommodations for the police, circa 6 April 1992. 4577/ According to a witness detained at the kindergarten, he and another prisoner were driven from that location to the textile plant situated some five minutes away. 4578/ The existence of this camp is also referred to in another report. 4579/

2878. It was his impression that the two of them were the only inmates at this location. They were reportedly detained here for several days in a rather small room which was, he believed, stained with the blood of past prisoners. 4580/ Although the facility contained quite a few Serb soldiers, the two were reportedly not abused until 16 May, at which time they were subjected to severe beatings for several hours. 4581/

2879. Following the initial phase of beatings, a short reprieve was given at which time the victims were made to clean their own blood from the floor and walls. Thereafter the beatings resumed. 4582/ According to the witness, the beatings were so severe that "both his cheek bones were smashed and the entire bone structure enclosing his upper teeth were loosened so much that his teeth protruded from his mouth". 4583/ He was released from the textile plant on 20 May and transferred to the courthouse in Zvornik. 4584/

2880. Ekonomija: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights.) This location was reportedly an agricultural cooperative. It was located in a rather secluded area of Karakaj and, as a consequence, its buildings served as death camp. 4585/ The facility consisted of stables, storehouses and a slaughter room. Reportedly a chamber existed which was used primarily for the "butchering" of inmates. 4586/ This location was reportedly populated by individuals from the Zvornik area as well as members of the Croatian National Guard. According to witness statements, this may well have been the "worst" camp in the area. 4587/
2881. Glinica Factory: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the Austrian Mission.) This facility was the site of a large aluminum factory in the village of Karakaj. One of the empty halls of the factory was reportedly used to contain Muslim prisoners as well as for purposes of interrogation. 4588/

2882. Movie Theater in •elopek: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Committee for Refugees.) •elopek is located approximately six kilometres north of Zvornik, on the border between BiH and Serbia. 4589/

2883. On 29 May 1992, 174 male citizens of Divi• were reportedly loaded onto buses and transported to a movie theater which was part of the local cultural centre (Dom Kulture). 4590/ The facility was established in a one story building which was constructed from brick and painted a cream colour. The building's windows were reportedly covered to block out the sunlight. 4591/

2884. On 10 June 1992, one of the Serbs removed seven pairs of fathers and sons from among the inmates. The pairs were forced on to the theater stage and made to disrobe. Once naked, the pairs were forced to perform fellatio on one another with the other male prisoners looking on from the audience. 4592/ Several other abuses were reportedly occurring simultaneously. In one incident, two men were taken from the audience, brutally beaten and then stabbed. 4593/ In another incident, a young boy was made to identify his father, after which, a Serb soldier, put a rifle in the boy's mouth and killed him as his father looked on. 4594/

2885. This same Serb soldier then turned his semi-automatic rifle onto those on stage and those seated in the audience. This behaviour resulted in the death of 10 men. 4595/

2886. On 27 June, this man allegedly forced 140 men to line up against the theater's perimeter wall and attempted to shoot each one, one after another. By the time it was over, he had managed to kill 20 men and wound an additional 20 others. 4596/

2887. In another incident, he cut off the ear of one inmate and the penis off another and then forced the victims to eat their severed body parts. 4597/ In a related report, this man was said to have demanded money and valuables from inmates and on one occasion beat the witness' brother with an ax handle, breaking both the victim's legs and one of his arms. 4598/ He then carved four cyrillic c's into the victim with a knife and when the witness began to cry, this man struck him and made him lick his brother's blood off of the knife blade. 4599/

2888. One report identified several of the Serbian perpetrators including the president of the community of Zvornik. 4600/ He was reportedly the "individual who was most instrumental in" the organization of the •elopek detention facility and the other Serb facilities in the area. 4601/

2889. Village home in •elopek: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Muslims from the Zvornik region were detained in a concentration camp established "in the building of the village home in •elopek". 4602/ Specific information regarding its operation and control was not provided by the report. 4603/ Another report refers to a camp in a farmer's home at •elopek. 4604/ It is unclear if this is the same camp.

2890. Unknown facility in Pilice: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one report several Muslim citizens from the village of Latva in
Zvornik were taken captive by Serb extremists and taken to Pilice where they were detained and severely abused. On 8 June 1992, some 64 prisoners were separated and taken to a house near the River Drina. All the inmates were reportedly killed by the extremists from the village of Pilice. A list of camps reported the existence of a camp in the village of Pilice.

2891. Lumber Factory in Caparde: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State.) This village is located just north-east of Zvornik, between Zvornik and Tuzla. According to one report Bosnian Muslim women from the county of Brko were detained at this facility for an undisclosed period of time. Forty of the women held at this site were reportedly taken outside of the facility and raped by members of Arkan's troops.

2892. Municipal Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one report, "ethnics" invaded the villages of Kostjerevo and Drinjača. Muslim homes were looted and burned and the residents detained in the municipal centre. The men were allegedly severely beaten for hours at a time, so much so that following the beatings, the walls were covered with blood.

2893. Reportedly some 35 Muslim men were killed by "ethnics" behind the building. Boys under 15 were taken from this location in the direction of Zvornik and 150 women and children were reportedly taken in the direction of Tuzla.

2894. Hall of the Culture Centre (Dom Kulture): (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the International Solidarity Network and the New York Times.) According to a Muslim female victim, members of "ethnik" groups from Serbia and Zvornik were responsible for collecting the citizens of the villages of Drinjača and Kostijarevo and detaining them in the hall of the cultural centre in Drinjača. The male inmates were reportedly beaten for four to five hours. Reportedly 35 men aged 17-70 were taken from the culture centre and shot. It is presumed that no one survived the shooting.

2895. Additionally, women were reportedly raped and otherwise physically mistreated. Relief came when, on 31 May, some 150 women and children were transferred to Tuzla for prisoner exchange. Reportedly on 27 or 28 June 1992, a 31 year-old Serb soldier opened fire on a group of Muslim civilians detained at this facility. Reportedly 16 civilians were killed and another 20 were wounded. The soldier was allegedly a member of the Serb paramilitary "Yellow Wasps."

2896. Vidikovac Hotel in Diviči: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Committee for Refugees.) Diviči was primarily a Muslim village on the Drina River. At the start of the conflict many Muslims fled Zvornik and sought refuge in this village. Between 8 April and 25 April, the war was contained in the north-east corner of BiH. Diviči, which is just south of Zvornik, was brought into the conflict on 26 April. It was then that Serb forces began shelling the village. Thereafter, on 27 April, Serb tanks from the other side of the Drina river joined in the aggression and began firing on the village.

2897. Following the occupation of the village, and the renaming of the village to Sveti Stefan, the Vidikovac hotel was apparently converted by Dragan's units into a temporary military dormitory.

2898. In one account, a Muslim civilian was arrested by three Serb paramilitaries in nearby Mali Zvornik and brought to and detained at the hotel. In the witness'
estimation, he was, at that time, the only prisoner detained at this location. 4621/

2899. According to the witness, 10 of Dragan's men surrounded him and began interrogating him as well as threatening to kill him or rape his wife and daughter. Thereafter he was beaten and placed into a small cubicle in the hotel's basement. 4622/

2900. According to his description, the basement cubicle was completely dark and the floor was muddy and wet with blood and urine. There was also excrement along the walls. 4623/ The inmate was later threatened and released by a popular singer, Pero Jovič. 4624/

2901. Divič Stadium: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) According to one report, an Imam was taken prisoner in the Divič Mosque, hung by his hands and beaten with iron rods. 4625/ He was later removed and taken to the stadium along with 400 other Muslims who, sometime later, were all reportedly moved to a concentration camp in Karakaj. 4626/

2902. Baljkovica Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one report 4627/ a rape camp was established by "Četniks" at this location just near Zvornik. According to one victim, "Četniks" captured her and her grandmother on a road outside her village. 4628/ Her grandmother was killed by the captors and the witness was taken to this rape/detention facility. 4629/

2903. She was detained in a room with some 29 other women and raped every other day. Allegedly a nurse came to the camp each month to determine who among the women was pregnant. 4630/ Those found to be at least three months pregnant were removed from the camp. The witness was detained at this site for five months before being removed. For reasons unknown to the victim, she was released by the roadside while the other pregnant women were transported elsewhere. 4631/

2904. School in Salihovići: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to a former detainee, she and four of her relatives (two of them children) were walking from Kamenica to Zvornik when they were stopped by a car containing four "Četniks" who forced the five to undress. 4632/ When the witness refused, she was detained and later transported by truck to a camp established in this school near Jasenica and Liplje. 4633/

2905. Reportedly some 470 men, women and children were detained at this location. There were 50 to 60 teenage girls interned here who were raped immediately. 4561/ After two days, all the women in the camp were subjected to rape. 4562/ All detainees were systematically robbed of their possessions and those who refused to co-operate were beaten and killed. 4563/ 2906. According to another report, after the fall of Kamenica, in May or June of 1992, 470 people, primarily women, were held in a camp in a school near Salihovići for some 15 to 20 days. 4564/ Reportedly all of the women were raped and many among them subjected to other severe abuses. 4565/ In one incident, a plastic bottle of motor oil was burned and the melted plastic poured over the bodies of the inmates. 4566/

2907. The report suggests that at some point the BiH Army overthrew the resident Serb forces and successfully obtained the release of individuals detained here. 4567/
2908. Bordello in Liplje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely a Press Source.) Liplje is a primarily Muslim village near the city of Zvornik. It contained fewer than 500 residents. 4568/ The majority of the incidents reported from this area occurred at the end of May 1992 when more than 400 of the villagers were detained in a large house formerly owned by a prominent Muslim. 4569/

2909. In one account, an 18 year-old Muslim girl was raped consecutively for five nights, each night by three different Serbian men. On each occasion, the men stripped naked and two of them held her down while the third raped her. 4570/ Thereafter, they switched places allowing each rapist an opportunity to watch the others. On the sixth night of raping, the "Četniks" forced the victim's father to watch as they raped her. 4571/ Her father was then taken to a toilet and hung for 24 hours by his neck, legs, and hands until a neighbour rescued him. According to the report, almost every women in the village was raped. 4572/

2910. In another incident, a woman reported having been similarly detained and raped twice nightly for 10 consecutive nights. 4573/ In another incident, a 17 year-old was raped and strangled to death. 4574/ In yet another, an 18 year-old was raped by four men in one night and then every night thereafter. 4575/

2911. Mosque in Novo Selo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely a Press Source.) According to one source, Serb troops reportedly rounded up some 150 Muslim women, children and elderly and forced them into a Mosque at gunpoint. 4576/ The source continues saying that the local Imam, was ordered to desecrate the religious establishment. The Serbs then ordered him to cross himself, eat pork and have sexual intercourse with a teenaged girl. 4577/ When the Imam refused all of these commands, he was severely beaten and cut with knives. 4578/

2912. "Gathering Points": (The existence of this type of facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Austrian Mission.) Serb forces were alleged to have used various facilities and locations as "gathering points" to collect and organize prisoners. 4579/ Among these locations are: the common village building in Drinjača, elementary schools in Liplje and Snagovo and mosques in Djulići and Klisa. 4580/ No information regarding the treatment, conditions nor the duration of internment at these locations was provided.

B. Croatia

1. Beli Manastir

2913. The county of Beli Manastir is located in eastern Croatia bordering Hungary and Vojvodina. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 54,160. At that time, the population was 41.7 per cent Croatian, 25.5 per cent Serbian, 16.5 per cent Hungarian, 8.4 per cent was referred to as "other" and 7.9 per cent was referred to as "Yugoslav". 4581/

2914. Beli Manastir: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Beli Manastir is located in north-eastern Croatia in the Baranja Region. Detention facilities were reported in the opština by several sources. 4582/ A Croatian woman reported that her husband, a civilian, was detained by "Četniks" in Beli Manastir for 10 days at the end of September, 1991. The woman was allowed to visit her husband at the facility, thanks to the intervention of a Serbian colleague of her daughter. As far as the woman was aware, 38 people were detained at this location and
were later taken to Borovo Selo. She also reported that her husband was detained for one day in Kozarac headquarters and Karanac police station, both of which are located in Beli Manastir.  

2915. Beli Manastir Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the Beli Manastir prison as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The ICRC representatives first visited the detention facility on 29 April 1992.

2916. Dunan Storage Complex: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Dunan Storage complex, located at the west end of Beli Manastir, was reported as a detention facility. The maximum capacity of this facility was reported to be 2,500 prisoners.

2917. Beli Manastir Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) The police station was located in the centre of Beli Manastir and was reported as a detention facility. At its maximum capacity, the facility could contain 300 prisoners. A former detainee, held there for 43 days, reported on the conditions at the facility. The witness was reportedly detained on 27 November 1991 and released on 7 January 1992. By his account, during the first three weeks, the prisoners were contained three to a cell. The cells measured approximately 1.2 metres by 1.8 metres. For the three weeks that followed, the witness claims that nine people were detained in a cell which measured three metres by four metres. The prisoners were allegedly fed on an inconsistent basis, receiving only one meal per day. On scattered occasions, the detainees were served hot meals (for example, goulash). Toilet facilities were available however the witness claimed that prisoners were beaten when they asked to use the facilities. There were allegedly no showers; washing was not permitted, nor for that matter was shaving. The prisoners were reportedly infested with lice.

2918. Inmates were allegedly beaten while in detention. One man was reportedly beaten to death. Another had his ear cut off. There were reports of civilian gangs from outside the facility coming into the prison and physically abusing the detainees. The witness claimed that the prisoners were forced to do heavy manual labour; including unloading coal wagons. According to the witness, he and others were threatened on several occasions with execution. He was reportedly taken to court, but no charges were ever brought against him. He also claimed that ICRC representatives did not visit this facility.

2919. Jagodnjak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International.) There are several reports of a detention facility in Jagodnjak, Beli Manastir. One source reported that the detention facility was located in the football stadium at the south-west edge of the city. The facility was allegedly opened on 15 September 1991 and contained approximately 1,500 prisoner in March 1992. Prisoners were reportedly detained at this site temporarily before being transferred to either Beli Manastir or Borovo Selo.

2920. Police Station, Darda: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC listed the police station in Darda as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 6 June 1992.
2. Benkovac

2921. The county of Benkovac is located in south-western Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population of Benkovac was 33,079. At that time, the population was 40.6 per cent Croatian, 57.4 per cent Serbian, with the remaining 2 per cent referred to as "others". 4591/

2922. Unidentified Benkovac camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Sources reported a detention facility located in Benkovac run by Serbian paramilitary forces holding detainees from Croatia. 4592/

2923. Benkovac na Kozari: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to another source, women were sexually abused in a detention facility run by Serbs in Benkovac na Kozari. 4593/

2924. Benkovac Army Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that on 18 November 1991, 84 civilians from the village of Škabrnje in Zadar county, of which 17 were children under the age of 10, were taken by masked "četniks" to an army barracks in Benkovac. They were abused and threatened with death. They were then moved to a kindergarten. The only male among them was interrogated. 4594/

2925. Kindergarten, Benkovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Approximately 25 Croatian women and children from Škabrnje were reported to have been captured during an attack on their village by "Četniks". They were allegedly held in a kindergarten in Benkovac for one night before being taken to Pristeg. In Pristeg they joined another group of imprisoned women and children and were then released. While detained at the kindergarten they were verbally abused and accused of being "Ustaše" and making pearls out of childrens' bones. They were also allegedly forced to watch Belgrade television. 4595/

2926. According to another report, 84 civilians were arrested in Škabrnje on 18 November 1991 by masked "četniks" and taken to an army barracks in Benkovac. They were then moved to a unspecified kindergarten. 4596/

2927. JNA Barracks, Benkovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Between 18 and 20 November 1991, members of the JNA, armed paramilitary forces, and the authorities of Serbian Krajina reportedly occupied the village of Skabrnje, west of Benkovac. The surviving Croatian civilians were allegedly detained in a JNA barracks in Benkovac for one night. They were interrogated and battered by the guards. The next morning some were released in Pristeg, and others reportedly were transferred to Knin for detention. 4597/

3. Bjelovar

2928. The county of Bjelovar is located in northern Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 65,773. At that time, the population was 80.1 per cent Croatian, 8.9 per cent Serbian, 7 per cent referred to as "other", and the remaining 4 per cent classified as "Yugoslav". 4598/

2929. Unidentified Detention Facility, Bjelovar: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Croatian forces allegedly maintained a detention centre in Bjelovar. 4599/
2930. A parish priest in Koprivnica was allegedly arrested and detained by members of the Croatian armed forces and Croatian authorities on an unspecified date in 1992. He was first in "preventive" detention in Bjelovar and was then transferred to Osijek. While detained there, he was mistreated and physically abused, as a result of which he allegedly suffered substantial physical injury. Although he was a civilian, he was reportedly exchanged as a prisoner of war for Croatian soldiers. 4600/

2931. Bjelovar Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the UN Special Rapporteur.) On 2 October 1991 Several members of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG) removed six detained JNA members from cell number two of the Bjelovar prison and took them to the forest near a farm for bull calf feeding owned by Josip Kiš at Veliko Korenovo. There the JNA soldiers were shot and the bodies buried in the refuse area. 4601/

2932. On 11 October 1991, a Serbian member of the Territorial Defence was detained by members of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia. The report indicated that he was held in prisons in Lipik and Bjelovar from October to mid-November. He was beaten and threatened with facial mutilation and death. His ear was cut with a knife and the soles of his feet burned. The source does not indicate which prison this treatment occurred in. The prisoner was exchanged on 8 November 1991. 4602/

2933. The alleged perpetrators included two reported ZNG members. 4603/

2934. Twenty-eight Serb men were allegedly arrested in the village of Imsovac in the municipality of Daruvar by a Ministry of Interior member and local HDZ committee members on 19 February 1992 and taken to Bjelovar prison. 4604/ The prisoners were subjected to physical maltreatment and one was taken out to a mock trial. He was forced to dig his own grave, and shots were then fired above his head. 4605/

2935. On 23 June 1993 Team ECLO West, Daruvar learned that the Serb Milicija incarcerated a Croatian truck driver who they wanted to exchange for three Serbs held in the Bjelovar prison. 4606/

2936. The President of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention was able to visit Bjelovar prison where he interviewed two prisoners who were captured on 5 August 1992. The prisoners were subjected to physical mistreatment which included beating, electric shock, mock execution, burning with cigarettes, and burning of the beard of one of the prisoners. They were first abused by the local police and later by the military police. The same prison officials duly registered all evidence of physical abuse and provided all necessary medical care. 4607/

2937. ICRC delegates reportedly visited this prison location on 11 October 1991. 4608/

2938. Police Station, Bjelovar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) According to one source, Croatian policemen made mass arrests in December 1991 in Daruvar and its vicinity. The arrested were imprisoned in jails in Daruvar and the police premises in Bjelovar where they were beaten and harassed. The civilians were then allegedly forced to agree to be exchanged for soldiers captured by the Banja Luka Corps of the JNA. Most of those arrested refused to be exchanged because they believed their property would be damaged and their families killed. Of the 62 who initially agreed to be exchanged 25 refused during the actual procedure. One prisoner allegedly died from severe beating during imprisonment. 4609/
2939. District Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) On 30 December 1991 a Serb prisoner was transferred to the District prison from an undisclosed location. There he was stripped naked and beaten. He was then put into cell number 1, where he and an undetermined number of other prisoners were deprived of food until 3 January 1991. On 3 January 1991 the prisoner was interrogated and beaten while tied to a radiator. He was made to sleep naked on the concrete floor of his unheated cell until 12 January 1991. On that day the prisoners were each given a blanket and a mattress. Curiously enough, the ICRC delegates visited the prison the following day. According to the report, the day after the ICRC visit, the blanket and mattresses were taken away. 4610/

2940. Barracks, Bjelovar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives reportedly visited a detention facility established at the local barracks on 10 October 1991. 4611/ No information was provided regarding the conditions existing at this facility.

2941. Hospital, Bjelovar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives reportedly visited a detention facility established at the local hospital on 11 October 1991, and then again on 24 October 1991. 4612/ No information was provided regarding the conditions existing at this facility on either occasion.

4. Daruvar

2942. The county of Daruvar is located in north-eastern Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 29,978. At that time, the population was 34.3 per cent Croatian, 33.2 per cent Serbian, with an additional 27 per cent referred to as "others", and the remaining 5.5 per cent described as "Yugoslav". 4613/

2943. Unknown Place of Detention, Daruvar: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 17 March 1992 an undetermined number of Serbs from the villages of Duhovi, Blagorodavac, and Uljanik in the county of Daruvar were allegedly arrested by members of the Croatian Ministry of Interior and subjected to brutal treatment in prison. Two of the prisoners sustained serious injuries and a third died while in custody. The report was silent as to the exact location of the facility. 4614/

2944. Daruvar Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one source, Croatian policemen made mass arrests in December 1991 in Daruvar and its vicinity. Those arrested were imprisoned in jails in Daruvar and in police stations in Bjelovar where they were reportedly beaten and harassed. The civilians were then allegedly forced to agree to be exchanged for soldiers captured by the Banja Luka Corps of the JNA. Most of those arrested refused to be exchanged because they believed their property would be damaged and their families killed. Of the 62 who initially agreed to be exchanged, the information suggests that 25 refused during the actual procedure. One prisoner allegedly died as the result of severe beating during imprisonment. 4615/

2945. Police Station, Daruvar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC representatives reportedly visited a detention facility established at the police station in Daruvar. The ICRC reported visiting this facility on 13 January 1992. 4616/ No additional information was provided regarding conditions existing at this facility.
2946. Daruvar Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 5 March 1992, all adult males from the village of Govedje Polje were allegedly arrested by the Croatian Ministry of Interior and transported to Daruvar prison. They were reported to have been subjected to physical mistreatment. 4617/

2947. Varteks Department Store: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one source, 80 Serbian civilians from Daruvar allegedly were arrested on 31 December 1991 and held in the basement of the "Varteks" department store by Croatians. 4618/ No additional information was provided regarding treatment, conditions, nor length of the facility's existence.

2948. Miokovićevi: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Miokovićevi was reported to contain a place of detention. 4619/ One report indicated a prisoner was beaten in Miokovićevi while in custody. This prisoner's upper jaw was broken. He was initially detained on 7 September 1991. 4620/

2949. The Cow Insemination Facility at Miokovićevi: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 23 September 1991 Serbian paramilitaries abducted a civilian from the Daruvar area after entering the village. The civilian was imprisoned in Miokovićevi for one month before being transferred to Bijela. Miokovićevi appears to have been run by "Četniks" who maltreated and beat the prisoners continuously. The guards would knock prisoners heads together. The witness alleged that his "tongue was taken out of his mouth", and his teeth were broken. He was reportedly beaten with an electric cable all over his body and also deprived of food for the first five days of his internment. He was detained with his hands bound and a rope around his neck. This victim was reportedly forced to stand for the majority of the time he was detained and to sleep on concrete floors. 4621/

2950. The prisoners were forced to dig trenches and had logs thrown at them as they worked. No medical treatment was available. The guards were all young men from the villages of Removac, Jasenas, Korenicani, Brdani Bastajski, and Cjepidlake. 4622/

2951. Bijela: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One source reported that a detention facility existed in Bijela, which is located just south-east of Daruvar and has a Serbian majority population. 4623/ The founder of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Daruvar was reportedly abducted from his vineyard in the presence of his wife and two other witnesses on 24 August 1991. He was said to have been forced into a car and taken to the village of Bijela, a place allegedly known as a "Četnik camp". He was detained there until 22 September 1991 when a policeman allegedly took him to an exchange. He was still missing at the time of the report. These events were confirmed by another inmate of the prison who was of Serbian nationality and imprisoned for making the statement that Croatia would exist as its own state. 4624/

2952. On 19 August 1991 four Croatian police officers were abducted by their fellow Serbian policemen while on duty. One was taken to Bijela and then moved to Bucje. The three others were abducted and then released by the police officer referred to above. 4625/

2953. On 23 November 1991 six Croatian men and one woman from the village of Vrbovac were reportedly arrested and detained in Bijela by "Četniks" from Serbia. There appear to have been two makeshift military prisons, one in the basement of a school and the other in the apartment of Marko Marojević. There
was a third prison in the basement of the village hall where sheep had been kept. The seven detainees appear to have been held in the village hall basement. The basement was dark, and breathing was difficult. There was no heating and the temperature was extremely cold. On the eighth day of their internment the detainees were allegedly interrogated and then moved to the first floor classrooms of a school. 4626/

2954. On 1 December 1991 the female internee was questioned by the "Četniks" as to why she worked for the Croatian National Guard and was then threatened with rape. One of the "Četniks" stripped her naked but did not rape her as she was menstruating. They moved her to another room from which she escaped, but she was discovered outside the room. She was then stripped half naked and threatened with rape and facial mutilation. A Serb who had served with the "White Eagles" threatened to cut off her ear. She was allowed to go the funeral of her mother under escort of the prison guards. On 7 December 1991 one of the "White Eagles" threatened to kill the woman. Additionally, the woman was afraid to use the toilet alone because another woman had been raped by the "White Eagles". She spent 19 days in the prison and was then transferred to Banja Luka. 4627/

2955. The guards would enter the rooms around 7:00 p.m. and maltreat the prisoners. The prisoners could not sleep at night because of the cold, and one prisoner suffered frostbite on his feet. The belongings of the prisoners were searched three times. They were given only rice to eat and were allowed use of the toilet at the discretion of the guards. One detainee was sentenced to death at the school prison, and another prisoner was killed. Young men were allegedly castrated, and salt was put in their wounds. 4628/

2956. The prisoner, who was first interned at Miokovićevo, was then transferred to Bijela in November 1991 and held for one month. At Bijela the prisoners were only beaten at night. The witness was thrown on the ground, kicked, and beaten until he was unconscious. The detainees slept on a concrete floor. 4629/

5. Djakovo

2957. Djakovo is located in Slavonia, north-east Croatia and has a population of 52,443, according to the 1991 census. At that time, the population was 91.7 per cent Croat, 3.8 per cent Serb, with 4.5 per cent described as "other". 4630/

2959. Djakovo: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Prisoners were reportedly detained in Djakovo. Forty-one Serbian prisoners were exchanged for 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations on 27 March 1992. The 41 were reported to have been arrested between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992. Almost all the prisoners were interrogated for three to 10 days at various places in Croatia, including Djakovo. Then they were allegedly taken to detention facilities in Osijek and Zagreb. 4631/

2960. Police Station, Djakovo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Three women, a boy and four men were hiding in the attic of a house due to fighting in the village of Sodolovci. Twenty to 50 members of the Croatian army allegedly entered the attic and took the people into custody after beating them. They were reportedly handcuffed and taken to Djakovo where the women were released. The men were apparently interrogated separately. One of the men, a Serb, who testified while in Osijek prison with the permission of the prison authorities, claimed that he was taken to a hospital and then to the police
station. Some of the police allegedly yelled at him and kicked him. He was also abused in the courtyard of the hospital. The prisoners apparently was transferred to Osijek jail sometime before 30 July 1991. 4632/

6. Drniš

2960. Drniš is located near Knin in Dalmatia. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population of Drniš was 24,157. At that time, the population was 76.8 per cent Croatian, 21.3 per cent Serbian, and 1.9 per cent was referred to as "other". 4633/

2961. Drniš Hospital and Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) One source indicated that at least three people were detained in the hospital in Drniš. Two of these people moved to an ordinary prison after 15 or 16 days in the hospital. All three prisoners had been captured on 16 September 1991, and all were exchanged on 2 November 1991. Two of the prisoners were Croatian police reservists in Pakovo Selo while the third was a Croatian civilian from Biočić. The prisoners appear to have been detained by Serbian forces. 4634/

2962. The detainees reported being physically abused. They were beaten with rifle butts, rubber truncheons, and wooden staves. One of the prisoners lost half his thumb. The detainees had cocked revolvers pressed to their heads. They were beaten about the kidneys, denied use of toilet facilities, and forced to drink urine. Additionally, two of the prisoners held in the same ward complained of sexual abuse. They were forced to perform oral sex on each other and on the prison guards, as well as being forced to participate in mutual masturbation. 4635/

2963. Some of the medical staff at the hospital verbally abused the prisoners, calling them "Ustaše". One of the doctors was allegedly particularly abusive. In addition one of the nurses with short blonde hair brandished a knife and placed it on the throat of one of the prisoners. 4636/

2964. The food was inadequate, and one of the prisoners, who spent his entire time in the hospital, lost 20 kilograms of weight. The detainees were deprived of sleep by interruptions, lights, and physical abuse. One of the prisoners was displayed on Belgrade television as an "Ustaša" and accused of rape and killing children. 4637/

2965. Two other prisoners were interviewed by the same source and appear to have been held in a prison. One cell at this detention facility was reported to be three by five metres large and held nine prisoners; another cell was 32 square metres and held 32 people. These prisoners claim that their hands were tied with electrical wire, and their personal belongings were taken. They were forced to clean toilets with their bare hands, transport the guards around in wheelbarrows, and sing "četnik" songs before being allowed to use the toilets. Their heads were forced in the toilets, and the younger ZNG soldiers were sexually abused. They were exhibited in public. The prisoners were deprived of medical treatment and were not allowed to wash for 30 days. They received three eggs a day and both witnesses lost 10 kilograms of weight. 4638/

2966. According to the report, there are approximately 243 people left in Drniš and all are over 50 years of age. Fifty of them are reported as ill. They are not allowed to leave their houses and are denied evacuation. 4639/

2967. Another report indicated that maltreatment of POWs had occurred, however, it was not clear that the prisoners were detained in Drniš. The descriptions of abuse included abuse of POWs by irregular soldiers in a prison
hospital with the medical staff at best standing back. There were allegations of verbal abuse of prisoners by one doctor and one nurse. This could be a reference to the same incident reported above. 4640/

2968. Barracks, Trbounje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that on 8 December it visited the detention facility identified at the barracks in Trbounje. 4641/

7. Dubrovnik

2969. Dubrovnik is located in southern Croatia on the Dalmatian coast. The 1991 census reported the population as 70,672, with 82.5 per cent Croat, 4.1 per cent Muslim, 6.7 per cent Serb, and 6.7 per cent other. 4642/

2970. Unidentified Detention Facility, Dubrovnik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by two neutral sources, namely the ICRC and the CSCE.) One source reported Dubrovnik in its list of places of detention. 4643/ The ICRC reported the prison in Dubrovnik as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 7 November 1991. 4644/

8. Dvor

2971. Dvor is located near Glina in central Croatia and according to the 1991 census it had a population of 14,636. The population was comprised of 9.5 per cent Croats, 85.6 per cent Serbs, and 4.9 per cent others. 4645/

2972. According to reports, on 26 July 1991, members of the Serb paramilitary unit "SAO Krajina" attacked several villages in the Dvor municipality including Unčani, Zamlača, and populated villages in the Pounje region. 4646/

2973. After the citizens of Pounje were expelled from their homes, they were reportedly collected and used as a "human barrier" to assist the paramilitary units' advance. 4647/ The concept was also employed with the people from Zamlača who were reportedly made to walk to Struga as "living shields" in an attempt to force the Struga police to surrender. At the entrance to Struga, the Serbs allegedly opened fire upon the people, killing many of the citizens from Zamlača who were made to "shield" them. 4648/

2974. Local Prison, Struga: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, some 10 days after the Serbian attack, several villagers who remained in the area were arrested and detained at the prison. The detainees were reportedly interrogated and subjected to severe physical mistreatment. 4649/

2975. Camps in Banija: (The existence of these detention facilities have not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 26 July 1991, members of Martić's paramilitary unit attacked several villages in the Dvor region, including Unčani, Pounje, and Zamlača; consequently, capturing and detaining many of the villagers in camps erected in Banija. 4650/

2976. Police Station, Dvor: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Following the attack on Zamlača, civilians from the area were reportedly detained by Serb irregulars in the basement of the local police station. 4651/ No additional information was made available regarding the duration of internment, the conditions nor the treatment of the inmates.
2977. Unidentified Militia Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) After the villagers from Zamlača and Pounje were forced from their homes, a great many of them were loaded onto a militia truck and transported to an undisclosed militia station. Upon arrival, the detainees were placed in the cellar of the facility—women in one room and men in another. 4652/ The rooms were purportedly flooded with water and the inmates were contained under these conditions for two days. 4653/

2978. The Serbs began interrogating the detainees, beginning with the women. Sources suggest that the primary question asked of the inmates was their "date of birth". Following this rather brief interrogation, all of the inmates were reportedly released. 4654/

9. Glina

2979. Glina is located in central Croatia and had a 1991 population of 22,997. This population was 35 per cent Croatian, 60.5 per cent Serb, and 4.5 per cent other. 4655/

2980. Glina Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC, U.S. State Department, and ECMM.) There are many reports surrounding the Glina prison camp. This detention facility was in operation as early as September of 1991 and continued to be in operation through September of 1993. Most accounts referred to the site as the former juvenile prison; whereas one account described the facility as being situated in the Glina "Hall of Culture." 4656/

2981. Serb forces controlled the operation of the Glina Prison. Serb Territorial Defence Forces, SAO Krajina Police, JNA soldiers, and "Četniks" all reportedly had a hand in the way the camp functioned. In addition, one ex-detainee noted that Serb paramilitaries, SAO Krajina forces, "Četniks" from Šabac, and JNA soldiers often visited the prison. A Croatian citizen of Serbian origin, who was accused of torturing Croatian POWs in the Glina camp was arrested on 12 December 1992 in Zagreb. 4657/

2982. Both civilians and POWs, most of Croatian ethnicity, appear to have been detained at Glina camp. The camp population averaged 60-100 persons. The first available account noted that on 10 September 1991, a man was forced from his home in Sisak county, robbed, and taken to the "Četnik" prison in Glina. 4658/ Two days later, 61 members of the Croatian MUP forces were captured by Serb soldiers and transported to Glina after spending four days in the village of Kukuruzara. 4659/ Others were arrested in Bestrma and Hrvatska Kostajnica and brought to the Camp in early September as well. 4660/

2983. At some point during the detention of these POWs, groups of civilians were brought to Glina. Many prisoners who had previously been held at the Petrinja internment camp were transferred to Glina as well. 4661/ According to one report, by the first week of October 1991, approximately 100 males were being held at Glina. This report noted that the men were mainly from Kostajnica. In addition, 30 females were held at the prison in separate quarters. At least two Croatian civilians were captured and detained at Glina beginning in November of 1991. 4662/

2984. Maltreatment of detainees, both civilian and POW, appears to have taken place regularly throughout late 1991 and early March of 1992, when many of the prisoners were exchanged. Civilians and POWs were kept in separate rooms. The POWs who were part of the MUP force were held in a 30 square metre room. They slept two to a bed, which consisted of uncovered boards. The condition
of the food and water was poor, and many of the inmates contacted dysentery. Use of toilet facilities was restricted and the POWs were allowed to bathe only once during their five-month detention period. 4663/ Four Croatians who were not part of the MUP force were kept in solitary confinement cells. The MUP POWs were often forced to use these cells as restrooms. The ICRC visited the camp in late October 1991, and conditions improved mildly after the visit. The detainees received bedding, and the confinement areas were heated. 4664/

2985. According to one report, beatings were carried out in the morning by the camp guards and in the afternoon by Serb soldiers and militia. The prison commander, who was unidentified, did not personally beat any prisoners, but allegedly permitted beatings to occur and led individuals to the prisoners' quarters so that they could select their victims. 4665/ Another report noted that the civilian prisoners were beaten "day and night", and that 10 civilians were killed with clubs between October and March of 1991. Three other Croatians were identified as having died as a result of beatings. 4666/ One group of Croatian prisoners, who were all between 60 and 70 years old, had been beaten on the soles of their feet and their hands. 4667/

2986. The POWs who were captured in September of 1991 were selected for beatings on the basis of prepared lists. The beatings took place in an office across the prison courtyard. Between six and 10 Serbs dressed in camouflage would take turns battering the detainees. Many of these prisoners were also tortured with electricity. Bare wire was strapped around a prisoner's finger, and an electric current was then passed through the wire. 4668/ Prisoners were beaten with bludgeons, fists, boots, and rifle butts. Some prisoners died as a result of the beatings. 4669/

2987. Prisoners were also emotionally abused by the guards. Many were told "in confidence" that they were going to be exchanged, only to be told in a couple of days that the exchange had fallen through. 4670/

2988. One former prisoner related that the "Četniks" who beat the POWs admitted they were taking a combination of Fortral and other drugs which induced a "high degree of aggressive behaviour". 4671/

2989. One of the best descriptions of the camp comes from a former prisoner arrested in Petrinja on 22 September 1991. 4672/ He reports that he was arrested by "the people in camouflage uniforms who had white bands on their heads and arms and brought to the camp". At Glina, there were JNA soldiers, officers, captains, and majors. He was kept in the part of the camp for solitary confinement. This section consisted of four solitary cells, each 2.5 metres by 2.5 metres. Inside each cell, there was one berth, a toilet, a washing stand and a small space with boards on the floor. There were only blankets on the bed and no heating. Often, there were six people to a cell. 4673/

2990. Apparently, food was scant. A small piece of bread sometimes with tea or spread was served to the prisoners. However, after a visit from the Red Cross, the food became a bit better. The prisoners ate on the courtyard in the tents. 4674/ They received a pile of overcooked rice with vegetable leftovers or some mashed potatoes. Once a week they were given beans. 4675/

2991. During his detention, the prisoners were also not allowed to bathe. Finally, after 70 days they were permitted to clean themselves, but they had to redress in their dirty clothes. They shaved every 30 days "at their own expense". However, they had been stripped of all of their valuables when they arrived at the camp making it impossible to pay for a shave. 4676/
2992. Prisoners were allowed to move only inside the prison area. They were forced to bow their heads and put their hands behind their back. It is not clear from the testimony whether their hands were actually tied or not.

2993. They beat the prisoners a few times per day and tortured them at night. This particular witness was beaten with rubber sticks and boots during which time he lost consciousness four times. He also underwent psychological maltreatment. He was told that his son had been captured and killed and that the Serbs had taken over Zagreb and other Croatian cities. He also was forced to work during his detention. He worked with cables in the Elektra and was not allowed to speak to the others.

2994. After 40 days of solitary confinement, the witness was moved to the room where the younger children were situated. There, each child had his/her own bed. Civilians remained in this room, and members of the Croatian National Guard and police were transferred to the "courtyard rooms" where there was some kind of music hall. Here, the floor was tiled and the room humid. Two men slept in one bed.

2995. Finally, this witness reports that on 15 November 1991 a group of elderly were brought in from Solno, Lovoča, and Stankovci. They numbered 12 and were beaten severely at the camp on 16 November. Two or three days later they were driven away in some unknown direction and were not seen again.

2996. The witness was exchanged on 14 March 1992. The day before he left, he and three other prisoners were beaten. They were forced to strip to the waist, were watered with hot coffee and kicked. Upon evaluation at a hospital, doctors confirmed the fracture of five to eight ribs on his left side. He now reports having kidney problems and a bad blood count. He regularly urinates blood.

2997. Another ex-detainee reports that he and a group of 60 others were arrested in Kukuruzara on 12 September 1991. They arrived by bus on 16 September. Upon their arrival, they were taken off the bus and physically and verbally abused by the local population as they entered the prison. They were all put in a room 30 metres by 30 metres. They slept on bunk beds, two to a bed. Drinking water was kept in the rooms in plastic cans. The water was not clean and many of them contracted dysentery. They were unable to go to the bathroom as needed and had to relieve themselves in plastic cans in the cell.

2998. Additional exchanges of prisoners occurred on the following dates. According to one former detainee, 40 captured MUP soldiers were exchanged on 31 October 1991. This may have been in response to a visit by the ICRC on 29 October 1991. Another exchange of prisoners took place on 1 November 1991, and on 3 March 1992 when the remainder of the POWs were exchanged.

2999. Despite the multiple prisoner exchanges carried out in March, detentions at Glina continued into 1992. ECMM reported that a "drunk man" from Sisak was being detained at the prison as 16 November 1992. UNCIVPOL also visited the camp in November of 1992, and counted a total of 96 prisoners. In January 1993 a young woman from Glina was arrested, charged with espionage, and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment at Glina. As of 9 August 1993, the date of the last reported ECMM visit to Glina, there were 100 persons being detained there, 60 were POWs and 40 were "other".

3000. ICRC delegates first visited the penitentiary on 29 October 1991. The camp was also visited various times by international journalists. Reporters came from Belgrade, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and the US Prisoners were
usually shaven and those who appeared better were selected to be shown off before the visits. After the visits, the prisoners were beaten. 4692 /

3001. Military Prison, Glina: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC delegates first visited the military prison on 24 February 1993. 4693 /

3002. Glina Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) ICRC delegates first visited the hospital on 1 September 1992. and the penitentiary on the 29 October 1991. 4694 /

10. Gospić

3003. Gospić is located in western Croatia on the Dalmatian coast and had a population of 28,732, according to the 1991 census. The population consisted of 64.3 per cent Croat, 31.1 per cent Serb, and 4.6 per cent other. 4695 /

3004. Gospić Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and Amnesty International.) This site was reportedly used to house a number of arrested or captured Serbs. At one point, the Croatian authorities admitted that at least three identified persons were being held in the Gospić area, but they did not state whether they were indeed at the prison. ECMM requested permission to visit the prison on 20 September 1993, but the request was denied.

3005. One prisoner, a retired JNA officer, was arrested by four armed and uniformed men of the Croatian military police at his home in Zagreb and taken to the camp on 23 November 1991. The arresting officers said that they wanted to speak with him for a few minutes and then took him to the prison. He was kept there for two months after which he was transferred to the prison at Kerestinec, Zagreb. 4696 /

3006. While at the camp, he was held in solitary confinement under extremely cold conditions. He was given two blankets, but the heating in the prison had been turned off on 27 November, and the window of his cell did not close properly. He was questioned about alleged links between Serbs in Široka Kula, Zagreb, and Belgrade, of which he had no knowledge. He was not allowed to wash or change his clothes during his detention. There was no toilet in his cell, and at night he was forced to use a bucket. 4697 /

3007. He reports that he was among the few prisoners who were not beaten by guards. He had suffered only a "few slaps" until 7 January when he was beaten by five guards at once in his cell. As a result of the beating, he lost consciousness and experienced heart disturbances the next day. 4698 /

3008. Apparently, breakfast had been cancelled at the prison on 27 November, and prisoners were only given two meals a day. Yet, the witness reports that on 15 December, three days before the ICRC visited the prison, breakfasts were resumed and the heating turned on. 4699 / The ICRC visited the prison on 18 December 1991. 4700 /

3009. Kalić: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Six Serb civilians from Divoselo and Čitluk were arrested during the Croatian offensive in the region. They were interrogated and later brought to the camp at Kalić. These civilians were interviewed by team OTOCAC on 14 September 1993. It is unclear from the report whether Kalić is located in Gospić, as no further information was provided. One of the ex-detainees did state that they were well treated by the police
and by their captors at the camp. 4701/

3010. Gospić Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) A camp holding hundreds of Serb prisoners reportedly existed in Gospić. The site was a former military dump and storage site for the Gavrilovic corporation. The area in which the camp was situated was 5,000 square metres and was surrounded by barbed wire fencing. The report described the site as a "collecting camp," for prisoners en route to the camp at Jadovno, three kilometres away. 4702/

3011. Gospić District Court: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The District Court was reportedly the site where arrested JNA officers were held from September 1991 to December 1992. The officers were allegedly tortured, both mentally and physically. In addition to beatings, detainees were forced to clean the prison camp, sing Ustaše songs and to "salute in the Nazi way". ZNG prison guards, two identified men were said to be responsible for the mistreatment of the prisoners. 4703/

3012. Lički Osik Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) This facility is reportedly located in the Culture Centre building in the village of Novi Lički Osik and administered by Martić police. At least 13 Croatian civilians were detained at Lički Osik prison in September of 1991. This figure was admitted by the headmaster of the prison, Ćedo Budisavljević. A woman from Lički Osik, whose husband was among those detained, visited the prison and said her husband was emaciated, had been given very little food or water and had been beaten. 4704/

11. Gračac

3013. Gračac is located in Croatia near Knin and had a population of 11,060, according to the the 1991 census. The population was 14 per cent Croat, 82.3 per cent Serb, and 3.7 per cent other. 4705/

3014. Gračac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A map, submitted by both Helsinki Watch and the Republic of Croatia, indicates that a "prison/camp run by paramilitary forces" was located at Gračac. The map asserts that detainees at this camp are Croatians and that the camp is controlled by "YA or Serbian paramilitary forces". 4706/

12. Grubisno Polje

3015. Grubisno Polje is located in northern Croatia and had a population of 14,186, according to the 1991 census. The population was comprised of 42.3 per cent Croat, 32.1 per cent Serb and 25.6 per cent other. 4707/

3016. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, ethnic Serbs comprised the majority population of Grubisno Polje while ethnic Croats were a clear minority. In early 1991, ethnic Croats began to "exert pressure on the ethnic Serb population" both in the town itself and in neighbouring villages. 4708/ Reports submitted by FRY indicate at least one place of detention in Grubišno Polje.

3017. Hotel, Grubisno Polje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One detention centre has been described as an "improvised jail" in the hotel in Grubisno Polje. Detainees
in the camp were ethnic Serbs and the camp was controlled by Croatian forces, including the Ministry of the Interior and ZNG members of the Republic of Croatia. 4709 Reports concerning this camp aver that prisoners have been tortured, mutilated, and killed. The camp was in operation, and violations were allegedly committed, in August 1991. 4710 There is no estimate as to the number of prisoners detained at the hotel.

3018. Reports also refer to other possible detention centres in Grubisno Polje; it is unclear if these are the hotel described above. First, one report claims that in December 1991 ethnic Serbs from Grubisno Polje were arrested, jailed, and tortured in Grubisno Polje. 4711 The location of the jail is not given. Second, from August to October 1991, government officials from the "Government of SAO West Slavonia" allegedly interrogated and tortured captured non-Serbs. It is not clear where detainees were being held. 4712/13

13. Imotski

3019. Imotski: (The existence of a detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Permanent Mission of Germany.) Imotski is located in southern Croatia and had a population of 38,555, according to the 1991 census. The population was 95.5 per cent Croat, and 2.9 per cent Serb, and 1.6 per cent other. 4713/

3020. Several reports, from various sources, contain the identical unsubstantiated claim that "police premises" in Imotski are used as a detention centre for about 20 Serbs. 4714/ Another report claims that, during November 1991, a Serbian soldier was tortured and mistreated in detention facilities in Listica (BiH), Imotski, and Split. The forces in command of these facilities are allegedly members of the MOI and ZNG of the Republic of Croatia. No specific information is provided regarding the alleged facility in Imotski. 4715/

14. Ivanec

3021. Ivanec is located in northern Croatian and had a population of 41,488 according to the 1991 census. The population was 97.6 per cent Croat and 2.4 per cent other. 4716/

3022. Lepoglava Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC listed the Lepoglava prison as a place of detention and delegates first visited it on 1 June 1993. 4717/

15. Karlovac

3023. The county of Karlovac is located south-west of Zagreb. According to the 1991 census, the population was 80,855. At that time, the population was 66.7 per cent Croatian, 26.6 per cent Serbian, with some 6.3 per cent referred to as "other", and the remaining 3.4 per cent referred to as "Yugoslavs". 4718/

3024. Karlovac Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) In June 1991, a prisoner allegedly was interned in Karlovac prison which was run by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia. He was reportedly ill-treated, beaten with truncheons, forcibly tattooed, and received numerous scars all over his body. He eventually escaped from the prison. 4719/ In August 1992, prisoners
at the Bosanski Novi Stadium facility were transferred to the Karlovac prison because a United Nations team discovered the camp. The ICRC reported the Karlovac prison as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The representatives first visited the detention facility on 12 February 1992.

3025. Karlovac Police Headquarters: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by neutral sources, namely the ICRC and Helsinki Watch.) One source reported that three soldiers, one Yugoslav army captain, and 17 Yugoslav army reservists, the majority of whom were Serb, left the town of Slunj in two army trucks. They were stopped by Croatian forces on the bridge over the Korana river and told to surrender. Three were transported to the police headquarters in Karlovac and eventually sent to Zagreb for detention. The others, while on the bridge, were allegedly maltreated and some were killed. The ICRC reported the Karlovac police headquarters as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The representatives first visited the detention facility on 12 February 1992.

16. Knin

3026. Knin is located in Krajina and had a population of 42,337 according to the 1991 census. The population was 88.6 per cent Serb, 8.6 per cent Croat and 2.8 per cent other.

3027. By the end of 1990, several villages in Croatia containing sizeable Serbian populations had found themselves with Serb citizens who refused to recognize Croatian authority and had unilaterally established "Serbian autonomous districts". These districts were governed by the local Serbs and many were even equipped with locally-recruited police forces.

3028. When the conflict erupted in Croatia in 1991, these Serb-run districts became satellite bases for JNA units. A number of local Croats who were detained by Serb forces in the region have reported that control of these facilities was primarily by local Serb paramilitaries rather than JNA forces.

3029. JNA Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US State Department.) On 5 and 6 April 1992, JNA units from the Knin corps, the White Eagles and an unidentified JNA tank unit collected some 1,600 Croatian civilians and 35 Bosnian Croatian and Muslim soldiers, loaded them onto buses and transported them to Knin. The buses arrived in Knin on 7 April and the civilian prisoners were separated from the military prisoners. The military prisoners were then loaded onto a refrigerated truck and told that they were going to a slaughterhouse. The truck drove all night with the freezer unit turned on.

3030. The military prisoners were removed from the truck and taken to the jail. They were then placed in a small cell on the third floor of the jail. Shortly thereafter, five Bosnian Serb irregulars came and allegedly beat them with clubs and iron rods. After all the prisoners were beaten, the Serbs left and did not return for three days. During this time, the prisoners were not fed or afforded any sort of care or attention.

3031. On 10 April, the prisoners were moved to a large room on one of the lower floors. A television crew from Belgrade was in this room and the prisoners were given scripts and made to read from them for the press detailing all the atrocities they had allegedly leveled on the Serbian people. On 20 April, the prisoners were turned over to Martić's police
and transported to the Knin jail. 4735/

3032. "Southern Camp" (Army Barracks): (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. 4736/) This facility was located on the road from Knin to Drniš, not far from Potkonje. 4737/ The report was supplied by a civilian male who spent a month at this facility.

3033. According to the report, Serbian and Montenegrin reservists captured him on the road and took him to a room in the southern Knin barracks. 4738/ Interrogation began immediately. The witness recalled being interrogated on four occasions in the Knin garrison building. 4739/

3034. Accompanying him in detention and the interrogation proceedings were some 20 other civilians, many of whom were from his town of Drniš. 4740/ They were all beaten daily with bludgeons, sticks, or anything that was available. The report alleges that the physical and mental mistreatment was constant and cruel. 4741/

3035. Knin Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and Amnesty International.) Nine of the military prisoners and three civilians from the JNA prison were removed by Martic's police and brought to this facility and detained in room number 4. 4742/ The guards at this location were "professional" jail guards who had been working at this facility since well before the beginning of the conflict. 4743/

3036. The prisoners were ordered to disrobe so that they could be searched for processing. During the strip search, the guards ordered the detainees to bend "over and spread their buttocks apart. Serbs would take police nightsticks, brooms or other sharp objects and drive them into a prisoner's rectum with sharp jabs. The guards told the prisoners that they were making sure that no one was hiding any weapons". 4744/

3037. Serbian guards typically brought their wives and girlfriends to the jail to see the prisoners. The inmates were instructed to comply with the orders of the "guests" which oftentimes included engaging in fellatio with one another while the women watched. 4745/

3038. On several occasions, small children were brought in and the prisoners were ordered to comply with their wishes as well. In one incident, a young boy demanded that one of the prisoners act like a horse so that the child could ride. 4746/ When the boy became dissatisfied with the inmate's performance, he 'urinated on the inmate's face, and then "ordered the prisoner to lick the urine from the floor". 4747/ Before leaving, the boy reportedly declared that the prisoner only needed one eye, so the youth stuck the inmate in the eye with a stick. 4748/

3039. One report details the experiences of a Croatian soldier captured during the battles for Kijevo in August 1991. 4749/ He was detained in a jail cell which measured three or four metres in size. There was only a wooden plank for a bed, very little ventilation and no light. 4750/ Four others were detained with him. The five were subjected to repeated and, seemingly unending, interrogation and mistreatment. The process went on for four to five hours daily and lasted 68 days. 4751/ Women and children were reportedly brought in to the facility to beat, kick and humiliate the prisoners. The detainees were given food once daily and water once every two days. The witness was exchanged on 2 November 1991. 4752/
3040. "District Prison of Knin" (Former Hospital) 4753/. (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC.) According to one report the facility at this site was extremely overcrowded. Twenty-five inmates were detained in a single room. The rooms were so crowded that the inmates could not all sleep at the same time. 4754/

3041. The report mentions that the food and toilet facilities were adequate. Reportedly the men were beaten in the yard each day. 4755/

3042. The testimony of two Croatian priests, 4756/ suggests that at one time some 70 Croatian inmates were detained at this facility. Approximately half of the inmates were civilians and the other half were National Guardsmen. 4757/

3043. According to the witnesses, the inmates were severely mistreated by some of the prison guards. The priests made note of the fact that not all of the guards were cruel, some were quite humane in their treatment of the prisoners. 4758/

3044. The priests were often forced to cross themselves in the Orthodox fashion, with three fingers. They were beaten with truncheons on their hands and backs. 4759/ They witnessed the broken teeth, jaws, ribs, and legs of the other inmates as well as the injuries to kidneys, ears, and other body parts. The beatings usually took place in the bathrooms or in the hallways. 4760/

3045. "SAO Krajina" Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) According to one report, an inmate was detained at this location and physically mistreated on a regular basis. His captors attempted to coerce a confession that he gave aid to the residents of Polača. 4761/

3046. According to the report, the detainee was poorly fed for the majority of his detention, except for the last 10 days, just prior to the prisoner exchange. At that time, he began receiving servings of eggs, bacon, beans and canned meat. 4762/

3047. In another report from a reserve member of the Croatian police force, he was captured by Serb paramilitary forces on 26 June and detained in the Krajina region. 4763/ He notes his awareness of the orders given to the police on duty not to mistreat the prisoners but recalls that they disregarded these orders and subjected the prisoners to beatings on a daily basis. Reportedly when he complained about the beatings to the press, the Serb captors beat him so severely that he suffered a broken rib. 4764/

3048. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The beatings began as soon as he was captured, was the report from a captured Croatian soldier. The Serb captors beat the men with everything they could find. 4765/ They also removed all of their valuable possessions. The Serbs then took them on buses to Civljane and then to the police station in Knin. 4766/ They were reportedly interrogated in groups of two and then beaten. Thereafter they were taken to the prison in the old hospital building. 4767/

3049. Garage in Golubić: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, on 26 June 1991, armed Serbs arrested, detained and battered 14 police officers from Glina. The detainees were taken first to Samarica Hill, where local lumberman were also detained. 4768/ Two days later, all the detainees were taken and contained in a garage in the village of Golubić near Knin. After a brief stay at this location, the prisoners were again moved, this time to the the old
17. Korenica

3050. Korenica is a province in western Croatia which borders BiH at Bihać. Its pre-war population was 11,307 of which 75.8 per cent were Serb, 16.8 per cent were Croat, 3.9 per cent other, and 3.5 per cent "Yugoslav".

3051. Military Camp, Frikašić: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) A detention facility identified as military camp in Frikašić was first visited by the ICRC on 27 August 1993.

3052. Korenica Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International, and the ICRC.) It is reported that there was a Serbian-run camp at the Korenica Police Station. This camp held Croatian civilians who were arrested and brought in by members of the Martić police and the so-called Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina, two Serbian paramilitary organizations active in the area.

3053. All reports describe that the arrest and detention of Croatians started in October 1991. One witness was picked up on 8 October in the village of Drežničko Selište. Others were brought in during this same time from Rastovača, Plitvička Jezera, and Slunj. A group of Croatian clergymen were picked up near Prijebelj in late October.

3054. Prisoners at the station are reported to have been interrogated, tortured, and abused. They underwent electric shock and beatings with wooden sticks, rubber truncheons, and rifle butts. They were hosed with cold water, forced to perform fellatio on each other and prison guards, and made to drink urine. One ex-prisoner was beaten so severely that he cracked seven ribs on the left side and 10 on the right. He was also hit badly in the head and, as a result, has restricted left eye movement and no sense of smell.

3055. The most detailed description of the camp comes from a Croatian priest who was held there from the end of October to the end of November, 1991. He had asked the commander of the JNA garrison in Slunj in mid-October to provide he and nine other Croatian clergymen with a military escort from Drežnik to Vaganac. There, they planned to bury six Croatian women who had previously been killed during a Serb attack of the village. The commander accepted their request and guaranteed them safe passage on their journey. Yet, on the way back, on 15 October at about 5:30 p.m. near Prijebelj, the JNA escort handed the religious group over to Serbian Martić police. These Serbian paramilitaries then ordered them to drive to Korenica.

3056. Upon their arrival at the police station, the group of prisoners was met by 200 Serbian civilians. They waited outside the station and taunted the prisoners as they were transported inside. Once inside, they were made to undress and then beaten by guards.

3057. The next morning a guard entered the cell and told the two nuns and one of the priests that they were free to go. Later, the others were beaten by guards, brought outside to be beaten again by a group of 40 civilians, and then returned to their cell. During these beatings, the witness apparently had a stick kicked into his colon opening.
3058. Later that same day, the witness was asked to see the commander for interrogation. The commander allegedly threatened him with a knife and ordered him to admit that he was a Serb and that he had received money from the local government. At one point, he engraved the Serbian cross and four "C's" in the witness' chest. 4784/

3059. Two other perpetrators were named in connection with activities at the camp. One is said to have brought Serbian civilians to the camp to beat and harass the prisoners. The other came to the camp on the witness' 18th day of detention and participated in prisoner beatings. 4785/

3060. A priest was held at Korenica for 23 days during which time he was repeatedly interrogated and beaten. He was asked about his supposed political work in organizing the Croatian Democratic Union Party in Dreznik, Vaganac, Rakovica, and Slunj. He was also accused of receiving money from the Vatican to purchase weapons for the Croatian defence. Furthermore, the witness claims that "bandits" continually came into his cell to beat he and the others. Apparently, they could do as they pleased with the Croatian prisoners detained at the station. 4786/

3061. On the 23rd day, a police commander came in and took the witness away. He told the other Serbs that he was taking the priest to be killed but instead took him to an unidentified private house. 4787/ It is reported that another of the priests was allowed to go to a hospital in Rijeka from 24 October to 26 October. Three other detained were subsequently released; the fate of the remaining four prisoners is unknown. 4788/ Another prisoner at the camp was transferred from Korenica to Manjača camp on 24 October 1991. 4789/

3062. The ICRC reportedly first visited the police station in Korenica on 31 October 1991. 4790/

3063. Private House: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The priest held at the Korenica police station described above was taken to a private house by a police commander near the end of November 1991. The report does not clearly indicate where the house was located and it is only possible that it was in the Korenica province.

3064. While there, the priest was tied to a chair and interrogated by a Commander. 4791/ There were 10 other prisoners at the house. They were Serbian deserters from Plitvice who apparently did not want to attack Croatian civilians. 4792/ The priest reports that he was treated better at the house than at Korenica. He was given food and beaten very little, allowing his wounds to heal. He stayed there for approximately 10 days upon which time he was taken by an officer Putnik, blindfolded, put on an aeroplane, and brought to the basement of another unidentified building. 4793/

3065. No other Serbian perpetrators are named in association with criminal activities in Korenica, but one witness accuses UNPROFOR members of collaborating with the "Četniks" in the area. 4794/

18. Kostajnica

3066. Kostajnica, located on the Croatian side of the border from Bosanski Novi and Bosanska Dubica, BiH, had a pre-war population of 8,000, 35 per cent Croatian and 65 per cent Serbian. 4795/

3067. Čavić Brdo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) Seven prisoners were
detained in Čavić Brdo in the Spamen Dom (Memorial) building in Samarica. The building is either a hotel or a bowling alley located in what appears to be Kostajnica. The location has not been confirmed and may be as far north as Cazma. They were detained by Serbian police from 26 July 1991 until 31 July 1991, though armed civilians had access to the prisoners and abused them. The Serbian police wore camouflage uniforms and berets and treated the prisoners correctly, according to the report. One of the detainees was a local official. He was detained after being allegedly ambushed on his way back from a meeting in Kostajnica. Those detainees who were wounded during the ambush either died or were taken to Bosnia. 4796/

3068. The official was badly beaten during his detention in a hotel which he claimed was the Serbian base. He believed he was beaten more severely because he was the only police officer detained. He was blindfolded and had his hands tied in front of his body at all times. Three medical workers who were detained were not blindfolded but they were beaten. 4797/

3069. Electric shock was used on the police officer during the course of his interrogation. All the prisoners were detained in the same room and the electric shock occurred in front of the other detainees. He believes that the device used to introduce the electricity to his feet and hands was a Polish telephone, a "dynamo machine on an electric generator" which required cranking. He was not certain of this because he was blindfolded during his interrogation but he heard a cranking noise. Five or six men were present during the interrogation and allegedly laughed when he screamed. He claimed that he was electrocuted after each question he could not answer, each shock lasted for three or four seconds. The Serbian police did the questioning and allowed the civilians to beat the prisoners. The interrogators were asking him about the number of MUPs in the police stations in various villages. The other prisoners were also electrocuted but the witness believed that their treatment was not as severe. 4798/

3070. The police were allegedly under orders to watch the prisoners, prevent their escape, prevent others from abusing them. The witness claimed that their commanding officer would come in once a day and would yell at the guards that the abuse was not supposed to occur. However, the witness claims the commanding officers reprimands had no effect on the treatment of the detainees. 4799/

3071. The police officer was forced to sleep in a chair for four days. He claimed that he was not allowed to lie down and to prevent this a knife was held at his neck and a gun at his mouth. The prisoners were threatened with death and accused of being "Ustaša". They were fed liverwurst spread twice a day for the first few days, but the witness claims he had difficulty eating due to the head trauma he suffered. 4800/

3072. The prisoners were not allowed to bathe but washed their faces in a basin in the corner of the room. 4801/

3073. Seven prisoners were transferred to a three by three metre room and their blindfolds were removed on 31 July 1991. In the room was a sponge-like thing on the floor where they slept. The room had no windows or ventilation. They were given aspirin but no medical treatment was received. Two of the seven were released first and then the rest. Five Croatian prisoners were exchanged on 26 July 1991 for two Serbians. The Croatians included the police officer, another man captured during the ambush and three medical workers who allegedly were captured driving a Red Cross ambulance. A truck driver and a commercial food inspector were also detained and the commercial food inspector was released the day before the police officer was exchanged. 4802/
3074. Kukuruzara: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) One source reported a detention facility in Kukuruzara, located north-east of the county seat. Fifty-eight prisoners were detained there from 12 to 19 September 1991 and then were transferred to the Glina prison. The prisoners were reported to be members of the Croatian Ministry of Interior and the Croatian Army. All the prisoners were abused, two were killed, and one was held in solitary confinement. The detention facility was controlled by the JNA and members of the SAO Krajina Militia.

19. Kutina

3075. The county of Kutina is located in northern Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 39,493. At that time, the population was 82.6 per cent Croatian, 7.9 per cent Serbian, and 9.5 per cent were referred to as "others".

3076. Kutina Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported a police station in Kutina as a place of detention. An ICRC representative first visited the police station on 28 December 1991.

20. Metković

3077. The municipality of Metković is on the border of Herzegovina in South Dalmatia. It is situated in the Neretva river valley from the Adriatic Sea approximately 22 kilometres north to the town of Metković, the county seat. According to the 1991 population census Metković had a population of 22,774, 93.7 per cent of which were Croats, 3.1 per cent Serb, and 3.2 per cent "other".

3078. Prison in Metković: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to reports, 19 Serb civilians from the village of Glušci, were arrested and detained in the local prison following a police raid in the region on 9 May 1992. Reportedly members of the Croatian National Guard were responsible for these activities.

3079. One report suggested that the 19 civilians were detained at this location for a undisclosed period of time and then transferred to prison camps in Split and Šibenik.

3080. A passenger aboard a JNA plane when it was shot down on 23 April 1992 was reported to have been captured by the Croatian army on the left bank of the Neretva river. Though the prisoner was allegedly taken into custody in BiH he was interned at a prison in Metković. There he was reportedly punched and kicked all over his body. The prisoner also claimed that he was forced to make a statement for Croatian television. In the statement he had to say he was a member of the aggressor army and that he had killed innocent Croatian people.

3081. Unidentified camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Serbs in the Capljina municipality were detained and mistreated in an unidentified camp in the area of Metković. The inmates were reportedly subjected to beatings, cut with various sharp objects, caused to undergo electric shock treatments and forced to engage in homosexual acts as well as acts of rape with female inmates. Reportedly the facility was operated by members of the
HOS paramilitary group. 4812/

3082. "Poduh" Tobacco Processing Plant: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Permanent Mission of Germany. 4813/) According to one report, in April 1992, Serb citizens in the Čapljina region were arrested by Croatian soldiers. 4814/ The detainees were initially taken to the tobacco station in Čapljina and held there for a few hours before being blindfolded and transported to the tobacco processing plant in Metković. 4815/

3083. At the Poduh plant, the personal possessions of the detainees were removed and they were subjected to beatings with clubs, mallets, rifle butts, baseball bats and sticks. The inmates were reportedly beaten in the genital area. 4816/ When they lost consciousness, they were reportedly revived with cold water. 4817/

3084. Following the beatings, the inmates were detained in a room on the lower level for six days. They were then taken to a location on the upper level of the plant to undergo interrogation. The questioning was performed on an individual basis and reportedly lasted quite some time. 4818/

3085. Following the interrogation, the inmates were blindfolded, their hands bound and they were transported to the Lora camp in Split. 4819/

3086. Military Police Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC listed the military police building as a place of detention and first visited it on 3 June 1992. 4820/

21. Našice

3087. The county of Našice is located in north-eastern Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 40,424. At that time, the population was 80.1 per cent Croatian, 11 per cent Serbian, with 8.9 per cent referred to as "others". 4821/

3088. Našice: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Prisoners were reportedly detained in Našice. Forty-one Serbian prisoners were exchanged for 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations on 27 March 1992. The 41 were reportedly arrested between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992. Almost all the prisoners were interrogated for three to 10 days at various places in Croatia, including Našice. Then they were allegedly taken to detention facilities in Osijek and Zagreb. 4822/

3089. Additionally, there were reports that prisoners taken at Budimci were later exchanged in Nemetin. The majority of the prisoners were Serb civilians and a small number of soldiers. 4823/

22. Nova Gradiška

3090. Nova Gradiška is north of the Sava River and borders Bosanska Gradiška. It had a population of 60,461 according to the 1991 census. The population consisted of 71.7 per cent Croats, 20.8 per cent Serb, 3 per cent Yugoslav and 4.5 per cent "other". 4824/

3091. Stara Gradiška Prison: 4825/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of
State, Helsinki Watch, and the ICRC. 4826/ This camp lies within a Serb-occupied area of Croatia. 4827/ The prison was in the centre of town and consisted of two separate wings. 4828/ It is unclear if the prison operated as a traditional jail before the conflict in Croatia broke out, but it was used to house prisoners of the conflict from as early as October of 1991 until at least 29 July 1993, when ECMM visited Stara Gradiška and observed that four inmates were being housed there.

3092. A host of Serb forces have been named as being involved in the control and operation of Stara Gradiška camp. It appears that initially, the camp was controlled largely by forces other than the JNA. Many of the reports of detentions occurring in November of 1991 name "Četniks with cockards," 4829/ members of the Plitvice Territorial Defence Units, 4830/ SAO militia, 4831/ and the White Eagles as running the camp and participating in the beating and torturing of prisoners. One report stated that on 30 November, the "Četniks" told the prisoners that from that point forward, their detention came under JNA jurisdiction. 4832/

3093. Reports have named several individuals as being involved in the operation of Stara Gradiška. Thirteen persons were identified as reported interrogators at Stara Gradiška, who also maltreated the prisoners, including two members of the Plitvice Territorial Defence Unit. 4833/ A Serb irregular was also reportedly involved in the interrogation of prisoners and may have ordered some detainees to be tortured. 4834/ The camp's alleged commander, at least as of March 1992, was a former YPA colonel who reportedly ordered soldiers to beat prisoners and may have personally tortured others. 4835/

3094. Detainees at Stara Gradiška were largely Croatian, but some Muslims were also detained there on certain occasions. Muslims from Teslić, Prnjavor and Bosanska Gradiška were brought to Stara Gradiška on an unspecified date. 400 people from Lisnija were also taken to the prison. 4836/ The prisoners included both civilians and soldiers. One group of prisoners comprised members of the Croatian Defence Council and Serbs who had refused to fight against Croats. 4837/

3095. It appears that there were two "peak" periods in which individuals were detained at Stara Gradiška. The first period was between November of 1991 and January of 1992. At least 18 persons from the county of Slunj were taken to Stara Gradiška from Ključ militia station in late November 1991. They had all been accused of slaughtering anywhere between one and 15 Serbian children. 4838/ One report noted that by 18 November, prisoners were been housed in groups of 50 in small cells, suggesting that the camp population exceeded 100 persons. 4839/ Of these prisoners, 20 were sent to Manjača on 22 November. However, the ICRC intercepted the convoy and the prisoners eventually were released and taken to Zagreb. 4840/ An additional 18 persons were taken from Stara Gradiška to Okučani police station on 6 December. 4841/

3096. A prisoner who was appointed to serve as "camp doctor" upon his arrival in Stara Gradiška on 9 December 1991, noted that he examined 635 prisoners between 12 December 1991 and 6 February 1992. 4842/ According to another former prisoner, additional detainees were brought to the camp from Buče on 15 December 1991, including 20 women who were later exchanged. 4843/

3097. Other Croatians were brought from Grđevica camp to Stara Gradiška in late 1991. These prisoners spent a total of 5 months in captivity at three different camps, including Grđevica, Buče and Stara Gradiška. 4844/ In the middle of January 1992, 16 Croatian guardsmen were brought to the camp, but then returned to the camp at Okucani to receive medical attention. 4845/ On 16 January 1992, 100 prisoners were exchanged in Pakrac. 4846/ Twenty-three additional prisoners were released on 26 January 1992 and taken to Bosanski...
The second high point for detentions occurred between May and June of 1992. On 26 April 1992, a BiH official and an HVO soldier were diverted from their planned meeting with Lt. Col. Zovin Peulićan and eventually taken to Stara Gradiška, where they were beaten by police officers and at least one individual who identified himself as a White Eagle. They were sent home that evening. On 29 May 1992, 400 men were transferred from Ključ sports hall to Stara Gradiška. Most of them remained there until mid-June, when they were transported to the camp at Manjača.

The following day, 29 May, four Muslims in an unidentified village were captured by White Eagles and taken along with seven other Muslims to Stara Gradiška camp. At that time, the prison was holding 450 males and no females. An additional two dozen prisoners were taken from Knin and arrived at the camp shortly after 4 June. On 14 June 1992, all 450 inmates were taken to Manjača and the prison was reportedly abandoned. However, as mentioned earlier, ECMM visited Stara Gradiška in July 1993, and four inmates were being detained there. This suggests that the camp was either reopened or remained in operation despite the witness' observations.

By most accounts, the camp was severely overcrowded throughout 1991 and 1992. In November 1991, groups of 50 prisoners were held in rooms measuring five metres by six metres. They were forced to sleep on the bare floor. One prisoner, who was detained at Stara Gradiška in May and June of 1992, was placed in a room with 60 other men. The room was 18 square metres in size. Because of the crowded conditions, the prisoners were not able to all sleep at one time.

There are discrepancies as to the treatment of prisoners at the camp. Several reports, which are based on interviews with persons detained at Stara Gradiška in November 1991 note that many prisoners were beaten and tortured by the guards and interrogators at the camp. This activity appears to have occurred when the "Četniks" or irregulars and SAO militia were in control of the camp. One prisoner stated that he heard shots every night for 12 consecutive nights during his stay at Stara Gradiška, and that he knew of at least four prisoners who died. This witness also stated that the ICRC visited on Christmas Day 1991 and that conditions improved mildly after Croatia was recognized in January 1992. However, another former prisoner stated that conditions at Stara Gradiška, while under the control of the JNA, was "bearable, indeed a positive blessing in comparison with Bučje [a camp in Pakrac]."

One of the more notorious forms of torture at Stara Gradiška was the use of electrified water. One prisoner who was held there in March and April of 1992 related that the camp commander threatened to throw him into the water unless he confessed. After being kicked and beaten, the prisoner's body touched a metal net which grazed the water, and he sustained shocks. This treatment was repeated 10 days later. Other prisoners were made to walk continuously in circles for hours, or to stand still for given intervals of time. In contrast, a prisoner who was detained at Stara Gradiška in May and June of 1992 stated that no one was beaten, "mishandled" or killed during his 14-day stay at the camp. Prisoners were interrogated, however, about their backgrounds and political affiliations.

One ex-detainee stated that prisoners were fed three times a day. Twenty-four prisoners had to share a kilogram of bread. In addition, a piece of cheese was distributed to the prisoners at breakfast and a piece of margarine was given at dinnertime. Prisoners were also given very little water, but were afraid to ask for more sustenance "as it was considered a
criticism...and was punished by beating". In November, prisoners were given only one bath, during which they were beaten and spat on.  

3104. Nova Gradiška Detention Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A group of civilians and Territorial Defence Units in Mašiška Šagovina surrendered to Croatian forces. One of the men among the group, a Serb, was taken to the detention camp at Nova Gradiška. No other details about the camp were provided.  

3105. Okučani Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Okučani is located just north of Stara Gradiška and west of Nova Gradiška proper. The former police station in Okučani served as a Serb-run detention facility in late 1991. As early as 6 December 1991, individuals were taken to this site and detained. The last known date on which prisoners were held at Okučani is the middle of January 1992.  

3106. Okučani was run by Serb forces, but it is unclear whether the forces were regular or paramilitary. One report noted that members of the Okučani Territorial Defence forces and SAO Krajina "tortured and killed detainees in Nova Gradiška," but does not specifically mention Okučani. Three individuals were identified as reportedly participating in the beating of Okučani prisoners. The military unit to which these persons belonged was not given in the report.  

3107. Most of the Okučani detainees appear to have been Croatian, and included civilians and military personnel. One group of 18 persons was taken from the camp at Stara Gradiška to Okučani on 6 December 1991. Among the prisoners were women and civilians. Twelve of these 18 were eventually returned to Stara Gradiška. An additional report noted that 12 persons were taken from Okučani to Stara Gradiška on 24 December 1991. It is possible that this report is referring to the same 12 individuals. Additionally, 16 Croatian guardsmen were brought to Stara Gradiška in the middle of January 1992. However, they were returned to Okučani because they were severely beaten and could not receive appropriate medical attention at Stara Gradiška.  

3108. Prisoners at Okučani were housed in small cells which measured one metre by 1.8 metres, so that the prisoners could not all sit down at one time. In one cell of this size, 14 prisoners were detained. The cells had neither windows or doors. Upon arrival at Okučani, detainees were stripped of all their belongings. During the day, the prisoners were beaten with all sorts of weapons, and at night, they were taken into a separate room where between five to six men beat the prisoners. Several individuals died as a result of beatings.  

3109. At least one prisoner was mutilated while detained at Okučani. An electric appliance for use in cattle was implemented to maltreat the prisoners, but the method used was not described. Others were forced to open a heated oven with their bare hands or eat salt and drink salt water. The group of prisoners who were taken from Okučani to Stara Gradiška on 24 December 1991 were described as having been severely beaten. In addition, one of the women prisoners had been tortured and raped by Okučani guards and other prisoners.  

3110. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the police station as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 3 January 1992.
23. Novska

3111. Novska is located north of the Sava River and borders Bosanska Dubica. According to the 1991 census it had a population of 24,731. The population was 67 per cent Croat, 21.8 per cent Serb, and 11.2 per cent other. 4874/

3112. Novska Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In December 1991, a Serbian family was taken by local Croatian authorities to the "Novska prison". At the prison, the entire family was allegedly subjected to physical and mental abuse. 4875/ Also within the municipality of Novska, in the village of Borovac, several members of Serbian paramilitary forces were accused of illegally detaining, harassing, and mistreating ethnic Croatians. These violations were allegedly committed between August and December 1991; no specific location is given. 4876/

24. Ogulin

3113. The county of Ogulin is located in Croatia, south-west of Zagreb near the border with Slovenia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 28,904. At that time, the population was 59.9 per cent Croatian, 35.3 per cent Serbian, with the remaining 4.8 per cent referred to as "others". 4877/

3114. Saborsko: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There was a report of detention of civilians in Saborsko by Serbian paramilitary formations on 12 November 1991. 4878/

3115. Plaški Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that on 1 December 1991, a member of the Serbian paramilitary forces, interrogated civilians in the police station in Plaški. 4879/

3116. Ogulin Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Two reports from the same source indicated that 23 Serbs from Ogulin and the surrounding villages were arbitrarily arrested between 17 November 1991 and 20 November 1991. The Serbs allegedly were held in the Ogulin police station for three days, where they were physically abused by police officers and a ZNG member of the Republic of Croatia, in an effort to extract confessions on alleged collaboration with "Četniks" and possession of firearms. They were questioned and beaten at the police station. One of the officers fired shots from an automatic weapon, killing three of them and gravely wounding one. 4880/

3117. Another source reported on what appears to be the same incident and included two statements by ex-detainees. Both statements concern the arrest and detention of ethnic Serbs at the Ogulin police station. On 18 November 1991 one witness was arrested at work by a patrol from the Croatian Ministry of Interior. No reason was given for the arrest. He was detained at the Ogulin police station with 23 other people of Serbian nationality. 4881/ The other witness was arrested at his house on 17 November 1991 by the so-called "Josip Turković Intervention Unit" and taken by police van to the Ogulin police station allegedly to give a statement. 4882/

3118. According to the first witness, the interrogations began the same evening and the detainees were interrogated individually by six to eight people. The witness was interrogated by a co-worker from the Čumerija enterprise for one hour and 10 minutes which involved the beating of the
prisoner on the legs and arms with a nightstick. He was accused of having been involved in an armed rebellion against the Republic of Croatia. 4883/

3119. The second witness was first interrogated by an elderly man allegedly from Zagreb to whom he gave his personal data and who questioned him about the Serbs from Plaški. He was then taken to another room where he spent up to two hours. A guard pointed a gun at his head and continuously clicked the trigger. A tall Croatian Defence Force (HOS) member with a red beret and a shorter man in civilian clothes entered the room. The two began interrogating and beating the witness. The HOS member kicked the witness in the head which caused bleeding. They left the prisoner ordering him to write a statement. The two men returned half an hour later and beat him again because he had not written anything. Another severely beaten prisoner was brought in and shortly thereafter the civilian took him away while the HOS member remained with the witness demanding a confession. The prisoner was then fed some bread and canned meat and when the other prisoner returned he too had been fed. The two prisoners were then taken to another cell which contained a severely beaten Serb. The Serb claimed he had been beaten all night, forced to sing "Ustaše" songs, and declare himself a "Četnik". 4884/

3120. The next day the two prisoners were taken out of the cell and told they would be released. Instead they were taken to a meeting room which held 10 other Serbs who had been arrested that morning. They were watched by two guards, one of whom collected money from the prisoners and bought them sandwiches and cigarettes. In the evening the prisoners were moved to the cafeteria in the basement. At 8:00 p.m., two "Turković's special policemen" entered the room and began taking prisoners out one by one. The prisoners returned badly beaten, the interrogators allegedly jumped from tables on to the chests of the prisoners. This continued until 4:00 a.m. on 19 November 1991. 4885/

3121. Those left in the room were threatened by a named person, who cocked his gun and pointed it at the prisoners. The witness was not beaten and he was told the man was saving him for last. At 7:00 a.m., two men entered and took the personal data of the prisoners. The witness was asked to reveal the names of the "Četniks" and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) members inJosip Dol. The witness gave only the names of the deceased and those who had fled. During that day, around seven more Serbs were detained. 4886/

3122. Both of the witnesses claim that at some time during their detention a man entered the room where the prisoners were held and fired at the prisoners. The first witness claims that on 19 November 1991, the two guards who watched the prisoners were joined by an armed man. This armed man fired his weapon at the prisoners. Three detainees were killed and one was seriously wounded. The guards disarmed the assailant and moved the prisoners to another room where they spent the night. 4887/

3123. The other witness claims that the assailant was a member of the Croatian National Guard (ZNG). The guards, one a special policemen and the other a man from Modruša, attempted to get the assailant to leave. They were initially successful, however, he returned minutes later and joined the two policemen at a table where they were interviewing the detainees. The assailant appeared to be intoxicated and began telling the other two about his experiences in the war. The two police tried to convince him to leave and get some rest as his shift was over. The assailant allegedly started for the door but suddenly turned and fired from his automatic weapon on the detainees. The two policemen pushed his gun to the floor and one hit him in the head with his gun. Two prisoners died and one was severely wounded. A policemen named called an ambulance and the wounded prisoner was taken away. 4888/
3124. On 20 November 1991 the prisoners were released without explanation. 4889/

3125. Another report alleged that between 19 November 1991 and 21 November 1991 some one hundred Serbs from different villages were arrested and taken to the police station in Ogulin. There they were beaten and interrogated about an alleged rebellion. Ten people were killed and 90 have disappeared. 4890/

25. Osijek

3126. The county of Osijek is in eastern Croatia bordering FRY at Vojvodina. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 164,577. At that time, 66.6 per cent were Croatian, 20 per cent were Serbian, 8.4 per cent were referred to as "other", and 5 per cent were referred to as "Yugoslav". 4891/

3127. Dalj Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC. 4892/) It was reported that on 10 August 1991, in the village of Erdut, 4893/ members of the JNA Novi Sad Corps, and members of irregular militia 4894/ comprised of Serb villagers from Erdut began arresting Croatian and Hungarian civilians remaining in the town after the JNA occupation. A number of civilians 4895/ were arrested and taken to the village of Dalj. After an interrogation and physical abuse, some of the civilians were released while some were taken to Borovo Selo. On 25 August 1991, additional Croatian civilians were arrested by the "Krajina Militia" in the town of Erdut. They were imprisoned in Dalj for seven days and then taken to Borovo Selo. Several days later some of the Croatians were taken back to Dalj and imprisoned in the "Kooperacija" company building. 4896/

3128. Temporary Dalj Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that a number of captured Croatian civilians from Vukovar were transported and temporarily detained in the village of Dalj during the last week of November 1991, after the fall of Vukovar. They were allegedly tortured and most of them were executed thereafter. 4897/ A witness testimony in another report corroborates the existence of this temporary camp in Dalj where many people were held and then allegedly executed. 4898/

3129. "Kooperacija" Company Building, Dalj: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that several Croatian civilians who were arrested in Erdut by members of JNA Novi Sad Corps and members of the "Krajina Militia" were imprisoned in Dalj in the "Kooperacija" company building. 4899/

3130. "Private" Prison in Dalj (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that Veso Proa, a Serb from Vukovar and a resident from Belgrade fired at an imprisoned Croatian civilian near the cyrillic sign "Dalj" at the entrance to the village. The man survived and was taken to the private prison in Dalj along with two other men. 4900/ Another report says that there is a "private" camp in Dalj. 4901/

3131. Police Station, Dalj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International. 4902/) A member of the Croatian National Guard interviewed in the Zagreb weekly newspaper Danas of 27 August 1991 described how he was captured in Dalj on 3 August, by Tocâl Serbs, former police officers who had occupied the police station in Dalj. He was questioned and released. The following day he was again detained and held together with some 20 other Croatians. He alleged that he was forced to load the bodies of 22 dead Croatian National Guardsmen and police into a refrigerated truck. He also alleged that he and his fellow
prisoners were forced to carry out various physical tasks by their captors who punched and beat them with rifle butts, put out cigarettes on their bodies and humiliated them. 4903/

3132. Police Station Jail, Osijek: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) A Serbian man being held in the Osijek jail described his arrest and treatment in an interview with Helsinki Watch. On 7 July 1991 the man's house in the village of Shilopsi was surrounded by the Croatian National Guard and he and the other civilians in the house surrendered. They were beaten inside the house with rifle butts and kicked. He reported that about 20 to 30 National Guards were hitting and kicking them. After being beaten in the house, they were forced to walk about one to two kilometres to their cars where they were again beaten. They were then taken to Djackovo police station and he was taken to the hospital where his wounds were stitched. They were then taken to the Osijek police station and put in jail at about 3:00 p.m. on 8 July. There were seven people arrested (four men) and the men were all in the jail in Osijek. 4904/ In another interview with Helsinki Watch, the police chief of Knin reported that they believe there to be a total of 45 men held in the jails in Osijek and Banija. 4905/

3133. Osijek Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC.) A report alleges that a man, Savo Ojkić of Voćin, who was imprisoned by Croatian authorities was subjected to brutal physical torture in Osijek prison which resulted in serious injuries of which he later died. He died in a Zagreb hospital where he had be taken for treatment. 4906/ The ICRC reports that its representatives first visited the Osijek prison on 7 December 1991. 4907/

3134. Osijek Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that its representatives first visited the Osijek barracks on 23 April 1992. There are no details given. 4908/

3135. Osijek Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that its representatives first visited the Osijek hospital on 31 March 1994. There are no details given. 4909/

3136. Secretariat of Internal Affairs Building, Osijek: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that after members of the Yugoslav People’s Army surrendered in Osijek, they were taken to the Secretariat of Internal Affairs building where all their belongings were seized and they were forced to run a gauntlet of enemy soldiers on their way to prison cells. They were allegedly beaten severely. 4910/

3137. Basement of House, Osijek: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to witness statements, members of the Croatian forces had entered into Paulin Dvor 4911/ on the night of 12 or 13 December 1991. Seventeen people were arrested and taken to the basement of the house of Mr. Andrija Bukvić. According to the witnesses, they were all killed. 4912/

3138. Unidentified Osijek camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) A report discusses detailed information gathered from former prisoners of a camp in Osijek. They were allegedly subjected to severe physical and mental mistreatment. The forms of mental mistreatment ranged from bullying, threats, blackmail, recruitment and humiliation to brutal maltreatment, and sexual
abuse. 4913/ This report is corroborated by another report discussing the

treatment of the prisoners exchanged in the village of Nemetin on 27 March

1992. 4914/ Another report says that prisoners were taken out to downtown

Osijek during the fiercest fighting to collect refuse and deposit it into

street refuse bins. 4915/

3139. Second unidentified Osijek camp: (The existence of this detention

facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) It was reported that

a parish priest in Koprivnica 4916/ was arbitrarily arrested and detained by

Croatian armed forces. He was first in preventive detention in Bjelovar and

was then transferred to Osijek. Although he was a civilian and clergyman, he

was exchanged as a prisoner of war for Croatian soldiers. He was allegedly

ill treated and physically tortured as a result of which he suffered great

bodily harm. 4917/

3140. Unidentified Ernestinovo camp: (The existence of a detention facility in

this village has been corroborated by neutral sources, namely the ICRC and

Amnesty International.) An Amnesty International and the ICRC report states

that there is a camp in Ernestinovo, in the county of Osijek. There are no

details concerning this camp. 4918/

26. Otočac

3141. Otočac is located near Gospić and had a population of 24,779. The

population was 64.9 per cent Croat, 32.2 per cent Serb, and 2.9 per cent

other. 4919/

3142. Otočac Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been

corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC listed the Otočac

Prison as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 2 April

1992. 4920/

27. Pakrac

3143. Before the second World War, Pakrac and its environs were almost

entirely populated by Croats. Following World War II, Serbs began to inhabit

the region and many Croats departed the area. 4921/

3144. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, the municipality of Pakrac had a

population of 27,288. Of that number 46.4 per cent were Serbs, 36 per cent

were Croats and the remaining 17.6 per cent were described as "others".

3145. Reports received from the region suggest that of the three detention

facilities in the municipality, two were Croat-run and one was Serb

controlled.

3146. Bučje Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been

corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International.) The

village of Bučje is located some 20 kilometres east of Pakrac. According to

reports, Bučje had become a reference point for "SAO West Slavonija". 4922/

The village became the military and administrative centre of the "SAO

West". 4923/ As a result, the prison was the most logical central warehouse

to which prisoners captured from surrounding areas with undetermined

containment assignment could be registered and detained. 4924/

3147. According to one report, on 19 August 1991, "Četniks" attacked and

occupied a portion of this Croatian community killing a number of civilians

and imprisoning others at this camp. From August to November 1991, a great
many the prisoners at this location were reportedly questioned, tortured and killed. 4925/

3148. In another account, an elderly Croat reported being arrested on 21 September by Serbian paramilitary forces and taken to the village of Bučje. He reported being held with both civilian and captured soldiers in a school building. 4926/

3149. According to the report, the detainees were made to sleep on concrete floors with only a piece of cardboard for bedding. 4927/ The detainees' hands were tied behind their backs and their ankles bound. They were reportedly beaten simultaneously by several of their captors. 4928/

3150. One former detainee, who was arrested in August 1991 and held in several detention facilities, stated that his treatment at Bučje was the worst. He reported that he and other prisoners were beaten by their captors while they were handcuffed and blindfolded. "Life in Stara Gradiška, under the control of the JNA was bearable, indeed a positive blessing in comparison with Bučje". 4929/

3151. In another report, on 29 August 1991, a physician from Pakrac was taken to and detained in the basement of the forestry company at Bučje. He was kept in a room that contained only a stool and a piece of paper. He was given bread to eat and, the following morning, a blanket. On the evening of the second day he was taken to a physician to be treated for his wounds. He was reportedly removed from the camp for a few days and then returned on 6 September, this time he was detained in the room in the former veterinary clinic. The room used to be a stable. The floor was damp. He was given a sponge mattress, two blankets and a pillow. He was permitted regular meals. There was reportedly a female lawyer held in the room next to his and 40 people captured were detained in a wooden barn in the municipality. According to the witness, Serbs as well as Croats were detained at this facility. Reportedly Serbs who were part of a resistance were detained by the Serb paramilitaries. 4930/

3152. The witness identified members of the JNA bringing in refugees from surrounding villages. According to the witness there were 150 individuals held at Bučje. Serbs were reportedly released 10-15 days after their arrival. There were reportedly 30 Serbs detained there. Approximately six people were killed, 10 people were unaccounted for and a number of women were raped. 4931/

3153. "Stara Ciglana": (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) "Stara Ciglana" was regarded as a death camp. 4932/ It was located in Pakračka Poljana, near Kutina. This facility was reportedly created by Special Forces Units of the Ministry of the Interior Affairs of the Republic of Croatia for the containment and control of ethnic Serbs. 4933/

3154. Reportedly, after their arrest, ethnic Serbs were brought to this location and, either individually or in small groups, prepared for and "liquidated". 4934/ According to the report, those not destroyed were detained in the camp for several days and thereafter removed to locations where they were later killed. 4935/

3155. "Ribarska Koliba" Hotel: 4936/ (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) This Marino Selo hotel was reportedly converted into the Croatian National Guard/Military Police headquarters and death camp. 4937/ It was reportedly a small settlement just between Pakrac and Kutina. It was created in late October 1991 and secured by some 30 military police officers. The commander at that time was one Damir Širac. 4938/
3156. According to one report, on 15 November 1991, members of the Croatian army arrested 15 Serbs from the village of Kip, six from Klisa, and one from Batinjani. 4939/ Most of the prisoners were reportedly members of Serbian insurgency, but all were unarmed. They were detained in a hotel in the village Marino Selo, and guarded by 12-15 Croat army members. 4940/ The prisoners were reportedly used as forced labour to bury the bodies of those killed in the camp. 4941/

3157. The detainees at this facility were beaten with iron rods which were removed from military beds, beaten with wooden truncheons, and reportedly in one case, a blow torch was burned across the chest of one of the inmates. 4942/

3158. Following the beatings, they were detained in a room in the cellar from which regular beatings were inflicted. 4943/ There was also reportedly a room next to this cellar containment area where other detainees were taken solely for the purpose of being beaten. 4944/

3159. One detainee recalled that his son was taken by members of the National Guard to a hotel room where he was placed in a chair with his hands tied behind his back and thereafter connected to electricity and tortured. 4945/

3160. In another incident, the Croatian soldiers reportedly cut off the ears of one inmate and then forced another detainee who witnessed the event to eat the ear. 4946/ They reportedly later cut the ears and fingers off of several other detainees. 4947/

3161. Police Headquarters: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the existence of a camp at the Police Headquarters in Pakrac. The ICRC first visited the camp on 14 January 1992. 4948/

3162. Jedinstvo Football Club: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In December of 1991 a Serb prisoner was interned in an improvised prison in the locker room of the Jedinstvo Football Club at Pakračka Poljana by the Croatian Army. While interned there he was interrogated and asked about the military positions of the JNA. He was also beaten daily. He filmed for five hours while interrogated. He was dressed in a fur cap, a coat of arms with a četnik insignia for the event. The guards also electrocuted him by hooking a power transformer to his toes and turning the power on. His stomach was also burned and he was treated in Pakračka Poljana hospital. 4949/

3163. Unidentified House, Pakrac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to the testimony of a civilian from Pakrac, who was arrested by Serb paramilitaries on 19 August 1991, he recalled being taken to an unidentified house near Bučje. He was handcuffed and blindfolded and was unsure of his exact location. He was interrogated and beaten in this condition. The witness made a written statement and was detained in the bathroom of this house overnight. The following day he and another detainee were transported to another private home in the area. 4950/

3164. Home of Jela Tarbuk, Pakrac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to the statement of a civilian physician detained at this location, the home of a now deceased patient, he and another physician were kept here from 20 August 1991 to 29 August 1991. Reportedly one guard was posted at the location during the day and two at nights. They were fed three times a day and interrogated only once. The witness was made to write a letter to the hospital in Pakrac requesting
surgical equipment and other supplies. The witness was transferred to Bučje on 29 August 1991. 

28. Petrinja

3165. Petrinja is located near Glina and had a population of 35,622 according to the 1991 census. The population was 44.2 per cent Croat, 44.9 per cent Serb, 5.1 per cent Yugoslav, 5.8 per cent "other". 

3166. Taborište Settlement, Brijest: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A concentration camp in which Serbians were detained was allegedly located at the Taboriste settlement, in the village of Brijest. About 500 prisoners were detained there, including 80 women and 40 children. The children ranged in age from 8 to 15, and they were beaten and forced to work during their detention. The female prisoners were raped every day, and the male prisoners were reportedly killed and buried in mass graves. 

3167. Vasil Gačeša Casern: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State.) The Vasil Gačeša casern, which was formerly operated by the JNA, reportedly served as a Serb-run detention facility in September of 1991. The casern was used to house Croatian civilians in Petrinja county. At least 31 Croatian persons were captured while trying to escape the fighting in Petrinja and taken to the casern. The prisoners were told they were being held "for their own security". Five of them were released the following morning. At least one of the prisoners was interrogated, beaten and forced to sign several confessions. The detainees also participated in burial detail, where bodies of killed persons were buried in two identified mass graves. One of the mass graves was reportedly located within Vasil Gačeša casern itself, and the other was near a small hill, where 18 Croatian soldiers were buried. The report did not indicate whether the soldiers were former prisoners of the casern.

3168. According to another report, SAO Krajina forces arrested a group of citizens on 21 September and took them to the casern, where a number of them were interrogated and tortured. Others were forced into labour. 

3169. Croatian soldiers may have also been detained at the Vasil Gačeša casern. On 16 September, Serb paramilitaries and JNA troops captured a group of 23 Croatian soldiers. They were reportedly tortured for several hours, then executed by a firing squad and buried in a mass grave. While the report did not specify the precise location where the captured soldiers were taken, the date of the incident coincides with other reports which mention the Vasil Gačeša casern. 

3170. Several individuals have been identified as participating in the operation of the Vasil Gačeša facility. Reportedly, the chief jailer was a JNA Sergeant and the commander of the casern was a JNA Major. Four alleged JNA interrogators were also identified.

29. Podravska Slatina

3171. Podravska Slatina is located in northern Croatia and had a population of 31,155 according to the 1991 census. The population of the opstina was 57.2 per cent Croat, 35.8 per cent Serb, 3.5 per cent Yugoslav, and the remaining 3.5 per cent were described as "other".
3172. Unidentified Detention Facility: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Little specific information is available regarding detention facilities in the municipality of Podravska Slatina. One report refers to Podravska Slatina, among other locations, as a place where Croatian authorities detained ethnic Serbs. POW’s interviewed in March 1992 reported physical violence and mental mistreatment. The names of prison guards and members of the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs are given as alleged perpetrators. 4961/

3173. Police Station, Voćin: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) It is reported that the police station in Voćin was used by Serbs as a detention centre. 4962/

30. Pula

3174. Pula is located in Istria and had a population of 84,606. The population was 55.5 per cent Croat, 7.6 per cent Serb, 36.9 per cent other, and 11.9 per cent regional ethnic orientation. 4963/

3175. District Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC listed the district prison in Pula as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 16 February 1992. 4964/

31. Rijeka

3176. The county of Rijeka is located in north-west Croatia bordering the Adriatic Sea, near the Istria peninsula. According to the 1991 census, the population was 205,836. At that time, the population was 71.4 per cent Croatian, 10.6 per cent Serbian, 2.9 per cent Muslim, 11.2 per cent of the population was referred to as "other", and 3.9 per cent was referred to as "Yugoslav". 4965/

3177. Rijeka: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including EMM and Helsinki Watch.) One source reported that the Croatian forces maintain a detention centre in Rijeka. 4966/ Around 14 September 1993 team Gospić of the ECMR was informed by the local Red Cross that some Serb prisoners allegedly had been transferred to Rijeka for unknown reasons after the last Croatian Army offensive in the Gospić pocket. The team was also informed that the authorities in Gospić would not allow anyone to see all the prisoners detained after the last offensive. 4967/ Another report claims that 12 draft age men, who arrived in Jablanica during January and February 1993, reported being picked up in various parts of Croatia by the Croatian police and detained in Rijeka before being sent to Posušje. The men appear to have been Bosnian Muslims though possibly three were Serbian. 4968/

3178. Rijeka Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) On 29 September 1993 the Knin Red Cross delivered the list of Croats incarcerated in the Glina jail and were given in return a list of Serbian soldiers, captured by the Croats in Ćitluk, Divoselo, and Medak and who were reportedly detained in the Rijeka prison. 4969/ The ICRC visited the prison in Rijeka on 4 October 1991. 4970/

3179. Rijeka Military Police Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the military police building in Rijeka as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The representatives first visited the
detention facility on 12 September 1993. 4971/

32. Šibenik

3180. The county of Šibenik is located in southern Croatia and borders the Adriatic Sea. According to the 1991 census, the population was 84,435. At that time, the population was 84.1 per cent Croatian, 10.5 per cent Serbian, with 5.4 per cent referred to as "others". 4972/

3181. Šibenik Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) It was reported that on 9 May 1992, Croatian authorities arrested 19 Serbs from the village of Glusci in the county of Metković on charges of "armed rebellion against the Croatian state". The arrested villagers were first imprisoned in Metković, then in Split and Šibenik. A prisoner exchange was arranged between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia for 14 August 1992. Twelve of the prisoners were exchanged, but seven refused to be exchanged and were reportedly then held in the prison in Šibenik for another 56 days. 4973/ Another report also discusses the allegation that the prison in Šibenik is holding prisoners of war. 4974/ There is also mention of a camp in a prison/penitentiary reportedly first visited by the ICRC on 9 September 1991. 4975/

3182. "Ante Jonjić" Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources. 4976/) In a statement given by a Serbian man 4977/, it is reported that there is a camp in the "Ante Jonjić" Barracks in Šibenik. The man was arrested by Croatian soldiers near the village of Mumilovaca on his way to Prebilovci in Čapljina county on 8 April 1992. He was handcuffed and taken to a camp at the tobacco processing plant in Čapljina. He was held there with others and they were all beaten. They were then taken to the "Poduh" tobacco processing plant in Metković, where their personal documents and all valuables were taken. They were also again subjected to severe and repeated beatings. They were later taken to the "Lora" camp in Split. They were again beaten repeatedly and given very little food. The man witnessed at least one man being killed. Allegedly, one night before the arrival of the International Red Cross, 12 of the prisoners were tied up and taken in a van to Zadar where they were held in the former JNA barracks. They were again beaten. From here, they were taken to Duvno (now Tomislavgrad) where they were held for about 10 days in the cellar of an abandoned house. They were then driven to Ljubuski and were again beaten. The witness was beaten so severely that he was taken to the hospital in Split where he stayed for 15 days. After this he was taken to Šibenik, to what he believes was the "Ante Jonjić" barracks. There, the prisoners were forced to "graze" on the grass. He was beaten and stabbed in the chest. He witnessed a 70 year-old woman and her 15 year-old granddaughter being raped. After about 10 days, he was taken back to "Lora" in Split. He was there for about a month and a half and then driven with other prisoners in three or four busses to the Kerestinec camp. From there, he was sent to Nemetin near Osijek and exchanged on 14 August 1992. 4978/

3183. Temporary Detention Centre: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) A witness reported being held for two days in what he believed to be a temporary detention centre in a cellar of a deserted house in the Šibenik area with 10 other prisoners. The guards were black-uniformed Muslims from the Black Legion. All the prisoners were beaten and as a result of being beaten himself, the source received a broken shoulder, broken nose and lost several teeth. From here the prisoners were moved to Eminovo Selo. During the move, 8 prisoners disappeared and the source believes they were killed. 4979/
3184. Šibenik Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Reportedly the ICRC first visited this facility on 2 February 1992. There are no details given concerning this camp. 4980/

3185. Unknown Cellar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) A witness reported being moved from Split to a location he cannot remember but believes to have been Šibenik where he spent one night and one day in the cellar of a normal village house with 10 other prisoners. 4981/ The source believes the village may have been Serbian as it was “empty” at the time he was there. 4982/

3186. A. Unidentified Šibenik Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) An unknown Šibenik camp was reported in a list of camps. 4983/

3187. B. Unidentified Šibenik Camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Thomson CSCE Mission.) An unidentified Šibenik camp was reported in a list supplied by Colonel Milosević, Commander of Serbian forces at Trebinje. 4984/

33. Sinj

3188. Sinj is located in southern Croatia and had a population of 60,178 according to the 1991 census. The population was 92.6 per cent Croat, 4.5 per cent Serb, and 2.9 per cent “other”. 4985/

3189. Sinj Military Police Building: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the military police building in Sinj as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 24 June 1993. 4986/

34. Sisak

3190. Sisak is located approximately 40 kilometres south-east of Zagreb and approximately 100 kilometres north-west of Prijedor, BiH. According to the 1991 census Sisak had a population of 84,247; 64.5 per cent were Croat, 3.2 per cent Muslim, 22.8 per cent Serb, 4.4 per cent Yugoslav, and 5.2 per cent other. 4987/ Reports based on statements of Serb prisoners detained in Croatian facilities in the area of Sisak suggest that they were subjected to physical, mental, and social mistreatment. 4988/

3191. Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch.) In one report, six Serbs—four women and two men—were arrested on 27 January 1992 on the highway near Sisak. The six were detained at the police station for 24 hours without food or water. 4989/ Their personal possessions were removed and they were divided into groups. Three were sent to Slavonski Brod and the remaining three, it was believed, were sent to Slavonska Požega. 4990/

3192. According to one report, a Serbian male was arrested in Zagreb by local police officers and taken to Zagreb police station. After being detained there for several hours—without explanation, he and his son were transferred to the police station in Sisak. 4991/ The witness was hand-cuffed and taken to a room with several police officers who immediately began interrogating and verbally assaulted him. 4992/ He was then taken to a room on the first floor of the station unaccompanied by his son. He was once again interrogated
regarding the activities of his brother. This second round of questioning lasted just under an hour, after which he was transferred to the jail in Sisak. 4993/

3193. Sisak Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) According to the witness he was placed in cell number 4 after the interrogation process at the local police station. He reportedly shared the cell with several other men. 4994/ In the early morning hours, he heard someone being beaten and recognized the screams as that of his brother. The beating reportedly lasted several hours. 4995/

3194. The witness was blindfolded the majority of the time and so was neither able to describe the surroundings, nor identify his captors or fellow inmates. He reportedly remained at this location overnight and was returned to the police station the following day where he was registered and released. 4996/

3195. Sisak Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) On an unreported date in 1992, ZNG member allegedly captured five Serbs in a forest, location unknown; three of those captured were women. The five were reportedly taken to the prison in Sisak where the guards allegedly beat and kicked one of the women who was pregnant. 4997/

3196. The Sisak prison was reported on the ICRC list of places of detention and was first visited on 5 August 1991. 4998/

35. Slavonska Požega

3197. The county of Slavonska Požega is located in eastern Croatia near the border with BiH. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 71,299. At that time, the population was 79.4 per cent Croatian, 14 per cent Serbian, and 6.6 per cent was referred to as "other". 4999/

3198. Unidentified Prison, Slavonska Požega: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Forty-one Serbian prisoners were exchanged for 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations on 27 March 1992. The 41 were reported to have been arrested between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992. Almost all the prisoners were interrogated for three to 10 days at various places in Croatia, including Slavonska Požega. Then they were allegedly taken to detention facilities in Osijek and Zagreb. 5000/

3199. Several sources submitted identical reports alleging that at least one person was taken into custody in Sisak and sent to Slavonska Požega. However, the report does not indicate whether the individual was detained there. 5001/

3200. Police Station, Požega: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Požega appears to be the same place as Slavonska Požega and the ICRC reported the police station in the općina as a place of detention. A representative first visited the police station on 6 April 1992. 5002/

3201. Slavonska Požega Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) On 10 December 1991, the village of Vučjak Čečevaci was attacked by Croatian forces. After the attack a member of the local Territorial Defence was arrested and taken to prison in Slavonska Požega. He was visited and registered by the ICRC. 5003/
3202. The ICRC first visited the Požega district prison on 24 October 1991.  

3203. Slavonska Požega Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In December 1991 Gornji Grahovljani, populated mainly by Serbs, was captured by Croatian forces. There remained 15 people in the village after the occupation and they fled to the woods. All 15 were killed expect for one 17 year old male. He was detained in the Slavonska Požega Jail by the Croats and released on 1 June 1993. At the jail he was questioned about the location of weapons in Gornji Grahovljani and taken back to the village to look. No weapons were found. A court in Osijek sentenced him to a year and a half in prison though he was not present for his sentencing. He served his entire sentence in the Slavonska Požega Jail. The ECMM team reported that the Croatian Ministry of Interior denies that the witness was ever jailed at Slavonska Požega.  

3204. Local Prisons: (The existence of these detention facilities have been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) On 24 November 1991 an ECMM team visited two local prisons in the Slavonska Požega opcina. These prisons contained two JNA officers and two "Četnik" suspects and all stated that their treatment in the prison was totally correct and in conformity with accepted norms. One of the JNA officers was charged with unspecified war crimes. Three of the prisoners had been beaten when they were initially arrested by Croatian forces at Slavonski Brod and of these one was badly beaten. 

3205. One of the JNA officers claimed that the prisoners were separated from each other. Mail could be received and sent but it was checked by prison authorities. The prisoners were given three meals a day, a bath once a week, and allowed to shave twice a week. They had to purchase their own toiletries and were seen by a doctor once a week.  

3206. The other JNA officer claimed he had not been allowed to contact his family until the last 10 days of his detention. He had been interrogated but stated that this was conducted in a correct manner. One of the suspected "Četniks" claimed he too had medical treatment and was allowed visits from his wife. He had hired a lawyer. 

3207. During this same visit the ECMM team had planned to interview a wounded "Četnik" at the hospital but the man had died before they arrived. The team was satisfied that the man died naturally from his wounds as they viewed the blood transfusion records. 

3208. Slavonski Brod is in south-eastern Croatia on the border of Bosanski Brod, BiH. In 1991, it had a population of 113,551, of which 85.2 per cent were Croat, 6.5 per cent were Serb, 5.4 per cent other, and 2.9 per cent "Yugoslav". 

3209. The killing and detention of Serbs in Slavonski Brod and the surrounding region is said to have started on 8 May 1992 and continued throughout July 1993. Three Croatian-run camps were apparently established during this time. They include a female prisoner "brothel", Kod Bardaka private bowling alley, and Slavonski Brod oil refinery. While the Serbs were detained in these camps, the Croats allegedly looted and destroyed all of their property. 

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3010/
3210. Brothel at Slavonski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The brothel at Slavonski Brod was set up to hold Serbian women and girls for the purpose of rape by Croatian and Muslim military personnel. Women brought to the camp were arrested and kidnapped from their homes.

3211. Apparently, women who got pregnant at the brothel were not allowed to leave so that they could not get an abortion. It is reported that members of Croatian and Muslim forces that had contracted AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases were deliberately sent to the brothel to have sex with the Serbian prisoners. 5012/

3212. Twenty-eight of the girls at the camp are reported to have come from the village of Sijekovac. They were kidnapped from their homes by four identified perpetrators. One of them implies in his signed confession of these crimes that there may have been other Croatian groups carrying out similar kidnappings in the area since he refers to himself and the other men as "his group" as if there were others. 5013/

3213. These men raided all of the houses from the Zidić store and bus station in Sijekovac along the road in the direction of Derventa. 5014/ One source explains that they used a station wagon which belonged to one of the perpetrators to carry out the kidnappings while another source indicates that they also used a van in these crimes. 5015/

3214. During the kidnappings, they would often tie up all of the relatives in the house and rape the girls there before taking them away. One of the perpetrators confessed that in certain instances they cut family members' throats. 5016/

3215. One report claims that the van became overcrowded at one point and that they had to take most of the girls to Slavonski Brod before making a second trip to pick up the six or seven remaining. 5017/

3216. After they had taken the 28 girls to Slavonski Brod, they each took one for themselves and brought them to the village of Gornje Kolibe. One of the perpetrators detained "his girl" in his house for several days during which time he raped her repeatedly. 5018/

3217. Kod Bardaka bowling alley: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team.) There are two reports that Serbian prisoners were detained at this private bowling alley. Apparently, prisoners were brought here when the Army of the Republic of Srpska took control of the area of Bosanski Brod and Odžak on or near 6 October 1992. 5019/ At this time, the Croatians retreated and transferred all inmates from the Serbian villages of Odžak, Bosanski Brod, and Derventa to Slavonski Brod. One of the places they brought prisoners was the Kod Bardaka bowling alley. 5020/

3218. One prisoner reports being brought there with 70 other men at this time from Bosanski Brod. The group spent one night at the bowling alley before being transferred to another camp which is not identified. 5021/ At the alley, the prisoners were severely beaten. One man reports spending the night at the alley and being beaten throughout the night. He claims that he was slapped in the face so many times that he was deaf for days. During these beatings, another prisoner had his ear bitten off. 5022/

3219. One perpetrator named in connection with the beatings at the bowling alley is a Croat. 5023/
3220. Slavonski Brod oil refinery: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The oil refinery was the largest reported detention facility in the area. At the camp, all young girls and women aged 12 to 45 were held in one hangar; the older men and women kept in another. 5024/ Prisoners had all of their personal belongings taken from them and were given one thin blanket with which to sleep. 5025/

3221. The prisoners at the refinery were beaten throughout their detention. Apparently, those in charge of the camp called this "brainwashing". 5026/ One witness relates that while at Slavonski Brod he was beaten naked for hours and that other Serbs were hung by their legs and beaten upside down. 5027/ In one instance, due to a theft or false accusation, one of the soldiers broke the skull of a 40 year-old prisoner with the butt of his rifle. 5028/ Many times, prisoners were taken outside the hangar to watch the beatings and killings of others. 5029/

3222. Women were regularly raped at the oil refinery. Military personnel would come in at night and take them to be raped and sexually abused. One witness understood that the women were detained at the camp in order to bear as many Croatian children as possible. 5030/ In one instance, the soldiers raped a group of women on a stack of empty oil barrels which were stored just outside the hangar in which they were held.

3223. The women raped on the oil barrels were also severely beaten. Some had their ears cut off and their "eyebrows carved in full length" with a knife; others lost an eye or a nose. 5031/ One girl even had her lip cut into pieces. 5032/ When the women were left alone, they received no food. 5033/

3224. One woman relates that she was raped and molested by four men at one time. When she struggled to get free from one of the men who was raping her at the time, another tried to cut her arm off with an axe. Later, another soldier burned her leg with a cigarette and then stabbed it with his knife. At this point, she fainted. 5034/

3225. Many of the women at the camp were from the villages of Bosanska Krajina and Kninska Krajina. 5035/ Some of them were even pregnant, but they were still physically abused. In one instance, the Croatian soldiers brought an eight-month pregnant woman to the camp, cut her stomach open with a knife, and stabbed her unborn baby. The woman died sometime later. 5036/

3226. Another instance of severe abuse involved a woman who was transferred to Slavonski Brod from Bosanski Brod in early October 1992. 5037/ According to another prisoner, the woman was gang-raped at Bosanski Brod on 2 October by 40 men and then had two 40 centimetre sticks stuck into her, one in her vagina and the other in her anus. She reportedly bled profusely and could not walk when she and the others were transferred to Slavonski Brod on 6 October. Apparently, she fell by the park in Slavonski Brod. An "Ustaša" came up to her, kicked her, and then fired all of the bullets in his pistol into her head. 5038/

3227. One witness relates that he was picked up on the highway near Sisak on 12 January 1993. He and an unidentified number of other prisoners were brought directly to Slavonski Brod. Apparently, they were left alone for two days, but then the soldiers from the front came to the camp to "rest and have some fun", and they were severely beaten. 5039/

3228. Another ex-prisoner relates that she was also on the road from Zagreb to Sisak when she and five other individuals were ordered off a bus by Croatian policemen. 5040/ Their arrest occurred on 28 January 1993. The prisoners
were first taken to the Sisak police station where they were "classified". They were held for 24 hours before being taken on to Slavonski Brod. During this time, they were offered no food or water and were stripped of all of their valuables.

3229. Apparently, while detained at the refinery, a fire broke out at some point, and the soldiers enlisted the help of the women to extinguish it. The witness stayed at the oil refinery until 22 April at which time she was transferred with 50 other women to the River Sana and then on to the camp at the primary school in Odžak. She claims that most all of the prisoners transferred with her were in their late stages of pregnancy.

3230. The perpetrators at the camp are said to have all used nicknames so that no one would know their true identities. The nicknames were colours and names of saints. One witness relates that the guards were named things like "Black", "Blue", and "Jesus". These were their combat names, and they never deviated from them.

3231. One of the men at the camp was nicknamed "Plavi". He is said to have been one that liked to carve out eyebrows in place of real ones on beautiful women, bite off ears, and poke out eyes. Apparently, he did either or all of these things to women.

3232. Unidentified Camp, Slavonski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) While the ICRC reportedly made several visits to the camp at Slavonski Brod, the camp was not specifically identified. They visited the camp on 1 February 1992 and witnessed 13 prisoners; they visited on 7 March and recorded 15 prisoners; finally, they went on 7 April and 10 June and again recorded 15 prisoners.

3233. Unidentified Camp, Slavonski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In mid-July 1991 authorities in Slavonski Brod allegedly imprisoned more than 90 citizens of Serb nationality.

3234. Private House, Slavonski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited a detention facility in a private house in Slavonski Brod on 13 August 1992.

3235. Military Prison, Slavonski Brod: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited the military prison in Slavonski Brod on 2 June 1992.

37. Slunj

3236. According to the 1981 Yugoslav census, the municipality of Slunj had 23,000 residents. Eighty per cent were Croat and the remaining 20 per cent were Serbs, Muslims, Albanians and other. Tensions purportedly began to rise in 1990 when, as a result of the general elections when the controlling Serbs lost a great deal of power.

3237. In response to the undesired changes, Serbian paramilitaries reportedly established an armed resistance. On 23 July 1991, the Serbs allegedly fired upon the villages of Drežnik and Saborsko. The paramilitaries were reportedly assisted by the JNA in the occupation of several villages in the area.
3238. Thereafter Serbs began closing the roads around Slunj and on 11 November 1991, airstrikes signalled the beginning of Serb occupation of the municipality. On the morning of 16 November, most of the civilian residents in the county fled to Cazin (BiH) and neighbouring villages to escape the attack by Serb forces. 5056/ The Croatian civilians who remained in the area were reportedly intimidated, looted, mistreated and arrested. 5057/ These actions reportedly resulted in the capture and detention of many civilians. 5058/

3239. Police Station in Drežnik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) According to one report, a Serb male from the village of Grabovac in Slunj, was arrested by Croatian police in Drežnik on 28 August and detained at the local police station. He was reportedly interrogated and beaten for several hours. 5059/ During the questioning period, he was reportedly taken from the interrogation room and into the hallway where some 10 police officers beat him until he lost consciousness. His captors reportedly poured water over him and then resumed the interrogation. 5060/ Reportedly one police officer struck him in the chest so severely that he vomited blood. He was then reportedly ordered to lick up his blood, when he refused he was struck in the head with a rifle butt. He was reportedly later transferred to the police station in Slunj where he was not mistreated. 5061/

3240. Tourist Complex, Grabovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Reportedly on 3 September 1992, the Croatian village of Vaganac was attacked and allegedly razed to the ground. A concentration camp was thereafter erected by Serbs to contain the captured Croats. 5062/ No information regarding length of detention, treatment nor conditions at the facility were made available.

3241. Barracks, Slunj: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the barracks at Slunj as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 26 October 1993. 5063/

3242. Split is located on the Adriatic Coast in the southern part of Croatia and had a population of 206,612 according to the 1991 census. The population was 87.3 per cent Croat, 4.2 per cent Serb, and 8.5 per cent other.

3243. Two sources indicated that a detention facility existed in Split. 5064/ One witness who claimed to have been held in the prison in Split by members of the Ministry of Interior and the ZNG stated that he was burned with a hot bayonet, and was cut and beaten every day. He allegedly was denied food and water and threatened with death. 5065/

3244. Lora Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the UK Defence Debriefing Team, and Helsinki Watch.) Lora prison is located in the town of Split. 5066/ During the Yugoslav conflict, this camp was in operation from as early as December 1991 until September 1992. Lora prison is situated at the naval base in Split. 5067/ The prison was circled by a high concrete wall and four metre-high barbed wire. 5068/ It appears that the camp consisted of several different cell blocks, one of which was allegedly used to hide prisoners when the ICRC visited. 5069/ Another source described the Lora prison as port buildings containing five hundred Serb prisoners. 5070/ Another source claimed that the prisoners were mainly civilians though 15 to 20 were Serbian volunteer fighters. During April and May of 1992 this source alleged there to
be around 60 prisoners in the detention facility. 5071/

3245. Both ZNG and MUP forces are said to have been in control of Lora Prison. Two reports identified Croatian military police as present at the camp in April and May of 1992. 5072/ Another witness related that prisoners were told that the camp guards fell under the command of the military police, but were "not quite following directions". 5073/ The commander of Lora prison was identified by name. 5074/ His wife allegedly participated in the beating of prisoners at Lora. 5075/ He allegedly took part in the abuse of the prisoners and one witness claims he put on a rubber glove and forced it into a prisoner's anus. 5076/ Another man was identified as a deputy warden. 5077/

3246. The interrogators at the detention facility reportedly tortured prisoners with electricity. The prisoners were allegedly strapped into a chair in the warden's office for this purpose. The interrogators used a hand-cranked generator to supply the electricity and would shock the prisoners until they passed out. 5078/

3247. According to one source, an undetermined number of Serbs from Čapljina were detained in Lora detention facility by members of the HOS. 5079/ They were apparently beaten, tortured, cut with various instruments and given electric shocks. 5080/ Two witnesses claimed that their ears were pierced with paper clips which were connected to a power generator and they were electrocuted in this manner. 5081/ Another prisoner reported that his fingers tied with wire which was connected to a field telephone power inductor. The prisoner was electrocuted in this way. 5082/ Another detainee claimed that electrical cords were attached to his sexual organs. 5083/ A priest was reportedly forced to perform fellatio on another prisoner while they were both electrocuted. 5084/ Others were allegedly forced to perform homosexual intercourse and the females detainees were raped. 5085/ In addition a report stated that 15 to 20 Serbs were held in the detention facility from April to May of 1992. 5086/ In March 1992, a low ranking JNA non-commissioned officer detained at Lora had German shepherd dogs attack him in his cell on orders of guards in masks. He was then ordered to kiss the dogs. 5087/

3248. The prisoners were deprived of food for periods up to four days. 5088/ Others claimed to have been deprived of food for two days and when they were fed they received a slice of bread. 5089/ Another source reported that the prisoners were fed small quantities of food twice a day and water four times a day. 5090/

3249. An undetermined number of JNA officers and soldiers were detained in the prison from January 1991 to August 1992 possibly as many as five hundred. 5091/ They were allegedly subjected to daily mental and physical maltreatment by the ZNG military police who were present at the detention facility. 5092/

3250. Allegedly prisoners were kicked, punched, and beaten on a regular basis. Often the guards would burst into the cells at night to beat the Serb prisoners. 5093/ The prisoners were forced to turn to the wall and put their hands on the wall above their heads, with legs stretched away from the wall so that their bodies were in a slanted position, whereafter they were beaten on the kidneys and loins. Prisoners were also ordered to stand still, raise their hands and inhale. As they exhaled the guards would hit them in the stomach. 5094/

3251. Several reports indicated that the prisoners received medical treatment at the Firule hospital. There they were under guard of the ZNG military police who allegedly maltreated them. There was no indication that the hospital staff participated in the maltreatment. 5095/ Another report indicated that a
severely beaten prisoner was hospitalized but then returned to the prison where the beatings allegedly continued. 5096 One witness claimed that he was hospitalized after having his ribs broken during a beating. He claimed that he was registered at the Firule hospital under a false name from 1 May until 20 May 1992. 5097

3252. Prisoners were forced to make statements to the effect that they were "Četniks" and that they had killed Croats and Muslims. They were forced to recite a memorized statement to the ICRC representatives and were beaten if they made a mistake. They were also made to race each other on hands and knees and the loser was beaten. 5098

3253. Three prisoners reportedly died from the beatings they received while in custody at Lora. One was held in block "C" where the guards reportedly hid some prisoners they did not want the ICRC to view. The prisoner was beaten while loud music was played to muffle his cries. He died in July 1992. Another prisoner was allegedly killed in the toilet next to cell number 2. The report alleged that the warden was replaced as prison warden due to these deaths. 5099

3254. An undetermined number of Serb prisoners were transferred from "Poduh" tobacco processing plant in Metković to the Lora detention facility in April 1992. The report indicated that at least one Montenegrin was detained at the facility. They were being detained by Croatian soldiers. Upon arrival they were ordered to take off their clothes and were deprived of their personal property. Then, they were taken to a concrete cell, measuring two by three metres and were beaten. These prisoners were allegedly forced to rape other female prisoners. 5100

3255. According to one report the ICRC visited the facility four times between 22 April 1992 and 10 June 1992. 5101

3256. Hospital, Split: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited the hospital on 31 March 1992. 5102

3257. Military Hospital, Split: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited the military hospital on 29 April 1992. 5103

3258. Penitentiary/Prison, Split: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited the penitentiary on 1 October 1991. 5104

39. Vinkovci

3259. The county of Vinkovci is located in eastern Croatia bordering Vojvodina. According to the 1991 census, the population was 98,484. At that time, the population was 80 per cent Croatian, 13 per cent Serbian, and 7 per cent was referred to as "other". 5105

3260. Vinkovci: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Prisoners were reportedly detained in Vinkovci. Forty-one Serbian prisoners were exchanged for 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations on 27 March 1992. The 41 were reported to have been arrested in various općinas between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992. Almost all the prisoners were interrogated for three to 10 days at various places in Croatia, including Vinkovci. Then they were allegedly taken to detention facilities in Osijek and Zagreb. 5106
3261. Mirkovci: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) Mirkovci police station was reported as a place of detention by the ICRC who first visited the facility on 19 February 1993. 5107/

40. Varaždin

3262. The county of Varaždin is located in north-central Croatia on the border of Slovenia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 94,020. At that time, the population was 94.9 per cent Croat and 5.1 per cent was referred to as "other". 5108/

3263. Varaždin Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reportedly first visited this prison on 7 February 1992. 5109/ There is no further information on this facility.

41. Vojnić

3264. The county of Vojnić is located south-west of Zagreb bordering BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 8,190. At that time, the population was 90.6 per cent Serbian, 5.3 per cent Muslim, and 4.1 per cent was referred to as "other". 5110/

3265. Vojnić Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Government.) Another source reported that a prisoner interned in the detention facility in Vojnić was not exchanged on 4 March 1992 in Karlovac with the prisoners from the Glina facility. This prisoner was not exchanged because the Serbs allegedly wanted to prevent the ICRC representatives from learning of the existence of the Vojnić facility. The Vojnić facility was located in the Vojnić police station, west of Glina on the road to Karlovac. It was not organizationally associated with the Glina facility. 5111/

3266. Vojnić Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the Vojnić Hospital as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The representatives first visited the detention facility on 30 June 1993. 5112/

3267. Vojnić Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reported the Vojnić prison as a place of detention in a report received on 27 May 1994. The representatives first visited the detention facility on 22 September 1992. 5113/

42. Vrbovec

3268. The county of Vrbovec is located in northern Croatia, east of Zagreb. According to the 1991 census, the population was 27,903. At that time, the population was 93.9 per cent Croatian, and 6.1 per cent was referred to as "other". 5114/

3269. Gaj: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Gaj, which is located in Vrbovec, contains a detention facility. Forty-one Serbian prisoners were exchanged for 380 members of the Croatian paramilitary formations on 27
March 1992. The 41 were reported to have been arrested between 6 November 1991 and 13 March 1992. Almost all the prisoners, after being interrogated for three to 10 days at various places in Croatia, were allegedly taken to detention facilities in Osijek and Zagreb and those at Zagreb were then detained in Gaj and Kerestinec. 5115

43. **Vrginmost**

3270. The county of Vrginmost is located south of Zagreb on the border with BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 16,534. At that time, the population was 70.6 per cent Serbian, 24.4 per cent Croatian, and 5 per cent was referred to as "other". 5116

3271. Vrginmost Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 14 September 1991, the villagers of Ponikvari were reportedly expelled from their village. One of the women fled to Topusko and was allegedly arrested on 21 September 1991, by Borivoje Šapić and other members of "Četnik" forces. She was taken to the Vrginmost police station and held until 4 October 1991. During her internment she was subjected to maltreatment and insults. 5117

44. **Vukovar**

3272. In July 1991, Serb forces launched artillery attacks on the village of Borovo Naselje and other areas of Vukovar county. Reportedly, tanks, howitzers, mortars and battleship guns fired upon the region for several days in a seemingly unrelenting fashion. 5118/ Before the fighting began, there were some 84,000 inhabitants in Vukovar county, of which 43.7 per cent were Croats, 37.4 per cent were Serbs, and the remaining 18.9 per cent were comprised of other ethnic groups. By August 1991, just over 15,000 remained. 5119/

3273. Despite their initial disorganization, the people of Vukovar put up a strong defence to the alleged aggressions of Serbian forces. For three months, the inhabitants of Vukovar resisted their aggressors. 5120/ Eventually, however, the town was surrounded and the defenders were forced to surrender. Many of the citizens were captured and held in camps and detention facilities. The majority of the detainees were taken to facilities throughout FRY. A large number of citizens were also detained in facilities scattered throughout the region. Although a few of the detention facilities were run by Croatian National Forces, 5121/ the vast majority of the sites were controlled and operated by various Serb paramilitary groups.

3274. Velepromet: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Vukovar was reportedly occupied on 18 November 1991 by the Yugoslav Army and members of several Serb paramilitary groups. Velepromet was the local subsidiary of a business which, following the occupation, served as a major collecting point for thousands of captured civilians as well as a distribution centre for several area Serb concentration camps. 5122/

3275. The process of registration and distribution of detainees presumably began with the separation of men from women and women from children. Each group was then taken to locations where they were interrogated--and in the case of women--raped and in some instances disfigured. 5123/

3276. Many of the women were taken to locations outside of the Velepromet facility. The men were detained throughout the facility itself. Many underwent medical examinations in addition to lengthy interrogations. Beatings were
reportedly the standard accompaniment to the interrogation proceedings. 5124/

3277. Serb forces not only controlled the military and police activities in the county but also the judicial services. According to one witness, while held at Velepromet, she was taken before Krajina court and charged with "genocide upon the Serbian people". Her captors allegedly brought in a gurney with a child who had been burned and accused the witness of the crime. She was sentenced to 15 years in jail and returned to the containment area at Velepromet. 5125/

3278. Another detainee recalled the situation at the facility towards the end of May 1992. He was placed in a room which measured approximately 100 metres square. There were 260 male detainees in this room. 5126/ He recalled that men were removed from the room all night and those who remained could hear machine-gun fire and concluded that the Serbs were killing the other inmates. 5127/

3279. According to the testimony of another former detainee, he witnessed his captors taking a two or three month old child and throwing it against the concrete with such force that the child's "brain littered all over the concrete". 5128/ The Serbs then proceeded to cut off the breasts of the child's mother. The woman reportedly bled to death. 5129/

3280. Many inmates were used as compulsory labourers and performed such tasks as cleaning the streets, fixing roofs and burying the dead at the nearby Bulgarian cemetery. Several inmates identified members of Šešelj's units at the prison. 5130/

3281. According to one witness, there were more than 400 detainees at the Velepromet facility. 5131/ Upon arrival, prisoners were reportedly separated into three groups. 5132/ One group was situated in the basement, the second group was in a small room near the guard house and the third group was contained in the carpentry workshop. 5133/

3282. Velepromet Office Building: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Following the occupation of Vukovar, members of the Serb paramilitary group led by one called Vojvoda established a National Court-Martial and housed it in the Velepromet Office Building. The premises also served as a detention facility—the fate of whose population was determined by the court established here. 5134/

3283. Velepromet Storehouses: 5135/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In one report, several members of the JNA assisted by other "Četnik" forces collected eight civilian prisoners from detention in the storehouse, bound their hands with wire, tied them to a tall barbed wire fence near the storehouse and then shot them. 5136/ The report notes additionally that three other civilian detainees were hung in the area near the storehouse. 5137/

3284. According to one report, Serbian forces gathered Croatian citizens, separating the men and detaining them in the storehouse. The men were interrogated and beaten at this location. On one occasion, Serb forces allegedly took 25 men from among those contained at this facility and shot them all. 5138/

3285. Velepromet Carpentry Workshop: 5139/ (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 1 December 1991, members of the JNA military police allegedly transferred prisoners to the Velepromet workshop where they were subjected to severe beatings and physical mistreatment. 5140/

3286. The workshop reportedly consisted of two rooms, one which was called the execution room, allegedly because all of the detainees in this room were
executed. This second room was also, apparently, the location from which interrogations were conducted.

3287. Allegedly one Serb prisoner was repeatedly kicked in the spinal area. The abuse was reportedly administered on a daily basis. The prisoners were later transferred to the JNA barracks in Vukovar.

3288. According to another report, a number of civilians were brought into the workshop by Serbian paramilitaries and killed. Executions were reportedly held day and night. The situs of the executions was some 50 metres from the workshop containment area and all those detained in Velepromet could watch the executions as they occurred.

3289. According to one witness, on one occasion, he and others held at the workshop were taken out to witness the court martialing process. Reportedly, a young Croatian soldier form Vukovar was brought out, one Serb guard jumped on his back, the Croat fell to the ground on his stomach and the Serb allegedly decapitated him and impaled his head for all to see. On another occasion, the Serbs reportedly cut a man in half with a circular saw forcing other detainees to witness the event.

3290. "Wooden Market": (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, on 18 November 1991, a group of men dressed in JNA uniforms arrested several civilians from the city of Vukovar and detained them in what was called the Wooden Market located on Švapsko Brdo. Information regarding the conditions, treatment or length of incarceration was not provided. The prisoners were reportedly later separated by ethnicity and gender and transferred by truck to the Velepromet storehouses.

3291. According to one report, a bakery was once located at the "Drveni Pijac" (Wooden Market). The witness recalled that on 19 November 1991 some 30 people were taken to the front yard of the bakery. After some time only one woman returned. The woman was reportedly crying because she had witnessed the killing of her husband.

3292. Bakery, Vukovar: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, Serb forces took four Croatian civilians to the local bakery and detained them there for an undisclosed period of time. During the detention, the men learned that former bakery detainees were killed and their bodies allegedly burned. One of the detainees managed to leave and was later taken to Velepromet.

3293. Vukovar Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to a Croatian inmate at the camp Velepromet, she and several others were loaded on to buses and taken to the Vukovar barracks. Regular soldiers reportedly manned this facility and the prisoners were provided with food and water upon arrival. In her statement, she suggests that the inmates were not mistreated at this facility, permitted regular meals and even allowed to smoke cigarettes. The witness was later taken to Sremska Mitrovica and then exchanged on 27 March 1992 in Bosanski Samac.

3294. Another detainee recalled that she and other women and children were separated from the men after the Serbs removed them from their homes. The women were taken to the barracks and held there overnight. The following morning, she and the others were transported to Velepromet.

3295. In still another report, from an individual evacuated from the Vukovar
Hospital, several individuals were transported to the JNA barracks and were reportedly physically mistreated and humiliated by their Serbian captors. Allegedly, following a brief period of internment, the hospital evacuees were loaded onto buses—along with several other individuals already in residence at the barracks and transported to Ovčara. 5161/

3296. Vukovar Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, at the end of September 1991, members of the Croatian National Guard searched all Serbian homes on Dalmatinska Street intentionally looting and pillaging as well as detaining the residents therefrom in the local police station. 5162/ Reportedly, the individuals detained here were all killed at the beginning of October 1991. The report identified several of those victimized at this location. 5163/

3297. Vukovar Municipality Building: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, from mid-October 1991 through early November 1991, several Serbian males were reportedly removed from their hiding places in various apartment buildings in the city of Vukovar, arrested and detained by members of the Croatian National Guard's military police in the prison established in the Vukovar Municipality building. 5164/ Many of these men were reportedly taken by members of the paramilitary group in handcuffs to the edge of the Danube, killed and their bodies deposited into the river. 5165/

3298. Vukovar Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Several inmates from the Komerc shelter were taken to and detained in the Vukovar Prison. The report suggests that only men were detained at this facility, however that fact has not as yet been confirmed. 5166/

3299. 71 Nova Street: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to the testimony of a Serb soldier, this location in the city of Vukovar is the address of a house which was used by Serbs to kill area residents. 5167/ The house stood near a shop and was situated in front of the house of a man called Stanko, a taxi driver. Serb activities in this house were allegedly ordered by an identified Captain. 5168/ The Serbs reportedly began the attacks on Vukovar from this and neighbouring homes. When control of Nova Street was had, the residents were taken to Velepromet and control of neighbouring streets was then sought. 5169/

3301. Supermarket in Radničko Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) A Croatian family was evacuated from their home in Vukovar and on 16 September 1991, detained in the basement of the supermarket in Radničko Naselje. They were detained there for two days with other Croats expelled from their homes. The witness, a male member of this family, was later transferred to Petrova Gora. 5170/

3302. House in Petrova Gora: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to a witness transferred from the supermarket detention facility to a private home at Svetozara Markovica Street No. 222 5171/ in Petrova Gora, he was detained in the basement of this home with approximately six others and subjected to frequent physical mistreatment. 5172/ Guards from Vukovar watched the prisoners for some 12 days at this facility. The guards reportedly wore uniforms bearing red stars. 5173/ The inmates were used as forced labour to dig graves in the area of the new fairgrounds. 5174/ The inmates were also made to bury many of the dead. The witness identified Milan Cvetičanin 5175/ as a member of the White Eagles and commander of the prison guards. 5176/
3303. Barracks at Sajmište: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a Croatian inmate was transferred from the prison on S. Markovica Street, to the basement containment area at Sajmište. 5177/ There were reportedly some 23 others also in detention at this site. The detainee was forced to repair the vehicles of his Serbian captors. 5178/ He recalled being detained with the others for one hour or so before being compelled into forced labour. According to his testimony, all of his fellow detainees at this facility were killed. 5179/

3304. House of Jozo Gelo, Sajmište: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, the witness and many others, forced from the streets by the military forces, were sent to the house of Jozo Gelo in the Sajmište district. The witness remained at this site for two days with some 11 other people. 5180/ Thereafter, the detainees were loaded onto trucks and taken to the barracks where they were interrogated. 5181/ They were later returned to this location where they were assigned to forced labour groups. The detainees at this location were reportedly supplied with tinned food and other supplies. 5182/

3305. "Cooperative Yard" 5183/ Lovas: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) The village of Lovas is located some 20 kilometres south of Vukovar. Lovas reportedly had a population of 1700 residents before Serb occupation. Ninety-four per cent of the village's inhabitants were Croatian. 5184/

3306. According to sources, the largely Croatian villagers surrendered to Serb paramilitary forces to avoid the aggressive occupation suffered by neighbouring villages at the hands of these groups. 5185/ However, despite the cooperative efforts of the local inhabitants, Serb forces purportedly attacked the village on 10 October 1991. Reportedly, the village was again attacked on 17 October after which, Serb forces succeeded in occupying the village. 5186/

3307. Following Serb occupation, some 1,500 Serbs from Western Slavonia, Bosnia and Vojvodina were reportedly resettled in the village. Thereafter, approximately 100 Croats remained in occupied Lovas. 5187/

3308. Following the JNA attack on Lovas on 10 October 1991, Croatians were forced from their homes and collected in the cooperative yard located in the centre of the village. The yard was used by the Serbs as a sort of prisoner clearinghouse. 5188/ There were over 100 women, children and elderly detained here. 5189/ Reportedly, the beatings and interrogation commenced almost immediately. The report suggests that following interrogation, many women and children were permitted to return home. By contrast, the male detainees were held for almost a month. And in some cases, many of those detained were reportedly killed by their captors on 18 October 1991. 5190/

3309. According to another report, all male inhabitants between 18 and 55 were collected and assigned to forced labour groups. 5191/ The men were placed in a courtyard, seated in chairs and instructed not to move. Those who failed to comply with this command were severely beaten. 5192/ They were reportedly detained in this manner overnight, some reportedly did not survive the beatings. 5193/

3310. The following morning, 17 5194/ from among them were selected, allegedly to harvest grapes. The location for harvest lay a great distance from the camp and the detainees were made to walk there. 5195/ As the group neared the outskirts of the village, they were reportedly ordered to enter a field of clover. They were reportedly made to walk through the field holding each other's hand. 5196/ As they entered, they discovered that this was a minefield. 5197/ The Serbs reportedly shot many victims in the back and forced others to continue
walking through the field. Reportedly 17 men were killed by mines or shot in the back. Another report regarding this same incident alleged that some 60 captured individuals were forced to walk across this minefield. Those who refused were reportedly shot by their Serbian captors.

3311. Another group of Croatian men from the courtyard were reportedly collected by members of the paramilitary group "Dušan the Great". On 17 October 1991, these Serbs reportedly subjected the inmates to beatings and interrogation. Some from among this group were transferred that day to a private home.

3312. Home of Mirko Milić, Lovas: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 17 October 1991, some 12 men from the cooperative yard were transferred to a private home and detained overnight. They were used as forced labour the following day. The prisoners were used to dig graves and bury the dead.

3313. Local Government Office, Lovas: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, 19 Croatian civilians detained in the basement of the local government office building were killed by Serbs on the evening of 18 October 1991. The witness was forced to bury the dead and saw one of the victims shortly before he died.

3314. The source continues that the population of Serbs began to grow as a massive Serb colonization began in the village. On 22 December 1991, police from Knin came and collected some 20 Croats and detained them in the local government offices where they were subjected to beatings with metal rods and wooden boards. The Serbs reportedly drilled holes in the feet of two of the inmates, using the same drill, holes were made in one inmate's knee. The Serbs reportedly removed the gold capped teeth of one of the inmates with pliers; the men were reportedly beaten about their genitalia and forced to fight one another. The prisoners were released and told to leave the village on 26 December 1991.

3315. Police Station, Lovas: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, on 22 December 1991, police of the "SAO Krajina" scoured the homes in Lovas and reportedly arrested some 20 Croatian civilians. The detainees were allegedly taken to the local police station where they were interrogated, beaten and otherwise maltreated. Following the beatings, the Croatian detainees were instructed to leave the village. The witness and his family as well as many others reportedly complied, leaving on 25 December 1991.

3316. House of Bora Keser: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The Serbs had reportedly converted this private home into a police station and jail. The ground and first floors were reportedly the police station while the basement area served as the jail. No information was provided regarding treatment, duration of incarceration, identity of detainees or the conditions at this facility.

3317. Unidentified Building, Borovo Selo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Helsinki Watch.) According to an elderly witness, on 1 July 1991, he was detained by masked men just outside his home. He was taken by car, first, to the city of Tenja where he was detained in a garage. Then later, he and four others were blindfolded and taken to Bobota where they were detained in a building's basement for four days. During this time they were not abused.

3318. The five were then taken by car to Borovo Selo and placed in a waiting area in an unidentified building. The waiting area was located on the ground floor of the building. The witnesses were reportedly severely beaten at this
location. It was reportedly at this location where the inmates' physical mistreatment began. 5215/

3319. The detainees were held in a dark room and beaten by men holding flashlights and clubs. The beatings and interrogations reportedly lasted for 10 consecutive days. The detainees were comprised of nine Croats and five Albanians. Many who were able to work were used as forced labour. The victims were detained at this location for 24 days. 5216/

3320. The building was situated across from the city council complex in what the witness described as a storage room. The door to the room had a window with bars. The doors were made of steel and were green in colour. The detainees were fed twice a day and taken outside once or twice daily. 5217/

3321. Unidentified Facility, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC first visited this camp on 13 August 1991. The ICRC does not identify the facility. 5218/

3322. "Komerc" Building, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) The town of Borovo Naselje is situated four kilometres north of Vukovar. At the time that JNA troops entered this town, there were reportedly some 4,000 individuals residing in large shelters. 5219/ The Komerc factory was among the buildings used as a shelter facility. Reports suggest that 1,000 civilians were housed in the facility at the "Borovokomerc" factory. 5220/ 3323. On 19 November, JNA forces surrounded the factory building and instructed the people to surrender. Following their surrender, the JNA began to register them, separate them, marking all men ages 17-70 as "defenders" and transporting them by bus to detention facilities as far away as Nis, Serbia. 5221/

3324. According to one witness, she, her husband and five others who were patients in Vukovar Hospital in late October 1991, were transferred to the Komerc shelter in the Borovo combine. The shelter was reportedly populated with quite a few Croatian National Guardsmen and approximately 30 Serbian men and women. 5222/ Reportedly Martin Sablić was the commander in charge of the civilian prison population and a man called "Gagi" was in charge of the military prison population. 5223/ A man named Lavoslav Bosanac was reportedly in charge of the entire Borovo Combine. 5224/

3325. According to one report, in mid-November 1991, several civilians were captured and detained at the Komerc factory building. They were reportedly beaten and robbed by their JNA captors who thereafter sentenced them all to be executed. 5225/

3326. "BZ" Shelter, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) According to one report, a detention facility was established in another one of the shelters in the community of Borovo Naselje. The report suggests that on 12 October 1991, inmates were transferred from one area of the shelter/prison to another for interrogation. The inmates were instructed that if they refused to answer questions put to them they would be beaten. 5226/ Many were reportedly beaten and maltreated despite their efforts at cooperation. 5227/

3327. In one instance in early November 1991, an identified inmate was subjected to interrogation at this facility. His captors gave him pencil and paper and told him to make a written statement. Despite his admission of possessing weapons validly, he was imprisoned in the cellar for some days and then transported to the kindergarten courtyard and reportedly shot by four guards simultaneously and at close range. 5228/
3328. "Dom Tehnike", Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, four prisoners who were held in the cellar of the "BZ" Shelter in Borovo Naselje were taken to "Dom Tehnike" where they were scheduled to be killed. The four were held at this location for a few hours and then returned without injury to the shelter. 5229/

3329. According to another report, in early October 1991, a Serb detained at this location was reportedly severely beaten and threatened by his captors. The report suggests that named guards at this facility were responsible for the killing of three facility inmates. 5230/

3330. "Abrazija" Pizza Parlour, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Members of the ZNG military police detained individuals in the cellar of the Abrazija pizza parlour and subjected the inmates to extensive interrogation and severe physical mistreatment. 5231/ One inmate was reportedly killed after being severely beaten in an attempt to extract a criminal confession. 5232/ Some inmates were detained here for several days, others for several hours, before being moved to other locations of detention. 5233/ According to one report, inmates were killed in order to serve as examples for others who refused or were hesitant in supplying requested information. 5234/

3331. Kindergarten, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, one inmate was detained at this location by four members of the ZNG military police. The inmate's captors reportedly shot him simultaneously. 5235/ Prisoners were reportedly routinely transported to this location from the S 10/2 Skyscraper and the BZ Shelter and shot by firing squad. 5236/

3332. S 10/2 Skyscraper 5237/, Borovo Naselje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) On 5 November 1991, two inmates were reportedly transferred from the detention facility in the BZ Shelter to the cellar of the S 10/2 skyscraper. 5238/ The two were interrogated by several members of a Serbian paramilitary group, beaten severely and threatened with death. The two were allegedly then taken to the court yard of the kindergarten, lined up against the wall and shot. 5239/ A similar event occurred on 18 November, when three inmates were taken from the shelter in the Nova Obučara building to a room in the skyscraper and interrogated by three members of the paramilitary formations. 5240/ They were reportedly then taken to the cellar of the building, made to lie on the floor and beaten severely by their captors. The following morning, the three inmates were reportedly taken to the court yard of the kindergarten, lined up against the wall and shot. 5241/

3333. "Nova Obučara" Shelter: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Nova Obućara personnel reportedly went into residential locations and announced that all citizens seeking shelter at Obućara were welcome. According to one report, the existence of this shelter was kept from the international humanitarian community. 5242/

3334. Upon arrival at the shelter, one witness noticed that people were lying about on the ground. Just off to the right of the entrance were long benches and all incoming residents were instructed to have a seat to await registration. 5243/ According to one witness, he and his wife remained seated on these benches for almost 24 hours. 5244/ Thereafter, the detainees are directed to the dining room where they were searched and personal effects confiscated. The prisoners were thereafter interrogated by the camp commander. 5245/
3335. A short time later, the detainees were escorted out and driven to an undisclosed location near the railway station and made to get out of the car and walk ahead of the vehicle. After walking for a short distance, the detainees were reportedly shot from behind. The male witness survived, however his wife was killed.

3336. According to another report, individuals detained at the Komerc shelter were transferred to this location on 7 November 1991. Martin Sablić was said to have been the commander at both locations. Although the prisoners were fed, the frequency of the food distribution is unknown. The inmates were also reportedly searched for weapons.

3337. A variety of sources suggest that detainees were transferred back and forth from this facility. One report suggests that several inmates were transferred from this location on 18 November 1991 to the Zbor premises in the building S 10/2.

3338. In many cases, individuals were transported from this site to locations where they were scheduled to meet their deaths. One report details the occurrences on 11 November, of a married Serbian couple who were removed from the shelter and allegedly killed. Additionally, on 14 November and 16 November, seven and 15 Serbian inmates, respectively, were removed from detention at this facility by their captors, transported to the bank of the Danube River and reportedly killed. Their bodies were disposed of in the Danube.

3339. Concentration Camp, Berak: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Before fighting erupted in Berak, the population of the village was 56 per cent Croatian and 38 per cent Serb. Following the occupation of Berak on 2 September 1991 by alleged members of the JNA and Serbian paramilitary groups, the non-Serbian inhabitants of the village were reportedly placed in a local concentration camp. A total of 92 civilians were reportedly detained at this facility between 2 September and 12 December 1991. The detainees were interrogated and reportedly physically abused. A number of them were removed from the camp and their status remains unknown. The report identifies the principal perpetrator.

3340. Fertilizer Store, Berak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) According to the statement of a 50 year-old Croatian woman from the village of Berak, in October 1991, Serbian paramilitary forces collected many of the remaining non-Serbian civilians and detained them in a fertilizer store. Reportedly, the men were systematically interrogated and many among them were physically mistreated. The report alleges further that many of the male detainees who disappeared from the camp are suspected to have been killed. Many of the detainees were later transferred to a private home and held there for some undisclosed period of time.

3341. Private House, Berak: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) According to an elderly Croatian female, members of the Serbian paramilitary group, the White Eagles, invaded her village in mid-December 1991. They reportedly came to her home, blindfolded her and took her to a neighbouring house. She believed that she was selected because her son had participated in the organization of military exercises. She was reportedly stripped naked and, over the course of about two hours, raped and forced to perform fellatio on seven men. Her captors reportedly put a knife to her breast, stuffed clothing in her mouth and screamed her son's name throughout the abuse. She was later fired upon with automatic weapons as they chased her away from the house.
3342. Tovarnik: The village of Tovarnik is located in the southern portion of Vukovar county in eastern Slavonia. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, there were some 3,000 inhabitants in this village; three-fourths of which were Croatian and the remainder were primarily Serbs. 5261/

3343. Following Tito's death and the formation of the first political parties, relations between Serbs and Croats deteriorated. After the initial attack on Vukovar, military presence increased in Tovarnik and on 20 September 1991, Tovarnik was attacked by armoured units from Šid and Ilinci. By 23 September 1991, the village was occupied by Serbian forces. 5262/

3344. House of Deceased Dr. Živorad Cvejić, Tovarnik: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources however none among them are neutral.) Reportedly on 20 September 1991, after Yugoslav Army tanks entered the village, Croatian civilians were captured and detained at this private home. 5263/ The detainees were reportedly interrogated, beaten and insulted. 5264/ The report suggests the beatings were inflicted by the local Serbs and that the JNA interrogated the inmates without maltreating them. In addition to a prison, this facility allegedly also served as a police station. 5265/ The detainees were later transferred to Šid and then to Begejci detention facility. 5266/

3345. According to another report, during the fighting in Tovarnik, Serbs allegedly collected some 40 residents from the village and detained them in the basement of this house. 5267/ Reportedly, over the course of a few days, the numbers of detainees thinned. Many were removed and never returned. Those who remained in detention reportedly heard screams and fire from outside the house. 5268/ The remaining detainees alleged being subjected to repeated physical abuse and mistreatment. After some time in detention, the detainees were released. 5269/

3346. Home of Milenko Svetica, Tovarnik: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) On 20 September 1991, Serb forces reportedly captured four civilians and detained them in the basement of one of the captured civilian's homes. 5270/ Some time thereafter, the detainees were transferred to Milenko Svetica's home where they were interrogated and reportedly mistreated. 5271/ According to one of the four detainees, the other inmates were killed by their Serb captors while he was permitted to escape. 5272/

3347. Unknown Building, Tovarnik: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, a detention facility was still in existence here on 25 May 1992, and some 22 Croatians were taken from their homes in Tovarnik and detained in the hall of this unidentified local building. 5273/ The detainees were reportedly beaten during their detention, forced to sign over control of their property and then transferred to Lipovac. 5274/

3348. School in Tovarnik: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report a Croatian from the village of Lovas, who was a mechanic by trade, was allegedly ordered by Serbs to work at a school in Tovarnik. The school reportedly served as one of the headquarters for area Serb activity. 5275/ The witness was able to identify several residents of Tovarnik detained in a small room at this site. 5276/

3349. "Ovčara": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ITN.) Several sources suggest that "Ovčara" is a part of the VUPIK-VUKOVAR agricultural factory. It's exact location in the area of Vukovar has not been secured. There are, however, reports that suggest that "Ovčara" was composed of a farm, a metal hangar and a warehouse. 5277/
3350. "Ovčara" Farm: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ITN.) According to one report patients were transported from the Vukovar hospital to the "Ovčara" farm where some among them were beaten severely. One former inmate was able to identify the man who "carried out most of the beatings". In some cases, prisoners were reportedly beaten to death. 5279/

3351. Metal Hangar, "Ovčara": (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) The testimony of a former patient at the Vukovar hospital who, after evacuation from the hospital, was taken to "Ovčara" noted that two busloads of individuals were corralled into the metal hangar. The facility was described as 50 metres by 20 metres with four doors. There was straw scattered about in the middle of the hangar. There were windows and also artificial light available inside. 5281/

3352. When the detainees entered the hangar, several Serb paramilitary members were lined up awaiting them. As the inmates passed by the waiting Serb soldiers, down the corridor, they were beaten and kicked with a variety of objects. All of their personal effects were then removed, after which individual episodes of mistreatment began. According to the witness, the beatings continued for several hours. The Serbs then prepared lists detailing names, family names, birthdates and addresses of the 300 or so male detainees. Thereafter, the inmates were separated into smaller groups, loaded onto trucks and told that they were to be taken to another hangar. The witness escaped from the truck en route to its next location. The whereabouts of the succeeding detention site was not made available. 5284/

3353. According to another report, on 5 November 1991, some 300 Croatian civilians and members of the military were detained at this particular "Ovčara" facility. The report suggests that after registration, detainees were loaded onto trucks in groups of 20 and transported to surrounding locations. 5285/

3354. "Ovčara" Warehouse: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the Austrian Mission.) A former detainee recalled that on 20 November 1991, he and several other Vukovar hospital employees—totalling almost 250 individuals—were placed onto buses and transported to either the Vukovar barracks or to the warehouse at "Ovčara". The detainees transported to "Ovčara" were led to a warehouse depot which was allegedly used to store agricultural machinery. The inmates' personal effects were taken from them at the entrance to the warehouse and, once inside, they were reportedly physically and mentally mistreated. After an undisclosed period of time a large percentage of the inmates were then returned to Vukovar and interned at the Velepromet facility. 5286/

3355. Building in Marinci: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, on 19 November 1991, JNA members attacked a group of civilians just outside the village of Marinci, allegedly opening fire on them. The civilians were then captured and taken to an unidentified building in Marinci and detained in the basement. The Serbs reportedly threatened by the inmates with an instrument described as a device used to "gauge 'Ustaše' eyes out". 5289/

3356. House in Negoslavci: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one report, several wounded individuals as well as employees of the Vukovar Hospital were transported to the basement of a home in Negoslavci. Reportedly the conditions were severely lacking. Because no toilet facilities were made available, the inmates were compelled to urinate in a common pot. The Serb captors reportedly beat the prisoners constantly and indiscriminately. The inmates received no food and
only an occasional cup of water. 5293/

3357. Unidentified Building, Mitnica:  (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Mitnica is reportedly a part of the Vukovar municipality whose inhabitants defended themselves and then surrendered after lengthy negotiations with the JNA. 5294/ The conclusory arrangements included the surrender and disarmament of all area individuals regardless of profession or ethnicity. The agreement stated further that all who surrendered would be permitted to move about freely as well as to leave for other parts of Croatia. 5295/ Additionally that all individuals would be administered to according to Geneva Convention standards. 5296/

3358. However, without regard for the written promises made to the contrary, Croatian men ages 14-70 were arrested and many were transferred to camps in FRY. 5297/ In the case of those not sent to Serbia, military personnel were separated from civilians and the former were detained at Ovčara and the latter at Velepromet. 5298/

3359. Detention facilities were created throughout the area. According to one report, Croatian guardsmen held 18 individuals in the cellar of an undisclosed building in Mitnica. 5299/ Two Croats were among the detainees. 5300/ Despite the cooperative surrender, there were allegations of severe physical mistreatment and the existence of compulsory labour groups. No information regarding length of duration or the specific location of the facility was provided. 5301/

3360. "The Second Congress":  (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) According to one witness, on 9 December 1991, Serb paramilitaries collected a group of Croat and Serb individuals and detained them in a building known as "The Second Congress", which was, more accurately, a demolished school building. 5302/ Members of the Serb paramilitary group, Šešelj, were reportedly conducting orgies in this facility. 5303/ The detainee recalled hearing screams from neighbouring rooms and recognized 5304/ the voices as those of former students. 5305/

3361. The detainees were reportedly registered and then separated, with Serbs being transferred to Velepromet and Croats transported to unknown destinations. It was believed by some that many of the Croatian detainees were killed. 5306/

45. Zadar

3362. The county of Zadar is located in south-eastern Croatia and borders the Adriatic Sea. According to the 1991 census, the pre-war population was 134,881. At that time, the population was 83.4 per cent Croatian, 10.5 per cent Serbian, and 6.1 per cent was referred to as "other". 5307/

3363. Brickyard, Nin:  (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) In a story in the Belgrade newspaper, Politika Ekspres, on 28 September, 5308/ it was reported that Croatians dressed in black were spreading terror amongst Zadar's Serbian population and arresting or forcibly evicting Serbian families. It was reported that a detention centre for Serbs was set up in a brickyard in the town of Nin, in Zadar county. The article claimed that the leader was a former police officer from the town of Benkovac. 5309/

3364. Zadar Military Prison:  (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and Amnesty International.) According to a report in Borba on 16 December, a number of prisoners released from Zadar military prison in an exchange of prisoners on 12 December 1991, stated that they had been beaten and ill-treated by Croatian security
forces. 5310/ The ICRC reportedly first visited this camp on 17 October 1991. 5311/

3365. Zadar Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ECMM.) The Mayor of Starigrad reported that Serbian prisoners of war were being held in Zadar jail. 5312/

3366. Zadar Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) A camp referred to as the "prison/penitentiary" was first visited by the ICRC on 16 October 1991. 5313/ It is unclear if this is the same camp referred to as the Zadar "Jail" above.

3367. Zadar Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the ICRC and the ECMM.) The Mayor of Starigrad reported that four Serbian prisoners of war were being held in Zadar hospital. 5314/ This camp is also reported on an ICRC list of places of detention. 5315/

3368. Former JNA Barracks, Zadar: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) In a statement given by a Serbian man 5316/, it is reported that there is a camp in the former JNA barracks in Zadar. The man was arrested by Croatian soldiers near the village of Mumilovaca on his way to Prebilovci in Čapljina county on 8 April 1992. He was handcuffed and taken to a camp at the tobacco processing plant in Čapljina. He was held there with others and they were all beaten. They were then taken to the "Poduh" tobacco processing plant in Metkovići, where their personal documents and all valuables were taken. They were again subjected to severe and repeated beatings. They were later taken to the "Lora" camp in Split. They were again beaten repeatedly and given very little food. The man witnessed at least one man being killed. Allegedly, one night before the arrival of the International Red Cross, 12 of the prisoners were tied up and taken in a van to Zadar where they were held in the former JNA barracks. They were again beaten. From here, they were taken to Duvno (now Tomislavgrad) where they were held for about 10 days in the cellar of an abandoned house. They were then driven to Ljubuški and were again beaten. The witness was beaten so severely that he was taken to the hospital in Split where he stayed for 15 days. After this he was taken to Šibenik, to what he believes was the "Ante Jonjić" barracks. There, the prisoners were forced to "graze" on the grass. He was beaten and stabbed in the chest. He witnessed a 70 year-old woman and her 15 year-old granddaughter being raped. After about 10 days, he was taken back to "Lora" in Split. He was there for about a month and a half and then driven with other prisoners in three or four busses to the Kerestinec camp. From there, he was sent to Nemetin near Osijek and exchanged on 14 August 1992. 5317/

3369. Unidentified Place of Detention, Zadar: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely Amnesty International.) A man 5318/ from Zadar reported being arrested by Croatian police officers in Zadar and held in detention there in October and November of 1991. He was allegedly mistreated and beaten. There are no other details available. 5319/ In another report it stated that on 11 November 1991, a Serbian adviser to the Croatian President confirmed at a news conference in Zagreb that a detention centre had been set up for Serbs in Zadar and that some Serbs had been killed on the spot. 5320/ Amnesty International has received reports of the torture and ill-treatment of prisoners detained by Croatian authorities in an unspecified detention centre in Zadar. 5321/
Zagreb

3370. Zagreb is the largest province in Croatia. It is located in the northwest corner of the country. As of 1991, it had a population of 930,550 of which 85.6 per cent were Croatian, 9 per cent "other", and 5.4 per cent Serbian.

3371. Kerestinec Camp/Military Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, the ICRC, and the ECMM.) Kerestinec detention camp was located in the military barracks in Sveta Nedela near Zagreb. The camp reportedly held Serbs, Muslims, Hungarians and members of other unidentified nationalities. 5322/ There are no precise details about who was running the camp, but according to witnesses, it appears to have been managed by Croatian military and police forces. 5323/

3372. Reports date the existence of the camp from October 1991 to August 1992 although exactly when it was established and presumably shut down is unknown. Likewise, the number of detainees at the camp is unknown. The only estimation comes from a witness brought to the camp in August 1992 who states that he was one of 420 prisoners. 5324/

3373. Many prisoners came from interrogation centres in Vinkovci, Slavonska Orahovica, Savonska Požega, Podravska Slatina, Djakovo, Novska, Našice and Sisak. These prisoners were split up and sent either to Zagreb, Osijek or Gaj, Vrbovec for long-term detention. 5325/

3374. One of the earliest reports of detention at Kerestinec describes the arrest of a JNA reservist by the Croatian forces around 8 October 1992. Apparently, the Serbian soldier was taken to Kerestinec camp, and there has been no sign of him since this time. The report does state that there are indications that he was subjected to torture at the camp and then killed. 5326/

3375. There are no detailed descriptions of the camp premises, but one witness who was detained at Kerestinec and other camps explains that all Croatian camps were sectioned off into three blocks. "A" was for former JNA members who had surrendered without a struggle; "B" was for elderly people between 70 and 80 years-old who were arrested in their apartments; block "C" was for military police, volunteers, and people whom the Croats called "Četniks". Apparently, those held in cell "C" received the harshest treatment from Croatian authorities. 5327/

3376. Inmates at Kerestinec were reportedly subject to torture and abuse on a daily basis. Apart from beatings, the most frequent forms of torture were low-voltage electric shocks, the rape of women, and forced fellatio on camp guards. 5328/ One report indicated that in April of 1992 six Serb detainees were taken in to room with black wall and force to play "Russian roulette". One prisoner reportedly turned the gun on the guards and was hung from his legs and stabbed to death. The other prisoners were allegedly forced to clean the blood up by licking the floor. 5329/ Another report indicated that a prisoner was hung by his feet in the black room and also taken to mock executions. 5330/

3377. One report indicated that inmates were sexually abused. Male prisoners were taken to a movie theatre to watch guards rape Serbian women. Men were also forced to perform sexually acts on one another. The report included a father and his two sons allegedly being forced to have sexual intercourse with each other. 5331/

3378. Prisoners received little to no food, were forbidden to sleep, were forced to sing anti-Serbian songs, march and salute the "Ustaša way," and were commonly poured with cold water. 5332/ Other abuses included putting the muzzle of a gun in prisoners' mouths, forcing prisoners to swallow various inedible objects,
gouging their eyes, and cutting off their ears. Another source reported that the a prisoner was beaten until he did not regain consciousness and was then taken to the Simunska Street hospital.

3379. One Serbian man detained there in January and February 1992 reports that he was kept with six other prisoners in a small room measuring six square metres with a concrete floor. On the third night of their detention, they were given pillows and a blanket each. He and the others were regularly beaten and always hungry. He also claims that almost all of the guards at the camp behaved in a "violent, aggressive way".

3380. Generally, prisoners were transferred to Kerestinec from other camps and ultimately sent from there to other places for exchange. In fact, some reports suggest the Kerestinec was a place where Croatian authorities go prisoners “ready” for exchange by feeding them, letting them shower and shave, changing their clothes, and offering them medical attention.

3381. Several reports describe the transfer of prisoners to Kerestinec from a camp in Lora, Split. One such report explains that in August 1992 a Serbian prisoner was brought to Kerestinec to a convoy of three or four “overcrowded” buses. This convoy was accompanied by a “strong Croatian security” force. Once at Kerestinec, he and the others were prepared over several days for exchange. Camp officials allowed the prisoners to shave, take a bath every other day, and see a doctor. Some were even dressed in JNA uniforms before being exchanged. From there, they went to Nemetin near Osijek where they were exchanged on 14 August 1992.

3382. A second report describes the transfer of still another convoy of prisoners who came to Kerestinic from Lora on 14 August 1991 at 7:00 p.m. This convoy was made up of about eight or nine buses and included up to 420 prisoners. Upon their arrival, they were given new clothes, pain killers and make-up to cover marks from their beatings. Ultimately, they too were taken to Osijek to be exchanged at the Nemetin-Sarvaš check-point. At this time, it is reported that 160 of the 420 prisoners did not want to be exchanged, claiming that they belonged to Croatia and show be allowed to stay there.

3383. Still another report indicated that a Serb prisoner at Gospić Camp was transferred to Kerestinec on 27 January 1992. This man was a retired JNA officer from the village of Široka Kula. He was released from Kerestinec on 21 February 1992 but then picked up again by Croatian military police officers from his home five days later. He was brought back to the camp and told he would be exchanged. Yet, the witness was ordered to go to Krajina, and he did not want to leave Zagreb. As a result, he was not exchanged and instead brought to Šibenik for one night and released the next day.


3385. Prison in Vlaška Street, Zagreb: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) There is one report that a JNA reserve captain was arrested, brought Vlaška Street prison, and killed. The arrest occurred sometime in the first half of 1991. Apparently, he was hit on the head with metal rods until his skull broke open; then, his body was chopped into pieces. From the report, it appears that he was detained for longer than just his killing.

3386. There is another more general report which alleges that detainees at the prison were maltreated with electricity, were forced to swallow inedible
objects, had their eyes gauged out and their ears cut off. 5345/ There is no further information about this camp.

3387. Only five names are indicated in relation to the crimes committed at these two camps. 5346/

3388. **Prison in former Military Court**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) In November 1991 four ethnic Serbs were allegedly held in the prison in the building of the former Military Court on Gajeva Street. They were held in separate cells of the prison and were harshly treated. One was a soldier from Slavonija, another was a corporal from a Serbian tank crew, the third was a reservist from Banja Luka, and the fourth was a taxi driver. They were reportedly beaten every day and were drenched with water and made to stand in the cold weather. One was allegedly forced to wash cars naked in the prison yard and others were forced to have oral sex. They were reportedly forced to beat one another and sing Ustaša songs. 5347/ The ICRC reportedly first visited this facility on 19 October 1991. 5348/

3389. **Remetinac Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) At the end of September a member of the JNA was detained in the Remetinac prison in Zagreb. He was allegedly held for 41 days and was beaten continuously. He was also reportedly stabbed in the arm and had cigarettes extinguished on his body. The food was reportedly inadequate and served to the detainees through a slot at the bottom of the cell door. The prisoner claimed to have lost a substantial amount of weight. 5349/ The ICRC reported Remetinac as a place of detention and first visited the facility on 19 September 1991. 5350/

3390. **Military Camp, Zagreb**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that it first visited this facility on 12 July 1991. 5351/ There is no further information on this facility.

3391. **Military Hospital, Zagreb**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that it first visited this facility on 11 November 1991. 5352/ There is no further information on this facility.

3392. **Military Prison, Zagreb**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that it first visited this facility on 1 June 1992. 5353/ There is no further information on this facility.

3393. **Prison Hospital, Zagreb**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC.) The ICRC reports that it first visited this facility on 16 July 1991. 5354/ There is no further information on this facility.

C. FRY

1. Kosovo

3394. **Lipijan**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including ICRC). According to one report there is a prison three kilometres from Lipijan along the road to Stimlje. It is constructed with fences two to three metres high. Prisoners were held there for up to 30 days before being taken to prisons in Serbia. 5355/ The ICRC visited Lipijan prison on 20 December 1993. 5356/
2. Montenegro

3395. **Baosici**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). Baosici is located in southern Montenegro, near Herceg-novi, along the Adriatic Coast. According to one source "extremists" have moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in Serbia, including Baosici. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 5357/ According to another source there were 350 prisoners at the camp sometime before October 1992. 5358/ Another source also reports the existence of this detention facility at Herceg novi in Baosici. 5359/

3396. **Herceg-novi**: This is probably the same detention facility referred to as "Baosici" above. Herceg-novi is located in southern Montenegro along the Adriatic Coast. According to one source "extremists" have moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in Serbia, including Herceg-novi. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 5360/

3397. **Herceg-novi City Jail**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). In March and April 1992, Bosnian Muslims fled from the hostilities in the Foča area to Montenegro, which they believed was safe due to programs authorities in Serbia broadcasted. These programs indicated that Muslims were safe in Serbia. In July 1992, at least 30 Muslim refugees in Herceg-novi were apprehended by the city police and detained in the city jail. They were held until unidentified police personnel and Miso Stevanović arrived in Foča police vehicles and transported them to the Foča prison. 5361/

3398. **Kumbor**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one source there is a military prison in Kumbor. Kumbor is located in southern Montenegro, near the coast. 5362/

3399. **Mornišća**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ICRC). One source reports that Mornišća is a military prison in southern Montenegro, just north of Kumbor. 5363/ According to Amnesty International Mornišća is a camp run by the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries. 5364/ The ICRC visited Mornišća prison on 11 November 1991. 5365/

3400. **Nikšić**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). A report indicates that Nikšić, a city in Montenegro, contains a detention facility. 5366/ Another source also reports the existence of this detention facility. 5367/

3401. **Pljevlja**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). Pljevlja, in northern Montenegro, was also a site where Muslims took refuge from the hostilities in the Foča area around March and April of 1992. In July 1992 Muslim refugees were rounded up and held in jails in several cities, one of which was Pljevlja, until they were picked up by Foča police personnel. All the refugees were taken to Foča prison and detained until they were sent to unidentified locations. 5368/

3402. **Podgorica**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). Podgorica, formerly Titograd, is located in southern Montenegro. It is another city where Muslim refugees, who had fled the conflict in Foča in July 1992, were held in the city jail until they were picked up by Foča police personnel. At least two Muslims were held in the jail. 5369/
3403. Sutmore: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). Sutmore is located in southern Montenegro, along the Adriatic Sea. According to the wife of a BiH refugee her husband was arrested on 20 May 1992 in Sutmore. He was detained for four days before being moved to an unknown location. His wife believes he may have been turned over to the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in BiH to be used in a prisoner exchange there. 5370/

3404. Approximately 130 prisoners from the Reserve Officers School in Bileca were allegedly moved to Sutmore. 5371/

3405. Zelenika: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC). According to the ICRC, 357 detainees from Mostar, Rodoc, Livno, and Tomislavgrad were transferred to Zelenika, Montenegro on 30 October 1992 and 73 were released there. Another 111 detainees from Konjic, Visoko, and Zenica were transferred to Zelenika on 23 December 1992 and 30 were released. The first group of detainees were held in Bosnian Croat controlled detention facilities and the second group were held in BiH Government detention facilities. Both releases were under ICRC supervision. It is not clear that there is a detention facility in Zelenika. 5372/

3. Serbia

3406. Aleksinac: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including the US Department of State). The majority of men from Vukovar were transported to detention facilities in FRY by the JNA and irregular soldiers. One of these detention facilities was located in Aleksinac. 5373/ In late April 1992, prisoners from Stajicevo were to be released in a prisoner exchange, however all the younger men were transferred to Aleksinac, Niš, and Sremska Mitrovica. 5374/

3407. A group of 180 Croatian National Guardsmen from Vukovar were transferred by bus from the Sremska Mitrovica to the Aleksinac detention facility. Upon arrival at Aleksinac, prisoners were beaten by military police, commanding officers, and civilians. A large number of civilians gathered behind the prison fence and shouted at the prisoners as they entered. The prisoners were severely beaten during their internment at the facility. The dates of their internment are not known, however they were transferred soon after their arrival in Aleksinac to Niš. The witness also claims that when the ICRC arrived at Niš some of the more severely beaten prisoners were moved to an army barracks in Aleksinac. After the ICRC departed the prisoners were taken back to Niš. 5375/

3408. Aleksinac Mines: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources but none neutral). There was also a report of thousands of prisoners from BiH being detained in FRY, some of whom were interned in the Aleksinac Mines. 5376/ Another report alleges that a group of men from Vukovar were forced to work in the mines in Aleksinac, and many of them were executed. The conditions were reported as unbearable. 5377/ This camp is also reported in another report. 5378/

3409. Batajnica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including the US Department of State). Batajnica is a city in Serbia, a few kilometres north-west of Belgrade. Five prisoners, the majority from the invasion by Serb forces of Bosanska Samac, were sent to a camp at Batajnica, in Serbia on 9 or 10 May 1992 from the Spanac JNA Barracks in Bljeljina. 5379/ According to another source, however, Batajnica contained 2,200 prisoners sometime before October 1992. 5380/
3410. Belgrade: Belgrade appears to contain several prisons where detainees from the Croatian and BiH conflicts were held and tried. The reports refer to a military prison, the military investigative prison, and the VIZ army prison, though it is not clear whether these are the same place. The reports also refer to the civilian prison and the central prison where prisoners were held for short periods after sentencing and before being transferred to other prisons to serve their time. The central and the civilian prison also appear to refer to the same place though this is not certain.

3411. At all three of these military prisons the procedures appear to have been similar. Prisoners were transferred from other detention facilities throughout FRY to be tried for various crimes in Belgrade. The prisoners were forced to make false statements to television journalists and were accused of crimes they claimed not to have committed. They were beaten while detained and awaiting trial. Most reports being tried and sentenced or merely awaiting trial. Some were transferred to the Central/Civilian Prisons after being sentenced and before being transferred to another camp. On 14 August 1992 most of the witnesses were exchanged at Nemetin.

3412. Unknown Prison in Belgrade: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including ICRC). An undetermined number of prisoners were transferred from Mitrovica to Belgrade on 5 March 1992. These prisoners were maltreated and filmed by television crews. They were served with bills of indictment two days before the exchange on 14 August 1992 in Nemetin.

3413. Another prisoner from Sremska Mitrovica was transferred to Belgrade on 14 February 1992 for a public trial which lasted for one month. Allegedly the prisoners were forced to confess to crimes they did not commit. The witness claims that the prisoners were tortured while in the custody of reservists but the younger reservists were not as cruel. One man was beaten so severely that his back was broken and he had to be taken to the Medical Centre in Belgrade. Initially the ICRC had access to the prisoners but for a two month period they were forbidden to visit the prison. The prisoners were exchanged on 14 August 1992 at Nemetin. On the way to the exchange, the bus would stop in villages and locals would enter the bus to beat the prisoners.

3414. Military Investigative Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC.) A witness was transferred from Stajicevo in early December to the military investigative prison located between the Slavija and Banjica areas of Belgrade. He was forced to make anti-Croatian statements in front of local and international reporters. The public prosecutor for Belgrade and another individual told the witness that if he did not make such statements he would be maltreated. He was coached for the interview and given a statement from which to make his remarks. The statements attempted to portray Croatia as the aggressor in the war, that Croatia wanted to take over Serbian lands and that Tudjman had deceived the Croatian nation, and wanted to be separated from Yugoslavia in order to make a profit. On 14 August, the Croatian prisoners from the Belgrade military investigative prison were exchanged at Nemetin.

3415. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). Several members of the Croatian army in Vukovar were transferred from Sremska Mitrovica to the military prison in Belgrade on 2 March 1992. One was tried for desertion from the JNA and the military court sentenced him to five years imprisonment. Following the trial he was transferred to the central prison in Belgrade on 20 July 1992 and then on the same day to Valjevo detention facility to serve his sentence. Another was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Both were exchanged on 14 August 1992.
3416. One witness believes that those removed from the Begejci detention facility in November 1991 were taken to the military prison in Belgrade. 5390/

3417. Around 16 October 1991, a convoy attempting to leave Ilok was stopped by the JNA and some people were removed from the convoy and taken to several prisons in FRY, including the military prison in Belgrade. 5391/

3418. VIZ Army Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). After six months in the KPD at Sremska Mitrovica a witness was transferred to the VIZ army prison in Belgrade in June. There they raised a bill of indictment against 31 prisoners. The witness was accused of crimes he claims he never committed. He awaited trial in the VIZ for 45 days but was exchanged on 14 August 1992 in Nemetin. 5392/

3419. A member of the Croatian Army was transferred from Sremska Mitrovica on 13 February 1992 to Belgrade for trial. He was beaten when he arrived at the VIZ Belgrade prison and then put under the protection of the ICRC. He claims to have been mentally abused though not beaten again. The witness was in Belgrade until 20 July 1992 when his trial took place and was sentenced to four years imprisonment. He was sent to the Central Prison Institution in Belgrade and from there to Požarevac to serve his sentence. He was exchanged 20 days later. 5393/

3420. A Croatian women from Vukovar was transferred from Sremska Mitrovica to the VIZ army prison in Belgrade on 3 February 1992. She claims that during her transportation, her hands were tied with plastic bands which caused swelling. At the prison, the detainees were beaten at night and the witness could hear screams from other cells. The witness was sentenced to 15 years in prison but was exchanged on 14 August 1992. 5394/

3421. Another woman was transferred to the VIZ from Begejci. She was questioned the first night at the prison by a reservist named "Lala". He beat her in the toilet room and forced her to take off her clothes. She claims that she was not raped though she was sexually mistreated. Three other prisoners were beaten before she was. All the prisoners were registered on a list and deprived of all their property and documents. The witness was then held in solitary confinement for a month and a half. She claims that she was not beaten while in solitary confinement though she was deprived of sleep. After that she was moved to a cell with a Serbian woman and remained in shock for 30 days. She was accused of armed rebellion, of crossing the Vojvodina border, and helping the "Ustaše". She was exchanged on 14 August 1992 at Nemetin. On the way to the exchange she claims the prisoners were robbed and local "Četniks" were allowed on the buses to mistreat them. 5395/

3422. Bor: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). Bor, a city in eastern Serbia, allegedly contains a detention facility in the Borski Rudnići Mines. According to one report there were 2,500 prisoners held in the detention facility. 5396/

3423. Bubanj Potok: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). At the end of September 1991 civilians, transferred from Bogdanovci, were detained in an army barracks controlled by the JNA. The barracks were located near Niš in Serbia and served as a training ground for a Martić special unit. The prisoners were physically maltreated by JNA soldiers. Each was allegedly hit 100 to 200 times and one epileptic prisoner was killed. 5397/
3424. Kakobovac Sheep Farm: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). One report indicates that a sheep farm in the Serbian Town of Kakobovac was turned into a jail where a large number of Croatian POWs from Vukovar were detained and killed. The bodies were buried in a canal between two buildings. The canal was used as a runoff for manure from the sheep and was lightly covered with dirt. When strong rains occurred pieces of the bodies would emerge from the mud. The bodies had to be exhumed and moved approximately half a kilometre and buried in a ditch. At the time of the report the area was surrounded by barbed wire to mark the site. 5398/

3425. Loznica: (The existence of this camp has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the US Department of State). According to one source "extremists" have moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in Serbia, including Loznica, in western Serbia. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 5399/ The BiH government also alleged that there was a concentration camp in Loznica. However embassy officials, humanitarian organizations, and western journalist did not find any indication of a camp there. Loznica, according to the officials apparently housed Muslim refugees from BiH under inadequate conditions and the circumstances of its closing are peculiar. 5400/ According to another source, however, Loznica Sports and Recreation Centre contain 1,380 prisoners sometime before October 1992. 5401/ Another report also mentions the camp in the Loznica Sports Centre. 5402/

3426. Kraljevo: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one source, a military prison is located in Kraljevo. 5403/

3427. Ljubovija: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). One report indicates that Muslims from several villages around Srebrenica were taken to a detention facility in Ljubovija. Ljubovija is located in Serbia on the eastern shore of the Drina river near the border of Bratunac. 5404/

3428. Mokra Gora: (The existence of this camp has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). Morka Gora is located near Užice in western Serbia. According to one source "extremists" have moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in Serbia, including Mokra Gora. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 5405/ According to another source there were 3,000 prisoners at the camp sometime before October 1992. 5406/ This camp is also mentioned by another source. 5407/

3429. Niš: Niš is located in western Serbia near the Bulgarian border, at the fork of the Morava River and Nišava River. 5408/ According to several reports, at least one detention facility, possibly more, existed in Niš containing an undetermined number of prisoners from Croatia, mainly Vukovar, and BiH. 5409/

3430. Military Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including ICRC). One source asserted that a military camp holding 1,540 prisoners was established in Niš. 5410/ The ICRC listed two detention sites in Niš which its representatives visited. The first was a military prison visited on 14 April 1992. 5411/ This camp is also mentioned in another report. 5412/

3431. Prison/Penitentiary: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources including ICRC). The second detention site listed by ICRC was a prison/penitentiary, visited on 2 December 1991. 5413/
3432. A detention facility clearly existed on 23 November 1991 as there were reports of Croatian National Guardsmen captured in Vukovar being held there. Reports indicate that prisoners were incarcerated in Niš as late as April of 1992. 5414/ Amnesty International, however, reported that in October of 1991 two JNA reservists were detained at Niš pending a military trial. The two reservists from Aleksinac had refused to participate in the conflict in Dalj and had insisted on their unit being withdrawn from Croatia. The basis of their complaint was that the JNA was the aggressor in the conflict and that the reservist troops were inadequately trained. 5415/ It is not clear that these men were detained in the same facility as the prisoners from Croatia and BiH.

3433. Little information was reported on the actual structure of the facility. What could be determined from the reports was that 35 to 160 prisoners were held in a single room 5416/ and multiple rooms existed. At least some prisoners had beds, apparently bunkbeds, and there was limited access to toilet facilities. 5417/ The dining area was located at some distance from the cells, so that the prisoners had to run to the location. 5418/ Solitary confinement cells were also used by the custodians of the detention facility. 5419/

3434. The commander of the camp, who is thought to have been a military commander in Sibenik, approved of all the maltreatment the prisoners received. He allegedly had a wife and child in Croatia and was prone to drinking a lot. The witness claimed that the commander was exchanged but did not expound on this. 5420/

3435. NCO Catić and 15 soldiers under his command went from room to room beating prisoners and were especially cruel around the time of Croatia's international recognition. 5421/

3436. One man most responsible for beating the prisoners was an ensign whose name is unknown. Though it was unclear what his role was in the detention facility, he wore a uniform without shoulder borders at times and civilian clothes at other times. He was described as a strong man with no mercy. 5422/

3437. The prisoners were interrogated by members of the Serbian Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) who were allegedly from Niš, by their accents. The KOS members beat the prisoners excessively and often. Another investigator was a captain of the first rank. 5423/

3438. The prisoners appeared to have been mainly Croats, though one report indicated Bosnians were also incarcerated. Around 16 February 1992, Amnesty International had reports from Croatian officials that an undetermined number of prisoners were held in Niš. 5424/ Another source claimed that over 22,000 captured civilians from BiH were taken to various prison camps in FRY including Niš. 5425/

3439. According to testimonies from ex-detainees at least 180 Croatian National Guardsmen from Vukovar were incarcerated in Niš on 23 November 1991. They had previously been held in Aleksinac for a few days and remained in Niš until 16 February 1992. 5426/ On 12 December 1991, a group of prisoners from Stajicevo were transferred to Niš. 5427/ Another group of Croatian Army reservists were transferred from Stajicevo to Niš on 22 December 1991 and remained there until mid-February 1992. 5428/ In late April at the detention facility in Stajicevo the male prisoners, between 17 and 45 years old, were transported to other camps in FRY including Niš. 5429/ One survivor of the massacres in Vukovar was held in Begejci until 21 January 1992 when he was transferred to Niš. 5430/
3440. Physical abuse, especially beatings, occurred on a regular basis at Niš. 5431/ One detainee, interned between January and March 1992 claims that he was beaten every other day. This resulted in severe injuries to his back, legs and feet. 5432/ Some prisoners were beaten with truncheons and kicked. 5433/ Another prisoner claimed that he had seven broken ribs and two fractured vertebrae as a result of the beatings he received while in custody. 5434/ The beatings were severe enough to cause the fatality of two prisoners in custody at Niš. 5435/

3441. According to reports, prisoners appear to have been beaten at random. For example, they were beaten as they went to meals and when they used the toilet facilities. 5436/ Physical abuse was also used as a sort of revenge or punishment. On 15 January 1992, the day Croatia gained international recognition, the prisoners were beaten harshly and told that they would not be treated according to the Geneva Conventions. 5437/ Prisoners were also beaten before being transported to other facilities in FRY. 5438/

3442. NCO Catić and 15 soldiers under his command beat one 17 year old prisoner until he lost consciousness. This occurred three times during the beating and the prisoner was revived with water each time. These soldiers would move from room to room beating detainees. Prisoners were usually abused by three to five guards. The guards would sometimes use dogs to terrorize the prisoners or shoot at them. 5439/

3443. A mentally unstable prisoner was treated exceptionally badly according to one witness. Two or three guards would jump on him and kick him in the loins, if he did not scream the guards would beat him more severely. They attempted to force a confession from him but he refused. The witness believes that the guards singled out the unstable prisoner because he was wealthy and owned a Mercedes. 5440/

3444. In addition to continuous battery, the prisoners were not allowed to exercise other than occasionally clearing snow with metal cabinet doors. 5441/

3445. Interrogations were reported but it was not clear from the reports how often they occurred. The prisoners were asked questions concerning the number of people they had killed or raped. They were forced through beatings to confess to crimes that allegedly never occurred and were forced to sign the confessions. Allegedly, the investigators would force one prisoner to sign a statement claiming another inmate had committed certain crimes. The accused would then be shown the signed statement and forced, again by beating, to confess to the crime as well. The prisoners were accused of various crimes which were based on where they had fought and what they did. 5442/ Among those interrogated were 180 Croatian National Guardsmen. They were maltreated and tortured during the interrogations. 5443/

3446. One room held 34 prisoners and each had a bed. They had to get up at 5:30 a.m. and were given one to three minutes to wash and relieve themselves. 5444/ The guards maltreated the prisoners as they went to relieve themselves. If they could not complete their bowel movement in the allotted time the prisoners would have to wait until the next call by the guards. 5445/ After using the toilet facilities the prisoners had to stand on a vinyl square in their room to wait for breakfast. The guards beat the prisoners during this time. 5446/

3447. The prisoners were forced to run to all of their meals and were often physically abused while they ate. The food was poor and even the soldiers were fed inadequately. 5447/ One witness stated that beans were served for both lunch and dinner for two weeks. 5448/
3448. After lunch there was a rest period, however this depended on the guards. The prisoners were made to jump up onto their beds, apparently bunkbeds, and if someone was unable to do so the guards would beat them. The prisoners had to wait until after roll call before being allowed access to the lavatories. 5449/

3449. Nevertheless, one detainee claimed the conditions at Niš were better than at Stajicevo. The cells were warmer and there was a doctor present. 5450/

3450. In the beginning of December 1991, the ICRC visited the camp and three prisoners were hidden in the shooting gallery. They had their hands tied and had to stand below a one and a half metres mark on the wall. 5451/ Again on 23 January 1992 the ICRC visited the detention facility. The prisoners showed the representatives their bruises but the representatives were forced to leave. 5452/

3451. A large group of prisoners appears to have been transferred from Niš to Sremska Mitrovica around the middle of February, 1992. 5453/ They were transferred by bus and had their hands tied with wire. 5454/

3452. Ozren Monastery: A report indicates there is a POW and civilian prison camp at the Ozren Monastery. 5455/ The location of this monastery has not been confirmed, however there is a town in Serbia, near Aleksinac by that name. 5456/

3453. Petrovac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). Petrovac is in north-eastern Serbia, south-east of Belgrade. A member of the Croatian Army, taken prisoner at the Henrikovci agricultural estate in Vukovar on 21 November 1992 by the JNA and unidentified Serbian paramilitary groups, was taken to Petrovac for an interrogation. He claims he was pressured to admit he was a member of the Counter-Intelligence Unit and was threatened with knives by a paramilitary member. He was severely beaten and he claims this left him in a coma. 5457/

3454. The witness was then transferred to a cellar which held another severely beaten male prisoner, the two were not allowed to communicate. Three JNA reservists beat them and pushed guns into their mouths. A sergeant major beat the two prisoners with a club until a captain requested that the beating stop and the prisoners should be "sent on". The sergeant major insisted that the interrogation and beating continue. A man recognized the witness and spoke in favour of him to the captain. The prisoners were transferred to the KPD in Sremska Mitrovica on 22 November 1992. 5458/

3455. Pozarevac: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). Pozarevac is located to the east of Belgrade in north-eastern Serbia. A ZNG reservists, taken into custody on 18 November 1991 in Vukovar, was transferred from the KPD to VIZ Belgrade on 13 February 1992. In Belgrade he was tried and sentenced to four years imprisonment on 20 July 1992. From there he was transferred to Pozarevac to serve his sentence. He was held in Pozarevac until 14 August 1992 when he was exchanged with five others from the prison. 5459/

3456. Prijepolje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). Prijepolje is located in southern Serbia near the Montenegrin border. According to a report compiled by a Professor at the University of Sarajevo, Serbian "extremists" have transported over 22,000 non-Serbs from BiH to camps in Serbia, one of which is in the city of Prijepolje. 5460/ According to another source there were 480 prisoners at the camp sometime before October 1992. 5461/ The existence of this camp is also reported by another source.
3457. **Rodnik**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely The Reuter Library Report). Medecins sans Frontières reports that filmed interviews with some 60 BiH refugees in France indicated that there were several Serb-run camps unknown of before these interviews. One of the camps was Rodnik which was reported to be in Serbia but it is unclear where. 5462/

3458. **Uzice**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the National Organization for Victim Assistance). According to information from the Territorial Defence Force in Visegrad, most of the 6,600 Muslim inhabitants of Visegrad were taken by the Serbian Territorial Defence to a detention facility in Uzice, Serbia in western Serbia near the Drina River. 5463/ The Uzice Corp was active in Visegrad in April and May 1992, along with the "White Eagles", the "Garavi", and the "Johnsons". 5464/

3459. **Valjevo**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ICRC). Valjevo, a city in north-western Serbia, contained a detention facility. A member of the ZNG, captured in Vukovar on 20 November 1991, was tried in Belgrade and sentenced to five years imprisonment. Following the trial, on 22 July 1992, he was transferred to the prison in Valjevo to serve his sentence but was released on 14 August 1992. 5465/ The ICRC visited the District prison on 15 June 1991. 5466/

3460. **Šabac**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one source "extremists" had moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in FRY, including Šabac. Šabac is located in north-western Serbia. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 5467/

3461. Šabac-"Zorka": (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). According to another source, however, Šabac's "Zorka" detention facility contained 12,000 prisoners sometime before October 1992 and that 2,000 of those in custody had been killed. 5468/

3462. **Topola**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team). Topola, located in central Serbia, allegedly contains a camp based at a former pig farm. Many of the inmates were formerly incarcerated in Manjaca camp. 5469/

3463. **Zlatibor**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including the Dallas Morning News). One report states that an unknown number of females, captured in Visegrad for the purpose of rape, were allegedly taken to the Zlatibor region in southern Serbia, between Uzice and Prijepolje. 5470/ The Uzice Corp was active in Visegrad in April and May 1992, along with the "White Eagles", the "Garavi", and the "Johnsons". 5471/ It is not clear which formation had custody of the women.

4. **Vojvodina**

3464. Vojvodina occupies the southern part of the Pannonian Plain and is separated from Serbia proper by the Danube and Sava Rivers. It contains approximately 400,000 Hungarians with large Serbian and Croatian minorities. 5472/ As with other regions in FRY, the non-Serb culture is actively suppressed by the government. The police and administration are wholly staffed by Serbs and are controlled from Belgrade. According to one source there is increasing conflict between the non-Serb independence movement
and the extreme nationalist Serbian organizations. 5473/

3465. Bač: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). According to one report there is a military prison in Bač. 5474/ A witness claims that he was arrested by a policeman on 10 October 1991 in Bodjani. He was asked for his identity card and then was driven to Bač for questioning. He was eventually taken to a detention facility in Paragovo. 5475/ According to another source there is a prison in Bač which is run by unidentified paramilitary forces. 5476/

3466. Bač Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the US Department of State). There is one report of a woman being detained in Bač police station. The woman and five members of a ZNG reserve unit escaped from Sotin by boat across the Danube River to Serbia with the intention of going to a Hungarian refugee camp. On 25 October 1992 a Serb villager caught sight of her and called the police. The police arrested her and transported the woman to Bač police station where she was interrogated by a Serb policeman and accused of terrorist activities. The policeman tied her up and beat her severely. That same evening she was transferred to Novi Sad. 5477/

3467. Begejevo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral). In 1991 and 1992 detainees were maltreated by JNA soldiers in Begejevo detention facility in western Vojvodina, near Odžaci. 5478/ One witness was arrested in Vukovar on 19 November 1991 by JNA members and left in the custody of "Četniks". The witness was eventually driven to Bogojevo where he/she was tortured for 10 hours by Arkan's units and "Četniks", before being transported to another location. 5479/

3468. Begejci: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Helsinki Watch). The village of Begejci is situated near Zrenjanin, Vojvodina. There are several reports of a detention facility existing near Begejci which held mainly Croatian men from Vukovar. 5480/ These included an undetermined number of residents of Borovo Naselje. 5481/

3469. A detention facility was allegedly constructed in October 1991 on a deserted farm near the village. 5482/ However, there are reports of detainees being held at this farm as early as September 1991. 5483/ The facility was operated by the JNA until January or February 1992 when it was closed due to bad publicity. 5484/ All evidence suggesting its existence was removed and the prisoners were sent to Sremska Mitrovica. 5485/ Another report indicates the prison was emptied of all the prisoners, 117 men and an undetermined number of women on 25 December 1991. All were transferred to Sremska Mitrovica. 5486/ 3470. One report refers to the farm as the Marakana Farm which had not been used in 15 to 20 years. 5487/ From reports the farm appeared to have been used for livestock prior to being a detention facility. One report made references to cattle while another to sheep. 5488/

3471. The detention facility was surrounded by two concentric rows of barbed wire attached to wooden posts to fence in the grounds. 5489/ The JNA officers and soldiers repeatedly told prisoners that the barbed wire was electrified. When the first prisoners were brought there they were made to clear the surrounding bushes and trees to build this camp fence. In addition to the barbed wire fencing the compound was surrounded by ditches and watchtowers, and was lit by spotlights. 5490/

3472. The reports described the buildings in varying ways. There appeared to
have been a shed, barn, or stable about 50 metres long and 10 metres wide 5491/ in which the prisoners were held. 5492/ This building had large doors that were never completely closed. There was no heating in the building so the temperature near the door was close to zero. The reports were not clear as to how many buildings actually composed the facility. One report describes several buildings:

"The compound included a red brick administrative/interrogation building, five guard posts, an approximately 20 metres long barn which served as the prisoner detention building, a feeding area with tables, roofed by a nylon tarpaulin, a dog run and a garbage pit." 5493/

A gravel path was spread to link the prisoners' housing with the administration building. 5494/ One report indicates the facility was made of brick, however it was unclear as to which building(s) were being referred to. 5495/ Two doctors who were detained at Begejci claim that more than one structure existed to house the prisoners.

3473. Dogs allegedly were kept at the camp. The guards were armed reservists which patrolled the grounds with police dogs. 5496/ The dogs also appear to have been kept between the two rows of fencing. 5497/

3474. The building where the prisoners slept was overcrowded. The prisoners slept on the concrete floor with straw 5498/ and pieces of tent. At night people were taken to a separate room where they were beaten and some died due to lack of medical treatment. 5499/

3475. The bathroom was of the field type, situated two metres from the prisoners' building, with eight places covered by plastic sheeting. 5500/

3476. The detention facility was also used as a rest and recreation centre for Serbian irregulars from the Vukovar front. The soldiers lived in a separate building and every few days two truckloads of troops were brought from the front and two truckloads went back. 5501/

3477. There were conflicting reports concerning the commander of the camp and the guards. According to one report the commander of the camp was a lieutenant colonel whose name is unknown. 5502/ Another report claimed the commander was a major who wore a camouflage military uniform whose name was also unknown. 5503/ When the camp closed, its director was allegedly moved to Belgrade, where he acted as the commander of a military facility. 5504/ It was not clear which individual this refers to.

3478. Allegedly there were 15 guards at the camp who wore non-camouflage, olive drab uniforms. 5505/ The guards were primarily Serbian reservists who had been mobilized. However a report describes these reservists as having worn camouflage uniforms. 5506/

3479. The prisoners were interrogated by three identified Serbs, who wore camouflage uniforms. 5507/ These three were transferred to the KPD at Sremska Mitrovica as guards on 25 December 1991. 5508/

3480. Six reservists, all from Belgrade, raped and mistreated a female detainee along with 24 unidentified reservists. 5509/

3481. The reports on the population of the prison vary between 25 initially and 1,600 in November, 1991. 5510/ Most of the reports indicate that the prison held between 500 and 600 prisoners at any one time. 5511/
3482. According to one report, before the first agreement on the exchange of prisoners there were 527 people detained in the camp, among them 25 to 30 women. The youngest prisoner was only 14 years old, while the oldest was 82 years-old and about 100 people were over 60 years old. Over 90 per cent were Croats and over 80 per cent of the prisoners were civilians who had never been members of any military unit. 5512/

3483. The first prisoners incarcerated at the farm near Begejci allegedly were 25 arrested members of the Croatian defence forces, but later many more prisoners, mostly civilians from Vukovar municipality, arrived. Around 25 September 1991, 70 citizens from Tovarnik were transferred from a detention facility in Šid to Begejci and were held until 9 December 1991. 5513/ According to a witness who was arrested on 23 September 1991 by military police, 90 detainees from Tovarnik were taken to Begejci on 3 October 1991. 5514/

3484. Another witness claimed that upon arrival in the camp he found civilians from the villages of Svinjarevac, Berak, and Orol, (villages in eastern Croatia) Some of them were brought to the Begejci camp on 3 October 1991. Until 20 November 1991, 367 or 387 persons were imprisoned in the camp. Another 175 prisoners were brought after the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries occupied Vukovar. 5515/ Sixteen people were captured near Priljevo and taken to Begejci on 21 November 1991. 5516/

3485. During November 1991 JNA soldiers brought civilians with bound hands to Begejci on a regular basis. These civilians consisted of an undetermined number of men from Tovarnik and two women. 5517/ In the second week of November 1991, 30 women were brought into the camp where they were raped and beaten by the reservists. 5518/ Another report claims that there were 25 women between the ages of 50 and 60 who were all civilians. There were many men older than 60. There were also children between 14 and 18 years-old. 5519/ In the same room with the men were 17 women. 5520/

3486. At about 5:00 p.m. on 19 November a group of 360 men and one woman were sent to the detention facility at Begejci. The women was taken because she allegedly had been helping the Croatian Militia. The group arrived on 20 November 1991. Some 140 prisoners were already at the camp, including about 10 women and a 14 year-old boy who was severely maltreated by the guards. 5521/ One report indicated that on 21 November 1991 an undetermined number of prisoners from Borovo Naselje were taken to Begejci. The camp held about 570 prisoners, 35 of which were female. 5522/ Five prisoners were transported by bus from Bogojevo to Begejci on 23 November 1991. The witness claims there were 1,600 detainees in one hall at Begejci. He was held there for three months and transferred to Niš in February or January 1992. 5523/

3487. Among the Croatian prisoners were two Sri Lankans who said they had been arrested at Belgrade airport. After the fall of Vukovar a group of 130 prisoners arrived, composed mainly of civilians. 5524/

3488. The wounded were accommodated in the same building together with the other prisoners; they had open wounds which did not receive proper medical treatment. In addition they were regularly beaten. 5525/ One source indicates that all the POWs with broken limbs were exchanged on some unspecified date for Serbian POWs. 5526/

3489. The food at the detention facility was very bad. One witness reported that the prisoners were given a little bit of bread, "one paste" for two men, and some bad porridge. 5527/ Another claimed that in the morning the prisoners received a small amount of tea, a piece of bread and sometimes a small piece of sausage-type meat. Lunches and dinners were equally meager and sometimes
nothing was received. Another detainee stated that the meals were scanty, usually some kind of greasy water. One prisoner allegedly found a mouse in the food and other detainees could not eat because of hairs in the food. The lack of food caused all prisoners to lose between five and 10 kilograms in weight.

3490. There were many old people in the camp who had their medicine taken away on arrival at the camp. They suffered from chronic heart and lung diseases. They did not receive any medicine while detained. There were also 25 psychiatric patients, four of whom were schizophrenics with no medication.

3491. All the prisoners suffered from drastic weight loss and were infested with lice. Ninety-five per cent of the prisoners reportedly suffered from infections of the upper respiratory tract and they did not receive medication for these infections or for fevers. There was an epidemic of diarrhea among the prisoners and those who suffered were not even allowed to go to the toilet. Urinary infections were also quite common.

3492. The soldiers selected and determined who needed medical help. One witness and three other detainees were taken to Zrenjanin hospital due to their injuries. The witness claims that the treatment at the hospital was inadequate and the nurses were verbally abusive. The four were taken back to the detention facility near Begejci and situated in an infirmary. There were 25 detainees in one room. A female army doctor arrived four days later to examine the cuts on the witness' genitals and hip which she sprayed with some unidentified substance. A doctor and his assistant came to the infirmary a few days after that to clean and bandage the witness' wounds. Another detainee also referred to the doctor and a clinic at the detention facility. The detainee was taken to the clinic for treatment of a neck wound and two bullet wounds to the right arm. There were several other detainees at the clinic, two who died due to treatment they suffered while at Begejci. The doctor allegedly covered one of the fatalities with a blanket and reported the cause of death as heart problems.

3493. The prisoners slept on the stone floor, in four rows, lying on straw with only one blanket to cover themselves. Because the room was crowded, people were not able to sleep stretched out. At first men and women slept in the same room. They were allowed to leave the room only for meals and to go to the bathroom if the guards permitted. In three months prisoners were allowed to bathe only once and people slept for a month or two without taking off their boots. They were not able to wash their faces regularly because the water pipes were frozen. Water was available in small quantities for drinking. During one witness' two months detention in the facility she was allowed to bathe only once before the arrival of the ICRC.

3494. The prisoners were used for labour at and around the detention facility. They were forced to prepare the buildings for future prisoners and were kicked, punched, and beaten with wooden sticks while working. Prisoners were taken to cut trees in the woods. Sometimes prisoners would not return from the woods, and the YPA military police would take those prisoners' belongings out of the shed. The witness claims he knows one man killed in this way.

3495. JNA police would come at 3:00 am and beat the prisoners and force them to sing "Cetnik" songs. The prisoners were verbally abused and made to stand or sit with their heads down and their hands behind their backs. Those who stood nearest to the guards were beaten. According to one witness the prisoners were forced to sing "Hej Slaveni" and to pay respect to the Serbian dead by observing one minute of silence.
3496. Prisoners were forced to abuse one another as well as being abused by the guards. A man and a woman chosen at random were forced to have sex. 5546/ One detainee claims he was forced to beat other Croatian detainees. 5547/

3497. The prisoners were beaten every day. They were ordered to hide their heads so that they could not see who was taken. Men, women and children were all beaten. 5548/ Three prisoners reported being beaten by soldiers upon arrival and again while apparently being registered. 5549/ On 13 November 1991, 10 or 15 Serbian reservists came to the detention facility and beat the Croatian POWs. Several were killed by having their heads slammed against a wall until they died. Nine of these detainees fainted, were dragged out into the cold until they regained consciousness, and were then beaten to death. 5550/

3498. The civilian police from Vojvodina also entered the camp on many occasions and beat various prisoners with the permission of the JNA officers in charge. Prisoners were taken outside the camp, shown to Serb civilians who were given the opportunity to beat them. These prisoners were put on public display as criminals, murderers. Some prisoners were tied naked to posts and beaten so severely that they suffered from "post-traumatic delirium" afterwards. 5551/

3499. The most prominent characteristic of life at the detention facility was the regular, daily, and systematic mistreatment of the prisoners. Soldiers would come in drunk at night and force prisoners to stand at attention and sing all night, or they would order them to lie down and cover their heads and proceed to call out their names and beat them. 5552/ The prisoners were questioned and maltreated by JNA police. A young women dressed in a JNA uniform would force the prisoners to write their personal histories and various confessions. 5553/

3500. Detainees were regularly interrogated at the detention facility by JNA officers. Beating usually accompanied the interrogations and the officers would not discriminate by age, health, or profession who they interrogated. Even arrested medical doctors, minors and wounded detainees were interrogated and beaten. 5554/ The prisoners were all beaten and forced to make false confession to killing Serbs. These confession were videotaped and later shown on television in Novi Sad and Belgrade. 5555/

3501. Several individuals were named as interrogators. Three interrogated the prisoners simultaneously and sought to force prisoners to sign statements they had not written and extort confessions. In order to persuade the prisoners to confess, the interrogators hit, kicked, and beat them with batons. One technique these interrogators used was to force a prisoner to lay on the floor on his stomach. One interrogator would stand on the prisoner's back and then pull the prisoner's legs up and back towards his head. Another interrogator would then beat the bottoms of the prisoners bare feet. Another technique used was to bind the prisoner's hands behind his back with plastic flex cuffs and then place him in isolation in the barn for as long as eight days. The three interrogators beat to death a 50 year-old man from Borovo Naselje. It was not known where the body was taken. 5556/

3502. The three interrogators and a first class ensign were also named as interrogators by a wounded detainee. The witness was called for questioning and the doctor was asked if the detainee was ready. The doctor responded that they were doing their job without problems. The doctor left the room and the four interrogators beat the witness until he confessed to the murder of five civilians. The witness told them that he was illiterate therefore could not write a statement which incited the four to beat him again. 5557/
Police from Novi Sad also arrived and interrogated the prisoner about the Democratic Party of Croats in Novi Sad and who the recruits into the Croatian army were in that area. During the interrogations, which usually took place at night, prisoners were beaten. 5558/

There were dozens of prisoners with broken ribs in the camp, and practically every prisoner was marked by bruises from frequent beating. Some prisoners lost their sight, hearing or several teeth, while several suffered broken jaws from the physical abuse they received. 5559/

An undetermined number of prisoners died at the detention facility from physical abuse. One prisoner over 60, a heart disease patient, was beaten to death in the camp and died without receiving any medical care. 5560/ At least two men died from beatings at the camp between 22 and 23 November 1991. 1991. One was approximately 55 years-old and had lived in Vukovar, the other was about 40 years-old and had heart problems. It was not clear if the men with heart problems were the same individuals. 5561/ Another report claims that two others died from their beatings. 5562/ The nine prisoners beaten to death by the reservists and the man who disappeared in the woods are also counted among the dead. One report claims the corpses were taken away in a Red Cross vehicle that resembled a refrigerator. 5563/

The women held in the detention facility were interrogated and beaten and they also suffered sexual abuse while detained. The irregular soldiers that arrived at the farm reportedly used the women as sexual slaves. Initially there were very few women in the camp, sources suggest that there appeared to have been over 30 altogether. 5564/

The women were held in the same stable with the other prisoners for 10 days and then moved to another room. There they slept on concrete floors with one blanket. The temperature was close to freezing and the women were unable to sleep due to the cold. The women had diarrheic problems. 5565/

On 1 November 1991, a Serbian reservist told one female detainee that she was to be his slave. He referred to her as "bitch" and she was to call him "master". She was told she would be a whore for 30 reservists and was forced to clean their boots while they wore them. 5566/ If the reservists were not satisfied they would kick the witness in the chest and face which caused severe nosebleeds. She was regularly raped, brutalized, sexually mistreated, and verbally threatened by all 30 reservists. 5567/

During the second week of November 1991, 30 women were brought into the camp. 5568/ The women were taken out at night by the soldiers but refused to discuss what had occurred. 5569/

The women were also interrogated and one reported that she was beaten in an attempt to force her to admit to killing an unidentified Serb. She was also heard to tell the interrogators not to touch certain parts of her body. One man was overheard as saying the woman had nice breasts. 5570/

One woman from Vukovar claims that because women were not held in Stajicevo she was transferred to Begejci the same night she was captured, 19 November 1991. She was driven in a JNA vehicle which also contained three soldiers. On the way they forced her to kiss them and threatened her with rape and death. Upon arrival at Begejci the soldiers put a gun to her head and played Russian roulette until the morning when she was forced to sing the Yugoslavia anthem. 5571/
3512. Another woman claimed that during the first 14 days of her internment she was taken for questioning. She reported that she was not beaten but she was sexually abused by one reservist. The other reservists were not allowed to touch her. 5572/

3513. The ICRC representatives reportedly visited the detention facility three times and were denied access on the fourth visit. The reason given for the denial of access was that there were no new detainees. 5573/ The JNA officers did not allow private conversations between ICRC representatives and prisoners. 5574/

3514. Every time the ICRC visited the detention facility a certain number of prisoners would allegedly be hidden from them. One report claimed that some prisoners were deliberately hidden from their sight so that their names would not be recorded. 5575/ Another report alleges that 15 POWs destined for the military prison in Belgrade were always hidden in a small room during the ICRC visits. 5576/ The ICRC visited the camp in early December and about ten prisoners who had been severely beaten were hidden in the administrative building for the duration of the visit. 5577/ A group of 17 prisoners were hidden whenever the representatives of the ICRC visited the camp and therefore were never registered by the ICRC. 5578/

3515. After the occupation of Borovo Naselje a large group of civilians arrived but were not listed with the ICRC because the camp officials denied them access until 10 December 1991. 5579/

3516. In December 1991 all but seventy inmates were exchanged for Serbian POWs. 5580/ On 10 December 1991 detainees were exchanged on the Bosanski Šamac-Slavonski Šamac Bridge. Ninety per cent of those exchanged were civilians. 5581/ On 23 December 1991 the seventy remaining prisoners were transported to other detention facilities. 5582/

3517. Indjija Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Indjija is a town southeast of Novi Sad, Vojvodina. The Croats in Slankamen, a town near Indjija, began experiencing ethnic problems around 1 August 1991. Shortly thereafter people began to be drafted into the JNA. The Croats allegedly had a difficult time in the military due to their ethnicity. One Croat reports that he moved to Croatia on 10 November 1991 due to avoid military service with the JNA. In January 1992 his wife and children joined him. His parents remained in Slankamen until they were forced to exchange their house. At this time their son returned to Slankamen to get his parents and retrieve some documents from the house. 5583/

3518. He was arrested and detained at the Indjija police station for an undetermined amount of time. There he was beaten and forced to confess to being an "Ustaša". He was also forced to accuse other Croats in Slankamen of the same. He was to be tried for allegedly misusing official documents because he had lost his drivers license and was issued another one after having found the original. He asked permission to speak to his parents and was told to return to the station in the morning. He escaped to Croatia that night. 5584/

3519. Livade: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources.) Livade is located near Zrenjanin in Vojvodina. A detention facility in Livade held approximately 6500 people in October of 1991, 400 of whom were women. The prisoners were predominately from Vukovar, Mikloševci, and Borovo Naselje. The witness was the only Muslim detained there. She was arrested with several Croatian soldiers on 8 October 1991 in Borovo Naselje and taken to Livade the same day. She and nine Croatians were transferred to Livade in a personnel carrier and were
physically abused by four "Četniks" during the journey. The witness claims that the prisoners were driven all over Serbia as the journey took 14 hours. 5585/

3520. Upon arrival the prisoners were lined up against a wall. The witness was taken out of line and searched. She was deprived of a necklace, three rings, and some money. A soldier told her to lie on some straw, and an hour later the captain and seven men raped her. The men were approximately 25 to 30 years-old. They forced her to have oral, anal, and vaginal sex which lasted until 5:00 a.m.. She was then moved to a hog pen. 5586/

3521. The captain interrogated her and forced her to confess that she fed Croatian soldiers in her home. She did not know the names of the soldiers. 5587/

3522. The witness claims that she was raped every night and that the Croatian women in the detention facility were also raped. The youngest was a 17 year-old and the witness herself was the oldest victim. All the rapes occurred in the same room and continued until 10 December 1991 when Captain Dukanović told the detainees they would be exchanged in Bosanska Šamac. The exchange failed and the witness was transferred to the detention facility in Šid. 5588/

3523. Novi Sad: International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) had reports of prison camps at various locations in FRY, including Novi Sad, Vojvodina. 5589/ Amnesty International also has reports from Croatian official sources that prisoners were still held by the JNA and Serbian paramilitaries at locations around FRY on 16 February 1992. 5590/

3524. Novi Sad City Jail: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Department of State). A detainee was reported to have been held in the Novi Sad city jail and then brought to Foca prison by Foca police in the early summer of 1992. 5591/

3525. Novi Sad Civilian Prison: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Department of State). A witness claims that he was arrested by a policeman on 10 October 1991 in Bodjani. He was asked for his identity card and then was driven to Bač for questioning. He was questioned by the police but believes he did not tell them what they wanted to hear so they took him to the civilian prison in Novi Sad, where he remained for three days. He was questioned and beaten in the Karadjordjevo by an investigator, JNA members, and reservists. He was beaten, he believes, because he did not want to sign a false statement which accused him of being a member of a terrorist organization which operated in Vojvodina. He was told that he was "registered" in a fenced hunting ground and was accused of leaving a path for others to follow. From Novi Sad he was taken to Paragovo. 5592/

3526. Another report appears to refer to the same incident, though the events in the report have not been confirmed. A woman who was arrested and taken to Bač police station was transferred to Novi Sad on 25 October 1992. She spent the night in a cell and was interrogated in the morning by the police inspector referred to above. This inspector is also described as the prosecutor for the Vojvodina region. He told the woman that all members of her terrorist group had been arrested. 5593/

3527. She was taken in a police van by ten Serbian reservists to the Karadordevo Hunting Woods, located on the eastern bank of the Danube River. There she was to show the investigator where she and her companions had crossed and hidden the boat. A Belgrade television crew was already at the woods and handed her a script to read which incriminated her of terrorist
activities. When she refused, the investigator and the soldiers beat her while the television crew filmed it. The investigator ordered the soldiers to aim their rifles at the woman when she still refused. She prayed and then told the investigator not to be a coward and shoot her in the front. He allegedly spared her life because of her bravery. He informed her she was a prisoner of war but had no rights. She was then taken back to Novi Sad and incarcerated in Paragaj Military Casern. 5594/

3528. Novi Sad Paragaj Military Casern: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). In October 1992 the Paragaj Military Casern allegedly held five Croats and four Czechs 5595/ in unheated cells. A women involved in the Karadjordjevo Hunting Woods incident, was interned there and interrogated continuously for three days. She was accused of terrorism and crimes she claims she did not commit. On 28 October 1992 the woman was told she would be sent to the occupied Ilok, Croatia and was told to write a statement. The Serbians who controlled the prison did not like her statement and beat her severely in the head and abdomen. 5596/

3529. The other eight prisoners were allegedly so badly beaten they could not move. One 70 year-old man fainted from pain and cold and was dragged into an office by a fellow Croat detainee. When the man was revived he was beaten again. One evening all the Czechs were removed from the cells and never returned. The woman was taken to Zrenjanin and incarcerated in Begejci on an unknown date. 5597/

3530. Novi Sad Police Station: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). One report describes the arrest of two men in Novi Sad on 2 October 1991. Both men were detained in the Novi Sad police station for 30 hours without receiving any explanation or hearing any accusations. During their detainment one of the men was interrogated and beaten. He was questioned about the Croatian forces and their weaponry in Ilok and the Croatian Democratic Party in Novi Sad. On 3 October 1991 he was released from the police station. The witness was arrested several more times before being transported to Paragovo on 6 November 1991. Before his transfer from the Novi Sad police station he was forced to give a written and signed statement. 5598/

3531. Novi Sad Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC). The ICRC visited Novi Sad Hospital, which was listed in the ICRC Places of Detention List, 16 November 1991. 5599/

3532. Palić: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely US Department of State). The BiH Government alleged the existence of a concentration camp in Palić, a town in northern Vojvodina near Subotica. However, certain embassy officials, members of humanitarian organizations, and western journalists visited Palić and did not find a "camp" or imprisoned Muslims. They did find a site where Bosnian Muslim refugees were billeted while waiting for travel documents so they could attempt to travel to Hungary. 5600/

3533. Paragovo: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one source there is a civilian/military prison in Paragovo. Paragovo, according to this source, is located between Novi Sad and Kamenica. 5601/

3534. Paragovo Military Prison in Sremska Kamenica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ISHR). Sremska Kamenica is located a few kilometres south of Novi Sad in Vojvodina. Three thousand residents of Borovo Naselje surrendered to the Serbian forces
at the new shoe factory on 20 November 1992. The prisoners, some of whom were
Croatian National Guards (ZNG-Zbor Narodne Garde), were taken to several
locations, one of which was the Paragovo Military Prison at Sremska
Kamenica. 5602/ Another source describes the detention facility as a military
police barracks. In addition to those detainees from Vukovar, Hungarians and
Croats from Vojvodina are allegedly being picked up off the streets and
detained in this camp. 5603/

3535. A witness stated that he was arrested on 6 November 1991 in Novi Sad. He
was transported to Paragovo Military Police Headquarters where he was forced
give a written and signed statement. The next day he was made to give a
statement while a "mayor" held a gun to his head and threatened him with
torture and death. The mayor questioned him about the hospital in Ilok. On 9
November 1991 he was transported with three other prisoners to the camp in
Begejci. 5604/

3536. Another witness describes how he was arrested on 10 October 1991
interrogated in Novi Sad and transported to Paragovo. He spent three days in a
barracks, the first in "the room of some lieutenant colonel" and the
subsequent nights in a storehouse which contained three connecting beds. The
witness was imprisoned with four others, three of whom were Ruthenes. JNA
Reservists appear to have been in charge of the detention facility. The
witness was not beaten or tortured though his fellow detainees were. He was
interrogated and the reservist in charge demanded that he write a statement
about the occurrences in Sotin, beginning with the death of the policemen in
Borovo Selo. On 1 November 1991 the witness was transported to Begejci
camp. 5605/

3537. Another source claims that as many as 15 detainees are held in a small
underground cell. Prisoners are beaten on a regular basis, burned with
cigarettes, and made to fight one another. 5606/

3538. Ruma: (The existence of this detention facility has not been
corroborated by multiple sources). Sometime after 20 October 1991 when the
JNA occupied Tovarnik, JNA members and Serb Paramilitary units, interned the
local civilians, mainly Croatians, in various detention facilities in FRY.
According to a witness account, JNA soldiers brought a group of civilians to a
farm near Ruma, 50 kilometres northwest of Belgrade. The prisoners were taken
off the bus two by two. The witness was ordered by a JNA soldier to strip to
the nude. After that the soldier threatened to castrate him. After the
witness, a female neighbour of his was called. The woman was ordered to take
her skirt off. At that point the soldier removed the witness from the room but
detained the woman for several more hours. The witness states that he saw the
JNA soldiers carrying out glass bottles filled with a dark fluid which he
thinks was the blood of the prisoners detained in the room. The witness did
not see the prisoners ever again. 5607/

3539. Village near Ruma: (The existence of this detention facility has not
been corroborated by multiple sources). Ruma is a village in Vojvodina, east
of Sremska Mitrovica, where prisoners were allegedly held for short periods of
time before being transported to Sremska Mitrovica. One witness, who was
arrested on 23 September 1991, was taken to Šid and then spent a day in
Sremska Mitrovica. On 25 September 1991 he and 90 others were transferred to a
village near Ruma. Most of the detainees were from Tovarnik and three of them
were women. All of the detainees were physically and mentally abused. The 90
detainees spent two days and one night in the prison before being transferred
back to Sremska Mitrovica. 5608/

3540. It appears that Croatians residing in FRY were arrested and detained for
use in later exchanges with Croatia. This witness was exchanged on 11 October
1991 in Bosanska Šamac and taken to a hospital in Zagreb. 5609/

3541. Ruma Sports Hall: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). Prisoners from Vukovar were separated from the women and children in Velepromet on 18 November 1991. The men were taken by truck to a sports hall in Ruma. There the prisoners had to give their personal data and their place of residence. 5610/

3542. Šid: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International). According to one report there is a military prison in Šid. 5611/

3543. On 22 September 1991 JNA soldiers, reservists, and "Četniks" entered the village of Tovarnik. The captured villagers, mainly in Tovarnik, were detained in a the house of a deceased doctor before being transported to Šid. The reservists and "Četniks" from Tovarnik mistreated the prisoners, however the JNA Army officers interrogated them without using force. The prisoners spent two to three days in Šid before being transferred to other detention facilities in FRY. All were released on 9 December 1991. 5612/ Large groups of prisoners were detained in Tovarnik before being deported to Serbia. 5613/

3544. Croatian officials reported to Amnesty International that there was a prison camp operated in Šid by Serbians sometime before or around February 1992. 5614/ The International Society for Human Rights also had reports of a detention facility in Šid. 5615/

3545. A witness reported being arrested in Šid and detained by the military police before being transported to Sremska Mitrovica. 5616/ Another witness claims that his mother and son were taken by the JNA, Serbian paramilitary units, and villagers to a detention facility in Šid where they were mentally abused. The witness, himself, was apparently detained in Šid from 12 September 1991 to 27 November 1991 when he was transferred to Sremska Mitrovica. 5617/ One report indicates that a women held initially in Livade, Vojvodina was transported to a stable in Šid after a failed prisoner exchange on 12 December 1991 and was held there until 6 January 1992. 5618/ One witness who tried to escape from the conflict in Vukovar was captured in Cerić by JNA soldiers around 22 November 1991. He was then detained in the police station in Šid for an undetermined period and transferred to Sremska Mitrovica. 5619/ Another witness from Vukovar was captured and taken by JNA army trucks to Šid and then to Sremska Mitrovica prison on 11 November 1991. 5620/

3546. Sremska Mitrovica-"Fruška Gora": (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). There was, allegedly, a detention facility in Sremska Mitrovica called "Fruška Gora". The report did not indicated how many detainees were held there. 5621/

3547. Kazneno Popravni Dom in Sremska Mitrovica (KPD): (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ICRC). KPD was a criminal rehabilitation centre for civilians prior to the war. 5622/ Beginning on 18 November 1991, 5623/ Croats were captured at the battle of Vukovar as well as Muslims from Bosnia were detained there. 5624/ Reports indicate detainees were being held in the KPD as late as 14 August 1992 by the JNA in conjunction with paramilitary groups and local Serbian civilians. 5625/ The ICRC first visited a detention facility in Sremska Mitrovica on 2 December 1991. 5626/ This camp is also mentioned in another report. 5627/

3548. The KPD is situated in the city of Sremska Mitrovica in south-western Vojvodina, FRY. The city is approximately 75 kilometres southwest of Vukovar, Croatia.
3549. The KPD facility located in the centre of the Sremska Mitrovica is an old brick building surrounded by high walls with barbed wire. It includes a building 60 to 70 metres long and eight metres wide. There apparently are multiple pavilions with rooms of varying sizes. Solitary confinement cells are located next to hall number 3. There also existed rooms called segregation. Segregation cells containing at least five individuals each, however, their purpose is not clear. The two story structure also contains a basement where prisoners were allegedly tortured.

3550. The JNA appeared to be in control of the KPD. This was substantiated by several prisoner statements claiming both the presence of the JNA at the detention facility and apparent custody of prisoners by the same. Also, prisoners compared treatment at the hands of the paramilitary members and JNA personnel, both of which had access to the detainees. An article in the Belgrade daily Borba quotes at length a civilian held in Sremska Mitrovica attributing his survival to the fact that he was held in a JNA prison. Further, several reports indicate lists of prisoners were supplied to the prison personnel by the Yugoslav Federal Police (SDS). In a letter to Human Rights Watch, the Serbian Government clearly admitted to having held individuals from Ovčara.

3551. The commander of the military guards at the KPD was called KOS by the prisoners, which is an acronym for counter intelligence agency. The guards referred to him by a code name. He participated in the beating of prisoners. Another document alleged that the camp was run by a JNA Captain. It is likely that they are the same individual as they are both referred to by the guards by the same code name and were at the KPD during the same time period.

3552. Some of the guards at the KPD were identified by name in various reports. Three were transferred from their positions at Begejci to the KPD around 25 December 1992. Five prison guards, all about 18 to 20 years-old and JNA privates, were at the KPD for military police training. They regularly tortured prisoners and were responsible for the deaths of at least 18 prisoners. Another guard was identified only by nickname.

3553. Sources identify seven others who were not prisoners and who were present during the beatings at the KPD. A lance corporal was present at the camp from 24 September 1991 to 3 October 1991 and beat at least one prisoner repeatedly.

3554. A captain, an investigating officer, interrogated prisoners at KPD and apparently supported the methods used by an investigating officer from Begejci—an ensign 1st class. One report indicates that prisoners were being forced to sign confessions written by the captain.

3555. In November 1991 detainees were beaten by JNA soldiers, JNA military police, and bus drivers of Serb nationality. Paramilitary units and civilians participated in the beatings and killings the KPD along with the JNA military personnel. Multiple reports indicate that military police and Serbian policemen beat prisoners on arrival at the KPD. One report in particular indicated a military police private first class took part in the beatings. A number of reservists acted as guards and apparently treated the prisoners more humanely. Another report indicated that the 182 MUPs and ZNGs who surrendered to the JNA were protected from the “Četniks”.

3556. Four Serbs from Vukovar who knew their victims inflicted the worst beatings and tortures on the prisoners of the KPD. They were brought in to take part in the interrogation of the prisoners. Two known perpetrators were called "executioners" by the prisoners. They would come into
the prison hall and remove men they knew as neighbours from Vukovar. 5651/

3557. It was reported that five women prisoners, taken into custody during the Vukovar conflict, were guarded by two female civilians. These guards forced one woman to read a cyrillic Bible and beat all the female detainees in their custody. 5652/

3558. The ethnicity of the prison population was mixed; the majority of the detainees were reportedly Croatians from Vukovar and Muslims and Croatians from Bosanski Šamac, BIH. 5653/ However, among the population were Hungarians and Croatians from the Vojvodina area imprisoned as part of FRY's domestic policy of relocating non-Serb ethnic groups. 5654/ There were also reports of an American, 5655/ a Ruthenian, 5656/ a Slovenian woman, 5657/ and several Albanians being imprisoned. 5658/ Several reports mention that Serbs from Vukovar, who refused to collaborate with the Serbian forces, and even a JNA soldier were detained. 5659/ The KPD was also populated with civilian criminals, not being held in connection with the conflict. An undetermined number of these criminals participated in the rape of at least one female prisoner. 5660/

3559. The number of detainees reported present at the KPD after the Vukovar surrender in November, 1991 range as high as 5,000 5661/ and as low as 300. 5662/ The majority of the reports are in the range of 3,000 to 4,000 prisoners. 5663/

3560. The KPD housed both male civilians and members of various Croatian forces. These included a whole unit of Croatian Army reserves, 5664/ 300 to 500 Croatian National Guardsmen (ZNG), 5665/ Croatian Army members, 5666/ and members of the Croatian Security Police (MUP). 5667/ In December an unspecified number of Territorial Defence members were transferred from Stajićevo with 500 other prisoners. 5668/

3561. There are also reports of women and children being detained but most do not specify numbers. At least 84 women were imprisoned after the fall of Vukovar and more were transferred to the facility in December 1991 and January 1992. 5669/ However, it seemed the majority of women were separated from the men, driven to various locations, and eventually released. 5670/

3562. Among the prison population were a number of civilian medical personnel, patients, and civilians from Vukovar hospital. 5671/ The Serbian authorities claim that only 380 patients were taken and 178 were released to Croatian authorities. 5672/ According to Amnesty International, by 27 November 1991 only 128 of a total of 440 patients, and 72 out of 320 hospital staff had been handed over to the Croatian authorities. 5673/ A major admitted that Serbian troops evacuated a number of people from the hospital to a place called Ovčara but claimed that he turned all these people over to prison authorities in Sremska Mitrovica.

3563. The majority of prisoners incarcerated at the KPD surrendered at the Mitnica district of Vukovar on 18 November 1991. These included military personnel and civilians. 5674/ The JNA had promised to release the civilians if the military forces surrendered but they did not honour this agreement. 5675/ Approximately 200 Croatian army reservists who were defending Mitnica, and the approximately 5,000 residents of the town, surrendered to the JNA. Before the surrender some of the reservists had hidden their uniforms and weapons. 5676/ One hundred and fifty ZNG members surrendered both with and without their weapons. They were all dressed in civilian clothes as there was a shortage of uniforms. 5677/ A European Community observer was present at the time of surrender. All non-Serb residents were separated from the Serbian residents. After that, the non-Serb men were separated from their women and
children; all the non-Serbs were then loaded onto trucks and taken to Ovčara. 5678/ They were transported from Ovčara in buses to the KPD in Sremska Mitrovica and incarcerated between 18 November 1991 and 22 November 1991. 5679/

3564. On 19 November 1991, Serbian forces (irregular and JNA) occupied Vukovar and rounded up all the citizens and the Croatian National Guardsmen. The men were separated and taken to the warehouse of the Velepromet company in Vukovar. Serbian paramilitary members had access to the prisoners at this point and committed atrocities such as killing 25 young men. On 20 November, a Belgrade television crew and well-known television personality Petar Slovenski interviewed the prisoners. At noon on the same day the Croatian POWs were loaded on to eight or nine buses, 50 to 60 prisoners per bus and taken to Sremska Mitrovica's KPD. 5680/ At the prison the men were separated from the women. 5681/ Another source claims all prisoners from Vukovar were transported to Sremska Mitrovica in the Negoslavci direction but only the men were removed from the buses. 5682/

3565. In addition to the Vukovar patients, civilians wounded in the mine field in Lovas were taken to Sremska Mitrovica hospital and the KPD. 5683/ Wounded individuals spotted near the road were also taken along with the other prisoners and incarcerated. Among them was a man who needed his leg amputated. Many wounded were held in the same room as other prisoners and were without medical care for eight days. 5684/ In addition to the wounded, there were two schizophrenics and one epileptic who were released after three weeks. 5685/

3566. Approximately 400 patients, 400 civilians, and some medical personnel were arrested in Vukovar Hospital on 20 November 1991 and an undetermined number were incarcerated by the JNA. 5686/ This included the staff and patients of the Vukovar hospital. There are independent reports from at least two doctors and two journalists. 5687/ It is not clear if this group also included several hundred military personnel who took refuge in the hospital. Some military personnel were captured while helping to evacuate the hospital. All were taken to Velepromet before being transported to the KPD. 5688/ Another source claims prisoners from the hospital were divided into three groups; women with children, women without children, and men. Women and children were taken to Serbia and from there to Croatia or Hungary. 5689/

3567. Another group of citizens, who were seeking shelter in their cellars, were taken to Drvena pijaca. There the men were separated from the women and children. The men were taken to Velepromet where Serbian reservists perpetrated crimes against them. The next day the prisoners were taken by bus to the KPD by Serbian reservists. During the journey the bus was stopped often and prisoners were taken out and killed. 5690/

3568. One witness was taken prisoner in Petrovci on 17 November and transferred to Sremska Mitrovica on 20 November 1991. 5691/ There are also reports that some of the prisoners were not abused because they were escorted by young Serbian soldiers though they were abused by local Serbs. 5692/

3569. On 19 November a convoy arrived at the KPD and the men were removed and the women and children taken in an unknown direction. 5693/ The male prisoners were forced to run a gauntlet. They were beaten with clubs, truncheons, axe handles, black jacks, bare hands, and kicked. 5694/ Three sources indicate the gauntlet was composed of policemen. 5695/ However, another source claims the prisoners were forced to step out one by one and were met at the gate by convicts in blue uniforms who beat them to exhaustion. 5696/ One report indicated that the prisoners were photographed shortly after arrival. 5697/
3570. When the prisoners reached a large hall they were forced to undress and were strip-searched. 5698/ All their belongings were confiscated. Some of the items were registered with the intent of being returned to their owners, other items, specifically valuables, were never returned. 5699/ One source claims documents belonging to the prisoners were returned. 5700/ All this was accompanied by humiliations, curses and, some sources reported, beatings. 5701/ In addition, lists, contents unknown, were made which the prisoners had to sign. 5702/

3571. After entering the camp, the majority of prisoners were put in rooms with wooden floors and no beds. There were nearly 100 prisoners situated in rooms between 50 square metres to possibly 92 square metres. The overcrowded conditions forced some to stand so others could sleep. 5703/ According to one source, there were 120 people in a space of 70 square metres. No one was able to lie on their backs and 20 people had to stand so others could lie down. 5704/ Some were made to sleep on metal-framed beds, on the floor, and on tables. 5705/ Another source states, 100 detainees from the Vukovar hospital were taken into a room where each had one metre of space. 5706/

3572. Cold drinking water was available from a water installation in a small space at the entrance to the room. The detainees had no soap, towels, toilet paper, or detergent. The rooms had central heating installations. During the night a strong light was turned on (only in a few rooms was the light of lesser intensity). Several days later each prisoner received two cushions, one blanket, towel, soap, and toilet paper. 5707/

3573. Approximately 200 people, who had surrendered with their weapons, were placed in a room with an oily concrete floor and no beds, blankets, or other furnishings. 5708/ Around 180 Croatian soldiers were locked in a room with 80 beds, 5709/ and 80 women were held in another room. 5710/ One source claims he was held in the "ice plant" in cold and damp conditions without a bed. Before that he was in a room with 102 other prisoners. 5711/

3574. All the prisoners claim the food was terrible and the portions inadequate, though they were fed three times a day. 5712/ Most prisoners lost weight, some of them up to 30 kilograms. 5713/ One source lost 18 kilograms during the nine months of his incarceration. 5714/ One source stated that the prisoners were deprived of food for two days after their surrender. 5715/ The women held in the KPD claim that the food was horrible, but of adequate portions. 5716/

3575. The prisoners were forced to eat unplucked chicken "with all kinds of crusts and disgusting things". 5717/ They never received fruit or vegetables. 5718/ Of the three daily meals, only one meal was hot. This meal consisted of broth and bread. One detainee claimed the guards always came up one slice of bread short in order to cause friction among the prisoners. 5719/

3576. One detainee complained that the tea was sour, the food was either too salty or without salt, and the bread was mouldy. 5720/ For breakfast the prisoners received a piece of hard, stale bread, a small sausage or a piece of meat from a can. Another detainee complained of no tea or white coffee. Lunch was usually cabbage, beans, or goulash. Another prisoner stated that the food was always too salty, too spicy, too acidic, or too bland; the bread was scarce, half-baked, and hard. The same was offered for supper. 5721/

3577. According to another source, hygiene was non-existent. 5722/ For months the prisoners were unable to wash or shave and became infested with lice. They were sprayed with insecticide. 5723/ The prisoners were given soap and toilet paper only when the Commission 5724/ was expected, but these were taken away the moment the Commission left. 5725/ They were eventually allowed to
bate after two and a half months due to the arrival of the ICRC. They were then again not allowed to wash or to satisfy the basic requirements of personal hygiene until the next visit by the Red Cross. 5726/

3578. The wounded were held in the same rooms as the other prisoners and were without medical care for eight days after incarceration. The other prisoners attempted to wash and care for the wounds because, according to one source, the stench of "pus and rotting flesh, was overpowering". After eight days the wounded were treated and their bandages were changed every second day. Some of the prisoners had their limbs amputated. 5727/ A prisoner who was held in solitary confinement spent four months in the hospital's infection ward. 5728/

3579. Reports indicate at least some of the detainees were seen by doctors but the frequency was unknown. 5729/ At Sremska Mitrovica a doctor gave one of the prisoners a painkilling injection after he was beaten by Serbian irregulars and handed over to the JNA. This was the only medical assistance he was given until the arrival of a doctor from Vukovar hospital who had been incarcerated. 5730/

3580. Other reports claim some prisoners were denied medical help. 5731/ One of the imprisoned doctors offered medical care to a wounded child in the camp. 5732/ Another prisoner reportedly led a small mobile medical unit within the camp. 5733/ There were enough bandages and solutions for the treatment of wounds but the supply of medicine was scant. Later, medicines were supplied according to need. The most frequent reported illnesses were upper respiratory tract infections, pneumonia, urinary infections, and different psychiatric disturbances. 5734/

3581. Prisoners were beaten severely on a regular basis. 5735/ Several detainees were allegedly beaten so severely that they suffer from permanent damage. 5736/ Some were beaten until they passed out and were revived with water so that the prison authorities did not have to take them to the Novi Sad hospital. 5737/ One source claims he was beaten unconscious four or five times; he was beaten on the head, they broke his teeth, wounded his chest and he still has kidney pains. 5738/ Another witness claims he was only beaten once and that he was kicked and beaten on the soles of his feet. 5739/ Other prisoners were also beaten on their feet. 5740/

3582. Prisoners were also forced to eat pepper and salt, had pistols shoved in their mouths, and one individual had his jaw broken and was unable to lie down due to his beating. 5741/ Many prisoners were beaten during their exercise period. 5742/

3583. The beatings were perpetrated by the guards at the KPD 5743/ and drunken paramilitary members. The latter encouraged younger JNA soldiers to take part. 5744/ The prisoners were beaten with bare hands and various instruments; truncheons, rubber hammers, blackjacks, mace type objects, baseball bats, clubs, and iron rods. 5745/ The guards unleashed trained dogs upon the detainees. 5746/

3584. As soon as the guards entered the room the prisoners had to stand with bowed heads and hands behind their backs. 5747/ They were made to stand or sit in this position for several hours at a time. 5748/ For a full month and a half they were not taken out into the fresh air. 5749/ In addition, they were forced to sing Serbian songs. 5750/

3585. Some prisoners were selected for abuse because they wore yellow boots typical of the ZNG, 5751/ others were selected for reasons such as not bowing their heads low enough when the guards entered the room. 5752/ Those detainees who participated in the defence of Vukovar were held in pavilion
three. These 180 were allegedly treated worse than other prisoners. They were beaten with iron rods on both feet and in the groin and kidney areas. 5753/ The Croatian soldiers were battered by military policemen, military officers, and bus drivers. 5754/

3586. An undetermined number of prisoners were beaten until dead. One detainee claimed that two prisoners died as a consequence of beatings and were left to lie for 20 hours next to those still alive. 5755/ There is another report of a detainee witnessing the death of two prisoners. 5756/ It is unclear as to whether these reports refer to the same incident. A woman claims that her brother-in-law from Lovas died in Sremska Mitrovica on 20 December 1992 due to maltreatment. 5757/ Allegedly the beatings which accompanied the interrogations often resulted in death. 5758/ At least 18 prisoners were tortured to death according to one source. 5759/ In contradiction, another source claims that people were killed but never in front of witnesses. 5760/

3587. Prisoners were forced to work in the fields, 5761/ clean sewers, and perform other hard labour until they were exhausted. 5762/

3588. In addition to physical maltreatment, the detainees were verbally abused. Often they were called "Ustaše" and slaughters of Serbian children. 5763/ The detainees were told that the Croats sexually abused both men and women and that all reports of Croatian crimes would be sent to Geneva. 5764/ All of those who fought at the Mitnica district of Vukovar were threatened with death if any were found guilty of crimes. 5765/

3589. The women in the prison were given a mattress, blanket, towel, and soap. Two women, who were left in the prison after the exchanges, were threatened with rape, accused of having been snipers, and of having cut children's fingers and ears off and making necklaces out of them. They forced one women to admit she had fired rifles and even attempted to extract false statements from her through beating. 5766/

3590. According to one source all of those who fought at Mitnica district of Vukovar were not registered until mid-January. 5767/ Another source indicated that some prisoners were allowed to receive parcels though they had been opened and items removed. 5768/

3591. One witness pointed out that the JNA soldiers were better to the prisoners than the paramilitary members. He believed if the detainees had been in the hands of the paramilitary members they would have died. 5769/ The JNA officers told one detainee that the maltreatment of prisoners was forbidden. This was not the case in reality, especially if the prisoners were members of Croatian Police, Croatian National Guard, or Territorial Defence. 5770/

3592. When the interrogations began and how often they occurred is not clear from the reports. Some reports claim that the interrogations began immediately and others claim the questioning began between eight to 15 days after the initial incarceration. 5771/ According to several sources the interrogations continued constantly, e.g. every day for six months, 5772/ and multiple times during one day. 5773/ However, another detainee claims to have been interrogated only five times in seven months of internment. 5774/

3593. The interrogations were allegedly carried out by military investigators, military officers and local Serbs from Vukovar. 5775/ The prisoners were allegedly questioned by many consecutive interrogators and statements were taken. 5776/ During the questioning the interrogators would accuse prisoners of raping Serbian women, of hiding weapons, and robbing Serbs. 5777/ From the
beginning, some prisoners were repeatedly investigated and questioned. If the investigators were not satisfied with answers, they insisted on their own versions. 5778/ Some prisoners were beaten in order to force false statements and extract confessions. 5779/

3594. The day after being arrested some prisoners allegedly had to fill out a questionnaire providing personal information about their profession, nationality, military activity, and social status or assets and were forced to make statements in front of cameras on two occasions. 5780/ According to one source, the prisoners were filmed answering questions such as where they were and what kind of formations they were in. 5781/ After the interrogations, prisoners always had to write and sign a statement. 5782/

3595. The method of most interrogations included physical abuse. Some prisoners were beaten continuously with sticks, kicked constantly in the ribs, belly and legs, and had their heads forcefully and repeatedly pushed against the wall. 5783/ The Croatian combatants who were not registered with the ICRC were beaten during interrogations, especially on the soles of their feet. 5784/ According to one detainee, if they suspected him of lying they would beat him all over the body, on his face and legs, and on the scrotum. 5785/ However, there are two reports which claim that at least some of the prisoners were not physically maltreated during interrogations. 5786/

3596. The option of collaboration was offered to some prisoners. The reward was supposed to be release from prison or some privileges within the camp. 5787/

3597. Solitary confinement cells were allegedly used as holding cells while prisoners awaited transfer to Belgrade for trial. 5788/ The cells were also used as places to perpetrate crimes against prisoners, 5789/ and to force them to sign prepared confessions denouncing their nationality, religion, and right to land. The confinement was often used as punishment for their military resistance. 5790/

3598. There are substantiating reports that many prisoners were held in solitary confinement cells for undetermined periods of time and physically abused. 5791/ According to one report some detainees were put in solitary confinement from two to five days and some did not return. 5792/ The prisoners were physically abused and were forced to listen to "Četnik" songs for days on end while in solitary confinement. 5793/ They were beaten more severely when Croatia had a military or political success, such as gaining international recognition as an independent state. 5794/ Though these beatings were not witnessed by the other prisoners, they could be heard and victims were seen being dragged out. 5795/ According to one source, prisoners could not walk or take care of themselves for seven to 10 days after returning from the confinement cell. 5796/

3599. Many prisoners were charged with crimes and sent to Belgrade to await trial. 5797/ The detainees were charged with armed insurrection and genocide, for example. 5798/ Some of the charges were based on articles in Express Politika and Politiika publications, 5799/ and false statements forcibly extracted from the detainees. 5800/ One prisoner was singled out for trial in Belgrade, and was kept, like other similar cases, in solitary confinement until the day he was to be taken to Belgrade. 5801/ Legal proceedings were initiated against another prisoner who was sent to Belgrade but then returned to the KPD. 5802/

3600. Transfers to Belgrade for trial occurred often. According to one source, many of those who were left behind after an exchange that occurred in March were transferred to Belgrade for trial. 5803/ Other transfers appear to
have taken place shortly after the initial incarceration, for example some 20 prisoners were selected at random and taken to Niš. 5804/ At the prison the men were separated from the women and five days later the men were transferred to Aleksinac. 5805/ Another group of 180 soldiers were transferred there around the same time. 5806/

3601. There are three reports mentioning mass graves. The witnesses were all detained at the KPD and appear to refer to graves in or around the Vukovar area rather than in Sremska Mitrovica. There are no reports of large scale killing at the KPD, or of how the dead were disposed of at the prison.

3602. One doctor from Vukovar was detained by the JNA to explain the existence of an improvised, open grave facing the hospital where there were 93 mutilated bodies lying on the grass and to explain the cause of death of 15 children who were found in a house near the hospital with numbered plates around their necks. 5807/

3603. On approximately 22 December 1991 a large number of prisoners captured on approximately 18 November 1992 in Vukovar were transferred from Stajićevo and Begejci to the KPD in Sremska Mitrovica. There were possibly as many as 2,000 Croat Army personnel in the camp as well as civilians. 5808/ In addition, there were more than more than 100 wounded from the Vukovar hospital held at the KPD with 1,000 prisoners, most of whom were civilians, after the release of some medical personnel 10 December 1991. 5809/

3604. On 22 December 1991 half of the detainees from Stajićevo were transferred to the KPD and the other half were sent to Niš. 5810/ The number transferred around 22 December 1991 and 23 December 1991 was not reported. 5811/ A group of 650 captives, who surrendered at the Commerce building, were also transferred to the KPD. 5812/

3605. On 23 December 1991, all seventy of the prisoners who remained in Begejci after the initial exchange were transported to the KPD and about 50 to the military prison at Niš. Those at Niš were again transferred to the KPD on 22 March 1992. 5813/ On 25 December 1991, 117 male prisoners (all the men left at the camp) and all the women were transferred to the KPD. At this time three interrogators were transferred as guards from the Begejci camp. 5814/

3606. A female witness was transferred to Begejci from Stajićevo after being captured at the Obucara warehouse in Borovo Naselje. There she stayed for two months before being transferred on 22 December 1991 to the KPD. She was held with five other women in a segregation cell for three and a half months. On 3 February 1992 she was transferred to the VIZ army prison in Belgrade. 5815/

3607. There is little information on the arrival procedures of those transferred to the KPD in December 1991. One witness who was captured at an air raid shelter in Vukovar claimed that upon arriving at the KPD from Stajićevo the detainees spent the night in the buses outside the prison. In the morning they left the buses and, while being beaten, were sorted by name for internment in the prison. 5816/

3608. Those prisoners transferred from Stajićevo to the KPD were held in overcrowded conditions, similar to the detainees who were incarcerated in November 1991. The reports did not indicate whether the transferees were incarcerated in the same cells as the other prisoners from Vukovar. From the similarity in the reports the prisoners appear to have been commingled.

3609. A witness from the Borovo factory capture was held in a big room, some 100 square metres, with 120 people. They had mats to sleep on, though they had to sleep on their sides. Sanitary conditions were some what better than
in the other prisons and it was warmer. There were 136 people in one
dormitory until the first exchange. According to another source, 100
people slept in one room at the prison and had one place to relieve
themselves. They also slept on mattresses on the floor.

3610. Another report claimed that initially there were 125 prisoners in one
room (number 8) and that these were later transferred to segregation cells.
Then 97 of them were moved to room (number 5) on 26 December 1991 where they
spent five days and were again put in segregation cells. Pavilion
number 3, room number 6, on the second floor contained 136 prisoners.
There were "pallets" to sleep on and free access to a washroom and bathroom
with potable water.

3611. Those prisoners who were transferred from Stajicévo alleged that the
conditions at the KPD were an improvement from what they had experienced. A
member of the reserves who surrendered at Borovo claims the prison was much
better because it was warm and the prisoners had cushions on the floor. In
addition they were able to bathe for the first time in two and a half
months.

3612. According to a ZNG member, who defended Borovo Selo, the living
conditions were better at the beginning of his incarceration at the KPD as
compared to Stajicévo.

3613. A female witness, transferred from Begejci to the KPD on 22 December
1991, was held with five other women in a segregation cell for three and a
half months then she was transferred to a solitary confinement cell, which was
1.5 metres wide and very cold. She had a bed in the corner and a vessel to do
her "needs", but was only allowed to bathe once in two months and this was due
to the visit of the ICRC.

3614. The food was bad and insufficient, according to various sources, but
better than in Stajicévo and Begejci. They received boiled chicken and
vegetables from time to time. Food was issued three times a day and the
detainees had free access to potable water.

3615. According to the reports the treatment of the transferees at the KPD was
a slight improvement over the other two camps. The prisoners allegedly
even joked among themselves until some were removed and beaten, which resulted
in completely silencing them. One detainee claims that the recognition
of Croatia's independence had no effect on the treatment of prisoners, though
they were now supposedly considered POWs rather than rebels against SFRY and
perpetrators of genocide.

3616. Even though the conditions and treatment were an improvement, the
beating continued on a large scale as in the other camps and some prisoners
even died as a result of these beatings. Allegedly, JNA soldiers and
Serbian paramilitaries were responsible for the beating deaths. One source claims to have witnessed 113 prisoners being beaten in room
number 13. By contrast, another witness claimed that only select prisoners
were beaten in the KPD and this was conducted in separate rooms.

3617. Some reports indicate that members of the military forces defending
Vukovar were singled out for more maltreatment than others. According
to a ZNG member who defended Borovo Selo, he was beaten on his chest near his
heart and on his back with a club fitted at one end with a ball made of
lead. The prisoners were also taken to the basement bathroom of the
prison where they were forced to confess to statements written by a Captain
Salić.
3618. The prisoners were taunted with threats of beating, trials and death. All of them allegedly were forced to stand in a bent position against a wall for anywhere from one half hour to as many as six hours.

3619. The prisoners transferred in December were also forced to labour in the fields. According to a captive ZNG member, around the end of June 1992 the prisoners were forced to gather beets from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. hours as punishment for complaining to the ICRC. The prisoners found this very difficult, they were dehydrated and developed blisters on their hands.

3620. The personnel of the KPD also took belongings from these prisoners. There were no reports from the transferees of their property being removed and registered as with the November group. Instead the guards reportedly searched the mattresses and other fixtures in the cells while the prisoners were made to wait in another room. The guards stole whatever personal belongings they found.

3621. Even though the conditions of custody were an improvement as compared with the other camps, the interrogations conducted at the KPD were allegedly more severe. The detainees were supposedly beaten with sticks on their soles, shoulder-blades, hands, and buttocks, but not on their heads. The witness does claim that prisoners were cuffed around the head but the meaning of this statement is unclear.

3622. A male witness alleges that the women were held in a different place from the male detainees and that they were also beaten. A female detainee reports that she was held with five other women in a segregation cell. The women detainees were guarded by two female civilian guards who beat them with sticks, as well as hit and kicked them. One woman prisoner allegedly went mad and began to speak to herself. Another was threatened with torture if she told the ICRC about the screams she heard from the other segregation cells.

3623. The December group of detainees experienced similar treatment during interrogations as the November detainees. Prisoners were beaten on the soles and in the joints during interrogations. One detainee claims to have been interrogated and beaten two to three times a week. He was made to lie across a chair in order to make the beating worse. During an interrogation another witness allegedly was asked to describe certain events and give names of Croatian soldiers. When he refused to do so he was beaten on his soles, and was accused of rebelling against the JNA.

3624. The prisoners believe these interrogations were to gain false statements from the detainees as well as out of hatred. One witness was interrogated by a captain but was forced to sign a statement written by an officer. Local people would also be brought in to take part in the questioning. As the interrogations and beatings continued the guards seemed to single out some prisoners for regular beatings. Many prisoners received lacerations, contusions, and fractured bones as a result of this.

3625. In January or February 1992 the original guards were replaced by several 18 to 20 year-olds who increased the frequency and severity of beatings.

3626. Female prisoners were also beaten and interrogated. One woman claims she was beaten by a soldier as he escorted her to the interrogation. During the questioning she was accused of armed rebellion.

3627. The reports concerning solitary confinement of prisoners from the December group concur with reports from the first group. Select prisoners were held in these cells for extended periods of time during which they were
beaten and, if female, raped on a regular basis.

3628. One witness was held in solitary confinement from 15 January to 13 February 1992 though the reason is not clear. During his confinement a wounded man was held with him. 5854/ When this man was taken away another was brought in. The witness was tortured on a regular basis and beaten by five convicts 5855/. These same convicts raped a woman in front of the witness's cell. He was then moved to the basement of the prison where the beating continued. 5856/

3629. A woman transferred from Begejci was raped in the KPD while she was in solitary confinement. Between 10 to 20 men, both guards and some regular criminals participated in the rape. Her screams could be heard at night by the other prisoners. 5857/

3630. A ZNG member was held in solitary confinement for four months because he allegedly went on strike with others and acted as a liaison during the strike. He was so badly beaten he could not get up for seven days. The prisoners were told by a militiaman that a mentally abnormal woman, unable even to sign her statement, confessed that she killed somebody and was kept in solitary confinement where other prisoners exploited her sexually. 5858/

3631. Some of the December prisoners were held in solitary confinement before being transferred to Belgrade. One detainee was transferred for desertion. 5859/ One of the women held in the segregation cell had legal proceeding brought against her. 5860/

3632. Apparently, when absolutely necessary medical assistance was available. 5861/ However, some wounded were treated by other prisoners and those who were beaten were given cold compresses from the WC by the other prisoners. 5862/ One prisoner who began bleeding through the mouth was taken to Novi Sad hospital, where he was treated fairly. He believes he has suffered permanent damage from his beatings. 5863/

3633. According to one witness there was a woman doctor who used to come every day to examine those prisoners who reported sick. She was described as being very correct. Also there was a dentist who pulled and repaired teeth. 5864/

3634. A few detainees were transferred to the KPD in January and then in mid February there was another large transfer. For the reports there seems to have been as few as 14 transferees in January.

3635. On 1 January 1992 a Croatian man from Vukovar, arrested in Backa Palanka as he returned from registering his car in Sarajevo, was transferred from Ilok, where he had spent six days, to Sremska Mitrovica. At the KPD he was held in solitary confinement for 56 days and afterwards in a room with other prisoners. At that point he claims that he was no longer beaten though others were. The prisoners were fed three times a day but the food was inadequate, usually some kind of soup that tasted like dishcloths. The witness lost 12 kilograms. 5865/

3636. On 2 January 1992 a small group of prisoners was transferred from an army barracks (location unknown) to Sremska Mitrovica's KPD. Among them were 13 adults and one child. 5866/ First they were taken to pavilion number one and then for a bath. The ICRC registered them and they were transferred to another room (number 14) where a doctor, who was also present at Vukovar Hospital and dealt with the negotiations, was being held. The doctor asked the witness to write statements of everything that occurred in Vukovar. The witness refused to do so as she believed the doctor was collaborating with the prison personnel. Pictures were taken of the witness and she was forced by
her female guards to read a cyrillic bible. 5867/

3637. The January group was allegedly interrogated by majors and colonels of the JNA and were not maltreated during the interrogations. The prisoners sat in chairs and were given statements to read aloud for a camera. These films would later, be shown on Serbian television. One witness claimed that she was required to state her name, how many people she killed, and claim to regret her actions. 5868/

3638. In the middle of February 1992 a large number of prisoners were transferred from the detention facility in Niš to the KPD. Most of these prisoners were transferred on 15 or 16 February 1992 and had been detained in Stajićevo prior to their detention in Niš. The majority of these prisoners were Croatian ZNG reservists from the battle of Vukovar. The reason for the transfer is not clear however the camps in FRY had received unflattering media attention around that time resulting in the closure of at least one camp. 5869/

3639. Nine Croatian reservists made statements in Zagreb concerning their transfer from Niš to the KPD. 5870/ One reservist claims he was transferred by bus with 260 other male prisoners from Niš to the KPD. 5871/ Among the reservists who were transferred there was one member of the Croatian Interior Ministry’s military police (MUP) and one freelance photographer from Zagreb who was in Vukovar to film the battle. 5872/ One Croatian soldier believes he was transferred to the KPD on 26 February 1992. 5873/

3640. Little information on the living conditions experienced by this group of transferees was available. Apparently these transferees reported that the cells at the KPD were overcrowded though the food was slightly better than in Niš or Stajićevo. The prisoners were never allowed to see any visitors though they did receive food parcels from them. The parcels often had items missing. In addition to the food parcels the detainees were allowed letters which were opened by the guards. At night the guards would force some prisoners to bathe, however it is not clear whether this was part of the maltreatment or if the bathing was in consideration of hygiene. 5874/

3641. As with the other groups of detainees this group was also maltreated, beaten, and interrogated on a regular basis. 5875/ The guards would often remove prisoners from their cells to beat them. One reservist claims he suffered permanent damage to his kidneys, eyes, and general health as a result of his beatings. 5876/ The freelance photographer allegedly has visible scars on his face and cigarette burns on his arms. 5877/ Four soldiers died in Mitrovica between 16 February 1992 and 28 March 1992 due to beatings they had received while in custody. 5878/

3642. During the interrogations the detainees were accused of offences they claim not to have committed. These accusations would at times result in the transfer of prisoners to Belgrade for trial. A member of the Croatian Army Reserves, held at the KPD until 2 March 1992, was taken to Belgrade for trial. In Belgrade he was sentenced to seven years in prison but was exchanged with 105 prisoners from the military prison in Belgrade. They were exchanged on 14 August 1992. 5879/

3643. On 22 March 1992 a man from Vukovar, an eyewitness and survivor of a mass execution carried out at Dalj, was transferred from Niš to Sremska Mitrovica. At the KPD he claims to have been beaten, questioned, and threatened. On 22 May 1992 he was exchanged at Lipovac. 5880/

3644. Three reports indicate detainees were being transferred to the KPD as late as 18 April 1992. An article published in the Belgrade Daily Borba
indicated that some of the prisoners were Bosnian Muslim Green Berets and Bosnian Muslims civilians from Bosanska Šamac. The leader of the Muslim party of Democratic Action (SDA) in Bosanski Šamac was quoted as saying that the Muslims in the area gave up their weapons without a fight when Serb forces took control of the town on 18 April 1992. The witness was taken for an informational discussion at the police station and then transferred to various prisons. He ended up in Sremska Mitrovica where he attributes his survival to being held in a JNA prison. The ICRC was aware of 15 Bosnians being held in the KPD as a result of the fighting in Croatia. 5881

3645. Another source indicates that the leader of the SDA was incarcerated with an American, a Croatian soldier and 12 Bosnians. Initially the group was searched and beaten. Then the BBC and the ICRC arrived. A man named Panić told the journalist he would offer a sizeable amount of money to anyone who could find a Bosnian in a Serbian prison. The prisoners were registered with the ICRC and not beaten on that day. The SDA leader claims that he refused to talk to the ICRC for fear of being killed or beaten. The commander of the camp requested that the SDA leader give a statement to the BBC claiming that the conditions at the camp were fine. The commander suggested that if the witness did so his chances of being exchanged would be improved. The witness did so and the statement was allegedly broadcast on Croatian television. 5882

3646. The prisoners were beaten regularly and made to strip before being beaten. Sometimes the guards would line the detainees against a wall and beat every second or third individual. Some prisoners were taken outside to be beaten. 5883/ The American was beaten more severely than the other prisoners. Another prisoner from the group was accused of killing Serbs. The guards held a mock trial in which the SDA leader was forced to be the judge. During the trial the accused prisoner was beaten severely and forced to confess to killing Serbs. The morning after the trial he was found dead. 5884

3647. The witness claims that he was never forced to perform sex acts, but that the Croatian soldier and the American were forced to engage in fellatio. 5885

3648. The ICRC delivered parcels to the prisoners which were confiscated by the guards. The witness claims that upon release the commander told him to write a statement about being robbed by the guards but the guards ordered him not to do so. This group was released in an all for all exchange on 14 August 1992. 5886

3649. In late April 1992, when prisoners from Stajićevo were to be released in a prisoner exchange a Serbian lieutenant colonel in charge of the prisoners transferred all the men between 17 and 45 years old to other camps. The prisoners were then transferred to Niš, Aleksinac, and Sremska Mitrovica. The report does not indicate how many prisoners were involved in the transfer. 5887

3650. The role of the ICRC in relation to the KPD was three fold: register detainees, monitor their treatment, and observe the exchange of prisoners. Apparently the KPD personnel expended a considerable amount of energy to deceive the ICRC. 5888

3651. For the first two months, December and January, the camp personnel would not allow the Red Cross access to the prison. 5889/ In January 1992, the ICRC requested admission to hall number 3 but was told that there was no one there. All the prisoners, who were in fact in that room, were moved out and shortly thereafter, the Red Cross was permitted to enter the emptied hall. On a second visit, the ICRC was allowed to see the prisoners. 5890
3653. Once the ICRC had gained permission to enter the camp, representatives interviewed the prisoners and took written statements; but the JNA officers were very successful in hiding some prisoners and misleading the representative. 5891/ For example, some of the prisoners were forced to dress in military uniforms over their civilian clothes to enable the JNA to present them as POWs rather than civilians to the ICRC and other international organisations. 5892/ The ICRC sent inspectors to the facility every 30 days which temporarily improved the lot of the prisoners. About 125 prisoners who were not included on the list given to the ICRC were hidden by prison officials in cellars and attics during the Red Cross visits. 5893/

3654. In addition, prisoners were given soap and toilet paper only when a commission was expected, but these were taken away the moment the commission left. At all other times hygiene was kept at a minimum. 5894/ In March, though, the guards were changed and the food improved on the request of the ICRC. 5895/

3655. According to one source the ICRC escorted some prisoners from Ovčara to Mitrovica, during the journey they were not maltreated. 5896/ Another source was told that the prisoners would be exchanged by means of the Red Cross. 5897/

3656. The presence of the ICRC appears to have maintained the morale of some prisoners. One source claims that he was beaten severely but his spirit could not be broken as they were under the protection of the ICRC. 5898/

3657. Other international organisations appear to have had access to the KPD as well as the ICRC. 5899/

3658. The ICRC appear to have been present and involved with the exchanges of prisoners between the Croatian authorities and the FRY authorities. 5900/

3659. The reports indicate there were several exchanges between 18 November 1991, when the first group from Vukovar were incarcerated at the KPD and 14 August 1992, when a well publicized "All for All" exchange took place. 5901/

3660. The first exchange took place in December 1991 when an undetermined number of medical personnel from Vukovar hospital were released. There is little further information related to this release though at least 1,000 prisoners remained detained. Included in the release were several female medical doctors. Another group of prisoners from the town of Ilok was also exchanged in December of 1991 though no details are available on the exchange. 5902/

3661. The second exchange occurred on 7 February 1992 involving another undetermined number of detainees who were among the first from Vukovar to be incarcerated. On 7 February 1992 the prisoners entered a room at the KPD and the guards read out the names of those who would be exchanged. They were told as they were leaving that exchange was by way of the Red Cross. 5903/

3662. One report indicates that a small exchange occurred on 27 March 1992. On the morning of that day the prisoners had their bags returned to them but only a few were on the list for exchange. According to the witness, many detainees remained in the KPD. 5904/ Again on 28 March 1992 a group of prisoners was exchanged. It is likely that these two reports refer to the same exchange though the dates differ. The witness in the second report claims that he was exchanged with 340 men and that around 900 detainees remained in the prison. 5905/ Another source who was exchanged on the same day claims he has possession of a list of 100 prisoners who remained in the prison after the exchange. 5906/
3663. Around 22 May 1992 another large release or exchange occurred however there is little information concerning it. From reports it can be pieced together that an undetermined number of Croatian reservists were released and at least one female detainee. 5907/

3664. The largest and most publicized exchange brokered by the ICRC, occurred on 14 August 1992. The prisoners were to be released under an 7 August 1992 agreement signed by the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panić and the former Croatian premier Franjo Gregurić in Budapest. 5908/ The exchange reportedly involved approximately 1,500 prisoners from the Croatia/Serbia aggression. 5909/ Another source claims that 418 Croatians and 765 Serbian prisoners were exchanged, all of whom were registered by the ICRC. 5910/

3665. The exchange took place at Nemetin near Osijek, Croatia and the prisoners were transported there by bus. Each prisoner was free to renounce his repatriation, and 174 exercised this option. 5911/At about 5:00 a.m. on 14 August, the Croatian prisoners from Sremska Mitrovica were loaded onto buses and sent towards Osijek, Croatia for a prisoner exchange. The prisoners were loaded, in alphabetical order on about eight buses. 5912/ Mistreatment on the buses included forcing the prisoners to hold their arms over their heads for long periods of time. The buses arrived at Bijelo Brdo, Croatia, about 9:00 a.m., and the prisoners had to wait aboard the buses for about six hours, until the exchange commenced. During that time, the guards would not let the ICRC on the buses to bring water to the prisoners. Serbian soldiers arrived at the bus convoy and asked the prisoners if they wanted to get off the buses to go to the bathroom. Those who left the buses were beaten. At about 3:45 p.m., the exchange process started, three Russian UNPROFOR troops boarded each bus and the convoy slowly made its way through Bijelo Brdo and Sarvaš to Nemetin, outside of Osijek. 5913/

3667. Other reports claim that those released on 14 August 1992 as part of the "all for all" exchange, were driven on buses for seven hours with their heads bowed and hands on their backs. They were beaten, cursed, forced to sing Serbian songs and shout "Long Live Serbia!". The JNA military police were on board the bus until it stopped at Sarvaš where two members of UNPROFOR came on board. The bus was stopped by the SAO Krajina police who threaten to kill the 15th prisoner they counted and beat the prisoners on the bus. The Russian UNPROFOR members watched and offered the prisoners water to drink, but did not interfere otherwise. 5914/

3668. Another report claimed that one of the members of the UNPROFOR team asked a Serbian, who was watching over the prisoners on the bus, to give him the boots that had been taken from a prisoner. It is not clear from the report what purpose the UNPROFOR member intended; whether take the boots back from the Serbs or to keep them for himself. The same UNPROFOR officers watched the Serb forces abusing the prisoners during the journey and took cigarettes. 5915/

3669. Stajićevo: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including Amnesty International). Stajićevo was located at a deserted farm some 15 to 20 kilometres south of Zrenjanin. 5916/ The ICRC first visited a camp in Stajićevo on 20 November 1991. 5917/ This camp is also reported by another source. 5918/ It consisted of several buildings called pavilions, and one or two buildings used by the administration. Each pavilion was surrounded by a three metre high barbed wired fence which the prisoners were forced to erect. One building was a cowshed some 100 metres long and 12 metres wide, with the remains of cow dung on the concrete floor, cobwebs on the walls and four to six broken windows. 5919/ One of the farm buildings was brick and had a tile roof. This structure had a concrete floor and was 200 metres long and 15 metres wide. 5920/
3670. The facility was operated by JNA military personnel and reservists. It was functioning as early as 20 November 1991 and was alleged to have closed in January 1992. The facility contained between 1,000 and 2,000 male prisoners between the ages of eight and 80.

3671. In the beginning they were guarded by the regular civilian police who were said to be cruel. They would beat the prisoners to death and steal from them. They were especially cruel to prisoners from Varazdin who wore grey uniforms. One witness believes that the guards became wealthy from stealing from the prisoners. Other reports indicate that the detention facility was in the control of the JNA reservists. It is not clear if there was a change of guard or if the civilian police and the reservists were active in the detention facility at the same time. Ethnic Serbs from Vukovar would bring lists of names of those inmates they wanted to have tortured or killed. The worst mistreatment was inflicted on the Croats by their former Serb neighbours and co-workers.

3672. The truth, according to one witness, was that they were terribly afraid of the prisoners. The witness got to know a Hungarian who served in the military police at the detention facility. He was fair, according to the prisoner. He told the witness that the guards were brought to the facility fifteen days before the fall of Vukovar and they were told that 1,500 "butchers" were to be interned there and the guards were scared of the prisoners. When the guards found that the prisoners were not so dangerous one guard would escort 10 prisoners at once.

3673. The detention facility commander was a lieutenant colonel. According to one report, if any one felt for the prisoners it was the commander. He forbid the policemen to enter the premises with their arms and beat them. The alarm was sounded one night because the local residents came by tractor and car with the intention of killing the prisoners. He set the entire army on their feet. Also when the ICRC arrived the commander was obviously embarrassed. He arranged running water for the prisoners.

3674. Another lieutenant colonel was also described as being an interrogator at the detention facility. The lieutenant colonel wore a green camouflage uniform and held an electric cattle prod.

3675. The guards consisted of some 20 individuals who were primarily police reservists of the JNA Army.

3676. One guard reportedly treated prisoners decently.

3677. Another guard was a lieutenant colonel. He allegedly killed three men in one night.

3678. Another guard at the detention facility was humane in his interaction with the prisoners and gave them small gifts such as cigarette lighters. He was later transferred to the military investigative prison in Belgrade.

3679. Another guard was called the butcher. He buried the corpses and was known to apply heating elements to the bodies of dead or dying prisoners, cut off pieces of heated flesh and force starving inmates to eat them.

3680. A guard whose name was not known was described in detail. Five other guards were identified. Seven individuals were all allegedly involved in the maltreatment of the prisoners but their roles at the detention facility is not clear. There were also unidentified guards who carried and used electric cattle prods on the men.
3681. The majority of the prisoners held in Stajićevo were Croatians from the Vukovar area, including Borovo Naselje. They were almost all captured in November 1991. There were between 1,000 and 2,000 prisoners held there, and the majority of the sources report the number to be 1,500. The prisoner population was predominately male and at least one report indicated that the women, children, and older people were sent to Novi Sad. The women and children were eventually released.

3682. Included in the prison population were patients and medical staff from Vukovar hospital and Croatian military personnel from Vukovar and its suburbs. There was also an imprisoned Syrian doctor and a Jewish Doctor. One report says the detention facility contained 1,300 prisoners, 200 were older than 70, and 170 were wounded.

3683. However, one report asserts that on 8 October 1991, a group of civilians were arrested in Borovo Naselje and transferred to Stajićevo. The witness stated that some 6,500 persons were interned in the detention facility among whom were many females. He also stated that the interned persons were mostly from Vukovar, Borovo Naselje and Miklusevci, Croatia. This source offers the earliest date the detention facility was open and the largest number of internees held. There are no other reports to substantiate this claim.

3684. According to one report, on 19 November 1991 JNA soldiers and Serbian paramilitary forces transported civilians, wounded, and members of the Croatian police and Croatian National Defence to Stajićevo. At that time, there were approximately 1,400 detainees in the detention facility.

3685. The prisoners arrived at the detention facility on 19 and 20 November 1991. Approximately 10 buses transported an undetermined number of prisoners to the facility and arrived around 8:30 p.m.. As the prisoners emerged from the buses they had to make their way through a corridor of militia, soldiers, and possibly civilians who lined either side of the passage and beat them with clubs and sticks. There were between 20 and 40 people forming this corridor and beating the prisoners. When the female witness passed through she was taken aside and told to sit. The female was transferred to Begejci because women did not remain long at the Stajićevo. They continued to bring other prisoners into the 100 metres long and 10 metres wide stable. People of all ages were situated inside the stable. Two doctors and three medical technicians were the last to leave the bus. They incorrectly thought they would not be beaten because the were wearing the insignia of the Red Cross on their arms and were carrying their first aid kits.

3686. They were told to bow their heads and put their hands behind their backs. After they passed through the corridor of police, JNA soldiers forced them to sit on a concrete floor. It took hours to fill up the stables and they always slept under flood lights.

3687. The first night, the JNA military police, young men wearing the usual white belts, were in charge of the prisoners. The Croatian National Guardsmen were separated out and people were beaten until they admitted to being with the National Guard. Those prisoners who wore uniforms suffered the most. There were 30 guards who were beating the prisoners at random. There was no order in this process and the chaos lasted for 24 hours. One witness realized it was best to keep quiet and pretend he was invisible.

3688. There were a few imprisoned soldiers who incriminated about 50 other prisoners. Those accused could not see their accusers as they covered their faces with masks and bags. By the second or third day the guards had separated some of the prisoners into groups of National Guardsmen, militia members, and members of the Croatian armed forces. The witness claims the prisoners were
made to sing by group. Some were taken away and never seen again, others were taken away and brought back. 5957/

3689. Some of the detainees claimed they were Serbian and were either situated in a warmer part of the stable or removed. They were not maltreated. Those who did not have papers to prove they were Serbian suffered the same fate as the Croats. 5958/

3690. During this initial treatment of the prisoners, many of them suffered severe injuries. Prisoners were made to sit on the concrete floor with their heads bent and hands crossed behind their necks. They were physically and verbally abused. The guards walked around yelling, punching and kicking the prisoners. Some prisoners, mostly National Guardsmen, were taken to the central floor area and beaten unconscious. Around 1:00 a.m., there was gunfire outside and a terrible commotion ensued. The guards brought in dogs and said they had shot a prisoner attempting to escape. 5959/

3691. The prisoners had no rights according to their captors. They were beaten and clubbed in the presence of officers, and sometimes on their order. The prisoners did not know what to enter under the heading "status" on the ICRC form. They were treated as insurgents against the state although the Army promised during the negotiations that they would all be treated as prisoners of war. 5960/

3692. The detainees were beaten constantly and most were chosen at random for this treatment. 5961/ Some were wounded and some were killed. The perpetrators were JNA and Serbian reservists. 5962/ A witness testified that he was beaten on his back and others were beaten on the soles of their feet. 5963/ Older people seemed to be beaten more often than younger people. Many had broken bones and one witness reported that three individuals died from the beatings. 5964/ Some individuals were beaten so badly that they could not walk. 5965/

3693. All the prisoners were beaten except those that were doing things for the detention facility authorities. 5966/ The guards were usually drunk and had dogs with them. 5967/

3694. According to one of the doctors, a number of prisoners were singled out for persistent beating by the prison guards. Every night such prisoners would be taken outside at about two or three in the morning. There they were met by a dozen soldiers who proceeded to kick and punch them and to beat them with truncheons until they lost consciousness. They aimed at the victim's chest, belly, back, kidneys, arms and legs. When the victim lay motionless, they would leave him to regain consciousness and return inside. People would totter back into the pavilion, groan, and fall down. The next night it would all be repeated over again. One of these prisoners gave his watch to the person next to him and said that he could not take any more beating. He planned to run away from the soldiers so that they would kill him. He asked that his watch be given to his wife. Amnesty International reports that the detention facility commander was informed of the ill treatment suffered by this prisoner and the prisoner was transferred from the pavilion. 5968/

3695. Most frequently they were beaten on the hands and feet with iron rods. The beatings lasted until the victim passed out; then, the prisoner would be revived with water and taken back to his cell. 5969/

3696. The first three days they were invariably beaten whenever they had to use the toilet and later the prisoners would be awakened at night to go to the toilet and to be beaten on the way. 5970/ The prisoners would also be awakened at midnight and taken to a beating session under the pretext they should
3697. They were beaten with clubs and sticks, they were forced to work in the fields, for example harvesting sugar beet and uprooting hedges around villages. 5972/

3698. People were taken away and it was not known whether they were returned. All the prisoners were beaten regardless of age or physical conditions. 5973/

3699. Prisoners were interrogated from the beginning of their internment until their release. The interrogations were always accompanied by physical abuse and confessions were sometimes videotaped.

3700. They were interrogated during their first days in Stajićevo. The interrogations occurred in separate rooms as well as in the stable. The detainees were accused of crimes and association with groups such as the "Ustaše". There were no real efforts to extract military information from them. If the interrogator thought the interrogation went well, the captives were beaten only slightly. If the interrogator was dissatisfied, the prisoners were sent to the basement for beatings and more severe treatment. 5974/

3701. When the interrogations began all the prisoners held in the warehouse wanted to be questioned even though they were physically abused. A rumor had circulated that all those found innocent would be released. Thirty prisoners were frequently summoned, they would be forced to write statements and were beaten. 5975/

3702. One room was equipped with a television camera. Prisoners were brought there and given scripts to read denouncing the Croatian Government and nation. They were also forced to renounce claim to personal property in Vukovar. 5976/

3703. Out of 300 combatants, only four surrendered in their uniforms, according to one witness. The witness, being one of these four was the first to be interrogated. The first evening the interrogators took his jacket and vest, which he claims was worth a lot of money. He believes that because he surrendered in his uniform he was beaten three or four times a day, and two times at night. He was beaten with clubs and rifle butts and even hit over his head. 5977/

3704. At this first interrogation an ensign confiscated his personal belongings; a watch, money, a "chainlet", and a rosary. He was given a receipt as proof that his belongings were taken away from him. They did not take his wedding ring because he could not get it off due to his weight. He had three billion dinars he had brought from Zagreb which was also confiscated. After a week the ensign told the prisoners they were going to get a canteen. The witness asked the ensign for his money back and it was returned to him. 5978/

3705. During the interrogation the witness found it strange that his interrogators already knew a lot about him. They knew he was a fireman, and that he had brought a M-53 (gun) from Zagreb. The witness told them it was a pure accident, and that his entire training consisted of cleaning and taking care of the gun. The interrogators knew the exact date when the forces had arrived and how many there were. He was accused of chopping off a tanker's head and playing football with it. He was also accused of cooking the head and giving it to his commander. 5979/

3706. On the 10th day he was interrogated for a second time. He was told that they had proof that he had killed two children and that was why he was being interrogated. This time he was interrogated by a lieutenant colonel who did not maltreat him. He was asked if he was hungry and was given a huge patty of
meat, a quarter of bread and a pack of "Partner" cigarettes. The conversation was normal and the lieutenant colonel knew all his personal data. He told the witness that he could not understand why he had gone to Vukovar as it was Serbian territory. The witness explained that it was Croatian territory and he had come to defend it. He was told that he would be charged as a war criminal and was then taken out to be beaten. 5980/

3707. On 29 November 1991, a prisoner testified to having survived four separate, severe beatings following an interrogation session. At about 4:00 p.m., an unidentified lieutenant colonel from the counterintelligence service Kontraobavještajna Služba (KOS) asked to speak with the prisoner. 5981/ The witness went with him to a room in an administration building where the lieutenant colonel took a seat behind a desk. A soldier with a baton in his hand which he constantly beat against the palm of his other hand, was present. The lieutenant colonel began the questioning by asking the witness to tell everything he knew about the ZNG and its leaders. The witness did not reveal any information about the ZNG in Borovo Naselje and the lieutenant colonel accused him of lying. The soldier kneed him in the kidney. After about 90 minutes, he was taken back to his detention area. 5982/

3708. He was then brought to another interrogation session, where another lieutenant colonel sat behind the desk. He wore a green camouflage uniform and held an electric cattle prod. Again the witness provided no information on the ZNG and was released back to his detention area. 5983/

3709. The same day, six soldiers came for the witness, the leader of this group was the unidentified guard who was a martial arts expert. The witness was beaten for what he believes was two and a half hours in a small patch of woods next to the detention facility. He was asked how many "Četniks" he had killed. He was then threatened with a knife to his throat and threatened that they would cut off his fingers. He was told to run but was unable to as the guards had injured his legs. They carried him back to the detention area on a blanket and he was beaten again later in the night. The prisoner urinated blood for the next two days and has scares on his left calf and right leg from the abuse. An imprisoned doctor convinced the detention facility administrator to take the witness to the hospital. 5984/

3710. In one small room, there was a leather chair used for torture with electric shock. Prisoners would be put in the chair and strapped down above the wrists and elbows. Clamps were then attached to the fingers on one or both hands and electricity was introduced by turning the knob of a dimmer switch. As the victims began to quiver the Serb guards would laugh and increase the power. Just before the prisoners passed out water would be thrown on them and the process would begin again. 5985/

3711. On the fifth or sixth night 5986/ of internment the militia in blue uniforms and some civilians arrived. The prisoners had been given salty tinned meat for breakfast and were very thirsty. The militia and the civilians told the prisoners they would play a game called the "waterbearing rite". The prisoner who lost was allegedly the one with blood on his hands and would have to pay. 5987/

3712. The prisoners were made to stand with their heads bowed and their hands behind their backs. A book was placed on their heads one by one and a witness heard the soldiers say "that the blue was all right, that he passed and was given some water, black was no good and he could not drink." This was repeated three times and they appointed one prisoner who had "passed" to distribute the water from a wineskin without spilling any. The first prisoner to drink consumed a large portion of the water so there was not enough for the last prisoner. They took him 5988/ behind some troughs and said he would be
crucified. The prisoner was heard screaming for help and pleading with them to kill him. He was heard saying his throat was full of glass and called out to a woman, Milica, to bring him water. At dawn, the witness claims, his screaming stopped. 5989/

3713. While this game was in progress some of the militia and civilians chose to harass a woman accused of being a sniper. The witness could not see who she was, as she was hidden behind a partition. He heard them beat her and pour water over her. He also heard words to the effect that they were taking her to a bunker. She was never heard from again. 5990/

3714. An undetermined number of prisoners died at the Stajičevo detention facility due to the maltreatment they received from the guards. 5991/ According to one witness 10 to 20 people were killed. 5992/ One prisoner was killed by having his thorax crushed. 5993/ Other reports indicate that eight people died in Stajičevo. 5994/ One detainee claims that three prisoners died during his month in the detention facility. 5995/

3715. Allegedly, in the first couple of days 17 people were killed. Three were shot and the others were beaten to death. Alcoholics began to go through withdrawal and hallucinate. One alcoholic tried to leave and was beaten to death by six guards. 5996/

3716. On the second day of internment the soldiers killed an electrician from Borovo. The electrician had diarrhea and was on his way to relieve himself when he was caught by the soldiers and taken behind the troughs. They yelled that he had been trying to escape and beat him. He attempted to defend himself and four of the soldiers killed him. The corpse remained on the concrete until morning. There was no investigation though the lieutenant colonel inquired about the deceased the following day. The remaining prisoners were questioned regarding the deceased's identity as well as his place of origin. In the prisoners' estimation, the lieutenant colonel concluded that the man was killed while trying to escape. 5997/

3717. In addition to physical abuse the detainees were subjected to humiliation. They were forced to stand with their heads down and hands behind their back. They had to sing the anthem "Hej Slaveni" and some "Četnik" songs. 5998/ The people from Varazdin were forced to sing "Hajde da ludujemo ove noći", a well known song sung by a Croatian singer Tajči. 5999/ At night, the guards forced the prisoners to read Serbian newspapers which described the Croats as individuals responsible for killing Serbs. 6000/ One evening villagers arrived to view the prisoners and the women spat on them. 6001/

3718. While interned at the detention facility one prisoner was ordered by a paramilitary leader to kiss a Serbian paramilitary emblem. When he refused, the paramilitary leader cut the left side of his mouth and stuck the emblem between his teeth. When he refused again, the paramilitary leader dug out three of the prisoner's teeth with a knife from which the prisoner bears a four inch scar on the left side of his face. 6002/

3719. The prisoners were held in a stable with concrete floors covered with livestock dung. It was cold and they did not have running water. They were given a ration of water twice daily. 6003/ The water they were made to drink was yellow and caused stomach upsets. 6004/ According to one doctor the prisoners received drinking water on the second day of their imprisonment and water for washing only five or six days later. 6005/ The standards of accommodation were minimal. Three hundred people were kept in one stable and 900 in another. 6006/

3720. The first night was spent on the floor and the prisoners slept in two
metre wide rows. There was a passage in the middle and the prisoners were laying down on both sides. 6007/ Twelve prisoners slept in the area of nine square metres. 6008/ Another report indicated that each person had less than one half square metre in which to sleep. 6009/ Spot lights were turned on day and night and the prisoners were beaten. 6010/ As it was very cold, they received some straw, a blanket and some military coats. 6011/

3721. All accounts described extremely harsh, cold and unsanitary conditions. Prisoners in the first pavilion (some 900) slept on a concrete floor. The day after their arrival they were issued a blanket and a week later they were issued a second blanket. After some 10 days, when the weather turned very cold, most prisoners were given a military overcoat and straw on which to lie. Prisoners attributed these improvements to the prospect of a visit by the ICRC which took place on 2 December 1991. 6012/

3722. Neither bath nor toilet facilities were provided for prisoners on their arrival. The first three days of their detention, prisoners relieved themselves on the floor in an area in the centre of the pavilion, where there were no doors or plumbing. 6013/ Another report indicated that from the beginning they urinated inside the stable, near the wall and one metre away from the place where they slept. 6014/

3723. The prisoners were held for two days before being allowed to relieve themselves. Some people defecated and urinated in their clothes. 6015/ The urine caused the stable to reek so that the guards allowed the prisoners to go outside to relieve themselves. 6016/ Prisoners were taken outside under guard to relieve themselves against the wall of the pavilion. 6017/ Another report claims they were taken out in groups and allowed to relieve themselves behind some troughs. Even outside the smell became unbearable after the fifth day. The prisoners were often abused as they went to relieve themselves. 6018/

3724. Conditions improved on the 16th day when the ICRC's arrival was announced. 6019/ The ICRC arrived on 12 December 1991 and registered the prisoners. 6020/ Red toilet cabinets were installed, running water was provided, and a kitchen was opened. 6021/ One witness claims that he relieved himself for the first time after the toilet was constructed. The prisoners were led out in groups of 10 or 20 which prevented all of them being beaten. 6022/ A day or two after the ICRC visit the children and those over 60 years-old were released. 6023/

3725. Eventually they were allowed to use the toilet only once a day at noon and in pairs. One prisoner who constantly had to urinate was forced to do so in a bottle and beaten frequently to disabuse him of his problem. 6024/

3726. On the seventh day the wounded, old, and children were moved to a warehouse. It was the lieutenant colonel who chose the people to be transferred. The witness asked if he could be transferred and was. He spent the remainder of his stay in the warehouse with 200 others. On the tenth day they were given some hay and a blanket to be shared by two inmates. There was no ceiling only a roof and when it became clear that the prisoners would freeze they were allowed to construct two stoves out of barrels and allowed to walk around the warehouse. There were several doctors among the detainees who had been arrested and they collected medicine from the prisoners. 6025/

3727. One report claims that the prisoners smuggled several transistor radios into the detention facility. They listened to radio Zagreb at 10:00pm, while during the day they listened to Radio Belgrade and Novi Sad. 6026/

3728. Some of the prisoners reported being allowed to smoke. While other claims they had to stand in the snow in their bare feet as punishment for
smoking. 6027/

3729. The prisoners were made to run for their breakfast to get there and back in five minutes. They had to stand up with their heads down and their hands behind their backs until breakfast was served and then had two minutes to eat it. The witness had serious difficulties with his stomach. The breakfast was accompanied by physical abuse by the guards. Their chairs were slipped from beneath them. They were then taken back to their room and forced to stand. The guards would enter the room periodically and beat them. 6028/

3730. During the first two to 15 days the prisoners received two meals each day. The meals consisted of a cup of tea, a slice of bread and some form of meat. The portions were small and the quality of the food poor. 6029/According to one source, breakfast was a slice of bread, half a slice of salami and some tea. Dinner was a slice of bread with something spread over it and some tea. 6030/Another witness claims that during the first 10 days, each prisoner got a deciliter of tea and a slice of bread every morning around 8:00 a.m.. The prisoners knew that there was not enough food to feed all of them and reportedly the last group of 20 or even 100 people received nothing. They were fed the same thing around 5:00 p.m. and would also get a slice of salami so thin one could see through it, or one frankfurter which was split among three or four prisoners. 6031/

3731. After that, the ICRC visited and the prisoners received warm food for the first time, usually potatoes in water. 6032/One report claims that later on the prisoners cooked potatoes and bean soup for themselves. The food was dished out in open air in front of the stables regardless of the weather conditions. 6033/

3732. Prisoners appear to have been treated by detained medical personnel from Vukovar Hospital. The detention facility commander cooperated with these detained doctors to a certain extent.

3733. In the poor conditions which the inmates lived, the suffering of the sick, wounded and elderly was particularly severe. According to the two doctors and a medical technician, among the total of 1,300 held in Stajićevo there were about 170 wounded, including people with serious bullet wounds and amputated limbs and several hundred sick inmates. There were also about 150 people over 60 years old. Many of the sick suffered from chronic illnesses, including diabetes, heart and lung disease, active tuberculosis, and epilepsy. One of the prisoners was semi-paralyzed and two were schizophrenics. The detention facility's inmates included 23 young people under 18 years of age. 6034/

3734. As the weather became colder, many inmates succumbed to diarrhoea. At one end of the pavilion captured doctors and medical personnel set up an improvised medical station, with five doctors and five technicians. They had just one bag of medicine they brought with them from Borovo Naselje and some medication they collected from other prisoners in the detention facility. When they requested medicine from the detention facility authorities they were reportedly told that the JNA did not have the drugs they required and they should obtain them from the ICRC. After about a week, an infirmary with places for some 20 patients, was set up with the help of a military doctor. At the end of two weeks about 80 prisoners were released, mostly the elderly and prisoners under 18 years-old. The first exchange of prisoners took place a week later, involving eight medical workers. 6035/

3735. Conditions were the worst for the first seven days. Prisoners were physically and psychologically ill-treated daily, and as a result four died. In the first few days at least two prisoners came to the medical station with
severe psychological disturbances reportedly due to severe physical mistreatment. 6036/

3736. According to one of the imprisoned doctors a prisoner came to him on the second evening of their internment complaining that his arm was broken during a beating he received from guards. The doctor bandaged it and told guards to take the prisoner to the detention facility commander, a lieutenant colonel, to make a complaint. Ten minutes later shots were heard and the doctor was summoned. He found the injured prisoner with a bullet wound to his chest and the guards claimed that the prisoner had attacked them. The prisoner was taken to the hospital for four days and later the doctor learned from a military doctor the man had died there. 6037/

3737. One prisoner was severely beaten and covered in vomit when he was found by one of the imprisoned doctors. The doctor woke a colleague and they put him on a door they used for an improvised stretcher. In the morning they demanded that the ill prisoner be seen by the official military doctor, a woman, and they also informed the detention facility commander. The female doctor claimed that the prisoner was not seriously ill and said she would bring medicine for him the next day. The next day he was dead. 6038/

3738. The imprisoned medics left after 10 days and the prisoners were without medical help. The detention facility doctor was there but he was not very good. He would only give the prisoners an occasional pill. In the meantime, the prisoners discovered lice in a warm part of the shed while those situated near the door were freezing. The second exchange was around the twentieth of December when the remaining prisoners were sent to SMKPD and Niš. 6039/ Another exchange occurred in late April. When prisoners were to be released the young men were sent to other detention facilities. 6040/

3739. On the 15th day of internment the ICRC insisted that all people over 60 years-old and all minors be released. They took away one or two busloads of men but many elderly people remained and most of those were sick. 6041/

3740. In December 1991, an ICRC representative arrived at Stajićevo and came to the medical clinic. The detention facility official had intended to hide some prisoners from the ICRC but did not do this in time. An unidentified guard told the representative that one of the injured prisoners was insane and had fallen down some stairs. When the guard left the room he told the representative that he was not insane and that he had been beaten. He asked them to contact the Croatian government or army. He was transferred in December to Belgrade. 6042/

3741. Some people were released during that time but refused to leave unless escorted by the ICRC as it had been rumored that those initially released were killed by the locals. A group of detainees, 270 civilians, were released in Bosanski Samac and were escorted by the ICRC. 6043/

3742. Subotica: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ISHR). According to one source "extremists" have moved 22,000 captured civilians to various camps in Serbia, including the Subotica region in northern Vojvodina near the Hungarian border. It is unclear from where the civilians originated or who their captors were. 6044/ Another source reports that there were 5,000 prisoners held in a concentration camp in Subotica before October 1992. 6045/ ISHR also has reports of prison camps at Subotica and various other sites in FRY. Those held are believed to be Muslims from Serb-held BiH and Croatia. There also appear to be non-Serbs arrested in Vojvodina among the prison population. 6046/ Another source also reports the existence of this detention facility. 6047/
3743. Zrenjanin: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one report there is a military prison in Zrenjanin. It is not clear if this refers to the same detention facility as Livade.

3744. Zrenjanin-Ečka: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). According to one source there is a civilian/military prison in Zrenjanin-Ečka.

3745. Zrenjanin Hospital: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC). The ICRC listed Zrenjanin Hospital in its report on detention facilities it visited. The hospital was visited on 25 October 1991.

5. ICRC visited camps

3746. Unidentified locations in FRY Visited by ICRC: (The existence of these detention facilities has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely ICRC). The following detention facilities were listed as having been visited by the ICRC:

(a) Derventa prison was visited on 29 April 1992;
(b) Gnjilane prison was visited on 2 December 1992;
(c) Istok prison was visited on 20 May 1993;
(d) Karaburma military hospital on 14 November 1991;
(e) Mitrovica Kosovska prison on 24 March 1992;
(f) Padinjska Skela prison on 19 June 1992;
(g) Peć district prison on 3 July 1991;
(h) Prizren district prison on 4 July 1991;
(i) Sombor district prison on 19 March 1992.

D. The Republic of Slovenia

3747. On 25 June 1991, Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. A brief military conflict between the elements of the Slovene Territorial Defence Force (TO) and the JNA ensued. After 10 days of fighting, the JNA agreed to withdraw all troops by October 1991. Reports suggest, that in those 10 days 7,900 men, including 1,000 officers, either defected or were captured by the TO.

3748. Reports suggest further that Slovenes used at least eight camps to detain captured personnel of the JNA and Yugoslav government.

3749. Dol pri Hrasniku: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, but none neutral.) Dol pri Hrasniku, a deserted mine, was allegedly used as a detention facility from 27 June 1991 to 1 July 1991. A report stated that 150 detainees were held in a room 14 metres long and six metres wide. The detention facility was controlled by members of the Ministry of the Interior and the TO. The identities of the commanders and guards were not reported.
3750. The ethnic make up of the prison population is not known, however some detainees were identified as military personnel, JNA soldiers, and officers of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Some of the prisoners were arrested in Maribor, Slovenia by the Slovenian Ministry of Interior. They were transported to the mine after being detained and interrogated in the Maribor police station.

3751. On arrival at the mine the detainees were, allegedly, met by members of the Ministry of the Interior and deprived of all their belongings. They were taken to a small room where they remained for the duration of their incarceration. The room had no toilet facilities, an inadequate water supply and only hay or concrete to sleep on. The detainees were all photographed with prison numbers and fingerprinted.

3752. The group was subjected to physical torture and threats of execution. Several times a day they were forced to stand in the heat outside and then immediately taken back to the abandoned mine where the temperature was approximately eight degrees Centigrade.

3753. Hrasnik: Hrasnik, a deserted mine in Slovenia, was a detention facility where as many as 200 people were detained in a 50 square metre room on an irregular basis. The reports were unclear as to whether this detention facility is the same as the Dol pri Hrasnik mine. Some of the prisoners were identified as military personnel. They were threatened with death if they attempted to escape. These 200 prisoners were asked to give military information concerning the JNA.

3754. Ilirska Bistrica prison camp: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the UK Defence Debriefing Team). The location of this camp is unknown, although there is some indication that it is located in Slovenia. A source reported that medical supplies were available in Ilirska Bistrica prison camp but prisoners often had to pay for them. Hepatitis, head lice, and rashes are commonplace and two people were reported to have died from illnesses.

3755. Ljubljana: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by multiple sources, including ICRC). Prisons in Ljubljana allegedly existed between the end of June and the beginning of July, 1992. Little information has been provided on these detention facilities. They were apparently controlled by members of the Ministry of the Interior and the TO. One of the detainees was detained for 36 hours in a catacomb-like room where he was physically and mentally abused. The ICRC indicated that representatives visited the prison/penitentiary on 2 July 1992 and the Clinic University on 7 July 1992.

3756. ICRC visited camps: The following information on detention sites was provided by the ICRC. No information is available other than the name of the detention site, date of the ICRC's first visit, and type of facility:

3757. Celje: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). The ICRC visited Celje on 10 July 1991, the type of facility was not determined.

3758. Dob Mirna: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). On 5 July 1991 Dob Mirna, a prison/penitentiary, was visited by ICRC.

3759. Kočevska Reka Barracks: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). Kočevska Reka barracks was visited by ICRC on 24 October 1991.
3760. **Nova Gorica Prison**: (The existence of this detention facility has been corroborated by a neutral source, namely the ICRC). Nova Gorica prison/penitentiary was visited by ICRC on 13 November 1991. 6068/

1. **Unknown**

3761. **Kozine**: (The existence of this detention facility has not been corroborated by multiple sources). The location of this detention facility was not reported. From IHRLI sources it is either in Slovenia or Vojvodina, FRY. One report indicated a Muslim male being deported to the camp of Kozine sometime between July 1992 and September 1992. The detainee claims to have been forced to sleep on the floor. The food was bad, too salty, or tasting of petrol, and insufficient. All the prisoners were repeatedly beaten on the head and back. The beatings occurred at night, usually between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.. The prisoners were also made to crawl and bite like dogs. 6069/
Notes

1/ See also Annex IX for a specific analysis on rape and sexual assault in the camps.

2/ For information on mass graves, see Annex X, on Mass Graves.


11/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-89, IHRLI Doc. No. 56603-56605. Reports indicate that in August 1992 the camp's population rose dramatically with the transfer of prisoners following the Omarska camp's closure.


15/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-2, IHRLI Doc. No. 56324-56327.

16/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-37, IHRLI Doc. No. 56440-56447.


23/ Id.


28/ Id.

29/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-37, IHRLI Doc. No. 56440-56447.

Notes (continued)


41/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-274, IHRLI Doc. No. 57219-57222.


49/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-2, IHRLI Doc. No.
Notes (continued)


51/ Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, Zagreb, to Georg Mautner-Markhof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-49196. The subject of this Note is a report established by Mr. Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo.


53/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-89, IHRLI Doc. No. 56603-56605. The subject reportedly had relatively free range of the camp.


Notes (continued)


67/ According to one report, each housing building was divided into six groups and each group went separately into the mess hall. Each building reportedly had one prisoner trustee (Poverenik) who was responsible for getting everyone out fast and for keeping order.


74/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-274, IHRLI Doc. No. 57219-57222.


79/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report, CFN 410,
Notes (continued)


81/ According to one subject, those released on that date were either born before March 1950 or after 1973. He said that the approximately 3,000 prisoners remaining included some new detainees from Kotor Varoš (approximately 50 persons). See, an official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304.


84/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-98, IHRLI Doc. No. 56632-56634.


88/ For a full description of the ICRC's activities at the Manjača camp, see paragraphs 281-287 above.


90/ This number also appears as 1,009 in other reports.


No. 9422-9427. Helsinki Watch reported that during its 13 December 1992 visit to the camp, it witnessed 500 men (319 Muslims, 180 Croatians and one German--numbers reportedly given by Serbian authorities administering the camp), being taken away from Manjača on buses marked "VRS" (Vojska Republike Srbije--Army of the Serbian Republic). Helsinki Watch reported that these men were allegedly taken for prisoner exchanges with the Bosnian and Croatian forces, and for several days their whereabouts were unknown until the ICRC announced the following week that the missing prisoners were found at a camp in Batković.


99/ See United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report on Manjača Camp", Appendix 1 to Annex D to JSIO 2841/19 (25 March 1994), IHRLI Doc. No. 63812-63813, for a list of alleged guards at the camp compiled from information available to the Debriefing Team.

100/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-243, IHRLI Doc. No. 57122-57125, refugee statement.


Notes (continued)


107/ They also noted that the difference in the manning of the two camps resulted from their locations, with Omarska being situated in the midst of a greater number of Serb villages, whereas Manjača, a large pre-war JNA training area being in an unpopulated area.


112/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-174, IHRLI Doc. No. 56877-56878. Subject was reportedly re-arrested following his release from Manjača and sent to another detention facility.

113/ When the prisoners arrived at Manjača, there were reportedly several other trailer trucks full of prisoners already there. It was reported that the bodies of 17 men who had suffocated while in transit were removed from one truck which carried men from Sanski Most.


116/ Id.


118/ Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, Croatia, Weekly Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40344, 40347.


121/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-86, IHRLI Doc.
Notes (continued)

No. 56593-56594.


123/ Witness Statement Submitted by War Crimes Investigation and Documentation, BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A1-2984A5. Identified witness, a former nurse, was reportedly held at Manjača until 15 September 1992, when the ICRC came to the camp.


131/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-37, IHRLI Doc. No. 56440-56447. Thereafter, on about 3 July, unidentified Serbs went house-to-house and took about 32 men prisoner. The men were ultimately transferred to a reported detention camp in a gymnasium in Sanski Most which already held 400 men from Sanski Most and was allegedly run by the local civilian police.


Notes (continued)


136/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56663-56666. The subject, a 30 year-old waiter from Višegrad, was interned at Omarska from 29 May to 6 August 1992.


140/ Division of Information and Research Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.

141/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-227, IHRLI Doc. No. 57068-57071. Subject is identified in the source materials.


145/ Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, Croatia, Weekly Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40344, 40347.

146/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-197, IHRLI Doc. No. 56949-56954. Subject is a BiH Muslim metal worker from Kevljani (where he had been the head of the Territorial Defence force) who was at the Omarska camp from May to 28 August 1992 when transferred to Manjača. He was held at Manjača until released on 14 November 1992 to the Karlovac Transit Centre.

147/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-2, IHRLI Doc. No. 56324-56327.

148/ Id.

149/ Id.
Notes (continued)


151/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-227, IHRLI Doc. No. 57068-57071. Subject is identified in the source materials.


156/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-233, IHRLI Doc. No. 57090-57092. Subject said that he actually saw the killing of one man and that other prisoners saw the other killings.

157/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-241, IHRLI Doc. No. 57116-57119. Subject is identified in the source material.


Notes (continued)


180/ Id.

181/ Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, Croatia, Weekly Information Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40344, 40347.
Notes (continued)


190/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849.


196/  Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, Croatia, Weekly Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40344, 40347.


199/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 92-274, IHRLI Doc. No. 57219-57222; Roy Gutman, "Prisoners of Serbia's War: Tales of Hunger,
Notes (continued)

Torture at Camp in North Bosnia", in _A Witness to Genocide_ 28 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24877-24883.


209/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 267.


217/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Summary No. 10 of Atrocity
Notes (continued)


221/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-274, IHRLI Doc. No. 57219-57222.


228/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-174, IHRLI Doc. No. 56877-56878.


Notes (continued)


238/ Id.


244/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-243, IHRLI Doc. No. 57122-57125, refugee statement.


Notes (continued)

251/ Id.


256/ Subject is described in the source material.


258/ The subject is described in the source materials.


260/ Subject is described in the source material.


264/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-274, IHRLI Doc. No. 57219-57222. The guard/commander is identified in the source materials.


266/ Subjects identified the officer in command of the buses in the source materials.

Notes (continued)


269/ Out of an estimated 1,200.


272/ He stated that he did not know the charges.


278/ ICRC lists of detention camps do not include a camp by the name of Dubička Gora.


280/ IHRLI Doc. No. 11409.


282/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11409.


Notes (continued)


286/  Subjects were reportedly six of the eight known survivors of the skirmish. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Vol II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9451-9453.


288/  The names of the three guards were Saša, Milenko and Zoran. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9452.

289/  Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9451-9453.

290/  Id.

291/  Id.

292/  Id.

293/  Id.

294/  Id.

295/  Id.


299/  After treatment, subject states that the Croatian prisoners were transferred to Stara Gradiška Prison (formerly known as Bosanska Gradiška). US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-106, IHRLI Doc. No. 56658-56660.

300/  Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56658-56660.

301/  According to the subject, this was because they were prisoners of war. Id.

302/  Id.

303/  United States Mission, Third Submission to the United Nations,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 2118, 2128-2129.

304/ Id. Four of seven survivors of the 21 August mass murder at Vlašića.

305/ Accounts describing conditions and treatment of prisoners for concurrent dates of detention at both the Banja Luka Hospital (see paragraphs 410-416 above) and the Paprikovac Optical Hospital are very similar. Furthermore, as both accounts pertain to several of the skirmish survivors, it is possible that the descriptions refer to the same hospital.


307/ Id.

308/ Id.

309/ Id. The commander is not named in the report.

310/ Id. The youth claims that he and the other prisoners were forced to drink urine each morning and evening.

311/ Id.


313/ Id.

314/ Id.


319/ Trešnjevka, "A List of Rape/Death Camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina", 28
Notes (continued)

September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 25314. A search of the available maps does not turn up a town in Banja Luka by the name of Laktaši. It is possible that the camp is located in the county of Laktaši situated on Banja Luka's north eastern border.


321/ Id.

322/ Id.

323/ Id.

324/ Id.


331/ Id.

332/ Wilbert van Hovell, Senior Legal Advisor, Special Operation in the Former Yugoslavia, letter to Professor Roman Wieruszewcki, UN Human Right Centre, 15 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11388.


Notes (continued)


343/  Agence France Presse, 20 June 1994.

344/  Id.

345/  Id.

346/  Id.

347/  Id.

348/  Id.

349/  Id.

350/  Id.


352/  Id.

353/  Id.


355/  US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No.
Notes (continued)

57180.

356/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12927.


359/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12927.


362/ Id.

363/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56544.


365/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56544.

366/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57181.

367/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56544.

368/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57129.


371/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, 3 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 33751 (reporting his name and his position as Camp Commander); US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57046 (giving his full name, with the alias, and his position as Camp Director), IHRLI Doc. No. 57132 (reporting his birth information, his height, weight, hair color, and official rank).

372/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57046.

Notes (continued)

374/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57132.

375/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57181. Born about 1936, Vasiljević was 175 centimetres tall, weighed 80 kilograms, had black hair, and always wore a JNA uniform.

376/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57038.


378/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23457.

379/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57129.


381/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57152.

382/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, 3 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 33750.

383/ United States Government, Letter to United Nations Secretary General, 26 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5848. The source claims that 120 prisoners from Čelopek joined an undetermined number of prisoners already in Zvornik courthouse. Most of these were then transferred on 15 July. Therefore, at least 60 prisoners were transferred.


385/ Id.

386/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56748.


392/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No.
57129.


396/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12928.

397/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57048.

398/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 57046.


401/ Id.

402/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12928.

403/ Id.

404/ United States Government, Letter to United Nations Secretary General, 26 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5845. The individual who witnessed this can identify the guards. In total, he witnessed 15 deaths.


407/ Id.

408/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, 3 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 33747.


Notes (continued)


418/ Id.

419/ Roy Gutman, "Nowhere Men", Newsday, 24 Jan 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 7589. JNA Colonel Petar Dmitrović was reported to be the camp Commander as early as July, 1992. It is unclear whether he was removed from command and later reinstated, or if he was always in charge and others reported to be in charge of the camp after July 1992 were just his subordinates.


423/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57161.


425/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57166.

426/ Id.

427/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12927.

428/ Id.

429/ Id.


431/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56544.

Notes (continued)

7589.

433/ Id.

434/ Id.

435/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56545.


438/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 21608.

439/ Id.

440/ Id.


444/ Id.


446/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56545.


448/ Id.


450/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 19147.

451/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 19147, 19291.


Notes (continued)

454/ Roy Gutman, "Nowhere Men", Newsday, 24 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 7589. In his article "Villagers Ease Pain in Camps" (Newsday, 24 January 1993), Gutman claims televisions were installed, indicating the availability of electricity.


457/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12927.


459/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12927.

460/ Id.

461/ Id.


463/ Id.

464/ Id.

465/ Id.

466/ The report suggests the existence of a prison: "This school should also be a 'private' prison consisting of nine prisoners." European Community Monitoring Mission, Submission to the United Nations, 12 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 19151.

467/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 19167.

468/ Id.

469/ Id.


471/ Id.

472/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56832-56835, at 56833.

473/ Id.


Notes (continued)


477/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56834, 56835.

478/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56833.

479/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56834.

480/ Id.


482/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 56833.

483/ US Department of State, Declassified Material, 3 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 33756.


495/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No.
Notes (continued)

57200.

496/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57200.


500/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Material, IHRLI Doc. No. 57200.


503/ An official UN source, Witness Statement provided by the German Organization Bureau for the Suffering/Needy Persons of Eastern Europe, IHRLI Doc. No.023684,751-2.

504/ An official UN source, Witness Statement provided by the German Organization Bureau for the Suffering/Needy Persons of Eastern Europe, IHRLI Doc. No.023684,751-2.

505/ An official UN source, Witness Statement provided by the German Organization Bureau for the Suffering/Needy Persons of Eastern Europe, IHRLI Doc. No.023684,751-2.

506/ An official UN source, Witness Statement provided by the German Organization Bureau for the Suffering/Needy Persons of Eastern Europe, IHRLI Doc. No.023684,751-2.

507/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005880,6.

508/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005880,7.

509/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88 at Doc.No.005880,7; see also IHRLI Doc.No.005887.

510/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005880,7.

511/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005880,7.

512/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005880,7.

513/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, Fax dated 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437,8.

514/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88.
Notes (continued)

515/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88.
516/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88.
517/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88.
518/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.005880-88.
519/ An official UN source.
520/ Note by the Secretary General, February 26, 1993, with Mazowiecki Report attached, IHRLI Doc. No. 035802,16; Update on ICRC Activities in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 029968,76.

521/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39, which includes a description of prisoner maltreatment at "the detention centre" in Bileća. According to one witness, 50 Muslim male prisoners were singled out for physical abuse. Each night the police would enter the camp and conduct "telephone" torture. This consisted of administering 40 volt electric shocks through telephone wires affixed to the victims' fingers. Each time the phone was dialed the prisoner received a shock.

Additionally, the witness reports that between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on 5 September 1992, police came to the jail claiming to be White Eagles and threatened to kill all of the inmates. The prisoners then boarded up the iron door to their cell in order to prevent the White Eagles from entering. Later, a Serbian guard warned the prisoners that the White Eagles were returning. The guard then threw the key to their cell into the bushes. For having helped the Muslims, the Serbian guard was beaten and held in an isolation cell with four Muslims.

Apparently, then, the White Eagles laid siege to the jail for three hours. Six prisoners were wounded by bullets. The White Eagles shot at the cell and threw tear gas into the windows.

522/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39, which includes a description of prisoner maltreatment at "the detention centre" in Bileća.

523/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39, which includes a description of prisoner maltreatment at "the detention centre" in Bileća.

524/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39.

525/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39.

526/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax dated 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437,8.
Notes (continued)

527/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057032-5; see also, United States Seventh Submission to the United Nations, April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225,39.

528/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax dated 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437,8.


530/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 056853,4.


532/ Note by the Secretary-General, February 26, 1993, with attached Mazowiecki report, IHRLI Doc. No. 035802,16.

533/ Note by the Secretary-General, February 26, 1993, with attached Mazowiecki report, IHRLI Doc. No. 035802,16.

534/ For example, a document entitled List No. 2, Municipality of Gacko, Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (Eastern Hercegovina), Issue: Ethnic Cleansing of Muslims, IHRLI Doc. No. 024001-12.


537/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

538/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

539/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

540/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

541/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

542/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.

543/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 048159.


Notes (continued)


549/ Update on ICRC Activities in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437,8.

550/ This camp may, in fact, also be the same as the camp reported at the Reserve Officers School.

551/ According to the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were 2600 prisoners in the Bileća barracks as of October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 013219,37.


553/ United Kingdom Mission To the Office of the United Nations and Other International Organisations at Geneva, Letter, 30 September 1993, and attached Defence Debriefing Team reports, IHRLI Doc. No. 043006,10,250; Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) Special Report on Prisoner of War (PW) Camps in the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)(note, the title of this British report is a misnomer in that it includes information on camps in the former Yugoslavia, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as is Bileća, rather than in the FRY exclusively), 24 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 063834.


Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


571/ There is also evidence in this report of a Stara Gradiška prison in Croatia. The geographic location of the facilities suggest that they are separated only by the Sava River. It is quite possible that the two facilities are related, i.e. co-operatively or jointly controlled.


588/ US Dept of State Unclassified Documents No.94/1-94/276, IHRLI
Notes (continued)

Doc.No. 056320-057229 at IHRLI Doc.No.056751.


Notes (continued)

607/ The Serbian shelling of the village of Čukove began on 10 June 1992 at 10 a.m. At this time, the witness and others fled to the nearby forest but were later arrested by Serbs in Radić. Croatian Information Centre, A Written Statement, November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11662-11665.


Notes (continued)


632/ Yugoslavian Daily Survey, Croats Torture Serbs In Bosanski Brod, IHRLI Doc. No. 047944.


634/ Yugoslavian Daily Survey, Croats Torture Serbs In Bosanski Brod, IHRLI Doc. No. 047944.


Notes (continued)


646/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Document 5, IHRLI Doc. No. 014208-014210.

647/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Document 5, IHRLI Doc. No. 014208-014210.


655/ Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing
Notes (continued)


661/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 014134-014136.


663/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 014194-014135.

664/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 014194-014135.


668/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 014194-014135.


Notes (continued)


674/ A UN memorandum stated that UN personnel stationed in Dvor believed that the existence of a detention camp in Bosanski Novi "is only the tip of the iceberg involving the concerted action of local Serbian authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina trying to establish a Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, free of Muslims." Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Aug. 1992) IHRLI Doc.No. 000277-000390 at Doc. No. 000354.


678/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc.No. 003267-003268 at Doc.No. 003267.


681/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, Oct. 1992, at Doc.No. 050194. According to a UN staffer stationed in the town of Dvor, near Bosanski Novi, the football field in the village of Bosanski Novi was used primarily as a "holding ground where Muslim groups are detained while their houses are being 'searched', the men isolated and transported to concentration camps." Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (Aug. 1992) IHRLI Doc.No. 000277-000390 at Doc. No. 000353.


Notes (continued)


690/ Field Notes, Helsinki Watch, Aug. 5, 1993 at Doc.No. 032327; See also Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Internal Affairs Sarajevo, Report of Crimes Committed against Humanity and the International Law and of Concentration Camps formed by the Aggressor in Bosnia and Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc.No.048204-048243 at Doc. No.048218.


Notes (continued)


711/ Among other things, they were made to cut the grass by hand.


716/ International Society for Human Rights: British Section, Human Rights and Serbia: The Situation in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serb-held area) and Croatia (Serb-held area), 29 May 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 009191-009201 at Doc. No. 009201.


Notes (continued)


733/ Also written "Kozila".


738/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Moslems, Testimony and other documents, IHRLI Doc.No. 022295 - 022316 at
Notes (continued)

Doc.No. 022308.


744/ A room which measured six by four metres.


Notes (continued)


754/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.


756/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.

757/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.

758/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.

759/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.

760/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056606-056609.

761/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056606-056609.


764/ Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.


Notes (continued)


776/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.


792/ Society for Threatened Peoples, Ethnic Cleansing Genocide for
Notes (continued)

Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 014463-014464.


800/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.

801/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.

802/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.

803/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.


806/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.

807/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.


812/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.
Notes (continued)

813/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.
814/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.
815/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.
816/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056636-056638.
826/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 057014-057020.
827/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.
828/ US Department of State, Account, IHRLI Doc. No. 056606-056609.
Notes (continued)


833/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.

834/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.

835/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.


837/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114, 009157-009159.


847/ Letter and attached report from Anne-Marie Thalman to George Mautner-Markhof, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, 19


849/ Men were either transferred to the primary school or remained at the stadium. Women, children, and the elderly were transferred to locations in Sekovici. See IHRLI Doc. No. 009763. See also World Campaign Save Humanity, Report on War Destructions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc.No.002769-002788 at Doc. No. 002786, 002788. And see Letter and attached report from Anne-Marie Thalman to George Mautner-Markhof, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 049183-049188 at Doc. No. 049187.


853/ IHRLI Doc.No.009763.

854/ IHRLI Doc.No.009763.

855/ IHRLI Doc.No.009763.


Notes (continued)


863/ Members of Arkan's and Šešelj's irregular units.


876/ World Campaign "Save Humanity", Report on On-Going on War
Notes (continued)


877/ Muharem Omerdić, Muslims in Concentration Camps, IHRLI Doc. No. 004313-004320 at Doc. No. 004316.
879/ Muharem Omerdic, Muslims in Concentration Camps, IHRLI Doc. No. 004313-004320 at Doc. No. 004316.
886/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence report, attached to letter dated 27 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 057334,69. See also, statements at IHRLI Doc. No. 057349, 55, 63 and 77.
887/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence report, attached to letter dated 27 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 057334,44,69. See also, statements at IHRLI Doc. No. 057349, 55, 63, and 77.
888/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated 27 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 057334,44.
Notes (continued)


892/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 056615-18; Danish Helsinki Commission, Interview, IHRLI Doc. No. 020974-87.


894/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033768-9 and 056927.

895/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033768-9 and 056927.

896/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033768-9 and 056927.


899/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033765.


901/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.

902/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.

903/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.

904/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.

905/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.

906/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033756.


908/ U.S. Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 034181.
Notes (continued)


913/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 057053-54. See also, U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 056616 where the militia station is described as an interrogation centre where many were killed.


917/ Also described as a granite quarry. See, U.S. U.N. Mission in Geneva, IHRLI Doc. No. 011360.

918/ U.S. Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 033760-1; U.S. Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 034181.


924/ See for example, British Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) Special Report On Camps At Brčko, 25 March 1994, attached to letter dated April 7, 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 063784.

925/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence attached to letter dated
Notes (continued)


927/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence attached to letter dated 27 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 057334,45.


931/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

932/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

933/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

934/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

935/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

936/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

937/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No.
Notes (continued)

011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

938/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

939/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,16-17; See also Witness Statement from the Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 006578,82-3.

940/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

941/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

942/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

943/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

944/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

945/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.

946/ United States Seventh Submission, April 12, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,27.


948/ United States Seventh Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 011912,41; Another witness purporting to be a former inmate of the Luka camp reported that according to other inmates as many as 1,000 killings took place there between 2 May and 22 May 1992 and that they were buried in a mass grave near the Bimex farm complex. United States Submission to the United Nations, 23 September 1992, IHRLI Doc No. 000087,91.

949/ U.S. U.N. Mission in Geneva IHRLI Doc. No. 011352-3; see also Committee for Research on Genocide and War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 00657881-3, where a witness states that of a total of 1500 prisoners in the camp, 120 were rescued and released by means of some kind of intervention or money.


Notes (continued)


964/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033777 and 056935.

965/ U.S. Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 033777 and 056935.

966/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33777, and 56935.

967/ Id.

968/ Id.

969/ Another source reported that while a prisoner at Luka he saw about 20 soldiers rape a woman in the presence of her child and other camp inmates. He also claimed that it was general knowledge that young girls were picked up daily and brought to the canteen where they were raped. The girls would then disappear. United States, Second Submission, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 112, 124. See also the description rendered above relating to to the female perpetrator and the delivery of girls to the camp commander and guards.

970/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33777, 56935.
Notes (continued)

971/  Id.


974/  The witness also reported that there were about 50 such "Specialci" at the Luka camp, that none of the conscript reservists were assigned to the camp on a permanent basis, and that the "specialci" referred to one another by nicknames.

975/  US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33782. He said that in May there were about 600 prisoners there. Men and women between the ages of 15 and 60. Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats From Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-Western Bosnia (Krajina), Report dated 5 September 1993, Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 36699, 36710; Dallas Morning News, 16 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39332A; US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56427.

976/  US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33782. He said that in May there were about 600 prisoners there; men and women between the ages of 15 and 60. Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats From Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-Western Bosnia (Krajina), Report dated 5 September 1993, Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 36699, 36710; Dallas Morning News, 16 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39332A; US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56427.

977/  US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33782. He said that in May there were about 600 prisoners there; men and women between the ages of 15 and 60. Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats From Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-Western Bosnia (Krajina), Report dated 5 September 1993, Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 36699, 36710; Dallas Morning News, 16 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39332A; US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56427.

978/  US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57044-57046.

979/  Id.

980/  Id.

981/  Id.

982/  Id.
Notes (continued)

983/ Id.

984/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57170-57172.

985/ Id.

986/ Id.

987/ Id.

988/ Id.

989/ Id.

990/ Id.

991/ Id.

992/ Id.

993/ United States Mission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11359, 11363.

994/ Id.

995/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 11347, 11357 11359-11360.

996/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34333; See also, Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 25 of Atrocity Information", IHRLI Doc. No. 43286, which includes an allegation that hundreds of prisoners from camps in Br•ko were taken to animal feed factories on the outskirts of town, killed and then processed into animal meal, put into bags and spread on the fields surrounding the city.


998/ United States Mission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11347, 11351-11352.

999/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34333.

1000/ US State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 33760, 33761; US State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 34180-34181.

1001/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57050, 57051-57052; United States, First Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 87, 91.

1002/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57063-57064.

1003/ United States Mission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11347, 11351-11352 and 11359, 11360; US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57050-57052. This may well be the same mass grave as above.

1004/ United States Mission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11359, 11363.

1005/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57059,
Notes (continued)

57170.


1007/ The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina, A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 36110, 36120.

1008/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 34165, 34166.


1010/ The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina, A staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 36110, 36120.


1013/ Id.


1015/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 33748-33751, 34167.

1016/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 34165, 34166, 33749-33751.

1017/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 34165, 34166.

1018/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57165, 57126, 57170.

1019/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57126-57132.


1022/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 34180-
Notes (continued)

34182; see also, The Riyasat of Islamic Community, September 1992, "On The Chetnik Crimes Over The Muslim Women In The Course Of Aggression In 1992 Upon The Republic Of Bosnia-Herzegovina", IHRLI Doc. No. 39440A, which alleges a concentration camp for women in Brezovo Polje where Serb forces abuse the women detained.

1023/ Muharem Omerdic, Muslims in Concentration Camps, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4313, 4318.


1031/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 33760-33761.

1032/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57126, 57151.


1034/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34333, 40237.

1035/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 40237.

1036/ An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34333, 40237.


1038/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 57334, 57368.


1040/ Id.
Notes (continued)


1042/ Id.

1043/ Tanjug, Home News, 30 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48004. A review of the documents available reflects the fact that apparently no international organization, including the ICRC, ever visited any of the alleged places of detention in Brcko. Whether or not they could have gained access if they tried is another question. One agreement on the release and transfer of prisoners included a request for clarification of Brcko as an alleged place of detention under Serbian control. The parties to that agreement met at the invitation of the ICRC. See, Agreement On The Release And Transfer Of Prisoners, Annex A3, List Of Alleged Places Of Detention According To Information Provided By The Parties During The Plenipotentiary Conference For Which Clarification Is Requested, 1 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4384, 4392.


1048/ According to the reports, the witness identified her captors as 10 men wearing fatigues with lilies on their caps.

1049/ Serbian Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11745-11845, at 11806-11807.


1051/ Inter-Agency Group of the Government of the Republic of Yugoslavia, Testimony regarding Violations of the Human Rights of Women,
Including Violence Against Them and Rape as a New Type of War Crime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, IHRLI Doc. No. 22197-22210, at 22209-22210; Serbian Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11745-11845, at 11806-11807.


1053/ Serbian Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 11745-11845, at 11806-11807.


1057/ Id.

1058/ Id.


1060/ Id.

1061/ Id.

1062/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57212.


1065/ IHRLI Doc. No. 48037.

Notes (continued)


1070/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57213.

1071/ Id.

1072/ Id.

1073/ It is unclear from the report whether the stadium referred to by this source is the same as the Iskra Stadium. Without more, it is here assumed that all reports of a stadium are referencing the detention facility at the Iskra Stadium. ECMM, "Executive Report Summary of Humanitarian Activity No. 38", 19-25 September 1993.

1074/ It is unclear from the report whether the stadium referred to by this source is the same as the Iskra Stadium. Without more, it is here assumed that all reports of a stadium are referencing the detention facility at the Iskra Stadium. ECMM, "Executive Report Summary of Humanitarian Activity No. 38", 19-25 September 1993.


1078/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57213.


1080/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57213.


1082/ Open Letter From Dragomir Djokić, Yugoslav Ambassador, U.N. Doc. S/24993, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48348; Bordellos of Screams: Confessions by The Women Raped in Muslim and Croatian Prisons, IHRLI Doc. No. 7087, 48571, 48574 (stating that approximately 150 Serbs were held there); Open Letter From Yugoslav Ambassador Dragomir Djokić to Frits Kalshoven, 27
Notes (continued)


1083/ Open Letter from Professor Biljana Plavšić, Member of Presidency, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 18675.


1086/ Open Letter from Professor Biljana Plavšić, Member of Presidency, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 18671, 18673.


1090/ IHRLI Doc. No. 48571.

1091/ According to the Director of the Kaonik prison, there are no other, smaller prisons in Busovača. This is in contrast to Zenica, where the main prison is supplemented by other detention centres.

1092/ There is apparently some disagreement as to who is responsible for this facility. The Director of the prison is critical of the HVO and it is stressed that the prison is run by the HVO and not local police officials. ECMM, Report on Inter-ethnic Violence in Vitez, Busovača, and Zenica - April 1993 (17 May 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29096.

1093/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29106-29110.

1094/ Again, the Director of the prison does not claim to be responsible for the actions of the HVO, whom he accuses of being unprofessional. The Director claims to be under the orders of brigade commanders in Busovača and Vitez. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29106-29110, 29107.

1095/ A list of the 79 Muslim prisoners is attached to the report. On 16 April 1993 there were 107 Muslim prisoners, and on 6 and 9 May 1993 there were 109 Muslim prisoners. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29106, 29111-29112.

Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 29695-29696.

1097/ ECMM, Report on Inter-ethnic Violence in Vitez, Busovac, and Zenica-April 1993 (17 May 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29107. Prison officials do not keep records of which prisoners are civilians. In addition to civilian and military prisoners (for which the prison has a capacity of about 80), approximately 40 actual criminals are jailed here.

1098/ The voluntariness or verity of these statements is disputed by the ECMM. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29110.

1099/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29108-29109.

1100/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29107.


1106/ Id.


1108/ Id.


1111/ Id.

1112/ Id.

1113/ Id.

1114/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1115/ Id.

1116/ Id.


1121/ Id.

1122/ Id.; See also United States Mission, Eighth Submission to the United Nations Security Council (16 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 23464.


1124/ Id.

1125/ Id.

1126/ Id.

1127/ Id.


1132/ Id.

1133/ Id.

Notes (continued)


1138/ Id.


1140/ Id.


1143/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34565.


Notes (continued)


1149/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34565.


1151/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34565.


1153/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 38312.

1154/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 18971.

1155/ Id.


1157/ Letter from Danielle Sremac to Mazowiecki, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11332-11334.


1163/ Letter from Yugoslavian Charge d'Affaire to the Commission of Experts, 27 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3121-3124.


1173/ Serbian Submission, 4 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5033.

1174/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34329.


1176/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 38313.

Notes (continued)

1178/ Id.
1179/ Id.


1188/ Letter from Danielle Sremac to Mazowiecki, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11332-11334.


1190/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, April-July, 1992 IHRLI Doc. No. 10348.

1191/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, April-July, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 10349.

1192/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 10348.

1193/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 10349.

1194/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 10348.


1196/ According to an ICRC report, a visit was made by ICRC representatives to a detention facility existing in Caplina [sic] on 22 November 1993. This detention facility was reportedly established in a
refugee camp. Assuming the ICRC report is in fact referring to this facility, no additional information was provided to confirm numbers of detainees in residence at this location. ICRC, "List of Detention Places Visited By ICRC in Former Yugoslavia", April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64437-64442, at 64438.

1197/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34329, 34554.

1198/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34329, 34554.

1199/ The ICRC report spelled or misspelled this municipality as "Caplina".


1203/ ICRC, "Number of Detainees visited by the ICRC during the last six weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina", 28 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29991.


1205/ Id.


1207/ Id.

1208/ Id.

1209/ In one incident which occurred on 14 August 1992, an entire family ventured out of their home to get drinking water and was shot down in front of the family's home. See Yugoslav Mission, "Life and Death Under Occupation: Documents Received by the Mission from the Occupied Territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", 4 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 48847-48919, at 48890.

1210/ Letter and Attached Documents from HQ ECMM HUM Section, To UN Committee for Human Rights Re: Possible Violations Of Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 40911-40923, at 40912.


1212/ Yugoslav Mission, "Life and Death Under Occupation: Documents Received by the Mission from the Occupied Territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", 4 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 48847-48919, at 48890.

Notes (continued)

1214/ Letter and Attached Documents from HQ ECMM HUM Section, To UN Committee for Human Rights Re: Possible Violations Of Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 40911-40923, at Doc. No. 40912.

1215/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40912-40913.

1216/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40912.

1217/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40912-40913.


1219/ Id.

1220/ Id.

1221/ Id.

1222/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 57095.

1223/ Id.

1224/ Id.

1225/ Id.


1227/ Id.

1228/ Id.

1229/ Id.


1231/ Id.

1232/ Id.

1233/ Id.

1234/ Id.

1235/ Id., at IHRLI Doc. No. 57097.

1236/ Id.

1237/ Id.

1238/ Yugoslav Mission, "Life and Death Under Occupation: Documents Received by the Mission from the Occupied Territories of the Republic of
Notes (continued)


1239/ Reportedly the water was freezing. Air temperature was around zero degrees celsius. Id.

1240/ Id.


1242/ The year was not provided.

1243/ European Community Monitoring Mission, "Humanitarian Activity Report No. 37", 12-18 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 38332-38359, at 38344. A finding of no war prisoners at this location on this date, is, unfortunately, not dispositive as to the existence of a concentration camp. It has been suggested in other locations that the continued existence of such facilities is directly related to the likelihood of inspection of these facilities by international or humanitarian agencies. See camp Kozile in the section on Bosanski Petrovac.

1244/ Year was not provided.

1245/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 38300-38330 at Doc. No. 38329.

1246/ Id.


1248/ Id.

1249/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 42865-42866.

1250/ Id.

1251/ Id, IHRLI Doc. No. 42867.

1252/ Id.


1255/ Id.

1256/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1257/ Id.
1258/ Id.
1259/ Id.
1260/ Id.
1261/ Id.
1265/ Id.
1268/ Id.
1269/ Id.
1272/ A number of the former detainees of Trnopolje had previously been interned at Omarska. Staff Report to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Hercegovina", August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 36121.


1281/ "Rape After Rape After Rape", New York Times, 13 December 1992, §4, at 17, IHRLI Doc. No. 35582-35584. According to one account, the people of 18 villages around Bosanski Novi were expelled from their homes. The men were taken to the Bosanski Novi Stadium and the women and children were detained in Doboj. Bosnia-Hercegovina Testimonies, Batch 1, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32011.


1284/ Interview Notes, 13 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39240.

1285/ Id.

1286/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 39242A.

1287/ Id.

1288/ Id.

1289/ Id.

1290/ Id.

1291/ Id.


1294/ Id.

1295/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1296/ Id.
1297/ Id.
1298/ Id.
1301/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9508-9509.
1302/ Id.
1303/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9509-9510.
1304/ Interview Notes, 9 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. 39242A-39243A.
1305/ Id.
1306/ Id.
1308/ Interview Notes, 9 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. 39242A-39243A.
1311/ Id.
1312/ Id.
1317/ Id.
1318/ Jeri Laber, "Bosnia: Questions About Rape", *The New York Review of
Notes (continued)


1319/ Id.
1327/ Id.
1328/ Id.
1329/ Id.
1330/ Id.
1331/ Id.
1332/ Id.
1333/ Id.
1336/ Id.
1337/ Id.
1338/ Id.
Notes (continued)


1340/ Id.

1341/ Id.


1347/ BiH, State Commission For Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Bulletin (February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 13312; Society for Treated Peoples, Ethnic Cleansing Genocide for Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 14422, 14482. At least one detainee was held in this location from July-August 1992 where he was then transferred to detention facility in a disco bar in Vila. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23690-23691.


1351/ Interview Notes, 13 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39240A.

1352/ Id.

1353/ Id.

1354/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23690-23691 (stating that the detainee giving the account was arrested and held here from May to July, 1992).

1355/ Canadian Mission, Submission to the United Nations, 30 June 1993,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 26661-26662.

1356/ Id.

1357/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23690-23691. About 60 per cent of the prisoners were treated in this manner. Canadian Mission, Submission to the United Nations, 30 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 26661-26662.

1358/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23690-23691.


1361/ Id.

1362/ Id.

1363/ Id.

1364/ Id.

1365/ Id.


1367/ Id.

1368/ Id.

1369/ Id.

1370/ Id.


1372/ US Department of State, Declassified Documents, 10 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 56398, 56401.


1374/ Id.


1376/ "Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats From Northern Bosnia and North-western Bosnia", 5 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36699, 36709; Muharem Omerdi*, Muslims in Concentration Camps,
Notes (continued)


1378/ Id.


1381/ Id.


1383/ US State Department Documents, Declassified Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 56471.

1384/ Id.

1385/ Id.

1386/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56472.

1387/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56471.

1388/ Id.

1389/ Id.

1390/ Id.

1391/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56764.

1392/ Id.; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183.

1393/ US State Department, Declassified Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 56764.

Notes (continued)

Doc. No. 16822.

1395/ US State Department, Declassified Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 56764.
1396/ Id.
1397/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56764-56765.
1398/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56765.
1400/ Physician's Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 39484.

1404/ Id. Additionally, Sarajevo Radio-Bosnia-Herzegovina Network reported that the Republic of BiH Ministry of Internal Affairs was privy to a conversation between Radovan Karad•i• and other high ranking Bosnian Serb officials about responsibility for war crimes in which Karad•i• declared that three identified individuals would have to be held out as responsible for the events in Fo•a, IHRLI Doc. No. 19891-19894; see also, US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56595, 56598.

1405/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56775-56780; Roy Gutman, Newsday, 19 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 16904.
1406/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56520, 62782.
1407/ Id.
1408/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 62782.
Notes (continued)

1409/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 62782-62783.


1411/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56775-56780.


1413/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56775-56780.

1414/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56781-56788, the description of KP Dom, its procedures and history is provided in large part by the information collected by the State Department from a 54 year-old Bosnian Muslim businessman from Sarajevo who was detained by mobilized Bosnian Serbs in Poča where he had extensive contacts in the community. He was put under house arrest from 8 April to 19 May 1992 and held in the prison from 19 May to 13 October 1992. British Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) "Special Report on Poča Camp", 25 March 1994, attached to letter dated 7 April 1994 reports Poča men's prison being used as a Serb prison for Muslims.


1416/ Apparently cats inadvertently triggered a number of the mines at some point during the year. This caused a startling explosion, prompting the above explanation by the guards to the prisoners. US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62778.

1417/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56781, 56783.

1418/ Id.


1421/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56781, 56784; see also, Bosnia Action Committee, Women's Section, IHRLI Doc. No. 9763.


1423/ Id.

1424/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1425/ Id.
1426/ Id.
1427/ Id.
1428/ Id.
1429/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9534-9535.
1430/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62778. Another source declares that many Muslims were murdered daily at the Foča House of Correction, Bosnia Action Committee, Women's Section, IHRLI Doc. No. 9763.
1431/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62778, 62781.
1432/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 62778.
1434/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 11912, 11928.
1435/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62778-62779.
1438/ Allegations to the attention of Professor Frits Kalshoven, Geneva, 5 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 4907.
1439/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62835-62837, 56448-56450.
1440/ Id. Although the individual reports this as a former juvenile correctional facility it seems that it is probably the KP Dom as described above.
1441/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 62780.
1442/ US Department of State, witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 57194.
1444/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12940, 12941.
1445/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1446/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, "Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia", IHRLI Doc. No. 9114, 9163; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12940, 12941.

1447/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, "Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia", IHRLI Doc. No. 9114, 9163; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12940, 12941.

1448/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information, Ministry of Health, Testimony SIL-420, IHRLI Doc. No. 39574A-39575A.


1450/ Id.


1454/ Id.

1455/ Id.


1458/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12940, 12941.

1459/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 18936, 18955.

1460/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1461/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1462/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1463/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1464/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-
Notes (continued)

57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1465/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550.

1466/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc. No. 57191-57196, 57188-57190; see also, Tom Post, "A Pattern of Rape", Newsweek, 4 January 1993, at 33, IHRLI Doc. No. 8549, 8550. Another report states that Muslim children have been born into captivity and retained for up to five months in a camp for women in Foča, Bosnia Action Committee, Women's Section, IHRLI Doc. No. 9772.


1468/ Minnesota Advocates, August 1992 to June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35623.

1470/ US Department of State, Witness Statements, IHRLI Doc No. 56905, 56906, 56775, 56777.

1471/ US Department of State, Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56906.

1472/ US Department of State, Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 56775, 56777.

1473/ Id.


1475/ US Department of State, witness statements, IHRLI Doc No 56775, 56777; Minnesota Advocates, August 1992 to June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35621.

1476/ Minnesota Advocates, August 1992 to June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35623.

1477/ BH Testimonies/FNo.3 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 29204; BH Testimonies/FNo.1, IHRLI Doc. No. 32102.


1479/ See, e.g., BiH Committee for the Protection of Human Freedoms and Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 26698, 26699.

1480/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information, Ministry of Health, Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 4622.

1481/ BH Testimonies/E 1992, IHRLI Doc No. 30207-30208, 30170-30171;
Notes (continued)

Bassiouni Interviews, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 15568-15569; see also BH Testimonies/FNo.3 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35685.


1484/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information, Ministry of Health, Testimony, 7 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 4642. One report states that a camp for women in Miljevina holds only girls of 14 or younger for any length of time. Older females, it seems, are raped and not held. Bosnia Action Committee, Women's Section, IHRLI Doc. No. 9773.

1485/ BBC Monitoring Unit transcript attached to letter dated 13 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 19884, 19902. See also BiH State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Bulletin No. 3 (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29841, 29853

1486/ BBC Monitoring Unit transcript attached to letter dated 13 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 19884, 19902. This may well refer to the KP Dom. For example, see Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior, report dated 19 October 1992, which practically mirrors the above description of a juvenile prison but refers to the Foča penitentiary, IHRLI Doc. No. 30258, 30261. However other sources report activity at such a place. For example, one source reported that in a home for young criminals he saw eight young men who had been thrown into quicklime, Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) "Special Report on Foča Camp", 25 March 1994, attached to letter dated 7 April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63784, 63824.


1488/ Id.

1489/ Id.


1493/ Robert Fisk, "The Rapes Went On Day and Night", The Independent, 8 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43916; see IHRLI Doc. No. 24001 for list of prisoners that were taken from Gacko to a camp in Bileca.

1494/ List of Prisoners, IHRLI Doc. No. 24001.

Notes (continued)

1496/ Id.


1498/ Id. This witness identified a Serbian individual as the head of a Serbian organization dedicated to ethnic cleansing. It is unclear from the report whether this man or organization was involved in the imprisonment of Muslim and Croatian prisoners.


1504/ Id.

1505/ Id.

1506/ Id.

1507/ Id.

1508/ Id.

1509/ Id.

1510/ Marlene A. Young Ph.D., J.D., Executive Director of the National Organization for Victim Assistance, "Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia", IHRLI Doc. No. 9123.

1511/ Id.

1512/ Id.

1513/ Id.

1514/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1515/ Id.
1516/ Id.


1518/ Id.
1519/ Id.
1520/ Id.

1521/ US Department of State, Unclassified Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 56320-56612, at 56509.

1522/ US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56509.
1523/ Id.


1525/ Witness Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 23968.
1526/ Witness Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 23977.
1527/ Id.
1528/ Id.

1529/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 23984. The description of the prison is consistent with the description of the prison located in the basement of the Samacki Hotel.

1530/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 23984.
1531/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 23981.
1533/ Id.
1535/ Id.
1536/ Id.
1537/ Id.
1538/ Id.
1539/ ECMM, Witness Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 23973.
Notes (continued)

1540/  Id.
1541/  Id.
1542/  Id.
1543/  US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56509.
1544/  Id.
1545/  Id.
1547/  US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56509. See victim list.
1555/  Id.
1557/  Id.
1559/  Id.
Notes (continued)

1560/ Id.
1561/ Id.
1562/ Id.


1564/ ECMM, IHRLI Doc. No. 23987. Another report stated that the hotel was located five to six kilometres from Gacko. See ECMM, Dubrovnik IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.

1565/ ECMM, IHRLI Doc. No. 23987
1566/ Id.; see also ECMM, Dubrovnik IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.

1567/ ECMM, IHRLI Doc. No. 23987. A man identified as Sutko Osmanagić was burned alive in the parking lot of the hotel. One report stated that the Gacko Prison was located in the basement of the Hotel Rudnik and the Gacko Power Plant, see ECMM Dubrovnik, IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.

1568/ ECMM Dubrovnik, IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.
1569/ Id.
1570/ Id.
1571/ Id.
1572/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 24017.
1573/ Id.
1574/ Id.
1575/ Id.
1576/ Id. Ten of the men were reportedly killed in the Gacko prison. The remaining male prisoners were transferred to a prison in Bileća, 30 kilometres away from Gacko.

1577/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23762.
1578/ Id. The witness reported being able to identify the perpetrator as Montenegrin by his accent.

1579/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23763.
1580/ Id.
1581/ Id.

Notes (continued)

No. 11886. The report provides no identifying characteristics concerning the hotel, it is referred to as "the city's hotel".

1583/ Id.
1584/ Id.
1585/ Id.
1586/ Id.
1587/ Id.
1588/ Id., IHRLI Doc. 11887.
1589/ Id.
1590/ Id.
1591/ ECMM Dubrovnik, IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.
1593/ Id.
1594/ ECMM Dubrovnik, IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.
1595/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 24014.
1596/ Id.
1597/ Id.
1598/ Id.
1599/ All individuals were named in the source materials. Id.
1600/ Id.
1601/ Id.
1602/ Id. The witness reported that it was alleged that those who were killed were thrown into an unmarked mass grave which was covered by an excavator somewhere behind the partisan cemetery in Gacko.
1603/ Id.
1604/ Id.
1605/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23989.
1606/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 024013.
1607/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 24013.
Notes (continued)

1609/ Id.
1610/ Id.
1611/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 4319.
1620/ Id.
1621/ Id.
Notes (continued)


1624/ Id.


1627/ Id.


1629/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax of 27 May 1994.

1630/ Id.


1632/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23684, 23698.

1633/ Id.

1634/ Id.


1636/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23684, 23698.


1639/ Serbian Submission, 4 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5049-5053.


1644/ British Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Report", IHRLI Doc. No. 43006, 43287; Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report On Sexual
Notes (continued)


1645/ Croatian Mission, Letter to UN Security Council from the Permanent Representative to the UN, 23 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36655-36660, 36659.

1646/ Letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 42820-42856, at 42855.

1647/ Id.


1649/ Id.


1651/ This report suggests that the museum is located in the village of Doljani, just outside of Jablanica. Id.

1652/ Letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 42820-42856, at 42855.

1653/ Id.

1654/ Id.

1655/ Up to and including the date of the report which is 3 August 1993.


1657/ This was suggested in several reports, but is as yet unconfirmed. See also ECMM, "Killed People and Detained Civilians from Doljani", IHRLI Doc. No. 40886-40910, at 40890.

1658/ It is quite possible that this report refers to the detention facility at the museum in Jablanica/Doljani. Another report referred to the museum facility as a prison. Compare Letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, 14 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 42820-42856, at 42855.


1661/ They were later all found dead, suggesting summary executions.

1662/ Helsinki Watch, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Abuses by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and South-western Bosnia-Herzegovina (September


1669/ Yugoslavian Mission, Letter and attached report from Pavicivic to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts, No. 627/1, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-28546, at 28546, 28672-28675. See also UN Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 8 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 12606-12629.


Notes (continued)

1675/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5513-5525, at 5523.

1676/ It is reported elsewhere that the youngest victim was 13, Report by Mr. Grebo to Mr. Mazowiecki's attention, Centre for Human Rights, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-49193, at 49189.

1677/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5513-5525, at 5523.

1678/ The woman's name and ethnicity were not given.


1680/ Id.

1681/ Id.


1683/ This camp is also reported in the Grebo Report 19 November 1992, Letter from Anne-Marie Thalman, Civil Affairs Zagreb, IHRLI Doc. No. 5492-5496, at 5494.

1684/ The woman's name is on record with IHRLI.

1685/ The year was not specified.

1686/ World Campaign "Save Humanity", "Report on War Destructions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina", IHRLI Doc. No. 2769-2790, at 2789.

1687/ Id.

1688/ The following information is reported in a report by Mr. Zdravko Grebo to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-49193, at 49189.

1689/ This report also mentions the 40 women and girls held in Caparde discussed above. It is unclear whether the people who were released after two days of torture and the 40 women and girls were held in the same place. Id.


1691/ Testimony of Social Care Worker from Kalinovik, IHRLI Doc. No. 29276; Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 35686

1692/ Testimony of Social Care Worker from Kalinovik IHRLI Doc. No. 29278.

1693/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29276.
Notes (continued)

1694/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 35686.

1695/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 35686. The former prisoner reported that he was held at the home of a Muslim named Gojko Janković.

1696/ Testimony of Social Care Worker from Kalinovik, IHRLI Doc. No. 29276.

1697/ Id.

1698/ Letter to the Bureau of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina from Social Worker at "Suhodol" War Hospital, No. 01/1992, 23 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39463A.

1699/ Testimony of Social Care Worker from Kalinovik IHRLI Doc. No. 29276.

1700/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 35686.

1701/ Witness Statement, 1 April 1993, Sarajevo Psychiatric Clinic, IHRLI Doc. 35686.

1702/ Id.

1703/ Id.

1704/ Id.

1705/ Id.


1707/ Id.

1708/ Id.

1709/ Witness Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 30194-30195.

1710/ Id.

1711/ Id.


1714/ Id.

1715/ Id.; Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 39462A.

1716/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 39461 (providing list of victim
Notes (continued)

names and dates of birth); Letter from social worker, IHRLI Doc. No. 29277.

1717/ Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 39461 (providing list of victim names and dates of birth); Letter from social worker, IHRLI Doc. No. 29277.


1723/ Id.

1724/ Id.

1725/ Id.

1726/ Id.

1727/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 43916.

1728/ Id.

1729/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 43917.

1730/ Id.

1731/ Id.

1732/ Id.

1733/ Id.

1734/ Id. Many of the raped Gacko women, many of whom were interviewed when The Independent revealed the existence of the Kalinovik rape camp, were reportedly trapped in the besieged Muslim sectors of Mostar and Jablanica. The Independent, 18 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29656.

1735/ Robert Fisk, "The Rapes Went on Day and Night", The Independent, 8 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43916. A health care provider from Gacko who assisted in several abortions on survivors, reportedly compiled a list on names and ages of all raped women along with the identities of five girls
Notes (continued)

taken by Serbian soldiers and forced to work as prostitutes. The girls were never seen again. Many of the women who survived the Kalinovik camp are living in villages in the area. These women recorded the names of young men who were brutally murdered by Serbian soldiers in their presence and the names of 71 women from a neighbouring village who were machine-gunned to death.

1736/ Id.
1737/ Id.
1741/ Id.
1742/ Id.
1743/ The year is not specified.
1744/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34325-34363, at 34329.
1748/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29679.
1749/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 29679.
1751/ Id.
1752/ Id.
1753/ Id.
1756/ Four thousand prisoners were reported to have come from Kljuć to
Notes (continued)


1757/ This camp appears on a list of detention facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ICRC is listed as the source of information pertaining to this particular camp, Julio A. Baez, Secretary of the UN Commission of Experts, Places of Detention, 21 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 16823; ICRC, "Agreement on the Release and Transfer of Prisoners", 1 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4392.


1762/ Velagići is located about five kilometres north-west of Ključ. Before the war, its ethnic composition was 75 per cent Muslim, 24 per cent Serb, and 1 per cent Croatian. It was considered one of the wealthiest suburbs in the district of Ključ. US State Department, "Subject: the Siege of Sanica Donja", 15 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56444.

1763/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56444-56447.

1764/ The 6th Krajina Brigade is reported to be a paramilitary formation made up of current and former JNA soldiers. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56444.

1765/ The witness was kept at Stara Gradiška from late May until mid-June when he was transferred to another location. He remained at the next facility until mid-December 1992. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56447.

1766/ The witness learned this from a woman refugee at a refugee camp in Karlovac, Croatia. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56445.


1769/ Id.

1770/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9450.
Notes (continued)

1771/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56440-56447.

1772/ The arresting forces were believed to be from the Sixth Krajina Brigade headquartered at Palanka. They were dressed in regular JNA uniforms. On their uniform shoulder and hat, they wore the Yugoslav flag. On the pocket, they wore a red ribbon. See Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56440-56441.

1773/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56442.

1774/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56442.

1775/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56441.


1777/ Id.


1779/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina/Association of Serbs from Konjic, "A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area", IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-7062, at 7032-7035.

1780/ Id.

1781/ Id.

1782/ Id.

1783/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Submission to UN Centre for Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 40214-40220, at 40216.

1784/ Id.

1785/ Id.


1788/ US Dept of State, Unclassified Documents, 27 January 1994, IHRLI
Notes (continued)


1790/ Helsinki Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases for War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, volume 5, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc.No. 29358-29383, at 29379.


1792/ Id. An aid station was located inside of Hangar Number 22 and across from the camp Command. Serbian physicians who were arrested were confined here and made to work. The most serious cases were brought to the aid station but it was generally ill-equipped to facilitate any serious treatment efforts. There were fewer than 10 beds in the aid station and only a few syringes and medicinal powders. Operations at the aid station were suspended in September 1992. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 46152.


1794/ Detainees were brought to Čelebići from several areas including the region of Klis, the Neretva Valley, Village Trusina, village Sutlić, village Bušćak, village Mrkosovice-Luksije, village Orlište, village Jasenik, village Slavkovići, Dobričevići, Bare, Prijeslop, Solakova Kula, Goransko Polje i Gorani, village Budišnjaka Ravan; village Džepi, village Sitnik, village Vrdolje, Kanjina, Donje Selo, Bjelovčina, village Blace, village Bijejela, village Borci, village Čičevi, village Kula, and village Česim.

1795/ Letter and attached report from President of Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to Director General of UN, 21 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 10333-10342, at 10335.

Notes (continued)

1797/ Testimonies, "Various violations of Human Rights Against Serbs in the Former Bosnia and Herzegovina", IHRLI Doc. No. 11592-11599.


1799/ Id.

1800/ Id.


1802/ Id.

1803/ Id.


1805/ Id.


1807/ In one report, after two and a half months in Number 9, 15 Serbs were transferred to Number 6. They found 220 other Serbs there who had previously suffered the torture of Number 9. Serbian Council Information Centre, "Moslem Camps in Konjic Municipality: Čelebići, Sport Hall-Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo, No. 3", 21 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 46157.

1808/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 46134-46175.

1809/ The building which housed "the Command" was also the site of the camp guards dormitories. Id.

1810/ Id.


1812/ Id.


1815/ Yugoslav Mission, Letter and attached report to the Chairman of
the Commission of Experts, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-28568, at 28532, 28568.


1818/ This perpetrator was reportedly the owner of a small shop in which he, before the war, sold green coloured berets, the moon-and-star badges, and emblems of the "Patriotic League" (Muslim illegal military organization). "č" was reportedly a member of the "green beret" - Bosnian Muslim Militia. Yugoslav Mission, Letter and attached report to Chairman of Commission of Experts, 27 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3103-3129, at 3128.

1819/ Helsinki Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases for War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, volume 5, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29358-29383, at 29379.


1821/ Id.

1822/ She recalled that a young girl was also detained in the same facility for 77 days. She also noted that she was detained alone for three days and was then joined by four women from Bradina who remained there for 19 days. UNPROFOR/ECMM/Yugo, Canada, Denmark Submissions/BiH State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, IHRLI Doc. No. 29494-30130, at 29654-29655.

1823/ Id.

1824/ Id.

1825/ Id.

1826/ Id.

1827/ Id.

1828/ According to the report, the witness was released on 31 August 1992 and returned to Donje Selo. Id.

1829/ Id.

1830/ "š" was described as "a short youth about 20 years old with only one strip of hair on his head". Serbian Council Information Centre, "Moslem camps in Konjic Municipality: Celebici, Sport Hall-Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo, Dossier No.3", IHRLI Doc. No. 46134-46175, at 46164.

Notes (continued)

1832/  Id.


1834/  Id.

1835/  Id.

1836/  Id.


1838/  Id.


1840/  Id.

1841/  Id.


1843/  The witness refers here to a specific victim who was killed in this manner. Serbian Council Information Centre, "Moslem Camps in Konjic Municipality: Ćelebići, Sport Hall-Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo, No. 3", 21 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 46152.


1847/  UN Security Council, Letter and attached Report Dated 5 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of the US to the UN Addressed to the Secretary General, IHRLI Doc. No. 2118-2121, at 2121.


1849/  Serbian Council Information Centre, "Documentation Regarding the Violation of Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, Crimes and Violence by Croatian and Moslem armed formations against the Serbian Civilian Population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dossier No.3", 21 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 46134-46175, at
46166.

1850/ Letter and attached report from President of Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to Director General of UN, 21 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7044.


1853/ Id.

1854/ Id.

1855/ Id.

1856/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 46153.

1857/ Id. IHRLI Doc. No. 46153.

1858/ Id.

1859/ Id.

1860/ Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Republic of Srpska, IHRLI Doc. No. 18673; Republic Srpska Statement Regarding Third Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 11532.

1861/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina\Association of Serbs from Konjic, "A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area", IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-7062, at 7040.


1864/ UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 8 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 12606-12644, at 12642.


1867/ A 34 year-old from Trnovo was identified as the camp commander at this facility. US Department of State, Unclassified Documents, 27 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 57223-57225, at 57225.
Notes (continued)


1869/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 12606-12644, at 12642.


1872/ Id.


1877/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina\Association of Serbs from Konjic, "A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area", IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-7062, at 7032.


Notes (continued)


1889/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5856-5870, at 5866.

1890/ Id.

1891/ Id.

1892/ Id.

1893/ Id.

1894/ Id.

1895/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 5866, 5869.

1896/ According to one report, the hotel Famos is located in Igman. Serbian Council Information Centre, "Moslem Camps in Konjic Municipality: Čelebići, Sport Hall-Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo, No. 3", 21 April 1993,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 46134-46175, at 46164. Cf. the section of this annex on Sarajevo.

1897/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5856-5870, at 5866-5867.

1898/ Id.

1899/ Id.


1901/ Id.

1902/ Id.

1903/ Id.

1904/ The exact location of this prison facility is unclear. The possibility exists that this facility is actually located in the county of Hadzici in the Sarajevo area.

The ICRC reported visiting two prisons/penitentiaries that were places of detention in the Konjic area. Their report was, however, silent as to the identity of the facility as well as to the party or parties in control. Reportedly they visited the first location on 14 August 1992 and the second on 4 May 1993. No additional information was provided regarding these two locations. See ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by the ICRC in former Yugoslavia, 25 June 1991 - 30 April 1993, IHRLI Doc.No.064439.

1905/ Letter and attached report from President of Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to Director General of UN, 21 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 10333-10342, at 10338.

1906/ A report says that about 50 Serbian women were held, Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Republic of Srpska, IHRLI Doc. No. 18673, 18676; Letter to Frits Kalshoven from Dr. Pavicevic, Deputy Head of Delegation of FR Yugoslavia to the I.C.F.Y. and Ambassador, Charge d'Affaires a.i., IHRLI Doc. No. 28663; Republic Srpska Statement Regarding Third Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 11532.

1907/ Letter and attached report from President of Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to Director General of UN, 21 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 10333-10342, at 10338.

1908/ The exact location of this village has not been established. Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina\Association of Serbs from Konjic, "A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area", IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-7062, at 7047.


Notes (continued)


1913/ The ICRC reported visiting two prisons/penitentiaries that were places of detention in the Konjic area. Their report was, however, silent as to the identity of the facility as well as the party or parties in control. Reportedly they visited the first location on 14 August 1992 and the second on 4 May 1993. No additional information was provided regarding these two locations. See ICRC, "List of Detention Places Visited by the ICRC in former Yugoslavia, 25 June 1991 - 30 April 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 64439.


1915/ Id.

1916/ The ICRC reported visiting two prisons/penitentiaries that were places of detention in the Konjic area. Their report was, however, silent as to the identity of the facility as well as the party or parties in control. Reportedly they visited the first location on 14 August 1992 and the second on 4 May 1993. No additional information was provided regarding these two locations. See ICRC, "List of Detention Places Visited by the ICRC in former Yugoslavia, 25 June 1991 - 30 April 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 64439.


1918/ Id.

1919/ Id.

1920/ Id.


1922/ Id.

1923/ Id.

1924/ Id.

1925/ Id.

1926/ Among them were 20 soldiers from BiH Army and five members of the Mujahedeen.

1927/ Letter and attached report dated 14 September 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, IHRLI Doc. No. 42820-42851, at 42835.

1928/ Id.
Notes (continued)


1930/ ECMM, Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 40837-41555, at 41225.

1931/ Id.


1934/ Letter from Member of the Republic of Srpska, IHRLI Doc. No. 18673; Republic Srpska Statement Regarding Third Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 11532.


1936/ Id.

1937/ Id.


1939/ Id.

1940/ Id.

1941/ UN Security Council, Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the Deputy Representative of the US to the UN Addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 3160-3167, at 3166.

1942/ UN Security Council, Letter dated 5 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, IHRLI Doc. No. 1326-1329, at 1329.

1943/ UN Security Council, Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the Deputy Representative of the US to the UN Addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 3160-3167, at 3166.

1944/ While several reports referenced the camp at the Kotor Varoš Prison, specific information regarding its operation and control was not made available. Tilman Zulch, Ethnic Cleansing: Genocide for Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 14422-14502, at 14481.

1945/ While several reports referenced the camp at Pilana, specific information regarding its operation and control was not made available. This facility may have been a saw mill. Id.

1946/ While several reports referenced the camp at the Maslovare camp, specific information regarding its operation and control was not made available. Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Moslems, "Testimony and other documents", IHRLI Doc. No. 22261-22361, at 22336.
Notes (continued)

1947/ UN Security Council, Letter and attached report dated 7 December 1992 from the Deputy Representative of the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, IHRLI Doc. No. 3160-3177, at 3173.

1948/ Id.
1949/ Id.
1950/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 3166.
1951/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 3173.
1952/ Id.
1953/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 3174.
1954/ Id.
1955/ Id.
1956/ Id.
1957/ Id.
1958/ Id.
1959/ Marlene Young, Ph.D., "Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in The Former Yugoslavia", IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-35602, at 35600.

1960/ Id.
1961/ Id.
1962/ Id.
1963/ Id.
1964/ Id.
1965/ Id.


1967/ Id.
1968/ Id.
1969/ Id.
1970/ Id.
1972/ Id.
Notes (continued)

1973/ While several reports referenced the camp at the police station, specific information regarding its operation and control was not made available. Tilman Zulch, Ethnic Cleansing: Genocide for Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 14422-14502, at 14481.

1974/ Letter dated 5 November 1992 from the Permanent Representative of France to the UN addressed to the President of the Security Council, IHRLI Doc. No. 1326-1329, at 1329.


1976/ Id.


1978/ The other two included the Sawmill (Lumber mill) and the Old Court Building. All three were reportedly quickly filled with prisoners when created. The source lists the names of those interned at these facilities as Croats and Muslims. International Peace Centre, Commission For Human Rights, IHRLI Doc. No. 22091-22147, at 22103.


1980/ Id.

1981/ Id.

1982/ Id.

1983/ Id.

1984/ Id.

1985/ Id.

1986/ See generally Annex IX, Rape And Sexual Assault.


1988/ Id., at Doc. No. 14481.

1989/ Id.

1990/ Id.


Notes (continued)


2000/ An official UN source, "Re: Information gathered from the Croatian weekly Globus", IHRLI Doc. No. 11388.

2001/ The report listed this location as lying in the county of Banja Luka. Because of the proximity of Banja Luka and Laktaši counties, it is believed that the county designation was, understandably, reported in error. See Trešnjevka, "A List of Rape/Death Camps", 28 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 25311-39311A, at 25314.

2002/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 25311.


2005/ Letter and attached documents dated 18 December 1992 from the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 48328-48347, at 48346.

2006/ The victim/witness alleges that she was raped by her former classmate. He was a member of Alija's Warriors. She reportedly spent more than five months in the bordellos of the Alija's units. See "Bordellos of Screams: Confessions by the women raped in Moslem and Croatian Prisons", IHRLI Doc. No. 7063-7071, at 7071.

2007/ Letter and attached documents dated 18 December 1992 from the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 48328-48347, at 48346.

2008/ Id.

2009/ US State Department, Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 9039-9072, at 9047.
Notes (continued)

2010/ Id.


2013/ Id.

2014/ Id.


2018/ Id.


2022/ Id.


2025/ It is reported that a total of 367 people are "assigned to residence" in de facto detention in the village of Livno and Raščani; Another ICRC report says that 80 people were held "in assigned residence" in Livno. "Update on ICRC Activities in the Former Yugoslavia", IHRLI Doc. No. 17843. Another report says that 79 were "in assigned residence" in Livno as of 6 May 1993. ICRC Camp List from Philippe Miserez, 19 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 16829. It was reported that 120 were under "house arrest" as of 23 November 1991. ICRC report by Cornelio Sommaruga, 3 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 12726.


2027/ Id.
Notes (continued)

2028/ Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Republic of Srpska, 30 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 18671, 11530.

2029/ Official Memo, Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs, 10/05/92, IHRLI Doc. No. 6926, 22227.

2030/ There are several reports of detainees interned at the Čelebići location. It is, however, unclear if the reports are referring to the camp Čelebići in the municipality of Konjic or if they refer to a location in the city of Čelebići, just outside of Livno.

2031/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 29751-29754, at Doc. No. 29752.


2049/ Id.

2050/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, April-July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 10349.


2059/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 38300, 38319-38320.

2060/ Id.
Notes (continued)


2063/ Id.

2064/ Id.

2065/ Id.

2066/ Id.


2068/ Id.

2069/ Id.

2070/ Id.

2071/ Id.


2078/ Id., at 304, IHRLI Doc. No. 9600.

2079/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9601.

2080/ Id.

2081/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9600.

2082/ Id., at 313, IHRLI Doc. No. 9609.

2083/ Id., at 312, IHRLI Doc. No. 9608.

2084/ Id. at 304, IHRLI Doc. No. 9601.
2085/ Id. at 305-306, IHRLI Doc. No. 9601-9602.

2086/ Id. at 311, IHRLI Doc. No. 9607.

2087/ Id., at 312, IHRLI Doc. No. 9608. It should be noted that 30 men in each of two rooms is only living quarters for 60 men which is inconsistent with reports that at one point more than 300 men were detained at this prison.

2088/ Id., at 308, 310, IHRLI Doc. No. 9604, 9606.

2089/ Id., at 311, IHRLI Doc. No. 9607.

2090/ Id., at 310, IHRLI Doc. No. 9606.

2091/ Id., at 313, IHRLI Doc. No. 9609.

2092/ Id., at 306, IHRLI Doc. No. 9602.

2093/ Id., at 304, IHRLI Doc. No. 9601.

2094/ Id., at 310, IHRLI Doc. No. 9606.


2096/ Id., at 313, IHRLI Doc. No. 9609.

2097/ Id., at 311, IHRLI Doc. No. 9607.

2098/ Id., at 309, IHRLI Doc. No. 9605.

2099/ Id., at 304, IHRLI Doc. No. 9600.

2100/ Id., at 308, IHRLI Doc. No. 9604.

2101/ Helsinki Watch was been unable to confirm that the secret police conducted extensive background checks into each of the guards with a criminal record. Id., at 306 n.25, IHRLI Doc. No. 9602.

2102/ Id., at 308, 310, IHRLI Doc. No. 9604, 9606.

2103/ Id. at 334, IHRLI Doc. No. 9630.

2104/ In testimony given to Helsinki Watch representatives, Milan states that the faces of the guards who beat the prisoners were familiar to him but he does not identify these men. Id., at 309, IHRLI Doc. No. 9605.

2105/ Id., at 333, IHRLI Doc. No. 9629.

2106/ Id., at 334, IHRLI Doc. No. 9630.

2107/ Id., at 311, IHRLI Doc. No. 9607.

2108/ Id., at 304, IHRLI Doc. No. 9600.

Notes (continued)


2111/ Id.


2113/ "Croat Troops March Muslim Civilians to Detention", Reuters, 11 May 1993.


2115/ "U.N. Visits 1,000 Civilians Held by Croats in Camps Outside Mostar", Agence France Presse, 12 May 1993.


2117/ "War in Bosnia: Muslim Civilians Are Rounded Up in Mostar", Daily Telegraph, 13 May 1993.


2119/ It is unclear whether this camp is the camp at the aluminum factory. For purposes of this report, these camps are discussed together here but can be distinguished by the individual reports given by witnesses as reported herein.


2121/ Id., at 333, IHRLI Doc. No. 9629.

2122/ Id.

2123/ Id.

2124/ Id., at 313, IHRLI Doc. No. 9609.

2125/ Id., at 333, IHRLI Doc. No. 9629.

2126/ Id., at 333, IHRLI Doc. No. 9629.

2127/ Id., at 345, IHRLI Doc. No. 9641.


Notes (continued)

2131/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2133/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2134/ Id.
2135/ Id.
2137/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2141/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2143/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2147/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 23695-23697.
2148/ Id.
2150/ Id.
2152/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34362.
2153/ Helsinki Watch, Bosnia-Hercegovina: Abuses by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and Southwestern Bosnia-Hercegovina, volume 5, Issue
Notes (continued)

18, September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35943.

2154/ Id.


2156/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34362.

2157/ Id.

2158/ Id.


2160/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34362.


2162/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 34340.


2164/ Id.


2167/ Id., at IHRLI Doc. No. 64224.


2169/ Yugoslav Mission, "Life and Death Under Occupation: Documents Received by the Mission form the Occupied Territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", 4 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 48847-48911, at 48910.

2170/ Id.


2172/ Id.

2173/ Id.
Notes (continued)


2175/ Id.

2176/ More specifically, it is reportedly located on the posterior side of the mountain and wooded area in a valley. The camp is reportedly surrounded by wire. Id.

2177/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 48888.

2178/ According to the report, the majority of the refugees were from the town of Kozarac in northern Bosnia, which reportedly came under Serb control on 26 May. See Marlene Young, Ph.D, "Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in The Former Yugoslavia", National Organization for Victim Assistance, IHRLI Doc. No. 35580.

2179/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 35578.

2180/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 35579.

2181/ The Rijasat, 2 April 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 9735.

2182/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 9773.


2184/ Gaj happens to be name of some six villages throughout BiH. They are located in Gornji Vakuf, Srbac, Goražde, Kiseljak, Srebrenica and Nevesinje. Because this report refers to the neighbouring town of Trusina, it is here assumed that this reference is not to the village of Trusina located outside of Konjic, but instead to the Trusina located in Nevesinje county.


2186/ Id.

2187/ Id.

2188/ Id.


2192/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, 15 January 1993, IHRLI


2197/ Id.

2198/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36533.


2201/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36521-36524.


2204/ Id.


2207/ Id.


2209/ Id.
Notes (continued)

2210/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36524, 36532-36533.
2211/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36521-36524.
2212/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 036520, 036533.
2213/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36521-36524, 36526, 35629.
2214/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36521-36524.


2218/ Id.
2219/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36534.
2220/ Id.
2221/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36532.
2222/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36521-36524.
2223/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36533.
2224/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36533.
2225/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36534.
2227/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 14134-14136.


2229/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 14134-14136.

2230/ Id.

2231/ "Bordellos of Screams", IHRLI Doc. No. 7063, 7078-7081.
Notes (continued)


2238/ "Bordellos of Screams", IHRLI Doc. No. 7063, 7078-7081.

2239/ Id.

2240/ Id.

2241/ Id.

2242/ Id.


2244/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36526.

2245/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Doc. 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 14134-14136.

2246/ Id. The school may be the Lijesce camp.

2247/ Id.; Statements, "Civilians of Serb Nationality Interned in Ustashi Concentration Camps in Odžak, Bosanski Brod, Slavonski Brod and Orašje", 15 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36520, 36524, 36533.

Notes (continued)

2249/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 3103, 3153.


2257/ Id.


2262/ Id.
Notes (continued)


2271/ Id.

2272/ Id.

2273/ Id.


2275/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, 3 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35300, 35328.


2277/ Id.

2278/ Id.

2279/ President of the Serbian Republic, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11765, 11775-11776.
Notes (continued)


2281/ Id.

2282/ Id.

2283/ President of Serbian Republic, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11776.


2285/ Id.


2289/ Id.

2290/ Id.

2291/ President of Serbian Republic, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11776.


2294/ Id.

2295/ Id.

2296/ Id.

2297/ Id.

2298/ Id.


2300/ Id.
Notes (continued)

2301/ Id.

2302/ Id.


2304/ Id.


2306/ Id.

2307/ Id.

2308/ Id.

2309/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, 3 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35300, 35328.

2310/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 35300, 35326-35327.

2311/ Id.

2312/ Id.

2313/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, 3 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35300, 35326-35327.

2314/ Id.


2316/ Id.


2320/ Serbian Submission, Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, University of Novi Sad, 23 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5113-5114.

Notes (continued)

2322/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 29753.


"During his mission the Special Rapporteur received a substantial body of evidence describing ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina from victims, witnesses and competent international monitors. The following are excerpts from a report prepared on the basis of testimony, received during the second mission from a number of reliable sources, which illustrates the methodical character of ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbian forces in the Prijedor area."


2328/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-109, IHRLI Doc. No. 56667-56668; Video Archive and Database, ABC News Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors", Part Two, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154. According to this report, the camp was two miles from the nearest highway.


2330/ Croatian Information Centre, "Weekly Bulletin No. 6", 13 September 1993, No. 002 B1H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 35755. All Croatian Information Centre reports list the Omarska camp as approximately 17 kilometres east of Prijedor.

2331/ Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council
Notes (continued)


2337/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-109, IHRLI Doc. No. 56667-56668; Video Archive and Database, ABC News Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors", Part Two, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154. According to this report, the camp was two miles from the nearest highway.


2339/ Croatian Information Centre, "Weekly Bulletin No. 6", 13 September 1993, No. 002 BiH-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 35755. All Croatian Information Centre reports list the Omarska camp as approximately 17 kilometres east of Prijedor.


2341/ Submission of Information by Austria Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of


2343/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40066. Subject drew a plan of the Omarska camp which appears at IHRLI Doc. No. 40082.

2344/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-109, IHRLI Doc. No. 56667-56668; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. Subject appears to be referring to the same building.


2348/ Id.

2349/ Id.


2358/ Id.
Notes (continued)


2360/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40067-40068. Subject was never taken to the "white house".


2365/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241.

2366/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241. Subject estimated that the maximum number of prisoners held at the camp ranged between 3,000 and 4,000. Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 7; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849. Subject estimated that the Omarska camp housed about 4,000 prisoners at any one time.

Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of the Special Rapporteurs and Representatives; Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/47/666, S/24809 (17 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 1488, 1500-1503. Report estimated the number of prisoners at 3,000. Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject estimated that the camp always had 3,000-4,000 prisoners. Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Hercegovina)", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4852, 4860. The report estimated the number of prisoners held at Omarska at 3,000. Helsinki Watch War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9384. Subject stated that in late May 1992, there were about 3,000 persons at the camp, but that when they brought more prisoners from other camps such as Trnopolje, they had to keep some of the prisoners outdoors.

No. 40064, 40073. Subject reported that there 38 women held at the Omarska camp.

2368/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074.

2369/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43259; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-261, IHRLI Doc. No. 57202-57206. Subject estimated that 4,500 prisoners were held at the camp.

2370/ World Campaign "Save Humanity", "Report On War Destructions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Hercegovina", Statement by N6, IHRLI Doc. No. 693. Subject estimated between 5,000-6,000 prisoners were held at Omarska in early June 1992; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56663-56666. Subject estimated that 6,000 prisoners were held at the camp upon his arrival on 29 May 1992.

2371/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2373/ Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, Zagreb, 19 November 1992, containing a report by a Mr. Zdravko Grebo, based on information reportedly taken from refugees from the Kozarac area, IHRLI Doc. No. 5505, IHRLI Doc. No. 49196 (duplicate); Roy Gutman, "Serbs' Death Camps, How the Guards Chose the Victims", A Witness to Genocide 60 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24914-24918. This report cites estimates made by the BiH Government.


2375/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2378/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-261, IHRLI Doc. No. 57202-57206. Subject estimated that there were approximately 30 male prisoners under the age of 18 at Omarska. US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies", April-May 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject reported that the camp was only supposed to hold men of military age, but that there were young boys there too. He said that the determining factor was whether the boys were well-developed or not. Subject cites an example of two boys from Kozarac who were approximately 13 years-old. He stated that the boys were subject to abuse by guards.


2380/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. It was estimated that approximately 90 per cent of the camp's population were Bosnian Muslims and 10 per cent were Croatian. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9378, 9377. It was reported that many of the camp's female prisoners were Muslim, at least two were Croat and one was presumed to be Albanian.


2383/ Roy Gutman, "There is No Food, There is No Air", A Witness to Genocide 34 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24884-24886.


2385/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2387/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43247.


2389/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.


2391/ Id.; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074 (testimony of female ex-prisoner from Prijedor). Subject stated that room 102 was located in a building which had a restaurant on the ground floor and that the front wall of the restaurant was glass from floor to
Notes (continued)

and that the building also contained offices.

2392/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Channel 4 TV, London, "True Stories: The Unforgiving", IHRLI Doc. No. 64057-64087, at 64070. According to a woman who was held at the camp, when they returned to their rooms they first had to

"wash the blood away, because the whole office was smeared with blood. The floor and cupboards, the furniture. They'd leave behind those instruments of theirs, the ones they tortured people with during interrogations. Stainless steel rungs, pipes, electric cables, wooden sticks. That's where we slept."


2394/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074; US Department of State Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. Subject described the camp's female prisoners as all "formerly politically active". United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40073.


2396/ Id.

2397/ Id.

2398/ Id.

2399/ An Official UN Source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3301; Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, ITN Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 52997-53012, at 53006; Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, CNN Clips, IHRLI Doc. No. 53071-53092, at 53088 (same report as ITN above); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9377.

2400/ Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, ITN Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 52997-53012, at 53006; Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, CNN Clips, IHRLI Doc. No. 53071-53092, at 53088 (same report as ITN above).


2403/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-227, IHRLI Doc. No. 57068-57069; Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject stated that he could hear female voices some time around 2:00 a.m. pleading "Please, let me go, you are already the seventh. . . ." Helsinki Watch Report, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9394. Subject stated that he could hear screams, shouts and crying from the women held in the investigation rooms.
Notes (continued)


2405/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 13-15. Testimony by a female Muslim engineer, and Croat solicitor who were held at the camp.


2407/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074.

2408/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993 (testimony of female ex-prisoner from Kozarac, a former agricultural technician who was held at the camp from 26 May 1992 to 23 August).

2409/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 8. Testimony by an identified female Croatian solicitor who was held at the camp.

2410/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.

2411/ An Official UN Source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9377; Amnesty International, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50201; Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35557. Report estimates that the camp opened on 25 May 1992. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150. Subject reported that the Omarska camp was opened on 26 May 1992, and that there were only several dozen prisoners in one hall when he and his son were transferred there on 27 May 1992.

2412/ Information Submitted by the Government of France, 5 November 1992, U.N. Doc. S/24768, IHRLI Doc. No. 1331. Based on testimony of a Muslim doctor aged 28, from Kozarac. Statement submitted by the Bosnia-Hercegovina Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A65-2984A68. Subject stated that on 24 May 1992, there was an infantry attack on Kozarac, and he hid in the forest with his family. On 27 May, the entire village reportedly surrendered and the subject and others were transported to the Omarska camp. Subject reported that at least six prisoners were shot dead; Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35560. Subject reported that he was brought to Omarska with hundreds of others on 26 May, after Serb forces destroyed Kozarac.


2414/ Statement submitted by Bosnia-Hercegovina Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A11-2984A19. Subject stated that on 26 May 1992, two buses full of men were taken from Kozarac to the Keraterm camp where they
remained for about hour with the heat on at the maximum capacity. The subject stated that the prisoners were then taken to "Bresicain", where they were held for two days, abused and denied food. They thereafter were transported to the Omarska camp. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9385-9386. Another subject reported that on 26 May 1992, he was taken to the Keraterm camp from Kozarac, along with approximately 200-250 other persons. The subject was reportedly beaten and registered at Keraterm, and at approximately 11:00 p.m., he and about 30 other men were reportedly driven to the Omarska camp on buses belonging to the Autotransport-Prijedor company. Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 771 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/26016 (30 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29783-29785. Subject stated that the Serbian army attacked Kozarac on 24 May 1992, and that Muslims and Croats from the town were rounded up and taken along with others to Omarska. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-233, IHRLI Doc. No. 57090-57092. Subject stated the men from Kozarac were taken to Brezičani, some driving their own cars, where they were kept in a schoolhouse apart from the women. He added that they had to pay for water and were subjected to severe beatings. The subject reported that on 28 May 1992, the 450 men were taken by bus to Omarska. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-104, IHRLI Doc. No. 56653-56654. One report stated that on 27 May, Bosnian Serbs brought 19 buses to Kozarac and began loading local residents into them. Eighteen of the buses reportedly went to Omarska where they arrived at 4:00 a.m. on 28 May. World Campaign "Save Humanity", "Report On War Destroctions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Statement by N6, IHRLI Doc. No. 693. It was reported that on the 27th, 20 buses filled with civilians from Kozarac and Prijedor were taken to the Omarska camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849. Subject was originally from the village of Kevljani and reported that at 11:00 p.m. on 27 May 1992, he was part of a convoy of about 500 prisoners who were taken by bus from the Brezičani Transit camp (about three kilometres north-west of Prijedor), to the Omarska camp. The convoy reportedly arrived at Omarska at about 3:00 a.m. on 28 May. The subject stated that this bus convoy was not the only one to reach Omarska during the early hours of 28 May. About 2,000 men reportedly arrived at the camp that night, some from the Keraterm camp in Prijedor, and some from Kozarac (11 kilometres east of Prijedor). According to the report, due to the large number of prisoners, about half of them were forced to remain outside on a concrete pad between the buildings. Statement submitted by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A59. One subject stated that on 28 May 1992, he and 160 other persons were taken to the Omarska camp from the woods near Kozarac. Statement submitted by Bosnia-Herzegovina Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A60-2984A64. One subject reported that he was arrested near his home of Kozarac on approximately 30 May 1992, where he was in a military unit which had run out of ammunition and was forced to surrender. He said that he was taken to an army barracks where he and approximately 10 others were interrogated by military police who wanted to know where the rest of their arms were. The subject reported that he was interrogated, beaten and tortured at the barracks and that at least one other prisoner had been killed. He stated that he was told to cross himself in the Christian fashion and when he refused, a Serb soldier took out his bayonet and carved a cross into his chest. The subject stated that from the army barracks he was taken to the Omarska camp. Republic of BiH, Group For Collecting Facts About War Crimes, Case File 734/1992, 31 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 31932-31937. One male subject stated that after the attack on Kozarac on 27 May 1992, he was arrested and held for two days in the prison of Ciglane near Prijedor and from there was transferred to the camp "Kemoterm", and after three days to the Omarska camp. Statement submitted by the BiH Information
Notes (continued)

Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A45-2984A46. One subject stated that he was caught in the woods surrounding the mountains near Kozarac on 3 June 1992, and was taken to Kozarac were he and others were interviewed and beaten. He stated that he and others were then taken to the Omarska camp. The subject reported that he was held at Omarska for 9 days (until his bladder exploded), and that he was then taken to a hospital in Prijedor. He reportedly stayed at the Prijedor hospital for 11 days without treatment and was then taken to the Keraterm camp. After being held and interviewed at Keraterm, subject was thereafter transferred back to the Omarska camp.

2415/ It was reported that the women and children from the village were bused to Trnopolje, Zenica, and finally Croatia.

2416/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56951. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-122, IHRLI Doc. No. 56699-56702. It was reported that while at Keraterm, the prisoners were packed so tightly together that they could not lay down. Many were also beaten or killed, and the prisoners were reportedly denied food and water.


2419/ Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 12", 25 October 1993, 002 B-H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 43737. Subject reported that on approximately 28 May 1992, prisoners were severely abused in transit from the Keraterm camp to the Omarska camp and upon arrival at Omarska.

2420/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56365.


2422/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-213, IHRLI Doc. No. 57027-57029. Subject stated that he was captured by forces which included a school friend who arranged for subject and his brother to change into civilian clothes. Subject stated that the friend warned the two brothers not to admit to Serb authorities that they had been fighting, or they would be "liquidated". The subject reportedly escaped from the Omarska camp after 72 days.

2423/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.


2426/ An Official UN Source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3301.
Notes (continued)


2428/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-227, IHRLI Doc. No. 57068.


2431/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064-40065. The subject reported that Prijedor was attacked on 30 May 1992, and that he and his two sons moved into an empty apartment. He reported that on 2 June 1992, at about 6:30 a.m., four Serb "Special Militia" arrested him and his two sons and their cousin, and took them all to the police station in Prijedor by truck. Subject reported that after his arrest on 2 June 1992, he was interrogated. Subject stated that during his initial interrogation he was asked questions about what he had been doing over the last six months and where Muslim members of the "militia" were located. The subject, stated that he was also accused of helping Muslim forces and buying weapons, but that he was not physically beaten. The subject stated that he was released that day, and was given a "safe conduct" pass. For the next 20 days, subject and his sons reportedly lived in the concrete garage of their burned-out home. On 4 July 1992, subject was reportedly arrested again and taken to the Prijedor police station.

2432/ According to the subject, his captors were apparently suspicious of the fact that his passport showed that he had returned to BiH after the outbreak of the war.


2437/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9383. Subject reported that he arrived in Omarska via bus after the village of Kevljani fell to Serbian forces in late May 1992.


Notes (continued)

2440/ US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Testimonies", April-May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 21591-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject stated that the prisoners had to kneel on the floor on the bus, which was very hot and overcrowded. He added that the prisoners were beaten during the bus ride and that three prisoners died during the journey.


2442/ Written statement submitted by the Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Statement juka6ea, Croat male (1950), Zagreb, 3 December 1992, (there is no IHRLI Number).


2445/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.


2448/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085. Subject did indicate whether those prisoners were ever transported out of Omarska.

2449/ World Campaign "Save Humanity", "Report On War Destrucions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Hercegovina", Statement by N6, IHRLI Doc. No. 693.


2451/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551. Subject was reportedly included in this transfer to Trnopolje.

2452/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43247. Subject stated that the 200 were prisoners all had, in one way or another, upset the Serbs. For example, they had hunting weapons found in their homes, had written articles criticizing Serb intentions, etc. Subject stated that all of the men had been given a hard time at the camp.

2453/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 43242.

first reported mass killing at Omarska and other camps on 2 August, and five
days later, as television pictures of emaciated prisoners were aired, Serb
authorities reportedly closed the camp and dispersed its population. US
Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-183, IHRLI Doc. No. 56903-
56904; Roy Gutman, "Back From the Dead, Freed Prisoners Detail Massacres", A

2455/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph
5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security
Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to
Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 41-2. It was also reported
that there were some prisoners who disappeared during the disbanding of the
camp.

2456/ For representative accounts of this transfer see, Information
IHRLI Doc. No. 1330; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232,
IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-
241, IHRLI Doc. No. 57116-57119. According to the subject, on 7 August 1992,
after an overnight stay on the buses at Manjača, six prisoners were killed by
the guards who had escorted them from Omarska. US Department of State
Declassified Materials, 94-206, IHRLI Doc. No. 57001-57004. Subject stated
that some time around 4 August 1992, he was loaded into one of 18 buses and
transported to Manjača. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-227,
IHRLI Doc. No. 57068-57069. Report that on 7 August 1992, approximately 2,300
prisoners were transported to Manjača and that camp officials at Manjača
appeared to have a computerized list of the incoming prisoners' names.
Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, IHRLI Doc. No. 48739-48742.
Subject stated that he sat behind the bus driver and that a police officer in
civilian clothes kicked him in the head and ribs, struck him with a rifle butt
and forced him to sing "ćetnik" songs. Republic of Croatia, Division of
Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia,
Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject stated that on 6
August 1992, 1,000 prisoners were transported to Trnopolje and 1,300 others
were sent to Manjača in 17 buses. The subject named numerous individuals said
to have accompanied the convoy to Manjača and to have brutalized the
prisoners. Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI
Doc. No. 2984A29-2984A31. Subject identified a prisoner who was taken out of
the bus six times to be beaten en route to Manjača. Croatian Centre for
Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly
Subject stated that on 6 August, some 18-19 buses took prisoners to Manjača
and that there were approximately 80 prisoners in each bus who were subject to
No. 2984A65-2984A68. Subject stated that 1,500 out of the original 3,000
prisoners were transported to the Manjača camp. Subject added that he
witnessed constant beatings and abuse on the buses. Statement submitted by the
BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A43-2984A46. Subject stated
that he was part of the transfer to Manjača and that 180 men who looked more
presentable were left at Omarska. Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation
and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 9", 4 October
1993, 003 B-H-Omarska-Manjača, IHRLI Doc. No. 40347. Subject stated that he
was put on the last of 14 buses which took prisoners to the Manjača camp. He
stated that after their departure, some 180 prisoners remained at the Omarska
57090-57092. Subject stated that the transfer occurred on about 8 August, and
Notes (continued)

1,300 prisoners were taken to the Manjača camp. He also described killings bayonet during the night at Manjača. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56663-56666. Subject stated that on 6 August 1992, there was a roll-call and approximately 1,200 prisoners were loaded onto 11 buses which left for the Manjača camp. Subject estimated that each bus contained 100-115 prisoners and four guards. Subject also described the poor conditions on the bus; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9374. Helsinki Watch reported that it spoke to Muslims in the Banja Luka area who stated that on 6 August 1992, a large convoy of 15-18 trucks and buses drove through the city. The convoy was reportedly carrying prisoners who had their heads shaved, and was coming from the direction of the Omarska camp, headed in the direction of the Manjača camp. Serbian military officials reportedly confirmed this allegation. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40073. Subject stated that on 6 August 1992, 17 buses filled with prisoners, including the subject, were sent to the Manjača camp between 1:00 and 4:00 p.m. and another 800 were taken to the pista at 6:00 p.m. and were taken to the Trnopolje camp. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9405. Subject stated that he was transferred by bus to Manjača in a convoy of 15 buses which left Omarska at 3:00 p.m. The subject reported that one of the men on his bus was killed when "[a] soldier hit the man in the chest with his rifle. The man cried out, [and] the soldier stabbed him in the mouth with his bayonet. Then the body was thrown out of the bus. I don't know the victim's name."

2457/ See above listed accounts and the report on the Manjača camp for additional details on this transfer.

2458/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.

2459/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.

2460/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085. Subject stated that on 3 August 1992, the Omarska camp was emptied of most of its prisoners. He stated that on that morning a camp official began reading a list of prisoner names, including people who had been killed, previously released or transferred, and people whose fate was unknown. He added that the reading of the list lasted all morning. Subject reported that the prisoners were required to stand in two groups and that one group of 780 prisoners was sent to the Trnopolje camp and second group of 1,200 inmates was transported in 21 buses to the Manjača camp. Helsinki Watch War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9403. Subject reported that several hundred men were taken to Trnopolje on 6 August 1992, and that most of the remaining prisoners were transferred to the Manjača camp, while approximately 180 remained at Omarska.


2462/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074.

2463/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc.
Notes (continued)

2464/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085. Subject stated that on 2 August 1992, 36 of the 40 women at the Omarska camp were sent to the Trnopolje camp. The subject added that four of the camp's female prisoners were retained along with 140 male prisoners to help clean the facility. Subject identified three of the women reportedly transferred and four of the women left behind. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40068. Subject stated that when the Omarska camp was closed, 33 of the women held there were transferred to Trnopolje and the remaining five stayed at Omarska.


2468/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993, testimony of female ex-prisoner from Kozarac, a former agricultural technician who was held at the camp from 26 May 1992 to 23 August 1992.


2473/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, CFN 629", IHRLI Doc. No. 43257.

2474/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, CFN 678", IHRLI Doc. No. 43260. Subject stated that special preparations were made for a BBC or CNN TV visit to the camp and that all except 170 of the prisoners were moved out of the camp. Subject added that beds were installed, but that the prisoners were not allowed to use them. The prisoners were also told to say that they had been at the camp for only a few days and that Omarska was only a transit camp.

Notes (continued)


2477/ A woman purported to be Nada Balaban, is pictured in the ITN report at IHRLI Doc. No. 52998.

2478/ The ITN report features a photograph of what the reporter said appeared to be the "larger of the two buildings", where the prisoners were kept.


2480/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9375, 9378. Helsinki Watch reported that during its visit, approximately 180 men were known to be detained at the camp. The prisoners reportedly had bunk beds and blankets, but had been given them only three days before. It also reported that during the visit the camp guards demonstrated how "well treated" the prisoners were by taking fifteen prisoners to a cafeteria where they were fed beans, a portion of meat and a quarter loaf of bread. In the presence of many guards, the prisoners also stated that they had been at the camp only for a few days and that they received the same food every day.


2482/ ICRC, "Prisoners Regularly Visited in Connection With the Conflict by the ICRC in Bosnia-Herzegovina", IHRLI Doc. No. 16835. This ICRC report indicates that the Omarska camp was "empty" on the ICRC's 12 August 1992 visit.


2486/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52958-52988, at 52983. This same report also contains a photograph of the man identified as Milomir Stakic.


2488/ Id.
Notes (continued)


2490/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52958-52988, at 52982.

2491/ Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, ITN Reports, IHRLI Doc. No. 52997-53012, at 53007; Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, CNN Clips, IHRLI Doc. No. 53071-53092, at 53088 (same report as ITN above).

2492/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43246.

2493/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9408-9409. According to Helsinki Watch, Politika and Borba reported that the Assembly of the "Serbian Republic" had elected a prime minister and cabinet at its 30 January 1993, session in Pale, and that Radoslav Brdjanin was identified as the newly appointed minister for urban affairs.

2494/ Id. The female subject reported that the women in the camp were not shown to Mr. Brdjanin.


2496/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-97, IHRLI Doc. No. 56629-56631. Subject identified the five individuals reportedly executed. Those individuals included: a Muslim policeman from Prijedor; the Democratic Action Party (SDA) Deputy; the Prijedor Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Party Representative; the Muslim chief of the local defence forces before the war; and the Prijedor Mayor before the war.

2497/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-97, IHRLI Doc. No. 56629-56631. The subject identified and implicated the chief of the Prijedor SDS Party; the Prijedor Chief of Police; and the head of the Prijedor City Council, who subject considered to be the worst of the three.


2500/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-97, IHRLI Doc. No. 56629-56631; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-27, IHRLI Doc. No. 56405-56410. Subject stated that the prosecutor wore the JNA uniform and had been a bailiff in the Prijedor court system prior to the war.


2504/ Id. Subject alleged several persons to be the Prijedor MUP inspectors and staff. These individuals are named in the source materials.

2505/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-25, IHRLI Doc. No. 56398-56402. Subject stated the Emergency Operation Centres seemed to be more important and wielded more power than the MUPs. Subject also did not know whether the power of the Emergency Operations Centres was official or unofficial.

2506/ Id. According to the subject, the flow of orders for emergency operations, including orders for the internment and/or execution of residents of Prijedor, came from the Banja Luka Emergency Operations Centre. The orders reportedly came from the Banja Luka MUP either through the Prijedor MUP or Prijedor Emergency Operations Centre. The subject also stated that there may also have been a delineation of the channel of communication by functional areas of responsibility between the MUP and the Emergency Operations Centre.

2507/ Id. Subject identified a named individual as the Prijedor Chief of Police and member of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). She also named one individual who she claimed was the chief's assistant at the MUP and other individuals who were members of the Prijedor Police Department and who she believed were SDS members. Subject also reported two alleged members of the Prijedor Emergency Operation Centre. Subject reported that the chief, as a member of the MUP or as Police Chief, was believed to have ordered the imprisonment of several named Muslims and Croats, including: a judge; an economist; a former President of the HDZ; the former Mayor of Prijedor; doctors; and another individual.


2511/ An Official UN Source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3301.


2513/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241. Subject added that at the same time shots were heard outside. Apparently, a guard shot and killed five running prisoners. Subject added that the camp commander seized the weapon and marched the guard away.


2515/ Id.
Notes (continued)

2516/  Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 12325.

2517/  The subject stated that the guards started hitting the health care provider and accused him of castrating Serbian children.


2520/  Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 93884. The subject reported that one of the prisoners was wounded, escaped, and was brought back to the camp about one month later. The subject added that the bodies of the three prisoners killed were not removed and lay on the ground for seven days in the heat.


2523/  Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 8", 27 September 1993, 009 B-H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 40341-40342; Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Process Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 8", 27 September 1993, 011 B-H-Ljubija, IHRLI Doc. 40342. Subject stated upon arrival at the Omarska camp, guards at the entrance took away his personal documents and money and physically maltreated him. Written statement submitted by the Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, 3 December 1992, Statement luka6ea, Croat male (1950). Subject stated that soon after his arrival at the camp in early July 1992, four Serbs came into the room where he was being held and asked for dinars, foreign currency, gold and watches. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9386. Subject reported that after arriving at the camp from Kozarac in late May 1992, he was taken to room number 26 where he and others were threatened and robbed. The subject stated that the guards at the camp would come into the room and order the prisoners to put their watches and shoes in a pile. The subject added that guards would sometimes tell prisoners that lives could be spared if they gave them 100 German marks and that prisoners would then collect money until they had no money left.


Notes (continued)


2532/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2535/ Id.


2540/ Id.


2544/ For example, See US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551; Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A11-2984A15. Subject stated that he was beaten during interrogation sessions by soldiers using chains and truncheons. Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A17-2984A20. Subject stated that one day he and another cellmate were ordered to
escort a prisoner for "investigation" and that the prisoner could not walk since he had, during an earlier "investigation", wooden nails pierced through his knees. Subject stated that the prisoner was never seen again. Republic of BiH, Group For Collecting Facts About War Crimes, Case File 734/1992, 31 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 31932-31937. Subject stated that during his time at the camp, interrogations followed by beatings were practised daily. Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A29-2984A31. Subject stated that upon arrival at Omarska in late May 1992, the prisoners were interrogated one by one and that all were beaten by rifles, iron bars, and various metal objects. Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 8", 27 September 1993, 006 B-H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 40342-40343. Subject stated that prisoners were frequently interrogated and that investigators and guards would kick them and beat them with their fists and various metal and wooden objects.

2545/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-183, IHRLI Doc. No. 56903-56904. Subject identified a number of alleged victims including a lawyer, a financial director of a mine, and a judge.


2547/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40068. Subject added that at the conclusion of an interrogation the inspector gave a "thumbs up" once if the prisoner was to be returned to one of the holding areas or a "thumbs-up" twice if the prisoner was to be taken to the "death cell" in the hangar-like building and thereafter by night to the "red house" for killing.


2549/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 11. Testimony by a female Muslim and female Croatian who were held at the camp.

2550/ Id., 119. Testimony by a female Croatian who was held at the camp.

2551/ Id., at 9. Testimony by a female who was held at the camp.


2556/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security
Notes (continued)


2558/ The subject reported that the walls of the hallway on the second floor were splattered with blood.

2559/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085. Subject commented that it appeared that the determination concerning category had been made prior to the interrogation session.


2562/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849. There was speculation that the data obtained was used in part to develop prisoner listings, as the camp officials had lists of the prisoners' names.


2564/ World Campaign "Save Humanity", "Report On War Destructions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina", Statement by N6, IHRLI Doc. No. 693.

2565/ Subject stated that this was because he fully cooperated and answered all of the questions to the best of his knowledge on the assumption that most of the facts were already known by his captors.

2566/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-261, IHRLI Doc. No. 57202-57206. Subject stated that towards the end of the interrogation he was asked by the interrogator (identified), whether he wanted to become an informant, to which he refused.

2567/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.


2572/ Subject was reportedly in the territorial defence forces in
Kevljani before the war.

2573/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-197, IHRLI Doc. No. 56949-56954. The subject stated that he was beaten for three hours and taken back to his room at 5:00 a.m.. He said that he took one step into the room and fainted, and then lost complete control of his body and had a diarrhea attack (subject added that he was unable to wash himself for over one month). He stated that he was unconscious for two days when guards came calling for him to exit the room. Subject said that he was unable to walk and was put into a blanket and taken into the hallway by six other prisoners. One guard then reportedly asked him where his hunting rifle and bullets were. Subject stated that he was then carried from the hallway and placed in another room of 36 men who were all sick. He stated that he occupied a space about 80 centimetres long, behind the door, and lay in a foetal position for several days. He added that received no medical attention and that one day, a guard came into the room to beat prisoners at random. Subject stated that about two weeks later he put in a much larger room (Room 15) with several hundred men for 37 days and was left alone. He stated that one individual, whose brother was the camp commander, showed great interest in a list of 101 men from Kevljani and that subject underwent a third questioning within the next few days.


2575/ US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Testimonies, April-May 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 21591-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject described the rest of interrogation and identified the uniformed men in the room. After making a negative statement about the JNA, subject was reportedly beaten.


2578/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568; Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 771 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/26016 (30 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29783-29785. Subject was transported to the camp from Kozarac in late May 1992, and reported that prisoners who arrived at the Omarska did not receive food for the first five days. Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A29-2984A31. Subject stated that he was given no food for three days. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-233, IHRLI Doc. No. 57090-57092. Subject stated that they were given water, but did not receive bread until the ninth day, and a meal until the 10th day at the camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-261, IHRLI Doc. No. 57202-57206. Subject stated that during his first three to four days at the camp in the administration building, he received no food. He reported that the next day, after his interrogation, he received 750 grams of bread which was divided by 24 prisoners. Later, the same size bread was reportedly divided by eight prisoners. After four days, he reportedly received the usual prisoner food ration. US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies, April-May 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject stated that after arriving at the camp on 30 May 1992, he did not
receive food for seven days. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9384. Subject reported that for the first 60 hours at the camp in late May 1992, they were given no food or water. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9387. Subject reported that upon arrival at the camp from Prijedor in late June 1992, he and about 2,000 other prisoners did not get food for three days.


2580/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366. Subject reported that each inmate received one meal a day consisting of 150 grams of bread and a bowl of vegetable soup. US Department of State Declassified Materials 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56649-56651. Subject said that they were fed one small piece of bread and one-half to one cup of nondescript food per prisoner. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-183, IHRLI Doc. No. 56903-56904. Subject said that they were fed a thin soup or gruel and a piece of bread. Roy Gutman, "Serbs' Death Camps, How the Guards Chose the Victims" A Witness to Genocide 60 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24914-24918; Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of the Special Rapporteurs and Representatives; Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/47/666, S/24809 (17 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 1488, 1495-1497. Report stated that a single meal consisted mostly of bread, rice and water United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40069. Subject reported that the meal usually consisted of a thin watery soup and a piece of bread not more than 100 grams in weight. According to the subject, the bread ration was a standard loaf divided into eight pieces.

2581/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849; US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies, April-May 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 21595-21627, at 21609-17. Subject reported that prisoners received one-eighth loaf of bread every 48 hours, and leftover rotten food that soldiers had left on their plates. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9386. Subject reported that the prisoners normally had one meal per day but that sometimes there would be no food for over 60 hours.

2582/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150; United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CPN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43243. Subject stated that food was brought in "soldiers containers" by trucks three or four times daily from the central mines canteen approximately three kilometres away. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40069. Subject stated that the food was not cooked in the camp, but was brought in from outside by truck.

Notes (continued)


2586/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 8. Testimony by a female Muslim engineer who was held at the camp.


2590/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849; Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 771 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/26016 (30 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29783-29785. Subject stated that for their one meal, the prisoners were forced within two minutes to get up, run, eat and run back to lay down in the parking lot again. Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 8", 27 September 1993, 004 B-H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 40342. Subject stated that the prisoners were given two minutes to eat their meal and were brought into the canteen in groups of 30. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-233, IHRLI Doc. No. 57090-57092. Subject stated that they were given 30 seconds for their meal. Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568. Subject stated that after two or three minutes, the prisoners were taken back to the tarmac. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9384. Subject stated that 540 prisoners ate within 20 minutes in groups of 30. He stated that in three minutes the prisoners had to make a group, run to the kitchen, eat and return to their rooms. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9398. Subject reported that the prisoners had three minutes to form a group of 30, eat, and get back to their room. He stated that soldiers armed with sticks, stood in the front of the canteen, poised to beat the prisoners. The subject stated that the stew that they were fed was boiling hot and that the prisoners often burned the inside of their mouths in their haste to eat.


2592/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", 12 October 1993, Tape No. 151, at 9. Testimony by a female Muslim engineer who was held at the camp.

2593/ Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of the Special Rapporteurs and Representatives; Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/47/666, S/24809, 17 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 1488, 1495-1497. Report stated that prisoners were forced to run the gauntlet in order to receive their meals; US Department of State...
Notes (continued)

Declassified Materials, 94-3, IHRLI Doc. No. 56328-56331; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-202, IHRLI Doc. No. 56975-56978; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc. No. 57185-57187; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. Subject estimated that on the average, every second day, prisoners were beaten by guards on the way to the mess hall. Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A43-2984A46; United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40069. Subject reported that verbal abuse and beatings occurred throughout the meal, and afterwards, the prisoners were made to lie down on the track outside for four hours, and anybody who moved or looked up was beaten or trodden-on by the guards.


2596/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on Omarska Camp, Annex C to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63795 (CFN 405, DOI 15 February 93, EDI May-August 92); United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on Omarska Camp, Annex C to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63797 (CFN 815, DOI 06 May 93, EDI Sep 92); Helsinki Watch War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9385, 9389; One subject reported that oil was sometimes put on the canteen floor to make the prisoners fall during their run to get something to eat.


2598/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 12322-12323.


2601/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.

Notes (continued)


2604/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-183, IHRLI Doc. No. 56903-56904; US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies, April-May 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject stated that it appeared that fuel oil was mixed with the drinking water provided to prisoners. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43243. Subject stated that "industrial water" was provided to the prisoners. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. The subject reported that the water provided to the prisoners was taken from the ore pits and that it was not fresh and was contaminated with diesel oil.


2609/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993; Roy Gutman, "Serbs' Death Camps, How the Guards Chose the Victims" A Witness to Genocide 60 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24914-24918. One subject substantiated allegations about the camp and stated that he was held in a warehouse for 12 days in May, jammed in a room packed so tightly that no one could lie down to sleep.


2613/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241.


2616/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc.
Notes (continued)

No. 56846-56849.

2617/ The subject estimated that four prisoners had less than one square metre of space.


2623/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camps: Survivors Tell of Captivity, Mass Slaughters in Bosnia" A Witness to Genocide 44 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24896-24902. Subject, a 63 year-old man from Kozarac, stated that he was held at the Omarska camp for one week in June and was probably released because of his age. He stated that he was held in an ore loader inside a cage roughly 700 square feet long with 300 other men awaiting processing by their captors. He stated that the metal structures contained cages stacked four high, separated by grates, and that there were no toilets. Roy Gutman, "Serbs' Death Camps, How the Guards Chose the Victims", A Witness to Genocide 60 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24914-24918; Stephen Engelberg and Chuck Sudetic, "Clearer Picture of Bosnia Camps: A Brutal Piece of a Larger Plan, Killings Described as Too Random to Be Genocide", New York Times, 15 August 1992, 16 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40044-40045.

2624/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43242.


2626/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information by Austria Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12321; United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43244. Subject, identified as a former veterinarian, stated that prisoners tended to rely on him for medical assistance. He reported that after a few weeks, two prisoners arrived in his room, both of whom were doctors. Subject stated that they performed operations using primitive instruments and would sew up prisoner wounds after beatings.
Notes (continued)

with ordinary cotton.


2629/ US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugee Testimonies, April-May 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. The subject reported that a young diabetic man had died as a result of his beatings, and he was told to carry the man to the doctor in front of the "white house". According to the subject, he and another prisoner brought the body to the spot but the doctor did not come outside.

2630/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43244.

2631/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. Subject attributed the outbreak to the contaminated water given to the prisoners. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150.

2632/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.


2636/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43244.


2638/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9385. Subject reported that the prisoners were beaten going to the toilet, and were given one minute there. The subject added that eventually, his whole group of prisoners was given only one hour to use the toilet and that some prisoners did not get to use the facilities at all and had to relieve themselves in the corner of the room.

2639/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551. Subject was not clear as to whether these beatings took place in the latrine area, or in other areas. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc. No. 57185-57187; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139; Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London. IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A65-
2984A68. Subject stated that on one occasion, following a beating, he went into a bathroom and was followed by a soldier. He reported that he did not use the toilet because he feared reprisals against his cellmates. Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", *Newsday*, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568. The report stated that beatings that accompanied trips to the toilet were so severe that former prisoners said that they preferred to defecate in their boots or in the rooms in which they slept.

2640/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.

2641/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2647/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150; Helsinki Watch Report, *War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II* (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9385; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57202-57206. It was reported that prisoners at Omarska received no soap and were not permitted to wash themselves.


2653/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139.

2655/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43244. The subject added that certain guards had supplied some anti-louse powder, but this was soon exhausted.

2656/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 43243. The subject also stated that after a while about 15 per cent of the prisoners began to receive parcels from their homes. He added that all parcels were searched and items were frequently looted by the guards.


2667/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43242.


2670/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph
Notes (continued)


2671/ Id.

2672/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 12325.

2673/ Id.


2676/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 14 of Atrocity Information, CFN 405", IHRLI Doc. No. 43241.


Notes (continued)

(CFN 405 DOI 15 February 93, EDI May-August 92).

2689/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 63795.

2690/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-3, IHRLI Doc. No. 56328-56331.

2691/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35563. The subject did not state whether the prisoner ate the flesh.


2694/ Id.


2697/ Id.

2698/ Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A60-2984A64.


2701/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52958-52988, at 52973.


2703/ Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A60-2984A64.


2705/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35556. Subject was identified by initial in the report.

2706/ Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A60-2984A64.
Notes (continued)

2707/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on

2708/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War
Identification made by an identified male prisoner. Video Archive and
Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No.
52958-52988, at 52980; Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, ITN
Reports, IHRLI Doc. No. 52997-53012, at 53006.

2709/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc.
No. 57137-57139. Subject referred to the structure as the "white torture
house" (Bijela kuća za mučenje).

2710/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town
Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52958-52988, at 52972. Subject stated that on
the night after he was beaten, 9 prisoners were killed in the first room in
the "white house". He stated that he did not recognize the persons who did the
killing.

2711/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on

2712/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 63797.

2713/ Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council
29785.

2714/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Sudwest-3, "War

2715/ Id., at 20-21. Identification made by a woman judge who was held
at the camp.

2716/ Id., at 21-24.

2717/ The subject commented that the number of persons called varied
from two to three, to as many as 12.

2718/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc.
No. 57082-57085. Subject lists some of the persons reportedly killed in front
of the "white house" in the manner described above.

2719/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc.
No. 56844-56849.

2720/ Statement Submitted by the BiH Information Centre, IHRLI Doc. No.
48739-47842.

2721/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian
Subject was identified in the report.

2722/ Id., at IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568. Subject was identified by
initial in the report.


2724/ Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, ITN Reports, IHRLI Doc. No. 52997-53012, at 53007; Video Archive and Database Scene Breakdown, CNN Clips, IHRLI Doc. No. 53071-53092, at 53087 (same report as ITN above).

2725/ Subject reported that his captors had been suspicious because his passport showed that he had returned to Bosnia after the outbreak of the war.

2726/ Subject stated that the interrogators demanded to know who had guns. When his relative stated that he did not know, he was reportedly beaten to death with an iron bar.


2729/ Croatian Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, "Weekly Bulletin No. 6", 13 September 1993, 004 B-H-Prijedor, IHRLI Doc. No. 35755-35756. Subject identified the names of some of the dead, who he carried out of the "white house".

2730/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.


2734/ US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugees Testimonies", April-May 1993, IHRLI Doc. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject identified the guard responsible for this act.

2735/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52958-52988, at 52974.


2737/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), Special Report on Omarska Camp, Annex C to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63798
Notes (continued)


2738/  Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 63794.


2740/  Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 12326.


2742/  Id.

2743/  See US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232, IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089. Subject reportedly witnessed the castration incident in the garage building. He stated that the incident took place on 10 June 1992. He implicated three named individuals, and others in the killing. He also added that one individual was forced to eat half a dead pigeon and to drink motor oil and that the three victims were subsequently ordered to participate in same-sex sexual acts. The subject also reported that one of the victim's father was forced to witness the above occurrence and to eat the other half of the dead pigeon and to drink motor oil. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-3, IHRLI Doc. No. 56328-56331, at 56330; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849. Subject stated that the incident occurred on an unidentified date in July 1992. He implicated a perpetrator, who had been a former coffee shop operator in Kozarac. He stated that the incident occurred in the high-bay area of the detention building. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-170, IHRLI Doc. No. 56861-56862. Subject implicated a guard and his shift, who he said in mid-June 1992 ordered one victim, to accompany him to an area of the building used as a mine vehicle repair shop, to see his son killed. Subject stated that the victim was then returned to Room 15 where he eventually related the castration incident to subject and others. Subject stated that the prisoner forced to carry out the castration, was then tied up and left in the vehicle workshop for six days without food, where he was said to have lost his mind and was thereafter shot and killed. Statement submitted by BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A17-2984A19. Subject stated generally that "the next day a young man came back to our room, he vomited a lot and told us that he was forced to bite off testicles of three other prisoners who died later that night". Statement Submitted by the BiH Information Centre, IHRLI Doc. No. 48739-48742. Subject stated that he witnessed the incident and that three named prisoners were involved. He implicated two alleged perpetrators by name. Source: BV, report containing an analysis of the castration incident, IHRLI Doc. No. 44047-44070; Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, ABC News Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors, Part Two", 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154, at 32151-32152. Subject interviewed stated that his son was castrated in his presence and that he was beaten. Mary Battiata, "Former Prisoners Allege Wholesale Serb Atrocities", Washington Post, IHRLI Doc. No. 35544-35547. Subject stated that two victims were taken to a basement room below the prisoners' quarters and savagely abused. He said that they were first hung from an auto-repair crane and severely beaten, then taken down and forced to perform sexual acts on each other, and were thereafter castrated. Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject implicated three alleged perpetrator as responsible for the 18 June
castration and stated that later, "[victim]" was forced to eat the sexual organs. Canadian Mission, Second Submission pursuant to Security Council resolution 771 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/26016 (30 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29783-29785; Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A59; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150. Subject stated that he did not personally witness the incident. He stated that the incident occurred in the "garage", which was frequently used for beating and torturing prisoners (on the first floor of the former car maintenance shop). He added that 500 prisoners were kept on the second floor of the structure and that some were able to hear everything that happened through a hole in the wall. He stated that "[two redacted names] were forced to drink from a ditch on the floor old motor oil". He added that the two prisoners were ordered to bite off and swallow the testicles and that they had no choice and they both did it. Subject implicated six Serbs, including two named perpetrators. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56664-56666. In a very general description of a castration episode in mid-June 1992, subject stated that the event occurred in the "white house". Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35564-35565. One subject reported that a named victim, a policeman, was ordered by an unidentified guard to strip naked in the hangar in front of parked dump trucks. "Do you remember the time you beat me up in the cafe?" the guard reportedly asked. A second Serb then reportedly found another Muslim prisoner against whose father he had a grudge and ordered him to lower his face into a channel cut in the concrete floor and drink old motor oil, and then bite off victim's testicles. According to the subject, three other men who had witnessed the castration were then killed by guards with metal rods and the man who carried out the castration returned to his room with his face blackened. The man was reportedly unable to speak for 24 hours. Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Channel 4 TV, London, "True Stories: The Unforgiving", IHRLI Doc. No. 64057-64087, at 64074.


Notes (continued)


2752/ Video Archive and Database, "Scene" Breakdown, "War Victims: A Time to Mourn, Part 2", Tape No. 151, at 9. Testimony by a female Croatian solicitor who was held at the camp.

2753/ US Human Rights Reports on BiH, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 9049. This report stated that according to former inmates, 10-15 prisoners were killed each day at Omarska between May and August, and prisoners were also subjected to torture and humiliation. Statement submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A65-2984A68. Subject stated that prisoners witnessed 10-20 dead bodies every day. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150.


2758/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 63798.


2760/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-95, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622-56623.


2762/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2764/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568. This estimate was based on eyewitness accounts of three former prisoners who spoke to the reporter.
Notes (continued)

2765/ Id. Three Bosnian journalists who were detained at Omarska reportedly arrived at an estimated death total of 1,200 or more.

2766/ Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, ABC News Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors", Part Two, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154. The Nightline reporter cited "an official US State Department report to the United Nations" that the number of prisoners killed at the Omarska camp could be as high as 1,400.


2768/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.


2775/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232, IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089. Subject did not personally witness this alleged killing, but stated that his father-in-law observed the execution from the window of the building in which he was being held.

from other prisoners at the camp that on 12 July 1992, on a Serbian national holiday, several prisoners were burned alive in a big fire in front of the "white house". United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40071. Subject reported that on Petrodan at 10:00 p.m. he observed through a kitchen window, a prisoner being beaten and thrown into a fire made from the large rubber tires from the excavating trucks at the mine.


2779/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-213, IHRLI Doc. No. 57027-57029. Subject described an incident, some time in July 1992 (during his second month at Omarska), when an identified prisoner who had reportedly organized resistance to Serb control in BiH, arrived at the camp with a ring in his nose, attached to a chain. Subject stated that the prisoner was dragged into the camp on his hands and knees by a young Serb soldier (like a pig), and that he was naked from the waist up. The subject reported that an identified "Serb" at the camp, who knew the prisoner then helped toss the prisoner onto a burning stack of truck tires, was pulled off (after which he cursed his tormentors), and was thrown back again until he died. US Committee for Refugees, "Voices from the Whirlwind: Bosnian Refugees Testimonies", April-May 1993, IHRLI Doc. 21595-21627, at 21609-21617. Subject stated that on an Orthodox Christian religious holiday, Djurdjevdan, the Serbs traditionally built bonfires, and on that night they built one and forced 200 prisoners to make a circle around it. They reportedly ordered the prisoners to reduce the size of the circle and ultimately threw someone into the fire. The subject added that the guards were drunk and were playing very loud music at the time. Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on Omarska Camp, Annex C to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63796 (CFN 59, DOI 23-25-5-6 July 93, EDI May-September 92). Subject reported that on 12 July 1992 large earthmover type tires were set on fire with gasoline and prisoners were forced to jump through the flames. Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on Omarska Camp, Annex C to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63796 (CFN 59, DOI 23-25-5-6 July 93, EDI May-September 92). Subject reported that during the Serbian holiday of Petrodan in 1992, he observed through the window of the camp's kitchen, a prisoner being beaten and then thrown alive into a fire made from the large rubber tires from the excavating trucks previously used at the mine.

2780/ Subject estimated that this occurred at the end of July or beginning of August.


Notes (continued)


2786/  Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.

2787/  United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Debrief of CFN 059", 9 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40064, 40071. According to the debriefing report, the subject also reported on re-interview, the killing on 24-25 July 1992, of 180 persons in the glass-walled room, marked VIP.


2789/  Roy Gutman, "Serbs' Death Camps: How the Guards Chose the Victims", A Witness to Genocide 60 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24914-24918; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551; Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12326; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993; Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject stated that on one occasion he saw a pile of 13 corpses stacked in a pile; Written statement submitted by the Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Zagreb, 3 December 1992, Statement luka66a, Croat male (1950), (there is no IHRLI Number). Subject stated that in five days at the "white house" he and three other prisoners were forced to carry out two bodies each on average every day.


2791/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551; Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12326; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993; Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A. Subject stated that following a mass killing of prisoners on 26 July 1992, at 4:00 a.m., he witnessed as bodies were being loaded onto two trucks and that the bodies were taken to the mines in Omarska and buried in mass graves. Canadian Mission, Second Submission Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 771 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/26016 (30 June 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29783-29785. Subject identified one of the truck drivers who was listed in the report by the initials "R.N."; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-251, IHRLI Doc. No. 57148-57150. Subject stated that bodies were picked up daily from outside the "white house" at 4:00-5:00 a.m. by a truck.

2792/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232, IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089; Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35555-35556. Subject was identified by initial in the report.

2793/  Canadian Mission, Second Submission Pursuant to Security Council
Notes (continued)


2794/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085. Subject stated that the identified Serbian man had previously worked at the Omarska mine and that he used two identified prisoners to help him load the truck. The subject stated that some days, as few as two to three bodies were removed, while on other days there were as many as 16.


2796/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-204, IHRLI Doc. No. 56982-56993. This report also identified alleged drivers of those trucks.

2797/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232, IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089; Mary Battiata, "Former Prisoners Allege Wholesale Serb Atrocities", Washington Post, IHRLI Doc. No. 35544-35547. Subject stated that guards made the prisoners go out behind a small shed where there was a truck and a bulldozer and that they were made to load 26 disfigured, and in some cases decapitated, bodies.

2798/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-95, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622-56623; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551. Subject reported that the trucks would carry about 40-50 bodies to the mine pit and dump them there.

2799/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc. No. 57137-57139. Subject stated that it was "common knowledge" at the camp that dead prisoners would be dumped in unused ore pits and buried with bulldozers.

Notes (continued)
shafts by truck or van and dumped there. He believed that the bodies were
taken to the area of Gruben or Busnovi.

2801/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Special Report on
(CFN 973).

2802/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph
5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security

2803/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-246, IHRLI Doc.
No. 57148-57150.

2804/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April
1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9411; United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT),
Subject reported that the Keraterm camp was situated in the north-east corner
of Prijedor on the narrow road leading east to Kozarushi. Austrian Mission,
Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12328; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56367. Subject reported that the Keraterm camp was located a few kilometres due east of Prijedor on Highway 4 (European Route E761) in the direction of Banja Luka. Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina)", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4852; Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, ABC News Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors, Part 1", IHRLI Doc. No. 39742; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578. A Subject reported that the Keraterm camp was located on the north side of the Prijedor-Banja Luka road. A road construction company was reportedly located across the road from building.

2805/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc.
No. 57185-57187. Subject who was held at the camp from 26 June 1992 to 5 July
1992 estimated that each hall held approximately 600 to 800 prisoners; US
Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-
56964, at 56964. Subject reported that prisoners were kept in 4 separate rooms
at the camp. BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29834. One subject reported that there were four rooms
with inmates: Room Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. See also BiH, State Commission for

No. 56367; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc. No.
56512. According to the subject, the ceramics factory had been designed by a
German firm. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc.
No. 56643-56645. Subject described a two-story high warehouse structure.

No. 56367-56368. According to the subject, the rooms used to house the
prisoners were located on the ground floor of this structure. The subject
stated that the camp was approximately 70 to 150 metres off the north side of
the highway between the villages of Cirkino Polje and Kozarac.

2808/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc.
No. 56512; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc.
Notes (continued)

No. 56576-56578; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56679-56693. The subject reported that there was more than one guard shack at the camp. One was reportedly located at the gate, and another, near Room 1.

2809/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368; US Department of State Declassified Materials, IHRLI Doc. No. 56512; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645. Subject reported that the four rooms were located on one end of the structure and that each room measured approximately 40 metres in depth. Two of the rooms were reportedly 20 metres wide and two were reportedly 10 metres wide. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57148. Subject reported that the main "hall", which was divided into four sections, was 20 metres by 50 metres in size. The subject stated that the first section housed administration and the Serbian police offices where interrogations were held. The second section, eight metres by 20 metres, reportedly held 550 prisoners. The third and fourth sections were reportedly six metres by 20 metres each and held approximately 250 or more prisoners each. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56679-56693. Subject provided an extensive description of the structure and hall dimensions.


2811/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368. The subject commented that access was not possible via the corridor. The subject added that the building was divided by a corridor and that stolen private property was stored in the rooms on the opposite side of the corridor which did not face the highway.


2813/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56367. According to the subject, the fence lay between 20 and 70 metres from the building at various points; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc. No. 56512. Subject reported that the camp was surrounded by a wire mesh fence.

2814/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-25, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject described a two metre-high fence, but did not specify whether it was barbed wire or not. The subject added that there were signs on the perimeter of the fence indicating that there were mines place along the fence area.


Notes (continued)

2818/  BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29828; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366. Subject estimated the number of prisoners at the camp at 3,000. He added that the prisoners were interrogated and that none of the prisoners remained at the camp for more than four days.

2819/  Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9412. Subject estimated that between 1,000 to 1,200 men were detained at Keraterm and that prisoners from Omarska were transferred periodically.


2821/  Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina)", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4852, 4858.

2822/  Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9412. Subject, who was brought to the camp on 20 July 1992, stated that prisoners were continuously being brought to the room in which he was detained and he believed that prisoners from the Omarska camp were frequently being brought to Keraterm. He claimed that approximately 400 prisoners were held in four rooms at the camp.


2824/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc. No. 57185-57187. Subject reported that upon his arrival at the camp on 26 June 1993, there were approximately 2,800 prisoners at the camp and that when he departed on 5 July 1992, there were still 2,000 prisoners.

2825/  Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, to Georg Mautner-Markhof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, November 19, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-49196. According to refugees from the Kozarac area, there were 3,000 prisoners held at the Keraterm camp.

2826/  Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina)", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4857.

2827/  United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team Special Report, "Concentration Camps and Other Places of Detention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia", Annex A to JSIO 2841-9, 16 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43009, 43014 (CFN 163); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368. Subject reported that men brought to the Keraterm camp from Prijedor in late May 1992 ranged in age from approximately 12 years-old to 80 years-old. The subject added that at no time were there small children at the camp.


Notes (continued)

2830/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc. No. 57185-57187; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368. Subject reported that the 70 per cent of the prisoners taken to the Keraterm camp from Prijedor were Muslims, and that the others were ethnic Albanians and Croatians.


2832/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368. The subject reported that Room 1 was located on the western end of the building on the first floor.


2834/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369. According to the subject, everyone at the camp (without exception) had to be interrogated. The subject reported that beatings were routine in Room 2 and the guards would enter the room and back the prisoners into one corner. To protect each other, some prisoners would reportedly lie on top of each other on the floor, ultimately causing some to die of suffocation. According to the subject, the bodies of some of the dead and seriously wounded would be left in the room for two or three days before being removed and placed outside next to a dumpster at the far northeastern corner of the building.

2835/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369. According to the subject, interrogations were held in rooms on the second floor of the building.


2838/ Id.

2839/ BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29834; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-195, IHRLI Doc. No. 56941-56944. Subject reported that he was crammed into Room 3 with several hundred prisoners on approximately 20 July 1992 and that from the start of his imprisonment (until his release on 5 August 1992), he saw Muslim men regularly beaten with iron bars and rifle butts. The subject also stated that every night five men were taken out of Room 3 and shot.

2840/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team Special Report, "Concentration Camps and Other Places of Detention in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia", Annex A to JSIO 2841-9, 16 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43009, 43014 (CFN 163); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964, at 56964. Subject was one of five Bosnian Muslims from villages in the Prijedor area who arrived at the Keraterm camp in mid-June for two months and were transferred to the Trnopolje camp in early August. Subject reported that room 3 was where prisoners were most severely tortured.

Notes (continued)

No. 56370.

2842/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 56371. Subject estimated that from 16 July 1992, 300 prisoners were killed at the camp per night. He reportedly arrived at this figure based on mental notes he made during morning roll calls as to how many prisoners on the roster were no longer present.

2843/ Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region (Bosnia-Herzegovina)", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4858; US Department of State Declassified Materials, IHRLI Doc. No. 56368. Subject reported that men from Prijedor were the first to arrive at the camp on 25 and 26 May 1992. Roy Gutman, "Death Camp Horrors: Survivors Detail Serbian Atrocities", Newsday, 18 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35553-35568, at 35557; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that the camp was opened on 25-26 May 1992 and that he was brought to the camp on 26 May 1992.


2846/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2848/ Statement by identified source submitted to IHRLI, IHRLI Doc. No. 29434-29436. The subject reported the abuse and killing of prisoners during the transfer to the Omarska camp. The prisoners on the bus were also reportedly greeted by beatings upon intake at the Omarska camp.


2851/ Republic of Croatia, Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony PRIJ-408, IHRLI Doc. No. 39578A-39581A.


2854/ "The Eyes of Bosnia", a documentary film, IHRLI Doc. No. 52442. Subject stated that the policemen burst into his home at 10:00 a.m. The subject claimed that he was a civilian who did not have any weapons and who was not part of a political party.

2855/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-263, IHRLI Doc.
Notes (continued)

No. 57185-57187.


2865/ BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29832-29834. One subject reported that upon arrival at the Keraterm camp, there were about 360 persons there from Puharska, and about 500 persons from Sivci. He reported that "[l]ater on, people came from Čarakovo, Hambarine, Prijedor, 10-15 people every night". See also BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Case File 735/1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 33330-33332.

2866/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578.


Notes (continued)

2873/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camps: Survivors Tell of Captivity, Mass Slaughters in Bosnia", A Witness to Genocide 44 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24896-24902; Roy Gutman, "Back From the Dead: Freed Prisoners Detail Massacres", A Witness to Genocide 44 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24944; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56679-56693. Subject reported that in late July-early August, it was rumored that the camp was closing because the ICRC was scheduled to visit the camp. The subject reported that before prisoners were transferred in early August, some interrogations were held.


2875/ Id. The report commented that this transfer to Trnopolje was an exception, since all of the other prisoners who had previously been transferred had been taken to the Omarska camp; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720.

2876/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc. No. 56514; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578. Subject reported that on 5 August, he and other prisoners were transferred to the Trnopolje camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-131, IHRLI Doc. No. 56736-56739. Subject reported that on 5 August 1992, approximately 1,200 prisoners were transferred to the Trnopolje camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-195, IHRLI Doc. No. 56941-56944. Subject reported that he and others were transported to the Trnopolje camp by bus on 5 August 1992. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9421. Two subjects reported that on 1 or 2 August 1992, camp authorities called prisoners out by name and loaded them onto 2 buses. Those buses were reportedly taken to the Manjača or Omarska camps, and the subjects reported that they never saw those prisoners again. The subjects reported that the rest of the prisoners (including subjects), were transported to the Trnopolje camp on 5 August 1992.


2879/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information", CPN 631, IHRLI Doc. No. 43260. The subject added that he believed that journalists had discovered that prisoners were being held at Keratorm and that was why the prisoners were moved to Omarska.


Notes (continued)


2885/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56679-56693. The subject reported that some of the men who beat the prisoner as they exited the bus wore olive-drab military uniforms, while others wore camouflage uniforms, both types reportedly with red ribbons attached to the right shoulder "epaulet" which hung down the right arm. Other men reportedly wore blue uniforms, without red ribbons, and one person, identified as a Montenegrain, reportedly wore a yellowish, non-camouflage uniform and a round red cap with a fringe at the back.

2886/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980.


2888/ Id.

2889/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, CFN 631", IHRLI Doc. No. 43260.

2890/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-4, IHRLI Doc. No. 56333. The subject added that the identified guard often "stalked" the camp when not on duty, seeking vulnerable men from which he had not previously confiscated personal belongings and beating them. The guard also reportedly fought with other guards to steal any jewelry which they may have confiscated.


2898/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369. The subject stated that prisoners waiting to be interrogated were held in Room 2. The subject added that sometimes prominent local persons who were recognized by the Serb guards were killed immediately, before they even got to Room 1. The subject commented that he was not interrogated until late
June 1992, about one month after his arrival at the camp, and felt that this was perhaps longer than most men had to wait, though there was no set schedule.

2899/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-14, IHRLI Doc. No. 56364-56366.


2901/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964. Subject was among BiH Muslims from villages in the Prijedor area who arrived at the Keraterm camp in mid-June for two months and were transferred to the Trnopolje camp in early August. The subject reported that after being stabbed in the thighs, he sat in pain for about 10 minutes and was thereafter ordered by guards to march to the bathroom to clean himself up. The subject reported that he lost a significant amount of blood and that a few nights later, an identified guard called out into the dormitory for him to come out and that he refused to answer. The subject reported that he told the guard that he had not fought against the Serb village and was thereafter left alone by the guard. See also BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29834. One subject similarly reported a prisoner from Prijedor who had been stabbed in both of his thighs with a knife.


2903/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645. Subject reported that his village of Čerječi had not fired any shots when Serb irregular forces entered.


2905/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9411. One subject reported that upon his arrival on 20 July 1992, he was not fed for the first five or six days. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-122, IHRLI Doc. No. 56699-56702. Subject reported that during his two day stay at the end of May 1992, the prisoners received neither food or water before being transferred to the Omarska camp. Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12329. One subject reported that from 26 July to 5 August 1992, the prisoners were given nothing to eat at the camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-131, IHRLI Doc. No. 56736-56739. Subject reported that after arriving at the camp in early July 1992, he and other prisoners received no food for the first several days. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369. It was reported that for the first five days, no food or water was given to the prisoners. After the fifth day, daily food rations were reportedly given to the prisoners. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that after arriving at the camp on 26 May 1992, he and other prisoners received no food for two days. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II
Notes (continued)

(April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9413. One subject reported that, in total, he and other prisoners at the camp were denied food for 15 days.

2906/ Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", December 7, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4858; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that a one kilogram loaf of bread was divided between eight prisoners and that every second or third day, they received 60 grams of soup with their bread.

2907/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-247, IHRLI Doc. No. 57140. Subject reported that during his three days at the camp from 25-27 May 1992, the prisoners received only once a small portion of cooked rice, which was served in their hands, and twice, a small piece of bread. Statement by identified source submitted to IHRLI, IHRLI Doc. No. 29434-29436. Subject reported that after arriving at the camp on 25 May 1992, prisoners received a piece of bread and a handful of rice on 27 May 1992; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980. Subject reported that he received one meal per day at the camp, usually a few beans and two small slices of stale bread. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578. Subject reported that prisoners were given one meal per day which consisted of a loaf of bread per eight men and some thin soup with beans.


2909/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9411-9412. The subject believed that the men in his area of detention were being singled out for punishment because they all came from exclusively Muslim villages.


2912/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9415. One subject reported that:

"They used to bus us when we went to lunch. There would be guards waiting inside with baseball bats to beat us. If you fell down, you were finished. Sometimes, we had to crawl the last 15 metres to where lunch was distributed. Every day the guards would invent new games. We had to shovel our food into our mouths quickly. We received about one or one and a half decaliters of soup and two small pieces of bread. This was the only meal of the day, and usually half the soup wound up on the floor. About 50 to 100 men were left without food each day."


Notes (continued)


2917/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12328. One subject reported generally that he was imprisoned with approximately 500 persons and even though the room was rather large, there was not enough space to sit or lay down.


2924/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-247, IHRLI Doc. No. 57140. Subject was held at the Keraterm camp from 25-27 May 1992 and was later transferred to the Omarska camp. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject was held at the camp from late May until August 1992.


2927/ Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4859; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that there was no medical service at the camp and that ICRC representatives were never seen there.

Notes (continued)


2931/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56370. Subject reported that on rare occasions, guards would permit a prisoner to hose down the toilet stalls.


2937/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-247, IHRLI Doc. No. 57140-57141; Austrian Mission, Submission of Information by Austria Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12333. A subject reported that one night in mid-July 1992, a prisoner going to the barrel used as a toilet was shot in the head through a window, and died immediately. Another subject reported that an identified Serbian individual "killed one person on the toilets and injured another person heavily . . . he picked out 5 men among the prisoners, one of them was killed, the others were heavily injured".


2939/ Id.


2941/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56370. Subject stated that he did not wash his hands for nearly 50 days due to the lack of water.


2944/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph
Notes (continued)


2947/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980.


2950/ Id.

2951/ Statement Submitted by the Croatian Information Centre, Code: luka1ea, IHRLI Doc. No. 11681-11683. Subject reported that the guards mutilated the man in front of his sons. It was also reported that on the same day, Radio Prijedor broadcasted that the old man was killed while forcing his way into the camp.


2957/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964. Subject was among BiH Muslims from villages in the Prijedor area who arrived at the Keraterm camp in mid-June for two months and were transferred to the Trnopolje camp in early August.


Notes (continued)


2962/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980. Subject reported that he could hear prisoners screaming and that he also heard shooting. He stated that once he was allowed to walk outside and looked into the room and saw that the walls were riddled with bullet holes and splattered with blood.

2963/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9414. According to a subject, one night,

"about 30 or 40 people were taken out of the room. Some [of those who had been beaten] walked in later and others were carried in. In the morning we found dead [bodies] amongst us again, and a truck arrived to take the dead and wounded.

2964/ Statement Submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A43-2984A46. Subject reported that during the day, treatment was fine, but when night came, they were taken to rooms and beaten with baseball bats. The beatings were alleged to have been performed by drunk individuals referred to generally as "Cetniks".

2965/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964. Subject was among BiH Muslims from villages in the Prijedor area who arrived at the Keraterm camp in mid-June for two months and were transferred to the Trnopolje camp in early August.


2970/ Id.


2972/ "The Eyes of Bosnia", a documentary film, IHRLI Doc. No. 52442.

2973/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc. No. 56513. Subject also reported that during the day, the guards took the prisoners outside and made them walk on all fours and bark like dogs.

One subject reported that he arrived at the Keraterm camp in mid-July 1992, and was put into the same room with men from the village of Carakovo. Other subjects were also among this group, and all of the subjects had been brought to the camp with two busloads of prisoners, all of whom were loaded into a single room. One of the subjects estimated the size of the room at about 80 square metres, with a small alcove in the right rear corner. The room reportedly had a single window high up in the front wall above a large sheet-metal "garage-type" door with a smaller opening in it. The subjects estimated variously that the room held 200-300 prisoners. From Monday through Friday, the prisoners in the room reportedly received little water or food. Only on Wednesday did they receive a 50 litre barrel of water and a slice of bread for each man. On Thursday and Friday, they reportedly received nothing. The summer temperature in the room was reported as stifling and the conditions were described as unbearable. One subject stated that two of the prisoners, who were medical technicians by training, attempted to keep the prisoners calm. On the fifth day (24 July), the prisoners in the room were reportedly given water again, but in one of the subject's words, "they put something in the water" and the men in the room "became crazy". Another subject said that "things" were shot in through the window which produced smoke and gas. It was reported that the prisoners, in their agitation, began screaming and pounding the doors and prisoners began to hallucinate and fight each other. Some of the prisoners reportedly had managed to force a hole in the sheet metal of the door, and escaped from the room, but were then killed by the guards outside. One subject stated that he worked his way into the corner of the room near the window which no longer had gas coming through it. All of the subjects stated that after the disturbance in the room had gone on for some time, the soldiers outside the building opened fire with large machine guns. The bullets reportedly came through the sheet metal of the doors and whoever was nearby was killed. One subject stated that because he was in the back alcove and out of the direct line of fire, he managed to survive, along with about 25 other men in the same location. A second subject stated that a similar number of prisoners in his corner of the room near the window also survived the mass killing. A third subject said that a bullet grazed his arm, and a piece of metal grazed his skull and he passed out. Two of the subjects estimated that between 150 and 200 men were killed or wounded in the massacre. One subject reported that early the next morning, the smaller opening in the door was opened and two guards entered with automatic weapons, going around the room killing some of the wounded with bursts from their guns. The subject stated that by 9:00 or 10:00 a.m., the prisoners who were still alive began protesting and begging for food and water. Another subject stated that he and others were chosen by guards to load both the dead and the wounded onto a truck. The subject stated that a prisoner was forced to drive the truck away with some of the guards and was never seen again. Two of the subjects reported that on the day after the massacre, soldiers came into the room and chose approximately 20 of the surviving prisoners, took them outside, lined them up against an outside wall of the room, and shot them. Some of the bullets reportedly strayed into the room and killed several men there. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report on the Keraterm Camp, Annex B to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, CPN 973, IHRLI Doc. No. 63789. A subject reported that 350 persons from Hambarine had been confined to one building in the camp. When those prisoners pleaded for the windows to be opened, the guards reportedly opened the windows high up on the floor and then opened fire with
machine-guns on the people below. The survivors were reportedly shot while illuminated by car headlights and then the prisoners from another building had to clear away the bodies. Some of the prisoners loaded onto trucks were reportedly still alive. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report on the Keraterm Camp, Annex B to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, CFN 1143, IHRLI Doc. No. 63789. Subject reported that he was alerted by the appearance of 2 vehicles illuminating the area with their headlights. He then reportedly heard fire orders being issued and three bursts of machine gun fire directed from a position about 30 metres from a building through the wall into a holding area. He stated that in the morning, "long trucks" were brought in to remove the corpses. The subject identified two men as the "shift leaders" responsible for the killings. United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report on the Keraterm Camp, Annex B to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, CFN 694, IHRLI Doc. No. 63790. Subject stated that on one occasion approximately 148 prisoners were killed in one night, and then in the morning, 40 prisoners who had been wounded were put onto a truck and driven away. Medecins Sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4860. It was reported that 12 refugees interviewed recalled the execution of 200 people in "room number 3" during the night of 24 July 1992. According to the report, the room accommodated about 230 prisoners, some from villages around Brdo. In the evening, tear gas grenades were reportedly thrown into the room and the prisoners were shot by the militia as they rushed out of the room. About 50 of the prisoners did not die right away and were buried along with the dead in a mass grave the next day. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964, at 56964. One subject reported that on 24 July 1992, over 100 prisoners were killed. The subject reported that he observed from a window in room 2 as the guard shift changed at 6:00 p.m.. He stated, however, that the shift changed again two hours later and the more guards were stationed with automatic rifles. The subject stated that disturbances in room 3 started because of insufferable conditions and that guards initially fired a few shots. The subject that stated that he heard a voice shout, "don't shoot without an order from Kola". The subject stated that when the rioting grew worse he heard Kola state, "fire" and then heard rapid gunfire and screams. The subject said that the following day, guards chose two prisoners from rooms 1 and 2 and that those prisoners counted 99 dead and 42 wounded. The prisoners then loaded the bodies onto a truck labeled "Prijedor Autotransport", and none of the wounded, or the driver of the truck (another prisoner) were seen again. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-59, IHRLI Doc. No. 56513-56514. Subject reported that on 26 July 1992, buses arrived and the prisoners aboard were divided into two groups. Each group reportedly had to go to the grass-covered area at the end of the building to form a circle and hold their arms behind their necks. It was reportedly a hot day and the prisoners in the building were not allowed to leave their rooms or go to the toilet. The camp's guards were reportedly reinforced by a busload of Serbian irregular forces who started beating the men in the circles for the remainder of the day. According to the subject, the men in the buildings broke down and the camp guards opened the door to room 3 and started beating the prisoners inside. The door to room 3 was then reportedly closed and the guards started to fire inside of room 3. According to the subject, the shooting continued until 5:00 a.m. on 27 July. The next day, a white truck with the words "Autotransport" written on it and the license plate PD 17-28, was reportedly loaded by 70 prisoner-volunteers. According to the subject, the dead (170) were loaded first and the injured (47) were loaded on top of them. The canvas cover was reportedly closed, and the truck which was dripping blood, drove away. According to the report, at 4:30 a.m. on 28 July 1992, the guards fired again into Room 3 and killed 27 prisoners. According to the subject, Banja Luka Television reported that
evening that there was an escape attempt at Keraterm and that 27 prisoners were shot dead while trying to escape. According to the subject, the news of the earlier massacre had leaked out and the guards killed the 27 men and showed them to reporters to cover up the earlier killing and to imply that this was actually all that happened. Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, Dispatches, "A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52971. One subject reported that on 24 July 1992, prisoners in room 3 begged for water and air. They banged on the doors and broke windows. Thereafter, special police arrived from Banja Luka, who opened fire. The subject reported that he survived, and in the morning, the prisoners took out 182 bodies and loaded them onto a truck. The wounded were also loaded onto the truck and were thereafter killed by the guards. The subject reported that he did not know what became of the 205 bodies which resulted from the mass killing. Mary Battiata, "Former Prisoners Allege Wholesale Serb Atrocities", Washington Post, 6 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 35544-35547. It was reported that on the evening of 24 July 1992, Serb guards positioned just outside room 3, fired burst after burst of automatic machine gun fire through the room's thin metal door. As many as 160 men in room 3 reportedly died that night and another 50 prisoners were killed the following morning when a new shift of guards entered room 3. It was further reported that 10 more prisoners disappeared after they were forced to load corpses onto a truck and leave the camp with them. Additional killings were said to have occurred the following night against an outside wall, and on many other nights after that. Roy Gutman, "Back From the Dead: Freed Prisoners Detail Massacres", A Witness to Genocide 84 (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947, at 24941-24942. A subject reported that on the evening of 22 July 1992, guards fired gas bombs into a large room at the camp and then machine-gunned everyone who came to the front, gasping for air. The subject estimated that 125 people were killed and 45 other were wounded in the attack, but that the wounded were loaded onto trucks along with the dead and were never seen again. BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29832-29834. One subject reported that on 27 July 1992, 145 people were killed and 45 others were wounded at the camp. See also BiH, State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes, Case File 735/1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 33330-33332; Austrian Mission, Submission of Information Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (11 February 1993", IHRLI Doc. No. 12334-12336. The Austrian report lists numerous accounts of what appears to be the same mass killing: One witness who was detained at the camp from 12 July to 5 August 1992, reported that "[o]ne night the Serbs killed 216 people. They thought that the 216 people had put up resistance, this is why they were killed . . . I saw by myself how they were shot." Another subject reported that 300 prisoners were held in a hall without getting food for several days and before shooting into the hall, the Serbs passed gas into it. According to the subject, they were shooting all night long, but some prisoners survived the attack. Another subject detained at the camp from 14 June to 5 August 1992 stated that one day a group of about 300 persons from Prijedor arrived at the Keraterm camp. They were reportedly locked up in a hall and received nothing to drink. After two days they reportedly became agitated and asked for water. The following night the Serbs reportedly came into the hall and "ravaged" for several hours. They reportedly shot into the hall, and the next day 90 out of 300 prisoners were dead and 28 were severely wounded. Another subject reported that, "[a]t the beginning of July a mass killing took place. The Serbs locked up approximately 300 people in a hall. For three or four days they got nothing to drink or eat. It was very hot in the hall because the windows and doors were closed. One night the cetniks began to fire and fired on
the hall for several hours. 96 or 97 people were killed, about 45 severely injured." Another subject reported that at the end of July an incident occurred during which 160 people were killed. . . . The men who were accommodated in the room next to ours didn't get any food or water for four days. I should add that it was in the middle of summer and it was very hot. In the evening of the fourth day one could hear the cries of the men perishing of thirst. The same evening, the soldiers threw bombs with flue gas and tear gas into the room, so that the people would try to break up the door and to flee . . . When they broke the door and came outside, soldiers were already waiting with machine guns and shot into the crowd. About 160 men were killed."

Another subject reported that on about 25 July 1992, some hundreds of prisoners were locked up in a hall without getting food or water for several days. According to this report, too, the soldiers passed gas into the hall and shot all night long. The next morning, at least 100 prisoners were dead and some 50 of them were injured. The subject stated further that the dead as well as the wounded were taken away by truck. A subject who was detained at Keraterm from mid-June to 5 August 1992 reported that

"[o]nce they locked people from a new transport up in a hall, without food and water. When they started to knock, the cetniks became angry. They shot 200 people, 50 were wounded. The dead and wounded were brought away in the same truck. We later heard that they also were killed."

According to another subject, one night around 20 July, 99 people were shot and 40 were injured. The witness stressed that the dead as well as the wounded were taken away by the same truck. Another subject described the incident as follows:

"One night, at the end of July, or beginning of August . . . several hundred people were locked up in a hall. They passed gas into the hall and then shot around all night. 98 people were dead and 45 injured. They all were taken away by the same truck."

Another stated that at the end of July, 200 people were locked up in a hall and that the soldiers then shot around for several hours. According to the subject, 160 people were killed and 50 others were injured. The subject pointed out that before the shooting commenced, gas was passed into the hall. One subject reported that during the night he heard shooting and that the next morning he saw 160 dead bodies and 45 others wounded. The subject stated that he later heard that those prisoners were chosen because they came from an area where a Serbian soldier had been killed. Another subject reported that 400 men from Hambarine were brought to the Keraterm camp on 25 July and that since some of them had tried to put up a resistance, 120 of them were shot by soldiers and 25 others were wounded. Also referring to villagers from Hambarine, another witness reported:

"One night, I heard shooting and cries. The next morning I saw 200 bodies. Some time before that, 200 prisoners from Hambarine and Rizvanovići were brought. I think they were killed. I had to help loading the bodies on a truck."

One subject reported that

"[a]round 24 July, some barrels of poisoned water were put in the middle of a hall. Some people drank this water and lost consciousness. The
others called for help until many armed soldiers arrived. They shot into
the crowd arbitrarily. They left the dead and the wounded people all
night long in the hall. The next day, we had to carry the dead bodies
out of the hall and lay them beside one another. The wounded also were
supposed to go to the same place from where they would be transported to
a hospital. My friends told me to go there too, because of my broken
rib. But then I recognized that the wounded were loaded on a cold-
storage car together with the dead, so I went back."

Another subject, reported that he was brought to the camp on 16 June 1992 and
that

"[a]fter about 14 days approximately 150 people were shot by Serbian
soldiers. Before being shot, they were given drugs. The Serbs said that
these people were to flee, which of course, was not true. The mass
killing lasted from 2 to 5 a.m. I saw by myself how the bodies were
loaded on the trucks and brought away."

US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-121, IHRLI Doc. No. 56698.
Subject reported that prior to the evening of 19 or 20 July 1992, men from
villages around Prijedor, including Čarakovo, Hambarine, Rizvanovići, Zecovi
and Biščani had been packed into detention room 3 at the camp. Those men had
allegedly resisted during the "cleansing" of their villages and the guards
reportedly sought to make examples of them. On the evening of 19 or 20 July,
the men in the room reportedly began to hallucinate and push at the door of
the detention room. The guards, who had set up machine guns in the yard
outside the door, reportedly threw tear gas grenades into the room, and as the
men attempted to knock the door open, the guards then opened fire on them.
According to the subject, the shooting lasted (on and off) until 5:00 the next
morning. Most of the men in the room were reportedly killed and a tractor-
trailer arrived the next morning to take away the bodies. US Department of
State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56577-56578. Subject
reported that in mid-July 1992, approximately three busloads of Muslim
prisoners from Čarakovo and Biščani arrived at the camp. The prisoners were
placed in a room adjacent to the toilet. The subject stated that on the day
following their arrival, the prisoners were forced to beat prisoners who were
already in the camp. For three to four days the prisoners were reportedly
denied food and water. On approximately 22 July 1992, the prisoners were
reportedly told to come out for their meal. A wheel-mounted "Spanish gun" was
reportedly positioned near the door to their cell, and as the prisoners left
the cell, they were shot. The subject said that 120 prisoners were killed and
30 others were wounded. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-192,
IHRLI Doc. No. 56931-56934. Subject reported that in early July 1992, the
prisoners in rooms 1 and 2 were ordered to lie down flat on the ground and
cover their heads with their hands. Two vehicles were reportedly parked near
room 1 with their lights on, illuminating the open field in front of the
entrances to the holding areas. Flood lights located approximately 50 metres
away from the entrances were also reportedly aimed at the holding areas.
Approximately 40-50 Bosnian Serbs then gathered in front of and approximately
30 metres from room 3 where "Category B" prisoners were held. According to the
subject, the prisoners in room 3 were ordered to stand up and the Bosnian
Serbs opened fire with their machine-guns. According to the subject, a group
of approximately 30 prisoners from room 2 attempted to escape, but were killed
halfway across the lit open field. The subject reported that 20 prisoners were
selected to load the bodies of victims (a total of 322, 46 of whom were still
alive) onto two military trucks and one civilian truck that had a trailer.
According to the subject, the 20 prisoners then had to climb onto the truck
Notes (continued)

and were never seen again. The subject reported that the victims of the above-described massacre were mainly from the villages of Carakovo, Kozarac, Zecovi and Hambarine. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that in July 1992, 174 Muslims from the village of Carakovo, were brought to the camp and placed in room 3. The subject reported that on the next day guards placed five machine guns outside the entrance to the room and killed all 174 prisoners. The bodies reportedly remained in the room all night and were loaded onto trucks the next morning. The subject reported that 10 of the prisoners survived and were left behind in the hall. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-195, IHRLI Doc. No. 56941-56944. Subject reported that on 24 July 1992, he was in room 3 which was stifling hot, with closed doors and windows. The subject reported that the men screamed for water and received contaminated water which was so bad that it caused 20 men to collapse and faint. The subject said in response to the commotion, 15 "Cetnik" guards came into the room and occasionally fired their rifles into the crowd of prisoners, but gradually pulled back. When they reached the large garage door, the "Cetniks" began firing their rifles and machine guns into the crowd of inmates. The subject reported that he positioned himself behind a door and feigned dead. The subject reported that at dawn "volunteers" were chosen to load the 130 bodies onto trucks. Thereafter, 40 wounded were reportedly waited to be loaded onto another truck which was to take them to the hospital. When no truck came, the wounded too, were reportedly loaded onto the truck with the corpses and taken away. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56679-56693, at 56683-56684. Subject reported that on a date in early July 1992 at approximately 10:00 to 11:00 p.m., guards set up three wooden tables in the courtyard and then placed an automatic weapon with a bi-pod on each of the tables. The guards then reportedly aimed the weapons at room 3 and began firing for an extended period of time. According to the subject, on the morning after the mass killing, a "paramilitary commission" of about 10 men dressed in civilian clothes arrived at the camp. During that time, guards at the camp reportedly selected six prisoners to load a truck with 150-200 dead prisoners. A driver who brought the truck reportedly went into shock at the sight of the carnage and an unknown prisoner was found to drive the truck. A member of the "commission" reportedly told the wounded that they would be taken to a hospital and they were loaded atop the dead in the truck. Two armed guards then got into the cab of the truck which thereafter departed. The "commission" members reportedly left at the same time. Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9415-9420. Two subjects described, in detail, a massacre which took place at Keraterm during the early morning hours of 25 July 1992.


Notes (continued)

2980/  Id.


2982/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980.


2986/  Statement Submitted by the BiH Information Centre, London, IHRLI Doc. No. 2984A43-2984A46; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-203, IHRLI Doc. No. 56980. Subject reported that he saw prisoners being forced to pile up dead bodies in what looked like a "garbage heap" US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that dead bodies were collected at a trash point, next to the fourth section and were transported by trucks every second or third day US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56369. One subject reported that bodies were taken from room 2 and placed outside, next to a dumpster at the far northeastern corner of the building.


2991/  US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-199, IHRLI Doc. No. 56960-56964, at 56964. One subject stated that a relative of his had a house near this area and from his window on one occasion he could see a truck unload many dead bodies into a deep pit and cover them with seven to eight metres of soil. The relative added that a few days later, trucks came again and loaded animal corpses into the pit and added another layer of soil. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-192, IHRLI Doc. No. 56931-56934. Subject reported that he learned from a Bosnian Serb that the bodies from a reported July 1992 massacre at the Keraterm camp, were taken to a mine
at Tomašica, near Omarska, where the 20 prisoners who had loaded the bodies of the initial victims were also executed and all of the bodies were buried in a mass grave.

2992/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56372. The subject reported that after an alleged mass killing on 19 July 1992, the bodies of the dead prisoners were taken to one of three mass graves in the areas of Tomašica, Omarska or Kurovo. The subject stated that Tomašica and Omarska had mines into which bodies were thrown and that the city dump at Kurovo was used for disposing bodies.

2993/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-250, IHRLI Doc. No. 57145-57147. Subject reported that he learned from guards at the camp that dead prisoners were buried at the ore mine near Ljubija.

2994/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-15, IHRLI Doc. No. 56372. Subject reported that he was told that his friend's body was thrown into a mass grave in a cemetery in the Pašinac district of Prijedor, along with 16 others who were reportedly killed at the Keraterm camp on 30 July 1992.

2995/ Statement Submitted by the Croatian Information Centre, Code: lukalea, IHRLI Doc. No. 11681-11683. A family who lived near the camp reported that there was a mass grave near the location called "Bajr", the former brickyard, in the immediate vicinity of the Keraterm camp.

2996/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team (DDT), "Summary No. 24 of Atrocity Information, CFN 694", IHRLI Doc. No. 43281; United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, "Special Report on the Keraterm Camp, Annex B to JSIO 2841-19", 25 March 1994, CFN 694, IHRLI Doc. No. 63790. One subject reported that victims of an alleged execution were were dumped in an area identified as Lake Ribnjak (a fish farm), or down the mine at Ljubija.


3000/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-80, IHRLI Doc. No. 56576-56578.


Notes (continued)

3004/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348.

3005/ Id.


3007/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-95, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622-56623.


3011/ Id., (reporting, however, that the detention-transit camp was set up in the town at least five weeks earlier).

3012/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-95, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622-56623, (reportedly soldiers set up two check points, one in the centre of Trnopolje and the other in Garavica (maps indicate a D. Garević approximately four kilometres west of Trnopolje on the main Prijedor-Trnopolje road)).


3014/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-10, IHRLI Doc. No. 56355-56361.


3016/ ITN News, BBC, "Omarska's White House", IHRLI Doc. No. 52995-53012 (interviewing Omarska administrator Nada Balban who says that Omarska and Trnopolje are both transit centres, not camps).


3018/ There is some confusion about the date of the first ICRC visit to Trnopolje. Numerous accounts by former detainees report that the ICRC visited Trnopolje with the international journalists in early August. According to an

3019/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. 56663-56666 (describing the camp as a tent city without guards, but under camp supervision).

3020/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-70, IHRLI Doc. No. 56546-56548 (reporting that the camp was "more or less an open area, without wire enclosures, only strategically placed guards kept the prisoners from escaping").; Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203.

3021/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (reporting that while detainees were free to leave the compound, the guards would threaten to butcher anyone who was late in returning to the camp).


3023/ Thomson CSCE Mission to the Detention Camps in BiH, Draft Report (September 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 262, (reporting that the camp is in and around a two story structure formerly used as a school); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-33, IHRLI Doc. No. 56424-56426 (describing the school and community buildings as being about 100 yards apart); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-10, IHRLI Doc. No. 56355-56361, (stating camp consisted of "all the school buildings, the school playgrounds, the culture centre, and the warehouse for construction materials"); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348, (describing the camp as consisting of the School Centre of Trnopolje, which was located in the centre of town near the railroad station and near a warehouse for construction material).


3025/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-118, IHRLI Doc. No. 56686-56688 (reporting that each tent housed 20 people).


3028/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-145, IHRLI Doc. No. 56799-56756. This information shows evidence of a central control for all the camps.
Notes (continued)


3031/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849 (reporting that the offices were located in a cafe across from the camp on the road which ran north to Kozarac); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-110, IHRLI Doc. No. 56669-56674; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9279-9445 (showing a hand-drawn plan of the camp showing offices of local Red Cross and guards across road from the camp); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-129, IHRLI Doc. No. 56728-56731 (stating camp is reported as consisting of three buildings: a two-story school building, a one-story administration building, and an auditorium. All enclosed by barbed-wire fence).

3032/ Medecins sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4843 (reporting that the centre of the camp was surrounded by barbed wire); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-33, IHRLI Doc. No. 56424-56426 (stating, school and house of culture "each surrounded by a fence").

3033/ Cf. US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-9, IHRLI Doc. No. 56349-56351 (reporting that after the first visit, on 4 August by the ICRC and international journalists that an order was issued to raise a 2.5 metre-high chain link fence around the original fence to increase security at the camp; that the installation was done by Serbian soldiers; and that when camp officials learned that the ICRC representatives would be returning, the fence was immediately taken down); see also US Department of State Declassified Materials 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720 (reporting that the camp prisoners were ordered to tear down the fence).

3034/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-10, IHRLI Doc. No. 56355-56361 (reporting that the day before the arrival of the news media the guards removed the barbed wire fence and installed a new sign at the entrance which read: "Receiving Centre-Trnopolje", and that as soon as the media left the sign would be removed and the fence would go back up).

3035/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304.


3037/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348.

3038/ While it is reported that some detainees slept under improvised coverings such as "lorry trailers" or home-made tents, other reports describe


3040/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-232, IHRLI Doc. No. 57086-57089 (reporting that the Muslim inhabitants of Kozarac were ordered to report to the town centre where the men were separated from the women and children).

3041/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (reporting that following attacks on their homes, up to 9,000 or 10,000 people from all over the region came to the camp; sleeping in their cars, farm machinery).


3044/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated 27 December 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57334 (reporting that women and children tended to be held three to five days until their numbers swelled to a few thousand, at which time the Bosnian Serbs then arranged to deport them, mostly to Travnik); Medecins sans Frontiere, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4843-4862 (2,000 detainees at all times, up to 5,000-6,000 when women and children were gathered together before being trucked out of the war area); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, Doc. No. 56549-56551 (reporting that women and children were often sent to Croatia within a few days); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-145, IHRLI Doc. No. 56799-56803 (reporting that about 3,000 detainees remained at Trnopolje after 1,580 prisoners transferred to Karlovac, Croatia on 17 September); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (reporting that the "official policy" at Trnopolje was that men, children, the sick, boys under 16, and men over 65 could leave Trnopolje on organized convoys).


3046/ Thomson CSCE Mission to the Detention Camps in BiH, Draft Report (September 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 240 (1,800 on 31 August 1992); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-270, IHRLI Doc. No. 57207-57209 (3,000-
Notes (continued)

4,000 Muslim men, women, and children during June of 1992); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304 (about 5,000, of whom 300 were children, 3,000 women, and balance mainly old men); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (2,000-6,000 between 26 June and October; 1,600-2,000 on 26 June); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57918 (6,000 on 31 May 1,680 in early October); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-119, IHRLI Doc. No. 56686-56688 (3,000-4,000 between early and mid-August); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-129, IHRLI Doc. No. 56728-56731 (3,000 on May 26--about 300 of whom from Prijedor, 2,700 from Kozarac and surrounding villages--and about 3,000 on 1 October mostly women and children); Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1992/S/1/10, 27 October 1992 (more than 3,000 on 12-22 October 1992); US Department of State Declassified materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348 (4,000-5,000 between 23 May and 11 July 1992); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-33, IHRLI Doc. No. 56424-56426 (5,000 in July and the first half of August--subject detained from mid-July until end of August); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304 (reporting that the ICRC saw about 4,000 people on 11 August); see also Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304 (reporting that ICRC reported about 4,000 on 11 August 1992); Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-39977 (3,500 between August 1 and 12, mostly older people women and children); Medecins sans Frontieres, "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4843-4862 (2,000 detainees at all times, up to 5,000-6,000 when women and children were gathered together before being trucked out of the war area).

3047/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645 (estimates 7,000 to 8,000 detainees from the period of 20 August to 1 September 1992); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-182, IHRLI Doc. No. 56899-56902 (about 10,000 people from the Kozarac area were sent to Trnopolje on 26 May and were quickly released to their own homes then re-interred at the camp later in smaller groups); Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (estimating up to 9,000-10,000 detainees; dates of detention unknown); Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39929-39930 (estimating that there were approximately 4,500 people in the central, fenced area of the camp, but saying that since the entire town was the camp, it held around 10,000 prisoners in total; detained from early June until late July): US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959 (estimating about 9,000 people in the camp in early June based on a calculation of the number of people in each area; detained from 25 May until 1 October).

3048/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304.

3049/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551; Witness testimony (source unknown), IHRLI Doc. No. 9146; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-9, IHRLI Doc. No. 56349-56351; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57198 (reporting that only a portion of the women and children could find room in the former school building); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-105, IHRLI Doc. No. 56655-56657 (reporting that women and children were housed in the gymnasium of the elementary school next to the camp); Cf.,
Notes (continued)

Witness Testimony (source unknown), IHRLI Doc. No. 9154 (reporting that men were held in the school, and as many as 600-700 women, children, and elderly men were held in the gymnasium.)


3051/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304.

3052/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563 (reporting that for the first three days the transerees were held outside the former school building); Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39931-39933 (reporting that they spent their first night in the school); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551 (reporting that new arrivals were housed in the library of the school).

3053/ US Department of State Declassified Material, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551, (reporting that women and children were often sent to Croatia within a few days).


3055/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9437 (reasoning that the guards were local Serbs who could identify the detainees for creation of the lists); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-73, IHRLI Doc. No. 56554-56555; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563 (reporting that each night Serb guards would come with a list and people would be taken away and never seen again); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563 (reporting that first on the list were all members of the TDF (Territorial Defence Force) and Muslims who had purchased weapons).


3058/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304; See also, Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203.


3060/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720 (reporting that the prisoners photographed by the journalists were recent transfers from Omarska and Keraterm and were in much worse physical condition than other detainees at the camp); Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947; IHRLI-Linden Productions Video Archive

3061/ Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39971-39975 (reporting that the names of everyone who spoke to journalists were recorded and that they were searched out at night to be killed); IHRLI-Linden Production Video Archives and Database, ITN BBC, "Omarska's White House", IHRLI Doc. No. 52995-53012; ABC Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors, Part Two", 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-9, IHRLI Doc. No. 56349-56351; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720; Republic of BiH, Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 34715-34716.


3069/ Id.

3070/ Thomson CSCE Committee to the Detention Camps in BiH, Draft Report (September 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 263 (reporting that the camp was undoubtedly "a disaster ready to happen"); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304; Amnesty International, Bosnia-Hercegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203.


3073/ "Victims of War", translation of a 3-part documentary, IHRLI Tape No. 123.

Notes (continued)

3075/ "Victims of War", translation of a 3-part documentary, IHRLI Tape No. 123.


3080/ Thomson CSCE Mission to the Detention Camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Draft Report (September 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 263 (reporting that after the camp commander left, the unsupervised guards harassed and mistreated the detainees with no apparent provocation); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-119, IHRLI Doc. No. 56686-56688.


3083/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9440 (reporting that usually 50 guards during a given shift); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-33, IHRLI Doc. No. 56424-56426 (reporting that about 20 on each of four shifts); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-129, IHRLI Doc. No. 56728-56731 (reporting that there were approximately 50 guards and that no more than 10 were available at any time).

Notes (continued)

3085/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-70, IHRLI Doc. No. 56546-56548 (reporting that the camp was "more or less an open area, without wire enclosures, only strategically placed guards kept the prisoners from escaping."); Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203.


3088/ Thomson CSCE Mission to the Detention Camps in BiH, Draft Report (September 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 263 (reporting that after the camp commander left, the unsupervised guards often harassed and mistreated the detainees with no apparent provocation); Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947.


3095/ Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing, Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39929-39930 (reporting that they were not Bosnian Serbs because they talked in ekavian dialect).

3096/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9437 (reasoning that the guards were local Serbs who could identify the detainees for creation of the lists); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-10, IHRLI Doc. No. 56355-56361.
Notes (continued)


3098/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume II (April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445 (identifying a first class captain with the unit).


3101/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-129, IHRLI Doc. No. 56728-56731 (3,000 on May 26--about 300 of whom from Prijedor, 2,700 from Kozarac and surrounding villages--and about 3,000 on October 1, mostly women and children).


3105/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc No. 56346-56348; see also US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959 (reporting that in mid-June and early August, many of the Muslim villagers whose homes were in and around Trnopolje were forced into camp).


3108/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-166, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849.


Notes (continued)


3122/ Id., (reporting, however, that the detention-transit camp was set up in the town at least five weeks earlier).

3123/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-192, IHRLI Doc. No. 56931-56934; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-70, IHRLI Doc. No. 56546-56548 (reporting that all the men from town of Bišćani were brought to Trnopolje after being turned away from Omarska because it was full).

3124/ Croatian Information Centre, Witness Statement jad15ea, IHRLI Doc. No. 39235A-39236A.


Notes (continued)

3129/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943.

3130/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-166, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849.


3132/ Bill Frelick, "Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, US Committee for Refugees, IHRLI Doc. No. 21595; see also: US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56663-56666, (reporting that those who were very old, very young or injured were evacuated to Trnopolje).

3133/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085, (reporting that four females and 140 male prisoners were retained at Omarska to clean the facility).

3134/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-228, IHRLI Doc. No. 57072-57074.


3140/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reporting that these papers were used to call men from the group, who were beaten and shot).


3143/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57334.

3144/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720, (report that prisoners transferred from Keraterm on August 3, were not fed for the first 4 days); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (reporting that people brought from Kozarac on May 27, were not fed for five days).
Notes (continued)


3153/ Bill Frelick, " Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, US Committee for Refugees, IHRLI Doc. No. 21621; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-230, IHRLI Doc. No. 57078-57081, (reporting that between 27 July and 18 August, the only meal normally served was lunch, which consisted of some thin soup and nothing else); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (transferee reporting that prisoners received the same amount of food as at Omarska); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57198; U.N. Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe, Commission on Human Rights, 21 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20862-20867, (reporting that detainees were surviving on minimum rations of bread); Stephen Engelberg, "Bosnians Provide Accounts of Abuse", The New York Times, August 4, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40042, (subject claims that food was limited to one piece of bread every other day; subjects dates of detention at Trnopolje are not reported); see however: "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-39977, (reporting that there was more food than at Omarska).

3154/ Draft Report of the Thomson CSCE Mission to the Detention Camps in Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 228; Bill Frelick, " Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, US Committee for Refugees, IHRLI Doc. No. 21621, (some of the townspeople of Trnopolje would leave food); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304; Amnesty International, "Bosnia-Hercegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights", October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 50198-50203, (reporting that detainees "had to depend on what relatives brought them, on what they could buy in the town (or from the authorities in the camp), or on food provided by the ICRC"); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reporting that the subject was given no food during her two days at the camp, but that some of the women in her group...
had brought food with them and apparently shared with the others); Stephen
Engelberg, "Bosnians Provide Accounts of Abuse", The New York Times, August 4,
1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40042; Stephen Engelberg, "Refugees from Croatia", The
Serbs working at the camp helped the detainees obtain food).

3155/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", April 18,
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (to obtain food from the local Red Cross,
detainees would pay a day in advance for bread and milk); US Department of
State Declassified Materials, 94-105, IHRLI Doc. No. 56655-56657, (reporting
that on July 24, the Serbian Red Cross visited and sold food; two loaves of
bread cost 1200 Bosnian Dinars); US Department of State Declassified
Materials, 94-270, IHRLI Doc. No. 57207-57209, (reporting that during June
1992, children were fed only one piece of bread each day, but that guards
could be bribed with German Marks for purchase of food); US Department of
State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reporting
that one of the prisoners in his group paid a Serbian guard 1,000DM for a bag
of flour, and that the bread made from it lasted one day).

3156/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", April 18,

3157/ "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia", Croatian
Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39931-39933, (subject, a
minor, reports that he was transferred to Trnopolje on August 1, and that for
the first several days his group were given no food).

3158/ US Department of State Declassified Material, 94-71, IHRLI Doc.
No. 56549-56551.

3159/ "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb,
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-39977, (reporting that women were allowed to go
home escorted by Četniks and prepare meals); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in
Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-
56720, (reporting that detainees from the village of Kozarac were occasionally
given permission to go home and get food from their gardens); An official UN
source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304; US Department of State Declassified
Materials, 94-33, IHRLI Doc. No. 56424-56426; Amnesty International, "Bosnia-
50198-50203; Stephen Engelberg, "Clearer Picture of Bosnia Camps", The New
York Times, August 16, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40044-40046; US Department of
State Declassified Materials, 94-149, IHRLI Doc. No. 56724-56727, (reporting
that women were allowed to leave the camp to get food).

No. 56663-56666, (reporting that although dangerous, many prisoners went out
and looked for potatoes and other vegetables in the fields; those caught were
shot); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-70, IHRLI Doc. No.
56546-56548; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc.
No. 56549-56551, (reporting that if they ventured out to what the guards
considered too far they were shot without warning); US Department of State
Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reports that Serb
snipers shot at the people saying that they had gone further than was
permitted or that they were caught stealing).

3161/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304.
Notes (continued)


3164/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-230, IHRLI Doc. No. 57078-57081; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720, (reporting that this food was taken away when the representatives left about 30 minutes later).


3167/ Draft Report of the Thomson CSCE Commission to the Detention Centres in Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 265; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304, (reporting that at the beginning prisoners could receive visits, but that these were suspended in early October).


3171/ Tilman Zulch ed., "Ethnic Cleansing", Society for Threatened Peoples", IHRLI Doc. No. 14483; Stephen Engelberg, "Bosnians Provide Accounts of Abuse", The New York Times, August 4, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40042, (reporting that the detainees were allowed only a few drops of dirty water a day from a pump out front).


3174/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-105, IHRLI Doc. No. 56655-56657, (reporting that the well was approximately 100 metres from the school); Sixth Submission by the United States to the U.N. Security Council, March 10, 1993, S-25393, IHRLI Doc. No. 18374-18375, (reporting that the well was about 50 metres from the prison gates).

Notes (continued)


3177/ The clinic was reportedly staffed by interned Muslim doctors. See however, Draft Report of the Thomson CSCE Commission to the Detention Centres in Bosnia-Hercegovina, September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 265, (reporting that the clinic was staffed by two medical students).

3178/ Therefore, as reported by the Special Rapporteur, "(t)here were diabetics without insulin, heart patients without digitalis, and persons suffering from hypertension without medication." "Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia", submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E-CN.4-1992-S-1-10, IHRLI Doc. No. 181-182; see also: Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445.


3180/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959, (subject was a Muslim who was detained at Trnopolje camp).


3182/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304, (where subject reportedly transferred to house arrest at a "Muslim House" in Banja Luka).


3186/ ITN News, BBC, "Omarska's While House, IHRLI Doc. No. 52995-53012, (reports that doctor gave the film to BBC journalist Penny Marshall, who smuggled it out of the camp); Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors", Part II, November 11, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154, (the doctor and patient are named in the report).


3188/ Id.
Notes (continued)

3189/ Roy Gutman, "Death Camps", A Witness to Genocide, Zagreb, Croatia, August 2, 1992, (reporting that the men were all under 18 or over 60; they were completely exhausted and very thin).


3191/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304, (reporting that hygiene appeared to be totally inadequate, particularly in relation to the number of detainees); "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39889-39930, (reporting that in the central camp area there was one outdoor toilet).


3195/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348, (reporting that the room was in the schoolhouse); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (reporting that the room was in the community centre building, and that several people were beaten to death there).


3197/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-73, IHRLI Doc. No. 56554-56555.

3198/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348.

3199/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9248-9445, (reporting that women were not heavily abused, just slapped).


3201/ Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Witness Statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 34715-34716


Notes (continued)


3207/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943, (reporting that women and very young girls would be taken away to a separate room and repeatedly raped for up to 6 hours); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959; Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9248-9445, (reporting that women were raped by guards, police officers and military personnel); "Victims of War", Documentary translation, IHRLI Tape No. 123.

3208/ Bill Frelick, "Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, US Committee for Refugees, IHRLI Doc. No. 21615, (subject says every night women were taken and raped); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. no. 56346-56348, (reporting that young girls raped every night); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11388-11401, (reporting that throughout the three months of the subjects detention about 500 girls were raped); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943, (subject, had been previously held in a camp in Jajce reported that the raping at Trnopolje did not happen as regularly as at the previous camp--dates of subject's detention at Trnopolje are not recorded); An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 3300-3304, (reporting that young girls were sometimes picked out and sexually abused); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551, (reporting that many women were gang raped or beaten); Stephen Engelberg, "Refugees from Camps", The New York Times, August 7, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40043, (reporting that there was a mass rape incident but that it was not repeated); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-149, IHRLI Doc. No. 56724-56727, (subject who was detained during June and July, reporting that camp guards routinely took young women away, and that it was common knowledge that they had been raped); Bill Schiller, "Bosnians Recall Horror of Rape", Toronto Star, 4 January 1993, p. A1, (subject claims was raped every night for at least 20 nights in July); Stephen Engelberg, "Clearer Picture of Bosnian Camps", The New York Times, 16 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40044-40046, (reporting that on at least one evening, drunken Serbian soldiers came into the women's detention hall and picked young women to be raped).


3211/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348.

Notes (continued)

3213/ Tilman Zulch ed., "Ethnic Cleansing", Society for Threatened Peoples, IHRLI Doc. No. 14475-14476; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11388-11401, (reporting girls claiming to have been raped by Serbs from Serbia); Stephen Engelberg, "Refugees from Camps", The New York Times, 7 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40043, (reporting that a mass rape was perpetrated by a group of drunk men identifying themselves as Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro, calling themselves "Cetniks").


3215/ "Victims of War", Documentary translation, IHRLI Tape No. 123.


3218/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445; Sixth Submission by the United States to the U.N. Security Council, March 10, 1993, S-25393, IHRLI Doc. No. 18359-18386, (reporting that women were taken to a house across the meadow out of site of the roadway); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959; Tilman Zulch ed., "Ethnic Cleansing", Society for Threatened Peoples, IHRLI Doc. No. 14475, (subject reporting that he saw 20 girls taken by Serbs toward the direction of Kozarac; half came back, while those who resisted were killed); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959, (reporting that women from the camp were taken to a vacant house in the village and raped).

3219/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943, (women were taken to a separate room); An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11388-11401, (women were raped in the office building next to where the subject was being held).

3220/ Witness Interview by Marion Weigel, Source unknown, IHRLI Doc. No. 39266A-39267A (subject and daughter were held for 21 days at Trnopolje).


3223/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-149, IHRLI Doc. No.
No. 56724-56727, (subject reports the names of the perpetrators).


3225/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943.


3228/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-198, IHRLI Doc. No. 56955-56959, (reporting that several weeks after their rapes, seven women denounced to Major Kuruzović some of the Serb soldiers who had raped them, that the women were sent to a neuropsychiatrist and then sent to Travnik by train); Stephen Engelberg, "Refugees from Camps", New York Times, 7 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 40043.


3232/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11388-11401.

3233/ IHRLI-Linden Productions Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52957-52988; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57198; Tilman Zulch ed., "Ethnic Cleansing", Society for Threatened Peoples, IHRLI Doc. No. 14422-14502, (subject reporting having seen rape of a 12 year old girl); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reporting that the soldiers would choose the most attractive young girls; those between 10 and 14 years old were taken).

reporting having seen one person killed in a beating by about 15 Serbs; subjects dates of detention are not reported).  

3235/ Roy Gutman, "A Witness to Genocide", Lisa Drew Books, Macmillan Publishing, IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947, (reporting that during subject's detention from June through September, that on occasion, guards would seize 5 or more prisoners who would never return); Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors", Part II, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154 (reporting that there were about 200 men killed, and that beatings were constant); "Ethnic Cleansing in the Kozarac Region", Medecins sans Frontieres Report, 7 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4843-4862, (reporting that 170 people were killed); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-101, IHRLI Doc. No. 56643-56645, (subject reporting that there were no known atrocities at Tnopolje between 20 August to 1 September 1992); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (subject reporting that approximately 250 people disappeared during his 50 days at the camp--dates of detention not recorded); Sixth Submission by the United States for the U.N. Security Council, 10 March 1993, S-25393, IHRLI Doc. No. 18359-18386 (reporting that between 50 and 60 prisoners died each day); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551, (reporting that between 10 and 15 prisoners were called out by name every 10 or 15 days and killed outside); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-182, IHRLI Doc. No. 56899-56902, (reporting that a named guard was observed to beat prisoners with a baton); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-149, IHRLI Doc. No. 56724-56727, (subject detained at Tnopolje in June and July).  

3236/ Witness Statement, Bosnian Government submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 33322-33323, (subject detained at Tnopolje during August 1992 stated that the detainees at Tnopolje were not beaten as at Keraterm and Omarska, however they were forced to graze the grass); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-195, Doc. No. 56941-56944, (transferee reporting that while there were minor beatings and robberies at Tnopolje, it was nothing like before at Keraterm).  


3239/ Id., (Helsinki Watch reports being denied access to this room).  


3241/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-73, IHRLI Doc. No. 56554-56555, (reporting that groups of Bosnian Serbs would frequently arrive at the camp, with or without lists, and take selected prisoners out of the camp and into the fields, that these men were never heard of again, and that the subject suggests that they may have been the victims of personal vendettas); Roy Gutman, "A Witness to Genocide", Lisa Drew Books, Macmillan,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947, (Serb acquaintances would come and call for a prisoner, take him out and kill him); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-230, IHRLI Doc. No. 57078-57081, (reporting that one soldier returning from the battle of Gradacac stopped at the camp, singled out a 70 year old prisoner apparently known to him, demanded his money then beat and stabbed the man to death with a knife).

3242/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-129, IHRLI Doc. No. 56728-56731 (reporting that a named prisoner was beaten by a named guard on two occasions because he allegedly shot several Serbs before being taken prisoner; prisoner subsequently died).

3243/ Id. (reporting that the husband and son of a Serb woman were taken by guards to a nearby lake and never returned, and were presumed to have been killed).


3245/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563 (reporting that first on the list were all members of the TDF (Territorial Defence Force) and Muslims who had purchased weapons).


3247/ Bill Frelick, "Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 21595, (reporting that drunken Serb soldiers coming from the front were the biggest problem);"Testimonies of Killings of Civilians", September 1992, Council of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Republic of Slovenia, IHRLI Doc. No. 47814, (reporting that locals in uniform would come to the camp and take away people to kill and that none of the "majors" (Army officers) would stop them);

3248/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-182, IHRLI Doc. No. 56899-56902;

3249/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-182, IHRLI Doc. No. 56899-56902;

3250/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-73, IHRLI Doc. No. 56554-56555;

3251/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57198;

3252/ "Testimonies on Killing of Civilians", Council of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Republic of Slovenia, IHRLI Doc. No. 47814, (reporting that subject believed the woman was shot by mistake during a simulation of defensive military action for Banja Luka TV); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (reporting that the woman was hit by a round fired indiscriminately during an argument between guards).
Notes (continued)

3253/ "Testimonies on Killing of Civilians", Council of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Republic of Slovenia, IHRLI Doc. No. 47814, (reporting that subject heard that Banja Luka TV was making a news report, and a Serb defence of an attack on the camp by Muslim Green Berets was simulated);

3254/ IHRLI-Linden Productions Video Archive and Database, Scene Breakdown, "Dispatches: A Town Called Kozarac", IHRLI Doc. No. 52957-52988; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-56348, (reportedly all of the people buried had been beaten to death and many appeared to have been tortured); Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9248-9445; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 56561-56563, (reporting that on one occasion young Muslims were forced to bury the bodies of a group of incoming prisoners who were shot because there was no room for them in the camp, and that the young Muslims were told that they too would be shot if they told anyone).

3255/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-266, IHRLI Doc. No. 57197-57198;


3257/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9248-9445,

3258/ "Testimonies on Killing of Civilians", Council of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Republic of Slovenia, IHRLI Doc. No. 47814, (reporting that subject believed the woman was shot by mistake during a simulation of defensive military action for Banja Luka TV); see however, Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", Vol. II, April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445, (reporting that the woman was hit by a round fired indiscriminately during an argument between guards).

3259/ Sixth Submission by the United States to the U.N. Security Council, March 10, 1993, S-25393, IHRLI Doc. No. 18363;

3260/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-8, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346-546348;


3262/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57334; Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", April 18, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445. According to one former detainee, the "official policy" at Trnopolje was that men, children, the sick and boys under 16 and men over 65 could leave Trnopolje on organized convoys.


3264/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-105, IHRLI Doc. No. 56655-56657, (reporting that the trucks stopped 10 km outside of Travnik so the women and children had to finish the journey on foot);
Notes (continued)

3265/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-230, IHRLI Doc. No. 57078-57081;

3266/ ABC Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors, Part Two, November 11, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154;

3267/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-97, IHRLI Doc. No. 56629-56631;

3268/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-270, IHRLI Doc. No. 57207-57209;

3269/ Helsinki Watch, "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina", April 13, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9428-9445;


3271/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720;

3272/ Croatian Information Centre, "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing", IHRLI Doc. No. 39931-39933;

3273/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-231, IHRLI Doc. No. 57082-57085;


3276/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-145, IHRLI Doc. No. 56799-56803; US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-165, IHRLI Doc. No. 56844-56849, (reporting that about 3,000 prisoners remained at the camp after this);

3277/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-108, IHRLI Doc. No. 56663-56666;


3279/ Bill Frelick, "Voices from the Whirlwind", April-May 1993, US Committee for Refugees, IHRLI Doc. No. 21617;


3281/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-126, IHRLI Doc. No. 56717-56720, (subject reporting having heard that thousands of Muslims and Croats were shot and thrown over the Vlašić waterfall in the area north of Travnik).
Notes (continued)

3282/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-139, IHRLI Doc. No. 56769-56771;


3284/ Sixth Submission by the United States to the U.N. Security Council, March 10, 1993, S-25393, IHRLI Doc. No. 18374-18375;

3285/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-12943.

3286/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423, (subject, a Muslim male, claims to be an eyewitness to the events of the massacre); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551, (subject claims that he was in the convoy, but that he was not on the buses, he reports that the incident happened at the end of July, however the account is consistent with other descriptions of the incident).

3287/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-196, IHRLI Doc. No. 56945-56948, (reporting that the group consisted of 250 men and about 10 women); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-179, IHRLI Doc. No. 56889-56891; The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No.57395; (reporting that when the buses arrived at the camp that there was a big clamor to get on board. The camp commander Slobodan Kurzovic (sic) made room on one of the buses for the subject and his father).

3288/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-103, IHRLI Doc. No. 56649-56652, (reporting that 10 buses and 8 trucks with trailers were brought to Omarska and prisoners were loaded on, the convoy went first to Trnopolje and then to Kozarac); The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to a letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57395, (reporting that during a brief stop at a gas station in Kozarac, three additional buses and seven trucks filled with men, women and children from Prijedor joined the convoy); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423, (reporting that the buses from Trnopolje were joined by two other buses and 6 trailer trucks);

3289/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to a letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57395.


3291/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423,

3292/ Roy Gutman, "A Witness to Genocide", Lisa Drew Books, Macmillan Publishing, IHRLI Doc. No. 24941-24947, (reporting that more than 200 Trnopolje camp inmates shot); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423, (reporting that all the men in the convoy were removed, approximately 250); The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57396, (reporting
that 250-300 male prisoners were selected); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, IHRLI Doc. No. 56549-56551, (reporting that 200 men were ordered onto the buses); Bosnian Government submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 33322-33323;


3294/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-71, 56549-56551, (subject reporting that there was not enough room for all the men on the buses and that he was one of three men were told to board a truck full of women and children, thereby escaping the massacre); ABC Nightline, "Bosnia: The Hidden Horrors, Part Two", November 11, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 32147-32154, (one subject reporting that women, children and old men and the sick were ordered to get out of his bus and to get into one of the trucks, and that he was able to sneak onto a truck).

3295/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57396;

3296/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-196, IHRLI Doc. No. 56945-56948, (reporting that buses drove forward about 200 metres); US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423, (reporting that the buses travelled about 2 km further and then stopped); The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57396, (reporting that the convoy drove for about 15 minutes before the buses separated from it);

3297/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423, (ravine 20 metres deep); The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57396, (ravine 50 metres deep);


3299/ The NSC Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence, attached to letter dated December 27, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 57397;


3301/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423;


3303/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-31, IHRLI Doc. No. 56420-56423;
Notes (continued)

3304/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-179, IHRLI Doc. No. 56889-56891;


3316/ "List of Concentration Camps" from Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulletin No.1, November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3041-99. Another report estimates 2,000 persons were detained at "Kevljani, Brezičani" as of November 19, 1992. (It is not clear why the prisoner totals from these two locations are combined because based on the available map and location information, Kevljani is approximately 12 kms east of the town of Prijedor.) Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, Zagreb to Georg Mautner-Markhof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, November 19, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-96.

3317/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-166, IHRLI Doc. No. 56851.
Notes (continued)

3318/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-166, IHRLI Doc. No. 56851.


3320/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-166, IHRLI Doc. No. 56851.


3324/ Witness Statement from "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39929-30. The subject, from Kozarac, relates that after the attack on his town, the residents were tricked when the Red Cross emblem was displayed and they heard announced over a megaphone: "Surrender, the Red Cross is waiting for you, you will be protected." The men and women were separated and loaded into 21 waiting buses. Some of the buses drove straight through the woods toward Trnopolje, the others went to Ciglane.


3330/ Witness Statements, submitted by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government Office, IHRLI Doc. No. 31933-37. Although the account does not give details about this incident the subject claims it happened the day after he was brought to Ciglane; he reports that after the attack on Kozarac on May 27, 1992, he was arrested and held at Ciglane for two days.
Notes (continued)


3334/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 776, 27 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43277. This source gives an incomplete map coordinate which locates the reported camp in the Kozarac area.

3335/ The report identifies the camp location as "Jajce, Prijedor." There is no listing for a town of that name in Prijedor according to available maps, however Jajce is a county in BiH located southeast of Banja Luka.

3336/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.

3337/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.

3338/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.

3339/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.

3340/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.

3341/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 12932-34.


3344/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 174, 31 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 43302-43303. The subject reports that "the Omarska concentration camp took in 4 separate camps in the area: Keramika, Trnopolje, Omarska, and Mrakovica."


3347/ "List of Concentration Camps" from Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulletin No.1, November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3041-99. Another report estimates 2,000 persons were detained at "Kevljani, Brezičani" as of November 19, 1992. (It is not clear why the prisoner totals from these two locations are combined because based on the available map and location information, Kevljani is approximately 12 kms east of the town of Prijedor.) Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, Zagreb to Georg Mautner-Markhof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, November 19, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-96.
Notes (continued)


3351/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 894, 21 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43289;

3352/ "List of Concentration Camps" from Bosnia-Herzegovina Bulletin No.1, November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3041-99; Confidential Note from Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer Civil Affairs, Zagreb to Georg Mautner-Markhof, Chief, Special Procedures Section, Centre for Human Rights, Geneva, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 49183-96, (reporting that 2,300 persons were held in "Ljubija mine, Sivac, Šenkovac, the Majdan camp" as of November 19, 1992.)


3356/ US Department of State, Declassified Materials, March 5, 1993, 94-146, IHRLI Doc. No. 56804-09.

3357/ US Department of State, Declassified Materials, March 5, 1993, 94-146, IHRLI Doc. No. 56804-09.

3358/ Subject states that the mine was located just west of the main road through Ljubija, south of the town, between an area marked as Ljubija Rudnik and a small lake. The prisoners were removed from the bus in groups of three and were forced to carry the corpses to an area out of sight of the subject. Automatic gun fire was heard and the groups of prisoners did not return to the bus. The subject assumed that the prisoners were being executed. The subject was able to escape during the confusion created when one of the prisoners struggled with a guard. He believes that he is the only survivor of the original group of 117 Muslims held at the Miska Glava cafe (see Miska Glava account.)

3359/ "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39931-33. The subject reports that the "guards" at the stadium were Serbs from neighbouring villages of
Donji Volar, Miska Glava and Tukovi. He identifies some of the guards. All reportedly were formerly civilians.


3361/ The remaining 70 POWs were taken by bus to a mine for execution. The men were removed two by two and shot. The prisoners in the bus rioted, only one is reported to have escaped. (See previous account, paragraph ***, for more information on this mass killing.)


3366/ Witness Statement VI, "Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia", Croatian Information Centre, Zagreb, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39931-33. Subject describes the events of his capture: On 21 July 1992, when his hometown of Bišćani was attacked by Serbs the subject escaped to the woods where he joined a group of about 270 people; they had 10 or 12 guns between them. The group then joined Capt. Asim MUHIĆ in the Kurevo woods (location unknown). After two days at this location the group was scattered by an attack by Serb paramilitaries. After the attack, subject and others were reportedly on their way to Cazin. The subject and 113 others were caught in the town of Miska Glava. According to the subject, his Serb captors were intending to kill the group but an officer ordered that the prisoners be brought to the hall in Miska glava.


3369/ US Department of State, Declassified Materials, March 5, 1993, 94-146, IHRLI Doc. No. 56804-09. Subject, a resident of Rizvanovići later escaped a mass killing at a mining area (see Ljubija Sports Stadium). He believes that he was the only surviving prisoner from a group of 117.

3370/ The subject believes that the ten men, called "volunteers" by their captors, were killed by the Bosnian Serb soldiers. He also believes that they were selected because they were residents of high standing or were relatively wealthy. He says that the victims were either known to some of their captors, who were from the local area, or that this information about them was obtained during the interrogations.

3371/ US Department of State, Declassified Materials, March 5, 1993, 94-
Notes (continued)

146, IHRLI Doc. No. 56804-56809. The subject believes that the three perpetrators were either doctors or other medical persons because they wore white medical smocks and had their own medical instruments. It is reported that all three had worked at the "Doktor Mladen Stojanović" hospital in Prijedor. This hospital was reportedly the main hospital for Prijedor and was located in the Urije district of the city. The names of two of the perpetrators are listed in the report at IHRLI Doc. No. 56807.

3372/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 678, 1 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43259.

3373/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 678, 1 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43259.

3374/ United Kingdom Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 678, 1 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43259.


3382/ British Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CFN 059, IHRLI Doc. No. 40063-120.

3383/ British Defence Debriefing Team, Debrief of CRN 059, IHRLI Doc. No. 40063-120.

3384/ Submission to IHRLI from Mediya (individual) containing statements by two detainees, IHRLI Doc. No. 29425-38.


Notes (continued)

3387/ US Department of State Declassified Materials, 94-206, IHRLI Doc. No. 57001-04. It is assumed that the appellations "Prijedor Police Station" and the "Serbian Police Headquarters in Prijedor" both refer to the main police station in Prijedor.


3403/ Author and source unknown, submitted by Women Living Under Muslim
Notes (continued)

(sic), under title of "Compilation of Information on Crimes of War Against Women in ex-Yugoslavia." IHRLI Doc. No. 6833. It may be that the location of this camp has been erroneously ascribed to Prijedor; the relevant events in the story happened in the county of Poča, in south-eastern BiH.

3404/ Author and source unknown, submitted by Women Living Under Muslim (sic), under title of "Compilation of Information on Crimes of War Against Women in ex-Yugoslavia." IHRLI Doc. No. 6833.

3405/ Author and source unknown, submitted by Women Living Under Muslim (sic), under title of "Compilation of Information on Crimes of War Against Women in ex-Yugoslavia." IHRLI Doc. No. 6833.


3408/ U.S. Congress, IHRLI Doc. No. 056973.


3411/ UPDATE ON ICRC ACTIVITIES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IHRLI Doc. No. 017836,43.

3412/ Fax from International Committee of the Red Cross with Situation Report on ICRC Activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina attached, 3 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 036944,55.


3414/ ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 35, 29 August-4 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 038404,12.

3415/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax of 27 May 1994.

3416/ ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 36, 5-11 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 038368,82.


3418/ ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 36, 5-11 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 038368,82.

3419/ ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 36, 5-11 September 1993,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 038368,82.

3420/ ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 36, 5-11 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 038368,82.


3422/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax of 27 May 1994.

3423/ Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention and number of detainees visited by the ICRC, fax of 27 May 1994.

3424/ Insufficient information was provided by the report regarding the specific location and control of the alleged facilities. For purposes of this analysis a conservative view will be adopted and only one of the two will be acknowledged in the count of detention facilities. ECMM HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY - REPORT No 36, 5-11 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 038368,82.


3428/ This background information comes from John Pomfret, Crisis in Bosnia, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, 7 May 1993, at A18, and from Kurt Schork, Bosnian Women Tell of Gang Rapes by Serbs, THE REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, 9 August 1992, BC Cycle.


3438/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.


3443/ Isi Mensud, Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Submission to


3449/ United States State Department, United States Submission to the United Nations Commission of Experts, Case 94-28, IHRLI Doc. No. 56415.

3450/ United States State Department, United States Submission to the United Nations Commission of Experts, Case 94-28, IHRLI Doc. No. 56415.


Notes (continued)

5999, 22320.


3467/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC (30 April 1994).

5494.


3471/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32036.

3472/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32036.


3476/ Muharem Omerdi, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps (29 June 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 4317.

3477/ Muharem Omerdi, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps (29 June 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 4317.


Notes (continued)


3486/  See Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.2), IHRLI Doc. No. 33290; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32054.


3489/  Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch
Notes (continued)

No.21, IHRLI Doc. No. 33290.


3495/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32036.


3498/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.2), IHRLI Doc. No. 33290.


3501/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.

3502/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.

3503/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.
Notes (continued)

3504/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.


3510/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32111.


Notes (continued)


3517/ STATE COMMISSION FOR GATHERING FACTS ON WAR CRIMES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, BULLETIN NO. 3--FACTS ON WAR CRIMES (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 13468, 29853.

3518/ Kurt Schork, Muslim women 'gang-raped by Serbs,' INDEPENDENT, August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39345A.

3519/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32037.

3520/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32037.


3531/ See Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32037.

Notes (continued)


3535/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.2), IHRLI Doc. No. 33290.


Notes (continued)


3547/ STATE COMMISSION FOR GATHERING FACTS ON WAR CRIMES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, BULLETIN NO. 3--FACTS ON WAR CRIMES (March 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 13468, 13471, 29853, 29856; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies, IHRLI Doc. No. 29184; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 31974.


3549/ STATE COMMISSION FOR GATHERING FACTS ON WAR CRIMES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, BULLETIN NO. 3--FACTS ON WAR CRIMES (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 13471, 29856; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies, IHRLI Doc. No. 29184; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 31974.


3552/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.2), IHRLI Doc. No. 33290.

3553/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.2), IHRLI Doc. No. 33290.

3554/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies, IHRLI
Notes (continued)

Doc. No. 29172; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.1), IHRLI Doc. No. 32112.


Notes (continued)

3566/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies, IHRLI Doc. No. 29186; See also Id. at IHRLI Doc. No. 29199, 29225-29226, 30191-30192; Petty Officer J. Ross and Cpl. T. McComb, Canadian Rape Report 1992-1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 33861; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 Victim Testimonies (Batch No.3), IHRLI Doc. No. 35676, 35693 (states that a group of approximately 21 people received food only once).


Notes (continued)

October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 121.


3583/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56923.

3584/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56923-56924.

3585/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56924.

3586/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 57076.

3587/ One source suggests that this open field was at Polygon, a test track for vehicles, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN Office in Geneva, Interviews of ex-prisoners, 21 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29747.


3590/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 6753.

3591/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56926; Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304; U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 57066-57067.

3592/ This man was a former colonel in the Yugoslav Army, U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 57066-57067.

3593/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56926.

3594/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 57110.


3596/ Media Press Sarajevo Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 22335.

3597/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304.
Notes (continued)

3598/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304.

3599/ This camp is referred to numerous times as the Manac camp, but it would seem that the witnesses are making reference to what is otherwise known throughout this report as the Manjača camp.


3601/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 57111; Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304.

3602/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56924.

3603/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 57111.


3609/ The auto factory was 200 metres west, and the other was 100 metres east, U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56558-56559.

3610/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56558.


3612/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.

3613/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.

3614/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56926.

3615/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56924.

Notes (continued)

3617/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.


3619/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304.

3620/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56924.

3621/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.


3627/ Media Press Sarajevo Report, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 22335.

3628/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.

3629/ Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN Office in Geneva, Interview of ex-prisoners, 21 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29749 and U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.

3630/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 56559.


3636/ This man came on 9 or 10 August 1992, Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN Office in Geneva, Interviews of ex-prisoners, 21 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29750.

3637/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56925.
Notes (continued)


3640/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 57112.


3643/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on the Muslims, IHRLI Doc. No. 22304.

3644/ U.S. State Department, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No 56924.


3649/ Witness testimony, recorded by Leila Hrvat, Zenica, 8 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 54752.


3651/ Witness testimony, recorded by Leila Hrvat, Zenica, 8 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 54781.


3653/ Witness testimony, recorded by Leila Hrvat, Zenica, 8 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 54776 and 54780.


Notes (continued)


3657/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 29745.


3661/ U.S. State Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 29

3662/ Muharem Omerdić, counselor of religious education at the Riyasat of the Islamic community in Sarajevo, Muslims in Concentration Camps, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 431

3663/ Permanent Mission of Denmark, IHRLI Doc. No. 29744.


3666/ These groups were dominated by Muslims and Croats.


3668/ Nikola Antanov, Fighting Flares in Bosnia, Leaders Plead For Peace, Reuters, 5 April 1992. For a full discussion of the Battle and Siege of Sarajevo, see Annex VI.


3670/ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Report to the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), Case III-011, at 22 (1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 2176 (alleging that in late 1991 and 1992 there were "bordellos" in Sarajevo where Muslim and Croat units raped Serb women as young as 12, keeping them in the "bordello" until the fifth month of pregnancy, and then detaining them to prevent abortions, and that men with infectious diseases including AIDS were "deliberately allowed" to visit the "bordellos" and rape women there); Bordellos of Screams: Confessions by the Women Raped in Muslim and Croatian Prisons 23-24 (undated), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 7088-7089 (same); Yugoslav Mission, Submission to the United Nations Secretary General, U.N. Doc. A/48/124, A/25506 (1 April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 18264 (alleging that Muslim and Croat forces run bordellos for Serb women); Yugoslav Mission, Submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights,
Notes (continued)

U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/86 (8 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 12609 (stating that Muslim militia run brothels with the knowledge and acknowledgement of Muslim authorities); Statement of [witness], taken 21 January 1992, in Sarajevo, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 11862-11863 (alleging that "bordellos" were a public secret).

3671/ This is not a comprehensive list of sites, but contains only camps for which few details are given. Camps for which there are more details are described more fully below.

3672/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (21 January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5525.

3673/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (21 January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5525.

3674/ Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency to the United Nations (5 August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11703.

3675/ Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency to the United Nations (5 August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11703.

3676/ Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency to the United Nations (5 August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11703.

3677/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11741.

3678/ Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency to the United Nations (5 August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11703.

3679/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11741.

3680/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11825.

3681/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (21 January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5525.

3682/ Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Open Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency to the United Nations (5 August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 11703.

3683/ Bordellos of Screams 24, IHRLI Doc. No. 7089.


3685/ Maggie O'Kane, UN Condemns Serb "Policy" of Rape, Guardian Weekly, 27 December 1992, at 22, IHRLI Doc. No. 6832.

3686/ This may be a misspelling. The author may have meant the county of Sokolac, just east of Sarajevo. Maggie O'Kane, UN Condemns Serb "Policy" of
Rape, Guardian Weekly, 27 December 1992, at 22, IHRLI Doc. No. 6832. It is also possible that it is referring to one of the other Sokolac's located in either Šipovo, Bihać or Sokolac counties.

3687/ Maggie O'Kane, UN Condemns Serb "Policy" of Rape, Guardian Weekly, 27 December 1992, at 22, IHRLI Doc. No. 6832.

3688/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11809 (alleging that there were private prisons for Serbs where men were beaten and killed and women were raped and that intellectuals were targets)


3694/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11821.

3695/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11826.


3697/ The report states that those accused of rape were probably members of special units commanded by the commander of the Territorial Defence Forces, but does not state how it arrived at that conclusion. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Third Report, 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64201.


3704/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces (21 January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 5525.


3711/ Statement of [witness], undated, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 18656-18658


3713/ Statement of [witness], Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 11816-
Notes (continued)

11817.


3725/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11810.
Notes (continued)

3726/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 11810, 11819-11821


3728/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11810.


3732/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11821.

3733/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 11810, 11819, 11821. See also, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Third Report, 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64219 (stating only that prisoners were physically maltreated, not alleging by what forces).


3735/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11819.

3736/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11821.


3739/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11823.

3740/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited By ICRC in Former


3742/ There is a very strong possibility that this refers to the tunnel prison located in Bradina, in the county of Konjic.


3745/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11826.

3746/ According to the source, this village is located some 10 kilometres from Sarajevo, however, information regarding the exact location of the village Presjenica and the Dečić camp has not been found. Consequently, their existence in Sarajevo county has not been verified.


3750/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11811.


3760/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11811.


Notes (continued)
Nos. 35657-35659.

3766/ It is unclear whether access was given in 1992 or 1993.

3767/ Helsinki Watch, Bosnia-Hercegovina: Abuse by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces in Central and Southwest Bosnia-Hercegovina.


3769/ It is unclear to what this word refers.


3771/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement of [witness], Case 534/92, IHRLI Doc. 33299.


3773/ United States, Department of State, Declassified Documents, Case 94-26, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 56403-56404.

3774/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No.064438. This site may be Grude Prison, discussed immediately below.

3775/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina\Association of Serbs from Konjic, A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area, IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-007062 at Doc. No. 7059.

3776/ Association of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina\Association of Serbs from Konjic, A New Genocide Against Serbs in Konjic Area, IHRLI Doc. No. 7032-007062 at Doc. No. 7059.


Notes (continued)


3782/ Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps (30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761.


3786/ Zdravko Grebo, Report on Human Rights Violations to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights 16 (November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 5508 (not reporting the duration); Zlata Phillips & Forman Phillips, War Experiences of Children from Bosnia/Herzegovina (1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 6701-6704 (reporting the statements of three children detained, each of whom stated they were kept for three days); Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps (30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761 (stating the convoy was detained for over 50 hours); Save Humanity, Report on War Destructions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 June 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 645, 657 (placing the duration at two days).


3790/ This information was told to Herak by two men who had thrown the bodies into the furnace to be burned. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Department, Statement of Borislav Herak (Sarajevo, 11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Department, Statement of Borislav Herak, Case 1114/1992 (Sarajevo, 14 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 33344-33351, 33346.

3791/ One source stated that these prisoners had been detained at the Jugopetrol warehouse at Rajlovac. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement of [witness] (Sarajevo, 3 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 32058-32059.

Notes (continued)


3794/ Statement No. 6, Why, Urbicid Sarajevo (1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 22123.


3798/ This information was told to Herak by Radomir Pustivuk and Danilo Ždralo, who had thrown the bodies into the furnace to be burned. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Department, Statement of Borislav Herak (Sarajevo, 11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 33344-33351, 33346; Court TV, Transcript of the trial of Borislav Herak, IHRLI Tape 27, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 16869-16899; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Department, Statement of Borislav Herak (Sarajevo, 14 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267.


Notes (continued)


3805/ There is a bit of a discrepancy with the date information provided in the ICRC report. The report states that ICRC representatives visited a detention facility at a hospital in Sarajevo on 24 September 1991; however, the siege in Sarajevo did not commence until April 1992. See ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited By ICRC in Former Yugoslavia, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442 at Doc. No. 064440.


3809/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11810.


3812/ Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human

3813/ UNPROFOR Daily Site Report, 21 January 1993, at 3, IHRLI Doc. No. 8282 (stating that the week of 21 January 1993, a CIVPOL Investigation Team visited Kula camp, run by Serbs, holding 171 Muslim prisoners; the camp had no electricity or running water).


3817/ Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/48/92, S/25341 (26 February 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 35815 (stating that in January 1993, there were 131 prisoners waiting at Kula for exchange); Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 50195-50196 (alleging that there were about 200 prisoners, mostly women and children, in one room of the camp); Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 279/92 (22 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 31980 (estimating the population in June at 180); Statement No. 9, IID 207/86, Save Humanity, Report on On-going War Destoructions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part II (7 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 4059 (placing the total number of detainees at 130 in mid-May, and adding that when the witness was exchanged, he saw 100 more detainees arriving).

3818/ This is most likely the Kula camp in the Butmir section of Sarajevo, near the airport. ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited By ICRC in Former Yugoslavia, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64437-64442, at 64438.

Notes (continued)


3821/ Susan Moran, Jury is Out on Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, Insight, 30 August 1993, at 17, IHRLI Doc. No. 33513.

3822/ Zdravko Grebo, Report on Human Rights Violations to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights 15 (November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 5507 (stating the population was mostly civilian with a few prisoners of war); United Kingdom, Defence Debriefing Team, Special Report on Prisoner of War (PW) Camps in the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Annex I to JSIO 2841/19 (25 March 1994), IHRLI Doc. No. 63836 (reporting that detainees were prisoners of war); UNPROFOR Daily Site Report, 21 January 1993, at 3, IHRLI Doc. No. 8282 (same); Susan Moran, Jury is Out on Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, Insight, 30 August 1993, at 17, IHRLI Doc. No. 33513 (stating that some prisoners were Serbian prisoners of war, but the rest were Serbian criminals); Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 279/92 (22 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 31980 (reporting that the population was civilian); Statement No. 9, IID 207/86, Save Humanity, Report on On-going War Destructions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part II (7 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 4059 (calling Kula the place "where civilians are kept").

3823/ However, the source stated that the camp was at the former JNA barracks at Lukavica. This may not be Kula camp, but may instead refer to Lukavica camp. United States, Department of State, United States Human Rights Report on Bosnia and Serbia, 1992 (January 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 9045.


3825/ Susan Moran, Jury is Out on Bosnia War Crimes Tribunal, Insight, 30 August 1993, at 17, IHRLI Doc. No. 33513.

Notes (continued)

3827/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 279/92, IHRLI Doc. No. 31980.


3833/ Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights (October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 50195-50196; Statement No. 9, IID 207/86, Save Humanity, Report on On-going War Destorutions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part II (7

3834/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 279/92 (22 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 31980.


Notes (continued)

3839/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 1757/93, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 35683-35684, 29237-29239

3840/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, State Commission for War Crimes, Statement of [witness], Case 1757/93, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 35683-35684, 29237-29239


3853/ Zdravko Grebo, Report on Human Rights Violations to the United
Notes (continued)


3857/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement N.N., Bulletin No. 3: Facts on War Crimes (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29870-29871 (alleging that about 400 detainees from Bratunac were brought to Pale in May 1992, and that the guards said the detainees had attacked Sokolac, but they appeared to be civilians, and included women and children); Statement of 4120/85, Witness No. 11, Save Humanity, Report on War destructions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 June 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 669 (stating that 435 prisoners from Bratunac were held for 2 days at Pale in preparation for an exchange in Visoko); Statement of [witness], Centre for Research on War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide, Zenica, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 54856-54860 (naming one person transferred from Bratunac to Pale in mid-May, released 20 June 1992); Statement of [witness], Centre for Research on War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide, Zenica, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 54812-54815 (naming one person transferred from Bratunac to Pale in mid-May, released in Visoko in June 1992).

3858/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement N.N., Bulletin No. 3: Facts on War Crimes (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29870-29871 (alleging that about 400 detainees from Bratunac were brought to Pale in May 1992, and that the guards said the detainees had attacked Sokolac, but they appeared to be civilians, and included women and children); Statement of 4120/85, Witness No. 11, Save Humanity, Report on War destructions, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (3 June 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 669 (stating that 435 prisoners from Bratunac were held for 2 days at
Pale in preparation for an exchange in Visoko).


3861/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23709.

3862/ This may be a can of soup, but the witness does not specify.


3865/ Statement No. 6, Why, Urbicid Sarajevo (1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 22123.


3868/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement N.N., Bulletin No.
Notes (continued)


When the witness was released, she stated that she counted 15 doors to other rooms. Statement of [witness], IHRLI Tape 21, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 32130-32140.


3872/ Statement of [witness], IHRLI Tape 21, transcript, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 32130-32140.

3873/ Statement of [witness], IHRLI Tape 21, transcript, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130-32140.

Notes (continued)


3877/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11813.

3878/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11828.

3879/ Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps 30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761.

3880/ Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps (30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761.

Notes (continued)


3883/ It is possible also that some were taken before and some after the attack. Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Services, Statement of Borislav Herak (Sarajevo, 14 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 33348; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulletin No. 3: Facts on War Crimes (March 1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29868-29870; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, State Security Services, Statement of [witness], Case 323/1992, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 31957-31958.


3893/ This witness may have been taken to Energopetrol. The events he
described coincided with a witness from that site.


3898/ Union for Peace and Humanitarian Aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Report to European Court for Human Rights in Geneva, Against War Criminals (28 October 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 49209-49210; Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps 3 (30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761 (stating that the camp was at barracks and when it overflowed, the excess people were put into garages in the village Krivoglavci and in a World War II bunker).

3899/ Zdravko Grebo, Report on Human Rights Violations to the United Nations Centre for Human Rights 16-17 (November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 5508-5509. Because it is difficult to discern the exact number of detention facilities situated in this area, a conservative position is taken and it is hereby assumed that only one facility was in operation.


Notes (continued)

3906/ Muharem Omerdić, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Muslims in Concentration Camps 3 (30 July 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 9761.

3907/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Statement of Borislav Herak, Case 1211/92 (Sarajevo, 11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267, 29258.

3908/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Statement of Borislav Herak, Case 1211/92 (Sarajevo, 11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267, 29264.

3909/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Statement of Borislav Herak, Case 1211/92 (Sarajevo, 11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267, 29265.

3910/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior, Security Department, Statement of Borislav Herak (Sarajevo, 14 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 3349.


3917/ ECMM, Humanitarian Activity Report No. 36, September 5-11, 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 38381.


3919/ One source stated that there were over 12 cells. Supplement No. 5, Serbian Council Information Centre, Documentation Regarding the Violation of Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, Crimes and Violence Against the Serb Civilian Population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dossier No. 3, Muslim Camps in Konjic Municipality: Čelebići, Sports Hall Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo (1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 46164-46169.


3923/ One source stated that there were over 12 cells. Supplement No. 5, Serbian Council Information Centre, Documentation Regarding the Violation of Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, Crimes and Violence Against the Serb Civilian Population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dossier No. 3, Muslim Camps in Konjic Municipality: Čelebići, Sports Hall Musala in Konjic and Donje Selo (1993), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 46164-46169.


3926/ Supplement No. 5, Serbian Council Information Centre,
Notes (continued)


3927/ It is unclear whether this happened only once or on multiple occasions.

3928/ It is unclear whether this man acted with another or whether his name might be differently spelled by the source.

3929/ Letter from Colonel Vinko Lukić, Union of Representatives, Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Committee Herzeg-Bosnia, Croatian Council of Defence Kiseljak to UNPROFOR, 23 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 55193-55195.


3932/ Bordellos of Screams 24 (undated), IHRLI Doc. No. 7089.


3942/ United Kingdom, Defence Debriefing Team, Special Report on Prisoner of War (PW) Camps in the Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Annex I to JSIO 2841/19 (25 March 1994), IHRLI Doc. No. 63835, 63836; United States, Department of State, United States Human Rights Reports on Bosnia and
Notes (continued)


3943/ Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Presidency, Republic of Srpska, Open Letter, 27 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 11810, 11821;


Notes (continued)


3957/ IHRLI Tape 65, Code A044 (October 10, 1993).


3963/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of the Interior,
Notes (continued)


3967/ Interrogation of [alleged perpetrator], IHRLI Tape 18, transcript, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 32226-32241, 32230-32231 (confessing to committing war crimes including the rape of captive Muslim women; the alleged perpetrator later retracted his confession, saying that he was tortured to give it).

3968/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs,


Zdravko Grebo, Report to Tadeusz Mazowiecki on Human Rights
Notes (continued)

Violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 5506-5507.

3979/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statement of [witness], Case 534/92, IHRLI Doc. No. 33299.


3983/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Statement of Borislav Herak, Case 1211/92 (11 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. Nos. 29247-29267, 29261-29263. This statement was corroborated by Sretko Damjanović, the colleague who participated in these murders. Damjanović retracted his statement in court. Interrogation of Sretko Damjanović, IHRLI Tape 18, transcript, IHRLI Doc. No. 32226-32241, 32233-32238.


3986/ There is also reported to be a camp in Tomislavgrad referred to as the Šekovići camp, it is unclear if these are references to the same camp or two different camps by the same name.


3990/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 023702.

3991/ It is unclear if the source is referring to Šekovići.
Notes (continued)

3992/ Defence Debriefing Team (DDT) Summary No. 25 of Atrocity Information, IHRLI Doc. No. 043287.

3993/ United Nations FAX, Julio Baez, Legal Officer/Assistant, Secretary of the Commission of Experts, IHRLI Doc. No. 016825; See also, Grebo Report 11/19/92, Anne-Marie Thalman, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Civil Affairs, Zagreb, IHRLI Doc. No. 5494; See also, List of Concentration Camps and Prisons at the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Approximate Number of Prisoners, IHRLI Doc. No. 022328; See also, World Campaign "Save Humanity", Report On War Destructions, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 052154; See also ICRC, List of Edtention Places Visited by ICRC in Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No.064438. Report refers to a camp visited in the village of "Šenkovići" on 22 June 1993.

3994/ Phillipe Koulischer, Deuxieme Livre Noir De La Purification Ethnique, Temoinages, Documents, Commentaires et Estimations Concernant l'Extermination des Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzegovine de Mars a Novembre (Decembre 1992) IHRLI Doc. No. 5977.

3995/ Reportedly there is a village in Mrkonjić Grad called Mlinište. It is possible that the information which follows refers to a detention facility in that county.

3996/ Letter from Ljubomir Sopčić From Senad Biščević (26 July 1993)

3997/ Translation by Ljubomir Sopčić of Testimony of Senad Biščević 26 July. 1993 (Serbs searching for timber reportedly discovered the camp when prisoners were forced to load their trucks with timber. These Serbs identified Serbian officers in control of the camp. IHRLI Doc. No. 040159

3998/ Translation by Ljubomir Sopčić of Testimony of Senad Biščević 26 July. 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 040159 (stating that an unidentified Serbian officer who was married to a Muslim woman entered the camp in search of his in-laws and was prevented from searching further by Commander Stupor after he had searched two of the barracks).

3999/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina(August 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 386. The five men had survived the killing of disarmed combatants on 15 May 1992, on the Vlasic plateau, near Travnik. The men were taken to a Yugoslav Army headquarters where the prisoners were reportedly beaten. The prisoners were then taken to the Babanovac Hotel where many Yugoslav army officers were present.


4003/ The man's name is on record with IHRLI.

4004/ Why, Publication for Human Rights and Peace, Sarajevo 1992,
Notes (continued)

"Urbicid '92 Sarajevo", IHRLI Doc. No. 22117.

4005/ The witness and victims names are on record with IHRLI. Witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 54640-54644.

4006/ Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muslims in Concentration Camps, by Muharem Omerdić, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 004313-004320

4007/ The woman's name is on record with IHRLI.

4008/ She named six alleged perpetrators.

4009/ Witness statement, IHRLI Doc. No. 029232-029235; Duplicate at IHRLI Doc. No. 031954-031955; Duplicate at IHRLI Doc. No. 035672-035673; See also, IHRLI Doc. No. 029852.


Notes (continued)


4024/ Letter from Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, 23 August 1993 (IHRLI Doc. No. 034952).

4025/ Letter from Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, 23 August 1993 (IHRLI Doc. No. 034952).

4026/ Letter from Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations, 23 August 1993 (IHRLI Doc. No. 034952).


4029/ Mazowiecki Report, 6 September 1993 (IHRLI Doc. No. 35733).

4030/ An official UN source, (IHRLI Doc. No. 034566).

4031/ An official UN source, (IHRLI DOC. NOS. 034329 and 034554).

4032/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date


4037/ This detention facility was reported as being in Tusanj, however being unable to locate this place it was added to the Tešanj file. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Third Report, 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64202


Notes (continued)

No. 5506.


4043/ D.I.M.H., Division of information and research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 4668-9 at Doc. No. 4668.

4044/ D.I.M.H., Division of information and research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony, IHRLI Doc. No. 4668-9 at Doc. No. 4668.


4055/ Also known as the Yugoslav National Army, the Yugoslav People's Army. JNA literally, Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija.


Notes (continued)


4065/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009128-9.

4066/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009128-9.

4067/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4068/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4069/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4070/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4071/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4072/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4073/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

4074/  Young, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114-009129 at Doc. No. 009129.

Notes (continued)


4086/ In one case, the soldiers first removed a victim's eye with a knife before cutting his throat. US Government Submission as requested by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 780 (1992), IHRLI Doc. No.018359-018369 at Doc. No.018368.


4088/ US Dept. of State, Submission of Docs No.94-1 through 94-276, IHRLI Doc. No. 056888.

4089/ US Dept. of State, Submission of Docs No.94-1 through 94-276, IHRLI Doc. No. 056888.

4090/ US Dept. of State, Submission of Docs No.94-1 through 94-276,
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 056888.

4091/ US Dept. of State, Submission of Docs No.94-1 through 94-276, IHRLI Doc. No. 056888.

4092/ Letter from Anne-Marie Thalman, Civil Affairs Zagreb, IHRLI Doc. No. 4908-005638 at Doc. No. 5495.


4100/ See Section on Bosanski Petrovac, supra.


4104/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in The Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 009114-035580 at Doc. No. 035578-80. It is possible that the report of the Medecins Sans Frontieres refers to detention facilities already mentioned in this county, however, because their report was silent as to the identity of the two facilities visited, these two locations are treated here as one additional facility.
Notes (continued)


4107/ UN Commission of Experts Letter from Julio Baez, IHRLI Doc. No.016819-016835 at Doc. No.016823.

4108/ UN Commission of Experts Letter from Julio Baez, IHRLI Doc. No.016819-016835 at Doc. No.016823.

4109/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No.035300-035330 at Doc. No.035326.

4110/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No.035300-035330 at Doc. No.035326.

4111/ Serbs were collected from various villages including Raščani, Eminovo Selo, Mandino Selo, Lipa, Kongora, Srdjani, Baljci, Oplečani and the city of Tomislavgrad. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.029751-756 at Doc. No.029756.

4112/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No.018936-018966 at Doc. No.018965.

4113/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No.035300-035330 at Doc. No.035323.

4114/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No.035300-035330 at Doc. No.035323.

4115/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No.035300-035330 at Doc. No.035323.


4117/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035323.

4118/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5.

4119/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5.

4120/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5.

4121/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5.

4122/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5.
Notes (continued)


4125/ Other sources have identified a similar rape camp in the village or county of Šekovići. It is unclear from the information if the camp references are intended to identify the location in Tomislavgrad county or that in the county of Šekovići.


4127/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012895-012950 at Doc. No. 012913-4.

4128/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012895-012950 at Doc. No. 012913-4.

4129/ Letter and attached report from the Yugoslavian Mission to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028595 at Doc. No. 028595.

4130/ Letter and attached report from the Yugoslavian Mission to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028595 at Doc. No. 028595.

4131/ Helsinki Watch, Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5. See also An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 029751-756 at Doc. No. 029756.

4132/ Helsinki Watch, Dinah's Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5. See also An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 029751-756 at Doc. No. 029756.

4133/ Helsinki Watch, Dinah's Field Notes, IHRLI Doc. No. 035300-035330 at Doc. No. 035324-5. See also An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 029751-756 at Doc. No. 029756. According to one report there were as many as 1,000 individuals detained in this camp-village. The report states that the inmates were detained without food, supplies and health care. See Yugoslav Mission, Letter and attached documents from Djokić to Chairman of Commission of Experts, 27 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 048408-048461 at Doc. No. 048418.


4136/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 023684-023685 at Doc. No. 023685. UN Economic and Social Council, Situation of Human Rights in the
Notes (continued)


4141/ Submission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 27 November 1992, Bates: 3120. Prisoners in this facility are allegedly transported to the village of Tisovac (near Busovača) where they are compelled to stand in a swimming pool with water up to their throats. They must remain in the pool until their skin begins to decay, at which time they are taken to Grude and exposed to the sun.

4142/ Because these camps are not identified and are inadequately described, multiple reports may be describing the same camp.


4152/ ICRC, "Prisoners Regularly Visited in Connection with the Conflict by the ICRC in BiH", IHRLI Doc. No. 017843 and 017848.


4158/ Letter from Biljana Plavšić, Member of the Serbian Republic Presidency, IHRLI Doc. No. 011784; Letter from Dragomir Djokić, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of FRY, 27 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 003151 at Doc. No. 003153.


4162/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023648.

4163/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023648.

4164/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023648.
Notes (continued)

4165/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023646.

4166/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023646.

4167/ Secretary-General Periodic Report S/25792 10 May 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 023646.

4168/ ICRC, List of Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4169/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 15 March 1993

4170/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 29 December 1993 no IHRLI Doc. No.


4172/ ICRC, List of Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4173/ ICRC, List of Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.


4175/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 29 December 1993 no IHRLI Doc. No. The report stated that the name of the prison owner was being withheld.

4176/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 29 December 1993 no IHRLI Doc. No. The source stated that this man's name is also being withheld.

4177/ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 29 December 1993 no IHRLI Doc. No. Most of the instructors in the training centre were allegedly "Mujahadeen" from a number of Islamic countries and many were known criminals and terrorists.


4179/ Bordellos of Screams: Confessions by the Women Raped in Muslim and Croatian Prisons, IHRLI Doc. No. 007088.


4184/ Yugoslav Daily Survey, 10 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 002200;
Notes (continued)


4185/ Yugoslav Daily Survey, 10 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 002200;


4187/ It is possible that "Tusanj" is misspelled and should in fact read "Tešanj". That being the case, the existence of this detention facility may properly be found in the municipality of Tešanj.


4191/ Letter to the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of Delegation of F.R.Y., IHRLI Doc. No. 028663.


Notes (continued)

No. 022214.


4202/ Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, IHRLI /Linden Productions Video Archive & Database, IHRLI Doc. No. 053048. The description of the cellars and the reports from the women are similar to the description of the 'tunnel prison' in Tuzla.

4203/ Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, IHRLI /Linden Productions Video Archive & Database, IHRLI Doc. No. 053048. The description of the cellars and the reports from the women are similar to the description of the 'tunnel prison' in Tuzla.

4204/ Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, IHRLI /Linden Productions Video Archive & Database, IHRLI Doc. No. 053048. The description of the cellars and the reports from the women are similar to the description of the 'tunnel prison' in Tuzla.
prison' in Tuzla.

4205/ Medical Opinions on Indications for Termination of Pregnancy, Dr. Slobodan Jakulić, Specialist in Neuropsychiatry, IHRLI Doc. No. 005123.

4206/ Medical Opinions on Indications for Termination of Pregnancy, Dr. Slobodan Jakulić, Specialist in Neuropsychiatry, IHRLI Doc. No. 005123.

4207/ Medical Opinions on Indications for Termination of Pregnancy, Dr. Slobodan Jakulić, Specialist in Neuropsychiatry, IHRLI Doc. No. 005123.


4220/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4221/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
Notes (continued)

circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4222/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4223/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4224/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4225/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY (1-7 November 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4226/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in former
Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4227/ David B. Ottaway, Bodies Bear Witness to Terror: Bosnia's vicious
circle traps a Muslim town, WASH. POST WEEKLY, 1-7 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 54359.

4228/ Muslim villagers flee new Serb onslaught: Refugees tell of
massacres, rapes, CHI. TRIB., 14 November 1993. Sec. 1 at 22, IHRLI Doc. No. 52559.

4229/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in former

4230/ Apparently, before their arrival, there was first a group of armed
Serbs called the "Garavi" who came to the village "coated with tar on their
faces." See Report on War Destruction, Violations of Human Rights and Crimes
against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part II, Witness Testimony,
Sarajevo, 7 July 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 695.

4231/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior, State
Security Department, Section SDB, Witness Statement, Sarajevo, 7 July 1992,
IHRLI Doc. No. 33248; Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior,
34732; Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue,
"Dallas Morning News," and German journalist, Alexandra Stiglmaier, Zenica, 5

4232/ Bureau of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armed Forces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Commune of Hadžići, No. 01/1992, 23 September

4233/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George
Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist, Alexandra Stiglmaier,

4234/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George
Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist, Alexandra Stiglmaier,
Notes (continued)


4237/ Many people who tried to leave the area, even with the proper papers, were sent back by Serbian officials. See Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, IHRLI Doc. No. 39357a.


4243/ Cultural Association of Muslims, the Centre for the Research on War Crimes and Genocide against the Muslims, Witness Testimony, Zenica, 3 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 54690-54691.

4244/ Cultural Association of Muslims, the Centre for the Research on War Crimes and Genocide against the Muslims, Witness Testimony, Zenica, 3 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 54690-54691.


Notes (continued)


4249/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior, Security Services Centre, Special Branch SDB, Witness Statement, Sarajevo, no date, IHLRI Doc. No. 29321.


4251/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštare, 6 November 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 39366a.


4253/ Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Witness Statement, Sarajevo, no date, IHLRI Doc. No. 29334-29336.


4255/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News" and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštare, 6 November 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 39366a-75a.

4256/ This woman alleges that she had not been to Žepa for over a year, but the "Cetniks" insisted that she had information from that region. See Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News" and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštare, 6 November 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 39372a.

4257/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News" and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštare, 6 November 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 39365a.


4259/ The witness learned this when the three were returned the following day. See Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštare, 6 November 1992, IHLRI Doc. No. 39368a.


4262/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39369a-39370a.

4263/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39369a-39370a.

4264/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39369a-39370a.

4265/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39370a-39371a.

4266/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39370a-39371a.

4267/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39368a-39371a-39372a.

4268/ The killings at the bridge at Višegrad are well-known. Here, Muslims were decapitated, mutilated, and thrown in the River Drina. See Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39371a-39373a.


4271/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39374a-39375a.


4274/ See Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal
Notes (continued)

Affairs, State Security Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 29335.

4275/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Security Department, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 29335-29336.


4279/ It is unclear if reports regarding a location in this area are not in fact referring to the Vardište located in the Breza region. It is quite possible that two distinct locations bearing the name Vardište exist. That fact has not, however, been determined.


Notes (continued)


4291/ Varda is referred to as a plant in the following document: Muharem Omeridic, counselor of religious education at the Riyasat of the Islamic community in Sarajevo, Muslims in Concentration Camps, IHRLI Doc. No. 4317; it is referred to as a sawmill elsewhere: Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ministry of Interior, State Security Department, Section SDB, Witness Statement, Sarajevo, 7 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 33249. It seems it may have been a furniture factory of sorts.


Notes (continued)


4303/ Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Services Centre, Special Branch SDB, Witness Statement, Sarajevo, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 29319.


4305/ This witness is the same woman described in the section on the fire station. She was brought to Vilina Vlas from the "New Bridge" by this man. See description of the activities at the fire station for further details.


4312/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the former Yugoslavia, 5-12 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9124.

4313/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George


4316/ Ecumenical Women's Team Visit, Rape of Women in War, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6683.


4318/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News, and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, Donje Moštre, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39376a.


Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


4334/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005863.

4335/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005863.

4336/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005863.

4337/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005865.

4338/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005865.

4339/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005864.

4340/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005864.


4347/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005865.
Notes (continued)

4348/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005865.

4349/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 005856-005865 at Doc. No. 005865.


4357/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23653.


4361/ Details concerning this camp were passed to the ICRC.

4362/ There is reportedly a list of 300 individuals who were held there. Many other persons were also held there, but their names are not on the list. ECMM, Report on Inter-ethnic Violence in Vitez, Busovača and Zenica - April 1993 (17 May 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 29087.


4365/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in the Former
Notes (continued)

Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4366/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in the Former
Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4367/ ICRC, List of Detention Places Visited by ICRC in the Former
Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 064440.

4368/ The U.S. State Department IHRLI Doc. No. 56477 claims that troops
came on 17 April; Roger Cohen, "Ex-Guard for Serbs Tells of Grisly 'Cleansing'
Camp," New York Times, A4, 1 August 1994 reports that troops arrived on 21
April.

4369/ This soldier is unidentified. See U.S. State Department, IHRLI
Doc. No. 56397.

4370/ There is a report that there were joint Muslim-Serb police patrols
until 10 April 1992. See Roger Cohen, "Ex-Guard for Serbs Tells of Grisly 'Cleansing'

4371/ Roger Cohen, "Ex-Guard for Serbs Tells of Grisly 'Cleansing'

4372/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on
No. 5974.

4373/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on
No. 5974.

4374/ Roger Cohen, "Ex-Guard for Serbs Tells of Grisly 'Cleansing'

4375/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56477.

4376/ Roger Cohen, "Ex-Guard for Serbs Tells of Grisly 'Cleansing'

4377/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on
No. 5974.

4378/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on
No. 5974.

4379/ Many of these villagers were brought to the camp at Susica. See the
description of this camp in the section which follows. Centre for
Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on Muslims, Statement on
Vlasenica Region, Zenica, 9 April-15 July, IHRLI Doc. No. 5974; U.S. State
Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56397.

4380/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56397.

4381/ Centre for Investigation of War Crimes and Crimes of Genocide on
Notes (continued)

No. 5974.


4383/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56478.


4386/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.


4389/ In specific, there is a report that all of the male inhabitants of the village of Pampa were collected and brought to a detention camp in Vlasenica. See United Kingdom Mission,, JSIO, Templer Barracks Ashford Kent, TN23, 16 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43026.


4393/ ICRC, Number of Detainees Visited by ICRC during the Last 6 Weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 29991.


4396/ ICRC, Number of Detainees Visited by ICRC during the Last 6 Weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 29991.
Notes (continued)

4397/ A nurse in Cerska reports having had to use a hacksaw to amputate the destroyed arms and legs of the wounded. He also had only home-made brandy and bed sheets to clean the wounds. See U.N. Security Council, Annex, Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 10 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23635.


4399/ Muharem Omerdić, counselor of religious education at the Riyasat of the Islamic community in Sarajevo, Muslims in Concentration Camps, Sarajevo, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4320.


4402/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56478.


4409/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.

4410/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56480-56481.

4411/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56481.

4412/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56481.


Notes (continued)


4421/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.

4422/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.

4423/ Apparently, these two prisoners were brothers. See U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.

4424/ Apparently, these two prisoners were brothers. See U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.


4429/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.

4430/ Popović states that his remorse over the eviction and killing of his former neighbours led to his decision to talk. His testimony allows for one of the only accounts of a camp's operation to be corroborated by both sides in the Bosnian war. See "Bosnian Camps Survivors Describe Random Death," New York Times, A6, 1 August 1994.


Notes (continued)


4443/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56478-56479.

4444/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.


4447/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56479.

4448/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56480.

4449/ See U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. and IHRLI Doc. No. 23457-23459.

4450/ U.S. State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 33751.


Notes (continued)

23457-23459.

4453/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.


4455/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.

4456/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.

4457/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 23701.


4462/ ICRC, Number of Detainees Visited by ICRC During the Last 6 Weeks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHLRI Doc. No. 29991.


4465/ ICRC, Prisoners Regularly Visited in Connection with the Conflict in the former Yugoslavia, 17 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 16833.


Notes (continued)


4472/ Multi-Ethnic Dream Fades in Bosnian Town, Reuters, 30 November 1994 (NEXIS Curnws file).

4473/ The remaining population consisted of 10.8 per cent Yugoslavians and 2.9 per cent listed as other.


4475/ According to his estimates, the population consisted of 120,000 Muslims, 23,000 Croats, and 15,000 Serbs. United Nations Centre for Human Rights Submission, 4 October 1993 (Bates: 40143).


4478/ Zenica Centre for Research, Summary Records Relating to the Sufferings of Croats in Central Bosnia, 8/93-9/93, IHRLI Doc. No. 42605.

4479/ Zenica Centre for Research, Summary Records Relating to the Sufferings of Croats in Central Bosnia, 8/93-9/93, IHRLI Doc. No. 42605.

4480/ United Nations Centre for Human Rights Submission, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 40146. For instance, one source indicates that there are 718 Serbian prisoners held in four Zenica prisons. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 11405.


4484/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 5858-5860.

Notes (continued)

4486/ Serbian Submission, 27 September 1992 IHRLI Doc. No. 5091-93). When he arrived, there were 400-500 Serbians being detained. See also Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, at pp. 26-7 (October 1994), Bates: 50204-05.


4489/ Serbian Submission, 4 October 1992 IHRLI Doc. No. 5050, 5052).

4490/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. Nos. 5859-5860.


4493/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5859.


4495/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5859.


4498/ Letter from Serbian-American Affairs Office, 30 October 1992, Testimony of Dr. Atanasije Jevtić IHRLI Doc. No. 776). One report alleges that many Bosnian Serbs have been killed by being thrown "into the blast furnace of the Ironworks 'Zenica'." Serbian Submission, 4 October 1992 IHRLI Doc. No. 5050).

4499/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 5859. See also UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 10 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 12461 (reports of civilians allowed free access to camps in Zenica in order to beat prisoners).

4500/ The camp is also referred to as the "conservatory of music."

4501/ As of 15 May 1993, the ICRC has not been granted access to the music school. ECMM, Report on Inter-ethnic Violence in Vitez, Busovača and Zenica - April 1993 (17 May 1993), Bates: 23895.

4502/ UN Centre for Human Rights Submission, 4 October 1993 IHRLI Doc. No. 40150-51).

Notes (continued)

4504/ Bates: 10344 (original document in French).


4506/ Zenica Centre for Research Submission, 8/93-9/93 (Summary Records Relating to the Sufferings of Croats in Central Bosnia) IHRLI Doc. No. 42608).


4513/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.

4514/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.

4515/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.

4516/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.

4517/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.

4518/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 038300, 038319-038320.


4522/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-005832 at Doc. No. 005819.
Notes (continued)


4531/ There are also reports which simply mention the existence of camps in Zvornik without much more in the way of detail: 26 prisoners are reported to have been held in Zvornik as of 10 June 1993, Comite International Geneve ICRC, IHRLI Doc. No. 023243; Update on ICRC Activities in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 017843; 26 prisoners are reported to have been held in Zvornik as of 6 July 1993, Situation Report on ICRC Activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 036956; Amnesty International Report on Women Living Under Muslim Laws, IHRLI Doc. No. 006758; ICRC Camp List 19 May 1993 from Philippe Miserez, IHRLI Doc. No. 016829; Update on ICRC Activities in the Former Yugoslavia, IHRLI Doc. No. 029975; ICRC Report 21 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 029958.

4532/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-005832 at Doc. No. 005823.

4533/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-005832 at Doc. No. 005824.
Notes (continued)

4534/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of
Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-005832 at
Doc. No. 005824.

4535/ United Nations Commission of Experts Letter from Julio Baez, 21
May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 016826; Zenica Centre for Investigation of War
Crimes of Genocide on Moslems: List of Concentration Camps and Prisons at the
Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 022328.
Zenica Centre for Investigation of War Crimes of Genocide on Moslems:

4536/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005847.

4537/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005847.

4538/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005848.

4539/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005848.

4540/ United Nations Commission of Experts Letter from Julio Baez, 21

4541/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005848.

4542/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005848.

4543/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at
Doc. No. 005848.

4544/ U.S. Committee for Refugees, Voices From The Whirlwind: Bosnian
Refugee Testimonies, April/May 1993, 021596-021627 at Doc. No. 021598.

4545/ U.S. Committee for Refugees, Voices From The Whirlwind: Bosnian
Refugee Testimonies, April/May 1993, 021596-021627 at Doc. No. 021598.

4546/ U.S. Committee for Refugees, Voices From The Whirlwind: Bosnian
Refugee Testimonies, April/May 1993, 021596-021627 at Doc. No. 021598.

4547/ Letter dated 12 April 1993 from the US Rep to the UN addressed to
the Secretary-General of the UN, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225-018240 at Doc. No.
018239.

4548/ Letter dated 12 April 1993 from the US Rep to the UN addressed to
the Secretary-General of the UN, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225-018240 at Doc. No.
018239.
Notes (continued)

4549/ Letter dated 12 April 1993 from the US Rep to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225-018240 at Doc. No. 018240.

4550/ Letter dated 12 April 1993 from the US Rep to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN, IHRLI Doc. No. 018225-018240 at Doc. No. 018240.


4557/ The headquarters was moved from "Alhos" to "Novi Standard".


4560/ US State Dept. Unclassified Documents, 11 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 056747-056749 at Doc. No. 056748. The ICRC reportedly visited a factory in Zvornik county on 19 May 1993. It is unclear from the information if the facility inspected was the shoe factory, the Glinica factory, the lumber factory or still another unidentified factory converted into a detention facility. See IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442 at Doc. No. 064440.


4562/ US State Dept. Unclassified Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 056516-
Notes (continued)

056519 at Doc. No. 056518.


4577/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US
Notes (continued)

to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.

4578/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.


4580/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.

4581/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.

4582/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.

4583/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.

4584/ Letter dated 26 January 1993 from the Representative from the US to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 005843-005848 at Doc. No. 005848.


4588/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-00583A at Doc. No. 005823. The ICRC reportedly visited a factory in Zvornik county on 19 May 1993. It is unclear from the information if the facility inspected was the shoe factory, the Glinica factory, the lumber factory or still another unidentified factory converted into a detention facility. See ICRC, List of
Notes (continued)


4602/ The report describes the concentration camp as "the building of the village home in Čelopek". It could well be referring to the types of village centres common to south Slavic villages and more commonly referred to as "Zadruge".

Notes (continued)

4604/ List of Concentration Camps and Prisons at the Territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 022328.


4609/ US State Dept., Submission to the Commission of Experts, Cases 94-1 to 94-27, IHRLI Doc. No. 056455-056457. Letter and attached report from AM Thalman addressed to Mautner-Markhof, 19 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 049183-049193 at Doc. No. 049190. The ICRC reportedly visited a factory in Zvornik county on 19 May 1993. It is unclear from the information if the facility inspected was the shoe factory, the Glinica factory, the lumber factory or still another unidentified factory converted into a detention facility. See IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442 at Doc. No. 064440.


4611/ Zulch, "Ethnic Cleansing", Genocide for Greater Serbia, IHRLI Doc. No. 014422-014475 at Doc. No. 014475. A camp referred to as the "Civic Centre at Čelopek" is reported in a list of camps. It is unclear if this is the same camp as the Municipal Centre. See Letter from Bosnia & Herzegovina to United Nations Security Council, 26 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 048671; Duplicate at Doc. No. 013234.


4613/ According to one report, an internment facility was located at the "Dom Kulture" in Čelopek. The facility in Čelopek was also said to have served as military headquarters for the police since December 1991. See Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, Report on "Ethnic Cleansing Operations" in the north-east-Bosnian city of Zvornik from April - June 1992, 6 April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 063984-064023 at Doc. No. 064015.


Notes (continued)

006759. See also IHRLI Doc. No. 035689-035690.


4627/ This report relies on information received from a secondary source.

4628/ Yugoslav Mission Batch of Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 018936-018958 at Doc. No. 018956.

4629/ Yugoslav Mission Batch of Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 018936-018958 at Doc. No. 018956.

4630/ Yugoslav Mission Batch of Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 018936-018958 at Doc. No. 018956.
Notes (continued)

4631/ Yugoslav Mission Batch of Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 018936-018958 at Doc. No. 018956.

4632/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012907.

4633/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012907.

4561/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012907.

4562/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012907.

4563/ An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012907.

4564/ Several detainees died from their injuries due to the absence of medical attention. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012911.

4565/ Several detainees died from their injuries due to the absence of medical attention. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012911.

4566/ Several detainees died from their injuries due to the absence of medical attention. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012911.

4567/ Several detainees died from their injuries due to the absence of medical attention. An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 012907-012912 at Doc. No. 012911.


4575/ Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide, IHRLI Doc. No. 024804-024940 at
Notes (continued)

Doc. No. 024930-2.


4579/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-00583A at Doc. No. 005823.

4580/ Austrian Mission, Submission of Documents to the Commission of Experts, 3 February 1993, No. 115.005.1/5-93, IHRLI Doc. No. 005814-00583A at Doc. No. 005823.


4585/ ECMM, Special Report, Prepared by Team Delta, 11 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19035

4586/ ECMM, Special Report, Prepared by Team Delta, 11 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19035

4587/ ECMM, Special Report, Prepared by Team Delta, 11 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19035


4589/ ECMM, Special Report, Prepared by Team Delta, 11 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19035

4590/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4591/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia And Herzegovina, Ethnic
Notes (continued)

Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexicographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census data.


4597/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 4, 30 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 34963; Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 5, 6 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35748


4600/ Letter to Dr. Kalshoven from Dr. Vladimir Pavičević, Deputy Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28590


4602/ Letter to Dr. Kalshoven from Dr. Vladimir Pavičević, Deputy Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28561


4604/ Letter to Dr. Kalshoven from Dr. Vladimir Pavičević, Deputy Head
Notes (continued)


4605/ Letter to Dr. Kalshoven from Dr. Vladimir Pavičević, Deputy Head of Delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28401, 28570


4608/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441.


4612/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4614/ Letter to Kalshoven from Dr. Vladimir Pavičević of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28571


4619/ Helsinki Watch, Croatian Government Charged with Human Rights
Notes (continued)

Violations, 13 February 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 41224


4624/ The Republic of Croatia, Supplement to the Information About the Missing Persons in the Area of Daruvar Municipality, 4 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 41168

4625/ The Republic of Croatia, Supplement to the Information About the Missing Persons in the Area of Daruvar Municipality, 4 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 41169


4630/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Mirolav Križa Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4631/ Yugoslavia Submission to the United Nations General Assembly, Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of One Group of People Released Through the Exchange of Prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48349

4632/ Helsinki Watch, Croatian Government Charged with Human Rights Violations, 13 February 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 41202


4635/ ECMM, Report on Statements About Violations of the Second Protocol
Notes (continued)


4640/ ECMM Team Foxtrot, Foxtrot Team Mission to Central Adriatic Coast and Hinterland, 14 November 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 19171


4644/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4647/ Testimony Concerning Violation of Human Rights, Civilian Suffering and Victims of Brutality and Aggression, IHRLI Doc. No. 007440-007446 at Doc. No. 007444.


4650/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin, No.
Notes (continued)


4653/ 26 July 1991-27 July 1991. The men were reportedly detained for a longer stretch of time, in some cases until 1 August.


4656/ It is unclear whether the Glina Hall of Culture and the Glina Prison are the same facility. However, the report which mentioned the Hall of Culture also described solitary confinement cells which might be found in a traditional prison.

4657/ The individual was tried in the Zagreb District Court and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment on 18 February 1993. According to ECMM, no substantial evidence was produced against him at trial. Later, he was exchanged "under duress" as a POW, despite having been convicted as a civilian. T. Mazowiecki, 5th Periodic Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/1994/47 (17 November 1993), IHRLI Doc No. 049367.


4662/ The women were later transferred to Manjača camp. However, the refugee who provided this information noted that the camps at Manjača and Glina were not organizationally related. Declassified Document No. 94-94, U.S. Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 056619-21.


4664/ During the visit, the ICRC registered the male prisoners, but were not told of the female prisoners housed on the premises. Declassified
Notes (continued)


4669/ One particular prisoner was beaten to death after he asked a guard to let him use the bathroom with a pan because the injuries he sustained from earlier beatings made it impossible for him to squat. See Society of Croatian Intellectuals, Testimony, 26 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7450.


4672/ One witness describes that there were six people in his cell for the first 40 days of his detention at the camp in September and October 1991. See Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony C/P-GL-67, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132, H5.

4673/ One witness describes that there were six people in his cell for the first 40 days of his detention at the camp in September and October 1991. See Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony C/P-GL-67, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132, H5.


4681/ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony C/P-GL-
Notes (continued)


4688/ None of the prisoners complained to UNCI VPOL about how they were treated, and UNCI VPOL noted that the condition of the camp was good. UNPROFOR, Daily Situation Report 012400A-022400A, November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 008316.


4690/ It is not clear from the report whether those prisoners classified as "other" were civilians or persons accused of criminal acts not related to the conflict. ECMM, Humanitarian Activity - Report No. 32, 8-15 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 034598.

4691/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4693/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4694/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


Notes (continued)


4700/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4701/ Source not available, believed to be from an ECMM report.


4703/ It is unclear to which "prison camp" the report is referring. It may or may not be Gospić prison. See U.N. Security Council, Inhuman Treatment of Detainees -- POWs, Case: IV-001, IHRLI Doc. No. 48290.


4709/ These latter forces were allegedly commanded by HDZ activist Stojan Gustin.


Notes (continued)

4712/ Appendix I, "Criminal Offences of Genocide," IHRLI Doc. No. 51723. The names of alleged perpetrators are included.


4717/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4719/ Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28591

4720/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56323

4721/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4722/ Helsinki Watch, Croatian Government Charged with Human Rights Violations, 13 February 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 41190

4723/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4727/ Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: Further reports of Torture and


Research of available sources have identified two possible detention facilities at military sites in Knin. The ICRC reports that it visited a detention facility at a military prison in Knin on 26 October 1991. Because the ICRC report does not identify the facilities visited with adequate specificity, it is not being used as a corroborating source for this facility. ICRC, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442, at 064441.


Research of available sources have identified two possible detention facilities at military sites in Knin. The ICRC reports that it visited a detention facility at a military prison in Knin on 26 October 1991. Because the ICRC report does not identify the facilities visited with adequate specificity, it is not being used as a corroborating source for this facility. ICRC, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442, at 064441.


Notes (continued)


4753/ Additional information regarding the camp at this location may be found in materials from the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, See Letter and attached report from W.J. Fenrick addressed to Robert Hage, 18 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 054453-054459 at Doc. No. 054454. Also, according to one report, in early September 1991, six members of Martic's police force allegedly spent some time in the "old hospital" where, as camp guards, they actively participated in the mistreatment of the inmates. See Criminal Offences of War Crime Against War Prisoners, Art. 144, IHRLI Doc. No. 002833-002834 at Doc. No. 002834.

4754/ The witness was able to identify some 180 individuals detained with him at this site. US State Dept. Documents, IHRLI Doc. No. 056599-056604 at Doc. No. 056602-3.

Notes (continued)

4756/ The priests were former detainees at this facility.


4771/ Society of Croatian Professional Women, Testimony Concerning
Notes (continued)


4774/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4775/ Republic of Croatia, the Committee for Aid to the Drniš Area, Annex 4: Interviews with People Deprived from their Liberty, Zagreb, 7 November 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 24113.


4778/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.


4781/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4782/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4783/ Statement by [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.


4787/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4788/ These numbers add up to 12, not 10 as originally reported, which
could mean that there were more than 10 prisoners from the group. See Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: Torture and Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings in War Zones, November 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 50174-50175.


4791/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4792/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.

4793/ Statement of [witness], Chicago, 15 December 1993, no IHRLI number.


4795/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21397

4796/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4797/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4798/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4799/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4800/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4801/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403

4802/ Helsinki Watch, Testimonies, 29 July 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 21396 – 21403


4805/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of
Notes (continued)

Detainees visited by the ICRC, Report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4806/ Letter and attached documents from the Yugoslavian Mission addressed to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028759 at Doc. No. 028758.

4807/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav KraljeLexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date


4809/ Reportedly an agreement was made between the FRY and Croatia to exchange prisoners. The 19 detainees were taken to Osijek on 14 August 1992 in order to expedite the exchange for imprisoned Croatian soldiers captured in battle. The "authorities" allegedly dressed the detainees in JNA uniforms in order to deceive the international community. See Yugoslavian Mission, Documents Submission to Commission of Experts, 2 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 0278401-028592, at 028579.


4818/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Serb Women, Men and Children in Areas Controlled By Croatian and Moslem Armed

4819/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Serb Women, Men and Children in Areas Controlled By Croatian and Moslem Armed Formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 15 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 046176-046208 at 046199-200; An official UN source, IHRLI Doc. No. 003229-003238.

4820/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4822/ Yugoslavia Submission to the United Nations General Assembly, Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of One Group of People Released Through the Exchange of Prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48349


4824/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4825/ The Stara Gradiska camp is alternately referred to as a penal institution and house of corrections. Reports refer to Stara Gradiska camp as being in Nova Gradiška, Croatia and in Bosanska Gradiška, BiH. It is unclear whether there are two separate facilities, one in each county, or whether the reports are referring to the same site. Thus, there may be some overlap between information provided in this section and information relating to the camp in Bosanska Gradiska, discussed supra.

4826/ It is recorded that the ICRC visited a facility identified as the Stara Gradiska military prison on 1 October 1993, this date, however, is inconsistent with the dates of the Croatia/Serbia conflict. It is possible that this reference is to the Stara Gradiska facility in Bosnia. ICRC, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 064437-064442, at 064441.

4827/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 000349.

4828/ A report by ECMM noted that by 29 July 1993, only one wing of the prison was being used because the other had been destroyed. On that date, only four inmates were observed. ECMM, Humanitarian Activity - Report No. 30/93, 25-31 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 032746. Another report noted that the prison was abandoned as a facility on 14 June 1992. U.S. Department of State Declassified Materials, IHRLI Doc. No. 057135.

Notes (continued)

No. 007144.

4830/ Republic of Croatia, Criminal Offences of War Crimes Against War Prisoners, List of Registered Persons Inclusive, IHRLI Doc. No. 002838.


4836/ Muharem Omerdic, Muslims in Concentration Camps, IHRLI Doc. No. 004313-14.

4837/ Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 040346.


4841/ Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony C/P-SG-1, 5 March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 000132C5.

4842/ The doctor had been transferred from Bucje camp. Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin No. 17, 29 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 053125.

4843/ The report lists the date as "15.2.91." It appears that this date was a typographical error, since the witness was not at the camp during February 1991 or 1992. Republic of Croatia, Testimony of Witness, 22 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 007147.

4844/ This group may be the same group the other witness described as coming to Stara Gradiska from Pakrac, since Bucje is in Pakrac county. Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: Further Reports of Torture and Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings in War Zones, March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 050125.

4845/ According to the witness, the soldiers had been severely beaten. Republic of Croatia, Testimony of Witness, 22 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 007148.
Notes (continued)


4848/ Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, IHRLI Doc. No. 000377-79.


4850/ The report described the camp as a "collecting centre" for detainees.


4860/ This witness also related that many of the prisoners at Stara Gradiska were hidden when the ICRC visited the facility during his detention. Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin No. 9, 4 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 040346.


4863/ Testimony of [Witness], International Human Rights Law Group, 22
Notes (continued)


4865/ Republic of Croatia, Criminal Offences of War Crimes against War Prisoners, List of Registered Persons Inclusive, IHRLI Doc. No. 002841.


4867/ Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, Testimony C/P – SG – 1, 2 March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 000132C5-D5.


4870/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health Division of Information and Information, Testimony of C/P-SG-1, 5 March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 000132D5.

4871/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health Division of Information and Information, Testimony of C/P-SG-1, 5 March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 000132D5.


4873/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


4876/ "Supplement 2: "War Crimes Against Civilian Population," IHRLI Doc. No. 2912-14, 2918. The names of alleged perpetrators and victims are included. See also Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia, Annex II, (missing date and U.N. Doc. No.), IHRLI Doc. No. 48349 (prisoners interrogated (and presumably detained) for 3-10 days in prisons in various areas, including Novska).


4878/ Croatian Submission, Supplement 2, War Crimes Against Civilian Population, IHRLI Doc. No. 2918
Notes (continued)

4879/ Croatian Submission, Supplement 2, War Crimes Against Civilian Population, IHRLI Doc. No. 2918


4881/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23491

4882/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23492

4883/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23491

4884/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23493

4885/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23493

4886/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23493

4887/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23491

4888/ Yugoslavia Submission, Memorandum on the Violation of Human Rights in the Serb Community of Gorski Kotar, 24 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 23494


4891/ Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexicographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia.


4893/ The village of Erdut is 30 kilometres east of the village of Osijek in Osijek county.

4894/ They wore the "Krajina Militia" insignia on their uniforms.

4895/ The report supplies a list of names of the individuals arrested which is on record with IHRLI.

4896/ Centre for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the
Notes (continued)


4898/ Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats from Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-western Bosnia (Krajina), 5 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 036745-036746.


4911/ Paulin Dvor is south of the town of Osijek.

4912/ Yugoslav Red Cross, 23 April 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 019795.

4913/ Letter from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Containing the
Notes (continued)

Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of one group of people released through the exchange of prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 048349-048355.


4916/ The priest's name is on record with IHRLI.


4919/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4920/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4921/ Testimony concerning Violation of Human Rights, Civilian Sufferings and Victims of Brutality and Aggression, IHRLI Doc. No. 007206-007209 at Doc. No. 007207.


Notes (continued)


4936/ Also known as the "Fisherman's Hut".


Notes (continued)


4950/ Mass Killings, Chapt. 9, p 186-7.

4951/ Mass Killings, Chapt. 9, p. 187.

4952/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date


4954/ See generally Annex X.


4956/ See generally Annex X.

4957/ Supplement 2, War Crimes Against Civilian Population with the List of Charged Individuals, IHRLI Doc. No. 2890.


4959/ Unidentified JNA soldiers also took part in the beating of the Croatian prisoner discussed supra. Declassified Document No. 94-81, U.S. Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 056580.

4960/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic
Notes (continued)

Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date


4963/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4964/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441.


4971/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4972/ Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krleža Lexicographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia.


Notes (continued)

4976/ The ICRC reports having visited a facility identified as a military prison in Šibenik on 6 March 1992, however since the facility is not specifically described it can not be used to corroborate the existence of the facility at the Ante Jonic Barracks. ICRC, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64437-64442, at 64441.

4977/ This man's name is on record with IHRLI.

4978/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Serb Women, Men and Children in Areas Controlled by Croatian and Muslim Armed Formations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, 1991-1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 046199-046207.


4981/ It is unclear if this is the same cellar prison reported above by another witness.


4985/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Kneža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4986/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

4987/ Republic of Croatia & Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Kneža Lexiconographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia, 1991 census date

4988/ Letter and attached documents dated 6 November 1992 from the Charge d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 048265-048291 at Doc. No. 048290.


4990/ RTV Belgrade - Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, IHRLI Doc. No. 032130-032140 at Doc. No. 032130; See also Bordello of Screams: Confessions by the Women Raped in Moslem and Croatian Prisons, IHRLI Doc. No.
007063-007083 at Doc. No. 007078. It appears from the information that the police station served both as a detention facility as well as a distribution centre. Sources suggest that individuals were brought to the facility after arrest, interrogated and, in many cases, divided into groups. There is no indication from the reports what process was used in grouping the individuals, only that from there they were sent to either Slavonska Požega or Slavonski Brod. See Letter and attached documents dated 18 December 1992 from the Charges d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the UN addressed to the Secretary-General, IHRLI Doc. No. 048328-048348 at Doc. No. 048332.


4998/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5000/ Yugoslavia Submission to the U.N. General Assembly, Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of One Group of People Released Through the Exchange of Prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48349


5002/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia Places of detention and number of
Notes (continued)

detainees visited by the ICRC, Report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


Notes (continued)


5017/ Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia, Submission to the Secretary-General, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48328-48355, at 48331.


5024/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130.


5026/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130-32131.

5027/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Document No. 2, Statement,
Notes (continued)


5029/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32133.


5031/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130-32131.

5032/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130-32131.


5035/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130-32133.


5037/ This woman was a teacher from Derventa. See Statement by Civilians of Serb Nationality Interned in Ustaše Concentration Camps in Odžak, Bosanski Brod, Slavonski Brod and Oraske, Samac, 15 May 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28888.


5040/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130.


5042/ The witness and two others were sent to Slavonski Brod; the others who had been arrested were taken to Slovanska Požega. See Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Rape and Sexual Abuse by Armed Forces, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5527.
Notes (continued)

5043/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32130.


5046/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32138.

5047/ RTV Belgrade, Testimonies of Serbian Women Who Have Been Raped, Tape: 0021, no date, IHRLI Doc. No. 32138.


5051/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

5052/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

5053/ Letter and attached documents from Mile Pecic, Catholic Parish Priest of Slunj addressed to the European Monitoring Team, IHRLI Doc. No. 024167-024174 at Doc. No. 024167,024171.

5054/ Letter and attached documents from Mile Pecic, Catholic Parish Priest of Slunj addressed to the European Monitoring Team, IHRLI Doc. No. 024167-024174 at Doc. No. 024167,024171.

5055/ Letter and attached documents from Mile Pecic, Catholic Parish Priest of Slunj addressed to the European Monitoring Team, IHRLI Doc. No. 024167-024174 at Doc. No. 024167,024171.

Notes (continued)


5058/ Letter and attached documents from Mile Pecic, Catholic Parish Priest of Slunj addressed to the European Monitoring Team, IHRLI Doc. No. 024167-024174 at Doc. No. 024167,024171.


5062/ Testimony Concerning Violation of Human Rights, Civilian Suffering and Victims of Brutality and Aggression, IHRLI Doc. No. 006250-006256 at Doc. No. 006253.

5063/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5070/ The Republic of Serbia, Biljana Plavsic, Information on the
Notes (continued)

Aggression of the Republic of Croatia Against the Republic of Srpska and
Genocide of the Serbs in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, 30 September 1992,
IHRLI Doc. No. 18674

5071/ United Kingdom Mission Submission, DDT Special Report,
Concentration Camps and Other Places of Detention in the former Republic of
Yugoslavia, 16 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43023

5072/ Defence Debriefing Team, Special Report on Prisoner of War Camps
in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Submission of the Government of
the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 25 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63836;
Defence Debriefing Team, Summary No. 13 of Atrocity Information, 30 September
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43266

5073/ ECMM, Memo Re: Alleged War Crimes on [Witness], 26 February 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 12679-81.

5074/ Helsinki Watch, Prosecute Now! Helsinki Watch Releases Eight
Cases for War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc.
28592, 64168, 64169, 64204, 64205, 64208, 64211-12, 64217; Serbian Council
Information Centre, Documentation Regarding the Violation of Human Rights,
Ethnic Cleansing, Crimes and Violence By Croatian and Moslem Armed Formations
Against the Serbian Civilian Population in BiH, Dossier No. 2, Rape and Sexual
Abuse of Serb Women, Men and Children in Areas Controlled by Croatian and
Doc. No. 46200

5075/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Rape and Sexual Abuse of Serb

5076/ Helsinki Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases For War Crimes
Tribunal On Former Yugoslavia, Volume 5, Issue 12, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 29374

64208, 64212, 64217

5078/ Helsinki Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases For War Crimes
Tribunal On Former Yugoslavia, Volume 5, Issue 12, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 29374

28592

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Third Report, 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64211,
64217; Helsinki Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases For War Crimes
Tribunal On Former Yugoslavia, Volume 5, Issue 12, 1 August 1993, IHRLI Doc.
No. 29374; Defence Debriefing Team, Summary No. 13 of Atrocity Information, 30
September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43239

64204

64208, 64217
Notes (continued)


5090/ Defence Debriefing Team, Summary No. 13 of Atrocity Information, 30 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43239


Notes (continued)


5102/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

5103/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

5104/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5106/ Yugoslavia Submission to the United Nations General Assembly, Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of One Group of People Released Through the Exchange of Prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48349

5107/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5111/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56621

5112/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia,
Notes (continued)

Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441

5113/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention Visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5115/ Yugoslavia Submission to the United Nations General Assembly, Analysis of the Medical-Psychological Examinations of One Group of People Released Through the Exchange of Prisoners, 18 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48349


5117/ Croat Submission, War Crimes against Civilian Population, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 2890


5121/ Vukovar Police Station, Vukovar Municipal Building, Pizza Parlour in Borovo Naselje, Kindergarten in Borovo Naselje. Unidentified Croatian forces, also presumably operated the facilities at the BZ Shelter, Dom Tehnike, S 10/2 Skyscraper building and a building in Mitnica.


5125/ The witness also stated that she later watched as her captors cut a boy in half with an electric saw. D.I.M.H., War Crimes and Grave Breaches of Geneva Conventions Committed by Serbian Paramilitary Forces in UN Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia, 6 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 036724-036758 at Doc. No. 036729-036730.
Notes (continued)


5132/ Many of the reports lack specificity regarding the exact location at which alleged violations were committed or exact locations at Velepromet where inmates were detained.

5133/ This description presumably refers to the basement of the office building.

5134/ This location presumably refers to the detention facility in the storehouse.

5135/ Letter and attached Documents from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 30 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018164-018184 at Doc. No. 018183.


5137/ Also referred to as the Velepromet Warehouse.


5141/ Also referred to as the Joiner's Workshop.


Notes (continued)


5152/ It is unclear if this report's identification of a bakery at the "Wooden Market" suggests that there was only one detention facility between the two locations. It is, however, here concluded that two separate facilities were in existence one at the local bakery and one at the "Wooden Market".


5159/ Testimony Concerning Violation of Human Rights Civilian Suffering and Victims of Brutality and Aggression, IHRLI Doc. No. 006323-006327 at Doc. No. 006325.

5160/ Testimony Concerning Violation of Human Rights Civilian Suffering and Victims of Brutality and Aggression, IHRLI Doc. No. 006323-006327 at Doc. No. 006325.
Notes (continued)

5161/ D.I.M.H., Testimony Vu-Bol-46, IHRLI Doc. No. 000132JJJ-000132KKK at Doc. No. 000132JJJ.

5162/ Letter and attached Documents addressed to Chairman of the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Mission, No. 607/1, 21 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 021750-021786 at Doc. No. 021759.

5163/ Letter and attached Documents addressed to Chairman of the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Mission, No. 607/1, 21 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 021750-021786 at Doc. No. 021759.

5164/ Letter and attached Documents addressed to Chairman of the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Mission, No. 607/1, 21 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 021750-021786 at Doc. No. 021768.

5165/ Letter and attached Documents addressed to Chairman of the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Mission, No. 607/1, 21 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 021750-021786 at Doc. No. 021768.

5166/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Depositions, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028696 at Doc. No. 028693.


5171/ According to one report a detention facility was established in house no. 220 in the Svetozara Markovica Street. This location was allegedly one of the headquarters of the Territorial Units. D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 1, IHRLI Doc. No. 004967-70 at Doc. No. 004967. In another report, a Croatia victim/detainee recalled being held in the cellar of a house at no. 239 in S. Markovica Street. He reported that he was beaten and physically mistreated at this location on a daily basis for several days. The detainee identified his captors. D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 3, IHRLI Doc. No. 004971-72 at Doc. No. 004972.


5174/ D.I.M.H., War Crimes and Grave Breaches of Geneva Conventions
Notes (continued)


5175/ Also known as Cveto.


5187/ D.I.M.H., War Crimes and Grave Breaches of Geneva Conventions


5194/ Several reports suggest that more than 17 men were selected. Seventeen was the lowest number reported and is used here to represent the most conservative estimate.


Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


5222/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Depositions, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028696 at Doc. No. 028691-693.

5223/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Depositions, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028696 at Doc. No. 028691-693.

5224/ Serbian Council Information Centre, Depositions, 2 July 1993, No. 627/1, IHRLI Doc. No. 028401-028696 at Doc. No. 028691-693.


5226/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017771.

5227/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017771.


5229/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017793.

5230/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017690.

5231/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017772. Letter and attached Documents from the
Notes (continued)


5234/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017800-017802.


5237/ This building is described in one report as an apartment building the basement of which was used for interrogations. Letter and attached Documents addressed to Chairman of the Commission of Experts from the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Mission, No. 607/1, 21 June 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 021750-021786 at Doc. No. 021777. It is unclear if this facility was operated by Serb or Croatian forces. One report suggests that Serb prisoners were transferred from this location by Croatian paramilitaries. Cf. Discussion of Borovo Naselje Kindergarten.


5241/ Documents from the Military Court in Belgrade, IHRLI Doc. No. 017767-017831 at Doc. No. 017773. Letter and attached Documents from the
Notes (continued)


5242/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017743.

5243/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017725-017727.

5244/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017725-017727.

5245/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017725-017727.

5246/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017725-017727.

5247/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017725-017727.


5251/ Military Court in Belgrade, IK No. 112/92, 26 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 017684-017766 at Doc. No. 017693, 017694.


5253/ Criminal Offences for Which Collection of Evidence Material is in Progress, IHRLI Doc. No. 002875-002889 at Doc. No. 002880.

5254/ Criminal Offences for Which Collection of Evidence Material is in Progress, IHRLI Doc. No. 002875-002889 at Doc. No. 002880.

5255/ Criminal Offences for Which Collection of Evidence Material is in Progress, IHRLI Doc. No. 002875-002889 at Doc. No. 002880.


Notes (continued)


5267/ D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 12, IHRLI Doc. No. 004984-5 at Doc. No. 004984.

5268/ D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 12, IHRLI Doc. No. 004984-5 at Doc. No. 004984.

5269/ D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 12, IHRLI Doc. No. 004984-5 at Doc. No. 004984. According to another report, as many as 100 Tovarnik citizens were imprisoned at this location. Croatian Information Centre, "Crimes Committed by Military and Paramilitary Formations Against The Croatian Population of the Village of Tovarnik Between 20 September and the end of December 1991", IHRLI Doc. No. 011687-94.

Notes (continued)


5275/ D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 8, IHRLI Doc. No. 004975-7 at Doc. No. 004976.

5276/ D.I.M.H., Testimony MG - 8, IHRLI Doc. No. 004975-7 at Doc. No. 004976.


5282/ Letter and attached Testimony from the Government of Croatia addressed to the UN Commission of Experts, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 003839-003856 at Doc. No. 003844-5. See also D.I.M.H., Testimony VU-170, IHRLI Doc. No. 004958-59.


5284/ Letter and attached Testimony from the Government of Croatia addressed to the UN Commission of Experts, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 003839-003856 at Doc. No. 003844-5. See also D.I.M.H., Testimony VU-170, IHRLI
Notes (continued)

Doc. No. 004958-59.


5302/ Mass Killing and Genocide in Croatia 1991/92: A Book of Evidence,
Notes (continued)

Kostović and Judaš, eds., 1992, Serbian Camps, Chap. 9, p. 198.


5304/ The witness was able to identify the victims by the sounds of their voices.


5307/ Republic of Croatia and Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethnic Map, The Miroslav Krle a Lexicographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia.

5308/ The year is not given.


5316/ This man's name is on record with IHRLI.


5318/ The man's name is on record with IHRLI.


Notes (continued)


5343/  ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, report received on 27 May 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64441


5351/  ICRC, Former Yugoslavia: Places of Detention and Number of
Notes (continued)

Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64437-64442, at 64441.


5357/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5360/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.

5361/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56784, This is an aspect of the situation which indicates the international character of the conflict, e.g. cooperation of authorities in two states and transportation of prisoners over internationally recognized boundaries.


5368/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56784; This is another aspect which indicates the international character of the conflict, e.g. cooperation of authorities in two states and transportation of prisoners over internationally recognized boundaries.


5373/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14939.


5376/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5381/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, April 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 64437-64442 at
Notes (continued)

64442.

5382/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, 25 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No.36375

5383/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.


5390/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5394/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132SSSS.

5395/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132UUUU.


5398/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI
Notes (continued)

Doc. No. 56628.

5399/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5404/ Save Humanity, Report on War Destruction, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 3 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 664.

5405/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5408/ Croatian Information Centre, Vladimir Zerjavic, Yugoslavia: Manipulations with the Number of Second World War Victims, 1993.


5414/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,
Notes (continued)


5425/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5427/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWWW.


5430/ Permanent Representative of Croatian to U.N., War Crimes and Grave Breaches of Geneva Conventions Committed by Serbian Paramilitary Process in United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in The Republic of Croatia, 6 September
Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)


5459/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5463/ National Organization for Victim Assistance, Recommendations for Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, Part II, Sarajevo, 7 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 9124.

5464/ Save Humanity, Report on War Destruction, Violation of Human Rights and Crimes Against Humanity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Part II, Sarajevo, 7 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 695.

5465/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,


5467/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at University of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


5470/ Interview of ex-prisoner, taken by American journalist George Rodrigue, "Dallas Morning News," and German journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer, IHRLI Doc. No. 39363a; (It is likely that the women were taken to the detention facility in Uzice, however there is no data to confirm this.)


5474/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health, Zagreb, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19093

5475/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT.


5478/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 1, 9 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32780


5480/ International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), British Section, Human Rights in the Former Yugoslav States, Report 3, Populations at Risk, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9250; Society for Threatened Peoples, "Ethnic
Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)

5491/ Other reports indicate the building where the prisoners were detained was between 20 and 30 metres long and wide.


5495/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT.

5496/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT.

5497/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.

5498/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.


Notes (continued)

No. 56866

5508/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56865


5513/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Crimes Committed by Military and Paramilitary Formations Against the Croatian Population of the Village of Tovarnik Between 20 September and the End of December 1991, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11690

5514/ ECMM Submission, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 13035


5516/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39558A


5519/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.

5520/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7363-7365

Notes (continued)

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5527/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT.


5529/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.


5534/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39558A

5535/ He received these wounds when a "etnik" attempted to sever his head from his neck and shot him twice during a mass execution in Dalj.

Notes (continued)


5539/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.


5545/ ECMM Submission, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 13035


5547/ ECMM Submission, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 13035

5548/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.

5549/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


50121.


5556/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56865

5557/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A

5558/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5564/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.

5565/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132RRRR.


Notes (continued)

No. 56626.


5570/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56626


5572/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5578/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.

5579/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


Notes (continued)

5585/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Livade Camp, A Written Statement, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39238A

5586/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Livade Camp, A Written Statement, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39238A

5587/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Livade Camp, A Written Statement, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39238A

5588/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Livade Camp, A Written Statement, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39238A


5592/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT.


5595/ The Czechs were a minority in Eastern Croatia and were arrested when the Serbian forces occupied the area.


5598/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPP.

5599/ International Committee of the Red Cross, Former Yugoslavia, Places of detention visited by the ICRC, 27 May 1994

5600/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56997

Notes (continued)


5604/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP

5605/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132TTTT


5608/ ECMM Submission, Statement of Croatian Resident of Šid, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 24184-24185

5609/ ECMM Submission, Statement of Croatian Resident of Šid, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 24184-24185

5610/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6325

5611/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health, Zagreb, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19093


5616/ ECMM Submission, March 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 13035

5617/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,
Notes (continued)


5618/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Livade Camp, A Written Statement, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 39239A


5624/ Croatian Information Centre, War Crimes Committed by the Yugoslav Army, 1991 - 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 15126 - 15130; "Although Serbia constantly claims that these are ordinary military prisons or detention centres, most of their institutions have all the characteristics of WWII camps. Murders, tortures and inhumane treatment, infliction of great suffering, violations of physical integrity and physical injuries forced hard labour, willful deprivation of the right to a fair trial, unjustified postponement of the exchange of war prisoners and civilians, or disrespect of exchange agreements, is the daily routine in all of those camps."


5628/ Defence Debriefing Team, Summary No. 20 of Atrocity Information, 29 July 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 043265; Croatian Society of Victimology, Center for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941; Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation
Notes (continued)


5630/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.

5631/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Center for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941
;Amnesty International, Yugoslavia, Further Reports of Torture and Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings in War Zones, March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 50100 - 50129; Amnesty International believes that the military in charge of the prisons in Vojvodina were aware of international standards regarding the treatment of prisoners, but have either been unwilling or unable to control abuses carried out by their subordinate.


5635/ Helsinki Watch, A Division of Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases for War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, 1 August 1993, Volume 5, Issue 12, IHRLI Doc. No. 29358 - 29366.


5643/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.

5644/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 2, 16 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32272A1 -32272A4; Vlasta Vince-Ribarić,
Notes (continued)


5658/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6266 - 6268; U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 33752 - 33758; One Albanian was arrested on suspicion that he was traveling to Croatia to join the military forces there.

5659/ A JNA Lieutenant, who was captured by the Croatian Army, was retaken by the Serbs at the fall of Vukovar and charged with desecration of a corpse; Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6410 - 6412; One Serb was allegedly among the prisoners at the KPD but was never beaten at the same time as the other prisoners. Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6413 - 6418; A Serbian employee at Vukovar hospital refused to leave when JNA soldiers entered the hospital and is reportedly held at Sremska Mitrovica; Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, 22 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36182 - 36190; Amnesty International, Arrest of Doctor, Journalists, and Others, 28 November 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 35001.


Notes (continued)


5668/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6226 - 6228


5672/ Helsinki Watch, A Division of Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch Releases Eight Cases for War Crimes Tribunal on Former Yugoslavia, 1 August 1993, Volume 5, Issue 12, IHRLI Doc. No. 29358 - 29366.


Notes (continued)

5679/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 
Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7486-7491


5681/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 

5682/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 

5683/ Permanent Representative of Croatian to U.N., War Crimes and Grave 
Breaches of Geneva Conventions Committed by Serbian Paramilitary Process in 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in The Republic of Croatia, 6 September 

5684/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 
Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6269 - 6272, 7278 - 7280

5685/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5686/ Amnesty International, Arrest of Doctor, Journalists, and Others, 

5687/ Amnesty International, Arrest of Doctor, Journalists, and Others, 

5688/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 

5689/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 

5690/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 

5691/ The Humanitarian Law Fund, Spotlight Report No. 4, 15 May 1993, 
IHRLI Doc. No. 16836 - 16851.

5692/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 


5694/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 
Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7486-7491; 7272 - 7274; 
U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56856 - 56494; Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, 
Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5695/ Vlasta Vince-Ribić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, 
Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6269 - 6272, 6503 - 6508; 
Notes (continued)


5707/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5709/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting
Notes (continued)


5717/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7433 - 7436; 7486-7491


5721/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5722/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5724/ The report does not indicate which Commission is being referred to here, however it appears to be some sort of humanitarian organization.


Notes (continued)


5728/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7263 - 7265; The hospital referred to in this report is not named, however there are several reference to Novi Sad hospital in other reports.


5731/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5732/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5733/ The source reported leading a small ambulance within the camp, the meaning of this is not clear.

5734/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5736/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6348 - 6352 (This prisoner was beaten by a Military Police Private First Class, referred to in paragraph 6.); Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6291 - 6293 (source claims to have been beaten by JNA police)


5743/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,
Notes (continued)


5770/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5773/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941


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5778/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5782/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5783/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5787/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5792/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,


5806/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, 25 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36371 - 36376


Notes (continued)


5811/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6486 - 6490; On 22.12.91 the ZNG member who defended Borovo Selo was transferred to the KPD. Other prisoners were beaten and charged with specific ooffences and taken to Belgrade; Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6231 - 6234, 6353 - 6356, 7516 - 7520

5812/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5815/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5819/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.


5824/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


Notes (continued)


5840/ See paragraph number 42.


5842/ 22


Notes (continued)

5845/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5849/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.

5850/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5853/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.

5854/ A wounded man was from Vukovar hospital. He was taken to Ovara with other wounded from Vukovar but escaped from the truck and was captured again at Cerić. This wounded man claimed that all 286 wounded from the hospital were driven to Ovara and killed.

5855/ These appear to be the convicts that were held in the prison on charges unconnected with the conflict.

5856/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 39559A.

5857/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56863 - 56867, it is not clear whether this is the same women referred to in paragraph number.


5860/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, 23 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132PPPP.


5866/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, 22 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36182 - 36190, at least two were Croatian women, two Serbs, a Slovenian woman, and a 12 year old Croatian boy.


5869/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622 - 56628, Due to bad publicity the Begejci camp was closed in January or February 1992 and the prisoners were transferred to the KPD. All evidence of a camp at Begejci was removed, according to a State Department Doc.


Notes (continued)


5884/ National Organisation for Victim Assistance, Recommendations Assistance to Victims of Trauma in the Former Yugoslavia, 12 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 9114 - 9162; The American was transporting refugees and was captured.


5891/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.

5892/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


5895/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,
Notes (continued)

Witness Testimonies, 26 January 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6257 - 6259

5896/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, 25 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36371 - 36376


5899/ Croatian Society of Victimology, Centre for Genocide and War Victims, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14938 - 14941.


Notes (continued)


Notes (continued)

No. 56875 - 56876

5926/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286


5928/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286


5930/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56433


5932/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56433


5943/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132ZZZZ

5944/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 15, November 15, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47023

5945/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, Weekly Bulletin No. 1, August 9, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32780


5949/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132BA5

5950/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132BA5


5952/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132VVVV
Notes (continued)


5962/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7222


5964/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56433

5965/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWWW.

5966/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWWW.

Notes (continued)


5973/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132VVVV-132WWWW.

5974/ U.S. Department of State, Declassified Materials, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 56433


5977/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286

5978/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286

5979/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286

5980/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286

5981/ The witness believes the lieutenant colonel belonged to the KOS because of the political tone of his questioning.


Notes (continued)


5986/ Probably November 25 or 26, 1991.


5988/ It is not clear which prisoner is being referred to as him in this case.


5992/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132VVVV-132WWWW.


5999/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women,
Notes (continued)

Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7226

6000/ Vlasta Vince-Ribaric, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7302


6003/ Vlasta Vince-Ribaric, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7226


6007/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132VVVV-132WWWW.

6008/ Vlasta Vince-Ribaric, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 7226

6009/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWWW.

6010/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132VVVV-132WWWW.


6014/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health
Notes (continued)

of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWW.


6016/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWW.


6020/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWW.


6022/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286


6024/ Vlasta Vince-Ribarić, Society of Croatian Professional Women, Witness Testimonies, January 26, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6359


6026/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 - 36286


6029/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132B5; U.S.
Notes (continued)


6030/ D.I.M.H., Division of Information and Research, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia, October 23, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 132WWWW.

6031/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 – 36286


6039/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 – 36286


6041/ Croatian Information Centre, Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War, A Written Statement, May 17, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36280 – 36286


Notes (continued)

6044/ Zdravko Grebo, Professor at Univ. of Sarajevo, Report on Crimes Committed Against Non-Serbian Citizens Of Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 11, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 5510.


6048/ Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Health, Zagreb, June 29, 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 19093


6052/ Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia; The Third Balkan War, p. 89, 96; (1993) Penguin Publishers


6055/ German Government Submission, April 1, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018567 - 018568


6057/ German Government Submission, April 1, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018567 - 018568


6060/ German Government Submission, April 1, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 018567 - 018568
Notes (continued)


6062/ Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, July 2, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 028402; It is unclear whether the prisons in Ljubljana include the Dol pri Hrasniku mine.

6063/ Yugoslavia Submission, November 10, 1992, IHRLI Doc No. 002189

6064/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, May 27, 1994

6065/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, May 27, 1994

6066/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, May 27, 1994

6067/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, May 27, 1994

6068/ ICRC, Former Yugoslavia, Places of Detention and Number of Detainees Visited by the ICRC, May 27, 1994

LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Addendum

ANNEXES TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

VOLUME V – ANNEXES IX TO XII
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX IX
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT

Under the Direction of:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Commission investigated rape and sexual assault in three ways. The first method was through a study of the documentary evidence contained in the database at the International Human Rights Law Institute (IHRLI) at DePaul University in Chicago. This study is discussed in paragraphs 28 through 294. The second method was through a field investigation. This investigation is discussed at Annex IIX, in paragraphs 1 through 190. The field investigators conducted 223 interviews in Croatia. The final method was through the analysis of investigations and interviews conducted by governments and submitted to the Commission, but not included in the database. For example, the government of Austria recently interviewed 18 refugees, several of whom were victims or witnesses of incidents of rape and sexual assault. Sweden conducted interviews of 35 refugees, most of whom were victims or witnesses of rape and sexual assault. These investigations and their findings have been sent by the Commission to the office of the Prosecutor for the ICTFY. A great number of fact-finding missions have been carried out to try to assess the incidence and extent of the use of rape and sexual assault as a weapon of war in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. The question of the credibility of victims and witnesses and the reliability of the information provided has been foremost in the consideration of this analysis. Indeed, some of the information provided, as described below, is general, generic, or insufficient. But such information may none the less be credible because of some particular details it may contain and because of other corroborating facts. Furthermore, interviews, whether conducted by the Commission or by certain governments, of victims and witnesses in sufficient numbers confirm certain accounts. Such interviews also provide a first hand account and description of certain facts, which are also found in the documentation available in the database. Thus, it is the cumulative nature of the information which tends to corroborate the facts about incidents in the locations described, as well as patterns of behaviour. Consequently, it is this cumulative effect which gives the information credibility and reliability. This is also the basis which provides a sufficient numerical basis to develop a statistical analysis from which to derive the conclusions described below. Thus, for example, of the 1,100 cases examined, it is possible to identify with some degree of accuracy the patterns described in paragraphs 8 through 25. The macroanalysis aspect of this report is therefore well founded on the facts. Obviously, individual cases and their level of readiness for prosecution will vary and, without speculating on any ultimate prosecutorial outcome, it could easily be surmised that no less than 10 percent of these reports are very likely cases for prosecution. Finally, the analysis of allegations by geographical location has been written in a way to conceal the identities of victims, witnesses, and alleged perpetrators, for confidentiality and security reasons. The vagueness present should not be taken for a lack of information. Names have been provided when they are taken from widely published sources like the news media.

3. The relevance of the study is therefore threefold: 1) it identifies specific individual cases, patterns and policies; 2) it establishes foundations in fact for allegations of rape and sexual assault in this conflict, and more particularly their use as an instrument of war; and 3) it serves as a basis for the eventual prosecution by the ICTFY of rape and sexual assault cases, particularly with respect to the prosecution of commanders and other decision makers who may have been responsible for individual conduct and formulating policy. A most significant corollary of the study is that it has identified a number of cases ready for the final investigatory stages leading to prosecution.
A. Summary of statistical information from all sources

4. This is a study by IHRLI of allegations of systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. The information for the study comes from the sources stated in paragraph 1. The database contains tens of thousands of allegations of rape and sexual assault. Rape is defined for the purposes of the study as nonconsensual sexual penetration, while sexual assault encompasses rape and other forced or coerced sexual acts. It also includes sexual mutilations for purposes of this study. When duplicated information is eliminated and the most general allegations discarded, the following statistics are revealed:

(a) There are approximately 1,100 reported cases of rape and sexual assault;

(b) About 800 victims are named, or the submitting source appears to know the identity of the victim, but does not disclose it;

(c) About 1,800 victims are specifically referred to but are not named or identified sufficiently by the witness reporting the incident;

(d) Witness reports also refer to additional numbers of victims through approximations. These reports suggest there may be about 10,000 additional victims the reports could eventually lead to;

(e) About 550 of the reported cases refer to victims of rape and sexual assault but are unspecific and do not give any identifying information;

(f) About 700 alleged perpetrators are named, or the submitting sources appear to have the name of the person they call the perpetrator but chose not to disclose it;

(g) About 750 perpetrators are specifically identified, but the witnesses do not know the name to make the identification complete;

(h) The cases contain references to about 300 perpetrators only approximately, with no specifics as to name or the specific number present;

(i) About 900 cases refer generally to classes of perpetrators but do not approximate their numbers.

5. There are about 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where people were detained and sexually assaulted:

(a) 88 of those are reportedly run by Serbs;

(b) 35 are run by unknown forces;

(c) 17 are allegedly run by Croats;

(d) 14 are allegedly run by Muslim and Croat forces together;

(e) 8 are reportedly run by Muslims.

6. This statistical information may not represent the true extent of what has occurred in the former Yugoslavia. This shortfall may be due to a variety of reasons:
(a) The chief reason is that victims are reluctant to report the assaults;

(b) Victims fear reprisals by their attackers, both for themselves and family members remaining in occupied areas; 9/ 

(c) Some victims feel shame and embarrassment and fear ostracization by their communities--this is especially true in Muslim society, though many female victims have banded together for support, unlike most victims of rape and sexual assault in peacetime; 10/ 

(d) A great deal of time has passed since the crimes were committed. 11/ Now, victims and witnesses have relocated to over 20 different countries. With the passage of time and migration, there is an increasing reticence to report incidents of rape and sexual assault at an international level. Victims and witnesses wish to get on with their lives and not to relive the shame and embarrassment of their experiences;

(e) Many do not have a place to report the assault or feel that reporting would be useless;

(f) Refugees have a certain level of skepticism about the international community. Support groups and therapists contribute to this skepticism due to their concern over the traumatic effect of reliving the trauma through constant questioning.

7. These concerns are evidenced in many of the reports used in this study. Submitting sources often withhold the names of victims, witnesses or perpetrators to protect them. Additionally, many of the witnesses who gave testimony stated that they were afraid to allow their identity to be revealed because of retaliation by the alleged perpetrators or rejection by their own community. Some of the victims report that the people who assaulted them said never to tell what had happened or they would hunt down the victims and kill them.

B. Methodology

8. To analyse the contents of the database, all of the allegations of rape and sexual assault were gathered. Summary sheets were created for each allegation. These worksheets separated out some of the vital information, such as the identity of the witness who reported the incident, the identity of the victims and perpetrators, the date and location of the incident, the source of the report, and the method of recording the information. The worksheets also contained a comprehensive summary of the incident of rape and sexual assault. These summary sheets were then used as analytical tools to compare the information in a standardized format. They were organized geographically, divided by the setting in which they allegedly occurred, and arranged chronologically within that subheading. The analysis which follows is also organized geographically by county in alphabetical order. This particular form was chosen because of the number of "warring factions", and the generally confusing nature of the conflict.

9. The setting was defined as either custodial or noncustodial, and those reports which did not specify the setting were assumed not to have occurred in custody. 12/ This classification was used for several reasons, primarily because some level of organization and coordination is required to hold people in custody. The greater the number of rapes and sexual assaults in custody, the greater the likelihood of higher-level control over, or acquiescence to the practice. About 600 reported cases specify that they occurred in settings
where the victims were held in custody.

C. Summary analysis

10. Rape and sexual assault have been reported to have been committed by all of the "warring factions". Additionally, many ethnic groups were reportedly victims of rape and sexual assault: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Croatians, Croatian Serbs, Croatian Muslims, Albanians, Czechs and others. However, it is important to avoid moral equivalency in the analysis. The vast majority of victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60 percent of the nearly 150 detention sites where men and women were allegedly raped and sexually assaulted. Finally, for purposes of prosecution, it is important to distinguish between "opportunistic" crimes and the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of "ethnic cleansing". Rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context of the practice of "ethnic cleansing"; discussed in Annex IV, and the practices in concentration camps, discussed in Annexes V and VIII. Most of the reported cases occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and none were reported to have occurred in Slovenia.

11. Several patterns of conduct are revealed in the reported cases, irregardless of the ethnicity of the perpetrators or the victims. These patterns are:

(a) Individuals or small groups commit rape and sexual assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic group before generalized fighting breaks out in an area;

(b) Individuals or groups commit rape and sexual assault in conjunction with fighting in an area, often raping women in public;

(c) Individuals or groups commit rapes and sexual assaults of detainees;

(d) Individuals or groups commit rape and sexual assault against women held for the purpose of being raped and sexually assaulted and for the purpose of harming the women;

(e) Detention sites are established solely for the rape and sexual abuse of women for the perpetrator's gratification.

12. The first pattern occurs before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in a region. This type of rape and sexual assault is accompanied by looting, intimidation, and beatings. Tensions in an area grow, and members of the ethnic group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours by intimidation, looting and beatings. Two or more men reportedly break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them, and often rape and sexually assault female residents. Some of the reported rapes and sexual assaults are singular and some are multiple. In either case, there is often a gang atmosphere where all the abuses are part of the same event, and all the attackers participate in the event, even if they do not sexually assault the victims. A distinct pattern of rape and sexual assault within this general type is peculiar to one area of BiH and Croatia. Paramilitary groups roam the countryside, abducting primarily Bosnian Serb women from their homes. The women are taken to a specific location, raped and sexually assaulted repeatedly, and then abandoned. The size of the groups of men range from four to 15. The victims are usually assaulted by each of the men in the group.
13. The second pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in conjunction with widespread or generalized fighting. When forces attack a town or village, the population is gathered and divided by sex and age. Some women are raped and sexually assaulted in their homes as the attacking forces secure the area. Others are selected after the roundup and are then raped and sexually assaulted publicly. The population of the village is then transported to camps.

14. The third pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in sites of detention or other "collection centres" for refugees. After the population is rounded up in a town or village, men and women are separated. Men are executed or sent off to camps, and women are generally sent off to separate camps. In these custodial situations, soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries, and even civilians are allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them away, rape and sexually assault them, and then either kill them or return them to the site. There is a significant amount of gang-rape and sexual assault reported in this context, and beatings and torture accompany most of the reported rapes and sexual assaults. Survivors report that some women are taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. The women who are not killed are eventually exchanged. Though this is the general pattern, there are also many allegations that women are raped and sexually assaulted in front of other detainees, or that other detainees are forced to rape and sexually assault each other. The sexual assault of men in these camps is generally public, and the men are not usually removed from the camp. In these camps, other forms of humanitarian law violations, such as torture, occur simultaneously. In camps with only male populations and in camps with mixed populations, men are also subjected to sexual assault. Examples of this type of camp include Serb-run Trnopolje in Prijedor, 19/ Croatian-run Ođak camp in Ođak, 20/ and the Muslim-run camp in Goranđe. 21/

15. The fourth pattern of rape and sexual assault occurs in specific types of sites of detention. Survivors of some camps report that they believe that they were detained for the purpose of rape and sexual assault. In these sites, all of the women are raped and sexually assaulted, the raping is quite frequent, and it is often committed in front of other internees. In this context as well, beating and torture accompany rape and sexual assault. Often, the captors state that they are trying to impregnate the women, pregnant women are treated better than their nonpregnant counterparts, and pregnant women are detained until it is too late in the pregnancy to obtain an abortion. 22/ Examples of this type of camp include the Serb-run Usara High School camp in Doboj, 23/ Muslim-run elebici camp in Konjic, 24/ and Croatian-run Dretelj camp in apljina. 25/

16. The last pattern of rape and sexual assault is detention for the purpose of providing sex. Women are collected from their homes and from camps and taken to hotels or similar facilities where they serve to provide sexual gratification for the armed forces. 26/ The women kept in these sites are reportedly killed more often than they are exchanged, unlike the female population in most camps. Additionally, unlike camp detention, the motive for detention of these women seems not to be to cause some reaction in the women detained, but instead to provide sexual services to men. The Yugoslav Mission submitted a list of such sites run by Croats and Muslims in BiH and the women's group Trešnjevka submitted a list of such sites run by Serbs in BiH.

17. In both custodial and noncustodial settings, many victims report that the alleged perpetrators state that they were ordered to rape and sexually assault the victims, or that they were doing it so that the victims and their families would never want to return to the area. Also, every reported case occurred in conjunction with an effort to displace the civilian population of a targeted ethnic group from a given region. Reports of rape and sexual
assault between members of the same ethnic group are few and have some ethnic component, such as sheltering members of the target ethnic group or marriage to a member of the targeted ethnic group. Very few reports fail to display some ethnic motivation.

18. Some characteristics of the rapes and sexual assaults include:

(a) Rapes and sexual assaults are conducted in ways that emphasize the shame and humiliation of the assault—such as forcing family members to rape each other, raping the victims in front of family members, including children, and raping persons in public places or in front of other internees;

(b) Large groups of perpetrators subject victims to multiple rapes and sexual assaults;

(c) Young women and virgins are targeted for rape and sexual assault, along with prominent members of the community and educated women;

(d) In custodial settings, perpetrators go through the detention centres with flashlights at night and choose victims randomly, returning them the next morning, thereby terrorizing the entire population of the camp;

(e) Perpetrators tell female victims that they will bear children of the perpetrator's ethnicity, that the perpetrators were ordered to rape and sexually assault them, or that, if the victims ever tell anyone or anyone discovers what has happened, the perpetrators will hunt them down and kill them;

(f) Victims are sexually assaulted with foreign objects like broken glass bottles, guns, and truncheons;

(g) Castrations are performed through crude means such as, forcing one internee to bite off another's testicles, and tying one end of a wire to the testicles and the other end to a motorcycle, then using the motorcycle to yank off the testicles;

(h) Perpetrators tell victims that they must become pregnant and hold them in custody until it is too late for the victims to get an abortion;

(i) Camp commanders often know about, and sometimes participate in, the rape and sexual assault of internees and former internees.

19. There also are many cases where female victims are protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attackers. Men take women out of the camps to protect them from rape and sexual assault, tell other guards or soldiers that the women are "taken", or help them escape. Women hide other women or bring them contraceptives. There is insufficient information on the sexual assault of men to determine a similar pattern.

20. Men are also subject to sexual assault. They are forced to rape and sexually assault women, they are forced to perform fellatio on guards and on each other, they are forced to perform other sex acts on each other, and they suffer castrations, circumcisions, and other sexual mutilations.

21. Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out
many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor, in particular, that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.

22. Other factors to consider in discerning a possible pattern include: similarities among practices in noncontiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and humiliation to not only the victim but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults.

23. The reported cases of rape and sexual assault contained in the database occurred between 1991 and 1993. The majority of the rapes and sexual assaults occurred during April to November 1992 and very few occurred before or after that. In the same time period, the number of media reports increased from a low of none in March of 1992 and of 13 in April 1992 to a high of 535 in January 1993 and 529 in February 1993. This correlation could reflect the lag in the ability of the media to cover the information, waning media interest in the subject, that media attention caused the decline, or that the purposes for which the alleged rape and sexual assault was carried out had been served by the publicity. The last two possible explanations would indicate that commanders could control the alleged perpetrators, leading to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of ethnic cleansing.

24. The numbers of alleged rapes and sexual assaults and the patterns present are different among the different countries. Most of the alleged assaults occurred in BiH in the latter two-thirds of 1992. All of the patterns described above were present. A smaller number of alleged rapes and sexual assaults occurred in Croatia, mostly in late 1991. There were only a few sites of detention, run by both Serbs and Croats, and most of the reported rape and sexual assault occurred when tensions were high in an area or in conjunction with the fighting. Nearly all the rapes and sexual assaults reported to have occurred in the FRY were committed while the victims were in custody. Most occurred in late 1991 in Begejci, Stajićevo, and Livade camps near Žrenjanin, Vojvodina.

D. Conclusions

25. Rape and other forms of sexual assault harm not only the body of the victim. The more significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate and personal decisions and bodily functions. This loss of control infringes on the victim's human dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective means of "ethnic cleansing". 27/26. Some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases are clearly the result of individual or small group conduct, without evidence of command direction or an overall policy. However, many more cases seem to be part of an overall pattern. Factors to consider in discerning a pattern include: similarities among practices in noncontiguous geographic areas; simultaneous commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations; common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, maximizing shame and
humiliation to not only the victim, but also the victim's community; and the timing of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. The presence of these factors strongly suggest that a systematic rape and sexual assault policy exists, but this remains to be proved. It is clear that some level of organization and group activity is required to carry out many of the alleged rapes and sexual assaults. One factor in particular that leads to this conclusion is the large number of allegations of rape and sexual assault which occur in places of detention. Out of about 1,100 reported cases, about 600 occurred in places of detention. These custodial cases do not appear to be random and indicate a policy of at least tolerating rape and sexual assault or the deliberate failure of camp commanders and local authorities to exercise command and control over the personnel under their authority.

27. Some of the allegations of rape and sexual assault are clearly instances of a policy of commission. In some cases, military commanders and camp commanders are reported to have ordered their subordinates to rape and sexually assault people who were not members of the subordinates' ethnic or religious group. Other cases point to a policy of omission, where military and camp commanders failed to prevent such conduct and failed to punish their subordinates for such criminal behaviour when it was discovered. There is evidence that rape and sexual assault have been used by all parties of the conflict to displace targeted ethnic groups, though not necessarily as part of an overall policy of "ethnic cleansing". However, the vast majority of victims are Bosnian Muslim and the great majority of alleged perpetrators are Bosnian Serb. Serbs reportedly run over 60 percent of the 162 detention sites where detainees are allegedly raped and sexually assaulted. Finally, for purposes of prosecution, it is important to distinguish between "opportunistic" crimes and the use of rape and sexual assault as a method of "ethnic cleansing".

II. GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS

A. BiH

1. Banja Luka

28. This county is in the north-west quarter of BiH, and, according to the 1991 census, had a population of 195,139. Bosnian Serbs comprised the majority at 54.8 per cent, while 14.9 per cent were Bosnian Croat, 14.6 per cent were Bosnian Muslim, 12 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", and the remaining 3.7 per cent were "others".

29. According to Helsinki Watch, which interviewed Bosnian Muslims in August of 1992, a succession of five draft notices had been issued to men in the Banja Luka area since April 1992, when the war began. The mobilization calls were broadcast on the radio, and those who responded were given mobilization slips, which allowed them to go to work. Men who refused to join the Bosnian Serb army were not allowed back into their workplaces. Businesses owned by Muslims were destroyed, and there was frequent, random gunfire. These circumstances caused the local Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to fear attack and created in them a desire to leave the region. Additionally, notices were posted at the bus station, stating that unless Croats and Muslims presented documents from the local military stating that they had agreed to leave the area permanently, bus tickets would not be sold to them.

30. This section of the study contains 11 reported cases, none of which are direct testimony. Six of the reports allege that the victims were Bosnian Muslim, while the rest do not specify the nationality, religion, or ethnicity of the victims. Many of the reports do not indicate the ages of
the victims. The reported ages of victims fall between seven and 65 and most are women of reproductive age. Four reports state that the alleged perpetrators were of Serbian ethnicity, but do not state their nationality. Three reports date the alleged attacks. One occurred in April of 1992, one occurred on 27 February 1993, and the third occurred on 29 September 1993. The remaining nine reports do not state when they allegedly occurred.

31. Two of the reports describe assaults that did not occur in custodial settings. In February 1993, three uniformed Serb irregulars robbed a Muslim household and allegedly raped or sexually assaulted a woman in front of her husband. In September 1993 two elderly women were reportedly raped in a village in Banja Luka.

32. Six reports describe rape and sexual assault in the Manjaa prison camp. According to Helsinki Watch, Manjaa had been a Yugoslav army camp before the war. It was situated on top of Manjaa Mountain, south of the city of Banja Luka, in Banja Luka county. Many prisoners from Prijedor were transported there. It was closed, reportedly with the help of the ICRC, between 14 and 19 December 1992. It held at least 3,917 prisoners. Women were reportedly brought to this camp from many places in BiH. One report involves a woman from Poča in the south-eastern part of BiH, who was burned with "hot irons" during her detention. Another report comes from a woman from Vlasenica, also in the eastern part of BiH. She became pregnant as a result of rape. Finally, a report states that women were taken from Kotor Varoš to Banja Luka and raped.

33. The most detailed report comes from a Bosnian Muslim woman, whose age and occupation are known. She was interned in the camp with her two young children. She states that two camp guards, identified by nicknames, raped her in front of her two children. Her daughter was also raped twice, but the perpetrators were not specified. The same witness stated that she saw camp guards rape a seven year-old girl in front of her mother and other inmates. The girl died of her injuries. The remaining two reports generally describe rape and sexual assault committed by guards and others at Manjaa Camp.

34. The last report in this section states generally that there is a "rape/death" camp, housing girls and women up to 25 years of age, at Laktaši in Banja Luka County.

2. Bihać

35. This county is in the north-west quarter of BiH, bordered on the west by Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the population was 70,896. Muslims were the majority with 66.6 per cent of the population, Serbs comprised 17.8 per cent, 7.7 per cent were Croat, 6 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslav", and 1.9 per cent fell in the "other" category.

36. There are five second-hand reports in this section of the study: Two reports concern camps in the village of Ripa, where Bosnian Muslim women were allegedly abused by Serbian forces of unidentified nationality. Another report alleges that there is a camp in Račić, and a fourth report alleges the existence of a camp in a house run by an identified man. At this house, the victims are described as Bosnian Serb. There is another report stating that the alleged victims are Bosnian Serb women. Rapes were said to have taken place in Bakšaiš village hall. The alleged perpetrators are Tudjman militiamen, Izetbegović militiamen, and local Muslims. The final report states generally that many women were
repeatedly raped in Bihać, and that a pregnant woman's abdomen was cut and the foetus removed. 52/

3. Bijeljina

37. Bijeljina county is in the north-east quarter of BiH, bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 census, the total population of Bijeljina was 96,796. Of this number, 59.4 per cent were Bosnian Serbs, 31.3 per cent were Bosnian Muslims, 4.4 per cent were described as "Yugoslav" and 4.9 per cent were categorized as "other".

38. This section contains 11 reports, 10 of which are second-hand accounts. Five reports describe rapes occurring in a setting where the victims were not in custody. According to one witness, a Bosnian Muslim machine technician, paramilitaries took over the town of Bijeljina in April 1992. Two paramilitary groups were involved: Arkan's forces and the forces of another identified man. The second man had reportedly been promised control of Bijeljina by Arkan. After they seized control of the town, the two groups conducted house-to-house weapons searches. While Arkan's men only looked for weapons, the second paramilitary group looted, vandalized and raped as well. 53/

39. Janja, another town south of the town of Bijeljina, was attacked by Bosnian Serb forces in May 1992. One witness reported that her husband was killed and that she and her daughter were raped. 54/ Another report states that there are allegations of killings and rape in Janja in May 1992 and later. 55/ In December 1992, 14 Serbian soldiers broke into a house, beat the father and son of the house, and raped the mother and daughter of the house. 56/ These incidents are among the seven which were non-custodial.

40. In addition, four custodial settings are described; one is the town of Janja, 57/ another is the secondary school centre in Bijeljina county, 58/ the third is a camp in Petkovići village 59/ and the last is the barracks at Bijeljina, where a number of young girls are kept to be used as "troop comforts". 60/ Most of the accounts do not discuss the time frame of the alleged assaults. The dates identified are April 1992, 61/ May 1992, 62/ and January 1993. 63/

41. Only two of the victims are named. 64/ The rest of the victims are unnamed; where specified, they are identified only as Muslim girls or women. Similarly, none of the perpetrators are named; where specified, they are identified as Serbs, though one report states that the perpetrators are Serbs under the control of a man with the same name as the paramilitary leader. 65/

4. Bosanska Dubica 66/

42. This county is located in north-western BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the county had a population of 31,577, 69.1 per cent of which was Serbian, 20.5 per cent of which was Muslim, 5.8 per cent of which identified themselves as "Yugoslav", and 4.6 per cent of which were identified only as "other". This section of the study contains four reports of sexual assault. One report is testimony and three reports are second-hand accounts. Each of the reports alleges that sexual assault and rape occurred in a custodial setting. Two allege that there was a camp or brothel organized by an identified man in Moštanica. 67/ One of these reports states that the victims were Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat. 68/ The other two statements allege the existence of a camp where rape
occurred. 69/ One of these states that a camp was located in a gymnasium. 70/ The alleged perpetrators were described in these reports only as Serbs. None of the reports gives a date of occurrence.

5. Bosanska Gradiška

43. This county is in the north-western quarter of BiH, just east of Bosanska Dubica, bordered on the north by Croatia. It had a prewar population of 60,062, according to the 1991 census. Serbs comprised the majority of this county's population at 59.5 per cent, Muslims were 26.7 per cent, 5.4 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", and 2.5 per cent fell in the category of "other". This section contains two second-hand reports, both of which allegedly occurred in non-custodial settings.

44. One report describes two rapes which allegedly occurred during the attack on Liskovac. The victims were Bosnian Muslim, but the perpetrators were not identified, except as men in uniform. On 1 August 1993, 12 men in uniform broke into a Bosnian Muslim home, beat the inhabitants, and destroyed their belongings. An 80 year-old woman who protested was shot in the head, as were two other men in the household. 72/ Reportedly, the soldiers were drunk. 73/ An 18 year-old in the household was raped repeatedly. 74/ The group then went to a neighbouring house, where they beat and shot the Muslim owner, beat and raped his 27 year-old wife, and shot her mother-in-law dead. 75/ The mother apparently tried to intervene. 76/ 45. The second report describes an alleged break-in and rape of a Bosnian Muslim woman in the presence of her family. 77/ No further details were provided.

6. Bosanska Krupa

46. This county is located in north-west BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia. The population was 58,212 before the war. Muslims were the majority with 74.5 per cent, 23.6 per cent were Serbs, and 1.9 per cent were described only as "other". There are five reports in this section of the study, all of which are second-hand. Three reports allege the existence of a camp where Bosnian Muslim women are kept for the purpose of rape by Bosnian Serb forces in Jasenica, 79/ and the other two allege the existence of such a camp run by Bosnian Serb forces for Bosnian Muslim women at the elementary school Petar Košć. 80/ Four reports are dated from May through July of 1992, and the fifth does not specify a date.

7. Bosanski Brod and Ožak Counties

47. These counties are located in north-east BiH, bordered on the north by the county of Slavonski Brod in Croatia. 82/ War began in these regions on 18 April 1992, when units of the Croatian National Guard of the Republic of Croatia crossed the Sava river, aided by members of the Croatian Democratic Union for the Commune of Ožak in the Republic of BiH. Croatian forces held this region until mid-July when they were finally forced to withdraw by the Serbs. Serb Army forces regained control of Bosanski Brod and Ožak between 13 and 15 July. The human rights violations contained in this report occurred just prior to and during the Croatian Army's occupation of this region. 83/ 48. Upon the initial Croatian offensive, villagers fled to surrounding towns yet untouched by the attack and to the safety of the region's forest. Those
not immediately able to escape were either killed during the siege of their village or interned by the Croatian forces in camps. Many of those who had originally fled, to the forest and other villages, were later found and interned in these camps as well. The reports compiled here describe internment in the Odžak Camp of Stroilit, at the elementary school in Odžak, and at the sports stadium in Bosanski Brod. It was in these camps and in the villages and forest of the region that violations allegedly occurred.

49. This section of the study contains 89 allegations of rape and sexual assault in Bosanski Brod and Odžak counties. Forty-two of these allegations are in the form of testimony of the alleged victims and/or eyewitnesses; 46 are second-hand reports. Of the testimony, there are two particular incidents provided in the form of a confession by a Croatian soldier. The victims and witnesses of the violations are both camp detainees and inhabitants of the region. The majority of alleged victims are identified as Bosnian Serb or as being of "Serbian nationality", although a handful are identified as Bosnian Muslim. The reported victims of rape and sexual assault are mostly women between the ages of 9 and 65. The majority of them are of "reproductive age" (between 15 and 40 years old).

50. The main perpetrators found in this report are identified as Croatian. They are further specified to be members of the Ustaši, Croatian police, or Vatreni Konji. The Vatreni Konji, translated as the "Horses of Fire", is a paramilitary group, reportedly part of the 102nd Brigade of the Croatian Defence Council. In several reports, camp guards and the commander of Odžak camp are also alleged to have committed rape and sexual assault. Finally, in two reports, Muslims are reported to have acted with, and under the command of, Croatian soldiers in crimes against Serb civilians.

51. The reports in this section come from the following sources: the large majority of them were submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights by the Yugoslav Government State Department or Chargé d'Affaires; others came from the Serbian Council Information Centre; a number of reports regarding the "Horses of Fire" were submitted by the Inter-agency Group of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (IAGGFRY); several were sent by Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch; and a few by the Ministry of Health, Croatia.

52. From among the allegations, 33 reports describe violations occurring while the victims were in custody. Most of these incidents took place at the aforementioned camps. There was one incident in which a Serb woman was taken from her home by a former schoolmate, and kept in a vacant apartment near the stadium in Bosanski Brod for 10 months. She was raped there repeatedly by her abductor and once by his cousin. Another instance of custodial rapes, which did not occur in the camps, involves the shipment of women from the region to Slavonski Brod and Kolibe, BiH. There, Serb and Muslim women from Derventa and Gornje Kolibe were kidnapped from their villages and taken to homes for "use" by the Croatian Army.

53. At the camps, different types of rape and sexual assault violations were allegedly committed. At Bosanski Brod, women reported being gang-raped, and also being raped repeatedly by the same soldiers during their entire detention. One eyewitness described a gang-rape in which a female prisoner was raped by 41 men before she was shot in the head. Most often, the victims describe being taken by soldiers to a warehouse, warehouse office, or an area near an oil refinery to be raped. From the reports, it appears that most women were not raped in the main detention centres of the camp, although they were raped in front of each other. There is one allegation of sexual assault committed against men at Bosanski Brod. In this case, men were forced to perform fellatio on each other.
54. At the Strolit Camp and elementary school in Odžak, a number of other remarkable assaults occurred, in addition to rape. For instance, there are several reports from Strolit which describe "camp weddings" organized by a Croatian Army commander, who was allegedly the camp warden, and his assistant. These weddings were arranged with prisoner "brides" and "bridegrooms". The prisoners chosen for the "weddings" were to be as incongruent as possible in physical appearance, educational background, and age. They were forced to drink alcohol and engage in sexual intercourse while other prisoners were made to drink, play guitar, and watch. There are also reports from this camp of prisoners forced to have sex with an identified mentally-handicapped woman. Finally, the majority of alleged castrations occurred in these two detention camps. The most graphic of the reported castrations involved a named Croatian woman. She is reported to have ordered a Great Dane to attack naked detainees and bite off their genitals.

55. Of the 56 allegations of non-custodial rape and sexual assault, 43 are linked to the Vatreni Konji, or "Horses of Fire". This group of paramilitaries would take women in Odžak from their homes at night to a house or forest to be gang-raped. The victims were either returned in the morning or abandoned outside the house or in the forest in which they were raped. Several reports describe the victims having to return home on their own, without clothes.

56. These "hostage" rapes allegedly occurred from May to August, 1992, with many of them taking place in batches (4 and 5 June, and 28 June to 2 July). The majority of reports describe the Vatreni Konji taking women from Novi Grad and its surrounding villages (in particular Posavska Mahala, where it seems many of the perpetrators were from). These men raped in groups of up to 10. Often, they were drunk and quite abusive to the women they raped. From the reports, they seem to have preferred young women, the youngest being a nine-year-old girl. Many of the victims report that they knew their assailants since they were all from the same region.

57. These paramilitaries were never detained or severely punished for their abuses because they are alleged to have threatened police and local officials. In one instance, the perpetrators were detained after the rape of a woman, but were then released when the residents of Posavska Mahala threatened Novi Grad with physical retaliation. Today, many of the members of Vatreni Konji are still in flight.

58. Some non-custodial reports also state that victims were abused by the police or individuals who claimed to be the police. Still others report men acting on their own. In these instances, it seems that certain individuals were simply taking advantage of the current climate of chaos in the region.

59. A number of locations were reported as sites of rape and sexual assault. They include:

- Private houses;
- Victims' houses;
- Stadium in Bosanski Brod;
- A building materials warehouse, a settlement, and a housing estate;
- Odžak camp;
- Slavonski Brod camp;
- Brothels in Slavonski Brod;
- Houses provided as safe havens for women in Novi Grad;
- Elementary school at Odžak; and
- Forest in the region.
60. Forty-one alleged perpetrators were identified by name in the reports. Among them was the Odñak camp warden, whose name appeared in at least four incident reports. Seventeen of the named perpetrators were specifically identified in as few as two reports and as many as eight. The following groups were also implicated as perpetrators:

- Vatreni Konji;
- Ustaši;
- Croatian MPs;
- Croatian soldiers;
- Croatian National Guard;
- Police;
- Croatian men; and
- Muslim men.

Also, there is a list of members of the Vatreni Konji compiled by the Yugoslav mission. It is not reproduced here in full because not all the names in that list appeared in the reports used in this study. Because that list was based on the reports used in this study, plus reports that did not contain allegations of rape and sexual assault, the remaining perpetrators on that list were probably not involved in these particular crimes.

8. Bosanski Novi

61. This is a county in the north-west quarter of BiH, bordered on the north-west by Serbian Krajina section of Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the region had a population of 41,541. Serbs were the majority of the population, comprising 60.4 per cent, Muslims made up 33.9 per cent, 3.7 per cent called themselves "Yugoslavs", and 2 per cent fell into the category of "other". This section of the study contains only one allegation of rape. According to refugees from Bosanski Novi, many young Bosnian Muslim women from the town of Bosanski Novi were raped by unidentified Serbs.

9. Bosanski Petrovac

62. This county is located in the north-west quarter of BiH and is bordered on the west by Croatia. Before the war, this county had a population of 15,552, according to the 1991 census. Serbs were the majority, at 75.2 per cent of the population, Muslims comprised 21.1 per cent, and the remaining 3.7 per cent were described only as "other". There is one second-hand report in this section, which is based on the victim's videotaped statement.

63. In early September 1992, two Bosnian Serbs from the town and three other Serbs came upon a group of Bosnian Muslims in a field in a town in this county. Two of the Serbs abducted the victim's husband and another man. The victim, a Bosnian Muslim woman in her thirties, was taken to a nearby house, forced at knife-point to strip, and raped by one of the Serbs. She was raped a second time by another Serb. The victim was released and found her husband who had been bound with chains, beaten and burned with cigarettes. The victim stated that she saw the soldiers take two young girls, aged 14 and 16, to the same house. From the girls' appearance, the victim concluded that they had been raped.

10. Bosanski Šamac

64. This county is located in the north-east quarter of BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia. The 1991 census places the population in the county at
32,835. Croats were the majority at 44.7 per cent, Serbs were 41.5 per cent, Muslims were 6.8 per cent, and 7 per cent were described only as "other". There is one general, second-hand report in this section, describing a rape by otherwise unidentified Serbs. There are no more details given. A second report states that there were about 800 prisoners in a Serb-run camp in the county. The population at the camp were Croats, Muslims and Albanians. The night of 7 May 1992, one prisoner was forced to swallow his feces, while another was forced to perform sex acts on a fellow prisoner.

11. Bratunac

65. This county is located in the central eastern part of BiH, bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 census, there was a population of 33,575 before the conflict. Muslims constituted a majority at 64.2 per cent of the population, 34.2 per cent were Serb, and 1.6 per cent were described as "other". There are three general reports in this section of the study. According to a 26 year-old Bosnian Muslim student, in the first week of May 1992, residents of Bratunac were rounded up and sent to the local stadium. There, prominent people were killed and young women were raped. The people in the stadium were then loaded onto trucks and taken to unknown locations. Another very general report states that Serbs raided homes and raped young women. The last report states that doctors at Bratunac hospital have treated Bosnian Serbs who were mutilated by castration or cutting their nipples off.

12. Brčko County

67. This county is located in the north-east quarter of BiH, bordered on the north-east by Serbia. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, Brčko had a population of almost 100,000: 20 per cent were Bosnian Serb, 45 per cent Bosnian Muslim, and 25 per cent Bosnian Croat.

68. This section contains 38 reports of rape and sexual assault in Brčko County. Twenty-nine are second-hand reports, while nine are testimonies. Four report occurrences in non-custodial settings, and the rest report occurrences in custodial settings. The perpetrators are identified primarily as Bosnian Serb and Serbian Serb. Many reports, however, describe the alleged perpetrators only as Serbian. The reported victims are identified primarily as Bosnian Muslim, though quite a few are identified as Bosnian Croat. The reports are from the Bosnian government, Muslim non-governmental groups, the United States government, and various news sources. There are several detention sites referred to in this section. Notably, a number of the reports reveal an organized, systematic pattern of rape and gang-rape activity.

69. Brčko was reportedly invaded by Serbian forces in April and May 1992. A camp was set up in a port facility on the Sava river, near the Ina-Luka gas station. The camp housed Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim males and females, there was no effort made to separate the sexes. People were reportedly collected from the surrounding areas, segregated according to ethnic and religious affiliation, and then deported to Luka camp. One hundred to 150 Serbs from Belgrade reportedly worked in shifts of 50 inside the camp. They wore green camouflage and green berets with two eagles on them. These were the only Serbs allowed in the camp. They reportedly carried out interrogations, torture, rape and killings in small offices inside the two warehouses. At the corner of one warehouse was a room called the
"rape room" which measured about 2.5 by 3 metres. This room was reportedly where women were taken and raped. Prisoners were taken in and out of the camp every day, and civilian officials visited for a few hours every day. 114/

70. The victim selection was reportedly well organized at Luka camp. Several reports suggest that young Serbian woman was responsible for its administration. 115/ Reportedly, she brought a nurse to Luka to "prepare the girls and make them calm". According to the nurse's report, she watched as the Serbian administratrix stabbed a girl in the breast and vagina with a broken bottle for resisting instructions. The girl subsequently bled to death. Instructions to the young victims included submitting to sexual exploitation. The process commenced with the camp commander selecting a girl whom he reportedly took to a private location, and then in groups of three or four, the camp guards selected and shared one girl between them. 116/

71. The techniques of mistreatment, while similar to those reported in other sections, also included incidents of gang raping. 117/ It was also alleged, that on a daily basis, young girls were picked and taken to a canteen where they were raped. 118/ Sometimes the girls would disappear. 119/ One report states that Serbs at Luka castrated 15 young men. 120/ One perpetrator confessed that in one day he was allegedly forced to rape 12 women. 121/ According to two reports, Bosnian Serb paramilitaries alleged that they were forced to rape women and kill men to prove their loyalty to the Serbian state. 122/

72. Additional sources report the existence of a "Rape/Death" camp in Brezovo Polje, 123/ also noted for its organized rape activity. Several sources testified to the sexual violence and humiliation suffered by women, usually Muslims, at this site. 124/ Brezovo Polje is also the site where Serb soldiers allegedly rounded up Muslim women and girls and transported them to the Osnovo furniture warehouse in Caparde, Žvornik County. 125/ The girls were allegedly raped repeatedly there. 126/

73. Two sources report on the atrocities allegedly committed at the "Laser Company" restaurant in Brčko. 127/ Several other facilities were reported as sites of mass rape and sexual abuse, including: Hotel Elvis, 128/ Hotel Galeb, 129/ Restaurant Vestfalia, 130/ Hotel Galija, 131/ Interpler factory, 132/ camp at Borovo Polje, 133/ camp at Lonari, 134/ bordellos, 135/ Serbian Illnes, and the Serbian military hospital. Another report suggests that there were about 3,000 ex-detainees in the free territory of Brčko, 1,000 of whom were women. 136/ The reporter noted that approximately 500 of these women have been victims of rape. 137/ In addition, a number of girls between ages 15 and 17 were allegedly held by Serb soldiers in three other locations for sexual purposes. 138/ They include a coffee house called Westphalia near Stolina, a coffee house near Skijana, and a private house in Grica. 139/ Grica is in the city of Brčko, while the other two locations are in the suburbs, in the direction of Bijeljina. 140/

74. Most of the reported incidents occurred between April and July 1992.

(a) Victim Information

75. Most victims were unidentified, but were described generally as Bosnian Muslim.
(b) Alleged perpetrator information

76. Twenty-six alleged perpetrators were identified by name in the reports. Among them were several military officials.

13. Breza

77. This county is located in the centre of BiH, just north-west of Sarajevo. The 1991 census places the prewar population at 17,266. Muslims constituted the majority at 75.6 per cent, Serbs were 12.3 per cent, 7.1 per cent were described as "other", and five per cent were Croats. There is one testimony in this section about a camp located in this county. A Bosnian Serb woman reported that she was abducted by 10 men in camouflage uniforms with lily insignia on their hats and raped repeatedly. She was held in a camp with seven other women from 26 May to 15 August 1992.

78. The camp was reportedly run by a man, identified by nickname. The witness and other detainees were repeatedly beaten, raped, and forced to do hard labor. They also witnessed a father forced to rape his daughter.

79. The witness became pregnant and received an abortion in Belgrade. According to the doctor's case file, she was 20 weeks pregnant, depressed, anxious, tearful, overwhelmed, and had feelings of shame and suicide. It was the doctor's opinion that the witness required serious psychiatric treatment.

14. Bugojno

80. This county is located in the west central section of BiH. Before the war, it had a population of 46,843, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority at 47.1 per cent of the population, Croats comprised 44.1 per cent, Serbs were 18.9 per cent, and 4.9 per cent were described as "other". There are eight second-hand reports in this section.

81. Fighting began in this area as early as February 1993. In conjunction with the fighting, Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries raped Bosnian Croat women. According to the UN Centre for Human Rights, the fighting in Bugojno started on 18 July 1993. By 29 July, the HVO had surrendered. Immediately after that, 5,000 Croats fled at the suggestion of the HVO. About 2,500 civilians and 350 HVO prisoners of war still live in the city. BritBat and the ECMM try to monitor the situation, but the remaining Croats are reportedly not well-treated.

82. Five reports, in this section of the study, concern rape in a noncustodial setting. In September of 1993, an identified person told the UN Centre for Human Rights that there had been five recent cases of rape, including one where the husband discovered his wife raped and dead, but was afraid to report it. Some of the victims found refuge in the local Catholic church. Apparently, the perpetrators were put in prison but then set free.

83. According to Major G. Binns, speaking at a briefing in Gornji Vakuf, in September of 1993, there were two documented cases of rape of Croatian women by Muslims, but the Major believed that there could have been as many as 10 cases. The ECMM has tried to investigate at least two of the cases. These two women may be the subjects of the next report. The ECMM reported that on 17 August 1993, two women, aged 50 and 51, were raped near Bugojno.
Two suspects were arrested. The alleged rapes were so "bestial in nature", that the reports are being submitted to the War Crimes Commission. Another report, which may describe the same incident, states that two Croatian women were subjected to a night of multiple and continuous rape while others watched. The perpetrators were reportedly "known for such activity".

84. There are reportedly three sites where women are kept in custody and sexually abused. These sites were allegedly operative during 1992, before the Muslim and Croat fighting broke out. Serb women were reportedly held at each of these locations. At the Slavko Rodić factory, about 100 Serbs had allegedly been tortured by mid-summer 1992. Women were reportedly the principle victims of torture, and most were reportedly publicly raped by their "Ustaša jailers". The last two reports allege that about 30 Serb women were kept at the Rostovo Ski Centre and about 15 Serb women were held at the house of a killed Serb, Reija Lukić, reportedly for sexual entertainment.

15. Busovaa

85. This county is in central BiH, just north-west of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 18,883. Croats comprised the majority with 48.1 per cent of the population. Muslims were second with 44.9 per cent, and 7 per cent of the population was described as "other". This section of the study contains three reports, two of which describe sexual assaults in noncustodial settings, and one of which describes an assault of a victim already in custody.

86. On 8 May 1993, a Muslim woman was raped by a man in HVO uniform. The perpetrator took her from her house to another house about 500 metres away, where he raped her. The police had two suspects and hoped to arrest them on 9 May. Another report alleges generally that there was one incident of rape in May or June 1993. Reportedly, the military perpetrators were sentenced by an HVO military court. These reports may be describing the same incident.

87. The last report identifies locations where Bosnian Serbs were held in custody by the Croatian Democratic Union. The site was called the "Black House" and housed both women and men. The witness heard his wife and daughter being raped in the cell next to his by a former co-worker.

16. ajnie

88. This county is located in the south-eastern quarter of BiH, bordered on the south and east by Serbia. It had a prewar population of 8,919, according to the 1991 census. Serbs made up 52.9 per cent, Muslims 44.9 per cent, and 2.2 per cent of the population was described as "other". This section contains one second-hand report from the government of BiH. It alleges that the elementary school in the county was used to house women for the purpose of sexual entertainment. The inmates are reportedly Bosnian Muslim, and the perpetrators are described only as "Cetniks".

17. Derventa

89. This county is located in the north-east quarter of BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia. According to the 1991 census, Derventa had a population of 56,328. Serbs comprised 40.8 per cent of the population, 39 per cent were Croat, 12.6 per cent were Muslim, and 7.6 per cent were described as "other".
This section contains two second-hand reports. One alleges that a 10 year-old was raped by a "Petrov". The other is a general report alleging that during a Serb attack on DREVENTA, they raped and killed residents.

18. Doboj

90. This county is located in the north-east quarter of BiH. Before the war, it had a population of 102,546, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority at 40.2 per cent of the population, Serbs were next with 39 per cent, 13 per cent were Croat, 5.5 per cent called themselves "Yugoslavs", and 2.3 per cent fell into the "other" category. This section of the study contains 34 reports of alleged rape and sexual assault. The alleged perpetrators are described, primarily as members of the Serbian forces, including the JNA, Serb militia, Cetniks, or members of Milan Martić's police forces, and the victims are identified primarily as Bosnian Muslim. The ages of the alleged victims were mostly unspecified, and ranged from 14 to 45, with most above 30.

91. The sources of the reports in this section include the governments of BiH, Croatia and the United States, as well as Helsinki Watch and news sources.

92. Several reports state that Doboj central high school, located in the Usara section of town, was a facility where hundreds of women and girls were detained and allegedly raped and gang-raped. One report details how the women and girls were collected and transported to the school. Serbian soldiers separated the women and children from the men in the village and then called names from a list. Another report claims that the women were lined up for selection, some women were put on a bus and moved out of the area, while others were loaded onto a separate bus and sent to the high school. One woman claimed that there were hundreds of people at the camp, another placed the population at 600, while a third stated that approximately 1,000 women a day were raped by unspecified men.

93. The quality of the sources and the corroborating testimony support the likelihood of the facility's existence. It appears that the reports are citing the same school, which seems to have been used as a rape camp for many months. The school was in operation as early as May 1992 and as recently as January 1993. Each day, soldiers came with flashlights and selected women to be taken to classrooms, where they were reportedly raped or gang-raped by as many as 10 men. Afterwards, they were returned to the gym. Many women claim to have been raped every day and sometimes by men they knew (despite the alleged perpetrators' efforts to hide their identity). In addition to being raped, it is reported that the detained women were raped with foreign objects, urinated on, beaten, and spat on. One woman stated that she was specifically targeted because she was the wife of a leader of the Muslim party.

94. The reports also claim that the alleged perpetrators made statements suggesting that a purpose of the detention and repeated rapes was to impregnate the victims. For example, one report states that the reason they were being held was to "make Cetnik babies". Other reports provide claims that indicate this to be the case. One woman testified that pregnant women were transferred to a hospital and fed twice a day, in anticipation of bearing offspring. Another woman said a man who claimed to be a gynecologist examined the victims to see if they were pregnant. He said pregnant women get better treatment.
95. The second facility allegedly used for rape was the Serbian Red Cross Refugee Camp. Reportedly, victims were regularly taken from the camp to an apartment in Pijesko, a section of Doboj, where they were raped. After the rapes, they were returned to the camp. The process was repeated every few days. 177/

96. Several reports detail rapes allegedly committed in the homes of the victims during June 1992. Fathers or sons were often present during the rapes. Four reports describe rapes that were perpetrated near the victims' male family members.

97. The following is a list of the locations of where sexual assault reportedly occurred in the area:

- Victims' homes;
- Middle School Complex gymnasium;
- School camp;
- Usara High School camp;
- Serbian Red Cross Refugee Camp;
- Mala Bukovica;
- Vukovići Člvičja; and
- A house in Lukavica.

98. The dates of the alleged rapes were mostly in June and August 1992.

(a) Alleged victim information

99. The victims were described primarily as Bosnian Muslim.

(b) Alleged perpetrator information

100. General Forces identified:

- JNA;
- Četniks;
- Police forces of Knin in Croatia (commanded by Milan Martić);
- Beli Orlovi ("White Eagles" paramilitary);
- Serb soldiers and militia;
- Soldiers with "SMP" on uniforms.

The reports also identified several perpetrators by name, among them the reported commander of the high school facility. Additionally two other alleged perpetrators were named.

19. Donji Vakuf

101. This county is located in the west-central part of BiH. According to the 1991 census, this county had a population of 24,232. The majority of the population was Muslim at 55.3 per cent, 38.7 per cent were Serb, and 6 per cent were described only as "other". There are two reports in this section describing sexual assault in a situation where the victims are in custody. The first alleges that a 22 year-old woman from Bugojno was kidnapped from a bus, on 27 April 1992, by Serbian forces. These forces detained her and another woman in a house for six months and raped them repeatedly until 10 July 1992. She was released in a prisoner exchange on 1 October 1992. 178/ The second report appears to be a medical record of the woman described in the first report. Though it does not identify the ethnicity or
nationality of the two victims, the perpetrators are named and identified. One was a civilian and the other a man in uniform. 179/

20. Foća and Kalinovik Counties 180/

102. Before the outbreak of fighting, Foća was a small, predominantly Muslim town in Eastern Bosnia. Based on the 1991 census, the total population of Foća was 40,513, of which 57.6 per cent was Muslim, 45.3 per cent was Serbian, and "others" comprised 3.1 per cent. It was one of the first towns Serb forces seized in Bosnia. Power was seized by three top associates of Radovan Karadžić: Velibor Ostojić, Vojislav Maksimović, and Petar anar. These individuals are reported to have organized the military assault on Foća in April 1992, taking control of the region. 181/

103. Serb forces have denied the foreign press and international organizations access to Foća since April 1992. Because they have only recently been given access, this document does not contain any new reports. Most of the information has come from refugees who left the area in August 1992. Because the accounts in this section allege the frequent transportation of victims from one site to another within both Kalinovik and Foća, all of the sites in these two counties are considered to be part of the same region.

104. There are reports of approximately 63 incidents of rape and sexual assault included in this section, 28 of which contain direct testimony from the alleged victims. Most reports specifically identify the victims as Bosnian Muslim, and many reports imply that the victims may be Bosnian Muslim, either through the events described, or by the name of the victim. There is one identified Serbian victim, 182/ and one report alleges that Croatian women were sexually assaulted. 183/ A few reports make no reference to the ethnicity of the victims in any way. The ages of the alleged victims fell between 12 and 43, and the majority were under 30. The perpetrators were described as Bosnian Serbs, Serbian Serbs, and in some cases merely as Serbs. Additionally, many were described as "White Eagles", others as Četniks with Četnik insignia, or generically as "Četniks".

105. About 28 of the reported cases occurred in settings where the victims were not in custody. From April to September 1992, women were raped and sexually assaulted in their homes, the forest, and in other locations in the villages of Foća and Kalinovik. Most of these sexual assaults seem to have been coordinated with efforts to rid the area of Muslims. Several reported cases state only that women were raped. 184/ Other reports contain more details and identifying information. For example, in April, three Bosnian Muslim women were allegedly raped in their home in a village in Foća. The women were 14, 28 and 31 years old. Reportedly, Serbian soldiers broke into the home. One of the soldiers was identified as a "Commandant". According to the victim and her mother, this man raped the 14 year-old and forced her to perform oral sex while her mother was in the next room. The other two women were raped in other areas around the house, but reportedly the assaults to the police, identifying one of the perpetrators. Reportedly, no action was taken. 185/

106. In another incident in early June, a Bosnian Muslim woman described how she was raped in her home by an identified Serbian volunteer. She described herself as rich. The woman’s husband and father were arrested in May. She described three groups of "Četniks" who travelled through the town during this time, one after another. One member of the first group tried to protect the woman and her family from harm. The second group, called the "elebići Četniks", came through looking for a Serb soldier wanted for rape and theft. The third group contained the man who raped the victim. He and a companion
came to her house. The companion unsuccessfully tried to stop the volunteer, who was drunk, from raping, so he protected and hid the victim's daughter. The volunteer raped the victim in her house. Afterwards, the victim fled and called police. Before the police arrived, men came to the house and shot at it, destroying much of the house. 186/

107. Also in early June, four men, two in uniform and two in civilian clothes, went to a woman's house, looking for the woman's sister. They took the woman, her sister, and another woman. Two of the men allegedly raped the first woman in a neighbouring flat. She stated that they cut the victim's clothes off with a knife and said that they were going to show her what Muslim men did to Serbian women. 187/ Another Muslim woman stated that she was raped at her home after her husband was arrested. Her mother-in-law and son were forced out and afterwards her house was set on fire. The family fled to Miljevina. 188/ In another case, three identified Muslim women were reportedly taken from their house to a flat where they were raped by three members of the Serbian army. The men threatened to kill them if they told what had happened. 189/

108. According to another Muslim woman, she was raped at a friend's house by three unknown "Četniks" in mid-August. The men told her that they behaved better than Ustaši behaved toward Serbian women. A friend witnessed the rape. This victim also alleged that an identified woman picked women for Serbian soldiers to rape. Additionally, the witness stated that an identified Serb commander saved her daughter, by taking her to Belgrade and arranging for her transport to Germany to "his place". 190/ Another identified Muslim woman reported that she was raped in her own home by one man she knew and two others. The man she knew said that he had to do it or the others would kill him. The victim and her family escaped the next day, when the men returned. 191/

109. Another woman estimated that about 100 young Muslim women were raped in Eastern Bosnia in June and July 1992. She stated that she was raped by a Serbian neighbour, a police officer. He said "it is war, you can't resist, there's no law and order". 192/ This woman also stated that the real attacks in Miljevina started in August 1992. The alleged leader of the "Četniks" in the area was identified by this witness. The witness stated that nothing bad happened while this leader was in the town, but when he left, bad things happened to Muslims. 193/ In another instance, a Bosnian Muslim woman reported that she was gang-raped by uniformed men, and that a 19 year-old relative was also raped in her house. The women complained to the police, who reportedly told the women not to see a doctor but to go to Partizan Sports Hall in Foča and wait for an evacuation convoy. The women fled, after they saw four women abducted from the sports hall, and hid at a relative's house. 194/

110. In another case, an identified woman stated that a man she knew forced her to help him steal from a house. He hit her and told her to "shake her ass". He raped her for two hours. The victim named a witness to the rape. The victim stated that she tried to run away, but the man returned with three other men. They took her to another house where the three men raped her. Her children were outside the house, and she stated that they knew what was happening to her. 195/ Another Muslim woman stated that an identified woman sent two Montenegrins to her apartment. She reported that they raped her several times, stating that she should give birth to a "Četnik". 196/

111. In a village in Foča, five young women were allegedly raped and sexually assaulted by Serbian neighbours. The men reportedly threatened to kill the women's children if the women told anyone of the assaults. 197/ Another
woman described how Serbian soldiers rounded up fellow villagers, divided them into three groups, and killed eight men. They chose girls and young women, tore off their clothes, and raped them. The soldiers killed any man who reacted. 200/

112. Another Bosnian Muslim woman stated that she was raped in the forest by three men in Yugoslav Army uniforms. The men had been led to the woman by her former landlord. The woman became pregnant and was unable to terminate her pregnancy. 201/ Outside the village of Foća, a witness reported that a "Petrov" tried to rape a girl in the forest. The Serb forces were rounding up Muslim villagers. The girl ran and hid with her family in a dugout. The soldiers threw grenades at the dugout, killing the family. 202/ Another woman hid in the forest to avoid problems with Serb soldiers. While hiding, she saw three identified men take three Muslim women to a house. The women later told the witness that they were raped. 203/

113. These reports occurred primarily during the summer of 1992. At the same time, women were taken into custody and raped there. Beginning in March 1992, women and children were taken into custody. Women between 12 and 35 years old were reportedly taken out systematically and raped. 204/ There were several sites where predominantly Muslim women were reported held and raped by Serbian soldiers. One of the sites was Veleevo prison. 205/ Another site was the "Petrov" headquarters in Brod, Foća, 206/ and another was the police station in Foća. 207/ The Hotel Miljevina was also allegedly used to house women who were repeatedly raped. 208/

114. Several reports detail the removal of the population from two villages in Foća. People were rounded up in the villages in early July. The women and children were separated from the men. The women and children were then taken to a hydroelectric plant under construction. At the workers' barrack, the women were interrogated, and then raped and sexually assaulted. 209/ Estimates of the number of women taken to this site range from 35 to 50. 210/ They were held at the site for about a day and then taken to the high school in Foća. 211/ 212/

115. At the high school, women, children, and elderly men were housed in classrooms. Every day, women and girls were removed from the classrooms, taken to other rooms or nearby apartments, and raped. 213/ One report stated that all women between 15 and 45 were raped. 214/ There are no estimates of the total number of inmates at the school, but one report stated that one classroom held almost 50 women and children. 215/ Some women were taken from their homes in surrounding villages directly to the school, without being taken first to Buk Bijeli. 216/ According to the reported cases, women were also beaten regularly. 217/ The women there were kept for several days, and the camp was reportedly closed 17 July. 218/

116. From the high school, the internees were taken to Partizan Sports Hall. 219/ There, women were taken out nightly and raped. 220/ Many women were taken straight from their villages to the sports hall, 221/ and at least two women were told by area police officers that they should go there for their own safety. 222/ 223/ 224/

117. The population of the camp was estimated to be between 37 and 74. Every account describes the same scenario: Serbian guards or soldiers came into the hall at night, selecting women and girls, taking them to nearby houses, and raping them there. 225/ Three reports state that women were raped in front of the other internees. 226/ One report states that women were only beaten if they resisted rape, 227/ however, most of the other reports describe frequent beatings. 228/ One report quotes a named Montenegrin who beat up three girls for telling journalists they had been
raped, as saying "Listen, it's better to be fucked than to be beaten and fucked". 229/

118. Several reports state that the youngest, prettiest, and smartest women were targeted for rape. 230/ Other reports identify young victims, which support this allegation. 231/ The perpetrators were generally described as Serbs, and some were reportedly from Montenegro. One report stated that the sports hall was guarded first by Serbian police, then by retirees from Karadžić's Serbian army, and sometimes by special forces. 232/ Another witness states that the same 50 men were responsible for all of the rapes at the sports hall. They reportedly slept during the day and raped at night. 233/ Others imply that there were more men, stating that they were never raped by the same man twice. 234/ Perpetrators reportedly stated that the women would bear Serbian children and that if any of the women told of the assault, they would hunt the women down and kill them. 235/ Some members of the alleged perpetrators' ethnic group, and in some cases, some alleged perpetrators saved women and helped them escape. 236/ The local Serb leader 237/ is accused of running at least one bordello in Miljevina, and is also credited with saving several women from detention and from rape in detention. 238/

119. Several reports describe an event that occurred the night before the camp was evacuated. At least two women were taken from the hall to an outdoor stadium, where they were gang-raped. At least one of the women was gang-raped by 28 men before she passed out. 239/ The women were rescued by an identified Serb soldier. 240/ On 13 August the detainees at the camp were reportedly evacuated. 241/ At least some were taken to Montenegro. 242/ However, according to one report, Partizan Sports Hall was used one more time to house about 150 Muslims from Miljevina on 2 September 1992. The detainees were there for about five or six hours, and were then taken to Gorañde. 243/

120. Some women were taken from the sports hall and from villages and placed in houses, where they were kept for the sexual gratification of soldiers. These houses have been termed "bordellos". 244/ One of these was reportedly organized by the local Serb leader. 245/ It was located in a storehouse formerly owned by a named Muslim. There were 12 named women and girls between 12 and 27 years old. The house was operational from at least June 1992 until March 1993. 246/ The girls were reportedly selected on the basis of the political activities of their relatives. 247/

121. In another village in Foča, 28 women were allegedly captured and raped by Serbian army troops and paramilitaries. They were then reportedly kept in detention for three months to prevent them from terminating their pregnancies. 248/

122. One more witness described a house where women were detained and repeatedly sexually abused. On 14 July 1992, she stated, Šešeljovci came to the witness' village and rounded up women, children, and elderly. The villagers were reportedly taken to the Foča police station and then placed into four nearby houses. The witness stated that a soldier told her that they were placed in these houses because they were not worth a bullet to kill them. Day and night, the witness asserted, 4 to 5 guards took 2 to 3 women at a time and raped them. Reportedly, the Serbian Democratic Party President, identified by name, played a tape of Marš na Drinu, 249/ and when this happened, the women were forced to undress. Men came and chose women to rape, reportedly seeking mother/daughter combinations. The witness stated that she was raped on two occasions, and once saw an 18-year-old raped by five men. The men who allegedly raped the victim told her that they would make her have Serb babies who will be Christians. The women were reportedly forced to drink
alcohol and eat pork. The witness also said that the men had been circumcised and that they stated that they had been circumcised so that they would not disgust the women. The witness also identified a hotel in the Foća area where women were taken and raped. On 13 August the detainees were evacuated from the town. They were taken to the Sandžak region of the FRY. The witness was hospitalized for four days, and stated that 30 detainees from Foća were pregnant as a result of rape. The women all had abortions except for one whose pregnancy was too far advanced.

123. There are reports of one more camp in the primary school in Kalinovik. On 2 July 1992, drunk Serb militiamen reportedly broke into the school. One witness reports that they said, "Look at how many children you can have. Now you are going to have our little Četniks." They reportedly selected 12 women, took them to the Hotel Kalinovik, forced them to clean the hotel, and then raped them. The women were then returned to the school. Reportedly, 95 women were raped in the next 26 days. Pregnant women were spared, and women who became pregnant were reportedly thereafter spared. One witness stated that the first night, the militiamen randomly selected teenagers and raped them in bathrooms next to the gymnasium. After that, they selected women by name. On 29 August, the detainees were exchanged, and at least 15 women terminated their pregnancies in Mostar and Jablanica.

(a) Victim information

124. Most reports specifically identify the victims as Bosnian Muslim, and many reports imply that the victims may be Bosnian Muslim either through the events described, or by the name of the victim. There is one identified Serbian victim, and one report alleges that Croatian women were sexually assaulted. A few reports make no reference to the ethnicity of the victims in any way. The ages of the alleged victims fell between 12 and 43, and the majority were under 30.

(b) Alleged perpetrator information

125. The reports identified by name 50 alleged perpetrators by name. Five among them were cited in as few as two and as many as five incidents. One alleged perpetrator was the Chief of Police and another was a military commander. Additionally, several groups were identified as having members who participated in the commission of sexual atrocities, among them:

- Seseljovci (members of Šešelj's group);
- Another identified paramilitary group;
- Četniks with Četnik insignia;
- Local Četniks;
- Serbian Militia from Montenegro;
- Serbian Police;
- JNA;
- Serbs from Montenegro.

21. Gacko

126. This county is located in the south-eastern quarter of BiH, bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 census, the prewar population of the county was 10,844, with 62.4 per cent Serb, 35.3 per cent Muslim, and 2.3 per cent described only as "other". There are two reports in this section of the study. One report is a general allegation that 12 girls from 12 to 19...
years old were raped on 1 August 1992 by Četniks from Miljevina. 257/

127. The second report, which is testimony, alleges that Serbs, including "White Eagles", invaded Gacko in mid-June 1992. The report names several perpetrators but does not state how they were involved. Women were taken to a small hotel named Košuta, which means "deer". They were taken to a large hotel room, searched for jewelry and money, and some were taken to a bedroom and raped. Men were reportedly taken to camps at Bileća, the next county south, and the women and children were returned to Gacko. On 4 July 1992, 780 women and children were reportedly taken to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 258/

22. Gorañde 259/

128. This county is in the eastern central part of BiH, just northeast of Foča. The 1991 census places the prewar population at 37,505. Muslims were the majority with 70.2 per cent of the population, 26.2 per cent were Serbs, and 3.6 per cent were identified only as "other". This section contains six reports from the government of Croatia, the government of Yugoslavia, Helsinki Watch, and various news sources. All of the allegations concern rape and sexual abuse in non-custodial settings. Five of the reports describe 30 year-old Bosnian Muslim victims, who were allegedly raped in their homes by Serbian irregulars. 260/ The reports describe at least two different victims, and may describe as many as five different victims. Without more identifying information, it is impossible to be certain. One incident allegedly occurred in April of 1992, 261/ and one in July of 1992. 262/ All of the reported victims were impregnated and currently in Zagreb.

129. The remaining report in the section describes a camp in Vitkovci, Gorañde run by Muslim "Green Berets". Bosnian Serb women were raped by Bosnian Muslim forces there. Men, women and children were also tortured and killed at the camp. The witness was imprisoned at the camp from 3 to 5 May 1992. 263/

23. Gornji Vakuf

130. This county is in the central part of BiH. The prewar population was 25,130, according to the 1991 census. Muslims comprised the majority with 56.1 per cent of the population, 42.6 per cent were Croat, and 1.3 per cent were described only as "other". This section contains one general second-hand report alleging that Bosnian Muslims sexually abused Bosnian Serb women and girls and circumcised Bosnian Serb boys. 264/

24. Jablanica

131. This county is in the south-west quarter of BiH, south-west of Sarajevo. With a prewar population of 12,664, Muslims were the predominant ethnic group at 72.1 per cent of the population, Croats comprised 17.8 per cent, 6.1 per cent were described as "other", and 4 per cent were Serbs. 265/ This section of the study contains four general reports, two of which are second-hand and two of which are first hand testimony.

132. According to an identified person, in June 1993, Muslim fighters asked the population of besieged villages to leave voluntarily, men who did not, were killed, women were raped, and children were forced to carry ammunition for the Muslim troops. 266/ The second report describes this killing by a special division of the BiH Army, the commander of which is named. In
Doljani village, approximately 56 people were killed; men, women, children, and the elderly. The bodies were mutilated, and many men were castrated. 267/ An eyewitness reported on this same massacre, detailing the castrations of the Bosnian Croat men of the Soldo family from the village. This witness stated that the attack was perpetrated by the MOS and members of "Zuka's special army". 268/ A woman of the village identified another victim of the attack who had been castrated. 269/

25. Jajce

133. This county is in the north-western quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the county's population was 44,903: 38.8 per cent were Muslim, 35.1 per cent were Croat, 19.3 per cent were Serb, and 6.8 per cent were described only as "other". This section contains only one second-hand report, stating that Bosnian Muslims sexually abused Bosnian Serb women and girls and circumcised Bosnian Serb boys. Reportedly, they also forcibly converted Bosnian Serbs to Islam. 270/

26. Kakanj 271/

134. This county is in the centre of BiH, north-west of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 census, it had a prewar population of 55,847. Muslims made up the majority with 54.5 per cent, 29.8 per cent were Croat, 8.8 per cent were Serb, and 6.9 per cent fell into the "other" category. This section of the study contains one first-hand account and one second hand report, based on a witness interview.

135. The testimony describes the alleged detention of a Bosnian Serb woman by two Bosnian Muslim men. She reports that she was held captive from mid-August 1992 until early September 1992. She states that she was released when her captors believed she had not been impregnated. Reportedly, she was evacuated to Pale, where she learned she was five months pregnant, and eventually went to Belgrade. 272/

136. The other report states that the Bosnian army moved into the county, between 5 and 13 June 1993, and evicted Bosnian Croat civilians. The witness was given a free movement pass, and travelled with UNPROFOR to all the villages with Croatian populations. The witness stated that the Bosnian soldiers had raped and then killed Croatian girls. In the village of Slapnica, two women, 40 and 45 years old, named Jaga and Andja were killed. The witness found them dead in their bathroom and stated it was obvious they had been raped. 273/

27. Kalesija

137. This county is in the north-east quarter of BiH, just west of Zvornik, which borders Serbia. The prewar population was 41,795, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority ethnic group at 79.5 per cent of the population, Serbs were 18.3 per cent and the remaining 2.2 per cent were classified merely as "other". On 18 May 1992, a teacher from Donje Vukovinje was raped in her own house by two Muslim men, while her Muslim neighbour was present. The victim related her experiences to a field officer for the United Nations Centre for Human Rights in Tuzla on 12 June 1993. 274/
28. Kiseljak

138. This county is located in central BiH. The 1991 census placed its population at 24,081, with 51.7 per cent Croat and 40.9 per cent Muslim. The remaining 7.4 per cent were characterized merely as "other". On 17 April 1993, Radio Kiseljak announced that UNPROFOR was scheduled to have operations in the village of Rotilj the next day. On that day, shelling began in the village and the HVO moved in and asked everyone to surrender their arms. On that same day, some villagers went to the lower part of the village and found seven dead. One woman among them had been raped. 275/ CANBAT LO, a part of UNPROFOR also reported that rape was committed in Rotilj. 276/

29. Kladanj 277/

139. This county is in the north-east quarter of BiH, just north-east of Sarajevo. It had a prewar population of 16,028, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority with 73.3 per cent of the population, Serbs comprised 23.9 per cent, and the remaining 2.8 per cent were categorized as "other". According to one woman from Vlasenica, she and 42 other men, women and children were taken from Sušica camp in Vlasenica on 10 August 1992. They were told they were to be exchanged in Tuzla. However, the women and children were put into a room in a house in Pelemis, Kladanj. There were about 15 women and 10 men in the basement of the house. There, seven girls, ages 14 to 16, were raped two to three times a week, sometimes during the day. No other women were mistreated. 278/

30. Klju 279/

140. This county is in the north-western quarter of BiH. This section contains 14 reports of sexual atrocities. Nine of the reports generally describe rape as a part of "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnian Muslims. 280/ The alleged perpetrators are described as Serbs, Četniks, paramilitaries, and Bosnian Serbs. The incidents described allegedly occurred in villages and the victims' homes. The timing of the alleged incidents was from May to October 1992, with most occurring from May to July.

141. One report describes a rape occurring in April of 1992. A young woman came to the town of Klju to pay a tax. While there, a tall thin soldier raped her in the municipal building. Afterwards, he told a fellow soldier passing by, "I've just had a sugary treat", to which the soldier replied, "Fiery are the boys from Ribnik". The victim did not tell her parents because she was ashamed. She left Klju in a convoy in September and gave birth to a boy in January 1993. She contacted her father, who asked her to join him but to leave the child behind. 281/

142. In another report, a signed witness statement, the witness identifies a man who she says raped his Bosnian Muslim neighbour. 282/ A third report states that in May or June 1992, eight Bosnian Muslim women were raped by Serbians in the town of Klju, in front of the house in which they were taking shelter. One 60 year-old woman stated that she was raped by three men, one of whom forced his hand into her vagina and forced her to lick the blood. Two of the women were killed. 283/

143. In the last report describing sexual assault in a non-custodial setting with some detail, a 53 year-old woman reports that she was raped in her home. She was hiding there, with her husband and five other women, when Serbian soldiers broke into the home, forcing everyone outside. She was raped by three soldiers outside in front of the others. She was raped again on the
side of the house until she lost consciousness. When she awoke, she crawled upstairs to her bed. One of the soldiers found her and raped her. He then put his hand inside her, pinching, as if to pull out her internal organs. He forced her to lick the blood off his fingers. 284 The woman's husband reported the rape to the police and she received medical attention. The police did not investigate or apprehend anyone. The victim and her husband fled to Travnik eight days after the assault. 285

31. Konjic 286

144. This county is located in the south central part of BiH, approximately 45 kilometres south-west of the centre of Sarajevo. According to the 1991 census, the population of Konjic was 43,636. Of this number, 54.5 per cent were Muslim, 26 per cent were Croatian, 15.2 per cent were Serb and the remaining 4.3 per cent described themselves as "other". This section contains 24 reports of alleged rape and sexual assault, one of which is testimony, the rest of which are second-hand reports. One report alleges that a woman was molested in her home 287/. Two reports allege that Bosnian Serb women were raped at the elementary school Zvonimir Beliša Nono in Bradina. 288 The commander of this camp is named. 289 Nine reports describe events at elebići Camp. 290 An identified Bosnian Muslim was reportedly the commander of this camp.

145. Five reports describe sexual abuse of Bosnian Serb women by the commander, 291 and one alleges that two men were forced to perform oral sex on guards of the camp. 292 These events allegedly occurred in May of 1992. Also in May 1992, a number of Serb women held in the Konjic Sports Hall were raped by Muslims. 293 The Sports Hall was also the site of an incident in which a Serb man was forced to have intercourse with a Serb woman while as many as 15 guards watched. 294

146. Some of the remaining reports allege the existence of a brothel in Buturović Polje, 295/ one at Amadeus Cafe. 296 One report states that a house in Đepić was used as a rape camp 297 and that one woman who was raped there was also tortured and became pregnant as a result of the rape. 298 Two reports describe incidents in which unspecified women were raped in the village of Hlapetići. 298

32. Kotor Varoš 299

148. This county is located in the north-western quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 36,670. Of this number, 38.1 per cent were Serb, 30.4 per cent were Muslim, 29 per cent were Croatian, and the remaining 2.5 per cent described themselves as "other". There are 13 reports in this section, five of which are testimony, and eight of which are reports. The sources of these reports are the governments of the United States, France and Croatia. This section also contains news reports and a submission from Tilman Zulch.

149. Generally, the alleged victims are described as Bosnian Muslim, and a few are described as Bosnian Croats. They are also generally described as young. The alleged perpetrators are described as Serbian, some from the Krajina region. Four of the incidents described allegedly occurred in non-custodial settings, while the remainder allegedly occurred in custodial settings. Locations of alleged rape and sexual abuse include the Vrbanja lumber factory, a camp, brothels, and the Hotel Borik. Some women were allegedly impregnated and detained until it was not possible to obtain
abortion. The events alleged in this section occurred from July until October of 1992.

150. Two testimonies (which may be from the same victim) describe an incident which allegedly occurred at the Vrbanja Lumber Factory in Kotor Varoš, where approximately 60 women and children were held after the occupation of the village of Dabovci. In August 1992, a 25-year-old Muslim woman stated that she was allegedly gang-raped repeatedly by Serbs. The rapes reportedly occurred at the saw mill after dark; the guards most often chose women between the ages of 16 and 35.

151. Two reports describe camps in which a number of women and young girls were kept for the purpose of rape. In addition, two reports generally describe places of detention where girls and women were held for weeks or months for the purpose of rape.

152. Four reports describe non-custodial single incidents of rape, all of which occurred in Kotor Varoš. At least one victim became pregnant as a result of the rapes. In one incident, a Croatian woman was taken with her husband to the police station, where the husband was beaten and the wife was raped by "prisoners". The remaining reports generally describe instances of rape in the Kotor Varoš region.

33. Livno

153. This county is located in the central western part of BiH, bordered on the west and south-west by Croatia. Data from the 1991 census indicates that out of a total population of 39,526, 72 per cent of residents were Croatian, 15 per cent were Muslim, 9.6 per cent described themselves as Serbs, and the remaining 3.4 per cent identified themselves as "other". This section contains one testimony alleging that Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim perpetrators organized a brothel in Livno containing Bosnian Serb women. Only one woman there reportedly was not Bosnian Serb. The victim's former schoolmate assisted in the transfer and placement in another brothel in Sarajevo.

34. Lopare

154. This county is located in the north-eastern quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population of the county was 32,400. Of this number, 55 per cent were Serbs, 37.7 per cent were Muslims, 3.9 per cent were Croatians, and 3.9 per cent described themselves as "other". This section contains one testimony, supplied by the government of Yugoslavia and the newspaper Borba. This testimony alleges that a Bosnian Serb woman was raped by unspecified perpetrators during an attack on her village. She was later taken to a camp in Tuzla.

35. Mostar and apljina Counties

155. These counties are in the central south region of BiH. This section contains reports of 16 incidents of rape and sexual assault in the Mostar and apljina region. According to the 1991 census record, the total population of Mostar was 126,087 of which 34.8 per cent were Muslim, 33.8 per cent Croatian, 19 per cent Serbian, and "others" constituted 10 per cent. The total population of apljina was 27,852, of which Croatians were a majority with 53.9 per cent, Muslims comprised 27.7 per cent, Serbs 13.5 per cent, and "others" 4.9 per cent. The alleged perpetrators are described as Croatian
paramilitary forces, though some are described as joint Croatian and Bosnian Muslim forces. The victims are described primarily as Bosnian Serb.

156. The patterns of reported rapes and sexual assault reflect the military activities in the area. In mid to late 1992, all of the reported cases of rape and sexual assault occurred in detention. The perpetrators were described as HOS members or generally as Croats, while the victims were identified mainly as Serbs. Throughout 1993, cases of rape were reported, generally between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Additionally, all of the reported cases occurred in non-custodial settings.

157. From February to November, 1993, Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries allegedly raped Bosnian Croat women in areas of fighting. Access to conflict zones was limited, however, so that investigators could not confirm many allegations or estimate the scale of the reported sexual abuse. In April, on the West Bank of Mostar, two armed soldiers took an identified woman and her mother from their apartment. They forced the mother to cross the front lines to BiH territory. They took the victim to an abandoned apartment, where she was raped by them and another eight soldiers, one after the other. She was also forced to perform fellatio on several of the soldiers. The soldiers took her to the frontline and forced her to cross to BiH territory. In another incident in June of 1993, four Serbian soldiers wearing stockings over their heads entered a flat and raped a Muslim woman living there.

158. Some of the reported rape cases targeted Croatians who protected Muslims, or Croats and Muslims, in mixed marriages. In July, three HVO soldiers in uniform arrived at the flat of a Muslim woman married to a Croat. One stood guard outside while the other two entered the flat. The woman and her husband had been helping Muslims leave the West Bank of Mostar. The woman stated that the soldiers called her a "balija" and swore at her, accusing Muslims of killing Croats. She said that they told her that her husband was not a true Croat since he had married a Muslim. The soldiers then reportedly poured boiling milk on the woman's stomach and groin, and they both raped her. Her children were sleeping in the next room. Because of this incident and other harassment, the family fled the area for Croatia. In another reported case, a woman reported that she saw HVO members abduct a Croatian woman. The victim reportedly was trying to defend a Muslim family. The two soldiers dragged her to another flat and allegedly raped her there.

159. In late September, two Muslim women were reportedly raped by HVO soldiers after being strip-searched. The alleged assaults occurred at a former Tuberculosis clinic in Mostar, called "the Dispensary". This incident of strip search and sexual abuse was apparently not isolated.

160. In a custodial setting, sexual assault is reported to have occurred at the Dretelj facility, in a suburb of aplitina from approximately April until late September 1992. The facility is a former JNA army barracks, currently under the control of Bosnian Croat forces. One report describes the camp as a fuel storage garrison housing 64 female and 100 male prisoners. Another witness stated that men and women were housed in separate hangars, and that 70 women from 30 to 80 years old were housed in the women's hangar. A third witness estimated the female population at 50 and described the living quarters as barracks. The camp was reportedly run by the HOS and an identified paramilitary group. One witness stated that the camp was run by a named "General", but that another identified man was commander for three days. It is unclear whether rape and sexual assault is still being reported in Dretelj or if the camp still houses women.
161. There are reports from several witnesses, naming 15 women victims of rape and sexual assault at the camp. They each describe the same scenario of Serbian men and women arrested and brought to the camp. There, the men were tortured and sexually assaulted, and the women were raped. Men came into the women’s hangar almost nightly, removed women, and raped them. The women were beaten and burned with cigarettes. Though the majority of the internees were Bosnian Serbs, there was one Bosnian Muslim woman and one Bosnian Croat woman detained at the camp. They were both married to Bosnian Serb men.

162. One witness stated that she and other women and men were held at an old military hospital before they were taken to Dretelj Camp. At the camp, seven women and seven men were called by name. Two women were forced to perform sexual acts on each other, and the other prisoners were forced to watch. The men were beaten. They were all then taken to Dretelj Camp. Another witness was detained longer. She stated that she and five or six other female prisoners were raped their first night there. One girl was raped twice. She and the other women were transferred to Dretelj after eight days at the military hospital.

163. There were several other sites where people were detained and sexually abused. One witness stated that three women held in the HOS jail in apljina were raped there. The women were then taken to the old jail. A woman, who may be one of the three the previous witness referred to, stated that she was held at Mostar University. She was forced to undress and was publicly raped. HOS members then forced three other detainees to rape her. She was then taken to the elovina jail on Šantićeva. She stated that she was treated very well there.

164. A woman stated that she was taken to a tobacco warehouse in apljina, where she was raped daily, forced to walk nude, and presented as a "Cetnik whore". Two reports alleged generally that particular sites in Mostar served as "bordellos". One of these sites was reportedly the Bristol Hotel. An identified girl stated that she was held in a big room with about 30 captured men and two other Serbian girls. She said that she was raped once by a neighbour and that the other two girls were raped many times.

165. Finally, three reports describe the rape and sexual assault of Serbian women by the HOS. One of these reports stated that a camp was closed by the HVO because of the atrocities occurring there.

(a) **Victim information**

166. In custodial settings, Serbian women were identified as the primary victims. While later, when fighting between Muslims and Croats intensified, the majority of reported rapes were non-custodial and the victims and alleged perpetrators were Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats. Many victims were identified by name.

(b) **Alleged perpetrator information**

167. Seven alleged perpetrators were named in the reports. Among them were the two former Dretelj camp commanders. The following is a list of the
military affiliations of the alleged perpetrators as identified by some victims:

- Bosnian Croat HOS forces;
- HVO forces;
- "Ustaši";
- Croatian/Muslim coalition forces;
- Bosnian Muslim forces; and
- Paraga's Black Shirts.

36. Nevesinje

168. This county is in the central south part of BiH, between Mostar and Gacko. According to the 1991 census, the county had a population of 14,421, 74.5 per cent of which were Serb, 23 per cent of which were Croat, and 2.3 per cent of which were "others". This section contains one report from the government of Croatia alleging the existence of a site in this region where women are kept and used for the sexual gratification of men.

37. Orašje

169. This county is in the north-east quarter of BiH, bordered on the north by Croatia and on the east by Serbia. This county had a population of 28,201 before the war, according to the 1991 census. Croats made up 75.3 per cent, 15 per cent were Serbs, 6.7 per cent were Muslims, and 3 per cent were "others". This section contains four reports of sexual assault, all of which allegedly occurred in custodial settings. The first report states that a woman was taken to a prison camp from 29 April to 7 October 1992. There, she was raped repeatedly by Muslim militiamen until her release. She went to the Hospital in Novi Sad, Serbia, where she was treated and given an abortion. She disappeared from the hospital.

170. The next report concerns a Bosnian Croat woman who was kept in a house in Obudovac, a village in the county. She was kept at the house from the end of October to the first week in January of 1993. Every day, usually at dusk, she was raped by about six Serbian or Montenegrin men. There were other women at the house, both Muslim and Croatian. The men stated that it was their goal to impregnate the women. The witness missed her first and second menstrual periods at the house. Another report may concern the same woman. It describes a woman who was kidnapped at the end of October and released on 9 January 1993. She was raped every day, and realized she was pregnant on 17 November 1992.

171. A final report involves male victims. A Bosnian Serb male prisoner was detained in Orašje prison. There he was subjected to daily beatings and torture. One guard cut off his genitals and he died in Bijeljina hospital.

38. Prijedor

172. Prijedor straddles a corridor connecting the Serbs' two-thirds share of Bosnia with their one-third share of Croatia. Muslims were the majority with 44 per cent of the population, while Serbs accounted for 42 per cent of Prijedor's prewar population of 112,000. In this county, 5.7 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", 5.6 per cent were Croats, and 2.2 per cent were described only as "other". After Bosnia's Muslims and Croats voted unanimously to secede from Yugoslavia in March, Karadžić announced that the
Serbs would form their own, ethnically pure state. On 30 April, Prijedor's Serbs arrested top Muslim officials, and appointed Serbs in their places. Soon after, the new officials fired all of the Muslim employees.

173. Nine days after this coup, Prijedor's officials demanded that the Muslims sign loyalty oaths to the Bosnian Serb state or be considered terrorists. On 14 May, Serbs raised roadblocks around Kozarac and cut telephone service to the town. On 24 May, Serbian tanks, mortars and artillery barraged the village. This siege lasted for three days, and survivors calculate that 2,000 villagers were killed. When the town fell, Serbs reportedly gave the people 10 minutes to reach the town's soccer stadium. Some were reportedly immediately executed. At the stadium, men and women were separated and taken to separate camps. Allegedly, rich Muslims were a particular target, along with political leaders and police officers.

174. This section of the study contains 178 reports of sexual assault. Ninety four of these reports are in the form of testimony, while 84 are second-hand reports. The alleged perpetrators are described primarily as Serbian. Some are described generally as Četniks, and some as Serbs from Serbia or Croatia. In some cases, the military unit of the alleged perpetrators is identified. Those units include the 6th Krajina Brigade, Banja Luka Corps, the Suva Rebra (Dry ribs) from Radomirovci, and the "Red Serbs". The victims are described primarily as Bosnian Muslim, and several are identified as Bosnian Croat. Their ages fall between the ages of 7 and 40, with most falling below 30. The sources of the reports include the governments of BiH, Canada, Austria, France, Germany, Croatia, and the United States; non-governmental organizations, such as Helsinki Watch, the Society for Threatened Peoples, Trešnjevka and Riyasat; as well as other news sources such as Newsday and the New York Times.

175. The reports in this section allege that assaults occurred from September 1991 to early 1993. Most of them occurred in May through August of 1992. (However, many incidents do not specify a date.) In conjunction with the fighting in the county of Prijedor, in May and again in July 1992, many women were raped. Some were raped in their homes, some were raped publicly and many were killed. This section of the study contains 33 reports of this type of noncustodial rape. The following villages are sites where this type of rape occurred:

- Bišćani; 350/
- Briševo; 351/
- Čarakovo; 352/
- Donja Ljubija; 353/
- Hambarine; 354/
- Hegeći; 355/
- Kozarac; 356/
- Kozaruša; 357/
- Ljubija; 358/
- Prijedor; 359/
- Rakovani; 360/
- Rizvanovići; 361/
- Suh Brod; 362/
- Trnopolje. 363/

176. Additionally, the reports in this section allege that Prijedor county was the site of many camps run by Serbs and housing mostly Bosnian Muslims, but also Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs: Kozarac, Prijedor, Omarska, Trnopolje, Jajce, Keraterm, Ljubija, Ciglane, Mrakovica Mountain, and Tešić. Among these camps, Trnopolje and Jajce seem to have held primarily women,
while Keratern held primarily men. At Prijedor and Omarska, women were reportedly only detained to work in the cafeteria. Most of the reports described alleged rapes that occurred while the victims were interned in Trnopolje camp.

(a) Omarska Camp

177. Detainees at Omarska report that it held many prominent citizens of Prijedor County. Reports of the number of women held at the camp range from 13 to 70. Both of these estimates were made by male ex-detainees. Because the women were housed separately from the men, the women's estimates may be more accurate. The numbers of women range from 3 to 36. These women ranged in age from 14 to "elderly". Male detainees describe the female detainees as girls, many as young as 16. However, women held at the camp describe most as professional women, which implies that they were older.

178. One woman describes how she was raped, by a member of the Territorial Defence Forces, four nights in a row. The fifth day, the witness reported that an identified camp commander asked her if she had been abused or raped. She reported that she had not because she feared retaliation and believed the commander knew of the assault since he had invited her assailant to the camp. Other witnesses also reported that this commander asked if they had been sexually abused. The witnesses stated they were beaten if they reported any assaults. Another witness stated that this commander was one of the men who raped her. Some ex-detainees state that women were raped one per night on an apparent schedule, while others report that rape occurred often or nightly. Many other witnesses at Omarska describe the rape of women there, corroborating these statements.

179. Male prisoners were forced to rape women and each other according to other reports. Additionally, several prisoners were castrated. In one incident, two men were reportedly forced to castrate four men with their bare hands. In another incident, one man was forced to bite off the testicles of four men, reportedly after performing oral sex. A named guard forced the man to castrate the other four. In another incident, one man's testicles were tied with a wire. The other end of the wire was tied to his motorcycle. A guard drove the motorcycle off, castrating him. Prisoners were also reportedly castrated by guards.

(b) Trnopolje Camp

180. There are 70 reports in this section describing rape and sexual assault at Trnopolje Camp in Prijedor. The population of the camp was between 3,000 and 9,000. Croats, Muslims, and other non-Serbs were detained there. Consistently, the reports state that drunk soldiers entered the camp nightly and selected women at random. These women were taken out and raped at a nearby theatre and in nearby houses. Some returned, but many did not. Those who did not, may be buried near the lake on the south side of town. Prisoners state they were forced by guards to bury those killed. Men were also sexually abused. They were forced to rape female internees, and some were reportedly castrated.

181. One report states that girls and women were raped only once at Trnopolje camp. That report states that drunk "Cetniks" burst into a hall, holding women and children. Some guards tried to protect the younger girls, wrestling them from the arms of the "Cetniks" and saying the girls were theirs.
The girls who returned stated that they had been raped. The commander apologized for the actions of the "Četniks", and posted an armed guard around the women for a few days. He stated that he personally guaranteed their safety.

182. This is the sole account, of 70, that states rape occurred only one night. Based on the overwhelming number of allegations, it is much more likely that sweeps of the hall occurred more than once.

(c) Keraterm Camp

183. Keraterm camp was part of a ceramics factory in Prijedor and housed only men. Male ex-detainees report that men were sexually abused. They were reportedly forced to perform sexual acts on each other and on guards. Two sources state that two brothers were forced to perform sexual acts on each other. A man was also forced to sit on a one liter Coca-Cola bottle, forcing it into his anus. He bled severely.

184. Though Keraterm housed only men, women were reportedly raped there. One Bosnian Muslim woman reported that she was taken to Keraterm and raped by several men on 11 August 1992. Another woman was taken there with her. They were transported to Omarska. Another witness stated that in mid-July, 12 to 15 Muslim women were brought in, raped, and then transferred to Omarska.

(d) Kozarac

185. There was reportedly a camp in Kozarac, where Bosnian Muslim women were raped. This may be the same as Trnopolje, but there is not enough information to make a judgement. At the camp, ex-detainees state that women as young as age 13 were raped nightly.

(e) Jajce

186. Jajce was apparently a camp for mostly women. Reportedly, it had a population of up to 500. The report from this camp alleges that girls as young as seven or eight were raped, and that the reporter was raped by several men, one after the other. The men, allegedly wore masks and forced the women to say, "I am a Serb, I am not a Muslim". Many women and girls reportedly died after being raped.

(f) Other locations

187. Ljubija was reportedly a site where girls and women were kept in houses for the sexual entertainment of soldiers and other men. Additionally, women were raped in Hambarine, at "Četnik" headquarters. The women's group Trešnjevka alleges that there is a camp in Duboki Potok, on Mrakovica Mountain. There is also reportedly a camp where women are raped in Tešić. Another camp was called Ciglane, which, according to one witness, had a population of 1,000. The witness asserted that women were raped at the camp and children were thrown into ovens. Finally, several witnesses stated that there were abuses in camps in Prijedor, but they did not name the camps. These allegations mirror those at other camps where women were held.
(g) **Victim information**

188. Victims were generally described as Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat.

(h) **Alleged perpetrator information**

189. The perpetrators were usually described as Serbs or "Četniks", many with no further information. At all of the camps, camp guards reportedly participated in sexual abuse of detainees. The camp commander at Omarska and the camp commander at Keratern both allegedly raped women. Some victims knew their attackers, but many did not. Members of the following military or paramilitary formations were identified as committing rape:

- White Eagles;
- Četniks;
- Serbs from Vukovar;
- Suva Rebra;
- "Red Serbs";
- Sixth Krajina Brigade of the Banja Luka Corps; and
- Guards.

39. **Rogatica**

190. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, Rogatica had a population of almost 22,000 before the conflict: 60 per cent were Bosnian Muslim and 40 per cent Bosnian Serb. Presently, very few Bosnian Muslims remain. 403

191. The fighting in Rogatica apparently began on 22 May 1992, 404 and lasted for about two months. 405 From that point on, Muslim citizens were not permitted to leave the city. 406 The information suggests that the alleged perpetrators were primarily Serbian, and the victims were primarily Muslim.

192. Most of the reports in this section were obtained from the BiH State Commission on War Crimes. There are 31 reported incidents of alleged rape; of those, 11 are in the form of direct testimony from the alleged victims. 407 Several reports identify a detention centre at a high school, generally, or more specifically, at the high school "Veljko Vlahović". 408 Other reports discuss a detention centre that bears similarity to Veljko Vlahović, sufficient to assume that the high school was, in fact, the main detention centre for women and girls in Rogatica. 409 Nearly all the reports allege that rape occurred while the women were detained. 410 There was also a detention centre in the area for men, called "Sladara". 411

193. Up to three hundred women and children were detained at the high school centre from late May or early June until early August. The conditions at the centre were described as "terrible". 412 One report suggests that 21 people were detained in a classroom and were given food only after the fourth day of captivity. 413 Another suggests that only about 6 per cent of the estimated 300 detainees were permitted to return to their homes for food and clothing, and then only in groups of two. 414

194. Following the attack on 22 May 1992, the area was again attacked on 25 May and the residents were asked to voluntarily report to the high school centre or the city stadium. 415 According to reports, there was no physical maltreatment at the centre until troops under the command of "Arkan" arrived in late June. 416 Most of the reports of sexual assault refer
to periods in July and August. 417/

195. The reported methods of victim selection are consistent with reports in other sections. Women were kept in classrooms, and men allegedly came in at night, looking for young women to take with them. 418/ Reports further allege that on some occasions the men called for women by name; 419/ if they failed to answer when called, the lives of all other detainees were threatened. 420/ On other occasions, the perpetrators simply walked through and, using flashlights, chose women. 421/ The women were reportedly taken to separate classrooms, buildings, or apartments and assaulted. 422/ This scenario apparently occurred every night. 423/ Reports suggest that all younger women in the camp were raped repeatedly 424/ and targeted for assault. 425/

196. The techniques of mistreatment were various. Women were often interrogated, beaten, kicked, stabbed, insulted, and threatened in conjunction with the sexual assault. 426/ In some cases, women alleged being forced to ingest quantities of alcohol, 427/ to sit on anti-tank mines, to jump from windows and balconies and forced to attempt suicide. 428/ Soldiers allegedly threatened to harm or kill their children if the women did not supply requested information. 429/ Reports alleged multiple perpetrators involved in incidents of rape; one victim reported being raped 12 times in five nights. 430/ Moreover, many women were pressured to denounce their religion, convert to Serbian Orthodox Christianity, and change their names. They were reportedly told that their lives would be spared if they complied. 431/

197. Many reports identify the same perpetrators. These alleged perpetrators are believed to be part of a paramilitary troop known as "Arkan's" soldiers. 432/ Nearly all the reports allege that the perpetrators were Serbian and also identify them by name. The alleged victims identified in the reports are nearly all Muslim.

(a) Victim information

198. All the victims were described as Bosnian Muslims.

(b) Alleged perpetrator information

199. Some 30 individuals were identified in the reports as alleged perpetrators. One among them was named in three separate reports.

40. Sanski Most 433/

200. This county is in the north-western quarter of BiH, south-west of Prijedor. According to the 1991 census, the county had a prewar population of 60,119. Muslims had a small majority at 47 per cent, while Serbs were second with 42.2 per cent. Croats were 7.1 per cent of the population and 3.7 per cent were "others". This section of the study contains two reports from the French government 434/ and Trešnjevka 435/ generally alleging the existence of a camp in Kamengrad, Sanski Most. Women are reportedly sexually assaulted at this camp.
41. Sarajevo and vicinity

201. Sarajevo is located in the south-eastern quarter of BiH. The Sarajevo region includes: Centar, Hadži, Iliđa, Ilijaš, Novi grad, Novo, Pale, Stari grad, Trnovo, and Vogošća. According to the 1991 census, the population of Sarajevo was 415,631. Prior to the conflict, 49 per cent were Bosnian Muslim, 29 per cent were Bosnian Serb, and 7 per cent were Bosnian Croat.

202. This section contains 146 specific incidents of rape in which the victims and many perpetrators were named; another 400 or so in which specific numbers of victims were referenced, but little else is revealed about their individual identities; and finally, 34 reports which refer to groups of children or women, generally, who were subjected to rape. The sources of the reports include the governments of BiH, Yugoslavia, the United States and Canada, non-governmental organizations, such as Helsinki Watch, and various news services. The victims and perpetrators reportedly come from all sides in the conflict.

203. On 5 April 1992, Serbs positioned mortars, artillery and snipers in the hills around Sarajevo and began laying siege to Bosnia's historic capital city. The residents were driven from their homes and forced to seek refuge in other villages, cities, or countries. For those unable or unwilling to flee, enemy controlled detention facilities became their fate. Both the establishment of these facilities and the commencement of the incidents of rape coincide with the beginning of the siege. Rather than safe havens, these facilities have become known as centres for continued aggression. Just over 70 per cent of the reports indicate that rape incidents occurred in custodial settings.

204. The cities and suburbs surrounding Sarajevo appear to be the site of over 34 facilities, including schools, cafes, and private homes, where women and girls were allegedly detained for the purpose of rape. Reportedly, the conditions at almost all detention facilities were uniformly unbearable. A former detainee at one facility stated that he and others were locked in a cell and believed to be located beneath the Dobrinja Dental Care Centre, previously belonging to a shop that sold spare car parts. Their Muslim captors kept the instruments of torture on a table in the cell which consisted of several metal bars, a sledge-hammer, a police baton and a car-axle. Another report examines the conditions at the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks where a dozen Serbian soldiers were held in a cell that can properly accommodate three persons at most. In a correlating report, some 40 Muslim women were housed in a hotel in Vogošća. All the women were forced to sleep together in one room in the hotel.

205. Evidence suggests that participants from each side in the conflict are responsible for the creation of such formidable conditions. Bosnian Muslim forces appear to have detained Bosnian Serb women in several facilities. One such facility was the former "Viktor Bubanj" Yugoslav Army barracks, which had separate rooms for oral and vaginal sex. Another facility was called the "Zagreb Hotel". A third facility was the Zetra Sports centre, where both men and women were sexually abused. Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat victims were also housed in a police school in Vrace, where they were reportedly raped.

206. Serb forces appear to have detained women--mostly Bosnian Muslim women--in various facilities for the purpose of rape. In the Sarajevo housing estates, Vraa, Aerodrom, and Grbavica, a large number of Muslim women have been confined and raped. Also in the Hadžići Sports Centre, Muslim victims were subjected to beatings and forced sexual acts.
reports and testimonies refer to the rape and sexual abuse of quite a few Muslim women at a Serbian controlled facility, known as Sonja's Kon-Tiki in Vogoša. 452/  

207. The reports also contain allegations of rapes committed outside of these special detention facilities, such as in victims' homes. Two members of Juka's Army are reported to have raped a Serbian woman in her apartment. 453/ A 60 year-old Muslim woman, whose house was burglarized by Četniks 62 times, was also then raped in her home by Četniks. 454/ Another elderly woman, who was 80 years old, was also reportedly robbed and raped in her home. 455/  

208. Rape was widespread and began early in the siege. The first accounts of rape were recorded as coming out of Novo Sarajevo, Grbavica, Vraca, and Lukavica. 456/ In Grbavica, an eyewitness reported that several Četniks participated in the raping of an eight year-old girl in his neighbourhood. 457/ Another report from Grbavica referred to a named Serbian perpetrator who, in separate incidents, raped two Muslim women in front of their handicapped husbands. 458/ In yet another report, a 15 year-old Bosnian rape victim recalled how she and 20 other girls were housed by Serbs in a small room and raped until they were impregnated. 459/  

209. In Ilijaš, Serbian forces were said to have detained women and girls following the mass exodus of Muslims and Croats. The detainees were reportedly housed at the Oseren Hotel for use as prostitutes. 460/  

210. In Vogoša, one eyewitness reported the rape of several 13 year-old non-Serbs. 461/ Another report states that five Serbs physically restrained a father, while a sixth raped his youngest daughter before him. The young girl did not survive the episode. 462/ Also in Vogoša, a minor Muslim girl said that Serbian girls who were her schoolmates broke into Muslim houses and, armed with knives, forced little Muslim girls and women to go with them to Serb positions in Žu where they were raped. 463/ The same report states that Serbian homes were transformed into torture chambers for Muslim women. 464/  

211. Vogoša is also the home to one of the region's most notorious "Rape/Death camps": Sonja's Kon Tiki Restaurant. It was reportedly a brothel with an attached concentration camp. The named Serbian camp commander, claimed that the brothel was filled with local women of low moral character whom he had invited, 465/ but reports suggest that many women were abducted and taken to Sonja's for use by Serbian troops. 466/ Several male prisoners reported being subjected to public sexual humiliation and forced to strip naked and commit sexual acts on each other. 467/ It was also here that two children, 7 and 13 years old, were allegedly raped in front of their parents by 20 Serbian perpetrators. According to reports, neither girl survived. 468/  

212. In the city of Sarajevo, reports evidence the continued aggression between Muslims and Serbs. Among the 42 reports from Sarajevo, 26 identified Serbian victims of rape, 12 identified Muslim victims, and only one report identified Croatian rape victims. Rapes were reported in several areas including Ahatovici, 469/ Žu, 470/ Vraca, 471/ Vrace, 472/ Dobrinja, 473/ Ciglane, 474/ Hadžići 475/ and Pale. 476/ Victims of war were detained in camps and brothels set up in areas such as the central prison, 477/ the Viktor Bubanj camp, 478/ Hotel Zagreb 479/ Hotel Europa, 480/ Bjelaven dormitory, 481/ Borsaliño Café, 482/ Dobrinja jail, 483/ Hadžići sports centre, 484/ Civil Engineering school, 485/ Primary School, 486/ University of Zagreb, 487/ Zetra Sports
213. In Hadžići, reports suggest that a camp was set up by Serbians at the Hadžići sports centre, which housed approximately 220 Muslim men. The report alleges that the detainees were subjected to forced sexual acts. Reports also suggest the existence of a brothel in Hadžići containing Serbian women.

214. In Ciglane Camp, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats allegedly took Serbian detainees to a brothel. Reportedly, the detainees were abducted and taken to the site in the camp and then raped repeatedly and regularly. Victims were sometimes blindfolded before being taken to the locations where they were raped. The reports also suggest that the predominant reason for the rapes was to impregnate the victims. Two reports quote Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat perpetrators as saying "We are making Serb bastards!"

215. Borislav Herak, a convicted Serbian war criminal, stated that his commanding officers encouraged him and others to rape their captives as a means of raising their morale. During his military trial, he testified that an identified Commander gave him the keys to the school in the village of Gornja Bioa and ordered him to go there and rape the women. On some occasions he returned the victims after raping them, but, on other occasions, he simply killed them. He stated that the Commander of the detention facility in Vogošća, whom he identified, recommended that he do whatever he liked with the victims, but just "don't bring them back". Excerpts from his trial suggest that on one occasion, he raped four women. In other testimony, while reportedly acting under the command of Branislav Vlaco, Herak confessed to raping and killing 12 Muslim women who were originally detained at Sonja's Kon Tiki. As a result of this trial, Herak was sentenced to death for raping 16 and killing 12 Muslim and Croatian women at Sonja's Kon Tiki.

216. There have also been allegations of sexual and other misconduct against UN peacekeeping personnel. One report alleges a conspiratorial relationship between the "Cetniks" and UNPROFOR. This report revealed that members of both groups drank together and often had orgies together. Furthermore, the report alleged that "Cetniks" often used UNPROFOR vehicles for their own needs. Another report alleges that UN peacekeepers were regular visitors at the Serb-run brothel in Vogošća. Report accused some peacekeepers of taking sexual advantage of Muslim and Croatian women, who were forced into prostitution, and failing to investigate either the Serb brothel or the detention camp after being informed of their existence.

217. Herak also testified that he saw UNPROFOR's Major General L. McKenzie in the company of four girls at the camp. He also accused other UN peace-keeping personnel of raping prisoners at the brothel. The local Bosnian Serb Commander added that UN personnel were actually frequent visitors, coming to the camp several times each week. Refugees and former camp detainees concurred, saying that on six or more occasions UN peacekeepers were seen in the camp. A dozen Muslim witnesses offered strong statements that UN peace-keeping personnel had participated in the sexual abuses suffered by the female detainees. Young Muslim and Croatian women were allegedly forced into UN armoured personnel carriers in the area of Sonja's. One victim stated that she had been raped at the brothel by a UN
officer. 515/ One news source reported that as many as 50 UN personnel from France, Canada, Ukraine, New Zealand, and an unnamed African country were involved in alleged sexual misconduct. 516/

42. Šekovići 517/

218. This county is located in the north-east quarter of BiH. Before the war, it had a population of 9,639, according to the 1991 census. Serbs were 94.3 per cent of the population and 5.7 per cent were Muslim. This section contains four second-hand reports of detention sites where Bosnian Muslim women are sexually abused by "Četniks". 518/ One report alleges that Bosnian Muslim women were sold into sexual slavery. 519/ These reports describe camps in Šekovići, but others, reported in another section, describe a "Camp Šekovići" in Tomislavgrad county on the western border of BiH. It is unclear whether all of these reports describe the same or different camps. The reports are not detailed enough to make any conclusion without further investigation.

219. The last report is the testimony of a witness of a rape in a prison in Šekovići. One night, a named perpetrator 520/ went to a prison in Šekovići and tried to beat up some of the prisoners. However, a police officer at the prison stopped him. Outraged, the perpetrator went door-to-door through the prison until he found a 27 year-old Bosnian Muslim woman. He forced her to take off her clothes, raped her, and beat her until she was covered in her own blood. The perpetrator then asked the other prisoners if they wanted a turn with the woman. 521/

43. Sokolac 522/

220. This county is in the eastern part of the centre of BiH, east of Sarajevo. The prewar population of the county was 14,833, according to the 1991 census. The majority of the population were Serbs at 68.6 per cent and 30.2 per cent were Muslim. This section contains one news report, giving details of a woman detained in a camp at a school in Parzevići, Sokolac, 523/ and testimony describing events which allegedly occurred at Slaviša Vajner's School in Parzevići, Sokolac. 524/ These two reports probably identify the same location and the same witness.

221. The testimony alleges that Serbs from Serbia attacked the village of Parzevići in May and imprisoned 13 women in the school. 525/ Women and a six year old girl were reportedly raped and sexually assaulted there. The women ranged in age from 6 to 30, and all the remainder were age 18 or under. The witness states that she was raped every night and sometimes twice a night. She was raped by five to six men and was able to identify four of her attackers. Among them were several identified perpetrators including a former police official. The others were unidentifiable and came from Serbia and only their nicknames were known. The witness became pregnant and asked for an abortion. The Serbs refused, saying they intended to have Muslim women give birth to "Četniks". The women were all exchanged when the witness was in her seventh month of pregnancy. All but the six year old were pregnant. 526/

44. Srebrenica 527/

222. This county is located in the centre of the eastern border of BiH. It is bordered on three sides by Serbia. The population was 37,211 before the war, according to the 1991 census. Muslims comprised 74.8 per cent of the population and Serbs were 25.2 per cent. This section of the study contains
three reports of rape and sexual assault. On 17 May 1992, one witness reports that he witnessed the rape of a girl in a village in the region. The girl was killed. 528/ In June, according to an autopsy report, another woman was raped and then killed. 529/ A general report identified those killed and missing from the county. It states that most of the women on the list were raped. 530/

45. Tešanj 531/

223. This county is in the central part of northern BiH, just south of Doboj. It had a prewar population of 48,390, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority at 72.7 per cent, 18.5 per cent were Croats, 6.4 per cent were Serbs, and 2.9 per cent were "others". There is only one report in this section of the study. Twenty-five women were kidnapped from Tešanj and taken to a nearby forest. For months, the women were raped, as many as 10 times a day. During the rapes, a Serbian guard told one woman, "Now you will have Serbian babies for the rest of your life". 532/

46. Teslić 533/

224. This county is located in the centre of the northern half of BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a prewar population of 59,632. Serbs were 55.1 per cent of the population, Muslims were 21.5 per cent, Croats were 16 per cent, 5.7 per cent described themselves as "Yugoslavs", and 1.7 per cent were "others".

225. This section of the study contains nine reports. Eight reports describe rapes at a camp located near Teslić. Of this group of reports, five discuss a 17 year old Bosnian Muslim woman from Kaloševići. A sixth report also may refer to the same woman. It is impossible to tell from available information if the same woman was the reporter in all six documents. It is possible that there were six separate 17 year old women from Kaloševići at Teslić Camp.

226. According to these eight documents, in March 1992, Serbian forces captured Kaloševići, a town near Teslić. 534/ Prisoners from the town were taken to a camp in the forest, about five hours walk from Kaloševići 535/ or 20 kilometres outside Teslić. 536/ The camp was reportedly a complex of small cabins in the forest, run by Serbian and Bosnian Serbs. Some perpetrators are identified as members of the "White Eagles". 537/ The camp allegedly held from 100 538/ to 1,000 539/ women and children. Allegedly, 12 of these women were repeatedly raped. The perpetrators came to the camp, raped women, and then left. The women were raped in front of each other and were told that they would bear Serbian children and that the perpetrators were raping them for revenge. Reportedly, some women were also beaten, and others were maimed or killed. The reports also allege that the detainees were forced to cook for the visiting soldiers and to serve them while naked. One report states that the commander raped 10 year old girls "as a delicacy". 540/ The 12 women escaped with the assistance of one of their Serbian friends.

227. The last report describes the sexual abuse of men in a prison in Teslić and in a Serb-run camp. There, prisoners were forced to perform fellatio on one another at the prison, and some also were castrated in a Serb-run camp. 541/
47. Titov Drvar

228. This county is located in the north-western quarter of BiH, bordered on the west by Croatia. According to the 1991 census, it had a prewar population of 17,209, 97.3 per cent of which was Serbian. The remaining 2.7 per cent were characterized only as "other". There is one general second-hand report in this section, which alleges that women were sexually abused in a camp in Prekale, Drvar. The perpetrators were described only as Serbian, while the victims were Muslim.

48. Tomislavgrad

229. This county is in central BiH, bordered on the west by Croatia. According to the 1991 census, its population before the war was 29,261. Croats comprised the majority at 86.6 per cent of the population, Muslims made up 10.8 per cent and 2.6 per cent were "others". Two reports allege the existence of "Šekovići Camp" in this county. This camp allegedly held Bosnian Muslim women for the purpose of rape. Reportedly, 300 Bosnian Muslim women were raped in this camp, and some victims were as young as seven.

49. Travnik

230. This county is in the north-eastern quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, it had a population of 70,402 before the war. Muslims were the majority at 45.3 per cent, 36.9 per cent were Croat, 11 per cent were Serb, and 6.8 per cent were "others". This section contains eight reports and is the only section, besides Sarajevo, where all three ethnic groups were reportedly both victims and perpetrators of rape and sexual assault. One report states that a Bosnian Serb woman was raped and then killed by Muslim/Croatian forces in July 1992. In October, a convoy was detained at the top of Vlašić mountain and the riders forced to walk down the mountain into Travnik. Some riders were killed and women were raped. In April of 1993, Bosnian Croats allegedly gang-raped Bosnian Muslim women in a house-to-house sweep.

231. The two remaining reports are undated. An official source reports only that numerous incidents of attacks on women and rapes in Mala Bukovica, Travnik, were reported. Two rape victims fled to Graaonica. The final report states that Bosnian Muslims raped Bosnian Serb girls and women and circumcised Bosnian Serb boys.

50. Trebinje

232. This county is the southernmost county in BiH. Before the war, it had a population of 30,879, 69.3 per cent of which were Serb, 17.9 per cent of which were Muslim, 8.8 per cent of which were "others", and 4 per cent of which were Croat. Some Muslims claim that Serbian authorities in the county forced them into exile in January 1993. One woman stated that four military policemen came to her house one night at 2:00 a.m., broke down the door, and raped her. As they left, they warned her that if she did not leave, then 12 men would come the next time.

233. The only other rape reported in this section occurred in July of 1993. Three men stole their way into the home of a Bosnian Muslim couple. They
forced the woman and her husband to undress in front of each other in the living room. They bound the woman’s hands behind her and raped her with a wooden baton and a spoon. She was then thrown onto a bed and threatened with further rape. Instead, the men bound her legs, threw her into the bathtub, and one of the perpetrators walked across her chest. She sustained broken ribs, a damaged lung, and other internal injuries. She remained hospitalized until the end of August, when her family was evacuated from the county. 557/

51. Tuzla and Živinice Counties 558/

234. These counties are in the centre of the north-east quarter of BiH. According to the 1991 census, Tuzla had a population of 131,861. Muslims were the majority with 47.6 per cent of the population, "Yugoslavs" were 16.6 per cent, Croats were 15.6 per cent, Serbs were 15.5 per cent, and 4.7 per cent were "others". Živinice had a prewar population of 54,653, with 80.6 per cent Muslim, 7.3 per cent Croat, 7.4 per cent Serb, and 5.7 per cent "other". This section of the study contains reports of 14 incidents of rape and sexual assault in Tuzla and Živinice counties. Only one of these reports is testimony. The sources of the reports included the governments of Yugoslavia and France and non-governmental sources.

235. According to these reports, Tuzla appears to be the site of several facilities where women were apparently held for the purpose of rape between approximately June 559/ and November 1992. 560/ The alleged perpetrators are identified as members of Bosnian Muslim, 561/ Bosnian Croat, 562/ and Bosnian Serb forces. 563/ Most of the reports do not identify the ethnicity, nationality, or religion of the alleged perpetrators. None of the reports identifies perpetrators by name. The alleged victims were primarily Bosnian Serb women, 564/ though many of the reports do not provide the ethnic, national or religious background of the victims. A few of the victims are identified by initials, age or village and complete personal information is reportedly in the possession of organizations that provided the Commission with the reports. One report alleges the existence of a camp for Bosnian Muslim women.

236. The reports identify several locations where rape was allegedly committed by Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces in Tuzla. One report cites a secondary school where about 100 Serbian women were reportedly held for the purposes of rape. 565/ Another report cites a house on the road towards Srebrenik (near Previša), where about 15 Serbian women were held. 566/

237. Four reports state that four different Serbian woman were held in one camp and raped up to five times a day for at least five months. Each woman was released in an advanced stage of pregnancy. Statements of the alleged captors and the pattern of release, indicate that women were uniformly not released until their pregnancy reached a certain stage. The reports do not provide detailed testimony from the victims, only a general description of how they were allegedly raped and the conditions in which they were held. 567/

238. Another report describes how unspecified perpetrators surrounded the village of Brezje, divided women and girls into groups, removed 36 youngsters, pillaged the village, and then transported the women to Tuzla. The reporter spent five months in a camp with 10 other women and was raped. (It is unclear if this camp is the same as any of the previously mentioned camps. Further investigation is necessary to clarify this.) She was, however, kept until her pregnancy was well-advanced. 568/
239. Another report cites a sports stadium at Živinice and former police offices in Tuzla as places where victims were held for rape. One report asserts that 200 girls, aged 15 and under, were held and raped in a camp in Lomnica. Another report states that there were rapes in Tuzla and Živinice without providing further detail as to whether they occurred in detention facilities. Finally, one report states that women were raped prior to a prisoner exchange, but does not allege the exact location of this event.

240. The dates of the incidents were fairly evenly distributed from July through November. (However, several incidents did not specify a date and one allegedly occurred in "early 1992".) Most incidents involving detention facilities allegedly occurred in mid-1992 (i.e. June or July). Three reports specify that they occurred from mid-1992 to November 1992.

(a) Alleged perpetrator information

241. Croatian forces; Muslim forces; and Serbian forces.

No names or descriptive perpetrator information was provided.

52. Vareš

242. This county is located in the centre of BiH, just north-west of Sarajevo. Before the war, the county had a population of 22,114: 40.6 per cent were Croat, 30.4 per cent were Muslim, 16.4 per cent were Serb, and 12.6 per cent were "others". This section contains seven reports of sexual atrocities.

243. In October 1993, NORBAT reported that rapes took place in Vareš. No additional details were given in this report. In late October, the Muslim village of Stupni Do was attacked by the HVO. Two women who escaped stated that they had been raped in the attack. Other women in the village were reportedly raped and then killed. In November, Croatian soldiers raped a woman in her apartment in Vareš.

53. Višegrad

244. This county is in the south-eastern quarter of BiH, bordered on the east by Serbia. According to the 1991 Yugoslavian census, Višegrad had a population of almost 25,000 before the conflict—63 per cent Bosnian Muslim and 33 per cent Bosnian Serb.

245. This section contains 33 reports regarding allegations of rape in the Višegrad region. Several of the reports are general allegations of mass rape in the Višegrad area, while others are more detailed testimonies and first hand accounts. According to these reports, the Višegrad area was the site of at least four facilities, including the Hotel Vilina Vlas, where women were reportedly confined and subjected to regular and repeated rape.

246. The victims were primarily Bosnian Muslim women and teen-age girls. The alleged perpetrators were members of the Serbian forces. The purported incidents of rape began in the Spring of 1992 and continued through Autumn 1992. The reports do not indicate the duration of these rapes, however, two reports suggest that the area was "ethnically clean" by July 1992.
and that no Bosnian Muslims lived in the town of Višegrad after that date.

247. The Hotel Vilina Vlas was the subject of many reports. The Hotel is located in a forest, about seven kilometres outside Višegrad, and is known as a spa or mineral thermal cure resort. It was apparently the site of many rapes.

248. One report estimates that 200 women, primarily Muslim, were detained at the hotel and sexually assaulted. It states that five victims committed suicide and many others were killed. One report claims that younger girls were taken to the hotel while older women were taken to other locations, such as occupied or abandoned houses, and raped. The number and consistency of the reports provides reasonable confirmation that a large number of rapes did in fact occur in this hotel.

249. A particularly detailed testimony tells how an identified Serbian policeman from Belgrade and a man whose name appears often visited the home of two teen-age Muslim girls and took them and another young woman to the Hotel Vilina Vlas. When they arrived, he instructed two other soldiers to interrogate two of the women and took one into a room with him. The reporter was later raped in that room, and she heard her sister and friend scream from other rooms. The reporter was taken home, but the sister and friend never returned. The girls' mother received no assistance from local authorities or police. This report also names several other girls kept at the camp and assaulted.

250. Other sites of alleged sexual abuse included a large fire station, a home for retarded children at Višegrad, the Višegrad Hotel, Hotel Bikavac, and a camp set up in a building above a tunnel. One report states that mass rapes occurred in public places such as restaurants, squares, and sports halls throughout Višegrad. It also states that 300 women are registered as being victims of rape.

251. Many rapes in the Višegrad area were allegedly perpetrated in an apparently systematic fashion. Reports state that victims were rounded up and transported to places like the Hotel Vilina Vlas and the Hotel Višegrad, apparently for the purpose of being detained and raped.

(a) Victim information

252. The reported victims of sexual assault are identified primarily as Bosnian Muslim girls and women. No victims are reported to be Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat. Reports from Višegrad are somewhat unique in that the ages of the girls allegedly raped appear to be quite young. Many of the reports refer to them as "children" or "young girls". The largest number of reported victims are the approximately 200 women and girls allegedly raped at the Vilina Vlas.

(b) Alleged perpetrator information

253. General Forces Identified:

Serbian soldiers;
Serbian paramilitary, including the group Beli Orlovi ("White Eagles");
Četniks;
Arkan's soldiers; and
Sešelj's soldiers.

Four men were identified by name, another was identified by first name only, and three more were identified by nickname. Two of the named men were identified by more than one witness.

54. **Vitez** 605/

254. This county is located in the north-eastern part of the centre of BiH, north-east of Sarajevo. Before the war this county had a population of 27,728, according to the 1991 census. Croats were the majority at 45.7 per cent, 41.4 per cent were Muslim, 7.5 per cent were "others", and 5.4 per cent were Serbs. This section contains four second-hand reports of sexual atrocities. The alleged perpetrators are identified as Bosnian Croat or HVO forces. The reports indicate that the incidents occurred in conjunction with fighting between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces.

255. In April of 1992, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims attacked civilians of each other's ethnic group. Croatian soldiers raped women in a house-to-house sweep. 606/ On 16 April, Croatian soldiers committed at least one gang-rape. 607/ The final report alleges that 150 Bosnian Muslims were detained for 16 days at Braće Ribara school in Dubravica, where women were allegedly raped. The inmates were later freed through the intervention of the ICRC. 608/

55. **Vlasenica** 609/

256. This county is in the central eastern section of BiH. The population was 33,817 before the war, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority with 55.3 per cent of the population, 42.5 per cent were Serb, and the remaining 2.2 per cent were "others". There was a camp in the area, called Sušica, which consisted of two warehouses and one small building surrounded by barbed wire. All the prisoners were kept together in one warehouse, measuring seven metres by 15 metres. At full capacity, it held an estimated 560 prisoners. 610/ The military commander was identified, 611/ and so was the administrative commander. 612/

257. On 26 June 1992, two Serbian brothers from Vlasenica took three women from the camp and raped them. The victims told the other prisoners what happened when they returned. 613/ Nikolić and Bašić were both responsible for allowing young women to be taken out of the camp and raped on other occasions. 614/ Bašić told young Serbs to choose the women to be raped. According to one source, raped women were usually killed, and in one evening three women were killed. 615/

56. **Zenica** 616/

258. This county is in the northern part of the centre of BiH. It had a prewar population of 145,577, according to the 1991 census. 55.2 per cent were Muslim, 15.6 per cent were Croat, 15.5 per cent were Serb, 10.8 per cent identified themselves as "Yugoslavs", and 2.9 per cent fell into the "other" category. This section of the study contains one general report stating that Bosnian Serb women were raped by Bosnian Muslim forces. 617/ The only other report in this section states that an older woman was raped in Zenica. 618/
57. Zvornik 619/

259. This county is located on the eastern border of BiH and Serbia. Before the war, there was a population of 81,111, according to the 1991 census. Muslims were the majority at 59.4 per cent of the population, Serbs comprised 38 per cent of the population, and the remaining 2.6 per cent were described as "other". There are 35 reports in this section of the study, 28 of which are reports and seven of which are recorded as some form of testimony. Most of the victims are described as Bosnian Muslim, and most of the perpetrators are described generally as Serbian.

260. In May of 1992, Serb forces attacked the area of Zvornik. In conjunction with the attack, women in the villages of Kostijarevo and Drinja were allegedly raped after 25 to 35 men were killed in fighting. 620/ Another report states that a 12 year old girl was raped and strangled in Salihovići, Zvornik. 621/ In Kamenica, a "Četnik" raped and kidnapped a 16 year old girl. 622/ Another report, which may be describing the same incident, states that an identified Serb soldier kidnapped a 16 year-old girl, took her to Papraća, and kept her as his sexual slave. 623/

261. The majority of the reports allege that women were sexually assaulted in Liplje, a small village of about 500. In May 1992, nearly 400 residents were reportedly held in the home of a prominent Muslim by Serb forces. During their captivity, young women were allegedly repeatedly raped. 624/ Some girls were killed. The women described the men as dirty and on drugs. One man stated that he was raping girls "[b]ecause [they were] Muslims and there [were] too many of [them]". Another stated that they were planting "the seeds of Serbs in Bosnia". One young girl was raped by two "Četniks" in front of her father. 625/

262. Other reports alleged that a camp was set up in a school in Salihovići. That camp allegedly held 470 inmates. Reportedly, the youngest women were raped first, and then older women were raped. One report alleges that a girl was raped in front of her family. 626/

263. Reports also allege that Bosnian Muslim women from Brčko were held in a lumber factory in Caparde, Zvornik, and 40 were taken out and raped by Arkan’s troops. The women stated that their captors indicated that they were forced to commit acts of rape. 627/

264. Several reports describe a camp in a shoe factory in Karakaj. There a female guard, a member of Arkan’s troops, ordered men to have sexual intercourse with her. When they refused, she shot them. 628/ One report called the factory the "Glinica" factory, and stated that 48 girls and women were raped there. 629/

265. Another camp was at a theatre in elopek, where 163 men were housed. One day, three "Četniks" came to the camp. One called out the names of seven pairs of men. The men were mostly fathers and sons or close relatives. The guard forced seven of the men to kneel down and bite off the penises of the other seven. Three of the men died. 630/ The other prisoners were forced to watch. A week or 10 days later, another of the guards cut off a man's penis with a knife. 631/ According to another source, the guard made this man eat his severed penis. 632/ The same source reported that this guard beat a prisoner with a wooden stick and shoved the stick into the man’s anus, causing the victim to bleed profusely. He stated that the guard, who was often drunk, forced prisoners to perform sex acts with each other. The prisoners were taken to Batkovići in late June and finally released in February 1993. 633/
266. According to one report, at camp Novi Izvor, just inside the Bosnian border, a guard raped a 17 year old female inmate in his room. 634/ There were also reported locations in Žvornik where women were forced to serve as sexual slaves. 635/ Finally, detainees were kept in a camp in an unidentified warehouse. 636/

B. Croatia 637/

1. Benkovac

267. Since the arrival of UNPROFOR in the municipality of Benkovac, 638/ 27 Croats were killed. They were, on average, over 60 years old and some were reportedly raped. The municipal government alleged that these murders were part of a systematic plan to rid the area of Croats. 639/

2. Daruvar

268. In February of 1992, Croatian police or members of the National Guard reportedly raped, tortured, and killed members of a Serbian family. The commanding officer was allegedly involved. There were four people in the family, and their identities are on file with the government of Yugoslavia. 640/

3. Drniš

269. According to the ECOM, in late August 1991, an unidentified Serbian woman was allegedly raped by Croatian soldiers. They then killed her and dismembered her body. 641/ From September to November, residents of Drniš were reportedly imprisoned. While imprisoned, the prisoners were forced to perform oral sex on guards and each other. They were also forced to perform mutual masturbation. Young CNG soldiers were reportedly targeted for sexual abuse. 642/

4. Glina

270. In late March 1993, one witness reports that he heard barking dogs in the middle of the night. He tried to awaken his wife, but could not. He left the house, believing that she would be all right. He hid in the woods outside the house and heard gunfire in or near the house. He returned to find his wife dead, with extensive damage to her head and signs of what "seemed certain to be rape". 643/

5. Gospić

271. In a village in Gospić, on 14 November 1992, two masked and armed men broke into a house. They beat the male of the household and burglarized the residence. One of the men attempted to rape the woman of the house, but his companion stopped him. 644/

6. Grubišno Polje

272. A witness reported that in the fall of 1991, he saw "the legion, the infantry and the tanks" rape a girl in town and then kill her. 645/
7. Knin

273. In late October 1992, Croatian prisoners from Manjaa camp in Banja Luka, BiH were taken to Knin for a prisoner exchange. There, the exchange fell through and the prisoners were taken to Knin prison for the night. Prison guards, unknown civilians, and guards from the camp reportedly forced the prisoners to lick the floor in the restroom, copulate in each other's mouths and sing Četnik songs. The prisoners were returned to Manjaa the next day.

646/ In another report, a witness to the raping of a 70 year old woman and her 15 year old granddaughter said that they were beaten on the head by a Croatian soldier, knocked unconscious, and then raped. The Croatian was a neighbour of the victims. 647/

8. Nova Gradiška

274. In late 1991, a 57 year old woman was imprisoned in a village in this municipality. Guards raped the woman, forced other prisoners to rape her, conducted shock treatments on her legs, and killed her husband. 648/

9. Osijek

275. On 2 August 1991, members of the Croatian National Guard and members of the Croatian Police force reportedly raped and killed a number of unarmed civilians in a village. 649/ In November of the same year, Serb forces "cleansed" another village of non-Serbs. In the process, they raped girls and women. 650/

10. Sisak

276. A 50 year-old Serbian woman stated that while she was detained at Sisak Prison, cigarettes were extinguished on her breast. She also saw young Serbian girls, lined up for "bathing" by the "Ustaši" guards at the prison. 651/ Another report pertains to a 54 year old Croatian woman who was escorted by UNPROFOR to the Medical Centre in Pakrac for treatment for injuries resulting from a rape incident. She alleged that the perpetrators were three Serbian soldiers. 652/ In another account, a Croatian soldier who witnessed the occurrences at the concentration camp Brijest (which interned some 500 Serbian prisoners) stated that there were approximately 80 women in detention. According to the reporter, four women were subjected to rape on a daily basis. 653/

11. Slavonski Brod

277. Allegations that Bosnian women were taken to "bordellos" and camps in the Slavonski Brod region are discussed in the Bosanski Brod and Odžak counties section, in the part of this study on BiH. See that section for more details. There is only one allegation of women taken from Croatia to this area for sexual assault. In July of 1992, female Serb prisoners from Poljari and Rabići were reportedly taken to a site in Slavonski Brod, where women were made available for sexual entertainment. 654/

12. Slunj

278. According to the statement of a Croatian rape victim, following the "Četnik" occupation only 16 people remained in her village. On several
occasions thereafter, "Četniks" entered her home to interrogate her. In February of 1993, two men went to her house, where they beat and raped her. She tried to report the attack to the Serbian police, but was not allowed to speak to the higher ranking officers. She attempted to ask UNPROFOR for help, but they said they could not help her. In April, three men with Četnik marks on their caps knocked on her door. They threatened to harm her and tried to set her bed on fire, but the oldest of the three men stopped these attempts. The "most violent" of the three raped the witness. She again reported the rape to UNPROFOR and was evacuated in May. 

Another incident occurred in the village of Liko Petrovo Selo, where a woman was tied to four stakes in the ground in a horizontal position. The witness stated that she was raped repeatedly by several Serbian soldiers who stated throughout the episode "that Yugoslavia was theirs . . . that they fought for it in World War II [and] that it'll be like this for everyone who doesn't listen".

13. Split

279. Lora Camp, in Split county, was run by Croatians and housed Bosnian Serbs. There, men were forced to rape women and each other. Additionally, electrodes were attached to men's penises, and on one occasion, a camp guard put a thick rubber glove on his hand and rammed it into the anus of one of the prisoners.

14. Titova Korenica

280. This section of the study contains two allegations of sexual assault. One report states that 24 Croatian soldiers were found and some of them had been castrated. The second report indicates that there was a detention facility in the county where a named person forced prisoners to sit on bottles, forcing them into their anuses.

15. Vinkovci

281. There is only one report of a sexual atrocity in this county. In July of 1991, members of the CDU reportedly arrested a man, dragged him from his car, and castrated him.

16. Vukovar

282. There are 20 reported cases of sexual atrocities in this section of the study. Seven of them concern a camp set up at Velepromet warehouse in the city of Vukovar in the last week of November 1991. The camp allegedly served as a major collection point for thousands of captured civilians for several days after the occupation of Vukovar. It was controlled by Serbians and "Četniks" and housed Croatian civilians. There, men were subject to genital beatings and castration. In one case, Serbian soldiers allegedly cut the testicles and penis off of a Croatian man. In another case, a victim reported that he was repeatedly beaten in the genital area at the warehouse and that a group of male prisoners, including himself, were lined up, their genitals were tied together with wire, and they were forced to walk around the room in which they were held. Another victim identified a man who tied the victim's testicles with a piece of wire and struck them with a blunt object.

283. Women were also subject to sexual assault. Prisoners stated that they could hear the screams of women as they were raped. Another witness
states that an identified pregnant woman he knew and 15 other Croatian women were raped while at the camp. A Serbian woman who was married to a Croatian man was also raped. 670/ A final source states merely that the warehouse was a place of "brutal rape". 671/

284. Sexual assault was also committed outside of this camp. In late September 1991, a Captain raped two 14 year old girls in front of their grandmother and then killed all three. 672/ In October, young Croatian girls who served the Serbian volunteers were forced to have sexual intercourse. The men threatened to kill the girls' families if they refused. 673/ In the second week in November, a doctor witnessed a member of the ZNG rape a young girl at the ZNG headquarters. He had been called to examine a patient at the site. 674/ In that same month, an Albanian woman reported that she was repeatedly interrogated and raped for 12 hours by a group of Yugoslav People's Army soldiers. 675/ In another incident in December, an elderly woman was killed and her daughter raped by an identified man. 676/ According to another witness, an identified man repeatedly raped a Croatian woman, taking her in the evenings and returning her in the morning. 677/ In a separate report, a 50 year old Croatian woman was raped and forced to perform oral sex on seven members of the Serbian "White Eagles". 678/ In another case, a 54 year old Croatian woman alleged that she was raped and tortured by Serbian soldiers following the occupation and fall of Vukovar. 679/ A final report states that an unidentified Croatian male was found in a mass grave. He had been castrated. 680/ An additional source suggests that a member of a Serbian paramilitary group was accused by the Croatian government of killing 150 people and raping 30 women. The accused admitted to participating in gang raping activities. 681/

17. Zadar

285. In this county, three Croatian guardsmen allegedly raped a Serbian woman in front of her husband and cut off his ears. 682/

18. Zagreb

286. There was reportedly a camp in this county called Kerestinec, run by the Republic of Croatia, housing Serbian inmates. At the camp, there were reports of forced fellatio, rapes, and other sexual mistreatment. One of the reporters of the assaults suffered a miscarriage due to the treatment. 683/ In another report, the information alleges that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman is responsible for war crimes, including those committed by T. Merep's men. Allegedly Merep's men raped the mother and the daughter of a local family and then killed all the members of the family. 684/

19. UNPROFOR sectors and miscellaneous

287. One report, which identifies the village/location only as Sector south, reports that six uniformed men broke into the house of an identified Croatian woman and attempted to rape her in December of 1992. 685/ Two other reports detail the rape of two women at a camp Buje. The first is an elderly Croatian woman whose victimization was memorialized on film. Her Serbian captors tortured her with electric shocks and gang-raped her. The second woman was similarly victimized but, in addition to filming the entire episode, the perpetrators beat her and forced a truncheon inside her. 686/
C. Serbia

288. This study contains 19 reports that rape and sexual assault were committed in Serbia. Two reports allege that women, among a group of 812 Bosnian Muslim refugees from Gacko, were raped in a railway station in Kosovo Polje in July of 1992. At some kind of camp in Novi Sad, also in July of 1992, a victim reported that guards touched her all over and attempted to undress her. They asked for volunteers to rape her. When no one volunteered, she was left alone. However, the guards forced her to manually examine another woman to see if the other woman was a virgin. The two women were then forced to do “something”, but the witness does not specify what.

289. Four reports concern the sexual abuse of an identified woman, reportedly of subnormal intelligence, at Sremska Mitrovica prison. The woman was definitely held from December 1991 through February of 1993. Guards and regular criminals in the prison allegedly raped this woman. Additionally, other prisoners-of-war were reportedly forced to “exploit her sexually.”

290. The other reports allege that women were raped in Begejci Camp, Stajićevo Camp, Livade Camp, and another unidentified camp, all in the Vojvodina region. The reported events occurred in the fall and winter of 1991. One woman from the Vukovar area states that the population of the camp was about 2,000. She was forced to have oral, anal and vaginal sex, and cigarettes were extinguished on her body while she was imprisoned at the camp from 8 October 1991 to 10 December 1991. Her first night, she was raped by seven men. She and the other female prisoners were raped almost every night. A general report states that women were raped in the concentration camps of Begejci and Stajićevo during the autumn and winter of 1991. Another woman states that she and the other women of her group were taken to Stajićevo briefly and then on to Begejci. On the way, three JA soldiers forced the witness to kiss them and threatened to rape and kill her.

291. Begejci camp reportedly held about 600 inmates. One Croatian woman, who was captured across the river from Vukovar, Croatia, while attempting to flee to Hungary, was taken to Begejci. According to her statement, she was taken to the camp in late October, where about 600 males and six females were imprisoned. She stated that she was forced to be a slave to 30 Serbian Reservists. The second week in November, 30 more women were brought in. The witness states that they were treated the same way. She was taken to the Military prison in Belgrade 14 November 1991. There, a Serbian reservist raped her in a bathroom. She was kept in solitary confinement, and the reservist raped her repeatedly during his work shift. She stated that he was often drunk and beat her if she did not please him.

292. Another woman was taken to Begejci. She estimates the population at 500, with five women in the camp. She states that she was not beaten but was sexually maltreated by one reservist who did not permit other, threatening reservists to do the same. She was taken to VIZ army prison in Belgrade and questioned by a reservist. He took her to a bathroom, forced her to take off her clothes, and beat her. He sexually assaulted the witness, but, she states, he did not rape her. The last report concerning Begejci states only that a man and a woman were forced to engage in sexual relations there.

293. One Croatian Muslim woman states that she was taken to a camp in Livade, near Zrenjanin, Serbia. There, she states she was raped by seven men, orally, anally, and vaginally. She and the Croatian women held there were reportedly
raped every night. The women ranged in age from 17 to 50 years old. On 12 December, she was taken to Šid. There, she states that the same things occurred, but she makes no statement or allegation of rape. 700/

294. At an unnamed Serb-run camp in Vojvodina, a woman reports that she was forced to keep a guard's penis erect in her mouth. She was forced to remain kneeling and if any semen spilled onto the ground, she was beaten. 701/ Another report states that there was a "bordello" for the army, where a kidnapped Bosnian Muslim 15 year old woman was forced to perform sexual services. 702/ According to the last source, non-Serbs were raped and harassed in Vojvodina as more Serb refugees came into the area. 703/
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX IX.A
SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATION

Under the Direction of:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

Principal Legal Analyst:

Karen Kenny, Consultant to the Commission
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Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh, M.D., Consultant to the
Commission of Experts, Coordinator of the Mental Health Team
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Part One

REPORT OF PHASE I

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview of the project

1. The Commission of Experts is authorised by Security Council resolution 780 (1992) to examine and analyse information which it "may obtain through its own investigations or efforts."

2. The (first) Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) indicated that the Commission intended to engage in selective in-depth investigations in a number of areas. Among these was sexual assault. 1/

3. The Commission's project to gather information regarding sexual assault was carried out in February and March 1994. The aim was to gather information regarding allegations of sexual assault, torture and mass killings (particularly in a detention camp context). The information gathered relates to the war in Croatia as well as to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

4. Planning for the interviews started in October 1993. A small Advance Team arrived in Croatia on 30 January to prepare for the interviews during February. The lawyer interviewers and the mental health specialists arrived in Zagreb on 26 February. After three days of briefings in Zagreb, interviews were conducted from 2 March to 24 March and follow-up work completed in the area by 9 April.

5. Interviews with 223 people were carried out, on behalf of the Commission of Experts in Croatia, among its refugee and displaced person communities from 2 to 24 March 1994, during phase I of the project. 2/ One hundred forty-six of these victim-witnesses were from BiH, while 77 were from Croatia. Among the victim-witnesses from BiH, there were 100 Muslims, 43 Croats and one Serb. Among the victim-witnesses with allegations concerning the war in Croatia, 26 were women and all were Croats.

6. A significant number of these interviews can provide the basis for possible prosecutions.

7. Among the 79 women in the group from BiH, 19 had been raped in their own homes and 13 raped in the context of detention. A group of 17 men and women had been eye-witnesses to rape or sexual assault. Several of these people have been assessed as key witnesses, because they have not only seen or experienced a great deal, but also have the emotional strength and clarity of presentation to play a pivotal role in a prosecution case.

8. The project has gathered significant information concerning alleged war crimes taking place in Croatia. This is particularly the case regarding rapes in detention and sexual assault of men, including castration in detention. In addition, seven survivors of the Lovas mine-field massacre were interviewed as was a survivor of the Dalj massacre.

9. The records of the interviews will assist the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal by indicating cases which are likely to found prosecutions for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or Crimes Against Humanity. The interviews are indications to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal of what the witnesses are able to attest.
10. The great majority of victims and witnesses interviewed were willing to be contacted in the future by the Prosecutor and would consider testifying before the Tribunal.

11. The interviews have highlighted areas where further investigation is needed.

12. Eleven teams of lawyers (from Finland, USA, Canada, Bangladesh and Ireland) carried out the interviews and eight mental health specialists worked to support the process. Fourteen interpreters were recruited locally after a rigorous selection procedure.

13. The project was carried out almost exclusively by female lawyers, mental health specialists and interpreters and involved approximately 40 people.

14. Victim-witnesses were approached through a number of contact persons, including local and international NGOs, Home Clubs, individuals, local mental health specialists and the Government of Croatia.

15. The Commission of Experts sought to conduct interviews in Serb-held territories in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but was unable to gain access.

16. The Commission sought to interview victims in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and contacted that Government several times in January and February 1994, but was unable to obtain authorisation to have Commission teams conduct interviews there. After a meeting between the Federal Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the Commission, it was agreed that the Government would conduct its own interviews based on a model provided by the Commission of Experts.

17. These 223 interviews reflect the best efforts of the Commission given the limited time and resources available. When the Commission's mandate ended, it was receiving an average of 15 witness calls per day. Because the mandate ended, these people were unable to give statements. Further, the field investigation itself is incomplete. The Commission would have worked in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had there been time and resources. Additionally, the investigation would have covered those countries with concentrations of refugees. In fact, the government of Turkey had invited the Commission to interview refugees there. There are about 18,000 refugees in Turkey. Thus, this investigation does not reveal the full picture and cannot purport to describe the full extent of sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia.

18. The present report is intended to accompany and introduce the records of the 223 interviews carried out on the Commission's behalf by the teams of interviewers in Croatia and Slovenia during March 1994.

B. The team

19. The Interviews Coordinator worked with the following key persons in implementing the project: Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh, Coordinator of Mental Health personnel; Ms. Maja Draženović, Chief Interpreter; Dr. Sabina Negetović, NGO liaison officer; Mr. Thomas Osorio, Field officer; Ms. Nancy Paterson; and Ms. Elenor Richter-Lyonett, NGO Coordinator.

20. Particularly, warm appreciation is here expressed to Ms. Draženović and Mr. Osorio who worked with the Interviews Coordinator in the field for the entire period of the project (February to early April 1994). Their unfailing
professionalism, stamina and good humour made the project possible. Ms. Draženović’s selection and recruitment of excellent interpreters for the teams of interviewers was crucial to the success of the project. Interpreters were selected—not only for their language skills, but for their maturity, capacity to empathise with victim-witnesses, and with concern for security of information.

21. The lawyers and mental health personnel gave up a month of their time to work as volunteers for the Commission and their dedication and commitment were evident. A complete list of those participating in the project is included in section F of this Annex.

22. A particular word of personal appreciation goes to Ms. Nancy Paterson, Coordinator of the legal team, and to the other lawyers who put in long hours of report writing after long days of interviewing. The professionalism of the team made them a pleasure to work with.

23. The work of Mrs. Bruna Molina-Abram, Deputy Secretary to the Commission, and Mr. Julio Baez, Assistant Secretary to the Commission, was greatly appreciated because, as with all field missions, the flexibility and support of the Secretariat were crucial.

II. METHODOLOGY

24. A number of fact-finding missions have been carried out in an attempt to assess the incidence and extent of the use of rape as a weapon of war in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These missions were primarily carried out for the purpose of publishing reports and increasing public pressure for an end to rape. The Commission of Expert's project goes further. This was the first time that the United Nations has conducted on-site investigations into rape as a war crime with a view to gathering information which may found prosecutions of the individuals responsible.

25. One of the aims of this report is to record the experience of the project for the benefit of future investigations.

26. The Chairman of the Commission of Experts decided that the project would take the form of a series of interviews, and selected the legal, mental health, and other personnel involved. The Interviews Coordinator was retained by the Commission from January to April 1994 and charged with the identification, location and selection of victim-witnesses for interview. Working within the parameters of what had been decided, procedures and approaches were created by the Interviews Coordinator to fulfil her role and implement the project. These procedures, and lessons that may be learnt from their application, are presented in this section.

27. The difficulties involved in investigations of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, and particularly concerning rape, are notorious and should not be underestimated.

28. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights' Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki, who has a team of staff permanently placed in the area, has noted:

"A persistent problem besetting attempts to chart the extent of the incidence of rape and other forms of sexual abuse remains the exceptional difficulty in obtaining reports of or investigating allegations. Hindrances include the continuing war conditions, the distress of victims and their fear of retaliation"
by or on behalf of the perpetrators, the dispersal of victims among other displaced people and, not least, the refusal of Bosnian Serb authorities to permit investigations in territories under their control. Also, reports of incidents of rape often only come to the attention of investigators many months after the incident has occurred." 4/

29. A number of other problems may be added to this list:

(a) the question of how to approach rape victims in a sensitive manner;

(b) how to combat "mission fatigue" among potential interviewees. Interviews have been conducted for a variety of reasons and by a variety of actors (resettlement officers, NGOs, fact-finders, journalists) and many people are jaded;

(c) how to ensure that the highly politicised nature of the subject among NGOs, individuals and governments does not impinge upon the independence and integrity of the investigation;

(d) how to counter the frustration and cynicism with which some people regard the United Nations in general and the International Criminal Tribunal in particular; and

(e) how to convince people that a project such as this is worth supporting with a little of their time (perhaps to contact potential witnesses or be interviewed themselves) when their people are still hungry and dying in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their relatives are in danger ("What are you going to do about what is happening now?").

With these problems in mind the following approach was adopted.

A. Briefings for the team

30. The Chairman of the Commission met with some of the team of lawyers and mental health specialists in Chicago on 29 January 1996 to give them an overview of the mission and to discuss their concerns. Prior to the team's arrival in Zagreb, the lawyers received copies of the reports of the main fact-finding missions, which had earlier been carried out by NGOs or inter-governmental organisations (including the United Nations) regarding rape in the former Yugoslavia. Also included were materials on the effects of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.

31. On their arrival in Zagreb, briefings for lawyers, mental health specialists and interpreters were held on 27 and 28 February and 1 March. Briefings covered the history of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and included a briefing on the military course of the conflicts by UNPROFOR Military Observers (UNMOs). Drs. Richard Rahe, Inger Agger and Soren Buus Jensen briefed the teams (including the interpreters) regarding the effect of post-traumatic stress on victims, and there was detailed discussion of interviewing techniques focusing on sensitivity to the mental health of the victim-witness. For the orientation of the teams, an introductory visit to refugee collective centres was arranged through a local women's group called Biser. The centres had been visited by a field social worker of the women's organisation.

32. Documents distributed at the briefings in Zagreb included background information on UNPROFOR and UNHCR and the Commission's list of known detention
33. The International Criminal Tribunal’s publication of 11 February indicating its rules of procedure and evidence was distributed, as was a copy of the Commission of Experts mandate in Security Council Resolution 780 (1992). For the conduct of interviews, a check-list prepared by Ms. Nancy Paterson, Coordinator for the legal team, was discussed and circulated. In the discussion it was particularly emphasised that each lawyer must ensure that the interviewee understands the mandate of the project; that the information gathered will be forwarded to the Tribunal; and that the fact that they chose to speak with the Commission did not imply that they would agree in the future to testify before the International Criminal Tribunal. Lawyers were asked instead to obtain an indication from the witness as to whether in principle they would be willing to have the Prosecutor contact them in the future.

34. The interview process was conducted from 2 to 24 March. In an attempt to reach a diverse cross-section of victim-witnesses who were likely to have been victimised in different parts of BiH or Croatia, interviews were conducted in many different parts of Croatia. Teams travelled to Varaždin, Zadar, Osijek, Grubišno Polje, Kutina, Split, Slavonski Brod, Gašinci, Rijeka, Vinkovci, Novi Grad, Novska, Ivanjica, and a core of at least three interviewing teams remained in Zagreb. In addition, two teams of interviewers worked in Maribor and Ljubljana in Slovenia.

B. Investigating rape in the context in which it occurs

35. While the project mandate was to gather information regarding allegations of rape, torture and mass killings, the lead focus was on rape and every person who wished to speak to an interviewer regarding rape was interviewed.

36. With that in mind, the project's approach was deliberately broad and aimed at protecting the safety and privacy of the victim-witnesses. To achieve that goal the project sought:

   (a) to ensure that no interviewee had to identify themselves as a rape victim by deciding to speak;
   
   (b) to ensure that both men and women who were victims of sexual assault would have the opportunity to give information;
   
   (c) to reach those who either witnessed sexual assault or had leads; and, in particular,
   
   (d) to place allegations of rape in the context of the torture and mass killings which frequently accompany them.

37. An illustration of this approach, with those details which would help identify witness-victims omitted, is the information gathered concerning one detention camp. Fifteen people were interviewed whose major allegations related to this camp. Some witnesses were men and all of the female victims had been raped. A number of the victim-witnesses had information regarding other war crimes—-a number of the men had significant information regarding sexual assault. One man gave corroborative information about rapes in both this camp and another; one witnessed a woman die after being in a coma for a week as a result of repeated sadistic rapes; another saw prisoners forced to perform fellatio (in another prison). Among the information provided concerning other violations of international humanitarian law, 10 of those
38. By interviewing men and women it was possible to place rape in the context of the camp setting and obtain corroborative information from men. Similarly, while the women were primarily victims of rape, they had witnessed many of the atrocities against men and were able to re-enforce their statements. While a detailed analysis has yet to be done, by obtaining a wide variety of views of the camp from a wide variety of sources, it may be easier to assess whether the rapes were an officially sanctioned form of torture than if exclusively female victims were interviewed.

39. Analysing the links between camps is important for tracing superior responsibility beyond the immediate camp manager. This strengthens the investigation of rape cases and other crimes committed in, or in connection with, the camps. Investigating their role in "ethnic cleansing." With this in mind, ex-detainees from camps where no women were held have been interviewed as part of this project. To give the example of the major detention camps of the Prijedor area: Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska and Manjača must be seen as links in a chain. Some people were detained in all four camps. An interesting line of inquiry might examine whether each of the camps in the chain had different functions vis-a-vis the other camps. It may be possible to show that these camps and the treatment meted out to prisoners in them formed a coherent whole, raising possibilities of superior responsibility, at least by omission.

40. This discussion is further developed in Part III below, Recommendations for Further Investigation.

C. The indirect approach to victim-witnesses

41. There are many and varied factors affecting the decision of victim-witnesses to speak. Many people prefer not to be interviewed. Safety is a major concern (see Section H) regarding security procedures, below). For example, many refugees and displaced persons have relatives still in conflict areas. In addition, some Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina who found refuge in Croatia, have felt vulnerable since the outbreak of the conflict between Muslims and Croats in central Bosnia and Herzegovina. Also, some people wish to concentrate on the future and put their experiences behind them; others cannot cope with the emotional distress of "re-living" the experience by the telling and there is an element of "mission fatigue" from repeated interviews by fact-finding missions and journalists. In addition, shame is an important factor in the decision of a rape victim to speak or not to speak. More than one rape victim first revealed their experiences to the Commission's interviewer, while their own families were not aware of their suffering.

42. Appreciation of the above-mentioned factors underlay the entire project. Therefore, the decision of each individual to speak, or not to speak, was fully respected.

43. In practical terms, this meant that an indirect approach was used when inviting victim-witnesses to speak. At all times, even when a direct route to the interviewee was known (e.g. their telephone number), an indirect approach was used. The contact person who suggested the name of the potential interviewee (usually a friend, supportive NGO etc.) was asked to contact the individual to see if they would like to speak to the Commission. Individuals were always given the decision-making power and never put under pressure to speak. Thus, the risk of upsetting, shocking or disturbing people inherent in
a direct approach was avoided.

44. In order to implement the indirect approach, a broad range of contacts were established with individuals, NGOs and government agencies. This process, begun by telephone and fax from Geneva in January 1994 and intensified through meetings organised by the Advance Team in the area from 30 January onwards, continued throughout the interview process in March and as more leads opened up, even to the day of the departure of the Interviews Coordinator on 9 April. The number and range of potential sources of information should not be underestimated.

45. The mandates of the Commission in general, and of this project in particular, were explained to these contact persons. They were invited to inform potential victim-witnesses with whom they were in contact of the opportunity to provide information to the Commission. This dissemination of the invitation to contact the Commission, either directly or through the contact person, was achieved in various ways but especially through group and individual meetings with relevant contacts. These contacts included local mental health specialists, women's groups and their field workers, and Home Clubs. Those contacted include almost all the 186 individuals and organisations on the list prepared by the Interviews Coordinator in section D of this dossier.

46. The indirect approach was thus intended to respect the privacy of each individual. It also aided in the witness selection process (see d) below).

47. The advantages of the indirect approach are outlined above. It served the purposes of the project for those reasons but it was also necessary for a negative reason. A large-scale interviewing process, which used interviewers who were not (at least on arrival) familiar with field work of this kind, or sufficiently familiar with the context of the former Yugoslavia, meant that interviews had to be arranged for them. For those teams working in places with high concentrations of refugees and displaced persons outside Zagreb, the contacts were arranged in advance, but the witness selection was often done on the spot by the lawyer. Some of the lawyers had the judgement to select witnesses likely to provide good information and to treat others with sensitivity. Others found themselves "railroaded" into interviews of several hours with a person who provided mainly hearsay information, or who just wanted to chat. Although, of course, it is better to accept the "chat" than to insult the person, it is even more preferable in a project with very limited time to select experienced lawyers who can prevent themselves from being "railroaded" with sensitivity.

48. An interview process structured in this way may be useful for a preliminary gathering of information such as this, but further investigation requires teams with sufficient experience so that they can develop and follow their own leads.

49. Overall, the indirect approach was adequate for present purposes but is not recommended for in-depth investigation (see below, Part III Recommendations for further investigation).

D. Selection of witnesses

50. The Interviews Coordinator was charged with the identification, location and selection of witnesses.

51. A great deal of time was spent by the project team, in advance of the interviews, to explain the Commission’s mandate and the project in particular.
This allowed people the time to consider whether this was an opportunity not to be missed to contribute information and seek justice for victims of war crimes. Gratifyingly, a large number of people were prepared to do so.

52. As outlined above, the indirect approach to witnesses and working with contact persons such as government agencies, NGOs and Home Clubs was also of assistance in ensuring that some pre-selection of witnesses was possible. Working with intermediaries familiar with the present circumstances of the victim-witness and who could provide at least the most basic information, such as where the person originates from or where they were detained, meant that interviewees could be scheduled who were the most likely to have good quality information regarding rape, mass killings or torture.

53. The selection of witnesses involves delicate and difficult judgement-calls, particularly where a large number of potential interviewees are identified. For example, once a contact person informs the Commission of the identity and location of a witness and of their willingness to be interviewed, it is a very delicate matter to explain a "refusal" to interview that person. Great care was taken to explain to all contact persons, that not all potential interviewees could be reached given the project's limited time and resources. Witnesses were never promised an interview which did not materialize, and NGOs etc., were encouraged to continue their valuable work and to send information directly to the Tribunal.

54. All victims of, or witnesses to, rape or sexual assault who wished to be interviewed were interviewed without exception. These interviewees went through no selection process at all. Where the contact person was an NGO specialising in supporting female victims of rape, it was usual for the interview to be scheduled without prior indication from the contact person as to the information likely to be provided. Sometimes only the general location of the event was known, either for security reasons or because the contact person did not have details.

55. In reflection of this focus, at the request of some women's groups, several lawyers were made available for as long as requested, to carry out interviews which would be confirmed very late the night before the interview or, not infrequently, on the morning proposed. As the Coordinator of the interview schedule, I am particularly grateful for the flexibility and patience which the lawyers and interpreters showed in facilitating victim-witnesses in ways such as this.

56. During the entire interviewing process, the schedule remained as open as possible, with lawyers not booked up too far in advance, to allow for the slotting-in of potentially key witnesses who might choose to speak.

57. Interviewees were also selected if they were likely to be able to provide corroboration (at least in part) of rape allegations. This was particularly the case where rape allegations were made regarding a detention camp where men were also detained (see the example of Omarska given above at b), regarding the investigation of rape in the context in which it occurs.

58. In cases other than rape, interviews were scheduled where mass killings or mass torture were alleged (the latter invariably in the context of detention). A great deal of effort was invested by the Interviews Coordinator in trying to assess the quality of the information provided by the contact person, in order to assess the kind of information likely to be given in an interview in advance of scheduling. This selection process was almost completely dependent on the indications given by the contact person in advance of the interview. Many contact persons had a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the information possessed by a witness and most were non-lawyers
who had great difficulty distinguishing between hearsay and first-hand information.

59. In summary, the selection process adopted for this project is an effective method of selecting witnesses if two conditions are simultaneously fulfilled:

(a) If the person selecting the witnesses is sufficiently familiar with the pattern of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to know what kind of information to expect when a contact person suggests a witness from Dretelj camp, Zasavica village or who survived the Dalj massacre; 9/

(b) If the information provided by the contact person is in fact accurate. The "Preliminary Information from Contact Person/Interviewee" form was developed to record information known in advance of the interview concerning, in particular, the allegation the witness would make and what was known of their mental health before the interview. The form was also useful after the interview for comparing the information given by the contact person and the information the witness was in fact able to provide. Briefly, one of the disadvantages of relying on contact persons as the basis for selecting witnesses is that, in their enthusiasm, the contact person may exaggerate the extent of the witness' first-hand knowledge, or simply not understand the distinction between this type of information and hearsay.

60. These two conditions were not always simultaneously fulfilled and unfortunately, this is reflected in the high number of interviewees who provided primarily hearsay information. However, it should not be assumed that these interviews were not useful since frequently they provided valuable leads or eye-witnesses.

E. The trauma of victim-witnesses

61. Sixteen people from Bosnia and Herzegovina and seven people from Croatia who were interviewed were noted by the interviewer as showing obvious signs of distress. Despite this, some insisted that they wished to speak with the Commission and to testify before the International Criminal Tribunal if given the opportunity.

62. However, the number of victim-witnesses suffering post-traumatic stress was certainly higher than noted in the lawyers' reports. Appearances can be deceptive, and it is a common reaction among the various organisations and individuals interviewing victims of war crimes to express amazement at the "strength" of the interviewee. The "strength" may be an illusion, as was tragically confirmed by the suicide of a man who had chosen to speak with the Commission and to consider testifying before the Tribunal (see Part II, c) of this report regarding Kula Butmir camp, Sarajevo). 9/

63. In view of the danger of PTSD and its impact on witnesses the Plan of Action envisaged that the mental health team would have the following role:

(a) to liaise with their local mental health counterparts to assess what psycho-social support is available for any interviewee who wishes it (particularly those in private accommodation); to ensure that the possibility of stable and continuing support is made available to the interviewee after the project team is gone;

(b) to be available to the victim-witness before, during or after the interview at the request of the witness.
64. Although it was not possible to carry out the plan exactly as envisaged, the mental health team did play a positive role and, in some instances, their presence was important in cases where the witness was traumatised. The mental health team was particularly valuable in Split through their teamwork with the lawyers, helping in the identifications of witnesses and in making contact with their local colleagues who could provide follow-up services.

65. If future missions decide it is appropriate to have a mental health component, it may be worth considering tapping into local resources more than was the case for this project. They may be expected to have more direct knowledge of the traumas likely to be encountered. In addition, there are a number of non-local mental health specialists who have been working in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for some time who might be invited to contribute their experience to future teams.

F. Previous statements of a witness

66. In a number of cases it was learned that a witness had made prior statements. In some cases, such previous statements were made available to the Commission and are included in the dossiers, but they were not always received by the lawyer prior to the interview. Thus, clarifications of inconsistencies with previous statements were not always obtained in the interview. These statements were generally provided by the Medical Centre for Human Rights and the Croatian Information Centre (HIC). Sometimes, only the English translation of the Croatian original is given. It has been found that these translations are not always of the highest quality. In addition, an element of exaggeration may be found to have crept into the statement which was not present in the original, perhaps due to the audience targeted to read the English translation. Some witnesses indicated that they were not given the opportunity to read over or correct their statement given to the HIC.

67. Many victims of war crimes have had their stories published in the local or international press. These may or may not be accurate reflections of what the person experienced.

68. In these types of cases, the Commission's interview record may in fact be a prior consistent summary of the information the witness possesses.

69. However, although not provided to the Commission, several other contact persons have taken prior statements from at least some of the interviewees. This is the case with Trešnjevka Women's Group and with the associates of Catharine MacKinnon (a USA lawyer working with some of the local women's groups).

70. The interview records presented herewith are part of an information gathering exercise and are not intended as definitive statements by the interviewee. This will be readily apparent from the files. The record of the interview is a summary presented by the interviewer of their understanding of the translated information provided. These were not confirmed or corrected by the witnesses. Interviews were not recorded on audio or videotape, although it was considered in the planning stages of the mission. However, based on lengthy discussions with the legal team which has experience with these issues, on the concern expressed by the Acting Prosecutor of the International Tribunal and on the fact that some contact persons would have requested copies, it was decided that interviews would be neither video nor audio taped.

71. On 11 February 1994 the President of the Tribunal published a
preliminary indication of its rules of procedure and evidence. This was
fortuitously published in advance of the commencement of the interviews
process and allowed the procedure of the project to take them fully into
account.

72. In light of the above, the interview records are not intended as
definitive statements.

G. Problems with interviewing people who have already
given statements available to the Commission

73. It is the view of the Investigation Coordinator that people who had
already given statements which had become available to the Commission should
not be interviewed again. However, there was no workable method of
ascertaining, prior to the commitment to interview:

(a) whether or not a statement had been made;

(b) nor of checking whether it had already been received by the
Commission; and if so,

(c) whether it was sufficiently detailed to be useful in the process
of gathering information for prosecutions; and if not

(d) whether a copy of the statement would be made available by the
witness (if they possessed one) or by the contact person.

74. Where interviewees have already given statements to another body, it is
possible that some of these statements have already been made available to
the Commission of Experts. It has not been possible to determine the extent
of this in reality given that the earlier statement may have been given
anonymously—as have some of the present interviews. In any event, a note of
cautions is sounded to those seeing corroboration where there is more than one
statement—it may be from the same person.

75. For future investigations, while it is important not to duplicate
effort, and it is extremely important to be aware of what information is
already available, it is also important to be aware of the limits of what has
been done. Large amounts of documentation and other material have been
produced concerning violations of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia, by innumerable sources. In order to use the information
effectively, a reasoned assessment of the information available concerning any
particular case should be made by lawyers working with the International
Tribunal based, inter alia, on knowledge of the source's methods in gathering
the information.

H. Security procedures

76. In the context of ongoing conflicts, it is hardly surprising that the
most widespread concern among contact persons and interviewees is for the
safety of victim-witnesses and their families who may remain in conflict
areas.

77. The security of victim-witnesses and their families was a fundamental
concern of this project. Interviews were carried out in as flexible a manner
as possible to meet the wishes of the victim-witness. This included
conducting interviews at secret locations in cases where the interviewee felt
it necessary to do so.
78. While 20 interviewees from Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed concern for their safety and that of their relatives (many of whom are still in areas of conflict), as did eight interviewees from Croatia, it is likely that many other interviewees implicitly share this concern. Their agreement to testify before the Tribunal will be conditional upon these concerns being met.

79. The only security measure possible, at this stage of preliminary information gathering, was the option of anonymity and tight data protection. Many witnesses chose this course, but by no means all did. For this reason interview notes etc., were kept on the person of the lawyer who carried out the interview or in the safe at the Commission’s Zagreb office until the typed-up interview records were definitively handed over to the Interviews Coordinator by the lawyer. It goes without saying that hotel rooms are not safe places for sensitive documentation.

80. On receipt of the completed files all indications of the identity of the interviewee were deleted. Not all interviewees specified that they wished to remain anonymous, but the consequences of information falling into the wrong hands are such that all efforts to protect victims and witnesses must be taken. In some cases the interviewee preferred to use his/her name. One victim of rape, a key witness, has long since decided that a public stance is her best means of protection from reprisal. Another interviewee provided the Commission with a copy of the records of the Belgrade Military Court which convicted him of war crimes. He agreed to its remaining in his file although it is impossible to use it without identifying him.

81. By contrast, for some witnesses it was a condition of the interview that there be anonymity from the outset.

82. The need to ensure, as far as possible, that these victim-witnesses may be contacted again should the Prosecutor wish to do so had to be reconciled with this need for anonymity to protect witnesses. In all cases where people wished to be re-contacted, a third party has been agreed to be the contact person for that witness. They agree to stay in touch with each other for the coming years so that the Prosecutor could, once again, find the witness (if the witness still agrees to be found). At the beginning of April the contact persons were informed by letter of the relevant codes of the Commission’s interviews for future reference.

83. In addition, a master list has been prepared which relates the identifying information for interviewees to the code which we have allocated to their file. This list is presented under separate cover, should be carefully protected and should never be located with the files themselves.

84. While the security system that was used for this project served our purposes, those planning future missions should give thought to more permanent arrangements for the protection of documentation.

I. Conclusions

85. In sum, the broad approach to allegations, placing rape in the context in which it occurs, was a particularly successful approach and is recommended for future use. The indirect approach to victim-witnesses is helpful in protecting the privacy of victims and for the selection of witnesses, but only if two conditions are fulfilled. The indirect approach is necessary when a large-scale interview process is involved, but as an interviews-based approach, is not recommended. The indirect approach should be used on a case-by-case basis where contacting a potential source of information is particularly sensitive.
86. Overall, while imperfect, the methods adopted appear to have met the needs of the Commission’s project—as evidenced by the fact that a large number of interviews were carried out and a number of key witnesses were identified for the consideration of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.

III. GENERAL COMMENTS REGARDING THE SUBSTANCE

87. The interviews are presented in 16 binders, clustered according to the area related to the allegations. Detailed analysis remains to be done regarding the interviews carried out. Reference should be made to the final report of the Commission of Experts which presents some of the illustrations of the five general patterns of rape (or sexual assault) drawn from the analysis of hundreds of rape (or sexual assault) allegations contained in the Commission’s database.

88. The broad approach to investigating rape, torture and mass killings is discussed above (I B). The information gathered in this series of interviews should be integrated into the area of the Commission's work to which it is most closely related. For example, a great deal of information regarding detention camps and mass executions (particularly the Dalj and Lovas massacres) has been gathered. Information relating to Prijedor should form part of a coherent whole by integrating the information which was gathered here into the Prijedor Project.

89. This section contains some general remarks regarding the substance of the interviews conducted. Reference is made below to "key" witnesses. By this term is meant that the interviewer and the Interviews Coordinator have assessed that this witness has not only seen or experienced a great deal, but that the witness also has the emotional strength and clarity of presentation to play a pivotal role in a prosecution case.

90. Of the 223 interviews conducted, 143 related to alleged war crimes in BiH. Of these, 79 interviewees were women and 66 were men. Approximately 100 were Muslim; 37 were Croats; one was a Serb.

91. Among the 79 women in the group from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19 had been raped in their own homes and 13 raped in the context of detention. A group of 17 men and women had been eye-witnesses to rape of sexual assault. Several of these people have been assessed as key witnesses.

A. Western Bosnia and Herzegovina

92. All allegations in this section are made against Serb forces.

1. Keraterm/Omarska/Manjača/Trnopolje

93. As outlined above in the discussion of methodology, no prior selection of places of allegation was conveyed to contact persons.

94. However, given that interviews were conducted in Croatia and the flow of refugees from Western BiH went mainly to Croatia or transited through Croatia, a considerable number of interviewees are from western Bosnia and Herzegovina, and particularly north-western areas. This information should complement the detailed study of the Prijedor area being conducted by Commissioner Greve.

95. Thirty-eight ex-detainees from the major detention camps of the Prijedor
area were interviewed. Many of the interviewees had been detained in more than one or all of these camps. For the purposes of analysis, the main place of allegation (most serious or most detailed allegations, or longest period of detention) is used. Thus the breakdown according to the main camp of allegation is: 15 witnesses from Omarska; three from Manjača; seven from Keraterm; and 13 from Trnopolje.

96. A number of victim-witnesses from Omarska were interviewed and all of the female victims had been raped. Most of the witnesses had seen deaths by torture and seven are witnesses to, or survivors of, mass executions.

97. One of the victim-witnesses from Manjača and two others from Keraterm saw guards forcing prisoners to perform fellatio on each other (two brothers were the victims in one case) or on the guard. Four of those interviewed appear to be survivors of the "Room 3" massacre. The lawyers who carried out the interviews have assessed four of the witnesses from Keraterm as key witnesses.

98. Among the victim-witnesses from Trnopolje camp, one was a victim of rape. Four other women saw women being taken out of the room for rape. One witness saw a woman shot in the room for resisting being taken out.

99. Some of the men from this series of camps were also transferred to the Old Hospital in Knin (usually for exchange) and they corroborate information given by interviewees who had Knin as the main place of allegation. This particularly the case regarding civilians being allowed to enter the prison to beat detainees. Others were transferred to Batkovići where they corroborate reports of very high casualties forced to work on the front lines (usually digging trenches). In one case, three men survived out of a work-group of 40.

2. Kotor Varoš

100. Nineteen women from Kotor Varoš were interviewed. Six were raped, most often gang-raped by guards, in the saw mill there. The victims from the saw mill were interviewed through three different contact persons: a local women's group; a non-local, non-governmental individual; and a local psychiatrist. There appears to be excellent cross-corroboration between the stories, and some of the women were almost certainly at the mill at the same time, although there is some confusion with dates.

101. One victim-witness was 8 months pregnant at the time of the rapes. The first rapist said he wanted to try a Muslim woman while the second told her she should be honoured by what the Serbs had done to her.

102. Another soldier said he would make Četnik babies in Muslim and Croat women. This victim became pregnant and had an abortion as a result of the two rapes.

103. In a third case, the soldier who raped her told the witness he had been ordered to do so. The witness was assessed as highly credible, but may not wish to testify.

104. Seven other women interviewed saw up to 50 to 60 women and young girls chosen by flashlight and taken out at night. The women and young girls were taken there from the surrounding areas and their detention in large numbers (one estimate is 500) was generally very short—sometimes one night. Then the women and children detained would be sent to Travnik on convoys of buses. Few of these women can identify perpetrators. However, this is an example of how sources of information other than the victim-witness may be applied to the
question of who was responsible for the organized traffic of women through the saw mill and by bus to Travnik via Vlaši, etc.

105. One woman was detained by her neighbour near her village for six months. She was raped almost daily by three or four soldiers. She was told she would give birth to a Četnik boy who would kill Muslims. The soldiers repeatedly said their President had ordered them to do this.

106. Four of the women from Kotor Varoš had been raped in their own homes. In two other interviews, the interviewer suspected that the witness had herself been raped although she preferred not to speak of her own experience. One of the women, a Croat, raped in her home, gave evidence against the rapist in court and was told he had received a prison sentence.

107. Seven of the women interviewed had seen others taken out for rape in the saw mill or had met victims immediately after they were raped elsewhere.

3. Banja Luka/Kozarac

108. Thirty-four people (17 women and 17 men) from the Banja Luka and Kozarac areas were interviewed. Five of the women interviewed had been raped or sexually assaulted in their own homes, including a young girl who was raped while one of her relatives was cut so badly that he later died from his wounds. Two others witnessed sexual assaults outside the detention context. Three other persons were particularly well-placed and described in some detail the general atmosphere and events in the area. One man had been slashed with a knife all over his body by masked men in his own home. The atmosphere of terror in Banja Luka until the present time is vividly evoked.

B. Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina

109. All allegations in this section are made against Serb forces.

110. Twenty-six witnesses were interviewed from areas such as Zvornik, Doboj, Modriča, Goražde, Bosanski Šamac, Poča and Brčko. Fifteen of these are women. One of the men may be an important witness to mass killing and torture (including deaths by torture) at Partizan Stadium, Poča. One of the guards played Russian roulette with the witness and two others, who were shot before the witness' turn.

111. One woman was detained in a private house with a number of other women for six months (lack of detail is for the protection of the victim-witness). All the women would be raped when soldiers returned from the front line every 15 days. The witness was told that the women had to do this because the women in another camp (which the witness names and which has been documented by other information gatherers) were exhausted. This witness gives excellent leads for further investigation but is very traumatised herself.

112. Another woman was repeatedly raped by soldiers in a private house in Bijeljina over two days; two women were raped in private homes in Doboj. The cases in Doboj, and the women raped in private homes in Kotor Varoš, illustrate the difficulties involved in trying to prosecute for rape outside the detention camp context. The victims can usually give very little identifying information about perpetrators. The event is so shocking that the victim has no time to reflect on anything, such as physical descriptions. One woman witnessed the rape and murder of her mother in their home.
113. Another victim-witness is able to identify the six soldiers who raped her in her own home because they were all her neighbours.

114. From the area of Modrića there are references in three interviews to the village of Zasavica, which may have been used as a detention centre for women. Information is mainly hearsay regarding allegations of sexual assault there. A third interviewee, a potentially important witness, gave a list of 26 men who are alleged to run that detention camp.

C. Other areas of BiH

115. A key witness was detained with his family in Kula Butmir, Sarajevo. He was forced to watch while groups of guards raped and sadistically tortured his wife and two daughters (aged eight and 13 years old). This occurred daily until on the fourth day the younger daughter’s throat was cut in front of him. The witness was chained at the legs and guards beat him to force him to watch, breaking both his legs. On the sixth day his elder daughter's throat was cut. His wife survived until the 13 day, when her throat was cut. The man committed suicide by hanging himself on 7 April 1994.

116. One victim-witness saw an elderly woman and others raped in front of a group of 100 detained villagers on Ozren mountain, in the area of Derventa. The witness was herself threatened with rape and she saw a number of men from the group having their throats cut. Another victim-witness from Kljuć names the two soldiers who raped her in their own home.

1. Croat Perpetrators

117. The following allegations are made against Croat forces. All the victims of Croat forces who were interviewed are Muslim, with one exception. A Serb woman who was interviewed was raped by a Croat soldier in her home near Capljina in October 1993.

118. Two other women were taken from their house and raped by two Muslim and two Croat soldiers in a cafe. One of the witnesses became pregnant and had an abortion.

119. A young Muslim woman was taken from her home to a house full of HVO soldiers where she was raped five or six times. The first rapist said he was doing this because she is Muslim.

120. One woman was detained and taken 1km from the prison to be raped by four guards while others looked on and encouraged them.

121. A boy was interviewed by one of the lawyers who has specialised in prosecuting child abuse cases. The boy was detained for a total of four months, including three months at the Heliodrome in Mostar. At an earlier place of detention, the boy was himself beaten and saw others die after beatings. The boy was forced to bite the ear off a man who died the next day, and was used as forced labour on the front lines. This information is strongly corroborated and amplified by a key witness who was detained in the same two camps at around the same times. Six other interviews were also conducted with ex-detainees from the Heliodrome in Mostar.

2. Muslim Perpetrators

122. The following allegations are made against Muslim forces.
123. In Bihać, a Muslim woman was raped by a soldier from the Fifth Corps as she tried to cross the front line to reach Mr. Abdić's forces.

124. Two ex-HVO Croat soldiers were interviewed. One was detained at Musala Konjic where 300 prisoners were detained. The witness (and others) were forced to perform fellatio on the guards or on each other. Prisoners' pubic hair was set on fire. This may be a key witness.

D. Croatia

125. The following allegations are made against Serb forces.

1. Knin area

126. Fifteen Croat witnesses were interviewed from the Knin area. All 12 of the men had been detained at the Old Hospital there. One witness, who was detained in five different places over a period of 14 months, told of suffering electric shocks to the scrotum at the Old Hospital and of seeing a father and son who shared his cell forced by guards to perform oral and anal sex with each other.

127. Two other witnesses overheard other prisoners being forced to perform fellatio on each other. One witness was ordered to do this but managed to refuse.

128. Another witness suffered a mock execution, an elaborate hoax which built up over three days, another suffered a mock throat cutting. Most of the witnesses corroborate the allegation that civilians from outside the prison were allowed inside to beat prisoners. One witness describes it as "like a zoo" and small children and women would come in and be encouraged to beat the prisoners while the guards held guns on them.

129. Of the three women who were interviewed from the Knin area, two are in their sixties. Two of the women were raped in their own homes and the third woman suffered an attempted rape (in her own home) and survived being shot in the head during the attack. The perpetrators all cursed "Ustašis" during the attacks.

2. Sremska Mitrovica/Stajićevo/Begejci

130. With the Old Hospital in Knin, these three camps were apparently the main ones for Croats captured around the Vukovar area. They were linked in much the same way as the four main camps in the Prijedor area, and some prisoners were detained in more than one of them. Other links in the chain of camps where some of the victim-witnesses were transferred, were prisons in Belgrade and Niš in Serbia. The common refrain throughout all the camps is of continued severe beatings.

131. One woman who was detained in a camp was forced to perform fellatio on a guard all night, every night. Other women were there but the witness was apparently the only one tortured in this way. One man was kicked in the testicles 40 times a day to "prevent him from making another Ustaša". Prisoners were forced to beat each other and the witness saw an 80-year old man and four others die from beatings. Another witness has studied the camp since his release and may be regarded as an expert on that particular camp.

132. An officer in the Croatian army who surrendered his unit on the fall of
Vukovar saw the execution of a large number of his men after surrender. He knows the location of the mass grave and should recognise the perpetrators. He was detained and beaten “almost to death.” He was also given electric shocks to the genitals and is now impotent. In a second camp he saw the rape of six women. Another interviewee tells of witnessing the rape of a woman by five guards in the same place of detention. The women were also sexually abused by female guards.

133. Another witness was detained in Stajićevo, an open warehouse, in minus 10 to 13 degrees. He saw seven or eight prisoners beaten to death days before the visit of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

134. Eight men were interviewed whose main place of allegation was one of the detention camps. Their periods of detention were commonly around six months. One of these witnesses had seen a man castrated. In one case the contact person had informed the interviewer that the man was sexually assaulted, but the witness had denied this in the interview. General conditions included very regular beatings and torture such as mock executions or being forced to eat a bowl of salt.

135. One of the victim-witnesses who was detained in a certain camp (detail omitted for protection of witness) was a religious leader who was beaten in front of other detainees and who saw men beaten to death with a special implement (nails sticking out of a board). Other prisoners were forced to lick the blood off another's body. Prisoners were apparently beaten according to a list.

3. Vukovar area

136. Ten people were interviewed from the Vukovar area (excluding those relating to the massacres in the section below).

137. One woman was gang raped by eight men in her own home, in front of her sister and her daughter. One of the soldiers was forced at gunpoint to rape her because "she was an Ustaša." The witness reported the rape to the authorities who said they could do nothing because of her ethnicity. Seven of the perpetrators were apparently questioned at the prison but released after three days. A 67 year old woman from Vukovar survived being raped in her own home on two successive nights and being shot in the head by the perpetrator.

138. Another woman was detained with several thousand others at Velepromet. She was beaten unconscious and her seven year old daughter taken away (still missing). While at Sajmište brickyard (during half an hour), she saw three executions and a pit with about 1,800 bodies in it. She also witnessed the public gang rape of a woman who was an army sniper. Another witness tells of overhearing a castration while in detention.

139. One man tells of seeing Arkan in his village ordering soldiers to beat the prisoners in the genitals.

140. One woman's home was taken over by neighbours and used as a detention centre for interrogations over several months. She was raped almost daily and beaten for several months; two other women were raped there too. She saw several killings and torture. With preparation, this could be a very important witness.
4. Other areas of Croatia

141. While in detention, a witness relates how men were forced to perform oral sex on each other. One incident involved prisoners lined up naked while Serb women from outside undressed in front of them. If any prisoner had an erection, his penis was cut off. The witness saw a named Serb woman thus castrate a prisoner.

E. Mass executions

142. Among the mass killings information received, there are allegations of a massacre in November 1991 (detail omitted for protection of witnesses) where soldiers divided their victims into groups and chose a method of execution for each group: the witness saw a woman being de-capitated, nine people executed with a chainsaw, seven by machine-gun, and six by slitting their throats.

143. Seven people were interviewed from Lovaš. A group of 60 men were forced to hold hands and cross a minefield. Ten men were killed by mines and a further 10 were shot in the back. The men give many leads for other (and possibly better) witnesses.

F. Factors in assessing the interviews

144. From the 143 interviewees with allegations relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 were assessed as offering only hearsay in the interview; 48 were assessed as having very limited information. This is about one third of those interviewed. However, this process of sorting out the chaff from the wheat is inevitable and the project yielded a number of key witnesses who may be considered by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal.

145. Very few of the 223 interviewees were regarded by their interviewer as incredible. The vast majority of victim-witnesses were highly credible. However, the following factors might be considered useful in assessing interview records:

   (a) Even assuming the best intentions in the world, most refugees have nothing to do all day but re-live and re-tell their experiences (although some are too traumatised for this). This is so common that children have been traumatised by the conversations of the adults around them. It may be expected that these conversations involve comparisons of suffering with the danger of embroidery in the telling. "Mission fatigue" and over-interviewing of victims carry their own dangers of distortion. This is particularly so as the majority of recorded rapes seem to have been carried out in summer and autumn of 1992, about 13 months ago.

   (b) The witness selection process (above) encourages NGOs and governments, etc. to help identify potential victims and to encourage them to give testimony. Again, even assuming the best intentions in the world, the encouragement to testify could take the form of: "You may be able to help them prove that it was systematic" and lead over-keen witnesses to add elements to prove "policy" that were not in fact the witness' real experience; or to add elements of someone else's experience to their own. Rumour, misinformation and propaganda are rife and readily believed.

   (c) The question of rape, systematic or otherwise, is a highly charged political issue. Some of the organisations working with victims are not independent of their governments or have a political agenda which colours their view of the truth.
(d) In addition to political reasons, there are other powerful incentives for distortion or exaggeration. Groups working with victims are justifiably outraged at their suffering. Furthermore, NGOs working with victims have one thing in common, whether in the former Yugoslavia or in third asylum states: shortage of funds. It is simply in the interests of these groups to maintain public outrage and pressure for those they are trying to help. The Interviews Coordinator was told by a rape victim that she had added other names to a list of women who were raped with her in order that they could also get funding through international NGOs. These women had also suffered enormously and she understandably wished to help them.

(e) Interviews were conducted by an Interviews Coordinator and a team of lawyers who did not have the opportunity of a detailed briefing from the Prosecutor regarding his intended approach as well as his and, (if it is known) the judges’ views on the interpretation of the Statute of the Tribunal, particularly regarding the elements which have to be proven to constitute a Crime against Humanity or a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. The interviews were almost certainly less effective without this kind of detailed guidance.

(f) Complex legal issues are raised by the situation of several of the witnesses who were themselves tried and convicted by military courts for war crimes during the war in Croatia. Court documents were provided by one man and are included in the file. Some of these convictions were apparently based on confessions extracted under torture in detention. Before serving their sentences, these prisoners were exchanged. Some of the men involved would make very good witnesses but clarification of how these convictions would impact their potential as witnesses, if at all, would appear to be necessary.

(g) Interviews were conducted by highly qualified professionals but their lack of long-term familiarity with the patterns of violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia meant that requisite detail was not always obtained in the interview.

146. Given the circumstances outlined above, the interviews carried out in this project should be built upon in further investigations.

147. For future investigations, the Prosecutor has some control over some of these factors and can minimise their damaging effects by his decisions, particularly b), e) and f) above. Some of the recommendations below may assist.

G. Conclusions which may be drawn

148. The information being gathered by states hosting refugees (other than Slovenia and Croatia) must be evaluated together with these interview records, as must all other information already received by the Commission.

149. The interviews have highlighted areas where further investigation is needed for the identified potential prosecution cases.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

A. Ratione materiae

150. A detailed analysis of camps and the relationships between them as well as an in-depth investigation of priority cases in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina should be considered, for the reasons set out in the following
paragraphs.

151. An enormous quantity of information has been gathered regarding violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, but it is of very uneven probative value.

152. In view of the urgent need to move towards evidence of high probative value, the International Criminal Tribunal may wish to concentrate its (limited) resources on priority cases for investigation in different areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In view of the problems of evidence which arise regarding those raped outside a detention context, it is suggested that priority be placed on investigating allegations of rape in detentions. Unless a great deal of investigative resources are invested it is unlikely that rapes outside the detention camp context will, of themselves, reach the threshold of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or Crimes against Humanity, as required to bring the cases within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. The links between these cases in different regions may then be examined to assess whether there has been a policy to commit rape or other crimes or a policy of omission which goes beyond the local level.

153. It is regarded as important to analyse the links between camps for tracing superior responsibility beyond the immediate camp manager. This strengthens the investigation of rape cases and other crimes committed in, or in connection with, the camps by investigating their role in "ethnic cleansing." With this in mind, ex-detainees from camps where no women were held have been interviewed as part of this project. For example, the major detention camps of the Prijedor area: Keraterm, Trnopolje, Omarska and Manjača must be seen as links in a chain. Some people were detained in all four camps. In addition, prisoners from these camps have been transferred to Knin and later to places in eastern BiH, such as Bijeljina and Batković, where many spent a year or more in detention. There are many such chains of camps which also formed clear patterns during the war in Croatia. This was the case with places of detention such as Velepromet (Vukovar), Sremaska Mitrovica, Stajićevo, Begejci and sometimes Belgrade military prison.

154. An interesting line of inquiry might examine whether each of the camps in the chain had different functions vis-à-vis the other camps. It may be possible to show that these camps and the treatment meted out to prisoners in them formed a coherent whole, raising possibilities of superior responsibility, at least by omission.

155. This aspect of the organisation of "ethnic cleansing" would undoubtedly reward further analysis by those seeking to trace command responsibility.

156. As will be seen from a glance at the Summary Sheets in sections H and I of this dossier, transfers of prisoners were frequent and often large-scale, involving perhaps hundreds of prisoners and convoys of buses. In general terms, it seems that prisoners were transferred when a camp became too overcrowded or when new arrivals of prisoners were expected. A study of the camps as links in a chain could also trace how prisoners are alleged to have been executed or transferred in advance of an ICRC visit or were hidden from such visitors. This may, or may not, reveal knowledge possessed by superiors of atrocities occurring in camps.

157. Many detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina were "local" camps. They were or are local in the sense that people from the immediate surroundings were rounded up and detained there, and because those running the camp were generally from these same localities. Victim-witnesses are not just able to identify perpetrators from photographs, but they are also able to provide full names and personal biographies of the perpetrators. In some cases, video and
photograph material, as well as books and articles, exist concerning detention camps.

158. Relatively high quality information has been gathered about the North West of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The present investigation has contributed to this through the 38 interviews conducted with ex-detainees from the four main camps in the Prijedor area, as well as other interviews with people from other parts of the north-west. The main reason for the high quality of information available is the direction of the flow of refugees from this area. People fleeing North West Bosnia and Herzegovina generally transited through Croatia or remain there now. On arrival they were met by a large number of fact-finders and journalists who interviewed them and documented their stories. In particular, ex-detainees were speedily re-settled through Karlovac transit camp in Croatia to third states by the UNHCR. In these host states there have been various initiatives to document their stories, for example, the interviews which Medecins Sans Frontieres carried out with the ex-detainees and their families from the Kozarac area who had been resettled in France (involving hundreds of people).

159. By contrast, information regarding detention camps in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina is relatively poor, in both quality and quantity. The pattern of the conflicts in the east meant that large numbers of people were displaced towards central Bosnia and Herzegovina (Tuzla pocket, Ženica) and the enclaves (now particularly Srebrenica and Goražde). In these areas, displaced people continue to live in emergency mode, with supplies of food still precarious and with intense fighting occasionally flaring (as is presently the case in Goražde).

160. Others forced to leave their homes in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina travelled through Serbia or Montenegro and found their way to perhaps Hungary, the Czech Republic or Slovakia.

161. Neither of these two broad flows of displaced people or refugees from east Bosnia and Herzegovina were met by the battery of international journalists and fact-finders that greeted refugees from north-west BiH in Croatia. In the Government-held areas of BiH, the State institutions (including war crimes commissions) and some providers of psycho-social support have been working under extremely difficult conditions to document the experiences of rape victims. They often lack the most basic tools for their work, such as paper, computer diskettes, electricity, fuel for cars in order to travel to victims, etc.

162. Even though the information regarding the east is relatively poor, it must be used as a basis from which to start and future missions should be familiar with what has been done. Priorities for additional investigation are identifiable.

163. The section below, ratione loci, presents a rough guide to where people from areas with a high concentration of rape allegations can now be found.

B. Ratione loci

164. The following are some broad indications of where displaced persons from eastern BiH can be found. There are large concentrations of victim-witnesses in some of the places who have never been interviewed:

165. In Tuzla there are people from Bratunac, Cerska, Konjević Polje, Žvornik, Bijeljina, Bosanski Šamac, Janja. Many from Poča, Višegrad and Čajniče and Eastern Herzegovina (Ljubinje, Gacko, Trebinje, Bileća, Nevesinje)
went through Sandžak and onward to Turkey (mainly Istanbul, İzmir and Bursa). Goražde hosts many displaced people from the Drina area, particularly Poča, Višegrad, Čajniče, Ustikolina, Ustipraža. Orašje received many people from Bosanski Šamac. In Gornji Rahišić there is a very large population of persons displaced from the town of Brčko and the Posavina corridor area, just across the front line. There are indications that the number of rape victims still in the area of Gornji Rahišić and surrounds is in the hundreds.

166. For mainly western Bosnia and Herzegovina, an important source of displaced persons is the Bihać pocket (in Bihać and Cazin), where there are many people from Prijedor, Kozarac, Sanica, Kijevci, Bosanski Novi, Sanski Most, Bosanska Krupa. These people tended to leave via Travnik or Bosanska Gradiška and a large number of people from these areas are now in Germany, Austria (Graz) and in the Gapčikovo camp on the Danube, on the border between Hungary and Slovakia. More Prijedor and Kozarac refugees who had remained in Croatia have now left for Norway and Sweden.

167. Of all these locations, the only two which present security problems at the time of writing (12 April 1994) are Goražde and some parts of the Bihać pocket.

C. Ratione personae

168. The lawyers involved in phase I of the Commission's project were highly-qualified professionals for whom everyone involved had a great deal of respect and who were a real pleasure to work with. However, their familiarity with the allegations of war crimes from particular areas was limited, a familiarity which can only come with time. The result is, as is apparent on the face of a number of interview records, that potentially important details were not obtained in the interview because the lawyer did not realise the significance of what she was hearing.

169. Investigators for future missions should preferably be deeply familiar with the missions carried out on the subject previously—the actors involved, the politico-military context in which the rapes occurred—as well as the politico-military context in which the investigation is being carried out. It would be most beneficial if the lawyers involved in the preparation of a case were themselves active in the investigation process. This would greatly enhance a prosecutor's ability to argue points of detail.

170. The number and range of potential sources of information should not be underestimated. The list of contacts included in this dossier should be of use to the Prosecutor but it is by no means complete. In order to use that list effectively, the user must be familiar with the reality behind the names and telephone numbers. It cannot be emphasised enough that the investigators must know who to ask for what information, whether it is a sensitive question and whether the answer is likely to be reliable.

171. Relevant international actors include the UN Centre for Human Rights, ECMM, ICRC and UNPROFOR. However, the most detailed knowledge is, not surprisingly, to be found with local contacts. In these cases the personality and advance preparation of the investigator are crucial. Local contacts like to know a person before they will open up with what may be sensitive information. An afternoon drinking Loza (a strong local spirit) and coffee is a method commonly used for this. An informal and personal approach to Home Clubs, for example, will open more doors than a more official style. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, many refugees in Croatia feel vulnerable and for some, authority remains a source of fear.
172. In the experience of the Interviews Coordinator, the most important element in this confidence building is being able to converse easily on the minutiae of the conflict in the area where the new contact comes from. This is also true when the problems in carrying out investigations in the former Yugoslavia (mentioned in the opening paragraphs to Part I on methodology, above) are recalled. The cynicism mentioned there could be very easily increased, as ignorance on the part of an investigator would not inspire confidence either in themselves or in the International Criminal Tribunal.

173. Investigative work for the International Tribunal will involve personal risk to investigators from the parties opposed to the work of the Tribunal. This is particularly the case for those who will work in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, whether before or after peace settlements. A certain amount of risk is inherent in the nature of the work, but it is greatly increased if personnel inexperienced in the complex peculiarities of the former Yugoslavia are used for field work. This point was very simply put19/ by the Chief of the UNPROFOR Military Observers: "If you say the wrong thing, in the wrong place, at the wrong time--you're dead."

D. Rationale temporis

174. Future investigations should be carried out by teams of lawyers and interpreters on a long-term, low-key basis, with an emphasis on work in Bosnia and Herzegovina and key asylum states.

175. Several months should be available for following up on leads which would be created and cultivated by the teams wherever necessary. Flexibility regarding travel arrangements would be essential.

176. In seeking to prove responsibility of superiors by omission, it is suggested that an important element in investigations should be the length of the period over which violations continued to occur. For camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a close study of the ICRC's access to camps would probably yield interesting results. This information is among that which the ICRC is willing to publish. A study could look at: the dates of commencement of registration of detainees in a particular camp, the frequency of following visits, obstacles put in the way, the procedure used by the organization to negotiate access, who had the power of decision in any particular case, and how they exercised this power. Power implies responsibility.

E. Implementing these recommendations

177. The approach of a large-scale interview process does not have the inherent flexibility necessary to carry out an investigation on a vertical, case-focused basis necessary for founding prosecutions. 20/

178. Small investigation teams consisting of a lawyer and an interpreter should specialise in investigating specific areas where the focus cases occurred. These teams should remain small, highly mobile and have the flexibility to pursue leads wherever they may be or whatever form they may take. This will involve extensive low-key work building relations of trust with victims and contact persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere. The merits of gathering information through simply talking to people on the ground should not be underestimated. In the context of rape, the best information is often received on the basis of personal endorsement of the interviewer by an intermediary (usually a person or organisation providing psycho-social support) close to the victim.
179. The discussion in Part I above regarding selection of witnesses might suggest the conclusion that better ways should be found to assess, in advance, the information likely to be provided in an interview. However, in practice, this will rarely be possible. The investigation should therefore not be approached from the perspective of the interview, but of meeting and talking with contact persons. The question of an interview should not even be raised until it emerges from informal conversation that the person involved possesses the kind of first-hand information needed for the investigation.

180. Close co-operation between the investigators and the Witnesses and Victims Unit 21 of the International Tribunal would be essential to allay the fears of, and provide support to, would-be witnesses.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

183. The interviews should be seen as a beginning. It takes time for people to be convinced that the process of prosecuting war criminals is really taking shape and for people to consider coming forward to provide information. It also takes time and commitment to create the atmosphere of trust necessary to enable them to do so. The project team invested a great deal of time and energy in this. As the interview process was coming to an end after only three weeks, it became clear that the project was snow-balling. More and more people were hearing about the interviews, seeing that it was a reality and that it was working well. More and more people approached the teams in Rijeka, Split, Osijek and Zagreb to contribute to the process.

184. However, the time limit on the project meant that not all those who decided to speak could be interviewed. A very positive beginning has been made which the International Criminal Tribunal may build on.

185. The process of raising awareness of the possibility of giving information for prosecutions of individual war criminals has begun and has reached a wide audience through the government, NGO, refugee and displaced person's communities. The message was clearly received and understood in view of the number of people approaching the team in the final stage of the interviews. This alone may be expected to benefit the prosecution process enormously.

186. One of the most important aspects of the project has been creating an atmosphere of trust and respect for the victim-witness. Many interviewees
conveyed to the teams that they felt they and their suffering had been acknowledged by having it recorded by the United Nations, regardless of whether they are called to testify.

187. Every individual and organisation which was contacted by the project team received a letter thanking them for their support and encouraging them to continue the work of gathering information by addressing themselves directly to the Tribunal. The address, telephone and fax number at the Hague was drawn to their attention. Those wishing to speak must not feel that they have missed the only opportunity they will have to make themselves heard.

188. The project has encouraged witnesses to consider the Tribunal as a real possibility. This is no small achievement considering that a great deal of doubt has been cast on the effective functioning of the Tribunal.

189. The majority of victims and witnesses interviewed were willing to be contacted later by the Prosecutor and would consider testifying before the Tribunal. A significant number of the interviews conducted should provide the basis for possible prosecutions.

190. The interviews have also highlighted areas where further investigation is needed. Some of the project's local contact persons say that they now understand the importance of direct information, as opposed to hearsay. This has been a learning process for all involved.

191. Despite the scale of the suffering, many people still have the capacity to trust and to hope that something may really be done to bring perpetrators to justice. This is a sign of hope for the future and for reconciliation. The hope represented by these 223 interviews involves a responsibility to build on their information and to ensure that the Tribunal is successful in bringing justice to victims of war crimes.
Appendix I

PLAN OF ACTION

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

192. The Commission of Experts was established by the Security Council in October 1992 to obtain and analyse information on violations of International Humanitarian Law in the former Yugoslavia. The following is a brief summary of the Plan of Action, as approved by the Commission of Experts at its Ninth Session during its meeting of 15 December 1993.

193. Through this Plan of Action, the Commission intends to gather evidence and to report its findings through the Secretary-General to the Security Council in accordance with its mandate. The primary goal is to produce specific evidence for the report of the Commission which may also be used for prosecutions and to identify possible patterns and policies.

194. The investigation will encompass violations of international humanitarian law against the person including extrajudicial executions, torture and other violations of international humanitarian law particularly in detention camps. Special emphasis will be given to allegations of sexual assault.

195. A more precise focus will be on the region of Prijedor-Banja Luka, Foča, Brčko, Doboj [the "Prijedor component"]. This Plan will be developed later.

196. Phase I of the investigation will take place from January to March 1994 in the former Yugoslavia. During that period, teams of interviewers will travel from their base in Zagreb to wherever witnesses and victims may wish to testify. It is fundamental to the work of the Commission that it welcomes testimony from any person, whether man or woman and regardless of their ethnic origin. Interviews in Phase I will be conducted in Croatia (including the UNPAs), Slovenia, and FRY (Serbia and Montenegro). For reasons of security of witnesses, interviews will not be carried out in BiH at this stage.

197. It is envisaged that Phase II will involve interviews in asylum countries (other than those of the former Yugoslavia) later in 1994. The Commission is in contact with 15 such host states in the hope that their refugee communities may also have the opportunity to give their testimony to the Commission. It may be that some elements of Phase II will be conducted in parallel to Phase I, if states request that interview teams be sent earlier (such as is the case with Turkey). Interviewers for Phase II will be selected from those involved in Phase I (and others) to visit asylum states, according to the specific approach to be adopted with each host state.

198. The interviews in Phase I will be conducted by lawyers experienced in violent crimes and particularly in violent sexual offences. All those involved in the interview process, including interpreters (who will be specially selected), will be suitably qualified and impartial women under contract with the Commission.

199. Throughout the investigation, the interest of the victims and witnesses is paramount. Particular attention will be paid to their physical and psychological well-being as well as to their personal security and the confidentiality of any information they may provide. Interviews will only be conducted with the consent of the witness-victim.
200. A highly qualified group of mental health specialists (including psychiatrists and psychologists) with experience of post-traumatic stress will be contracted by the Commission. This group of experts, consisting mainly of women, will be available to the victim-witnesses as they wish before, after, and possibly during, the interview. Once interviewees have been identified, selected and located, the mental health volunteers will liaise with local mental health professionals to ensure that post-interview counselling will be made available to each interviewee. These volunteers will also assist in briefing the interviewers and will develop a protocol to apply to all interviews in Phases I and II. The mental health professionals will research and prepare a report on possible patterns of mental health problems involving, where appropriate, statistical analysis of the widespread nature of the phenomenon. Their role will be completed in Phase I.

201. The preparatory work for Phase I will be carried out by the Interviews Coordinator (a lawyer with field experience to be retained by the Commission) who will work with the Commission for the three month period of the entire project and report on the investigation to the Commission and the NGOs Coordinator. They will carry out intensive planning of the schedule of interviews from Geneva throughout January 1994, followed by 10 days of in-region planning (from 30 January). They will be accompanied in the field by two Commission staff persons; one Chief Interpreter; one Assistant for Serb-language areas; and one mental health professional. This period will be followed by 20 days of interviews with witnesses/victims (from 10 February) carried out by 10 teams of interviewers. The report of the investigation will be finalised by the Interviews Coordinator in Geneva by the end of March.

202. For the selection and pre-briefing of interviewers, a meeting is tentatively scheduled in North America approximately two weeks before the arrival of the interviewers in Zagreb. In addition, intensive briefings for interviewers and interpreters will take place in Zagreb for three days prior to the interviewing.

II. INTRODUCTION


204. The Commission reiterated the importance of this objective in the Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) (UN Doc S/26545 [6 October 1992], at Annex) [Second Interim Report], and signalled its intention to undertake specific investigations and to conduct victim and witness interviews (see Second Interim Report, at paragraphs 9 to 11).

205. The Commission determined that the investigations would be conducted in the former Yugoslavia, as well as in other states where refugees from the hostilities are located [asylum states]. Pursuant to the latter, contacts with representatives of the Governments of the asylum states, and of a number of intergovernmental organizations [IGOs] and non-governmental organizations [NGOs] operating in the asylum states and elsewhere have been made.

206. On 6 October 1993, the Commission sent a letter to the Governments of a number of asylum states, thanking those Governments for their ongoing cooperation with the Commission and informing them that it intended to dispatch a team in the near future to those states. The aim of such a team would be to
carry out interviews to gather evidence of alleged violations of international humanitarian law in general, and of sexual assault, in particular. Finally, the Commission requested such Governments as have already conducted interviews to forward the results of the same, as deemed appropriate, to the Commission.

207. Consultations were held in late November 1993, at Geneva, between and among certain members of the Commission and representatives of various IGOs and NGOs, as well as with experts from the legal and mental health professions. These consultations fostered an open exchange of information and ideas on issues concerning allegations of sexual assault and of other violations of international humanitarian law in the context of the ongoing work of the Commission.

208. During 24 to 26 November, the Commission also conducted consultations with representatives of Governments, the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, a number of European-based NGOs, and several North American experts in the legal and mental health profession.

209. As a result of the foregoing, the Commission has developed a plan of action for the conduct of an in-depth investigation into allegations of sexual assault and other violations of international humanitarian law in connection with the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia [Plan of Action].

210. At the Commission's Eight Session, held at Geneva, 27 October 1993, the Plan of Action was discussed by the Chair of the Commission, and Commissioners Greve and Cleiren. These discussions were developed at Geneva between 23 and 25 November 1993 and, once again, when the Chair and Commissioner Greve met in Geneva on 25 and 26 November 1993.

211. As regards meetings with Government representatives, Commissioner Greve travelled to Stockholm on 24 November and was given information valuable for the present investigations by Swedish Government officials. While in Geneva, she also held consultations with representatives of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations. On 26 November, the Commission Chair and Commissioner Cleiren met with the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Kooijmans, inter alia, to discuss funding for the Plan of Action.

A. Purpose of the investigations carried out pursuant to the plan of action

212. In fulfillment of the Commission's mandate pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, the purposes of the investigation into alleged violations of international humanitarian law in general, and of allegations of sexual assault, in particular are:

(a) In general, to report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, regarding evidence which may be used by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

(b) In regard to sexual assault allegations, to report, through the Secretary-General, to the Security Council on specific cases as well as on patterns and policies pertaining to this category of violation of international humanitarian law as well as to establish an historic record of the extent of this type of victimization and of the manner in which it has been conducted.
B. Guiding concerns underlying the plan of action

213. As a result of the meetings and discussions referred to in the Introduction, it was decided that the investigations should be conducted in the following manner.

(a) Using a broad approach to allegations: The Plan of Action will seek to elicit and to record for the Commission not only information relating to allegations of sexual assault but also allegations of other violations of international humanitarian law which is discovered in the course of the Plan of Action. In this context, particular regard will be paid to detention centres located in the former Yugoslavia.

(b) The interest of the victims and witnesses is paramount, from the perspective of their physical and psychological well-being as well as of their personal security. In particular interviews will only be conducted with the consent of the witness-victim and interviews will only be conducted where psychological assistance and support is available locally to the victim-witness for continuing post-interview support. The Plan of Action will be carried out in close co-operation with the Multiplier Factors referred to below, to ensure that this concern is realised.

C. Funding of the plan of action

214. The Plan of Action described herein is to be funded by the Voluntary Trust Fund established by the Secretary-General on 24 May 1993 to assist the Commission in its work, and which refers specifically to elements of this Plan of Action, as well as to related investigations. The draft budget for Phase I of the Plan of Action appears as Annex A (covering a period of forty-five days from 15 January 1993). Costings for Phase II will be presented later.

D. Methodology

215. Phases I and II of the Plan of Action will be carried out under the direction of the Chair of the Commission of Experts. The Prijedor component will be carried out under the direction of Commissioner Greve. This paper is mainly concerned with Phase I of the project. A detailed plan of Phase II will be presented at a later date, and will to some extent be determined by the findings of Phase I. It is envisaged that the Plan of Action (both phases) will be carried out over a total of 90 days.

216. It should here be emphasised that some preparatory work for Phase II of the Plan of Action will need to be carried out during Phase I. For this reason there will be some overlap between the two phases.

1. Phase I interviews in the former Yugoslavia

217. Phase I of the Plan of Action will comprise 10 days of preparatory work by the Advance Team of the Core Group in Zagreb, followed by 20 days of interviews by 10 lawyer-interpretier teams, in different areas of the former Yugoslavia. In the course of Phase I the broad approach to humanitarian violations (described at b above) will be followed. In preparation for Phase II, information will be sought regarding humanitarian law violations of any kind which occurred, or occur, in detention camps in the Prijedor-Banja Luka, Foča, Brčko, Doboj areas. This project may be developed in detail in Phase II and is referred to below.
2. **Phase II interviews in asylum states and the Prijedor component**

218. After Phase I is completed, Phase II will comprise interviews carried out in asylum states (other than in the former Yugoslavia). Particular attention will have been paid to general as well as sexual assault, allegations concerning the Prijedor-Banja Luka, Foča, Brčko and Doboj areas in Phase I. If, at the end of Phase I, it is found that certain allegations relating to those areas would benefit from in-depth investigation, this would be carried out in Phase II, in parallel to the interviews carried out in asylum states following the Phase I model. The scope of the Prijedor component of Phase II will thus encompass allegations of torture, arbitrary execution, as well as the sexual assault of detainees.

219. The report of the Phase I findings of the Interviewers will be drawn up by the Core Group and will serve, among other things, to assist the Core Group in its preparation of interview schedules for Phase II interviews in the asylum states and for its Prijedor component. Following a series of interviews in those states, a report of Phase II will present the findings reached. It is expected that the final report of the Core Group, consolidating information of evidential value uncovered in the former Yugoslavia and in the asylum states, will be presented to the Commission by mid-June 1994.

220. The Commission will carry out the Plan of Action through two clusters of individuals: (i) the Core Group, and (ii) the Interviewers.

3. **The core group**

221. The Core Group will comprise:

(a) the Chair of the Commission of Experts and Commissioners Greve and Cleiren;

(b) B. Molina-Abram (Deputy Secretary), J.A. Baez (Assistant Secretary) and Messrs. Bergsmo and Kempenaars (Assistants to the Commission);

(c) Dr. S. Cavanaugh (Mental Health professional);

(d) Karen Kenny (Interviews Coordinator);

(e) Elenor Richter-Lyonette, (NGOs Coordinator);

(f) Maja Draženović (Chief Interpreter); and

(g) Thomas Osorio (Assistant to Interviews Coordinator and to the Chief Interpreter (for Serb-language areas)).

222. In the absence of the Chairman and the Commissioners from the mission area, the Deputy Secretary or the Assistant Secretary of the Commission will have overall supervision and responsibility for the investigation.

223. The general role of the Core Group is to plan the investigations, coordinate the working relationship between the Commission and the multiplier factors (as well as among the latter) and to organize the plan of work of the Interviewers (more detail regarding the Core Group's functions is provided below).

224. An Advance Team consisting of two members of the Commission's Secretariat, the Chief Interpreter, the Interviews Coordinator, the Assistant
for Serb-language areas and the mental health consultant will arrive in Zagreb on 30 January in advance of the Interviewers, **inter alia**, to finalise the interview schedule for all of the former Yugoslavia. This will build on the local contacts and preparations already undertaken by the Interviews Coordinator and the NGOs Coordinator in Geneva during January 1994.

225. Prior to the taking of evidence of victims-witnesses, the Core Group plans to do the following (see Annex C below):

(a) develop a standardized format of evidence-recording, in addition to the sworn testimony of the witness, which will be transcribed in narrative form. This may take the form of a check-list to be used by all Interviewers. For example, it must be ensured that the victim-witness who has given evidence can be located in the event that such evidence is required for use by the Chief Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal. This check-list may be communicated to local facilitators involved in laying the groundwork for the arrival of the Interviewers;

(b) develop a standard method of transcribing testimony from audio tapes in Serb or Croat for confirmation, swearing and signing by the witness;

(c) develop procedures designed to ensure the confidentiality of information received by the Commission from a victim-witness, as well as information which would tend to disclose their identity. These procedures will include rigorous selection procedures for all Interviewers, interpreters and secretaries involved, as well as procedures to ensure that the chain-of-custody of the evidence can be reliably traced, and that any attempts to tamper with the evidence can be detected;

(d) organise the training of the Interviewer teams (including interpreters) in the course of three days in Zagreb **inter alia** in the use of key-words and expressions likely to be encountered in the interview process (which may allude indirectly to aspects of incidents undergone by the witnesses); sensitization to the victim-witnesses and the situation prevailing in the major refugee camps and in other communities/settlements; on the geography of the regions to be visited in the context of the investigations. The briefings will be carried out under the guidance of the legal and mental health professionals of the Core Group. In addition, a summary of information pertinent to the investigation and available to the Commission through its data base will be made available to the Core Group and the Interviewers. In this context, the Commission may request the Liaison Officer of the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia [ICFY] [LO/UNPROFOR], situated in Geneva, to up-date the Core Group regarding the current situation and emerging trends in the territory of the former Yugoslavia prior to departure for Zagreb.

(e) develop procedures for the coordination and sharing of information with ICFY, UNPROFOR and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the former Yugoslavia;

(f) co-ordinate the planning and execution of on-site missions with UNPROFOR, where the area of their mission is concerned;

(g) develop procedures, probably in collaboration with the International War Crimes Tribunal, for the transmission of evidence to national prosecutors, should such a request is made.
4. The multiplier factors

225. The Commission will benefit from coordination with multiplier factors, namely, (i) Government refugee agencies and other social agencies, (ii) IGOs and NGOs, (iii) other national, intergovernmental and non-governmental support groups. These multiplier factors are located in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in the asylum states.

226. It is hoped that the multiplier factors will assist the Commission in:

(a) identifying witnesses and victims;

(b) providing information concerning persons who may be willing to offer evidence to the Commission; and

(c) providing psychological insight into the nature and condition of the victims, so as to assist the Interviewers in their approach.

5. The mental health professionals

227. The entire investigation will be victim-oriented. During Phase I only, seven volunteer mental health professionals, co-ordinated by the mental health expert member of the Core Group, will build upon pre-existing networks (at present, largely in Croatia), train local mental health professionals in both the procedural and substantive aspects of the mandate of the Commission, in general, and of the tasks of the Interviewers in particular. In many instances, contact networks comprise local and international NGOs. Local professionals may, subject always to the consent of the potential witness, inform the Commission of the willingness of such persons to give testimony to the Commission. The mental health members of the Core Group will be responsible for serving as a liaison between the Commission and the local network contact in order to prepare for the forthcoming arrival of the Commission mission.

228. Furthermore, although they will not attend interviews, the mental health experts will provide support for the interviewers as appropriate. In particular, the mental health experts will assist in briefing the interviewers and will develop a protocol to apply to all interviews in Phases I and II. When Phase I interviews commence, the mental health professionals will research and prepare a report on possible patterns of mental health problems involving, where appropriate, statistical analysis of the widespread nature of the phenomenon. Their role will be complete with Phase I.

6. The interviews

229. The persons carrying out the investigation interviews in the former Yugoslavia will be experts drawn from the legal profession [Interviewers]. They will be given immediate guidance and assistance by the Core Group of persons based in Geneva, as well as by the Advance Party of the Core Group to be based in Zagreb during Phase I. Volunteer interviewers will be requested to serve for a minimum period of 30 days.

230. The Interviewers will operate with the assistance of a specially selected interpreter. All those involved in the interview process will be women (unless the victim-witness otherwise requests). The working language of both the Core Group and of the Interviewers will be English. Four secretaries will be needed locally and hired on an hourly basis for transcribing testimony from audio-tapes after the day’s interviews, prior to their being approved,
sworn and signed by the witness and the Interviewers.

231. The Interviewers will be selected by the Commission on the basis of a review and analysis of curricula vitae received from various countries by the Commission, as well as on the basis of a briefing meetings which will take place in North America two weeks in advance of their arrival in Zagreb. It is expected that some Interviewers will be contributed to the Commission, at no cost to it, by the governments of various states while the others will volunteer their services (see Annex A).

232. Interpreters and secretaries will be subject to rigorous selection criteria emphasising the need for absolute professionalism, confidentiality and compassion, in addition to first-class English and Serb or Croat interpretation skills or clerical skills, as appropriate. These locally-available persons will be identified, contacted, screened and selected by the Chief Interpreter who will be in the Core Group’s Advance Party.
Appendix II

PARTICIPANTS

I. COMMISSION MEMBERS AND COMMISSION STAFF

A. Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni (USA-Egypt)
   Chairman, Commission of Experts

B. Professor Christine Cleiren (Netherlands)
   Member, Commission of Experts

C. Ms. Bruna Molina-Abrams
   Deputy Secretary, Commission of Experts

D. Mr. Julio Baez
   Assistant Secretary, Commission of Experts

II. CORE GROUP CONSULTANTS

A. Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh (M.D.) (USA)

B. Ms. Maja Draženović (Croatia)

C. Ms. Karen Kenny (Ireland)

D. Mr. Thomas E. Osorio (USA)

E. Dr. Richard Rahe (M.D.) (USA)

III. LEGAL TEAM

A. Ms. Lena Andersson (Finland)

B. Ms. Susan Axelrod (USA)

C. Ms. Francine Borsanyi (Canada)

D. Ms. Linda S. Crawford (Canada)

E. Ms. Sharon Janelle Crooks (Canada-Ireland)

F. Ms. Kenna Dalrymple (Canada)

G. Ms. Feryal Gharahi (USA-Iran)

H. Ms. Sara Hossain (Bangladesh)

I. Ms. Nancy L. Paterson (USA)

J. Ms. Tanja Petrovar (Slovenia)

K. Ms. Laura D. Silver (Canada)

L. Ms. Merja Pentikäinen (Finland)
IV. MENTAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL TEAM

A. Dr. Abigail Benton Sivan (M.D.) (USA)
B. Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh (M.D.) (USA)
C. Dr. Wanda Fremont (Ph.D) (USA)
D. Dr. Alice Geis MS, RN, CS (USA)
E. Dr. Stephanie Gregory (M.D.) (USA)
F. Dr. Daniel W. Hardy (M.D., J.D.) (USA)
G. Dr. Richard Rahe (M.D.) (USA)
Part Two

REPORT OF THE MENTAL HEALTH EXPERTS

Summary

233. The goals of the mental health team were threefold: 1) to prevent re-traumatization of witnesses interviewed, 2) to provide acute medical/psychological care, and 3) to recommend and arrange for medical, psychiatric, and psychosocial care within the local health care structure. These goals were met in most respects. None of the witnesses were re-traumatized as a result of the interview process, although several said they regretted testifying because they feared for their safety and that of their families. In the majority of the cases testimony was a positive healing process for witnesses. The mental health professionals were present in 85 of the two hundred testimonies obtained by the lawyers. In these 85 cases a great deal of information regarding the witnesses’ psychological and medical status was obtained during testimony. Following the legal testimony, the physical and psychological well-being of the witness was further assessed. Discussion of etiology of physical and psychological symptoms, brief psychotherapy, and recommendations for treatment were made following many testimonies witnesses. Follow-up medical, psychiatric, and psychosocial care, when recommended, required a great deal of ingenuity and creativity, particularly for those with refugee status. In most cases, however, the mental health teams were successful in obtaining the care needed in the local health care system. If a mental health professional was not present during the interview, and assessment or intervention was felt to be necessary by the lawyer, the mental health worker would be made aware of this need.

234. Finally, although not directly related to the Commission’s work, the mental health team was able to obtain a large amount of medications which were distributed to refugee centres in Croatia and medical care facilities in Sarajevo and Tuzla in Bosnia.

235. Forty-five men and 37 women were interviewed. Forty-five were Catholic, 29 Muslim, two Orthodox, and one undetermined. The trauma these witnesses had experienced as a result of torture and/or rape was significant. Sixty-five percent had a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or symptoms of PTSD. Seventeen percent had an anxiety or depressive disorder, and 16 percent experienced normal bereavement. Half of the interviewees had sustained moderate to severe physical injuries. Refugees had generally received inadequate psychiatric and medical care following the trauma. The care for displaced Croatians ranged from adequate to good. Most witnesses were functioning at a higher social, occupational, and personal level than would be expected given the degree of trauma they had experienced. Emotional blunting was also less than would be expected given the amount of trauma sustained. Grief over losses experienced during the war and concerns for the present and future were paramount. Witnesses used a positive attitude and positive activity to maintain their high level of functioning. This included a strong sense of responsibility to family, children, and community and a high level of resourcefulness in dealing with problems. In short, the courage of these witnesses and the other victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is a testimony to the strength of the human spirit under adversity.

I. INTRODUCTION

236. The first section of this report addresses the selection, activities, and role of the mental health team. Other areas covered in this section
include comments on issues relating to the health care system in Croatia, witness selection, volunteer lawyers, and translators.

237. The second section describes the psychological effects of testimony as well as the psychological and physical effects of trauma on the witnesses.

II. SELECTION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH TEAM

238. In December 1993, Professor Bassiouni requested that Rush Medical College organize a mental health team to assist the legal team in obtaining testimonies from sexual assault victims as a result of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Since it was unclear at this juncture what skills would be needed, it was decided to put together a balanced team including four psychiatrists, one internist, one gynecologist, one psychologist and one nurse. Seven were female and one was male. None, by design, were personal friends nor had any administrative relationship with others on the team. Six were from Rush Medical College, one from Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago and one from the University of Syracuse in New York. All had experience in treating sexual assault victims and two had additional experience in treating sexual assault in children. Four had experience in treating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in the United States, and three had provided medical/psychiatric care in war conditions or to survivors of such conflicts outside the United States. One was a lawyer as well as a psychiatrist and three had special expertise in forensic psychiatry. Each was selected for his or her ability to tolerate ambiguity and work as a team member under complex and difficult conditions. Additionally, Richard Rahe, a retired admiral and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Nevada, who has had extensive experience leading teams of lawyers and doctors in debriefing torture victims, was selected to be our consultant. Prior to our leaving for the former Yugoslavia, the mental health team had several planning sessions, which helped develop a sense of camaraderie and cohesiveness which was important to the success of the mission in the former Yugoslavia.

III. ACTIVITIES OF THE MENTAL HEALTH TEAM

239. Preliminary work. Dr. Stephanie Cavanaugh went with the core team to Zagreb, Croatia from 29 January 1994 through 11 February 1994. Her job was to establish liaisons with the local mental health workers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local physicians, national experts in rape and torture, and physicians from the Croatian government. She also had numerous informal discussions with displaced persons and refugees. Following this, she made recommendations regarding: 1) the role of the mental health team; 2) the content of the mental health briefing which was to include: a) visits to refugee camps, b) a discussion of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder by Richard Rahe, M.D., c) techniques to make testimony a healing process, given by Inger Agger, Ph.D. and Soren Buus-Jensen, M.D., and 3) a system to refer witnesses within the local health care system.

240. Interview Phase. All but one member of the mental health team arrived in Zagreb on 26 February. The first three days were devoted to formal orientation and training sessions, and informally to making the acquaintances of the lawyers and interpreters with whom the team would be working in the next few weeks. The particular contribution of the mental health team to this initial period in Zagreb was Dr. Cavanaugh's securing the services of Inger Agger, Ph.D., Soren Jensen, M.D. and Richard Rahe, M.D. for lectures, training sessions, and role playing exercises to prepare the multi-disciplinary teams for the tasks ahead—the detailed documentation through interviews of critically sensitive information, without re-traumatizing the witnesses by the
process. Additionally, these international experts on the assessment and treatment of torture victims endeavoured to sensitize our teams to the importance of recognizing and minimizing the almost inevitable tertiary trauma to ourselves, as a result of intense interaction with the primary victims during the interviews.

241. Thereafter, team assignments were made and our work began in earnest. Mental health team members spent from two to four weeks in the former Yugoslavia. The average length of time spent was 18 days and the average number of interviews was 10.25 per team member.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE MENTAL HEALTH TEAM

242. Unfortunately, the ambiguity of the role of the mental health team throughout the mission, on the part of the leadership of the Commission caused unnecessary stress on the relationship between the mental health workers and the lawyers.

243. The role of the mental health team members was never clearly defined. As a result, individual teams devised their own strategies. Although many of the lawyers were positive to mental health input and had worked with mental health professionals in the past, the ambiguity about our role made it difficult for the lawyers to decide how best to utilize us. This was further compounded by the fact that there was a smaller number of mental health workers than lawyers. Only three of the mental health team were able to stay for one month, because of a change in the start date of the mission.

244. The two teams in Split, each consisting of a lawyer, mental health worker and translator who worked together for one month, were the most successful. Each lawyer and mental health team member interviewed the witness together and developed an interview process which resulted in useful legal information and also allowed for appropriate medical and psychiatric intervention on the part of the mental health worker. This model has been used extensively in other parts of the world to debrief victims of torture.

245. The mental health team participated in 85 testimonies. All of the two hundred witnesses were asked if they wished the mental health specialist (who was described as "an expert in the medical and psychological sequelae of trauma") to be present during testimony. None of the witnesses refused and most expressed appreciation for the presence of the mental health professional. If a mental health worker was not involved in an interview with the victim, the lawyers, in many cases, asked for assistance later. When the mental health professionals were included in the interview, they were able to help the lawyer obtain information and provide appropriate intervention and support for the victim. Also, in many instances, they were able to provide acute medical, psychosocial, and psychiatric care and recommend ongoing care within the structure of the local health care system.

246. In other teams, a number of models for the interview process were used depending upon the relationship between the lawyers and the mental health professionals. During the legal testimony a great deal of information regarding the witnesses' psychological and medical status was obtained, even if the mental health professional was totally passive. The witness was then asked if he or she wished time with the mental health professional, during which the witness' psychological and physical status were further assessed. Education regarding the etiology of physical and psychological symptoms resulting from the trauma was helpful for witnesses. In some cases, brief psychotherapy or family therapy was possible and greatly appreciated by the witnesses. Helena Načić, M.D., our liaison with the Croatian government, had
given approval for physicians to provide acute psychiatric or medical care. In several cases, medication was prescribed and dispensed by the mental health workers for acute problems.

247. Although the medical system in the former Yugoslavia was quite sophisticated prior to the war, it has since been over-loaded and has had to function with inadequate supplies and medical personnel. As a result, obtaining follow-up medical care for the witnesses was often a challenge. Although the Croatian medical system is over-loaded, registered displaced Croatian citizens are entitled to the health benefits of non-displaced Croatian citizens. Helena Nakic, M.D., provided displaced Croatians who testified in Zagreb access to medical and psychiatric care at the University of Zagreb. Further, the mental health specialists arranging medical and psychiatric care for displaced Croatian citizens outside Zagreb rarely had to rely on sources other than the Croatian medical system for this care.

248. Providing follow-up care for refugees was a more difficult matter. For those living in registered refugee centres, there was often one physician who cared for 400 to 1,000 people, many of whom are quite ill because of war injuries or poorly treated chronic illness. Unfortunately, refugee physicians are not licensed and cannot provide treatment for refugees. Additionally, necessary medications are in short supply. Refugees without access to camp physicians must pay for their medical care or receive it through non-governmental organizations. Ongoing medical, psychosocial, and psychiatric care for refugee witnesses were pieced together through NGOs, with which the mental health worker had linked in each interview site. Medicins du Monde, Medicins sans Frontières, Biser, Caritas, and other NGOs assisted in providing this health care.

249. It was hoped that the local mental health workers contacted by the core group during their preliminary work in Zagreb would take the place of the mental health team after the majority had left. Unfortunately, the local mental health workers were overwhelmed with their everyday responsibilities. They did, however, provide extremely valuable consultation and support. The presence of Sabina Negovetić, M.D., a member of the core team who speaks Croatian and is extremely knowledgeable about the health care system in the former Yugoslavia, would have been most valuable in increasing the efficiency and quality of the medical and psychiatric care for witnesses.

250. Additionally, the mental health team brought medications to Zagreb, a small amount of which was distributed to refugee camps in Zagreb. The majority was taken to Sarajevo in Bosnia. Rush Medical Centre sent another large shipment of medications which was later distributed to Tuzla in Bosnia.

251. Although it was not originally intended that the mental health team secure witnesses for interview, the contacts of the mental health team with the community produced a number of witnesses for testimony.

V. SELECTION OF WITNESSES

252. During the core team's visit to Croatia many NGOs, home clubs, and mental health workers were confident that a number of witnesses would come forward. Additionally, during visits to refugee centres many stated a desire to testify. During the first two weeks of the interview process very few of these witnesses came forward. There are several possible explanations for why this occurred. The environment in which these interviews were conducted was highly complex. Witnesses were fearful for their safety and that of their families. Witnesses may have been concerned that their refugee status in Croatia or hopes for relocation would be jeopardized by testimony. There were
negative feelings among witnesses toward the United Nations and concerns as to whether data would be kept totally confidential. Most of those interviewed in the first two weeks in Zagreb and Split had previously given sworn testimony to the Croatian government. As a result, some potential witnesses may have been concerned about the interference of the Croatian government in the interviewing process. Since Sabina Negovetić, M.D. and Eleanor Richter-Lyonette had the majority of the contact with the NGOs during the core visit it is unclear if their absence was a factor. Certainly, the flow of witnesses would have increased if they had been present during the interview phase of this mission. Finally, many involved in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and those in Europe were not anxious for the work of the Commission to continue.

253. In spite of this, as the lawyers, mental health workers, and translators began to develop relationships with the social/medical/psychiatric system in which they were interviewing, many witnesses began to come forward. Unfortunately, the length of time it took to get the interview process established in each separate site resulted in a great deal of wasted time. Also, many witnesses came forward when the interview teams were ready to leave. Finally, it is unfortunate that the second phase of the investigation, interviews with witnesses located in other European countries, could not be completed.

254. It is a tribute to the courage of the witnesses that 200 people were willing to come forward under these circumstances.

VI. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TESTIMONY

255. No witness interviewed with a mental health professional was re-traumatized, although several said they regretted testifying because of fear for their own safety and for that of their families. On the other hand, after the initial testimonies many witnesses recruited other witnesses. In the majority of cases, the process by which a lawyer, mental health professional and interpreter listened for two to 10 hours to the witnesses' testimony was healing and positive for those testifying.

256. There are several reasons for this positive outcome. First, as in psychotherapy, the empathy and concern shown by the lawyer, mental health specialist, and translator for the witness was in itself healing. Some descriptions of the suffering endured were so horrible that either the lawyer, mental health worker, or translator, would at times become tearful, a powerful message that the witness was not alone in his or her horror and pain. For those who had not testified previously, telling the whole story in detail for the first time was a relief. It allowed the witness to remove the horror of the experience from within and to distance and objectify it, as those bearing witness carefully recorded it. The fact that volunteer lawyers and mental health professionals had come from other countries specifically to take their testimony and provide psychological and medical assistance made it obvious to them that the world cared about the war crimes they had experienced or witnessed. Finally, many witnesses stated that the most positive aspect of testimony was the hope that the perpetrators of these war crimes might be prosecuted and that what they had endured was not acceptable to the world. This helped heal the feeling of helplessness and guilt that some of the witnesses experienced because of their lack of control over their own torture or rape, or the torture, rape, or slaughter of family members, friends, and other prisoners. The hope for justice gave them a sense that something positive might be accomplished.
VII. PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSICAL STATUS OF THE WITNESSES

257. Table I shows the demographics of the 82 witnesses who testified. Most had a good premorbid adjustment with a negative psychiatric history. The types of trauma sustained by the witnesses, summarized in Table II, were for the most part quite significant. The psychiatric diagnoses, as assessed by the mental health workers, are set forth in Table III. Most witnesses were functioning at a higher social, occupational, and personal level than would be expected, given the nature of the emotional and physical trauma they had endured. Due to the fact that most witnesses preserved appropriate affect when discussing traumatic events, the emotional blunting commonly seen was much less frequent than would be anticipated given the extent of the trauma. Altruism, humor, intellectualization, isolation and attention to the problems of the present situation—all high level psychological defences—were commonly used. Witnesses used a positive attitude and positive activity to maintain their high level of functioning. This included a strong sense of responsibility to family, children, and community. Additionally, most attempted to "carry-on" regardless of their circumstances and maintained a high level of resourcefulness in dealing with problems. Support from family members was high.

258. Those who had been physically injured appeared to have a more difficult time psychologically. Those witnesses who had a high level of family or social support following the trauma did better psychologically and those witnesses with early psychosocial or psychiatric intervention recovered more rapidly.

259. Witnesses were frequently most affected by the unpredictable nature of the trauma. Observing others being tortured, raped, or slaughtered, with little control over the situation, was most difficult. Survivor guilt was common, and the torture, rape, or slaughter of a family member was the most traumatic. Intrusive thoughts and bad dreams from the trauma were more likely to be those of the secondary trauma they had witnessed than of the primary trauma they had experienced. Torture, rape, humiliation, or slaughter by those known by the witnesses was the most difficult for witnesses to integrate.

260. Most witnesses had attempted to put the trauma behind them, in spite of intrusive thoughts, bad dreams, and fear of certain environmental cues associated with the trauma. Grief from loss of home, previous life, death of loved ones, separation from family and friends, and inability to engage in gainful employment was common. Missing a family member was more disruptive psychologically than grief for dead relatives. A protracted time in a refugee centre without hope for relocation was a significant stressor. Many refugees saw no realistic hope for improvement of their situation without relocation. Displaced people were also concerned about their future, but were usually better off in terms of monetary resources, family, community, and medical care.

261. Half of the witnesses had sustained moderate to severe injuries as a result of the trauma. Displaced persons in Croatia had received adequate to good medical and psychiatric care following the trauma, although ongoing care was often a problem. Refugees for the most part had inadequate care after the trauma and at the time of testimony. In most cases, the mental health professional was able to obtain ongoing medical and psychiatric care for those that testified.
## Tables

1. **Demographic Data of Witnesses Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Less than 20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40-49</td>
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<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>14</td>
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**ETHNICITY**

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>ETHNICITY</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatian (Roman Catholic)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Croatian (Roman Catholic)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian (Serbian Orthodox)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Serbian (Serbian Orthodox)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Undetermined</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. **Trauma Experienced by Witnesses Interviewed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>MALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raped once; held for 15 days; husband missing and presumed dead. (2)</td>
<td>Beaten severely and repeatedly during 13 months of imprisonment; loss of home and village. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned briefly three times; gang raped once; rifle stuck in vagina. (2)</td>
<td>Beaten repeatedly during 7 months of imprisonment; village destroyed. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forcibly removed from home to camp for 10 days where women were taken by guards in the night and presumably raped or otherwise abused. (2)</td>
<td>Beaten severely and repeatedly during six months of imprisonment; prison roommate killed by guard; heard women prisoners screaming; knew they were being raped; no Croatians or Muslims left in village. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived in fields for four months while village under attack; was pregnant; was raped once by attacker who pointed gun at her abdomen. (2)</td>
<td>Severely beaten on one occasion but not imprisoned; many friends in village killed; forced to deed home &quot;to the Krajina.&quot; (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken from village with other women; observed mass graves with decapitated bodies and much blood; some women taken by guards at night and presumably raped over approximately two week period. (2)</td>
<td>Threatened with death at arrest; friends killed; lived under house arrest for seven months. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); raped multiple times. (1)</td>
<td>Multiple beatings during 13 months of imprisonment. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprisoned and tortured (length undetermined); witnessed torture of others. (1)</td>
<td>Moved from place to place for one month with family. (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband missing, presumed dead; saw him bleeding. (1)</td>
<td>Suffered torture and witnessed killings, tortures and mutilations for two days. (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Parenthetical number indicates ethnicity of victim. (1) Croatian; (2) Muslim; and (3) Serbian*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location/Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raped; shot in head during attempted execution. (1)</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); witnessed rapes and beatings; forced to sign over property. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband dead; witnessed mass executions. (1)</td>
<td>Witnessed massacre; father and brother killed; sister raped while prisoner. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raped. (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raped repeatedly. (2)</td>
<td>Escaped with pregnant wife from two villages under attack; baby born with palsy. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated from husband and son; forced to leave home. (1)</td>
<td>Father taken (presumably killed); soldier pointed gun at his head and pulled trigger several times (presumably unloaded); village women raped. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang sexual assault of victim and daughter-in-law in their home. (1)</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); suffered beatings and torture. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband killed; witnessed murder of family members and friends; home burned, children repeatedly threatened with mock executions. Moved to six different locations over one year period. (1)</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); suffered beatings and sexual assault. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed death of husband, other family members and friends; imprisoned three days and threatened with mock executions. (1)</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); witnessed beatings. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated from husband and son for several weeks; witnessed burning of home and killing of neighbours; held hostage for two days and threatened with death. (1)</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); beaten and witnessed killings. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed killing of husband, family and friends, as well as destruction of home and village; hid for three weeks; separated from son; threatened with rape. (2)</td>
<td>Held two months in detention centre; witnessed slaughter of 150 fellow prisoners. (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessed burning of home and destruction of village; held in detention centre for six months; aware of rape of other captives; husband's whereabouts unknown. (2)</td>
<td>Held in detention camp for two months; little food and water; saw many prisoners die; friend decapitated and his head thrown to other prisoners; wife missing. (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang raped by four men on one occasion with resulting pregnancy and medical complications;</td>
<td>Imprisoned (length undetermined); during which he endured forced labour, beatings and having to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
whereabouts of parents and other family unknown. (2)

Witnessed destruction of village; imprisoned in "women's house" for five months; beaten; husband's whereabouts unknown. (2)

Separated from husband; home burned; neighbours murdered; beaten and shot in pelvis, requiring four surgeries and resulting in inability to walk. (1)

Village occupied; neighbours killed; home burned; family held in detention camp; beaten on several occasions; raped by two men on one occasion. (1)

Home burned; husband and children missing; neighbours killed; raped by two men on one occasion; beaten on several occasions. (1)

In hiding for three months while village occupied; suffered gunshot and chemical wounds; beaten; witnessed killings. (1)

Raped on two occasions; life threatened. (1)

Raped on two occasions, once in front of her two daughters who were also raped; village destroyed. (2)

Imprisoned for 18 days; made to strip to underwear, beaten with truncheons and kicked during interrogations; gang raped by four guards, forced fellatio. (1)

Village occupied and residents harassed; escaped with immediate family, rest of village massacred later, including relatives and children. (2)

Husband and father abducted, separated for one and a half years; neighbours killed. (2)

Found mutilated bodies of brother and sister-in-law; grandchildren forced to kiss floor by their walk through a mine field. Witnessed burning of home and murders. (1)

Imprisoned for six months during which time he was beaten and psychologically abused. Witnessed home being burned and killings. Family's whereabouts unknown. (1)

Imprisoned for 11 days and beaten severely daily. (2)

Witnessed destruction of village and deaths of neighbours. Captive for 10 days and beaten. Whereabouts of family unknown. (2)

Imprisoned for six months, beaten daily, witnessed tortures and killings; forced to eat two kilos of salt; family whereabouts unknown. (2)

Witnessed destruction of home and mass killings including three children murdered. (1)

Home burned, neighbours killed. Imprisoned for one month; suffered physical and emotional abuse. (1)

Detention camp for six months, where repeatedly physically tortured; home burned; witnessed killings. (1)

Imprisoned for six months during which he was tortured daily, life was threatened, witnessed killings, and was starved. (1)

Forced to work for occupiers of village for several months; severely beaten on multiple occasions. Witnessed beatings and killings. (1)

Imprisoned for 4 months; severely beaten on several occasions. (2)

Imprisoned (length undetermined); witnessed execution of prisoners by chain saw; repeatedly beaten;
Serbian teachers. (1) shot in arm; knifed. (unk)

Held for two days, raped once; captors played Russian roulette with her; husband and son-in-law killed. (2)

Witnessed killing of women and children during invasion of town. (1)

Victim and baby moved from village to village; husband missing; raped 6-10 times with knife held at throat, child's life threatened if victim did not submit. (2)

Imprisoned (length undetermined); suffered beatings. (1)

Raped in house by two residents of village. (2)

Imprisoned (length undetermined); suffered beatings, torture and mock executions. (1)

Imprisoned (length undetermined); beaten by guards and civilians; suffered sexual torture. (1)

Witnessed beatings, torture and burning of houses. (1)

Witnessed beatings, torture and burning of houses. (1)

Son executed; other family members died. (1)

Suffered torture, beatings, and stabbing; witnessed penile amputation. (2)

Imprisoned for three months during which he was tortured and witnessed killings. (1)

Survived massacre in mine field; Suffered beatings. (1)

Held two months in dentention camp; repeatedly beaten, starved; prisoners forced to bite each others genitals; many prisoners died. (1)
### 3. Diagnoses of Witnesses Interviewed*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIAGNOSIS/Female</th>
<th></th>
<th>DIAGNOSIS/Male</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD/Symptoms only</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>PTSD/Symptoms only</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major depression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major depression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unranked</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Unranked</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Mild</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety Disorder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anxiety Disorder</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment Disorder</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adjustment Disorder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With depressed mood</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>With depressed mood</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With mixed features</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>With mixed features</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bereavement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bereavement</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissociative Disorder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dissociative Disorder</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somatoform Disorder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Somatoform Disorder</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Abuse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Alcohol Abuse</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No diagnosis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No diagnosis</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Insufficient information</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Some have more than one diagnosis

The DSM-IV criteria for these disorders is found in Appendix II.
Appendix I

262. From 3 to 7 March, Dr. Hardy accompanied Professor Bassiouni to BiH. In Sarajevo Professor Bassiouni and his team met with President Izetbegović and various members of his cabinet and advisors, and later with the State War Crimes Commission. Professor Bassiouni and team also met formally with State War Crimes Commissions in Zenica and Tuzla, and with the U.N. military command in Kiseljak. A number of informal meetings with U.N. workers, military personnel, clergy and other individuals also took place. Of special relevance to the work of the mental health team were meetings in Sarajevo and Tuzla with physicians actively involved in treating civilian war casualties.

263. In Sarajevo, Professor Bassiouni and team met with the Director of the Koševo hospital and delivered medications and medical supplies donated by mental health team members and others. After that meeting Dr. Hardy toured the pediatric clinic and met with the director of the psychiatric clinic at the hospital. At the pediatric clinic Dr. Hardy saw a nine year old boy who was unable to walk. An extensive medical examination disclosed no physiological explanation for his condition. Ultimately, his treating physicians determined that the boy, who had lost several close family members during the siege of Sarajevo, developed a psychogenic paralysis in an unconscious effort to secure hospitalization at Koševo, the only place where he was able to experience a relative degree of safety. Dr. Hardy asked the age of the youngest patient treated for a war-related psychiatric disturbance. He was told of a six month old child who, having experienced the sound of artillery shelling, would for months thereafter begin screaming and develop full-body muscle contractions upon hearing any unexpected noise no louder than a door closing. [N.B. These are signs of increased arousal which are associated with the diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder].

264. At the psychiatric clinic, Dr. Hardy learned that all beds and most chairs in the unit were occupied by patients suffering from war related conditions, usually PTSD or Major Depression. The clinic director stated that he had worked continuously seven days a week for over two years, with the exception of a few days the previous year when he was himself disabled by physical injury. The clinic director stated that when hostilities began the Serbian clinicians left (approximately one-half of the hospital staff), and indicated that all of the remaining staff throughout the hospital were seriously overworked. He said the hospital had suffered approximately 300 shellings since the siege began. Most disturbingly, he said that as a consequence of these circumstances, five physician staff members of the hospital had committed suicide within the last two years.

265. At Tuzla, Professor Bassiouni and his team met with Dr. Kreitmayer, a gynecologist and member of the local War Crimes Commission. Dr. Kreitmayer said she had seen 760 cases of raped women at her clinic, and other cases of physical abuse and torture arising from the present conflict. She said the youngest rape victim was five years old, and the oldest was 81. Dr. Kreitmayer said she documented 70 cases of PTSD, and "lots of" cases of somatic disorders. Later the Bassiouni team met with the psychiatrist from Dr. Kreitmayer's clinic. She related various cases with which she had dealt, told of the taunting which often accompanied the rapes (e.g. "Where is your Alija now?"). and mentioned a village where all of the women (approximately 50) had been raped by the aggressors. The team members agreed that one of the remarkable aspects of this interview was the obvious extent to which the psychiatrist had herself been psychologically traumatized by her experiences in treating the victims of war crimes.
I. CRITERIA FOR MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE

A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same two-week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.

   Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical condition, or mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations.

1. depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful). Note: In children and adolescents, can be irritable mood.

2. markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation made by others)

3. significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day. Note: In children, consider failure to make expected weight gains.

4. insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day

5. psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down)

6. fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day

7. feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick)

8. diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others)

9. recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide

B. The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode[].

C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hypothyroidism).

E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, i.e., after the loss of a loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than two months or are characterized by marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.
II. BEREAVEMENT

This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is a reaction to the death of a loved one. As part of their reaction to the loss, some grieving individuals present with symptoms characteristic of a Major Depressive Episode (e.g., feelings of sadness and associated symptoms such as insomnia, poor appetite, and weight loss). The bereaved individual typically regards the depressed mood as "normal", although the person may seek professional help for relief of associated symptoms such as insomnia or anorexia. The duration and expression of "normal" bereavement vary considerably among different cultural groups. The diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder is generally not given unless the symptoms are still present 2 months after the loss. However, the presence of certain symptoms that are not characteristic of a "normal" grief reaction may be helpful in differentiating bereavement from a Major Depressive Episode. These include 1) guilt about things other than actions taken or not taken by the survivor at the time of death; 2) thoughts of death other than the survivor feeling that he or she would be better off dead or should have died with the deceased person; 3) morbid preoccupation with worthlessness; 4) marked psychomotor retardation; 5) prolonged and marked functional impairment; and 6) hallucinatory experiences other than thinking that he or she hears the voice of, or transiently sees the image of, the deceased person.

III. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR 300.12 DISSOCIATIVE AMNESIA

A. The predominant disturbance is one or more episodes of inability to recall important personal information, usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness.

B. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of Dissociative Identity Disorder, Dissociative Fugue, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Acute Stress Disorder, or Somatization Disorder and is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a neurological or other general medical condition (e.g., Amnestic Disorder Due to Head Trauma).

C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

IV. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR ADJUSTMENT DISORDERS

A. The development of emotional or behavioral symptoms in response to an identifiable stressor(s) occurring within 3 months of the onset of the stressor(s).

B. These symptoms or behaviors are clinically significant as evidenced by either of the following:

   1. marked distress that is in excess of what would be expected from exposure to the stressor
   2. significant impairment in social or occupational (academic) functioning

B. The stress-related disturbance does not meet the criteria for another specific Axis I disorder and is not merely an exacerbation of a preexisting Axis I or Axis II disorder.
D. The symptoms do not represent Bereavement.

E. Once the stressor (or its consequences) has terminated, the symptoms do not persist for more than an additional 6 months.

Specify if:

Acute: if the disturbance lasts less than 6 months
Chronic: if the disturbance lasts for 6 months or longer

Adjustment Disorders are coded based on the subtype, which is selected according to the predominant symptoms. The specific stressor(s) can be specified on Axis IV.

309.0 With Depressed Mood
309.24 With Anxiety
309.28 With Mixed Anxiety and Depressed Mood
309.3 With Disturbance of Conduct
309.4 With Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct
309.9 Unspecified

V. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR 300.81 SOMATIZATION DISORDER

A. A history of many physical complaints beginning before age 30 years that occur over a period of several years and result in treatment being sought or significant impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

B. Each of the following criteria must have been met, with individual symptoms occurring at any time during the course of the disturbance:

1. **four pain symptoms**: a history of pain related to at least four different sites or functions (e.g., head, abdomen, back, joints, extremities chest, rectum, during menstruation, during sexual intercourse, or during urination)

2. **two gastrointestinal symptoms**: a history of at least two gastrointestinal symptoms other than pain (e.g., nausea, bloating, vomiting other than during pregnancy, diarrhea, or intolerance of several different foods)

3. **one sexual symptom**: a history of at least one sexual or reproductive symptom other than pain (e.g., sexual indifference, erectile or ejaculatory dysfunction, irregular menses, excessive menstrual bleeding, vomiting throughout pregnancy)

4. **one pseudoneurological symptom**: a history of at least one symptom or deficit suggesting a neurological condition not limited to pain (conversion symptoms such as impaired coordination or balance, paralysis or localized weakness, difficulty swallowing or lump in throat, aphonia, urinary retention hallucinations, loss of touch or pain sensation, double vision, blindness, deafness, seizures; dissociative symptoms such as amnesia; or loss of consciousness other than fainting)

C. Either 1. or 2.:

1. after appropriate investigation, each of the symptoms in Criterion B cannot be fully explained by a known general medical condition or the direct
effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication)

2. when there is a related general medical condition, the physical complaints or resulting social or occupational impairment are in excess of what would be expected from the history, physical examination, or laboratory findings

D. The symptoms are not intentionally produced or feigned (as in Factitious Disorder or Malingering).

VI. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR 300.02 GENERALIZED ANXIETY DISORDER

A. Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), occurring more days than not for at least six months, about a number of events or activities (such as work or school performance).

B. The person finds it difficult to control the worry.

C. The anxiety and worry are associated with three (or more) of the following six symptoms (with at least some symptoms present for more days than not for the past six months). Note: Only one item is required in children.

1. restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge
2. being easily fatigued
3. difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
4. irritability
5. muscle tension
6. sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying sleep)

D. The focus of the anxiety and worry is not confined to features of an Axis I disorder, e.g., the anxiety or worry is not about having a Panic Attack (as in Panic Disorder), being embarrassed in public (as in Social Phobia), being contaminated (as in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder), being away from home or close relatives (as in Separation Anxiety Disorder), gaining weight (as in Anorexia Nervosa), having multiple physical complains (as in Somatization Disorder) or having a serious illness (as in Hypochondriasis), and the anxiety and worry do not occur exclusively during Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.

E. The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

F. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism) and does not occur exclusively during a Mood Disorder, a Psychotic Disorder, or a Pervasive Developmental Disorder.

VII. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR 309.81 POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the
following were present:

1. the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others

2. the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: in children, this may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behavior

B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:

1. recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts or perceptions. Note: in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed.

2. recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, there may be frightening dreams without recognizable content.

3. acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young children, trauma-specific reenactment may occur.

4. intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event

C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:

1. efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma

2. efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma

3. inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma

4. markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities

5. feeling of detachment or estrangement from others

6. restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)

7. sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, or a normal life span)

D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two (or more) of the following:

1. difficulty falling or staying asleep

2. irritability or outbursts of anger

3. difficulty concentrating
4. hypervigilance
5. exaggerated startle response

E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than one month.

F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.

Specify if:
Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than three months
Chronic: if duration of symptoms is three months or more

Specify if:
With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least six months after the stressor
Notes

1/ UN Doc S/25274 [10 February 1992], at Annex I; First Interim Report at paragraphs 65 and 66.

2/ Phase I was intended to involve interviews conducted in all the states of the former Yugoslavia (except for Slovenia, which is part of phase II). Phase II involves interviews conducted in states hosting refugees outside the area.

3/ Including those by innumerable journalists in addition to NGOs such as Amnesty International, Equality Now, Helsinki Watch, the World Council of Churches and intergovernmental organisations such as the European Community (as it then was). Within the United Nations a mission was carried out in January 1993 by medical experts working under the mandate of the Commission on Human Right's Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation in the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 February 1993). See also the Special Rapporteur's most recent report (E/CN.4/1994/47) and the Report of the Secretary General on rape and the abuse of women in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1994/5).


5/ This dissemination approach finds echoes in that used by the Truth Commission for El Salvador in an ultra-sensitive political climate to invite potential victim-witnesses to give information regarding grave acts of violence (a major difference with the current project is its use of the mass media). The Interviews Coordinator directly observed this while acting as a human rights monitor in ONUSAL. Seven thousand statements were received in the Truth Commission's offices as a result of their dissemination campaign; see From Madness to Hope: The Twelve Year War in El Salvador, 1992/1993, at 41 of the original Spanish text.

6/ When teams were to be based outside Zagreb, the Interviews Coordinator set up contacts with NGOs, etc., in the area in advance of the team's arrival. A meeting with all the relevant local actors was set up for the first day of the team's work to introduce the interviewing team and to build on the earlier contacts made to arrange interviews. For this initial meeting, the teams were accompanied by the Interviews Coordinator, Mr. Osorio or Ms. Maja Dranovi (who both have extensive experience in this type of field work) to assist them in this initial period. In addition, to allow the teams time to settle in before they undertook their own scheduling for the succeeding days, interviews for the first few days would sometimes be scheduled there by the Interviews Co-ordinator (through contacts in Zagreb).

7/ Where it was obvious that this was repeatedly happening with a team outside Zagreb, after discussions with the teams involved (who were probably becoming a little frustrated) the Interviews Coordinator would invite them to return to Zagreb where they would join the scheduling programme of the Interviews Coordinator.

8/ It goes without saying that most contact persons use the term "massacre" very loosely to cover everything such as a shell hitting a town to the witness' relative being killed in battle.

9/ This should serve as a reminder of the depth of the suffering of
these victim-witnesses and of the need for utmost concern in working with them.

10/ This is discussed elsewhere, Memorandum from the Interviews Coordinator to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts of 21 March 1994.

11/ Video-taping of witnesses is a particularly sensitive issue in the context of rape victims, and for this additional reason this procedure not be adopted.


13/ These camps were actually located in FRY, in the region of Vojvodina. However, since the population of these camps was primarily from Croatia, they are discussed in this section.

14/ These paragraphs are drawn from the Memorandum of the Investigation Coordinator to the Chairman of the Commission of Experts of 10 January 1994.

15/ See, id.

16/ Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal, invokes the responsibility of superiors where:

"... if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."

17/ The case of Omarska is an interesting one in this context because international journalists obtained permission to visit the camp from the highest levels of the Bosnian Serb leadership. The journalists exposed the horror of the camp and effectively forced its closure. The circumstances of this access given to international journalists should be investigated as it may (or may not) be evidence of a lack of knowledge by superiors of the nature of the camp (otherwise, the argument goes, why would access be granted to the journalists).

18/ In particular, it does not contain contacts for BiH nor for FRY.

19/ Major Bob Moquin (Canada), Zagreb, 28 February 1994, during the briefings for the project participants.

20/ See Memoranda from the Interviews Co-ordinator to the Chairman of the Commission regarding the inherent limits of the Plan of Action dated 10 January 1994; as well as 13 February 1994. Although it should be noted that because of the sheer scale of the project, with 223 interviews carried out, it was possible to achieve some focus, for example, regarding the 19 women interviewed from the Kotor Varoš area.
21/ Although the Interviews Coordinator is not yet aware of how this will function.

22/ This appendix is taken verbatim from Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Fourth ed. American Psychiatric Association ed., 1994).

23/ Id. at 227.

24/ See, id. at 335.

25/ Id. at 684-85.

26/ Id. at 481.

27/ Id. at 626-27.

28/ Id. at 449-50.

29/ Id.

30/ Id. at 427-29.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX IX.B
RAPE PILOT STUDY (SARAJEVO)

Under the Direction of:

William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to

Principal Legal Analyst:

Lieutenant-Colonel K.S. Carter, Consultant to
the Commission of Experts

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. A Cooperation Service Agreement relating to the employment of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team, dated 16 June 1993, and agreed to by the representatives of the United Nations and the Government of Canada, provides the legal framework for a pilot study on the issue of rape to be conducted in Sarajevo.

2. Three people, two military police investigators and one military lawyer conducted the pilot study. All members of this sub-team are female.

3. The rationale for attempting the pilot study in Sarajevo was that the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the League for the Help of Victims of Genocide are located in Sarajevo. During a visit in April by the Commission's Chairman and Rapporteur for On-site Investigations, conversations with members of these groups indicated that they had already collected, and could make available, a substantial amount of information on this issue.

II. OBJECTIVE

4. The original objective of the pilot study was to prepare a report assessing the feasibility of prosecuting alleged perpetrators and, if practicable, their superiors in certain individual rape cases.

III. METHODOLOGY

5. It is useful to outline the actual work done in Sarajevo in order to convey the practical possibilities of such an investigation.

(a) Thursday, 24 June 1993 - the team arrived in Sarajevo in the early afternoon. A meeting was held with the four interpreters assigned to the group. After assessing the linguistic capabilities and temperaments of the interpreters, two women were selected to work on this project. Due to the dangers and difficulties of travelling to and from the Holiday Inn, it was decided that the interpreters should also stay at the hotel. This turned out to be a wise decision, since they were extensively employed in translating statements in the evenings, which would have been impossible outside the hotel due to lack of electricity.

(b) Friday, 25 June 1993 - a morning meeting was held with representatives of the State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the League for the Help of Victims of Genocide. As a result of that meeting, the team received a computer list of the information held by, as understood at the time, the League, which was described as the organization which coordinated all available information on this issue. The list was in Bosnian and divided into five parts: victims, witnesses, incidents, alleged perpetrators, and documents. At that meeting, the team also met Mrs. Azra Smajović the Vice-President of the League and its representative on the BiH War Crimes Commission. Arrangements were made with her to visit the Koševo Clinic, where a number of victims of rape had been treated and where the league files were kept. The team had been informed previously by the On-site Rapporteur that during his and the Chairman's earlier visit the League had stated that it had 89 files on named individuals who had been raped. Mrs. Smajović during this meeting indicated that she believed that only about 15 victims might still be available in Sarajevo for interviews.
(c) **Saturday, 26 June 1993:** Work continued on the translation and inputting of information from the list. In the afternoon, a visit was made to the Koševo Clinic. Dr. Šimić, the Head of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, gave the team a tour of those facilities. He indicated that 24 women had been treated in the past year as a result of rape and five had received abortions. None of them were currently hospitalized. He did, however, introduce the team to a 13-year old girl who he had operated on for a ruptured appendix, but who had suffered other internal injuries as a result of being raped. Dr. Šimić indicated that she was not yet strong enough to be interviewed, but that if we contacted him later in the week he would arrange for an interview. The team then went to another building in the Koševo Clinic complex, which was the headquarters of the League. There the Team met with Mrs. Smajović and Dr. Šadija Hadžisović, a psychologist and the head of the League. After some discussion, we established that the League had only nine files, seven of which related to women who had been raped. These files consisted of a single information sheet which was filled out on the victim. The team was informed that all the same material was available in the files of the Bosnian War Crimes Commission. Arrangements were made to obtain access to the files at the earliest possible date.

(d) **Sunday, 27 June 1993:** All the material was entered into notebook computers provided by the Commission. The team had developed a simplified database programme, based on the Chairman’s information sheets. Unfortunately, even this more simplified version proved unworkable under "field conditions"; consequently, the investigators developed an even simpler, but workable, format. Information was sought from various UN sources regarding the rape issue.

(e) **Monday, 28 June 1993** – the two investigators obtained permission to take the 105 files identified by the Bosnian War Crimes Commission as relating to rape to UNPROFOR Sarajevo Sector to be photocopied. It is perhaps useful to emphasize the great amount of time it takes in Sarajevo to achieve tasks which might take only a few hours in a more normal European or North American context. There were no telephones, in most cases no electricity, and severe restrictions on movement due to sniper fire and shelling, in addition to having to work through interpreters.

(f) **Tuesday, Wednesday, 29-30 June 1993:** Translated and input information from the file.

(g) **Thursday, 1 July 1993:** Investigators conducted an interview of the young girl in the Kosevo Clinic who had been identified as a victim of rape. Dr. Šimić also informed the investigators that another woman who was four months pregnant had just come in that day asking for an abortion. She was identified by him as a rape victim who had been recently exchanged by the Bosnian-Serb authorities as part of a personnel exchange. He indicated that he would speak with her and ask if she would agree to be interviewed. Work also began on correlating the information being translated and input. Two primary candidates for interviewing were selected. Preliminary discussions with representatives of the Bosnian War Crimes Commission and the League indicated that it would be impossible for them to make those two people, or indeed any other victims, available for interviews.

(h) **Friday, 2 July 1993:** A formal request was conveyed to the Bosnian War Crimes Commission that the two victims identified be made available for an interview. It was decided that the best time and location would be 0900h on Monday at the Bosnian War Crimes Commission's offices. The translating and input of information from files continued.

(i) **Saturday, 3 July 1993:** The team was confined to hotel for most of
the day due to heavy shelling. UNPROFOR vehicles were not on the streets. The translation, input and correlation of reports was continued.

(j) Saturday, 4 July 1993: The team leader went to the Koševò Clinic to determine if the woman identified by Dr. Simić was available to be interviewed. Unfortunately, due to the influx of patients as a result of the heavy shelling the day before, she had already been released. The translation, input, and correlation of the reports was continued.

(k) Monday, 5 July 1993: The investigators went to the Bosnian War Crimes Commission offices to conduct the two interviews. Regrettably, the Bosnian War Crimes Commission indicated it had been unable to arrange the interviews. The translation, input, and correlation of reports received was continued.

6. The methodology followed by the team was to first obtain all relevant information in the possession of local groups in order to avoid unnecessary delays and duplication of effort. This material was then translated with priority being given to those files where it was indicated, or seemed most likely, that the victim was still available to be interviewed. The information from these files was then input in a simple, but effective, database to enhance preservation, correlation, and future use of the information. Concurrently, as victims became available, and if they were willing to speak to investigators, interviews were conducted. These interviews were recorded on audio and video tape. It was the intention of the team, had circumstances permitted, to also interview other witnesses to specific incidents.

IV. RESULTS

7. The team acquired a print-out of the BiH War Crimes Commission's database containing all the information identified as relating to the issue of rape. The database is organized into five categories, listing 126 victims, 113 incidents, 252 alleged perpetrators, 73 witnesses, and 100 documents.

8. In addition, the team acquired copies of all the files in the possession of the BiH War Crimes Commission and identified as relating to rape. A total number of 105 were obtained. All the material obtained from the BiH War Crimes Commission was in Bosnian and had to be translated. A first review of these files indicated that approximately eighty relate to allegations of rape. At best, these files consist, of copies of victims' handwritten statements. At worst, they contain a newspaper article or a government statement. The most complete file contains a single statement from a victim or a witness. The information has been translated, input, and incorporated into the analysis of, Annex IX, Rape and Sexual Assault.

9. The team had a video and audio record of the interview of the 13 year-old girl who was identified as a victim of rape.

V. LEGAL ANALYSIS

10. The 1907 Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, recognized as customary international law, provide at article 46: "Family honour and rights, the lives of persons . . . must be respected." It is submitted that in the context and language of the times, this clearly indicates that rape, as a contravention of "family honour," is not permissible conduct.
11. Under Geneva Conventions I and II, Wounded and Sick on Land and Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked at Sea, the protection provided to women from rape is a combination of the prohibition under article 12 against "violence to their persons" and the injunction that they be "treated humanely" and "be treated with all consideration due to their sex."

12. Women combatants are protected against rape while being held as prisoners of war under articles 13 and 14 of Geneva Convention III, which provide:

"Prisoners of war must at all times be treated humanely. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention . . . prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence . . . and against insults . . . . Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their honour. Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex . . . ."

13. This analysis has as its foundation, the opinion of the Commission of Experts, expressed in paragraph 45 of its Interim Report (S/25274) of 10 February 1993 that:

"... the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have concluded among themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law applicable in international armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia."

Even if this were not the case, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a successor state to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as well as Croatia, Slovenia, and BiH, by declaration, are bound by common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibiting ... "violence to life and person . . . [and] ... outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" ... and article 4[2] of Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibiting ... "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular . . . rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault." Rape is a war crime. In conflicts to which international humanitarian law applies, it is prohibited by both customary law and specific treaties.

14. It is only in Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War that rape is specifically and directly prohibited. Article 27 provides: "Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault." Any such act which "wilfully causes great suffering or serious injury to body or health" constitutes a grave breach under article 146 of Geneva Convention IV.

15. Articles 75 and 76 of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain specific prohibitions against rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault of any woman, whether a combatant or a non-combatant. These articles prohibit:

"... outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault . . . threats to commit any of the foregoing acts . . . . Women shall be the object of special respect
and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault.”

16. As breaches of international humanitarian law, rape and those offences associated with it, in addition to constituting domestic offences, are clearly punishable under the domestic legislation of the former republics of Yugoslavia to the extent that legislation incorporates, in particular, the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.

17. To the extent that rape and those other offences associated with it constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I, other States, pursuant to article 147 of Geneva Convention IV and articles 80, 88 and 89 of Protocol I, are required to take prosecutorial action in regard to those persons against whom a case has been made. Alternatively, those States have a duty to cooperate in extraditing such persons.

18. Most recently, a number of such offences have been identified as falling within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal, established to try serious war crimes committed in the territory of the former republics of Yugoslavia since January 1991.

19. The essential elements of the offences of rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault are not specified in the applicable law. It is suggested that it is reasonable to take the approach that rape requires evidence of vaginal penetration, but that indecent assault encompasses all other forms of sexual assault on both male and female persons. Enforced prostitution of female persons is prohibited under both Geneva Convention IV and Protocol I. Enforced prostitution of male persons is only directly prohibited under Protocol I, though a strong argument can be made that such a prohibition is incorporated under a more general heading. The essential element of enforced prostitution would appear to be the forcing of an individual to engage in various forms of sexual relations with a number of partners. It is considered that there is no requirement for an "exchange" of services of a sexual nature for benefits. There is however a distinction between enforced prostitution and multiple acts of rape. The former would be more appropriately charged when an individual is held for a period of time by an individual, several individuals, or an organization and forced to engage in sexual relations with multiple partners. Individuals, themselves, might not actually rape a victim, but could nevertheless be involved in keeping them in a situation of enforced prostitution. The individuals who engaged in sexual acts with a victim of enforced prostitution might also be charged with rape or indecent assault.

20. The responsibility for such violations of international humanitarian law would rest with the individual perpetrators, but also, through the doctrine of command responsibility, with those higher in the chain of command who not only organized or condoned such action but also those who failed to deter or punish such action by troops or other individuals under their command. The standard commanders will be held to is: did they know, or ought they to have known (a wilful blindness/recklessness standard) that such actions were occurring and, being in a position or otherwise obligated to prevent such violations, did they fail to take the appropriate action.

VI. PROSECUTION DIFFICULTIES

21. Rape and other associated offences of a sexual nature are notoriously underreported in almost every society. This underreporting is exacerbated in direct proportion to the degree a society denigrates a victim for the offence perpetrated upon him or her. This cultural impact must be taken into account when trying to obtain reports of rapes, as well as while conducting interviews
with the victims and seeking the agreement of the victims to testify before a tribunal or similar body.

22. In order to obtain reports of rape incidents from victims it is recommended that long-term contacts be established with medical, social, and religious organizations, which may be more readily contacted by victims and which could assist them during the traumatic decision to report the rape and process of reporting. It is also recommended that a standard method of obtaining information from, and tracking the location of, victims and witnesses be developed in conjunction with such organizations in order to maximize the preservation and usefulness of the initial reports received.

23. Consideration must be given as to whether a victim's identity can be fully protected before and during trial proceedings, and whether a victim's testimony can, in some cases, be given outside a tribunal setting (i.e. in another location, or in a "commission evidence" setting).

24. It would also be useful to explore the extent to which the culture of a particular victim would permit testimony relating to other rapes and sexual assaults which she or he may have witnessed, even if the victim will not testify to what happened to her or himself.

25. Even with victims who are willing to give statements or testimony, there may be severe difficulties in obtaining from them sufficient details to substantiate convictions. For example, with relatively young and/or innocent victims with no prior sexual knowledge and/or experience, obtaining a description of what happened to them can be very difficult. There is a lack of concepts and terminology and a description may be: "then many men hurt me down there". It is recommended that techniques such as the use of anatomically-correct dolls be relied upon in interviews once it is established this is culturally acceptable.

26. A consequence of such difficulties is that the completion and retention of medical documents substantiating reports of rape become even more vital.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

27. The most important lessons learned from this pilot study are:

(a) although the information obtained from the Bosnian War Crimes Commission is a useful starting point, it is neither as extensive nor as comprehensive as the team was led to believe. Also it was not being gathered and organized to assist in conducting investigations of offences nor in preparing prosecutions;

(b) information is available from a variety of sources, both local and international (i.e. UNPROFOR) but it is considerably less than "advertised". In addition, it is not being preserved, collected, and organized with the idea that it be useful for prosecution. To achieve that goal, dedicated personnel, most effectively those with police investigatory and law of armed conflict backgrounds, should be deployed as soon as possible in a pre-prosecution investigatory phase; and

(c) small teams, including a high proportion of female personnel, deployed for extended periods in specific geographic locations would be the most effective means of gathering such information.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

Under the Direction of:

M. Cherif Bassiouni
Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of Facts, Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Because of the large scale of victimization in the Yugoslav conflict, many persons are buried in individual and mass graves. The mass graves report attempts to identify and provide relevant information concerning any and all alleged mass graves in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This study is not designed to classify sites based on their prosecutorial potential, but to provide a factual description, and whenever possible, some analysis of the mass graves reported to be in existence as of 30 April 1994. It should be noted that the reporting or existence of a mass grave does not necessarily imply that a war crime has been committed.

2. It is significant to note that further study of mass graves should be made for three reasons:

   (a) A mass gravesite is a potential repository of evidence of mass killings of civilians and POWs. Such sites can yield forensic information which can provide evidence or insight into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of those buried there.

   (b) The manner and method by which a mass grave is created may itself be a breach of the Geneva Conventions, as well as a violation of the customary regulations of armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions require parties to a conflict to search for the dead and to prevent their bodies and remains from being despoiled. For every deceased person who falls into the hands of the adverse party, the adverse party must record, prepare, and forward all identification information, death certificates and personal effects to the appropriate parties. Parties to a conflict must also ensure that deceased persons are autopsied and buried in individual graves, as far apart as circumstances permit. Bodies should not be cremated except for hygiene reasons or for the religious reasons of the deceased. Interment should be carried out in an honourable fashion, according to the religious rites of the deceased. Victims should be grouped by nationality and their graves maintained and marked so that they can be easily found.

   (c) The identification of mass graves can serve a reconciliatory purpose between the "warring factions", so that the families of those killed during the conflict can learn the whereabouts of their loved ones.

3. This report is divided into two sections. The first section is the summary analysis and the second section consists of factual descriptions of all reported gravesites and analysis by geographic location. The Summary Analysis, in Section II below, discusses the methodology of the report, defines relevant terms, and tracks the following information: total number of graves; number of graves in each geographic region; number of graves by ethnicity of victim and of perpetrator; number of graves containing a given range of bodies; number of graves where information suggests the bodies were victims of mass killings; number of graves near detention facilities, and so forth. In addition, this section will discuss patterns, trends, and commonalities which have manifested themselves in the various reports of mass grave sites.

4. The Analysis By Geographic Location, in Section II(B) below, describes gravesites by county and is organized alphabetically. The 1991 population and ethnic distribution information is provided for each county, as well as a brief summary of military activity in the region, if available. Many of the counties reported multiple mass graves. The section also contains the following:

   (a) All identified gravesites in that county are then discussed in
detail. A full description of the location of the grave is given, along with all known relevant events leading up to the creation of the gravesite. Ethnicities of victims and perpetrators are identified; however, names of victims have been redacted to protect their identities as well as those of their families. The names of some perpetrators reportedly involved in the events surrounding the mass grave are known, but not disclosed.

(b) Other information includes the number of bodies buried in the grave, how the grave was created, and any investigations, visual sightings or forensic explorations of the grave and data gained therefrom.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary analysis

5. For the purposes of this report, "grave" is defined as any site which:
1) is intended as a place of permanent interment; and 2) has physical characteristics which prevent the bodies from being moved by the natural elements. Accordingly, rivers do not fall within the definition of mass graves for this report, nor do groups of bodies left to decompose on forest floors. "Mass" is defined as any group of two or more persons sharing the common place of interment. "County" is defined as a region known as an "opština". An opština is larger than a municipality or town, and includes smaller villages and hamlets which surround the larger cities. "Ethnicity of perpetrator" is defined as the ethnicity or religious affiliation of the party responsible for the deaths that led to the creation of a mass grave. In many instances, the party responsible for the killing is not the party directly involved in creating the mass grave. This would occur in a situation where civilians were killed and their neighbors had no choice but to bury them in mass graves, due to time, sanitary, or safety considerations.

6. Reports of mass graves are entered into the IHRLI database. The database generates a separate screen for each reported mass grave and tracks all relevant information available about each site.

7. When a report of a mass grave is received by the database, it is cross-checked against any factual information already on hand to avoid duplication. If the report contains data on a gravesite previously identified in the database, any new data is incorporated into the active file in the database. If the report concerns a new mass grave, a file is opened for that grave. The purpose of the files is to develop and organize information for analysis and track corroborative accounts of mass graves.

8. This report is based on over 10,000 pages of source information received and database incidents developed by IHRLI. This information is submitted by a variety of sources, including UN organizations, member states, governments of the warring factions, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The substance of the information received varies from general reports of patterns of activity in the former Yugoslavia to detailed witness accounts, which describe specific incidents at length.

9. Based on the available information, there are four general types of mass graves which exist in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The first type is a gravesite where the bodies were victims of a mass killing but the method and manner of burial were proper. The second type is a gravesite where the bodies were those of civilian casualties or soldiers killed in combat, and therefore not unlawful killings, but the method and manner of burial were improper. The third type includes gravesites where the bodies were victims of a mass killing and the method and manner of burial were improper. Finally,
the fourth type includes gravesites where neither the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the victims nor the manner and method of burial were improper.

10. The number of mass graves reported to exist is as follows:

(a) 38 counties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia contain a total of 187 alleged mass grave sites, with 143 in BiH and 44 in Croatia;

(b) Over half of the sites in Croatia (27) are located in the eastern region of the republic, comprising the counties of Vukovar, Osijek, and Vinkovci; and

(c) Over half the sites (79) in BiH are located in the north-western quarter of the republic, comprising the counties of Prijedor, Ključ, Kotor Varoš, Sanski Most, and others.

11. The number of bodies said to be contained in the graves are as follows:

(a) 25 contain at least 10 bodies;
(b) 16 contain at least 10-20 bodies;
(c) 29 sites contain at least 20-50 bodies;
(d) 22 contain at least 50-100 bodies;
(e) 20 contain at least 100-500 bodies;
(f) 13 contain at least 500 bodies;

(g) Reports on 62 of the gravesites did not specify the number of bodies buried at the site. For more accurate analysis, reports which contained allegations that "thousands" of individuals are buried at a certain site, without a more concrete number, were classified as "unspecified". Likewise, those reports which claimed that a given number of people were killed in a location, but did not refer to that number in discussing the subsequent burial, are classified as "unspecified"; and

(g) Many persons tend to report large numbers of persons buried in mass graves on the basis of numbers of missing persons, rather than numbers of those killed. This was the case in Sector West, in Pakračka Poljana, where 1,700 bodies were alleged to have been buried. In all, 19 bodies were found by the Commission, at which point the Krajina authorities suggested that 2,500 bodies were actually buried in Marino Selo, a few kilometres away.

12. The ethnicity of the victims buried in reported mass graves are as follows:

(a) 65 are said to contain at least some Muslims;
(b) 32 are said to contain at least some Croatians;
(c) 19 are said to contain at least some Serbs; and
(d) 81 sites did not have the ethnicity of the victims specified. It should be noted that many of the gravesites are said to contain victims from more than one ethnic group, usually Muslims and Croatians. Where a mass grave is alleged to have victims of multiple ethnicities, the site is counted twice,
once for each ethnicity reported.

13. The ethnicity of perpetrators responsible for killing persons buried in mass graves are as follows:

(a) Persons buried in 81 of the reported gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Serbs;

(b) Persons buried in 16 of the gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Croatians;

(c) Persons buried in five of the gravesites are alleged to have been killed by Muslims; and

(d) Of the reports, 87 of the reports did not identify a perpetrator. Where the ethnicity of the perpetrator was not clearly established from the data, sites are classified as having an unspecified perpetrator, despite one ethnic group's clear military control of the region. 13/

14. Of the reported sites, 54 of the reported sites are at or near detention facilities. This comports with the data that suggests many of the victims buried in mass graves were prisoners who died or were killed at detention facilities run by an adversarial ethnic group.

15. Over half (99) of the alleged gravesites appear to contain victims of mass killings. In these instances, the source information clearly detailed the circumstances of the killing 14/ or provided witness testimony about the deaths of the victims.

16. There are several trends which appear throughout the report of mass graves in both BiH and Croatia, including Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, such as Krajina and Eastern and Western Slavonia. The first is the coexistence of mass graves and detention facilities. Mass graves are frequently reported in areas where numerous identified detention facilities were located and where many individuals were reportedly killed. This coexistence suggests that mass graves were and are deliberately being used as a means of secretly disposing of the bodies of those persons unlawfully killed. 15/ Some of these persons may have been killed in detention, while others were killed in the course of "ethnic cleansing". 16/ This is particularly true in the counties of Brčko, Poča, Pakrac, and Prijedor.

17. A second trend concerns the manner in which the graves are created. After a mass killing, the occupying troops or detention camp guards will often select a handful of civilians or prisoners to assist with loading dead bodies onto trucks to transport them to a burial site. Other prisoners are forced to actually dig the grave in which the dead are to be buried, usually with their bare hands or shovels. After the transport or excavation is completed, the prisoners or civilians are also killed and thrown into the grave with the dead bodies, presumably to eliminate any potential witnesses to the killings and subsequent burials. Lack of available witnesses also accounts for the poor quality of information about many of the gravesites.

18. A third trend appearing from the data concerns a blatant disregard for the rites of a proper burial. Most of the dead in mass graves are neither placed in coffins nor wrapped in any sort of protective material. In many cases, the victims are not identified by name, or registered as dead before burial. 17/ These actions deny the dead a dignified burial and effectively prevent the families of those killed in the conflict from ever tracing their whereabouts.
19. A fourth trend suggested by the data concerns the burial site itself. There is a pattern whereby perpetrators dispose of bodies in pre-existing but non-traditional sites, which provide a ready-made place for body disposal without the use of mechanical diggers or excavators. Dead bodies are frequently thrown in mineshafts, canals, quarries, landfills, caves and the like. In addition, these are the types of sites where bodies are said to be buried in large numbers as opposed to small numbers, possibly because it is easier to effectuate the burial of many people if the need for actual excavation is eliminated.

20. A fifth pattern appearing from the data is the delay or denial of burial by the occupying forces. In many instances, dead bodies will be left on streets, lawns or forests for days or weeks, forcing the surviving civilian population to view the devastation. When villagers attempt to bury the bodies themselves, they are often prevented by the opposing faction or must risk their own lives to do so.

21. A sixth trend is the circumvention of interment altogether. Victims' bodies have been disposed of in a variety of ways which do not embrace actual interment in a grave, be it real or makeshift. The most common non-burial method of disposal is the dumping of bodies into rivers. The Danube, Sava, Sana, and Drina Rivers have all been reported to contain the bodies of killed persons. Some victims have allegedly had their stomachs slit and filled with sand so the bodies remain submerged once in the river. Also, many persons were reportedly burned in ovens or gathered into homes and set ablaze.

22. Many of the methods of burial or disposal of bodies are designed to instill fear and intimidate the civilian population still living in contested areas. This is particularly true in the case of bodies dumped in rivers, where the population downstream is forced to witness masses of bodies floating in the water. When bodies are buried, they are often placed in very shallow graves or merely covered with a layer of dirt, so that body parts often surface during inclement weather. Another example of a burial designed to provoke fear is in Blagaj, located in Prijedor county, where bodies were buried only from the waist down, so that passers-by were forced to view a line of decomposing persons.

23. Many of the attacks which led to the creation of mass graves in BiH occurred in late April, May and June of 1992. This is particularly true in the south-east quarter of BiH, which includes Foča, Gacko, Rogatica and Vlasenica; the north-east quarter of BiH, including Brčko and Žvornik; and the north-west quarter of BiH, which includes Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Kotor Vasoš.

24. Mass graves in many regions appear to be the final phase in an "ethnic cleansing" process. Mass graves are usually found in sectors where forces have followed a distinct pattern of expulsion: the county is attacked by artillery; infantry troops enter the villages and force villagers from their homes, during which time many are killed. Once the houses are emptied, they are looted and burned. Those villagers who are still alive are rounded up and the men are separated from the women, children and elderly. These villagers are either killed, deported or detained; in any event, they rarely return to the village from which they came. The bodies of those killed during the initial expulsion, subsequent detention, or expulsion after release are often deposited in mass graves in and around the area where they were killed or died from torture or other wise.
B. Analysis by geographic location

1. Bijeljina County 21/

25. Bijeljina county represents the north-eastern-most corner of BiH. The county of Bijeljina is situated 40 kilometres east-south-east of Brčko, and 10 kilometres east of the Drina River. The 1991 census calculated the population of Bijeljina at 96,796 persons, comprising 59.4 per cent Serbs, 31.3 per cent Muslims, 4.4 per cent Yugoslavs, and 4.9 per cent "other". 22/

26. Serb forces, including Arkan's men, entered Bijeljina on 1 April 1992, and gave residing Muslims until 7 April to surrender any weapons they had, assuring them that nothing would happen to them. 23/ After midnight on 8 April Serbs began to enter selected Muslim houses. By the first week of May half of the non-Serb population of Bijeljina had fled; however, on 7 May Serb authorities forbade anyone from leaving the city. 24/ As of 11 May, the Serb forces still had not destroyed the city. 25/

Gravesites

27. Bijeljina: Someone from Bijeljina reported that random killings took place during the first week of Serb aggression against the town of Bijeljina. 26/ She said that people killed by automatic weapons (and not shells) were lying in the street, and were picked up by the garbage collection service to be carried to the Drina River. 27/ She further related how families had been killed in their homes, which prompted people to begin burying their relatives or others they knew in their own gardens. Bodies were also taken off the street for burial. 28/

28. Novo Selo - Animal Disposal Site: 29/ Novo Selo is a town located approximately 10 kilometres to the south of Bijeljina and is .5 kilometres east of the Drina River, with an estuary, the Janja River, bisecting the centre of town. According to one report, Arkan's units and local Serbian soldiers killed an estimated 1,000 Muslims. They threw some of the bodies into the Drina River and buried an unknown number in an animal disposal site north-west of Novo Selo. 30/

29. Hills of Brijesnica: The hills of Brijesnica are located near the village of Brijesnica, which is approximately three kilometres east of Bijeljina. One account states that following the initial raid on Bijeljina, which took place during the first week of April 1992, Serbs would take the mutilated bodies of those they had killed to the low, forested hills of Brijesnica. There, they threw the corpses into open pits and covered them with dirt. Other corpses were taken by truck at night and dumped into the Drina River. 31/

30. Batković Prison Camp - Cow Stable: 32/ The town of Batković is located 10 kilometres north of Bijeljina, where a prison camp reportedly existed at the dead end of a road approximately one kilometre north of the town. Most deaths would occur at night and corpses were normally wrapped in sheets and then removed by a military truck every morning. 33/

31. A witness stated that there was a mass grave located next to the Batković prison camp. At least 15 bodies were buried next to a cow stable that stood approximately 200 metres south-west of the camp's nine buildings. The cow stable was 50 metres long and 10 metres wide, and was constructed of stone on the bottom half and wood on the upper half. The prisoners at Batković neither knew the identity of those buried at the stable nor the circumstances of their deaths. 34/
2. Bosanski Brc

32. Bosanski Brc is in northern BiH. The Sava River constitutes its northern border, with Slavonski Brodu on the opposite side in Croatia. The county contains 33,962 persons, 41 per cent of which were Croatian, 33.8 per cent were Serbian, 12.2 per cent were Muslim, 10.6 were Yugoslav and 2.4 per cent were "other".

33. Military activity in Bosanski Brod began on 18 April 1992, when ZNG units crossed the Sava River from Croatia. Villagers fled to the forest surrounding the towns which had not yet been attacked. Those who did not escape were killed or taken by the Croatian forces to detention facilities, including the football stadium at Bosanski Brod.

34. There is only one report of a mass grave in this county. A resident of Bosanski Brod was imprisoned and detained at the football stadium, along with a relative. The witness learned from other detainees that the relative was killed during detention. The witness alleged that those who were killed "in this way" were buried in the garden of Luka Krkac, near an embankment along the Sava River.

3. Bosanska Dubica

35. The county of Bosanska Dubica is located in north-western BiH, on the border with Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the county had a population of 31,577 persons, of whom 69.1 per cent were Serbian, 20.5 per cent were Muslim, 5.6 per cent were Yugoslav, and 4.6 per cent were "other".

36. Hrvatska Dubica is the site of an alleged mass grave. It is unclear whether this village is actually located in Bosanska Dubica, but the county is referred to in the report.

37. On 15 September 1991, Serbs reportedly killed 85 people, mostly elderly, at a location called "Bačina". The bodies were then thrown into an old mine situated on Zelina hill. The murders were allegedly ordered by a high ranking public official.

4. Bosanski Novi

38. Bosanski Novi is located in north-western BiH, just west of Prijedor county. According to the 1991 census, Bosanski Novi contained 41,541 persons, of whom 60.4 per cent were Serbian, 33.9 per cent were Muslim, 3.7 per cent were Yugoslav and 2 per cent were "other". There are several reports of mass graves in this county.

39. Blagaj. Blagaj is situated in the Japra valley, in a strategic location between Prijedor and Bosanski Novi, and is almost exclusively Muslim. It appears that the village was attacked and occupied by Serb forces in late April or early May of 1992. Eventually, the town became a sort of refugee centre for as many as 7,000 Muslims, despite the fact that the city continued to be attacked and under blockade.

40. There are two separate reports regarding mass graves in Blagaj. The numbers of those buried are identical, as is the place of burial. However, the dates of the burials in the reports are different, as is the manner of burial. Thus, the two accounts will be discussed separately.

41. According to a State Department report, Serb soldiers read 200 names
from a list of men in Blagaj whose relatives had joined the fighting against Serb forces. These men were gathered together, taken to an open field next to the AliSi school building, and shot with automatic weapons. Another group of persons was then given shovels and ordered to dig two parallel trenches, two metres apart, in the field. Each was 100 metres long, one metre deep and 50 centimetres wide. The prisoners were then told to bury the corpses upright and only from the waist down, so that the upper half of the bodies would still be visible. The bodies remained this way for 10 days, and the stench from decomposition was so bad that the Bosnian Serb forces pulled out to the high ground surrounding the village. On 12 May 1992, they moved back into the village and, using heavy machinery, buried the bodies in a mass grave at an unspecified location.

42. Helsinki Watch interviewed another man who was involved in the events in Blagaj. This man noted that in mid-June, Serb soldiers came out with a list of 250 Muslims who were to be deported from Blagaj to Svodna, a nearby Serb village. The remaining people were separated by gender and put on cattle cars. During this operation, 200 people were killed. The source did not observe the killing but said his relative observed four to five corpses on the road back to Blagaj. The following morning, he saw soldiers digging trenches with bulldozers near the school and loading corpses onto tractors. There were two large trenches near the school, each 10 to 20 metres long. It is possible that the trenches that the source's relative observed were those dug by the Bosnian Serbs after they returned to the village. However, the first account says that burial took place in mid-May, not June, as the source's sister believed.

43. Agici: There is an alleged mass grave in Agici, which is situated four kilometres from the Japra River in Prijedor County. According to a witness, a group of 50 Serbians from the village forced all the Muslim civilians from their homes on 22 June 1992. The Muslims were taken to a graveyard which was one kilometre from the village, in the direction of the Japra valley. The men were separated from the women, and the Serbs began beating some of the men. Around midnight, two farm tractors came to the graveyard and transported the women and children to Bosanski Novi. The 25 men who remained at the graveyard, along with the two Muslim drivers of the farm tractors, were never seen again. A Serbian backhoe operator later told the women villagers that he had been sent to the graveyard to bury the bodies of the men, who were killed after being forced to dig their own graves.

5. Bosanski Petrovac 45/

44. Bosanski Petrovac is in north-western BiH, only 20 miles from the western border between BiH and Croatia. According to the 1991 census, the county claimed a total of 15,552 persons, of whom 75.2 per cent were Serbian, 21.1 per cent were Muslim, and 3.7 per cent were "other".

45. Bosanski Petrovac came under the control of Serb forces in the spring of 1992. Many of the Muslim men in the village were sent to one of two places: a makeshift camp in the "Kozile" woods or to Drvar. Most of the detainees were released or exchanged in the summer of 1992. Bosanski Petrovac is near Ključ, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Banja Luka, sites where numerous Serb-run detention facilities allegedly have operated during the late spring and summer of 1992.

46. In September of 1992, Muslims killed 15 Serbian troops in Bihać, northwest of Bosanski Petrovac. This reportedly sparked a wave of mass killings of Muslims in Banja Luka and Bosanski Petrovac. After these mass killings, a Muslim leader appealed to the local Serbs in control of Bosanski Petrovac and
requested permission to evacuate 2,500 Muslims to Travnik. The leader of the SDS agreed, and the evacuation took place on 24 September. The county's proximity, both to detention facilities where thousands of persons were allegedly killed, as well as to the city of Bihać, may have been the reason mass graves were created there.

Gravesites

47. Didovići: This mass killing was carried out on 21 September 1992, when approximately 100 Muslims were shot to death. Some of the bodies were buried in the town's only cemetery, 44/ but most were buried in a mass grave in the town's Didovići section. The refugee who provided information regarding the mass killing did not know the grave's exact location. 46/

48. Bosanski Petrovac Cave: A cave in Bosanski Petrovac county, approximately 10 kilometres from the town proper, on the road to Ključ and near Bravsko, was allegedly used as a burial site. A number of Bosnian refugees informed the US State Department about this site. According to the refugees, the site was used to bury Bosnian Muslims killed in Prijedor, Ključ, Sanica, and Bosanski Petrovac. The number of bodies contained at this site was not known. 49/

6. Brčko

49. The county of Brčko is located in north-eastern BiH. The Sava River borders Brčko on the north and east, and Croatia sits on the opposite side of the Sava. According to the 1991 census, Brčko county had a population of 87,332 persons, 44.4 per cent of whom were Muslim, 25.4 per cent were Croatian, 20.8 per cent were Serbian and 6.4 per cent of the inhabitants identified themselves as "Yugoslavs". 51/

50. Military activity in Brčko began on 30 April 1992, when Serb forces blew up a bridge across the Sava River as a group of Muslim refugees was attempting to cross. 52/ A number of refugees were killed. Fighting in Brčko itself commenced the following day, as Serb reservists from Bijeljina launched artillery fire into the Muslim parts of the city. Concurrent with the artillery attacks, local Serbs began arresting their Muslim and Croatian neighbors. "Arkan's" men would transport the prisoners to various detention facilities around the city. 53/ On 8 May 1992, many of the prisoners were taken to a warehouse complex in the old "Luka" port, which was reportedly where thousands of Muslim and Croatian prisoners were beaten, tortured and/or killed during 1992. 54/

51. Along with other persons killed during the attacks on Brčko, these prisoners were disposed of in a variety of ways, including burial in at least seven mass gravesites. None of the sites seem to be sites of legitimate burial. The method and manner of the burials suggest impropriety, as do the circumstances causing the deaths of the victims. 55/ All of the gravesites appear to be within a few kilometres of the city of Brčko itself, as opposed to the small, surrounding villages.

Gravesites

52. Brčko City Dump: The Brčko City Dump is located three kilometres outside of the city of Brčko, off the road to Bijeljina. Many individuals who were killed on the streets of Brčko, as well as those who were killed during detention, are said to be buried at this facility. 56/
53. **Brčko Brick Factory**: The brick factory is two kilometres from Brčko, along the road to Lončari. Victims of the killings in Brčko are said to be buried at this site as well. 57/

54. **Brčko Town Cemetery**: One report estimates that 3,000 men, women, and children were killed while imprisoned at Luka Camp. The report notes that corpses were taken away from the camp in refrigerator trucks to the town cemetery and buried in shallow graves. Specific information as to the number of bodies buried there, or the location of the cemetery was not provided. 58/

55. **Bimex Agricultural Complex**: The Bimex complex is located about three kilometres east of Brčko. 53/ According to a witness, there were 32 Muslims and six Croats performing forced labour there. 60/ Approximately 200 metres from the farm, a pit was dug. It was three to four metres wide, 30 metres long and two metres deep. The gravesite can be reached by driving east from Brčko for 1.5 kilometres, a bridge sits across a brook. The grave sits alongside the brook, 70 metres from the right-hand side of the bridge. The witness noted that corpses of men, women, and children were brought to the pit in two refrigerator trucks. The bodies were thrown into the pit and covered with a white substance which smelled like chlorine. 61/ When the unloading was complete, the truck drivers would clean the trucks at the fire hydrant. Once the pit was full, the Serbs brought a front-end loader to the site and covered it with dirt, then with the ruins of the Brčko mosque and another layer of dirt. The grave was then rolled flat and grass was planted. Witness estimated that there were 200 or more bodies at this location.

56. A second witness said that he often passed three large pits, each at least 15 metres long, at the site to which bodies were taken by a truck. The truck had license number BC519-15. 62/ A former prisoner of Luka camp said that as many as 1,000 killings took place between 2 and 22 May 1992, after which the bodies were buried at Bimex. 63/

57. A textile worker from Brčko provided further detail regarding the grave in the Bimex area. He claimed that many of the people who were killed at Luka, as well as Muslims and Croatians buried at two other Serb-run detention facilities in the area, were buried in a series of four mass graves off of the road between Brčko and Brezovo Polje. The sites sit in a wooded area which is between the road and the Sava River. 64/ It cannot be determined whether this site and the site described as being 200 metres from Bimex are the same. However, if the road on which Bimex is situated is 500 metres from the Sava, and the gravesite is between the road and the river, it would seem, then, that the site would be approximately 200 metres from the Bimex complex. 65/

58. **Luka Camp Garbage Dump**: Many of those killed at Luka Camp were transported to the camp garbage dump or to an area just behind their living quarters. 66/ Detainees were recruited by camp personnel to take the bodies from the site at which they were killed to one of these two places. While this was occurring, those prisoners who had "volunteered" to carry the bodies were often shot themselves. Some of the victims may have still been alive when placed in the dump.

59. **Serbian Police Station**: The Serbian police station in Brčko, located on Majevićka Brigada street, was another site where prisoners from the Luka Camp were sent to dump bodies of those killed during detention. It is unclear whether an actual burial site exists at this location, as no other information about the site was provided. 67/
Other means of disposal

60. Although many of those killed in Brčko during 1992 were put in actual burial sites, the bodies of thousands of others were disposed of in less traditional and, arguably, more brutal ways. During the initial weeks that the Luka Camp was operating, those killed during detention were thrown into the Sava River. Others were thrown into a well, which emptied into the Sava. When bodies began resurfacing in other locations, camp personnel began making slits in the corpses and filling them with sand so as to keep them submerged. 68/

61. After May, 69/ bodies were transported to the "Kafilerija" factories. A witness stated that trucks drove bodies into one of the factory buildings, in which three industrial-sized cooking vats with furnaces were housed. The bodies were dumped inside the building, and the "Četniks" would remove jewelry as well as gold or silver fillings from the bodies. Fingers would be cut off if it was difficult to remove rings from them.

Three of Seselj's men guarded the facility. Later, the bodies were reportedly dumped in the furnaces and burnt, after which they were put through a process which ground the bodies into cattle feed. 70/

62. The witness stated that three trucks were involved in the transport to Kafilerija. They left every morning at 4:00 a.m. One was a civilian refrigerator truck which contained the dead bodies. The second carried 10 to 12 other prisoners, who assisted in the loading and unloading. The third contained Četnik guards. Once these three trucks arrived at Kafilerija, other trucks would proceed there throughout the day, each carrying approximately 20 bodies. 71/ Another report noted that the influx of bodies to the farm was so great that eventually bodies were buried in mass graves or compressed by garbage trucks and taken to dumpsites. 72/

63. In addition, other prisoners, particularly Muslims, were reportedly taken to the dog pound in Brčko, where they were cremated. 73/ One report says this began occurring after 16 May. The dog pound is located on the road from Brčko to the Interplet factory. No details regarding the number of victims were provided. 74/

7. Doboj 75/

64. Doboj county is located in north-eastern BiH. Its northernmost area is the county of Bosanski Brod, which sits on the border with Croatia. According to the 1991 census, Doboj contained 102,546 persons, of whom 40.2 per cent were Muslim, 39 per cent were Serb, 13 per cent were Croatian, 5.5 per cent were "Yugoslav" and 2.3 per cent were "other".

65. Serb forces occupied the county of Doboj in May of 1992, and shelling of the villages began. 76/ Initially civilians were allowed to leave the county, but many remained. On 10 May 1992, the Serbs forced all remaining villagers to leave their homes and to turn over their weapons. Houses were looted and burned. When everyone had been expelled, the Serb soldiers separated the men from the women and children. The women and children were taken away on buses, while the men were left behind. 77/ According to one report, the village of Sjenina, north-east of Doboj proper, was turned into a detention camp, where draft-age men were kept and movement across village lines was not allowed. 78/
Gravesites

66. **Sjenina & Gra?ska Cemetery:** Civilians from the two villages of Sjenina and Gra?ska fled into the forest when the occupation of Doboj began. When they attempted to return to their homes, they were rounded up by Serb irregulars. They were told that they would be taken to Doboj by bus, but were forced to march there instead. Forty-five individuals, however, were kept aside and not made part of the convoy. These 45 persons, both male and female, were taken to the cemetery near the mosque and forced to dig graves. When the graves were completed, the people were shot with automatic weapons and pushed into the grave. Afterwards, the grave was filled in and leveled with earthmoving equipment.

67. **Jabo?i? Polje, Pridjel and ?evarlije:** Mass graves are reported to exist in the villages of Jabo?i? Polje, Pridjel, and ?evarlije. No details regarding the precise locations of these gravesites were provided in the report.

68. **Fo?a**

The county of Fo?a is located in south-eastern BiH on the Drina River. According to the 1991 census, the population of Fo?a was 40,513 persons, of which 51.6 per cent was Muslim, 45.3 per cent Serbian, and 3.1 per cent was classified as "other".

69. Fo?a was seized by Serb forces in the early April 1992 Serbian offensive. On 8 April 1992, unidentified Bosnian Serb units attacked Fo?a and took many facilities. At 10:30 a.m. on 8 April, an unknown number of uniformed Serbian male and female citizens of Fo?a expelled both Serbian and non-Serbian residents of the town from their homes. After being taken to initial screening stations, the Muslims were taken to two warehouses in the industrial sector of Fo?a and the Serbs were told to move to outlying villages, where they would be safe from any future combat. After two weeks, Muslims were sent to detention centres. Then, after an interval varying from a few weeks to two months, armed men in uniforms, either police reserves, militia men, or other paramilitary forces, combed the villages conducting house-to-house "interrogations". The men were often sent to camps, while the women were forced to stay in or around Fo?a and were frequently raped. A witness reported that Serbs attacked her village of Tro?anj on 3 June, and about 50 people, mostly women, were taken in trucks to a workers' barracks called Buk Bijela. Many people were allegedly killed and many alleged mass graves have been reported in the county of Fo?a.

**Gravesites**

70. **Tito Sign:** The "Tito" sign is a sign commemorating the late Marshal Tito, located on a hill overlooking Fo?a. A woman reported that she saw a group of persons, a number of whom were members of the Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA), being driven up to the sign in a yellow mini-van. She saw the Serbs make the group strip, take their money and identification cards, and then saw them kill the Muslims with knives. The woman saw the mini-van bringing other people to the same site where they were killed in a similar fashion over a four to five day period and she believes there is a mass grave under the "Tito" sign.

71. **Outdoor Stadium:** The same witness who reported the mass grave under the "Tito" sign reported that there are two to three mass graves near
the outdoor stadium in Foča. 95/ NO details regarding how many people are buried there were provided.

72. **Potato Field:** On 4 May 1992, eight Muslims were lined up and shot by unidentified Bosnian Serb soldiers in Jelec. 97/ The bodies were buried in a potato field, south-west of the only house in the area, by the individual who found the survivor of the shooting and another person. The nearby house was located approximately one kilometre west of Jelec, in an area called Luka, and was 1.3 kilometres east of Drač. It was used as a vacation home and was the only structure on the southern side of a creek, about 50 metres south of a small bridge. 98/

73. **Creek Bank 99/:** On 4 May 1992, a group of Bosnian Serb soldiers shot a group of eight Muslims in Jelec. 100/ One Muslim survived the shooting. 101/ The bodies were buried at the base of a creek bank, on the northern side of the creek, approximately 300 metres south-west of the mass grave in the potato field near the vacation house discussed above. 102/

74. **Aharine, Muslim Cemetery:** Muslims living in the town of Aharine, a small town approximately 1.5 kilometres south-west of Foča, reported that a mass grave had been dug with a bulldozer in a Muslim cemetery and over 20 bodies had been interred there by unidentified uniformed Serbs from Foča in the summer of 1992. 103/ The grave is on the right side of the road leading north to Foča and is approximately 500 kilometres north-east of Aharine. 104/

75. **Foča Hospital:** On 20 April, several Muslims 105/ were taken behind the hospital, executed, after being found guilty of possessing weapons, and buried in a grass field behind the hospital. 106/ Muslim Foča residents believe that because the field had an unbroken grass surface before hostilities, and afterward it was full of overturned sod, the soldiers were using the area to bury numerous bodies. 107/

76. **Forest near Mesaje:** It was reported that on 3 July 1992, the same day the Serbs looted and burned down all the houses in Mesaje, 30 to 40 people who were killed in the forest were buried with bulldozers in one grave in the forest near Mesaje. 108/ It is not clear whether those killed were from the village of Mesaje.

77. **Miljevina Cemetery:** It was alleged that six unidentified bodies, three male and three female, were buried in a common grave in the Miljevina Cemetery. 109/ No details of the circumstances of their deaths were provided.

78. **Goraždanska Jabuka 110/:** About 200 civilians are reported to have been killed during Serb attacks and a mass grave was allegedly found in Goraždanska Jabuka. 111/ This information was corroborated in a witness statement. 112/

9. **Gacko 113/**

79. The county of Gacko is located in south-eastern BiH. Before the war began, the population totaled 10,844 people, of whom 62.4 per cent were Serbian and 35.3 per cent were Muslim.

80. Serbian military activity in the Gacko area occurred during the period of April 1992 until June 1992. The reports vary as to the particular events. A witness reported that Šešelj's men attacked Gacko in April. During the
attack, the Serbs allegedly killed 150 Muslims and arrested approximately 60 to 70 Muslims between the ages of 16 and 45 and detained them in the lobby of the Elektroprivreda hotel. At a later time, the Serbs took the detained men to a camp in Bileća or other unknown facilities. The witness stated that after the attack, the Serbs set the town on fire and completely destroyed it.

Another witness' account of the attack on Gacko alleged that "ethnic cleansing" began on 1 June 1992. After Serbs attacked the town, they imprisoned approximately 120 Muslims, age 14 and older, or used them for forced labour. The Serbs also attacked 13 surrounding villages (the "Kula" villages) which were 100 per cent Muslim. The inhabitants that did not manage to escape were tortured and killed. The witness stated that the Serbs gave some of the Muslims certificates to travel to Macedonia. However, the "White Eagles" were reportedly waiting for them at the Motel Košuta, five or six kilometres from Gacko, where the Serbs stopped the cars and beat the men. The Serbian leader, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, reportedly stated that the women and children would be sent home and the men taken to a prison.

Grave sites

The World War II Partisan Cemetery: The basement of the hotel Rudnik and the Gacko powerplant served as Serb prisons, where interrogations, beatings, and deaths reportedly occurred. The Serbs buried the killed Muslim prisoners in a mass grave either in or near the World War II Partisan Cemetery in Gacko. There are differing witness accounts of the exact location of the grave.

An ECMM submission reports that a witness noticed that an unspecified number of prisoners began to disappear from the prison. The witness related that the Serbs killed the prisoners and threw them into an unmarked mass grave located behind the Partisan cemetery in Gacko. The witness stated that an excavating machine covered the mass grave afterwards. The report did not state when the killings and subsequent burial occurred.

A US Department of State report, containing the testimony of a witness, differs slightly. The witness related that the Serb infantry forces captured 15 Muslims in Mostar and transported them to the hotel basement prison in Gacko. The 15 prisoners joined 100 Muslims from the village who were reportedly prominent figures such as teachers, business men and leaders of the community. The witness stated that about 15 prisoners disappeared after the Serbs allegedly interrogated and beat them. The witness learned through conversation among the prisoners that the Serbs killed the 15 Muslims and buried them in a mass grave in Gacko's World War II Partisan Cemetery.

In yet another eyewitness account, a Serb killed an elderly Gacko man in a church courtyard. The witness stated that several hours later, a forklift picked up the body and took the remains to a mass grave in the Gacko textile factory.

Outskirts of Gacko: There is a possibility that another mass grave exists in or near the town of Gacko. A witness to an attack by Serbs in April 1992 stated that the Serbs killed 150 Muslims and buried them in a mass grave near the outskirts of Gacko. The witness did not provide additional information as to the location of the grave or the circumstances surrounding its excavation. The witness may or may not be referring to the mass grave in the...
or near the World War II Partisan Cemetery.

10. Gospić

87. The county of Gospić is located in western Croatia. It is one of the larger counties in Croatia in terms of area, and enjoys a long shoreline on the Adriatic Sea. According to the 1991 census, Gospić had a population of 28,732 persons, of whom 64.3 per cent were Croatian, 31.3 per cent were Serbian, and 4.4 per cent were "other".

88. The "Serb Krajina" area, south of Gospić, has been the site of hotly contested battles between Croatian and Serbian forces. In September of 1993, Croats seized 11 villages on the edge of the Krajina region, in an area called the "Medak pocket". Afterwards, a cease-fire was reached between the two parties, and Croatian forces began to withdraw from the area. While executing their withdrawal, they razed up to 11 villages in the region. All houses in the villages were destroyed, and many civilians were killed. UN peacekeepers in the area said that evidence in the various villages, such as the use of bulldozers and the discovery of surgical gloves, suggested the destruction was well-planned, and mass graves may have been excavated. In Krajinovići, a small hamlet in the Medak pocket, two severely burned bodies were found.

89. Later, UN officers concluded that no substantial evidence of mass graves was present in the 11 destroyed villages, despite earlier suspicions. However, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conducted a medicolegal investigation of the Medak pocket in late October 1993. PHR reviewed the postmortem examinations conducted on the bodies and assessed their reliability. Reports on at least two of the bodies autopsied suggested that extrajudicial executions had taken place in the Medak pocket; however, the issue of mass graves was not addressed in the PHR document.

11. Ključ

90. The county of Ključ is located in north-western BiH and the Sana River passes through it. According to the 1991 census, the population of Ključ was 37,233, of which 47.6 per cent was Muslim, 49.5 per cent Serb and 2.9 per cent were classified as "other".

91. Many different Serbian military and paramilitary formations implemented a program of "ethnic cleansing" of all non-Serb residents in towns and villages situated in the district of Ključ. The Serbs began attacks on many different villages in the Ključ area from late May until early June 1992. By this time, the Muslim population of Ključ's southernmost district along the Sana River was expelled.

92. By approximately 15 June, Serbian paramilitary forces were present throughout the Ključ region but were not in complete control. They were prevented from taking full control by about 1,700 Muslim fighters who roamed the region's forests and controlled the area at night. Serbian forces attacked Muslims who could not or would not hide in the woods, and almost all Muslim villages in the region suffered casualties. Single households or groups of villagers would be marched behind their houses and executed by machine-gun. As a result of these Serbian attacks, many people were killed and there are several allegations of mass graves in the area.
Gravesites

93. **Prhovo**: An unnamed witness described a mass killing in Prhovo and provided the location of a mass grave in that village. At approximately 2 p.m. on either 1 or 3 June, Serbian forces entered the village and had a woman, S.M., use a megaphone to call all residents to the centre of the town. The Serbs then opened fire on the villagers, killing approximately 200 men, women, and children. The victims were thrown into a mass grave in a wooded area approximately 200 metres from the village centre. The witness also provided a list of those killed and the alleged perpetrators.

94. A Muslim man who had escaped to the woods when the shooting started in Prhovo went to the District Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Ključ and told the Serb officials that the dead were still lying in the streets and that the decaying corpses represented a health risk. He asked for permission to bury them. Eventually, the Serbs agreed to allow him to return to Prhovo and select a gravesite.

95. At about 7:00 a.m. on 9 June, the Muslim man and three others selected a gravesite in an approximately 30 to 40 metres wide area of low land between the third and fourth houses in the village (counting from the southernmost house). This area was on the west side of the road, and was bordered by a fence. A digging machine and three busloads of soldiers arrived by 11:00 a.m. and began digging. When the grave was finished, it was about three metres by four metres and 2.5 metres deep. The four men then threw the bodies of the Prhovo victims into the hole and the machine covered the grave with earth.

96. **Velagići**: Velagići is located five kilometres north-west of Ključ. According to the US Department of State, the population of this village was 8,000 people, of which 75 per cent were Muslim, 24 per cent Serb and 1 per cent Croat. In June 1992, several men reportedly organized, oversaw, and executed a mass killing, in which 282 Muslim men were killed in front of a school near Velagići and then buried in a mass grave. The school was a brick structure measuring 20 metres long by 30 metres wide and was painted white. It was situated in a field approximately 50 metres south of highway number five which led from Ključ to Bosanski Petrovac, opposite the point at which the highway forked off to Gornja Sanica to the north. On the day of the killing, Serbian soldiers dug a large hole in the field between the school and highway number five using heavy machinery.

97. Muslims were ordered to line up along the edge of the hole facing the school, while the women and children were brought in to watch. Then, the person in charge ordered the execution of all of the men. Though most of the men were shot to death, some were stabbed with knives. The commander personally killed several of the men by stabbing them. After the killing, the Serbs tried to wash blood stains from the walls of the school. When this was unsuccessful, the school was plowed into the hole to fill in the mass grave.

98. **Biljani Village Hall**: Biljani is located about three kilometres south-east of Sanica, which is 18 kilometres north-west of Ključ. A villager reported seeing a bulldozer, painted in Yugoslav National Army colours, dig a mass grave behind the village meeting hall in Biljani. The villager saw the bulldozer dump 300 to 400 bodies into the mass grave. The meeting hall is located approximately at the centre of Biljani and slightly behind the row of houses lining the road to Sanica.
99. It was also reported that in July 1992, Bosnian Serbian soldiers from the Sanski Corps captured villagers from Biljani and Gornje Sanica and took them to the school in Jabukovac. About 200 to 300 males and females were killed and many females were raped before they were killed. The bodies were then buried in a mass grave behind the school in Biljani, which also served as the village meeting place.

100. Lanište Cave: Lanište is located three kilometres from Velagići along the road to Bosanski Petrovac. At about the time of the mass killing in Prhovo discussed above, male Muslims from the villages of Hamići, Nezići, Vojići, Hadžići and Častovići were taken to Velagići and temporarily housed in the local school. About 250 of these individuals were killed and transported, along with the rest of the prisoners, to Lanište. The bodies of the 250 prisoners killed were taken down a very lightly traveled path, which formed a right turn off the Lanište-Petrovac road, at approximately the last house in Lanište. After about one kilometre, the path led to a small hunting lodge and a natural depression, or cave, locally referred to as Radojčina Lokva, where the bodies were thrown.

101. Bijana: According to one witness, over 120 people were killed in the village of Bijana. The exact number could not be confirmed because the bodies of those killed were continually found in the woods. A mass killing began at 3:30 a.m. and was completed by 5:30 a.m. It began at Sefet Domićeta’s house, where she was killed with her sons. Many families were burned to death in their houses. The witness could not confirm the existence of mass graves in the area, but believed some could be found along the slopes of Gologlav Mountain.

102. Konjic is situated in south-central BiH. According to the 1991 census, Konjic had a population of 43,636 persons, of whom 54.5 per cent was Muslim, 26 per cent Croat, 15.2 per cent Serb and 4.3 per cent was “other”. Bradina, a village of 750 inhabitants, is the largest Serbian village in the county. It is from Bradina that two reports of mass graves in the county arise.

103. Bradina was attacked on 25-26 May 1992 by a combination of Croatian Armed Forces soldiers, 800 “Green Berets”, and Muslims from 16 nearby villages. Houses were burned and inhabitants were killed. Other Serbs who survived were captured and taken to various detention facilities. Reports vary as to the total number killed during the attack, but it ranges from 44 to 57 persons.

104. Some, if not all, of these individuals were buried in a mass grave located at the Bradina Orthodox Church, often referred to as “Sv. Spas” Orthodox Church. The grave was reportedly excavated by Muslims using a bulldozer. Two reports allege that 23 of those killed in the Bradina attack were buried at this site, and a third report contains allegations that 57 Serbian refugees are buried there. After the 13 July attack, most Serbs were expelled to Donje Selo and Cerice.

105. Kotor Varoš county is located in the north-central part of BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population was 36,670 persons, 38.1 per cent of whom were Serbian, 30.4 per cent were Muslim, 29 per cent were Croat and 2.5 per cent were described as “other”.

13. Kotor Varoš
106. Kotor Varoš was laid siege to by units from Knin and Banja Luka, with help from local Serbians, in early June 1992. For the most part, the besieging army wore the insignia of the JOS (Yugoslav armed forces), "sometimes with a tricolour without a star". On 11 June 1992, these units forced their way into town. Local Muslims and Croats were captured, and about 80 were taken to the sawmills. The next day, artillery destroyed the villages of Hrvačani and Bilice. Over 500 people were killed in just a few days and their bodies thrown into mass graves.

Gravesites

107. Kotor Varoš: A witness from Kotor Varoš, who was arrested by Serbs and held in several locations, reported a mass grave in Kotor Varoš. He stated that on 11 June alone, 300 to 400 corpses lay in the street. He and several other prisoners had to put the corpses into black nylon body bags which were then carried by bulldozer to a nearby mass grave. He said that he personally put over 70 bodies into bags that day and estimated that at least 1,000 people were buried in this grave.

108. Kukavica: In the settlement of Kukavica on 25 June 1992, the corpses of six men killed with logs were buried in the Muslim cemetery, situated at the centre opposite the shop Krai A G. Basel. No other details regarding this site were provided in the report.

109. Donja Varoš Old Cemetery: In the area of the local hospital in Donja Varoš, about 30 civilians from the village of Kukavica were crushed to death with a loading truck. The corpses remained at the place of execution for some time, but were finally buried at the old cemetery near the mosque in Donja Varoš. This grave was also mentioned by a Croatian witness, who reported that a mechanical digger was used to bury the dead.

110. Vrbanci: The same witness reported the existence of a mass grave in Vrbanci next to the road. Reportedly, a mechanical digger was used to bury the dead.

111. Vrbanci Mosque: One report noted that a man was killed by a "četnik" after he was forced to dig a crypt for 45 persons killed in the mosque. No other details about the site were provided.

112. The county of Kupres is located in west-central BiH. It is one of the smaller counties in terms of population, holding only 9,663 persons according to the 1991 census. Serbians constituted the majority in Kupres, comprising 50.7 per cent of the population, while 39.6 per cent was Croatian, 8.4 per cent was Muslim, and 1.3 per cent "other".

113. Fighting between Serbs and Croats began in April of 1992, when Croatian armed forces entered the villages of Gornji and Donji Malovan. Other divisions took strongholds in the suburbs of Kupres proper, and attacked the city centre, which was mainly inhabited by Serbs. While most of the population had previously fled the county, some remained and hid in their cellars during the attack. Kupres is one of a handful of counties in which Croatian forces are said to be responsible for killings, which led to the creation of mass graves.

114. There are three separate reports concerning mass graves in this county.
However, it is possible that the reports may refer to the same incident and resultant grave.

115. According to one report, 52 Serbs were killed in the beginning of April 1992 by Croatian forces. The report goes on to state that a "nondefined" number of Serbs killed in Gornji Malovan, a village near Kupres, were buried in a common grave at Borova Glava, and their corpses are yet to be found. The Serbian government is in possession of photo and television documentation about the crime. 115/

116. A French government report alleges that on or about 14 April 1992, two mass graves were created in Kupres, which contain the bodies of 54 Serbs killed by Croatian units. No other details about the site were provided. Because the number of bodies reported is similar to that at Borova Glava, it is possible that this report and the report from the Serbian Government are referring to the same site. 116/

117. A third report noted that seven pits containing a total of 28 mutilated bodies were discovered by the JNA when they entered Kupres. The dead were Serbs from the villages of Gornji and Donji Malovan. 117/

118. The first two reports are common in that they allege that a similar number of persons were killed. However, it is not clear from the first report that the 52 Serbs mentioned were the same Serbs mentioned in the mass grave. In addition, the second report does not identify the site of the grave as being at Borova Glava. The first and third reports are similar in that they both refer to the villages of Gornji and Donji Malovan. The first report does not identify the victims as being from those locations, nor does the third report specify the villages as being the exact site of the mass grave. Thus, it is possible that anywhere from 28 to over 100 bodies may be buried in Kupres.

119. **Kupres Field**: In April of 1992, the villages of Osmanlije, Glovo, Zlosela, and Kukavice were occupied and more than 30 Croatian civilians were reportedly killed. At the time of the report, their graves had not been located, but they were believed to be buried in Kupres Field. 119/

120. **Modriča** 120/

According to the 1991 census, the population of Modriča totalled 35,413 persons. The ethnic distribution of the county was fairly even with 35.3 per cent Serb, 29.5 per cent Muslim, 27.3 per cent Croat, and 7.9 per cent "other".

121. Military activity in Modriča began on or about 15 May 1992, when the county began being shelled by Serb forces. 200/ An unidentified Serb mechanized unit, accompanied by tanks, entered Modriča on 15 May and proved to be too powerful for the 102nd Voluntary Brigade, made up of Muslims and Croatians, which retreated toward Odžak. 201/ While many killings allegedly took place once the Serbs occupied the county, there is only one report of a mass grave, presumably because the Serbs would not permit the burial of any bodies lying dead in the streets. 202/

122. **Cement Pit**: The Serbs captured 10 members of the voluntary brigade and 40 policemen (who were mostly Muslim). The policemen were detained in the basement of the police station. The soldiers, however, were reportedly tortured and sunk up to their chests in a cement pit. Most of them were unconscious as their ears, noses and tongues were cut off. The Serbs then
rounded up the families of the brigade members, beat them, threw them onto a pile of wood, and set them on fire. 203/

123. A soldier of the BiH Army corroborated the account of cement pits used as a means of disposal for those killed in Modriča. He related that on 15 June 1992, the battle for the liberation of Modriča began. He and others observed civilians who had been bound with wire and had their throats slit. They also found burned bodies. Once the "liberation" was complete, the soldiers said they found three babies in a small electric cement mixer, the oldest of whom was two years-old. 204/

124. In late May 1992, the Serbs reduced their presence in the area and the voluntary brigade was able to retake Modriča for about 12 days. During this time, they released everyone from detention and buried the dead. 205/ Most of the freed Muslim civilians fled towards Odžak and Slavonski Brod. Serbs recaptured Modriča on 7 June 1992.

16. Mostar 206/

125. The county of Mostar is located in the Neretva River valley in southern BiH. According to the 1991 census, the population of Mostar was 126,067 and comprised of 34.8 per cent Muslims, 33.8 per cent Croats, 19 per cent Serbs, 10 per cent Yugoslavs and 2.4 per cent "other".

126. Immediately following the Bosnian Muslim and Croat declarations to secede from the Serb-dominated Yugoslav Republic, Serbian forces launched an offensive against the central BiH government and, specifically, Mostar in April 1992. For more than a year, Muslims constituted about half of the HVJ and together with Croats, they fought successfully to free the city from the Serb bombardment. This military cooperation soon ended, however. 207/

127. Hostilities between Croats and Muslims began on 9 May, when Croatian forces stormed the local headquarters of the BiH Army and began expelling thousands of Muslims from their homes on the west bank of the Neretva River, forcing them into the old Muslim quarter on the eastern side. 208/ Bosnian Muslims launched a counter-attack on 30 June. 209/

128. Sutine Landfill: Sutine landfill is located several kilometres north of Zalik, which is on the northern edge of Mostar, alongside a Muslim cemetery. According to a witness, a mass killing of approximately 28 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian men took place on 13 June 1992 and resulted in a mass burial at the landfill. 210/

129. On 13 June, about 200 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian men, women, and children from Mostar were rounded up by Bosnian Serb forces and taken to Zalik. 211/ The males were separated from the women and children and taken to the Sjeverni Logor casern nearby. 212/ The men were registered on a roster and placed on trucks, which later departed for Sutine, several kilometres north of Zalik. 211/

130. Upon arriving at Sutine, the prisoners were taken to a building which belonged to a cemetery and was near the Sutine landfill. Part of the building was being used to interrogate and reportedly torture the prisoners. 214/ Prisoners were taken, one by one, for their interrogations 215/ and beatings, and afterwards, were taken outside and killed by either a pistol shot to the head or by automatic rifle fire. 216/

131. Two of the prisoners were taken outside the building and instructed to throw the bodies of three prisoners into the Sutine landfill. 217/ When
they returned, four more prisoners were killed and their bodies were also thrown into the landfill by the two men. 218/ Guards then fired on the two prisoners, and one of them was killed instantly. The other was hit in the arm and stomach. 219/ Both men fell down an embankment and landed at the bottom of the slope. 220/

132. The witness related that bodies of other prisoners continued to be dumped into the landfill for the next 90 minutes, at a rate of about one body every five minutes. 221/ The next day, the Bosnian Serbs used a bulldozer to push trash and earth over the bodies in an attempt to conceal them. 222/ The witness remained in hiding for the following 11 days, and on 24 June was taken to Mostar hospital. Several days later, the landfill was unearthed and the bodies of 28 223/ persons were found. 224/

133. It should be noted that the Special Rapporteur Mazowiecki has reported that the number of bodies found at the Sutina landfill totalled 150, not 28. 225/ Mazowiecki's report also stated that a local pathologist had examined the exhumed bodies, and almost all of the dead had been shot at close range with automatic weapons. 226/ It is unclear why the discrepancy in numbers of bodies is so great.

134. Another report notes that an individual observed 100 bodies in a shallow grave in Sutina during August 1992. 227/ This suggests that there may be another gravesite in the area, since the landfill site was exhumed around the end of June 1992; however, no other details regarding the site were provided in the report. 228/

135. **Vrapčići - Uborak Landfill:** Vrapčići is a village located four kilometres north-north-east of Mostar. According to a witness from the area, Vrapčići and a neighboring town, Potoci, came under Serb attack in May 1992. 229/ On 18 May, Muslims and Croats from both towns were rounded up by Serbs. Many of the men were taken to a detention camp in the Vrapčići stadium, but were exchanged in Bileć on 7 June. On 12 June, 88 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian residents of Vrapčići, including elderly men and women, were rounded up and taken to the stadium.

136. Over the next few days, all of the prisoners at the stadium were killed and their bodies were thrown into the Uborak landfill at the north-east end of Vrapčići. On 20 August 1992, the 88 bodies were unearthed from the landfill and were removed for identification and proper burial. 230/ All victims had been shot in the head with automatic weapons.

137. There are many commonalities of fact between the Sutina and Uborak sites. Both are north of Mostar proper. The killings at both locations also took place on the same day. Because of the difference in the number of bodies buried at each site, it seems that Sutina and Uborak are indeed two different sites. 231/ However, many of the reports which refer to gravesites at Sutina may have actually been referring to Uborak. These reports refer to between 100 and 200 bodies being buried at the gravesite. While these figures are much larger than 88, the discrepancy is not as large as with Sutina, which according to a witness, only contains 26 to 28 bodies.

138. **Public Park:** According to Newsweek, the public park in Mostar has been turned into a cemetery, containing "75 fresh graves". 232/

139. **Bijelo Polje:** Three common graves are reportedly located at Bijelo Polje, which is near the main road between Mostar and Sarajevo. No other details about the site were provided. 233/

140. **Balinovac Muslim Cemetery:** According to a witness who took part in
"work detail", Muslim detainees buried bodies of executed Muslims in shallow, unmarked graves at Balinovac. 234/ The cemetery had already been filled with victims of the war's earlier phase with the Bosnian Serbs. On 15 or 16 July 1992, the witness said that he and others buried 13 bodies. 235/ Of them, 12 were men in HVO uniforms and one was a woman. The witness was told by those directing the digging that "even hundreds of graves will not be enough".

141. Another released detainee detailed two other mass burials of executed victims at the Muslim cemetery. On 6 July, the detainee buried three women and a one-year-old infant, and on 16 July, the witness helped bury 16 men in civilian clothes.

142. **Unspecified Locations**: An 9 October 1993 news article reported that the BiH army had discovered three mass graves near Mostar, which contained the bodies of 575 civilians. 236/ Most of the victims were Muslim. 237/ Bosnian Croatian officials denied the BiH Army allegations. 238/ The report did not identify the precise location of the gravesite.

143. In the summer of 1992, a news photographer documented Serb POWs exhuming dozens of corpses from a mass grave in Mostar. 239/ Their Muslim captors said that those buried in the grave had been killed by Serbs. 240/ An Italian film crew and British journalist showed up a few days later and also documented the site. 241/ 144. Another report notes that a source told of three graves in Mostar containing 99, 100, and 110 bodies, respectively. Victims were generally elderly men, women, and children, who had been shot in the back of their heads or had their throats slit. 242/ 17. **Nova Gradiška** 243/ 145. Nova Gradiška is located in north-eastern Croatia on the border of Croatia and BiH. The southern border of Nova Gradiška is the Sava river. According to the 1991 census, the population was 60,461 persons, 70.7 per cent of whom were Croatian, 20.8 per cent were Serbian, 3 per cent were referred to as Yugoslav and 4.5 per cent as "other".

146. The former Yugoslav Army, paramilitary units, and Serbs from the Banja Luka Corps were in the area starting in September of 1991. 244/ The soldiers of the former Yugoslav Army moved from Bosanska Gradiška into the prison compound and started maltreating the villagers from villages around Gradiška. 245/ While the Serbs forced them out of their villages, some villagers managed to escape by tractors, and some were killed in their houses. 246/ There are reportedly two mass graves in Nova Gradiška.

**Gravesites**

147. **Stara Gradiška Camp**: The village of Stara Gradiška is located directly on the Sava River. It is reported that 50 to 60 corpses were thrown into a well at the Stara Gradiška camp. 247/ 148. **Stara Gradiška**: A witness provided testimony concerning a mass grave in Stara Gradiška. 248/ Serbs forced the witness' relative to go from house to house asking owners to hand in any weapons. When they did not find any, the Serbs brought him back to his house, 249/ beat and tortured him, then forced him and other villagers to dig their own grave. 250/ Seven of the villagers were killed and thrown into the grave at the back of the woman's
149. Mašička Šagovina: According to news reports, the village of Mašička Šagovina was burned and pillaged by Croatian forces in December 1991. On 19 December, Croatian forces arrested civilians and Serb soldiers of the territorial defence force, who had attempted to defend the village, but surrendered. Ten men were immediately killed by a member of the "Croatian Death Squad". In all, at least 21 persons were killed. Most of the victims were shoved into a mass grave by a bulldozer. The report does not specify whether the grave was dug by Croatian forces.

150. Odžak county is located in north-eastern BiH, and sits along the Sava River, with Croatia on the opposite side. According to the 1991 census, Odžak's population was 30,651 persons, 54.2 per cent of whom were Croatian, 20.3 per cent were Muslim, 19.8 per cent were Serbian, and 5.7 per cent were "other".

151. There is only one reported mass grave in Odžak. It is located near the hospital in Odžak proper. According to various reports from the Serbian government, the former military depot in the village of Rabići was holding 300 Serbs. Serbs who were detained both in Rabići and in the village of Poljari were reported to have been killed and buried with bulldozers near the hospital. A known perpetrator's name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

152. Ogulin is located in western Croatia. According to the 1991 census, Ogulin had a population of 28,904 persons, of whom 59.9 per cent were Croatian, 35.3 per cent were Serbian, and 4.8 per cent were "other". Ogulin has one reported mass grave within its borders.

153. The enclave of Gorski Kotar in Ogulin is near the border of the Serbian Krajina area. It extends from Velika Kapela Mountain to the River of Kupa. In this area, there are 178 villages and settlements inhabited by approximately 6,000 Serbs. In August 1991, Croatian authorities and Serbs in the enclave agreed to preserve the status quo of the area pending the "global political solution of ex-Yugoslavia". By the terms of that agreement, Croatian authorities agreed to keep their armed troops out of Serb villages, as well as to refrain from setting up new police outposts in the area. They also promised not to force Serbs in Gorski Kotar to serve in the Croatian armed forces.

154. On 24 September 1991, however, the Croatian local authorities completely destroyed five villages on the outskirts of the Gorski Kotar enclave. The villages were Brlog, Staro Selo, Tupljaci, Rapajin Do/Rapajin Klanac, and Drenov Klanac. Two thousand of the inhabitants fled to neighboring Krajina. Those who remained in the burning villages were killed and buried in garbage dumps, to be discovered by relatives who later returned to the area. Another report said the dead villagers were "thrown into pits and covered with manure".
20. **Osijek**

155. The county of Osijek is located in eastern Croatia, just north of Vukovar and Vinkovci counties. According to the 1991 census, Osijek had a population of 164,577 persons, of whom 66.6 per cent were Croatian, 20 per cent were Serbian, 8.4 per cent were "other" and 5 per cent were Yugoslav.

156. Osijek fell victim to fighting between Croatians and Serbs in 1991, around the same time that the fighting in Vukovar began. There are three reported mass graves in this county.

157. **Dalić Cemetery:** The village of Dalić had a 33 per cent Croat and 52 per cent Serb population before the war. Military activity began in Dalić on 1 August 1991, when it was attacked by JNA and Serb paramilitary forces from the directions of Bijelo Brdo and Borovo Selo. The paramilitary groups attempted to take over the police station, but the officers inside called for the JNA to intervene. When the JNA arrived, they told the police to surrender. The police refused and fired at the JNA. The JNA engaged the police, stormed the police station, and 80 policemen were killed. Local Croatians and Hungarians tried to flee, but many were killed by paramilitary sniper fire. The paramilitaries then went through the village, reportedly killing anyone who was wounded.

158. One witness, along with eight others, was forced to move bodies from the police station and primary school to the Catholic Cemetery. The work party picked up 24 policemen from the station, three civilians killed in their homes, and eight persons from the primary school. Of the eight, five were Croat guards who were naked and had been shot at close range; the other three were policemen. Those victims who hailed from Dalić were buried by the local gravedigger. Other bodies were transferred to Osijek Hospital. On 4 August, this witness returned to the cemetery, where he observed a large hole dug by a military bulldozer. Local Croatians were forced by Serb paramilitaries to throw the dead bodies of those killed at the police station into the hole. Ten persons were in the hole when it was covered with earth, and hands were seen protruding from the pit.

159. **Ernestinovo Park:** During the attack on Ernestinovo, several inhabitants were killed and later buried in mass graves in the park. The park is along Glavna Ulica (Street) and the site consists of three pits situated between the gallery and the monument.

160. The Osijek Red Cross provided detailed information about those buried in two of the three mass graves. No data was available about the bodies buried in the first pit. The second pit is believed to contain six bodies and some cattle. The third grave contains eight young persons, some of whom were wearing Croat Army or MUP uniforms, while others were naked. The bodies were all buried one metre beneath the ground. There were other individual graves scattered throughout the village.

161. These graves were reported to UNICIVPOL on 17 November 1992, and Special Rapporteur Mdiaye and forensic expert Morris Tidball Binz visited the site in December of that year. Binz observed three areas of adjacent earth with no identifying marks. The mounds were low and irregular, with irregular perimeters of no more than 15 metres. No evidence was present which would contradict allegations of mass graves in the area. Binz recommended that the area be cleared of mines, surveyed, and probed. He also noted that available information suggested that the graves were sanitary and that the buried bodies were civilian casualties of war or military personnel killed in combat, not war crimes.
162. Vladislavci, Obnova Factory: Eighteen Serbian civilians and one Hungarian from the village of Pavlin Dvor are allegedly buried in a mass grave in Vladislavci. The grave is said to be situated near the Obnova Factory, where cattle were previously buried. 277/ The killings occurred on 11 and 12 December 1991. After the Croatian Army began occupying houses in November, most of the population of this small village sought refuge in "House No. 51" and "House No. 40". On the night of 11 December, two or three bursts and screams were heard from one of the houses. Later, a truck drove by, turned off its engine, and after 30 to 40 minutes left the house.

163. Neighbors woke the next morning and observed blood inside one of the houses. This blood spread right to the "bridge". 278/ Later, on 12 December, "House No. 51" was blown up and completely destroyed. One of the bodies was found near the hayloft of House No. 51. 279/ Villagers believe the other bodies were taken to Pavlin Dvor and buried there. An alleged perpetrator of the killing was named. 280/

21. Pakrac 281/

164. The county of Pakrac is located in Croatia, in Sector West. The county consists of the town of Pakrac and 68 small villages and hamlets. The 1991 census listed the population of Pakrac as 27,288 persons, of whom 46.4 per cent were Serbian, 36 per cent were Croatian, 12.8 per cent were "other", and 4.8 per cent of the population identified themselves as Yugoslavs.

165. Throughout October 1991, members of the Croatian Army reportedly began arbitrarily arresting ethnic Serbs in the counties of Pakrac, Garešnica, Kutina, Bjelovar, and Zagreb. 282/ These persons were taken to several small camps in the region, including "Ribarska Koliba" (fisherman's cottage) in Marino Selo and "Stara Ciglana" in Pakračka Poljana. 283/ Both of these camps are near the Ilova River. 284/ Later, control of the detention facilities was turned over to the National Guard of Croatia. According to witness statements and reports, prisoners were beaten and tortured; and up to 2,500 were allegedly killed near the campsites. 285/ These activities continued until March of 1992.

166. Based on two statements of former prisoners of Marino Selo, a minimum of three separate mass graves were reportedly excavated at Marino Selo, as a means of disposing of the bodies of those killed at the camps in Marino Selo and Pakračka Poljana. The graves at Marino Selo are said to contain the bodies of as many as 800 Serbs. In Pakračka Poljana, villagers and subsequent UNICVFOL investigations suggested there existed as many as 26 mass graves holding the bodies of 700 Serbs. One report noted that many of those buried in the graves were not former detainees of these camps, but were from other settlements in Western Slavonia where Serbs were killed in late 1991. Their bodies were then transported to the sites, which were in the vicinity of the Ilova River. 286/ Serb sources, however, allege that that Croatian authorities reopened some of the gravesites and took the bodies elsewhere as a means of hiding any evidence of mass killings. This activity was reportedly taken in response to publication of information about the camps and mass graves in the region. 287/

Gravesites in Marino Selo

167. Marino Selo Fish Pond: An ethnic Serb who was detained at the Ribarska Koliba camp in Marino Selo has alleged that he was involved in the burial of bodies in mass graves. 288/ The witness was arrested on 15 November 1991 and taken to Ribarska Koliba, along with other Serbian men and a few women.
He related that he and many of the other prisoners were subjected to severe beatings, mutilation, and torture. On 19 November, four of the prisoners were removed from detention and taken out towards the Ilova River. He then heard gunfire. The following morning, the witness and two other men were taken out and discovered the bodies of the men. The Croatian guards made the three prisoners bury the dead. Three of the dead prisoners were buried in a part of a fish pond, near the Ilova River, from which water had been removed. This grave was not marked.

168. Marino Selo Bridge: Two witnesses were again put on burial detail on the afternoon of 20 November. At that point, three more men were buried in a common grave, without coffins, 150 metres downstream from the bridge. One of the witnesses noted that the grave was only "two shovels deep" because "they wouldn't allow any greater depth". Branches and grass were strewn over the grave, and one of the witnesses found a one-liter bottle nearby, which he also placed on top of the grave so that it could later be identified.

169. Marino Selo Garbage Dump: According to a forensic report based on investigations conducted in 1992, allegations surfaced of a third mass grave in the area, situated in a garbage pit behind an abandoned motel. The grave was reported to contain the remains of up to 12 people, and lies about five metres from a stream which drains the reservoirs of a fish farm. The pit is three metres long by two metres wide, and is 1.5 metres deep. Two-thirds of the pit is filled with water.

170. UNCIVPOL Daruvar Station was notified of the allegations of mass graves in Marino Selo in September of 1992. Sgt. Jone Blikra and Cst. Dan Parchomchuk spoke with the witnesses who provided depositions to the Serbian Council Information Centre. Based on their conversations, the UNCIVPOL officers drew a sketch showing the graves in Marino Selo. A few days later, the two officers went to Marino Selo in an attempt to locate the graves. Following the sketch, they found what they believed to be the gravesites.

171. In December of 1992, Mr. Morris Tidball Binz, a forensic expert commissioned by UNCHR, visited Marino Selo and other sites in Croatia said to contain mass graves. Binz carried out a rapid surface exploration of two locations in Marino Selo. The first site was the garbage pit behind the abandoned hotel, discussed above. Binz observed old garbage around the site, but found no human remains upon surface exploration. It did, however, show signs of recent disturbance (within the last two months), as evidenced by earth and garbage which had been removed from the pit and scattered around. The pit was explored with a metal probe, but Binz discovered nothing, including odors, which would suggest the presence of decomposing human remains.

172. Binz also visited another site, 150 metres downstream from the garbage pit, on the same side of the stream bank. He explored the area for signs of excavation, but found nothing.

173. The Commission of Experts, in conjunction with a War Crimes Investigation Team provided by the Government of Canada, conducted investigations and excavations in the Pakrac county, but limited its focus to the alleged sites in Pakračka Poljana. No investigation of the sites at Marino Selo was conducted due to lack of time and resources.
Gravesites in Pakračka Poljana

174. Allegations of mass graves in Pakračka Poljana came to the attention of UNPROFOR in December of 1992. At that time, a Croatian woman from Pakrac registered a complaint with UNCPVPOL Pakrac, stating that her husband had been arrested by Croatian soldiers in September of 1991, along with seven other men, none of whom had since been seen. She also reported that a mass grave was rumoured to exist between the villages of Poljana Pakračka and Gaj, wherein 200 bodies of Serbian men and women were buried.

175. A few weeks later, a source independent of the Croatian woman corroborated the existence of the mass grave and provided additional details as to its location and possible perpetrators. UNCIVPOL Officer Nicholson, another monitor, and the source visited three possible gravesites on 9 February 1993. For purposes of identification, Nicholson identified these sites as A, B and C. In October and November of 1993, the Commission of Experts organized a mission to investigate the sites. The description of each site, and the results of the mission, are discussed separately below.

176. Site A: This site allegedly contained five bodies. Nicholson's initial visit to this site revealed remnants of bodies scattered around the location; namely, clothing, boots, a crutch, and skeletal remains. It was described as being the smallest of the sites. The bodies seemed to have been transported from a previous burial site because of heavy plastic material found at the scene. However, the site was reportedly cleared on 15 March 1993, and the bodies were moved to an unknown location. The WCIT attempted to examine the site anyway on two separate occasions, but found it inaccessible because of mud-blocked roads.

177. Site B: Site B was situated less than two kilometres from Site A, and was reported to consist of two pits, each five feet by six feet, with an unknown number of bodies. The pits were situated approximately 19.5 metres from a hunting cabin and were 15 feet apart from one another. Site B was cleared by unknown parties between 8 and 15 May 1993. Subsequent inspection by Nicholson revealed that trees had been planted as an "obvious ruse for fresh digging".

178. Site C: Site C was situated less than five kilometres from Site A. When Nicholson first visited the site, he observed two elongated trenches filled with earth. Each trench was four metres by 20 metres, and no observable signs of human remains were present. According to Nicholson's source, each trench contained 100 bodies. Nicholson also observed approximately eight independent and smaller graves bordering the two trenches.

179. Nicholson revisited the site on 4 May 1993, at which time he believed there were 17 elongated trenches, not two as he had originally thought. Since his source had told him that each trench contained up to 100 bodies, Nicholson extrapolated in a UNCIVPOL report that Site C could contain as many as 1,700 bodies.

180. The War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) arrived at Site C on 20 October 1993 to begin investigation. After preparing the site for security and excavation purposes, it was observed that the trenches Nicholson observed totalled 20. The team excavated test trenches on several of the trenches and dug the remainder with a backhoe. The tenth trench (or "feature" as called by the WCIT) revealed the remains of two humans. Each of the other trenches was empty, and the team concluded that the "features" were excavated for use as military defensive trenches, not mass graves. A smaller disturbance of earth near the
first feature was also found to contain the remains of one human. [318/]

181. WCIT explored another area in Site C which abutted the upper bank of a nearby stream. [319/ Further investigation revealed six adjacent but independent graves, containing a total of 14 bodies, and a seventh grave nearby, containing two bodies. [320/]

182. In all, the remains of 19 individuals, 16 males and three females, were found in nine separate graves in the field south of Pakračka Poljana. [321/ All of the graves appeared to have been dug by hand and were meant to be clandestine. WCIT concluded that the area around the graves was used as an execution site. Spent rounds were found in the area, and five of the bodies had their hands tied together with rope. Fifteen of the bodies evidenced gunshot wounds to the head, two had blunt head trauma; one had multiple gunshot wounds to the body, and one had massive head trauma. Based on these findings, WCIT believed that Officer Nicholson’s original estimate, that 1,700 bodies were buried at the site, was erroneous. [322/]

183. PHR reports that the graves exhumed at Pakračka Poljana may be connected to a soccer clubhouse near the site. According to PHR, witness statements suggest that the clubhouse may have been used as a secret detention centre by the Croatian military and police from August 1991 to March 1992. This time period corresponds with the likely time of burial for all or most of the exhumed bodies. [323/ Reported survivors of the detention facility related that many of the prisoners were executed near the clubhouse. [324/]

22. Petrinja [325/]

184. Petrinja is a county in Croatia situated on the Kupa River, approximately 50 kilometres south-east of Zagreb, and 60 kilometres north-west of Prijedor. According to the 1991 census, Petrinja had a population of 35,622 persons. The population of Petrinja is broken down as follows: 44.9 per cent were Serb, 44.2 per cent were Croatian, 5.1 per cent were Yugoslav, and 5.8 per cent "other".

185. Serbs attacked Petrinja on two separate occasions; the second occurring on 16 September 1991. [326/ During the second attack, some Croatian forces were reportedly forced to retreat. During the withdrawal, some soldiers were captured, taken to detention camps, and/or killed.

Gravesites

186. Gavrilović Villa and Vineyards: According to witness testimony, the witness and a number of Croats, who had been mobilized by the Croatian Army, began retreating to Zupić and Nebojjan. Upon their arrival in the Gavrilović Villa, located alongside the Gavrilović vineyards, [327/ they were surrounded by "Četniks". The Serbs encircled the Croats, ordered them to remove their uniforms, and proceeded to line them up for execution. The witness was among the first to be called and was placed with two other Croats, with their backs to the firing squad. On hearing the gunshots and feeling the other two men fall, the witness fell into nearby bushes, where he realized that he had been shot in the arm and chest.

187. The witness stated that after falling to the ground, he remained conscious and heard the Serbs shooting "other people". [328/ As night fell the Serbs left everyone as presumably dead, at which point those survivors who could walk left. [329/ The witness remained at the site, apparently unable to move, and stated that "the Četniks" returned in the
morning to search the corpses for valuables and found him and another
survivor. As the Serbs moved to a neighboring "weekend cottage", the witness
"stood up and moved along the hill towards Petrinja". He reached a house
whose owners recognized him and they drove him to the ambulatory of the
Croatian Army. 330/

188. In a separate account submitted to the US State Department, a witness
tested that during the same Serb offensive against Petrinja, 31 Croats
were captured by JNA forces while attempting to escape to Sisak, a town
located approximately 10 kilometres north-east of Petrinja. 331/ All of
the captives were taken to the Petrinja internment camp 332/ located in
the former Yugoslav Army casern known as "Vasil Gaćeša". 333/ The
prisoners were held for one day, and the next morning all but five of the
prisoners were released.

189. While interned at the Petrinja camp, prisoners participated in burial
details involving "mass graves". On one such occasion 18 Croat soldiers were
buried in an open area on a small hill, approximately 100 metres east of
Gavrilović Villa and near a vacant house. According to the report, the bodies
of the soldiers were piled in a 10 metres square area. 334/

190. The gravesite referred to in the State Department account may be the
site of the killings mentioned in the first report discussed. The "vacant
house" may be the "weekend cottage" as described in the first report, and the
hill along which the grave is found may also be the same hill along which the
first witness escaped. Furthermore, the coincidence of date, 16 September, on
which the killing took place according to the first report, and on which the
second witness was captured and interned, strongly suggests that the 18 bodies
found may be the corpses of the Croatian soldiers killed as reported by the
first witness. 335/

191. Vasil Gaćeša: The witness from the State Department report, discussed
above, participated in a mass burial within the Vasil Gaćeša casern where 40
bodies of civilians from Petrinja, mostly Croats, were interred. 336/

192. Taboriště: A detainee testified that there was a concentration camp
holding Serbs in the settlement of Taboriště, in Brijest near Petrinja.
There, he claimed that among the 500 prisoners were 80 women and 40 children.
He said that male prisoners "are being killed and buried in pits". 337/
There was no information provided regarding the site of the burials or "pits", or if the interments constitute one mass grave.

23. Podravska Slatina 338/

193. Podravska Slatina is in north-eastern Croatia, on the border with
Hungary. The county contained 31,155 persons in 1991, 57.2 per cent of whom
were Croatian, 35.8 per cent were Serbian, 3.5 per cent were "Yugoslav" and
3.5 per cent were "other".

194. Voćin, a village in Podravska Slatina, was the site of military action
between Croatian and Serbian forces in December 1991. 339/ Members of
Serbian paramilitary formations reportedly killed a total of 43 villagers in
Voćin, Hum, and Krašković. Voćin is also the site of a reported mass grave.

195. According to Ms. Renilde Steeghs, a member of a European observers team,
24 people were found in a mass grave in Voćin. There is also speculation that
the ruined church in that village contains more victims. 340/
Furthermore, 150 Croats remain missing from Voćin.
196. Prijedor straddles a corridor connecting the Serbs’ two-thirds share of BiH with their one-third share of Croatia. Prijedor’s pre-war population was 112,000 persons. Muslims were the majority with 44 per cent of the population, while Serbs accounted for 42 per cent. The remainder of the population was comprised of 5.7 per cent Yugoslavs, 5.6 per cent Croats; and 2.2 per cent “other”.

197. After Bosnia’s Muslims and Croats unanimously voted to secede from Yugoslavia in March of 1992, Radovan Karadžić announced that the Serbs would form their own state. On 30 April, Prijedor Serbs arrested leading Muslim officials and replaced them with Serbs. All Muslim employees were fired by Serbs shortly thereafter.

198. Nine days later, officials demanded that Muslims sign loyalty oaths to the Bosnian Serb state or be considered terrorists. On 14 May, Serbs raised roadblocks around Kozarac and cut off telephone service. On 24 May, Serbian tanks, mortars and artillery attacked the village. This attack lasted for three days, during which an estimated 2,000 villagers were killed. Afterwards, many civilians were allegedly taken to detention facilities, with rich Muslims, political officials, and policemen as particular targets.

199. The process of displacement, military attacks, and detention of civilians took place on a wide scale throughout the county of Prijedor. Most villages fell in the same fashion as Prijedor and Kozarac. As civilians were killed in their towns or in detention facilities, a need arose for large-scale body disposal. As a result, there are reports of 60 mass graves in Prijedor county alone, more than in any other county in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. From the available information, it appears that many of these gravesites were designed to conceal evidence of mass killings.

200. This section will describe gravesites in Prijedor proper, Trnopolje, and other small villages in the area, the Omarska and Ljubija mining complexes, graves in the Japra river valley, and those near the border with Sanski Most.

Prijedor:

201. While most of the alleged mass burials in the county took place in the surrounding villages, some mass graves did surface in Prijedor proper.

202. **Prijedor City Dump:** Several persons, including one individual who loaded bodies for burial, allege that there is a mass grave at the Prijedor garbage dump. It can be reached by taking the road from Hambarine to Ljubija and going up a hill. The sources state that a large number of bodies were picked up in villages near Prijedor, transported to the dump in July 1992, and bulldozed. 343/

203. One of the reports, which discusses the July killing at Keraterm Camp, 344/ lists a place called “Kurovo” as one of the possible sites where the victims may be buried. The report then says Kurovo is the city dump. It is unclear if this is the same site as discussed above. 345/

204. **Pašinac Cemetery:** Pašinac is a district of Prijedor town, and sits three kilometres north of the city, near a small airport. Seventeen prisoners from Keraterm Camp, including Safet Marić, were buried in a mass grave at this cemetery. Marić had reportedly been beaten, his throat slit, and a cross carved into his head. 346/
Baltine Bare: There is a general report that 2,000 people are buried by the River Sana in Baltine Bare, near Prijedor. No other details about the site were provided. 347/

Europa Inn: The road leading to Prijedor, which is near the Gaj woodland and the Europa Inn, is the reported site of a mass grave holding 700 bodies. Local villagers may have been responsible for digging the grave, but it is unclear whether they did so of their own volition or were forced by the Serb authorities. 348/

Bajer Factory: Most reports note that those prisoners killed at Keraterm Camp were taken to the mines at Omarska, Tomašica, or Ljubija. 349/ Another report, however, alleges that those internees who died from beatings or torture were taken to “Bajer”. 350/ where clay was excavated for the local brick factory. 351/ Another report states that the grave was covered by construction material from the destroyed Old Town. Some individuals were buried alive under the rubble. 352/

Bišćani is a Muslim village of 1,000 persons, just west of Prijedor proper. It was bombarded with artillery on 20 July 1992. The following day, the infantry moved in. 353/ Soon the soldiers occupied every home in the village. Most of the male residents were killed in or outside their homes. Women and children were rounded up and kept in a few houses. One witness observed seven deaths by shooting. Because of its proximity to Prijedor town, reports of gravesites in Bišćani are included here. 354/

Bišćani Cemetery: A 22 year-old Bosnian Muslim said that from 20 to 27 July, surviving residents buried victims’ bodies in the local cemetery. The 40 survivors were then forced to walk to the entrance of the Prijedor city, where a bus transported them to Trnopolje Camp. 355/

Left Bank of Sana: Several tens of people were allegedly killed and buried near the left bank of the Sana River in Bišćani. 356/

Tukove: This small village near Bišćani contains a joint grave, where a woman witness’ brother and five others are buried. No other details regarding the site were provided. 357/

Tukove Trash Heap: A witness interviewed by the Croatian Information Centre related that she and three other women had to put the bodies of 20 Bišćani villagers, who had been killed on the way to a detention camp, into the trash heap. The following day, they tried to bury the bodies properly, but Serb soldiers stopped them, saying the bodies were going to be taken away. 358/

Jubovci: Allegedly 120 people were killed in Jugović and Bišćani and buried in Jubovci. No other details regarding the site were provided. 359/

Trnopolje is a small village of 5,000 people, nine kilometres east of Prijedor. It sits on the north side of Lake Ribnjak, and is halfway between Omarska and Prijedor. Before the war, the village consisted of 950, families of which 704 were Muslim, 102 were Croat and the rest Serbs, Ukrainian, Albanians and others. 360/

Trnopolje was attacked on the same day as Prijedor, 23 May 1992, and the village was occupied without any shots fired. The local villagers were
ordered to turn over their weapons, and the Serbs began a campaign of harassment against the population. They fired shots at Muslim houses, and the wealthy and intellectuals disappeared. Many villagers were killed in their homes.

216. The school centre in the main part of the village was thereafter turned into a detention facility, holding as many as 4,000 to 5,000 people. Women and children were kept in the culture hall, which was part of the school; the men were kept separately, often being forced to sleep outside.

217. The Serb attack on Trnopolje and subsequent detention of many civilians had severe consequences. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of villagers were reportedly killed and buried in mass graves. Some of these graves seem to have been created as a necessity of war; others may have been a way of concealing evidence of mass killings. In Trnopolje itself, there are reports of eight separate mass grave sites. There are also three additional villages in the immediate vicinity of Trnopolje, Šivci, Manićani and Kamićani which are also said to contain mass graves.

218. Ribnjak Lake & Fish Hatchery: As mentioned above, the village of Trnopolje borders Lake Ribnjak. This lake appears to have been the location of a fish pond and hatchery which is just a few hundred yards from the village. This lake was not only the site of several reported mass graves, it is also where Muslims were disposed of by burning.

219. Many of the victims buried at Ribnjak lake were prisoners of the Trnopolje and Trnjani camps. According to one detainee of Trnopolje, drunk Serb soldiers would enter the camp at Trnopolje every night and take two or three girls outside and rape them. Some of the women were returned to the camp, and others were taken to Prijedor hospital. Still others were killed, and people from the camp were required to bury them near Ribnjak. When the men would return from burial detail, they told the other prisoners that the dead had been beaten to death, and many appeared to have been tortured. A named guard was said to often select prisoners to dig graves for dead prisoners. Frequently, those assigned to this task never returned.

220. Another former prisoner corroborated these stories of torture, mutilation and mass graves in Ribnjak. On an unspecified date in July, four to five soldiers came to Trnopolje and took six men away from the camp. All were from Kamićani village and all had the surname Forić. The following day, guards selected seven prisoners to dig a mass grave for the men next to Ribnjak. According to the gravediggers, the seven men had been cut with knives, crosses were carved into their chests, knives were pushed through their chins and tongues, through which wires were then inserted.

221. At least two Bosnian Muslims were killed in the Sanićani Ribnjak area of Trnopolje. Sources heard from friends in the village that their bodies were either thrown in the fish hatchery or into the Gomancica River.

222. Some prisoners, however, were never buried. It is reported that many Muslims who had been detained in the Trnjani and Trnopolje camps, and had died from beatings, starvation or were killed, were taken to Ribnjak. At that point, their bodies were reportedly doused with gasoline and they were set on fire.

223. Soccer Field: Trnopolje Camp’s setting in the school centre provided an array of facilities in which to house prisoners, including a soccer field 200 metres from the school. A Bosnian refugee reported that in June of 1992, the bodies of eight Muslim prisoners were buried next to the soccer field, under a
large oak tree. 368/

224. **Mezari**: Mezari is a neighborhood within Trnopolje village. A large number of bodies of prisoners who were killed by Serb guards at Trnopolje camp were disposed of at the Mosque in Mezari. The individual who reported this incident was unsure whether the bodies were buried there or if they had been burned. 369/

225. **Trnopolje Park**: According to a witness statement, there is a park one kilometre north of the Trnopolje camp. This witness alleged that many of the prisoners killed at the camp were buried on park grounds. No other details about the site were provided. 370/

226. **Trnopolje Mill**: Helsinki Watch interviewed a man who was assigned to dig graves while detained at Trnopolje camp. The witness went on several burial trips during his detention. Among the sites he was aware of was the mill, where 60 to 100 people are said to have been buried. 371/ A second man that Helsinki Watch spoke with corroborated the existence of this site, saying there are "many graves" near the mill, and a bulldozer was used to cover them. 372/

227. **Trnopolje Meadow**: The gravedigger who spoke of burials at the mill actually participated in the burial of persons in a meadow near the camp. 373/ This meadow was 400 metres from the camp, at the end of a fence which runs along the left side of a road near the railway station. At least three bodies were buried there, two of whom were identified as Ante and his son Zoran. All three bodies had the backs of their heads missing, and one was shot through the eye. 374/

228. **Trnopolje Fields**: According to at least one former prisoner, some of the dead from Trnopolje camp were buried in numerous fields in the vicinity of the camp. 375/ It is possible that the meadow referred to by the gravedigger mentioned above was just one of the fields in which bodies were buried. 376/

229. **Residential Houses**: During the occupation of Trnopolje, many villagers were killed in their homes and yards. Often, Serbs would bring prisoners away from camps in the area and kill them in the village citizens who were not yet in detention. There are reports of numerous mass graves in the yards of Trnopolje's residents. 377/ Most were buried where they died.

230. As an example, two individuals related the execution and burial of 11 to 13 persons in front of the Redžić house in Trnopolje. 378/ On 9 July 1992, seven Serbs and others arrived in the village in APCs and military trucks, and began rounding up Muslim men from their homes. Eventually the group numbered between 40 and 50, and they were gathered in front of Mevlja Redžić's house, along with Mevlja and her daughter-in-law. Eleven men and two women were asked to step forward. 380/ They were taken across the road and killed by machine-gun fire. They were buried behind Mevlja's house. 381/

231. **Manišani Village**: One witness who was detained at Trnopolje for over four months had to bury Muslim bodies three times. The Muslim had been dead for three weeks, and were buried in the village of Manišani, seven kilometres from the camp. 382/

232. **Šivci Cemetery**: The village of Šivci is two kilometres from Trnopolje camp. It was shelled sometime after 14 June, and between 45 to 120 people were killed during the Serb attack. 383/ Moreover, its proximity to Trnopolje made it a prime site for mass burials.
233. The cemetery in Šivci appears to have initially been the primary site for burials of those killed at Trnopolje Camp. A Bosnian refugee, who was assigned to bury the dead at this location, noted that there was not enough space to bury all those killed, which forced burials to the fields around Trnopolje. 

234. Šivci Unpaved Village Road: One of the gravediggers interviewed by Helsinki Watch noted that 50 people were killed at one time in Šivci on 26 or 27 June. He also said that men are buried along a small road which is just to the left of the unpaved village road in Šivci.

235. Kamičani Mosque: Three former prisoners of Trnopolje Camp are buried near the mosque in Kamičani, a small village near Trnopolje. According to a gravedigger, three men received permission to scavenge food from the camp guards. When the guards who escorted them went away for a few moments, the police reportedly stopped the three men. The guards returned to find the three men missing. They were later found near the mosque. One's throat was slit, one was shot in the head, and the third had his foot severed. The three were buried where they died.

Omarska

236. Omarska is situated approximately 16 kilometres east of Prijedor proper. In the early part of 1992, it was the site of a Serb-run detention camp, where thousands of local villagers, primarily Muslim males, were detained. Many of the prisoners were subjected to beatings, torture, mutilation, and execution. In nearby Prijedor, another camp was established at the "Keraterm" ceramics plant, where prisoners withstood treatment similar to the prisoners at Omarska. Indeed, many prisoners were shuttled among the Omarska, Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Manjaca camps from the period of May through October 1992.

237. This region contains several mining operations scattered throughout the landscape. These mines, particularly those in Omarska, Tomašica, and Ljubija, which reportedly contain a great number of victims of the fighting in Prijedor county, as well as those killed during detention. The deep pits and shafts created by previous mining operations provided an easy way to carry out large-scale burials; evidence of which could be readily hidden from local villagers and the international community. Indeed, the Serbs regularly recruited local villagers and camp inmates to assist in disposing of the bodies and then killed them as well so as to eliminate any potential witnesses.

238. The lack of witnesses explains why the descriptions of most of the mass grave sites in this area are sketchy and almost always consist of hearsay. The names of various gravesites are described in a variety of ways, making it difficult to ascertain a precise number of locations in the area. In the village of Omarska, there are reports of 12 mass graves.

239. Omarska Mining Complex: The village of Omarska contains a vast mining complex for the excavation of iron ore. This complex was comprised of several different pits, most of which were used to bury the bodies of those killed in the Omarska and Keraterm camps, as well as those killed in villages which were attacked by Serb forces.

240. Many villagers from Prijedor and former camp inmates refer to the "Omarska mines" as burial sites. More often than not, the precise location in which persons are buried is not provided. Six mining locations, however, have been identified as those constituting mass graves: the "Jezero" open pit, the "Ruvac" open mine, the lake near Medjedja dam, the
excavations at "Mamuze", Maričke mine shaft, and Gradina Brana mine shaft. According to the witness who identified the first three sites, 10 to 20 people were killed every day during the three month existence of the Omarska camp and buried at these sites, as well as at Tomašica. 391/ The Jezero and Mamuze sites were closed in January 1992, and area residents say the sites now contain a number of Muslims. The Jezero pit, according to one report, contained the bodies of 59 injured and nine killed civilians from Keraterm Camp. 392/

241. Many of the witness reports identify specific numbers of people buried at the Omarska mines. A former inmate personally observed between 40 to 50 bodies taken away from Omarska camp and deposited in "a nearby mine". 393/ On 24-25 July, 190 Omarska prisoners from Čarakovo were killed at the camp, on the open ground between Bijela Kuća (white house) and Klaonica (slaughter house). A prisoner witnessed a mechanical digger putting the bodies onto two large trucks, which then left "in the direction of the mine shafts". 394/

242. According to several interviews with refugees, a specific incident which took place at Keraterm camp resulted in a huge mass burial, most likely at one of the Omarska/Tomašica mine sites. The numbers of persons involved varies from report to report, but the general sequence of events surrounding the incident do coincide. On one night in mid-July 395/ of 1992, a large number of men were killed or wounded in Room 3 of Keraterm Camp. Two Serb guards reportedly opened fire on a number of prisoners housed in Room 3. Hundreds of men were killed 396/ and still others were wounded. 397/

243. The following morning, the guards enlisted several prisoners to load the bodies of both the dead and wounded onto trucks for disposal. 398/ Once the loading was complete, the trucks traveled to one of the various mine locations, where the bodies of the wounded, dead, and those who assisted in loading the trucks (who were likely killed on-site) were thrown into the mine. 399/

244. Of the six individual accounts of the incident, three mention Omarska as one of the likely mine locations where these bodies were taken. Four specify the Tomašica site as a possible location, and one identifies the "Ribnjak" or "Ljubija" mine as the site. 400/ If, as one of the accounts suggests, Tomašica is part of the mining complex at Omarska, then the likelihood that these victims are buried at or near Omarska is highly probable. However, the mine locations in Omarska are not the only potential sites of mass graves.

245. Omarska Lime Pit: One former prisoner of Omarska Camp alleged that each morning about 10 people were taken away to a nearby lime pit. One local villager found his brother's body in the lime pit. Other villagers found severed body parts, but could not identify any relatives. 401/

246. Manmade Swamp: According to one witness, a former Omarska inmate, there was a rumour of a mass grave situated about 600 metres south of the camp. It consisted of a .5 kilometres long, manmade swamp, which was part of the mineworks and contained acid. The witness suggested that the swamp was being used to dispose of many of the victims killed at the camp. 402/

247. Sites at Omarska Camp: Several reports mention the existence of mass graves, which may be located at the Omarska Camp itself. A former inmate stated that most of the killings at Omarska took place in the machine hall. Prisoners would be called away, shots would be heard, and the prisoners never returned. The inmate alleged that these victims were ultimately buried in a mass grave near the machine hall. 403/ The camp garbage heap was also a site mentioned as a place where bodies were dumped. 404/
248. Another inmate related that every night, two prisoners were selected to bury the dead. One night the witness was chosen, and he buried 11 corpses crosswise in a "pit". The location of the pit was not specified.

249. Busnovi and Gruben: The Busnovi and Gruben regions are also alleged to be gravesites. No other details regarding these sites were provided.

250. Tomašica: As discussed earlier, the Tomašica mine may very well be a part of the whole Omarska mining complex, where scores of former prisoners are buried, particularly the victims of the July killing at Keraterm's Room 3. One account, which related the Keraterm incident, was specific about the burial site and did not refer to the mine itself. This witness speculated that the bodies were taken to an area in Tomašica known as "Depunija". Someone he knew saw a truck unload many dead bodies into a deep pit there.

251. However, the mines at Tomašica may not have held only prisoners of the various Prijedor camps, but other victims as well. According to one witness, 18 Muslims were killed in the yard of a residential home in Prijedor during late July 1992. These men, along with the bodies of 40 to 50 men killed on Partizanska Ulica, were transported in a truck, which was followed by a bulldozer. The vehicles turned onto the road which led to the Tomašica mines. The witness only saw the loading of the bodies, not the burial, but mentioned that the road travelled led only to the mines and to no other road or location. The witness also noted that he observed a truck designated as belonging to the Tomašica mine pass him on the road. As it turned, blood spilled out of the truck and he saw arms and legs hanging.

252. Ljeskare: There is a horizontal mine shaft in the village of Ljeskare. Prisoners at Omarska Camp heard rumours that 500 women, children, and elderly from the village of Hambarine were being held in the mine shaft. They were suffocated when the entrance to the shaft was destroyed by explosives.

253. Ljubija is 10 kilometres south of Prijedor. Like Omarska and Tomašica, Ljubija is a mining community, and served as an additional location where prisoners and villagers were taken for burial.

254. Strip Mines: In the middle of May 1992, Serb soldiers from an unidentified unit took control of the Ljubija strip mine. Guards posts were established, the location was armed, and barbed wire was erected. Because of the frequency with which witnesses to the mass burials in Prijedor were killed, the precise locations of the sites are often not provided. Accounts refer to the "Ljubija" mine, strip mine, open pit iron mine, and the like. Six locations, however, have been identified with more specificity:

(a) Vukulja: Vukulja was a pit 12 kilometres in an unknown direction from Ljubija. Prior to May of 1992, recent ore excavations had taken place at the site. A source provided hearsay information that 150 Muslims from Kozarac and thousands of other Muslims from the Prijedor area were killed in the Vukulja and Ljubija pits in August of 1992.

(b) Sljunkara: The Sljunkara open pit was five kilometres south-west of Prijedor. Just as Muslims from Prijedor were buried in Vukulja in August, others were buried in the Sljunkara pit in May of 1992.
(c) Iskopine Pit: The Iskopine pit is located just west of the main road through Ljubija between an area marked "Ljubija Rudnik" and a small lake. In late July 1992, many of the male villagers of Rizvanovici were rounded up by Serb forces. Between 117 and 155 Muslim males were taken to the village of Miska Glava, where they were held in a cafe for three days without food or water. Seven of the prisoners were disemboweled or had their throats slit, and 10 were taken away and never returned. The remaining prisoners were taken to Ljubija sports stadium, where they were beaten. Approximately 60 of the prisoners were mutilated and killed. Those who were still alive had to load the mutilated corpses onto buses. The buses drove to the Iskopine pit, parked near a bulldozer, and two or three prisoners took turns hauling the corpses to an area 20 metres from the buses. Automatic rifle fire emanated from this area and the prisoners never returned. An escapee believes they were executed by rifle fire.

(d) Open Pit Mine - Stara Cesta Road: This open pit mine is said to be two to three kilometres south of Ljubija. It is 12 metres in diameter and is six metres deep. On 1 August 1992, a pile of 20 to 25 bodies, all with multiple bullet wounds, was seen in this pit. The pit is on the east side of Stara Cesta Road and north of a dirt path, which turns off the main road to the east. A Bosnian refugee personally observed these bodies, which were covered with earth a few days later.

(e) Redak & Kruška Pits: Redak is an open strip mine pit three kilometres south of Ljubija, and Kruška is one kilometre south of Redak. Bodies were said to have been dumped in these pits after the attacks on the village of Brisevo. The pits at these locations were 5 to 100 metres from the road, with dimensions of three metres by three metres by 2.5 metres. The pits were empty before hostilities began in Sanski Most, but in August of 1992, residents observed that the pits were filled with the region's yellow dirt. One person observed human bones protruding from one of the pits. Another report alleged that 200 people were buried in one grave at Redak.

(f) Ljubija Mines: Other allegations generally state that Ljubija mines were used as burial sites. One prisoner from Keraterm related that his Serb guards told him that the 15 to 20 prisoners who died at the camp each day were buried at the ore mine in Ljubija, 15 kilometres west of Prijedor.

(g) Another man from the area stated that he spoke with a man who buried bodies brought by the Serbs to the strip mines. Specifically, more than 100 villagers from Hambarine were captured, taken to the strip mines, executed, and buried by an excavator.

(h) Another report states that in July 1992, bodies of killed civilians were brought on a regular basis to the Ljubija mines, where they were soaked with oil and set on fire. Afterwards, bulldozers would cover them with dirt and cobbles.

255. Šurkovac: Šurkovac is a village 2.5 kilometres north of Ljubija. Within the village is a hamlet called Volarić, entirely populated by gypsies. According to a refugee, 12 unidentified bodies were unloaded off a truck on the left side of the Ljubija-Miska Glava Road. Eleven Gypsies were forced to bury the victims who may have been from Rizvanović. As the Gypsies were digging the mass grave, a delivery truck, which was supplying food to the Serb Army, passed by and the Gypsies were fired upon, instantly killing nine of them. The witness identified the gravesites on a topographic map.
256. **Tomeks Plant**: A large number of bodies are reportedly buried in a mass grave near the Tomeks plant in Ljubija. No other details regarding the site were provided. 426/

257. **Liubica Dizdarević Residence**: This house is situated near the west side of the intersection of Stara Cesta road and the new road 3.5 kilometres south of Ljubija. A group of 20 Muslim prisoners, some from the village of Carakovo, were transported to this site by bus and taken to a pear tree. Their hands were tied behind their backs and 10 armed guards escorted them. The prisoners were forced to dig a pit. The guards then beat and shot the prisoners and pushed them into the pit, which was then covered with dirt. The witness heard of the killing from his aunt, who was an eyewitness. During the last half of August, human hands and feet could be seen protruding from the pit. 427/

258. **Raljaš**: There is a general report that 19 persons were killed and buried in five graves in Raljaš. 428/ No other details regarding the site were provided. 429/

**Gravesites Near Sanski Most Border – Stara Rijeka & Brišeo**

259. Stara Rijeka is approximately three kilometres south-east of Ljubija and sits on the border with Sanski Most county. It nearly forms one village with its neighbor, Brišeo. Because of the specificity with which graves in both villages are described, they will be discussed separately.

260. **Stara Rijeka Cemetery**: On 25 July 1992, soldiers from the Bosnian Serb 6th Light Infantry Mountain Brigade, the Fifth Kozara Brigade and local mobilized Serbs converged on both Stara Rijeka and Brišeo. All Muslim and Croat males were apprehended. During the roundups, 85 residents, including 17 women, were killed. 430/ Most were slain with knives. Serbs in Stara Rijeka allowed survivors of the attack to bury the dead; those in Brišeo did not. 431/ In August of 1992, nine bodies were buried in two graves in the Stara Rijeka Croatian “Grošica” Cemetery.

261. Two Bosnian refugees gave detailed descriptions of the burial sites and identified the victims. 432/ The cemetery is four kilometres south of Stara Rijeka, on the east side of the highway to Stari Madjan. It is surrounded by a wrought iron fence and has only one means of ingress and egress: a small bridge which spans a two metre canal separating the cemetery from the highway. The first grave is to the left of the cemetery entrance and covers a six square metre area. Two Bosnian Croatian married couples 433/ from the villages of Brišeo and Stara Rijeka are buried there. 434/

262. The second grave is to the right of the cemetery entrance and is four metres by 2.5 metres. Nine members of the same family, 435/ who were Bosnian Croats from Stara Rijeka, are buried there: three brothers, four sons of two of the brothers, a nephew of the brothers, and a cousin from Brišeo.

263. When the bodies were found, all the throats had been slit; the backs of their knees had been cut, and all body hair had been burned off. One victim’s head had been scalped and his eyes were removed. One other victim had skin removed from his left elbow, and another’s spine was broken. It appears from the report that the bodies were discovered by a villager, and he was granted permission to bury them. 436/
264. In addition, there is a general, unconfirmed report that 43 people were killed in Stara Rijeka and buried in two graves. 437/

265. Briševo: A 30 year-old Bosnian Croatian witness from Briševo 438/ has provided testimony of mass grave locations, names of some victims, and details of how they were killed. 439/ The first attack on Briševo was on 27 May 1992. By the dawn of 24 July 1992, the area was entirely encircled. On about 24 August, the area was under mortar attack. After the mortar attack, troops moved from village to village, indiscriminately seeking out and killing inhabitants. 440/ Meeting little or no resistance, these forces moved through each town and forced out the remaining inhabitants. 441/ Most people were hiding from the shelling in their basements, where the soldiers killed them. About 70 bodies were buried, all of which had suffered multiple bullet wounds. 442/ The Sixth Krajina Brigade and members of the Fifth Kozara Brigade were reportedly responsible for these mass killings. Most of the victims were killed by the Sixth Krajina Brigade. 443/ The witness also provided the names of some perpetrators. 444/

266. Some of the information provided included individual graves located near mass graves. 445/ These individuals also may be the victims of mass killings. All of the graves were dug by civilians from the village of Briševo, including the witness, except for the first grave listed later, which was dug by the victims themselves. All are over one metre deep and all are marked with a cross and surrounded by wooden fences, again with the exception of the first grave listed. Some bodies were wrapped in sheets and blankets and then buried. 446/ The following is a list of those graves in the Briševo area. 447/

267. In mid-August, a bus arrived from Ljubija with about 20 Muslim prisoners. They were predominantly young men (in their early twenties) from the village of Carakovo. They were removed from the bus with their hands tied with wire behind their necks and escorted by about 10 guards with assault weapons. After their hands were freed, they were forced to dig a pit. The guards beat and shot them and then pushed their bodies into the pit. Before leaving, the guards covered the bodies with dirt. During the last half of August, the witness could see hands and feet protruding from the grave. 448/

268. The badly burned bodies of an 80 year-old man, a 55 year-old woman, and a 67 year-old man are buried near a witness' house. This grave is located in Pimaci. 449/

269. Above a witness' house in Mlinari, six people are buried. 450/

270. About 10 metres from the well near Marko Buzuk's house, a 65 year-old woman, a 60 year-old man and a 30 year-old man are buried. 451/ In the same immediate area, about 400 metres west of Mlinari toward Groarac, 452/ a grave contains four male bodies with multiple bullet wounds. 453/

271. At the location called Jezerc (Little Lake), four people are buried.

272. There are two graves 200 metres from the road south of Lisina, near a witness' house. 454/ The two graves are about 70 metres apart. 455/ An entire family of six individuals is buried there.

273. Four women and four men were brought and killed near Ivo Žunić's house and later buried there. 456/
274. The graves of two 16 year-old males are located on the Žunića Ravna road, north-west of Buzuci. One boy was buried on the south side of the stream, and the other was buried on the north side. Their bodies bore identification stating that they were from Rizvanović.

275. The witness also provided detailed information on how a number of the victims listed above were killed. Many were tortured and all were beaten. Some were killed by picks, shovels, and stakes, while others were mutilated.

276. Rogatica is located in eastern BiH, near Srebrenica and Višegrad. According to the 1991 census, Rogatica had a population of 21,812 persons, 60.4 per cent of whom were Muslim and 39.6 per cent were Serbian.

277. Dobrun/Okrušje: A witness from Višegrad related that Serb Muslim relations grew tense upon the arrival of the Užice corps on 14 April 1992. The Užice corps left a month later, and Serb irregular forces came in. Muslims began being subjected to curfews and dismissed from their jobs. Those Muslims who belonged to the SDA were often taken for interrogation. At one point, the commander of the Serb Territorial Defence Forces ordered all Muslim men over the age of 15 to report to headquarters. Upon arrival, they were told to be out of the village by noon; thereafter many Muslims fled.

278. The witness joined a convoy of four buses carrying refugees from Titovo Ušće towards Skopje. The convoy was stopped by Četniks between Pobruš and Okrušje. Nineteen men were taken away from the convoy, and the witness later heard that the men had been killed and their bodies buried in a common grave.

279. Žepa: UN monitoring organizations (UNMO) received a report of a possible mass grave in Žepa. A local civilian met with UNMOs who said that there was a mass grave near his house, and related that most victims were killed in 1992, in Višegrad and its surroundings by "Četniks", not local Serbs. The bodies were then thrown into the Drina River and surfaced in Slap. All of the victims were Muslim. The witness has a list of 85 persons who were buried in the mass grave. Another man secretly buried the personal property of the dead in another location in Žepa. UNMO patrols visited the alleged site and confirmed that there is a mass grave at the location, as well as some individual graves. The report notes that a total of 185 persons may be buried in the area.

280. The county of Sanski Most is located in north-western BiH, just south of Prijedor and west of Banja Luka. According to the 1991 census, Sanski Most had a population of 60,119 persons, 47 per cent of whom were Muslim, 42.2 per cent were Serbian, 7.1 per cent were Croatian, and 3.7 per cent were "other".

281. Military activity in Sanski Most began in late May 1992. On 27 May, roads across the Sana River were blocked local Serbian police and, possibly, the JNA. Mortars and artillery were brought into position the next day, and the county began being shelled that evening. The Serbs asked the citizens to surrender and report to the main soccer field in Sanski Most. Most citizens left their homes to comply, and Serb forces began "cleansing" the towns. Houses were looted and burned. If villagers remained inside, grenades were thrown in to kill the occupants. At a later date, villagers were taken to detention facilities somewhere in Ključ and/or Sanski Most, including...
"Krings" camp.  

From information available to IHRLI, most of the mass graves in the Sanski Most county surfaced in the surrounding villages, and not in Sanski Most proper.

282. Kliuje-Sanski Most Road: A Muslim villager from Sanski Most county was one of those transported to detention facilities in the Kliuje and Sanski Most area. While he was on board a bus between the two counties, he saw a pile of 40 to 50 bodies lying in a meadow approximately five metres from the road. At the foot of a hill, a bulldozer was digging, what the villager presumed to be, a mass grave.

283. Vrhpolje: Vrhpolje is a small village 12 kilometres south of Sanski Most. On an unidentified date, the village was looted, burned and destroyed, and 3,500 of its inhabitants were killed and then buried in mass graves. The graves are reportedly located between Highway 15 and the Sanica River, next to a gravel road that crosses a wooden bridge. The bridge is situated just south of where the Sanica River joins the Sana River. The graves were dug by bulldozers for four days. A Serbian guard at the Krings Camp told a Bosnian refugee about the site. Gypsies may have assisted with the burial of the bodies.

284. Klijevci: Klijevci is a village situated eight kilometres south of Sanski Most. According to reports, the entire Muslim male population of the village, aged 14 and older, were killed and buried in mass graves. The order to kill the Muslims was reportedly given by a Serb commander. This information was given to a Bosnian refugee by a man who was one of a group of 20 men who were taken to be killed but escaped.

285. Hrustovo: Like Klijevci and Vrhpolje, Hrustovo is south of Sanski Most by 13 kilometres. This Muslim village was also completely destroyed, and all inhabitants who had not fled the region earlier were killed. The victims were buried in mass graves, but the precise location was not provided in the report.

286. Otiš: A source interviewed by the United Kingdom noted that he had heard rumours that all Croats living in Otiš were killed and 5,020 of them were buried in a mass grave. No other details about the site were provided.

287. Škriljevita: G.S., a Croat civilian from Škriljevita, outside of Sanski Most proper, was reportedly ambushed by Serbs on 2 November 1992. He and five other individuals were taken to a location near the Glamosnica forest, lined up in a row, and shot at with machine-gun fire. G.S. survived the shooting and later escaped. He noted that on the same day, a group of three other Croatian civilians were killed in a similar fashion, as they were returning from Sanski Most. Another Croatian was killed, reportedly because the Serbs feared that he knew of the murders of the three civilians. The Serb authorities gave an ultimatum to the villagers of Škriljevita to bury all of these victims before 3:00 p.m. on 4 November 1992. The villagers received the bodies of the nine individuals on 3 November, which they buried in the common grave in the Škriljevita cemetery.

27. Sarajevo

Sarajevo is located in southern BiH. The county consists of several districts, including Hadžići, Ilijaš, Ilidža, and Vogošća. Sarajevo's population in 1991 was 525,890 persons, 49.3 per cent of whom were Muslim, 29.9 per cent were Serbian, 10.7 per cent were "Yugoslav", 6.6 per cent were Croatian, and 3.5 per cent were "other".
289. Tarčin: The village of Tarčin is situated in Hadžići district, 20 kilometres north-east of Konjic proper. The self-styled "Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" informed the ECMM office that a mass grave exists on the outskirts of Tarčin, near a meat factory. According to a map, the gravesite appears to be located between the factory and the river, just north of an east-west railway line. The factory sits north of the intersection of the road to Kreševo and the road between Konjic and Sarajevo.

290. It is believed that there are 30 Croats from Konjic in the grave, as well as three Serbians. Five of the victims are said to be children. The perpetrators are known, but not named for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Although ECMM was called upon to investigate, as of 22 November 1993, the HVO denied access to the routes to Tarčin.

291. Sarajevo City: A woman resident of Sarajevo informed a German journalist of a possible mass grave in the city of Sarajevo. The grave sits in the Muslim controlled centre of town, between the burned library building and the Miljacka River.

292. Rajlovac: A captured Serb soldier related details regarding the site of a mass grave in Rajlovac. According to the soldier, Sešelj’s troops were in the village of "Ahatovići" burning houses and killing its inhabitants. The soldier’s mission in the village was to "kill and destroy". Sešelj’s troops captured 150 men, women, and children and ushered them into a hole, near a stationed machine-gun. All of the persons were then shot by the machine-gun and automatic rifle fire. Later, two Yugoslav People’s Army trucks arrived on the scene, and two other prisoners had to load the dead bodies onto the trucks.

293. The trucks traveled to Rajlovac, and stopped at a hole which was 10 metres deep and five metres wide. The prisoners, some still alive, were thrown into the hole, where some of Sešelj’s men continued to shoot at the bodies. A dredger then poured dirt over the hole.

294. Ilijaš: The soldier noted in his interrogation that 30 Muslims who had been detained in a school in "upper Bihać" were taken to "Ilijaš", where they were killed and thrown into a "peć" [stove].

295. Lješeva: Lješeva is a small village in the Ilijaš district. On 4 June 1992, the village was attacked with artillery fire from Serb forces. The following day, four busesloads of soldiers surrounded the Muslim part of the village and ordered the Muslims to gather in the centre of town. During the occupation, many of the civilians in the village were killed. Some of the corpses remained unburied for 18 days, but were later interred in a "mass churchyard". The report lists 20 identified victims, but is not clear as to whether all 20 persons were buried in the churchyard.

296. Žuć: Žuć is a mountain in the Sarajevo area. A Serbian soldier witnessed the mass killing of 20 to 30 Muslims and the burial of those bodies at the same location. No further details were provided in the report.

28. Slavonska Požeega

297. Slavonska Požeega is located in the region of Croatia called "western Slavonia", with Slavonski Brod and Nova Gradiška forming its southern border. According to the 1991 census, Slavonska Požeega had a population of 71,299.
persons, 79.4 per cent of whom were Croatian, 14 per cent were Serbian and 6.6 per cent were "other".

298. On 19 October 1992, Croatian authorities issued an order to many Serb villages in several counties, including Slavonska Požega. The order stated that the ethnic Serb population from each named village was to leave within 48 hours. The depopulated Serbs would then have the choice of moving to villages with Croatian majorities, or going to refugee camps. The villagers of Jeminovac and Snjegavić did not comply with the order, because they did not know where to go.

299. On 10 November 1991, members of the Croatian National Guard entered all villages which had not complied with the depopulation order, including Jeminovac and Snjegavić. ZNG forces threw flammable substances and hand grenades into the homes. Most of the houses were burned down, and residents were killed, either by gunfire, having their throats slit, or burning to death inside their homes. Several tens of inhabitants were killed and buried in a mass grave. No details regarding the precise location of the grave were provided.

29. Sokolac

300. Sokolac is in south-eastern BiH, near the counties of Olovo and Rogatica. According to the 1991 census, Sokolac had a population of 14,833 persons, 68.6 per cent of whom were Muslim, 30.2 per cent were Serbian, and 1.2 per cent were "other".

301. Sokolac may be the site of one mass grave, perhaps near the village of Sokolovići. A former citizen of Visegrad provided testimony about the location. On an unidentified date, Serbs suggested to the civilians of Višegrad that they should flee the county and 400 refugees boarded six buses to Olovo. On the Isarevo Hill, near Olovo, the convoy was stopped by Četniks. The elderly and handicapped, women, and children were made to walk towards Olovo, while the men went toward Sokolac.

302. The following day, the refugees learned the convoy would travel to Han Pijesak and they would be exchanged. However, the buses went to Sokolovići, Kalimanovići and Zakomo, and stopped at the sugar factory. The Četniks took all the jewelry, money and identification papers from the refugees. Soon, a man arrived and the Četniks began beating one of the refugees. The others tried to escape, but they too were captured. Some were beaten and harassed.

303. Later, the bus of prisoners traveled a short while, then stopped. The prisoners were forced 150 to 200 metres uphill along a muddy road. Ten of the men were separated from the group, and two of them were shot by Četniks armed with submachine-guns. The men "disappeared", according to the witness. The witness then saw that a pit had been dug in the area, and concluded that all of the prisoners would be shot and thrown into the pit. More killings commenced, and the witness began to run away. The Četniks fired bursts at him, but he managed to escape. In all, the witness estimated that 49 persons were killed at the pit.

29. Srebrenica

304. Srebrenica is located in eastern BiH, on the Serbian border. According to the 1991 census, the population of Srebrenica was 37,211 persons, of whom 74.8 per cent were Muslim and 25.2 per cent were Serbian.
305. There is a report of one mass grave in Srebrenica. Serbs report that the Bosnian Muslims killed a number of Serbs in this county, and that there is a mass grave in the village of Tomanice.

306. The county of Titova Korenica is located in southern Croatia, on the border with Bihać pocket. According to the 1991 census, 75.8 per cent of its 11,107 persons were Serbian, 15.8 per cent were Croatian, 3.9 per cent were "other", and 3.5 per cent were "Yugoslav".

307. There are two mass graves reported in this county. The victims in both reports appear to be soldiers of Croatian ethnicity.

308. Debelo Brdo School: In August 1991, the Howitzer Battalion of the 3rd Yugoslav People's Army Corps received orders to travel to Croatia. Upon arriving in Croatia, the battalion was told that they were "no longer members of the JNA", but were local volunteer Serbs who were part of the Sixth Lički Division of the Army of the Serbian Krajina. They traveled for several months around the vicinity of Debelo Brdo and Petrovo Selo, near Plitvička Jezera National Park. From their various positions, they fired upon Croatian villages with artillery.

309. Their mission, according to a Bosnian Croatian refugee, was to "destroy all Croatian villages and kill all Croatians and Muslims". The refugee explained that this mission prompted the battalion's executive officer, a Macedonian, and all non-Serbs of the unit to desert.

310. When the unit arrived at Debelo Brdo, it found the bodies of 24 Croatians who had their throats slit and their heads smashed with blunt instruments. Some had their genitals removed. Members of the "battalion" collected the bodies and buried them in a mass grave 300 metres from the school in Debelo Brdo. The refugee recognized some of the victims as former JNA troops of Croatian ethnicity. He also heard from other soldiers that the victims had been killed by Serbs. The report does not state whether the Croatians were members of the JNA during a time when it was given orders to destroy Croatian villages.

311. Čanak: This village was looted and burned on 10 December 1991. During the attack, 60 civilians and Croatian soldiers were killed, and 11 members of the Croatian Army's 128th Ričevka Brigade were missing. There is a report that two "graveyards" are present in the village, one of which was the site of executions. JNA forces as well as Serb militias and paramilitary groups, are said to be responsible for the killings. No other details about the site were provided.

312. Tomislavgrad is in the south-western part of BiH, and borders Croatia. Of the 29,261 inhabitants of Tomislavgrad, 86.6 per cent were Croatian, 10.8 per cent were Muslim, and 2.6 per cent were "other".

313. There is one report of a possible mass grave in this county. On 22 September 1993, ECMM met with General Pašalić who informed them that an "improvised" mass grave had been discovered at "Raštani". The grave may contain more than 20 bodies. According to Pašalić, the grave had not yet been exhumed at the time of the meeting with ECMM.
314. The county of Travnik, on the Lašva River, is located approximately 70 kilometres west-north-west from Sarajevo, and 20 kilometres west of Zenica. Travnik had 70,402 persons in 1991. 45.3 per cent of whom were Muslim, 36.9 per cent were Croatian, 11 per cent were Serbian and 6.8 per cent were "other". According to the Deputy Mayor of Travnik, B. Kadrić, the population swelled to 100,000 in September 1993. It now serves as the main transit centre for Muslim refugees and displaced persons from Serb controlled areas.

315. Vlašić Mountain - Korišanska Stijena: The Vlašić mountain range is just north of Travnik, and in 1992, the area served as a passage out of Serb-held territory. The village of Korišanska Stijena is situated at the edge of the Ilomska River, which sits in a canyon below Vlašić Mountain. The village of Petrovo Polje is also nearby, and this small region is alleged to be the site of the largest mass grave in BiH. More specifically, it is where up to 250 men were shot and killed during a convoy operation from the Prijedor area to Travnik.

316. On 21 August 1992, it was announced that some prisoners would be released from Trnopolje. No specific manner of selecting prisoners for release was apparent. According to one witness, four buses of prisoners were loaded at Trnopolje, including 250 men and 150 women and children. The convoy then moved toward Prijedor, where two buses and six trailer trucks, containing mostly women and children, were added to the convoy.

317. The convoy proceeded towards Travnik, crossed a bridge over the Ilomska River and then stopped. All the males from each of the buses and trucks, totalling approximately 250, were gathered together and placed on the second and third buses from the front. The women and children who had been on those vehicles were put into others. The buses and trucks transporting the women and children passed the two buses carrying the men, so that the men's buses were in the rear of the convoy. The entire convoy traveled a small distance, and then the buses carrying the men stopped. The remainder of the buses continued on the road towards Travnik.

318. Ten soldiers, wearing blue camouflage and red berets, took the male prisoners off the second bus one by one. The men were lined up in two rows, facing west. On the west side of the mountain, there was a 20 metre cliff, which ended in a slope that descended 300 metres to the Ilomska River. The men were then told to proceed to the edge of the cliff in the row formation and kneel. Automatic weapons fire was heard for five minutes, and the bodies of the men fell into the gorge. The men in the first bus were taken out in groups of three for execution.

319. Three men were taken to the back of the second bus, and they saw two large pools of blood 10 metres behind the rear of the bus. They also observed prisoners standing at the edge of the precipice, then falling over the edge as they were shot. Many of the prisoners, including several of the survivors, jumped off the cliff voluntarily to avoid being shot. The entire incident lasted about 15 minutes.

320. The guards left, but an hour later, the entire convoy of buses returned empty. A few guards got out of the buses and sprayed the bodies at the base of the cliff with automatic weapons fire and threw hand grenades at them. B.J., one of the survivors interviewed by Helsinki Watch,
related that he saw many corpses after he jumped over the cliff and that the executions continued. 527/ He said that many of the corpses were old, and that there were probably "fewer than 200". 528/

33. **Vinkovci**

321. Vinkovci is a county in eastern Croatia which borders Osijek and Vukovar. The county is populated by a Croatian majority, with small groups of Serbs. 529/ According to the 1991 census, Vinkovci claimed a population of 98,484 persons, 80 per cent of whom were Croatian, 13 per cent were Serbian and 7 per cent were other.

322. Fighting in the area began in October of 1991. The village of Tordinci was captured by the JNA and Serb paramilitary forces on 25 October 1992. 530/

323. There are four reports of mass graves in the county. Information regarding these graves is very limited.

324. **Tordinci Catholic Church**: A mass grave was said to exist at the Tordinci Roman Catholic Church. The victims were reportedly tortured before death. 531/ According to television and radio reports, as well as the report of a JNA captain, 208 corpses were buried at this site, along with dead animal corpses. However, Osijek police could not locate any witnesses to the burial. On 25 August 1992, police gave a document to UNCIVPOL that described the grave as being in front of the Catholic Church, stretching from the cross to the nearest house.

325. Four days later, UNCIVPOL visited the site. The official observed a pile of dirt in front of the church, which measured 75 to 100 feet in length. It appeared that a trench was dug quite some time before the officer's visit, due to the undisturbed tall weeds along the pile. 532/ In early December 1992, ECMN notified the Vinkovci police of the mass grave, who were interested in pursuing an exchange of bodies. 533/

326. Special Rapporteur, Waly Bacre Ndiaye and forensic expert, Morris Tidball Binz, briefly visited the site on 18 December 1992. Binz observed a trench 30 metres long, four metres wide and between .5 and one metres high. The mound seemed to have been deposited within the last two years of his visit, but no later than the summer of 1992, judging from the vegetation growing on the site. The mound bore no visible signs or indications, and sat parallel to and on the side of the main road in front of a church. Contrary to other reports, Binz's report stated that the available information suggested that the bodies were not victims of atrocities or other war crimes. However, Binz stated that nothing was inconsistent with the allegations of a mass grave at the site. He recommended clearing the area of mines, as well as probing the trench with rods to obtain more conclusive information. 534/

327. Another report stated that UN forces discovered a mass grave in Tordinci, which contained the bodies of over 100 Croat soldiers and civilians. It was not stated whether this was the site located at the Catholic Church. 535/

328. **Antin, Matanović Summer House**: UNCIVPOL was notified of a mass grave in Antin on 23 June 1992 by the Osijek police. The police had information that a mass grave existed in an identified location. The house was situated near the railway station. According to police, two young men from Antin were interviewed on 2 July 1992 and stated that a large hole had been dug behind the house several years ago for a swimming pool. They believed bodies were
buried in the hole during the fighting in Vinkovci.

329. UNCI/VIPO/ visited the area on 21 August 1992. The officials spoke with a female refugee who was living in the house and inspected the backyard. They observed a hole which was 20 metres by 10 metres by three metres. It appeared to have been open for some time, as small trees grew along the sides and edge. The officials noted that it clearly had not been dug up in the spring or summer of 1992, based on the vegetation growing around it. While people were reported missing from Antin, UNCI/VIPO/ concluded there were clearly no bodies buried in this location. They did note, however, that witnesses heard shooting near the railway station and there may be a mass grave in that area. 536/

330. Antin, Cave Near Railway Station: According to one report, a mass grave was discovered in a cave dug close to the Markušića railway station. There were no details regarding the circumstances of the grave's creation or the number of bodies. 538/

34. Vlasenica 539/

331. The county of Vlasenica is in eastern BiH, only 10 to 20 kilometres from the Serbian border. It is situated 50 kilometres south-west of Zvornik, along Highway 19 to Sarajevo. 540/ According to the 1991 census, the population of the county was 33,817 persons, of which 55.3 per cent were Muslim, 42.5 per cent were Serb and 2.2 per cent were “other”. 541/

332. On 17 April 1992, Serbian troops entered Vlasenica. Other Serb forces that had occupied Novi Sad joined the effort in Vlasenica on 2 May 1992, as well as Bosnian Serb forces from Šekovići located 15 kilometres north of Vlasenica. 542/ Over the next five weeks, villagers were reportedly captured, taken to the village police station, and beaten. Those Muslims who were believed to be “extremists” were detained at the police station.

333. On 24 June 1992, Serbs evacuated approximately 50 families who lived on Žarka Vukovića street. The Serbs told the civilians that they were looking for a specific “dangerous” Muslim. After the evacuation, five of the houses on that street were set afire, and the villagers were forced to walk to a prison camp in the Sušica River Valley. The “Sušica Camp” was located about 200 metres from the town’s main street. 543/ This camp was reportedly the site of many beatings perpetrated by camp officials. 544/ There were also alleged killings at the camp, which may have led to the creation of three mass graves in the vicinity of the camp. 545/

334. Mračnica Quarry: Mračnica is a quarry which is situated in a valley on Viselac Mountain. The site is two kilometres from Vlasenica on the road to Han Pijesak. According to one report, most of the killings at Sušica Camp took place at the quarry, and bodies were also buried there. No one has yet confirmed the existence of the grave because after an unspecified date, people were no longer allowed to travel to the area. 546/

335. Alpro Aluminum Factory: The source who provided information regarding burials at Mračnica, also stated that other burials may have taken place on the wasteland at the Alpro Aluminum Factory. No other details regarding the site were provided in the report. 547/

336. Dirt Road: Another report regarding the Sušica Camp identified another mass grave in the vicinity of the detention facility. At 1:00 a.m. on 25 June, two of the camp guards 548/ forced four of the prisoners outside; four gunshots and screaming were heard. An hour later, guards entered the
warehouse where prisoners were being held and told them to close the windows, as four prisoners had tried to escape. After sunrise, two prisoners were forced to bury the corpses of the four dead prisoners. The two turned left on the dirt access road that ran next to the camp, crossed a concrete bridge, then turned right onto another dirt road that led to the villages of Luke and Zalakavljë. The two men buried the bodies among some evergreen trees 200 metres from the start of the road, and 10 metres off to the left, in the direction of Luke. 542/

35. **Vukovar 550/**

337. The county of Vukovar is the easternmost county in Croatia. The Danube River forms the county's eastern border, and Vukovar city enjoys a riverside setting. Vinkovci county is to the south-west and Osijek is to the north-west. According to the 1991 census, the population of Vukovar was 84,024 persons, of whom 43.7 per cent were Croatian, 37.4 per cent were Serbian, 11.6 per cent were "other" and 7.4 per cent were Yugoslav.

338. In May 1991, JNA, Četnik and Serb Territorial Defence Forces, with the assistance of local Serbs, began attacking Vukovar. 551/ Daily artillery attacks continued on Borovo Naselje and the periphery of Vukovar's city limits. Many civilians fled, but returned in August to resume their daily lives. Still, the population had been numerically emaciated: 50,000 persons resided there before the war, and by 25 August 1991, only 15,000 persons were left. Up to this point, casualties were buried in the new cemetery of Vukovar, but burials at this site became increasingly difficult due to the war. 552/

339. Fighting continued until 14 September 1991, when the JNA attacked again and gained control of the south-west part of Vukovar from the direction of Negoslavci. Civilians began retreating to the centre of the city. 553/ About 18-19 November, the Croatian defences succumbed to the siege. In the first few weeks of military conquest, JNA forces and Serb paramilitary troops allegedly abducted, tortured, and/or killed hundreds of Croat civilians, police, and soldiers. 554/ Residents living in Vukovar's suburbs also fell victim to the activities of the Serb forces, as they converged on Vukovar from a variety of directions.

340. There are reports of huge numbers of mass graves throughout the county of Vukovar. These numbers are paralleled only in the Prijedor county in BiH. Most contain Croatian victims; a few contain Serbs. The available information suggests that some of the sites, which originally seemed to be illegitimate were indeed sanitary graves and contained civilian casualties of war or military personnel killed in combat. A man on burial detail for the Serb forces reported that the JNA dug up many sites around Vukovar and took the bodies away for proper identification and autopsy. 555/ Other sites in Vukovar do suggest evidence of mass killings and improper burials. In all, there are 19 alleged mass grave sites in Vukovar county, of which nine are in the city of Vukovar, and 10 are in its suburbs.

341. **New Cemetery:** The new cemetery is between the "Center" and "Sajmište" sections of Vukovar city, and is near the Supanic primary school. The Croatian Government and Red Cross 556/ both reported that 1,200 victims are buried at the site, but the Croatian Government does not list it as a site where mass killings took place. Dr. Vesna Bosanac, director of the Vukovar Hospital, indicated that this was the burial site for those killed in Vukovar only until 26 August 1991. After that date, the cemetery became "unapproachable". 557/ A gravedigger on burial detail for the Serbs alleged that 378 bodies, who remain unidentified, were buried at the new
342. **Old German Catholic Cemetery**: The old German Catholic Cemetery is near the Vukovar hospital and the landmark Count Eltz chapel. This is the site to which bodies were taken after 26 August 1991, when the new cemetery could no longer be reached. Dr. Bosanac said that one grave at this cemetery contains 300 persons, the largest such site in Vukovar.

343. Available information suggests, however, that the cemetery may have been the site of two mass killings of Serbians. One account states that a reported ZNG member killed 15 Serb inmates at an identified location after forcing them to dig their own grave. A second account alleges that Croatian officers and paramilitaries reportedly took 15 Serbs out of the ZNG military prison and brought them to an identified location. The Serbs were lined up on the edge of a grave and shot in the back with automatic rifle fire. The bodies then fell into the mass grave.

344. While both of these accounts allege that 15 Serbs from the ZNG prison were killed, each identifies different perpetrators. Thus, as many as 30 Serbians may be buried at this site.

345. **Sports Stadium "Sloga"**: This stadium is situated near the old railway station in Vukovar. There are a variety of reports regarding this site, which call into question earlier suspicions that it was an "illegitimate" gravesite.

346. The Croatian Red Cross alleges that 120 unidentified victims are buried at Sloga. No other details about the site were provided. However, two independent accounts allege that 70 bodies in coffins were located at the stadium and a nearby field. One of the reports stated that the coffins remained unburied and that bodies were taken there after burial at the new and old cemeteries ended. A submission from the Croatian Government alleged that 1,300 persons were buried at the site, but did not list the location as a place of mass killing.

347. Finally, a man who was enlisted for burial detail by Serb forces told the Red Cross that people had been buried in pits in Lužac, which is near the stadium and next to the school, but that the pits were now empty, as the bodies had been dug up for proper identification and autopsy. It is unclear whether this site is the Sloga Stadium.

348. **Brickyard at Sajmište**: The Vukovar brickyard was located in the "Sajmište" area of town. It was near railroad tracks and sat behind the "Velepromet" warehouse, a reported detention facility in which thousands of Croatian civilians were housed during the late months of 1991. The details regarding this site vary widely from account to account, but it appears that this was one site used by Serb paramilitaries to bury individuals who were killed during detention at Velepromet.

349. Two accounts place the number of corpses at the brickyard graves at 1,000. A former prisoner of Velepromet was taken to the brickyard graves by four Velepromet guards to look for her husband’s corpse. She saw a number of holes in the area, containing about 1,000 corpses of men, women and children. It is not clear whether all of the bodies were killed at Velepromet, or if the bodies were found elsewhere and brought to the site.

350. In a different report, the Croatian Red Cross alleged that 250 corpses were buried at the brickyard, but were later transported to Grabovo fish pool. This was also suggested by the gravedigger interviewed by the Red Cross, who said many bodies were transported from the city to surrounding
areas for burial, including Grabovo. The large number of those reportedly killed, coupled with the transient nature of the burial system, makes it difficult to establish a firm number of the bodies buried at this site, if bodies remain buried there at all.

351. **Vukovar Forest:** UN Commissioner Torkel Opsahl interviewed Ivica Kuletić, who is in Zagreb prison and is accused of war crimes. According to Opsahl’s report, Kuletić allegedly took part in the killing of the sick and wounded from Vukovar Hospital. In addition, he confessed that in a forest near Vukovar, approximately 1,500 civilians were killed, an incident in which he participated. A large pit had been previously dug, to which detained civilians were brought by lorry every three to four hours. Five groups of civilians were brought to the site, with 250 to 300 persons in each group. Kuletić admitted that he and other persons killed a total of 1,500 people with machine-guns. In his conversation with Opsahl, however, he alleged that his confessions were made under duress and that he did not participate in the killings.

352. **Kivi Shop on Svetozara Markovića Street:** Two reports, hailing from the Red Cross and the Government of Croatia, note that a mass grave was located on Svetozara Markovića Street, near the "Kivi" shop, and contains 360 bodies.

353. **JNA Barracks:** Marijan Karaula, a resident of Vukovar, stated that 72 corpses were buried at the JNA barracks. Reportedly, this site was later plowed over with a bulldozer.

354. **Home for Elderly/Harbor Headquarters:** Both of these sites are near the Vukovar hospital, and Dr. Vesna Bosanac related that when the Vukovar Office of Burials ran out of coffins, bodies were disposed of at the home for the elderly. At the time of Dr. Bosanac’s report, 50 bodies remained unburied there, as did 50 bodies in the backyard of the Harbor Headquarters. The bodies do, however, all have serial numbers for identification purposes.

355. **Residential Houses:** A report detailing the siege of Vukovar noted that many JNA soldiers killed during the Vukovar fighting were buried in common graves in the yards of Vukovar’s private residences. However, a gravedigger working for the JNA noted that the Army handled burials of its own soldiers, often taking the bodies to Negoslavci, or beyond to Serbia.

356. **Petrova Gora, Gelešova Dol:** Petrova Gora is an area of Vukovar. At Gelešova Dol, 50 to 75 Croatian soldiers were allegedly shot and their corpses burned.

357. **Petrova Gora, Svetozara Markovića Street:** A resident of Vukovar was captured by Serbs and forced to work on burial detail in the region. One gravesite at which he worked was at the end of Svetozara Markovića street, near the new fairgrounds. The site is on the right side of the street, near Misir’s vineyard and 100 metres from the Vesela Dolina Inn. Witness and eight or nine other persons dug graves at this site. Witness estimated that 20 to 30 holes were dug very close together, with each pit holding three to four men. Those buried in the grave were Croatians, mostly men aged 18 to 30, in civilian clothing. The witness observed no women. He related that those he buried were killed in a variety of ways, but most did not seem to be traditional war casualties: the majority were shot in the head or had their throats slit.

358. **Petrova Gora, Stevo Kokot Property:** The aforementioned witness
described the location of another grave in Petrova Gora. He did not participate in burials at this site, but two of his comrades did. The gravesite is on the property of Stevo Kokot, near the pond on the exit from Vukovar. To reach the site, one would take the road from Vukovar to Petrovci, near the new fairgrounds, for about 200 to 300 metres. On the left side is a 500 metre long black slag road. On the right side, 150 metres along this road is a group of trees and the house of the Brac brothers. The mass grave is located between these two landmarks. Witness alleged that the JNA brought corpses there. 582/

359. Ovčara: The evacuation of Vukovar Hospital in November 1991 and the alleged mass grave at Ovčara have previously been the subject of reports prepared by the Commission. 583/ Accordingly, this section will discuss new information obtained since the date of the last report. 584/

360. Plans and arrangements were made throughout 1993 to conduct a second site exploration of the Ovčara gravesite. The goals of the second site exploration would be to exhume the bodies at the site, collect physical evidence, perform autopsies on all bodies at a selected morgue facility, and secure any available testimonial evidence not yet collected.

361. Once the resources and personnel were secured, the teams were dispatched to Sector East on 19 October to begin the investigation. The teams consisted of a contingent from Physicians for Human Rights (PHR); a Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) consisting of two military lawyers and three police investigators; and one UN Support Detachment Deploy from the Netherlands.

362. Upon their arrival in Sector East, the teams were told by UNPROFOR that a meeting with Republic of Serb Krajina officials, including Colonel Milanović, was required before the excavation could begin. Milanović was not available until 22 October, so the various teams went to the Ovčara site on 20 and 21 October to conduct a survey which would not involve excavation.

363. During the site survey, the area was cleaned and cleared of mines. Physical evidence, including spent cartridges were recovered. The arrangement of these cartridges confirmed earlier findings that the a mass execution had taken place at the site. 585/ Topographic mapping and metal detection sweeps were completed. On 23 October, Commissioner Fenrick advised that the Republic of Serb Krajina Parliament had made a decision to postpone activity at Ovčara until the political situation in the former Yugoslavia was resolved. Accordingly, all personnel ceased operations at Ovčara and withdrew from the site. Attempts were made to salvage the exploration, but with no success. The area remains under UNPROFOR protection. 586/

364. Lovas: Lovas is situated south-east of the city of Vukovar. Military activity in the village began on or about 10 October, when Serb forces fired grenades from their positions in the graveyard. 587/ The "White Eagles" arrived, and the movement of all villagers was restricted. The village surrendered, and arrests and killings of civilians began. 588/ Many villagers were subjected to forced labour, which included burial detail.

365. The alleged mass grave(s) in Lovas appeared to be located in the Catholic cemetery. Witness accounts spoke of one or two long canals or trenches, into which dead bodies were thrown. One witness was forced to drive those killed in the village to the graveyard, beginning on 14 October. One person identified the dead while five or six other Croats loaded the corpses onto the truck. 589/ Nine people were killed on 15 October, and their bodies were also taken to the Catholic community grave. At the site, a canal was dug by a military excavator which was 25 metres by 80-100 centimetres wide by two metres. On the opposite side was a shorter canal, 10
to 12 metres long. However, witness never buried bodies in the smaller canal. A minimum of five persons were buried in the canal on the first day. When a row of bodies was complete, they would be covered with dirt and a new row was started. 590/

366. Another Lovas villager saw 26 people brought from a lorry to the site of two trenches, each 25 metres long and one metre wide. The trenches were not properly covered, and thus, parts of bodies were visible. This witness said that a total of 80 people were buried there. 591/ However, the Red Cross noted that the mass grave at the cemetery extended for 100 metres, from the cemetery entrance to the chapel, and that 140 villagers who had been executed were buried there. 592/

367. UNCIVPOL visited this site on 28 August 1992, after receiving word of the gravesite from the Osijek police. The UNCIVPOL official observed evidence of heavy equipment in the area and saw a mound of earth two metres by 50 metres. The official noted that the most "glaring proof" that a mass grave was situated at the site was the fact that it was visited by friends and family on a regular basis. The site was being maintained by them, as weeds had been removed and flowers planted at different points along the mound. 593/

368. On the basis of UNCIVPOL's findings, Special Rapporteur Ndiaye and forensic expert Morris Tidball Binz did a brief investigation of this site on 18 December 1992. Binz noted that the area consisted of a 30 metres long, two metres wide and slightly elevated mound of disturbed earth, and it appeared the trench had been refilled with earth. He observed that the middle part of the mound had been cleared of vegetation, and funeral ornaments had been placed on the top. He found no evidence which was inconsistent with allegations of a mass grave at the site. 594/

369. Binz's report suggested that the victims buried in this grave were victims of war crimes, and that the names of the dead were registered and can be traced. 595/ Thus, it would appear that the burial site itself is legitimate, but forensic information may reveal that the persons buried there were civilian victims of mass killings.

370. Jakobovac: Reportedly 300 imprisoned civilians and soldiers were executed and put in mass graves in November 1991. These graves were allegedly situated on the Vukovar-Sotin Road, towards Jakobovac. 596/ UNCIVPOL visited the area, but found no indication of a grave.

371. Kakobovac: A woman interviewed by the State Department was told by other Croatians that a sheep farm in the Serbian town of Kakobovac was turned into a jail, where a large number of Croatian POWs captured in Vukovar were killed. Afterwards, they were buried in a canal between the two buildings of the sheep farm. The canal had been used as a runoff for manure from the sheep and was lightly covered with dirt. When strong rains came, body parts could be seen protruding from the canal. The bodies were then moved to a ditch, .5 kilometres away where they were reburied. Barbed wire surrounds the gravesite. 597/

372. Berak: Hostilities in this small village outside of Vukovar began as early as 17 May 1992, when seven villagers were expelled by Serb paramilitaries. A mass grave was said to exist in the Sarvaš Valley, between Berak and Svinjarevci. A villager from Berak was informed by unnamed witnesses that a relative of the villager had been allegedly killed by a named "Cetnik". According to the eyewitness, the perpetrator told JNA soldiers that he killed the person and threw the body into a pit in which all 32 killed villagers of Berak were buried. Those villagers had been abducted from Berak
between 2 and 14 October 1991. 598/

373. **Bogdanovci**: Bogdanovci is a small village in Vukovar, just north-east of Vinkovci. There was a general report that Vinkovci Police had knowledge of a mass grave near the village, containing an unknown number of bodies. According to the Croatian Red Cross, JNA and Serb paramilitaries performed summary executions of captured civilians and soldiers who attempted to escape Vukovar after the conquest. At the time of the report, 300 persons from the area were missing. 599/ However, the report did not speculate that all 300 persons were buried at this site.

374. **Petrovci**: The forest near Petrovci may be a mass burial site for Croatian soldiers. According to the Red Cross, Serb paramilitaries and JNA forces captured 16 Croatian soldiersretreating from Vukovar, and executed and buried them at this location. Two villagers were forced to bury the bodies of the dead soldiers. 600/

375. **Tovarnik**: Of this village's 3,000 inhabitants, 75 per cent were Croatian, and the rest Serbs. Once Vukovar was attacked, JNA forces and Chetniks transported troops and weapons through the village on a daily basis. Civilians were captured and killed in the village beginning in late September of 1991. There were reports that four mass graves, holding the bodies of 250 villagers, exist in Tovarnik. 601/ One was located in the Catholic Cemetery, two were located in the vicinity of the Catholic Church, and the fourth was on the outskirts of the village. 602/

376. In late September, members of the irregular forces forced a Tovarnik villager to dig out a mass grave for killed civilians, along with six other Croatian men. Twenty-four residents of Tovarnik were buried there in a single day. 603/ During October, this same villager and two others buried three Croatians. 604/

377. Another witness related the burial of the parish priest. On 2 October 1991, the priest was allegedly shot in the back in the rectory. A witness discovered the body, he wrapped it in a blanket, placed it in a plastic bag, and then buried it in the mass grave in the cemetery. 605/

36. **Zenica**

378. The county of Zenica is located in central BiH between Travnik and Kakanj. According to a 1991 census of the area, the population totaled 145,577, of whom 55.2 per cent were Muslim, 15.6 per cent were Croat, 5.5 per cent were Serb, 10.8 per cent were Yugoslavian, and 2.9 per cent were listed as "other".

379. The BiH Army and the Croat HVO forces began to fight in the area of Zenica around April 1993. 606/ Specifically, the III Corps of the BiH Army, accompanied by Mujaheddins, attacked the villages on 8 June 1993. 607/ During the attack on the village of Maljina, the Mujaheddins allegedly killed approximately 25 Croats who were then buried in mass graves in Maljina. 608/ After the attack, members of the III Corps of the BiH Army or the military police prevented Croats from leaving the area without permission. 609/ Officials would grant exchanges of Muslims and Croats at an average cost of 250 DM per Croat. 610/

380. **Maljina**: On 23 September 1993, a UN official attempted to visit the mass grave sites in Maljina. 611/ The Deputy Commander of III Corps of the BiH Army, D. Merdan, refused to allow an investigation. 612/ The mass grave sites contained the remains of at least 25 Croats who were
allegedly massacred by Mujaheddins on 8 June 1993. Merdan stated that after an attack, a process of "assassination" occurred, meaning human corpses were buried and animals were burned. Merdan also stated that there were two mass graves in the vicinity of Maljina in which 25 to 30 bodies were buried. However, Merdan claimed that he did not know how many of the dead were civilians.

381. The UN official also interviewed a Catholic priest from Zenica, who corroborated the allegation that two mass graves existed in Maljina. The priest also received information that a third smaller grave existed.

382. The UN official finally received permission to visit the sites from the Chairman of the Exchange Commission, Mr. Slavko Beba. The UN official went directly to Bikoši, a small hamlet located 1.5 or two kilometres from Maljina. The UN official chose Bikoši based on an eyewitness account of the alleged killing of Croats. The UN official found the situation to be exactly as the witness related, that the Croats were allegedly lined up against a wall and shot. The UN official saw that the wall was freshly patched and was certain that at least 25 Croats were killed.

383. Near the wall, the UN official found two piles of freshly dug earth, which corresponded to the Zenica priest’s description. However, the Chairman of the Exchange Commission stated that the graves were located two kilometres from the spot. The UN official’s report never indicated whether the piles of earth were in fact the mass graves alleged to exist in Maljina.

384. A later ECMM report indicated that the UNPROFOR British Battalion confirmed the existence of the mass graves. However, the report did not contain specific details as to the location of the graves. The report also stated that 50 people were killed in the incident and that the BiH Army tampered with the graves. The ECMM did not indicate the source of this information.

385. Biluša: EC monitors reported that a mass grave was discovered in the village of Biluša in the Zenica area. The HVO information office reported that 32 bodies of Croat victims, most likely from Zenica, had been exhumed as of 5 August 1993. No other details regarding the location of the grave or the circumstances surrounding its excavation were given.

386. The county of Zvornik is located in north-eastern BiH, bordered by the Drina River on the eastern side. The county consists of the town of Zvornik and 66 smaller villages and hamlets. According to the 1991 census, the population of Zvornik was 81,111 persons, of which 59.4 per cent were Muslim, 38 per cent were Serbian and 2.6 per cent were classified as "other".

387. Serbian military activity in Zvornik began in April of 1992. Serbian civilians of the county began evacuating themselves from the village. Artillery and mortar fire commenced on 8 April, and JNA forces, Arkan’s and Sesi’s units and local Cetniks occupied the village the following day. Šešelj’s units demanded that Muslim residents surrender all of their weapons, and then forced them from their homes. This operation was reportedly organized by senior police officers.
Two hundred Muslim houses were burned, and 76 people were killed. Young male residents who had gathered outside of their homes were told to either join the Serbian forces, leave, or be shot. In the "Kula" section of Zvornik, men had gathered in the hospital basement. They were pressured by Četniki to provide information on "resistors". Those who refused were taken away, possibly to the detention facility at Karakaj. According to one report, 2,500 men were killed on 9 and 10 April. From mid-April to August of 1992, mass graves were allegedly excavated at various locations in Zvornik proper and its surrounding villages.

388. **Kazambašić Cemetery**: The Kazambašić Cemetery is just outside of Zvornik proper, approximately two kilometres north-east of the city. The site is on the north-west side of the road that branches off west to Tuzla and north-east to Belgrade. It is believed to be a Muslim cemetery. In mid-April 1992, Serbian forces began using a bulldozer in the cemetery to dig large pits. The dimensions indeterminable. After the pits were excavated, buses and trucks arrived at the site up to three times per day. On some days, no bodies were dumped, but a bulldozer operator was always on site.

389. The excavation and burial at the cemetery was witnessed by several people. Residents of Little Zvornik (on the Serbian side of the Drina River) observed the digging of the graves and bodies being dumped into them as early as April. Another report noted that 600 Muslims, who had been detained at the Celopak and Divić camps, were killed, loaded onto trucks by Muslim and Croatian prisoners, and taken to the cemetery for burial. On 26 May, seven boys, who were detained in the Karakaj district, were walking past the cemetery with a Četnik. On that date, they observed approximately 600 bodies being dumped into the pits from trucks. The boys described the gravesites as being on both sides of a road that ran north-west through the cemetery and about 100 metres from the main road.

390. A 35 year-old resident of Zvornik viewed holes being dug "in a Muslim graveyard". She noted that the digger worked all day for seven days, and in the afternoons, locals who had been taken from their homes and killed were buried in the holes. She estimated that there were at least 100 people in each of several holes, but could not provide approximate dimensions of the gravesite.

391. **Ravnaje Stone Quarry**: The Ravnaje rock quarry is located three kilometres east of Zvornik, near the Hotel Drina, in Serbia. Muslims from Zvornik reported seeing a convoy of refrigerator trucks driving on a road which lead to Ravnaje. The trucks had been loaded with the bodies of 60 prisoners, who had been shot and killed at the loading dock of the Karakaj camp slaughterhouse. A prisoner who had been one of those shot survived, watched the loading of the trucks, and was able to escape to Bosnian Muslim held territory. He joined the Muslim Defence Forces and viewed the convoy of trucks during his service with the organization. Another resident of Zvornik, who is now a refugee, also stated that she had heard of burials occurring in the gravel pits below the Drina River from Celopak.

392. **Vidakova Njiva Suburb**: Vidakova Njiva, a suburb, is just south of Zvornik proper. The alleged gravesite is located on a 1.5 kilometres stretch of land along the west side of the Drina River. A former captain with the Yugoslav Territorial Defence stated that from 9 June to 5 August 1992, between two and seven dump trucks came at night to this location and dumped corpses in trenches that had been excavated by a bulldozer during the day. It was estimated that at least 2,000 to 3,000 bodies were buried in this
area. 655/

393. **Meterizi Cemetery:** Meterizi Cemetery is approximately 700 metres south of the Karakaj industrial complex. Muslim Defence Force personnel serving in the county witnessed earth-moving machines digging a large pit in the cemetery. The witness speculated that the pit was to be used as a mass grave, but no other details about the site were provided. 656/

394. **Snagovo, "Crni Ves":** Snagovo is a village in Zvornik county, eight kilometres from Zvornik proper. It is situated along the road that leads from Zvornik to Pale and Sarajevo. A former captain with the Yugoslav Territorial Defence stated that in April and May 1992, at least 500 people were buried in a mass grave at Crni Ves, which is near the village of Snagovo. No other details about the site were provided. 657/

395. **Snagovo:** On 1 May 1992, Serb troops in the village of Snagovo killed 42 civilians, including a pregnant woman and a two year-old child. The bodies were transported to a truck garage, placed inside, and the building was set on fire. The remains were taken to bulldozers and taken to an unidentified mass grave. 658/

396. **Grbavci Cemetery:** Grbavci is located two kilometres from Zvornik. On 18 May 1992, Serb militiamen surrounded the village and began shooting. Residents began to flee. Many of the male villagers were rounded up, put into a line, and upon an order to "kill the Ustaša", were shot at with automatic weapons. At least 56 men were killed. Three days later, some of the villagers returned from their hiding places and buried the victims on the edge of the cemetery, between two rows of houses, near the spot where they died. 659/

397. **Other Graves:** There are general reports of other mass graves in Zvornik county. These include: a) Ramin grob, in the village of Glumina 660/; b) Šljunkara, near Karakaj and c) Amajići, on the Serb side of the Drina River. 661/
Notes

1/ As simple breaches, burials in violation of these provisions carry only disciplinary penalties.

2/ Chapter II, Article 19 of the Annex to the Hague Convention of 1907 provides that "the same rules shall be observed regarding death certificates as well as for the burial of prisoners of war, due regard being paid to their grade and rank".

3/ See also Protocols I and II for clarification of these provisions. Protocol I applies to international armed conflicts and Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts.

4/ This duty is explained in Article 15, First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), and Article 18, Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949). Both articles provide substantially similar information.

5/ Article 16, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949); Article 19, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949); Article 120, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); Article 129, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War (1949).

6/ If cremation takes place, the circumstances of the cremation and the reasons for doing so must be detailed on the decedent’s death certificate.

7/ Article 17, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949); Article 20, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (1949); Article 120, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); Article 130, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War (1949).

8/ Non-governmental organizations which have cooperated with the Commission are listed in Annex I.B, List of Missions Undertaken by the Commission.

9/ An example of this type of grave would be where a group of civilians was executed by machine-gun fire, and their fellow villagers conducted a proper burial in the local cemetery according to the appropriate religious rites.

10/ The following counties contain at least one reported mass gravesite and are addressed in the report: Bijeljina, Bosanski Brod, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanski Novi, Bosanski Petrovac, Brčko, Doboj, Foca, Gacko, Gospic, Ključ, Konjic, Kotor Varoš, Kupres, Modriča, Mostar, Nova Gradiška, Ožak, Ogulin, Osijek, Pakrac, Petrinja, Podravska Slatina, Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sarajevo, Slavonska Požega, Sokolac, Srebrenica, Titova Korenica, Tomislavgrad, Travnik, Vinkovci, Vlasenica, Vukovar, Ženica and Zvornik. Mass graves have also been reported to exist in the county of Bratunac, which was the subject of a previous report and is not covered here.
Notes (continued)

11/ This number will fluctuate as additional information is received by IHRLI.

12/ For a discussion of the mass grave investigation at Pakracka Poljana, see Annex X.B, Mass Graves - Pakrka Poljana, UNPA Sector West, Croatia.

13/ For example, in the Brčko county, many of those buried in mass graves were prisoners of the Serb-run Luka camp. Most of the graves, however, only specified that the people were Luka prisoners, not that the identified perpetrators were Serbs.

14/ For example, if a report noted that 20 civilians were lined up against a wall and killed by automatic weapons fire, the victims would be classified as victims of a mass killing.

15/ An example of a grave which was deliberately concealed is Ovčara, an agricultural complex a few kilometres south of Vukovar. The gravesite at Ovčara is in a field near a dumpster, where the burial grounds are difficult to discover. For a discussion of the site explorations at Ovčara, see Annex X.A, Mass Graves - Ovčara Near Vukovar, UNPA Sector East.


17/ Some of the gravesites in Vukovar county may be an exception to this trend. Croatian civilians, as well as JNA forces, were reported to have registered many victims of the fighting in Vukovar. JNA forces were also said to have dug up bodies previously interred and taken them to for proper autopsy and burial. See the section on Vukovar for a more detailed discussion of these procedures.

18/ For a more detailed discussion of the gravesites in Blagaj, see below.


20/ Id.; see also Annex VIII, Prison Camps.

21/ For a discussion of the prison camps in Bijeljina, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 462-507. For a discussion of the paramilitary groups operating in the region, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 344-361.

22/ A State Department disclosure asserted that the prewar demographic constitution of Bijeljina reflected a 90 per cent Muslim majority and 10 per cent Serb minority. Declassified Document No. 94-162, US State Department, IHRLI Doc. No. 56832.

23/ The witness recalls that the Arkan-led contingent was clad in black uniforms and stocking caps. Declassified Document No. 94-46, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56464. Another report places the number of Arkan’s forces at 1,000. Declassified Document No. 94-45, US Department of State.
Notes (continued)


24/ In order to leave Bijeljina, citizens had to have written permission from the local Serb authorities. This permission was given only upon payment of money. Declassified Document No. 94-46, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56833.

25/ Id.


27/ It is unclear whether the bodies were ultimately dumped in the river, or were interred at a site near the river. The number of bodies also remains uncertain.

28/ The numbers of bodies in the garden graves was not specified, nor was the number of graves dug. Also, that people also buried strangers taken off the street may suggest that greater numbers are buried. Id.

29/ Novo Selo is also recognized under the name "Janjá", after the estuary of the Drina which runs through the town.

30/ There was no further information as to the physical makeup of the "disposal site", nor were there details given regarding the location of the site. The refugee who provided the report learned of the use of the animal disposal site through conversations with friends who lived in Novo Selo. Declassified Document No. 94-45, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56464.

31/ The exact location of the pits is unspecified, as is whether or not the pits constitute one mass grave. Declassified Document No. 94-46, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56832.

32/ Batković is also referred to as "Crnjelovo-Donje".

33/ No further details are known about the transporting of corpses out of Batković camp. At one point, in or around July 1992, the Batković prison camp allegedly held 1,300 prisoners, all but two of whom were male. Declassified Document No. 94-366, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62817.

34/ A named officer was reportedly the director of the camp. Declassified Document No. 94-366, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62816-62819.

35/ For a discussion of prison camps in Bosanski Brod, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 605-628. For a discussion of the paramilitary groups operating in the region, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 367-371.

37/ The witness, whose name is redacted here, did not explain what she meant by "in this way". Statement of (Witness), Submission of the Republic of Serbia, 23 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48597-48598.

38/ The report identified by name a witness to the event, whose name has been redacted from this document.

39/ The perpetrators are known but not named for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Declassified Document No. 94-85, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56592.


41/ The perpetrators are known, but not named for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. The person who ordered the killings reportedly wore blue camouflage, and a white patch insignia with four S's.

42/ Concurrent with the mass burial, other villagers were forced from their shelters and put on cargo cars out of the city. Declassified Document No. 94-1, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56322.


45/ A discussion of prison camps located in this county can be found in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 648-658.

46/ Drvar is the county directly south of Bosanski Petrovac. According to a witness interviewed by the US State Department, the Serbians in Drvar helped the Muslims upon their arrival, and were considered to be "good" Serbs. The background information in this section was taken from Declassified Document 94-84, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56587-56588.

47/ It is possible that the burials in the graveyard were also mass graves, but because of the lack of information about the site, it is not separately discussed in this report.


Notes (continued)

50/ For a detailed discussion of the prison camps in Brčko, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 711-865. Information regarding paramilitary groups operating in this county is contained in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 385-403.


53/ These facilities included the Military casern movie hall, the "Laser" bus depot, the Posavina Hotel, the Partizan Sports Complex, the hospital and the city's three mosques. Declassified Document re: Ethnic Cleansing, Torture and Killings in Brčko, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 34166.


56/ Declassified Document No. 94-93, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56615-56616. A witness interviewed by the State Department related that he, too, had heard rumours that a mass grave was located at the garbage depot, but had no firsthand knowledge about the site. Declassified Document No. 94-222, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57050-57052. Another refugee noted there were rumours of a mass grave "near the Brčko-Bijeljina Road, about two to three kilometres from Brčko, near the beginning of Mrčinište". While the report does not specifically identify the site as the city dump, the sites are located on or near the same road. Field Notes of Dinah PoKempner, Helsinki Watch, 5 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32304.

57/ Declassified Document No. 94-93, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56615-56616. Another report describes the Luka Camp itself as being situated at a brick factory. If this report is accurate, then bodies were presumably being buried on-site immediately after they were killed. Submission of the US Mission Regarding Situation in Brčko, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11351.

58/ It should be noted that no other report makes mention of the cemetery as a possible mass burial site. UN Centre for Human Rights, Report of Zdravko Grebo, 19 November 1992.
59/ There are numerous reports which mention a "livestock pen", "chicken farm", "pig farm" and so forth. It is unclear from the report whether all of these reports mean to describe the agricultural complex at Bimex, but for the purposes of this analysis, they are discussed together.

60/ Unless otherwise noted, all information in this paragraph is taken from Declassified Document 94-222, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57051-57052.

61/ Witness speculated the substance was some type of pesticide. However, the substance may have been lime. A journalist, whose name is on file with IHRLI, interviewed a witness who was involved in the fighting at Brčko. Journalist (name on file with IHRLI), Interview with [Witness], IHRLI Doc. No. 39142.

62/ This witness also provided directions to the site which were nearly identical to those of the first witness. Declassified Document No. 94-225, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57063-57064.

63/ The witness did not state whether all 1,000 persons were buried at Bimex. Declassified Document No. 94-201, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56973.

64/ The road apparently runs parallel to the Sava River and is 500 metres away from its bank.

65/ Another report corroborates the existence of a mass grave near the Brčko-Brezovo Polje Road. The report notes that the site is east of the "pig farm", about one kilometre south of the Brčko-Brezovo Polje Road. The site allegedly consists of several filled trenches. Submission of the US Mission Regarding Situation in Brčko, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11351.

66/ All information in this section was taken from Submission of the US Mission Regarding Situation in Brčko, 3 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 11351.


68/ The report noted that this activity occurred during the first week of June. The witness, upon whose testimony the report was based, estimated that 1,000 people had been killed at the Luka Camp up to that point. Supplemental (7th) Submission of the Government of the United States of America to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. No. S/25586 (13 April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 18234.

69/ The US 7th Submission notes that bodies were dumped into the Sava until at least the first week of June. This report places the stoppage of that activity as earlier in May.

Notes (continued)


73/ Muharem Omerdić, Muslims in Concentration Camps, 29 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4318.


75/ A discussion of detention facilities in Doboj can be found in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 975-1020. Paramilitary groups also operated in the county. These groups are discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 409-410.

76/ The following background information was taken from Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Volume II (1993), at 216-217, IHRLI Doc. No. 9506-9509.

77/ It is reported that many women from the county were detained in various facilities and raped.

78/ This information was based on letters received at refugee camps, presumably from individuals in detention. Declassified Document No. 94-377, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62489.

79/ Two individuals who reportedly led the irregular forces are known, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

80/ The report did not reveal the fate of those sent to Doboj in the convoy.


82/ Id.

83/ A discussion of the many detention camps in Poča is provided in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1035-1109. Identified paramilitary groups operating in the county are discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 413-420.

84/ Nina Bernstein, "The Home of Hate: Serbs Take Over Muslim Homes In Bosnian Towns", Newsday, 31 August 1993, at 4.


A Muslim woman reported that her husband was arrested by Serbs and taken to a concentration camp. She fled to Foća and from an apartment witnessed "the daily ritual of sexual abuse at the Partizan sports centre." Roy Gutman, "A Daily Ritual of Sex Abuse", Newsday, 19 April 1993, at 5.

91/ It is also alleged that many bodies were thrown into the Drina River. Declassified Document No. 94-218, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57040.


94/ She recognized and identified two of the victims. Their bodies were thrown into the Drina River. She also said that two of the perpetrators were reportedly locals. Id.

95/ This stadium was the site where several Muslim women were raped by uniformed Serb soldiers. Roy Gutman, "A Daily Ritual of Sex Abuse", Newsday, 19 April 1993, at 5.


97/ A witness, whose name is redacted here, identified by name the seven Muslims who were killed. Declassified Document No. 94-356, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62784.

98/ Id.

99/ Information about this gravesite appears in the same report as the information for the "Potato Field" grave. Although the dates and numbers of the Muslims killed are the same, the names of the victims are all different. There is no indication whether these two incidents are related. Declassified Document No. 94-356, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62784.

100/ Declassified Document No. 94-356, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62784-62785. Two of the Bosnian Serb soldiers are known, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

101/ The names of all the victims, which were provided in the report, have been redacted here. Id.
Notes (continued)


104/ Id.

105/ Some of the victims were identified by name. Declassified Document No. 94-142, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56787.


107/ Id.

108/ It is also alleged that the Serbs killed a family in the forest by throwing several hand grenades in the dugout where they lived, killing the family of four women and three children. The seven people killed were identified in the report, but their names have been redacted here. Declassified Document No. 94-265, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57192.

109/ The report also notes that there is photographic documentation of this incident. This documentation is not currently in the possession of IHRLI. Republic of Srpska, Crimes Against Serb People Committed on the Territory of the Republic of Srpska, Submission of the Republic of Serbia to the United Nations (25 October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 5021.

110/ This report also has information on an incident in which captured Muslims were thrown into the Bezdanica gap. The report is unclear as to whether this is a mass grave. BiH Armed Forces, Statement of [Witness], IHRLI Doc. No. 39465A.

111/ Id.


113/ For an overview of identified prison camps in Gacko, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1116-1153. For a discussion of the activities of Šešelj's units in the county, see Annex III.A, Paramilitary Report, paragraphs 421-427.


115/ Id.

116/ Id.
Notes (continued)

117/ All background information in this section taken from ECMM, Weekly Activity Report, January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5893.

118/ Id.

119/ Id.


121/ Id.

122/ It is unclear whether the testimonies contained in the ECMM and US Department of State submissions are referring to the same disappearances and killings or whether they are entirely separate incidents. Id.


124/ Id. The Gatačko field may be a different grave than the one mentioned in the other testimonies involving Gacko. The ECMM witness stated that the bodies were buried behind the Partisan Cemetery. The area behind the Partisan Cemetery may be the Gatačko field. If this is the case, then it is highly likely that the two witnesses are speaking about the same grave.


127/ Sherry Ricchiardi, "Civilians Become Bargaining Chips in Balkan War's Unremitting Terror", St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 18 September 1993, at 5B.


130/ For details regarding the autopsy reports and the subsequent conclusions of PHR, see Physicians for Human Rights, Report of a Medico-legal Investigation in the Medak Pocket, former Yugoslavia from 27 to 29 October 1993, 10 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 62592-62597.

131/ For a detailed discussion of identified detention facilities in Ključ, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1242-1258.
Notes (continued)

132/ One report stated that according to ethnic groups, Serbs formed the majority with 18,425 people, but non-Serbians (Muslim and "others") formed the total majority with 18,797 people. Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), at 7, IHRLI Doc. No. 39894.

133/ Among these military and paramilitary formations were groups from the so-called "Republic of Serbian Krajina", Martič units, the White Eagles (Beli Orlovi), Arkan units, Šešelj units and other armed Serbian units. Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), at 9, IHRLI Doc. No. 39896.

134/ As a representative example, on 29 May 1992, regular Yugoslav Army (JNA) forces began a siege of the village of Sanica Donja, near Ključ. The Muslims surrendered on about 31 June. The Serbs entered Sanica Donja again on about 3 July, and started at one end of the village and proceeded from house to house, taking all the men hostage. This process was repeated in most, if not all, of the villages of Ključ. A more detailed summary of military action can be found with specific grave locations discussed below. Declassified Document No. 94-37, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56440.


136/ Reportedly, many bodies were also thrown into the Sana River, or devoured by starving dogs and ravens. Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), at 8, IHRLI Doc. No. 39895.

137/ IHRLI Doc. No. 39907.

138/ Prhovo is located approximately 10 kilometres west of Ključ.

139/ It was reported that the destruction of the village was ordered and carried out under the direction of Major Samardžija. It is also believed that he knew of the mass killing and ordered the burial. Declassified Document No. 94-78, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56568-56569.


142/ Id.

143/ Her list of some of those killed included 18 persons, whose names are redacted. Her list of some of the alleged perpetrators included 14 persons, whose names have also been redacted. Croatian Information Centre, Genocide: Ethnic Cleansing in Northwestern Bosnia (Ante Beljo ed., 1993), at 75-76, IHRLI Doc. No. 39961-39962.
Notes (continued)

144/ This report appears to be discussing the same incident that the Muslim woman reported, as the list of 51 people killed contained in this report contains the same names that she gave. Declassified Document No. 94-357, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62787-62788.

145/ Id.

146/ To the west of the site stood another house. Declassified Document No. 94-357, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62786-62789.

147/ Id.

148/ Id.

149/ Id.

150/ Velagići was renamed "Ravna Gora" by local Serbian authorities in June 1992. Declassified Document No. 94-37, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56445.


152/ The men were identified in the report, but their names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

153/ Id.

154/ Id.

155/ Id.

156/ The same bulldozer, or one similar to it, that was observed in a town called "Večagići" was also seen in Biljani (discussed below) digging a mass grave. Declassified Document No. 94-37, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56446. See also Declassified Document No. 94-17, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56378.


158/ Id.

159/ Unless otherwise noted, the following information about mass graves in Biljani was reported in Declassified Document No. 94-17, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56378.

160/ It is believed that the meeting hall is the largest building in the village.

161/ The same bulldozer, or one similar to it, was also observed in the village of Večagići, although no digging or corpses were seen in Večagići.
Notes (continued)


161/ It is unclear whether both reports refer to the same burial, or if two burials actually took place.


165/ The date is thought to be sometime between 29 May and 3 June 1992.


167/ Id.

168/ The following information about mass graves in the village of Bijana in Kluč county was reported in Unidentified Personal Testimony, 7 August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48879.

169/ It is believed that, in addition to the 120 people killed, there are some people who were taken to a concentration camp in Srnetići.

170/ The names of perpetrators were provided in the report, but have been redacted here.

171/ The report does not specify the date of the incident.

172/ For example, the Đaferagići family was burned to death in their house.

173/ For a discussion of the activities of Arkan’s men and other paramilitary groups in Konjic, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 436-444.


175/ The village was attacked again on 13 July, the day the village was renamed. The remaining Serb houses were burned, and a small number of villagers were detained in the Elementary school building. According to one report, many women were raped the evening of the 13 July. Id.

176/ One report identified persons who participated in the attack. Their names have been redacted here. Id. at Case I-075, IHRLI Doc. No. 28449-28450.

177/ Detention facilities included Čelebići camp, Konjic Sports Hall, Bradina Elementary School and the prison.
Notes (continued)

178/ Two of the three reports on which this section is based were submitted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Two of the reports, one of which alleges that 52 Serbs were killed, identify 44 victims by name. See Annex IV, IHRLI Doc. No. 28778-28782, and Annex IV, Case No. I-075, IHRLI Doc. No. 28449-28450.


180/ Id.

181/ For a discussion of prison camps in Kotor Varoš, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1336-1366.


184/ Although the witness says that he "had to" put the corpses into body bags, it is unclear whether he was actually forced to do so voluntarily. Id.

185/ Id.


187/ Id.

188/ Id.

189/ In this report, the location of the mass grave is reportedly "Donji Varoš". It appears to be the same location. Society for Threatened Peoples, Ethnic Cleansing: Genocide for Greater Serbia (T. Zulch ed.), IHRLI Doc. No. 14483.

190/ Id.

191/ Id.


193/ For a discussion of the activities of Šešelj’s men in Kupres, see Special Forces, Annex III.A, paragraphs 445-446.
Notes (continued)

194/ The following background information is taken from V. Hadživuković, M. Ivanišević and D. Tanasković, Chronicle of an Announced Death (1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 37507.

195/ It is not clear from the report whether those found in the mass grave were among the 52 killed in Kupres. Submission of the Government of Germany to the United Nations, 6 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5450.


198/ The location of Kupres field was not provided in the report. Department of Information and Research of the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Croatia (hereinafter DIMH), Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats from Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-Western Bosnia (Krajina), 5 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36702.

199/ For a discussion of camps in Modriča, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1415-1425. For information regarding paramilitary activity in the county, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 451-454.

200/ All information in this section was taken from Declassified Document No. 94-72, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56552-56553.

201/ According to the report, the brigade consisted of about 500 volunteers and two Croatian Army officers. Most of their ammunition consisted of old JNA stock. The brigade was subordinate to an unidentified Croatian corps from Croatia.

202/ The refugee who provided the information was a member of the voluntary brigade and speculated that the Serbs forbade burials to intimidate the local population into submission or flight.

203/ The policemen were later shot to death. Id.


205/ The report did not state whether the bodies in the cement pit were given a proper burial. Declassified Document No. 94-72, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56552-56553.

206/ For a discussion of paramilitary groups operating in Mostar, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 455-463, and Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1426-1467, for information on detention facilities in the county.

Notes (continued)


212/ The order to conduct this separation was allegedly given by Milan Skoro, the Chief of Police in Zalik. Id.

213/ Id.

214/ Id.


216/ Id.

217/ Id.

218/ Id.

219/ Amnesty International reports that at this point, the witness' story contradicts itself. In his written statement to Amnesty (as well as in the State Department report), witness says he received two bullet wounds. However, in an article published in a Zagreb newspaper, he stated, "I was not hit by a bullet but my leg hurt terribly because of the beating". Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights, October 1992, at 34-35, IHRLI Doc. No. 3535-3536.

220/ It is unclear whether the embankment was that of the landfill.

221/ The witness does not include this information in his statement to Amnesty International. Declassified Document No. 94-45, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56467-56468.

222/ Id.

223/ Another report says that 26 civilians were found at the "Mostar garbage depot". This seems to refer to Sutina, since the date of the incident is listed as 26 June 1992. The civilians, according to the report, were from the villages of Zalići and Vrapići. International Society for Human Rights, British Section, Human Rights and Serbia: Report 2 - Ethnic Cleansing - New Information On Human Rights Violations, 28 May - 2 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 9221.
Notes (continued)

224/ It is possible that Croatian troops discovered the mass grave at Sutina. An article in The St. Petersburg Times, 31 August 1992, stated that Croatian troops dug up mass graves containing some 200 mostly Muslim civilians who were reportedly shot by Serb irregulars in June 1992. The article mentioned pathologist Omar Kadić, who stated that almost all the corpses had been shot at close range with automatic weapons, as the Mazowiecki report noted. The victims ranged in age from 20-70. A few Croatian women were found at the site, but most of the corpses were middle-aged or elderly Muslim men. "Shelling of Marketplace Kills 15, Injures Dozens in Sarajevo", The St. Petersburg Times, 31 August 1992.


226/ Id.


228/ However, the report may be referring to the "Uborak" landfill, since that site was not excavated until August. Id. For a discussion of the Uborak site, see below.

229/ Unless otherwise noted, all information in this section was taken from Declassified Document No. 95-46, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56469-56470.

230/ Four of the victims were identified in the report, but their names are redacted here.

231/ However, one report notes that 88 corpses were found at Vrapčići and 28 persons were shot dead at Sutina and buried at Uborak. This would suggest that the 88 who were thought to be buried at Uborak are actually in an independent grave. It might also suggest that Sutina is the name of the district in which the Uborak landfill sits, and that there is no landfill called Sutina. Zenica Centre for Research, List of Places of Mass Executions and Commune Graveyards in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzezovina, August - September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 42601.

232/ The article did not state whether the graves were individual or collective. Charles Lane, "A Muslim Town's Long Nightmare", Newsweek, 6 September 1993.


235/ Id.
Notes (continued)

236/ "Bosnians, Croatians Battle on Supply Line", The Chicago Tribune, 9
October 1993, at 6, IHRLI Doc. No. 35962.

237/ Id.

238/ Id.

239/ Jeff Kramer, "A Westside Photographer Traveled to Bosnia-
        Herzegovina to Capture the Fighting: What He Saw Was Genocide", The Los
        Angeles Times, 1 October 1992, at 1.

240/ Id.

241/ Id.

242/ Defence Debriefing Team, Special Report on Mass Graves, Annex E,
Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, 25
March 1994, IHRLI Doc No. 63817.

243/ Detention facilities in Nova Gradiška are discussed in Annex VIII,
Prison Camps, paragraphs 3090-3110.

244/ International Human Rights Law Group, Testimony of [Witness], IHRLI
Doc. No. 6214-6215.

245/ Id.

246/ Id.

247/ Declassified Document No. 94-169, US Department of State, IHRLI
Doc. No. 56860.

248/ All of the witness' personal data is available at International

249/ Id.

250/ Id.

251/ Id.

252/ "Macedonia Moves to Split from Yugoslavia", The Chicago Tribune, 20

253/ The arrests were reportedly carried out by three known perpetrators
whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

254/ One man reportedly survived and was taken to Nova Gradiška
detention camp. His fate thereafter is unknown. Id.

Notes (continued)

255/ The report states that all of the victims were buried in the mass grave. However, the victims are listed in two separate groups, so it is unclear if the victims in both groups are in the mass grave. Their names are provided in the source documentation, but have been redacted here. Ten additional victims are believed to have been set on fire in the house of Branko Miletić.\footnote{Id.}

256/ The report of this gravesite was based on the testimonies of three individuals, whose names are kept confidential, and who were detained in the Kerestinec camp. These testimonies are not currently in the possession of IHRLI. In addition, the report notes that there is a VHS tape of the incident, prepared by the Croatian forces responsible for the attack and subsequent killings. Case II-021, Submission of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. No. YU/SC 780-92/DOC-1/E (3 November 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 1193.\footnote{See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 1478-1506, for a discussion of detention facilities in Ođžak, and Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 467-474, for a discussion of paramilitary groups operating in the region.}

257/ Some of these detainees were shipped in the direction of Bosanski Brod on 1 July 1992.\footnote{Some of these detainees were shipped in the direction of Bosanski Brod on 1 July 1992.}

258/ The detention facility in Poljari was located in a primary school.\footnote{The detention facility in Poljari was located in a primary school.}


260/ See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3113-3125, for a discussion of detention facilities located in Ožulin.\footnote{See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3113-3125, for a discussion of detention facilities located in Ožulin.}


263/ See Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 624-629, for a discussion of the activities of Arkan's men and other paramilitary groups in Osijek. See Annex VII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3126-3140, for information on identified detention facilities in the county.\footnote{See Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 624-629, for a discussion of the activities of Arkan's men and other paramilitary groups in Osijek. See Annex VII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3126-3140, for information on identified detention facilities in the county.}


Notes (continued)


268/ One report alleges that as many as 1,500 civilians were killed during the first week of fighting in Dalj. Amnesty International, Yugoslavia: Torture and Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings in War Zone, November 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 50167.

269/ Three accounts say 25 bodies were taken to the hospital, a fourth says 22 were transported.


271/ The date of the attack on Ernestinovo was not specified in any of the reports.


273/ Alleged victims buried in this pit, whose names are redacted here, included both soldiers and civilians. Id.

274/ Those buried in other graves were also identified in the report. Id.


276/ Binz' allegation that the graves were sanitary remains to be reconciled with the Red Cross report that many of the bodies were naked or buried with cattle. Morris Tidball Binz, Forensic Report on Preliminary Investigations of Mass Graves in the former Yugoslavia, 11 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 18997-18999 (with accompanying photographs and illustrations).

277/ The names of the victims were provided in the report, but have been redacted here.

278/ The location of the bridge was not provided in the report.

279/ An autopsy was performed on the body, which was identified in the report. The listed causes of death were "cuts on the neck and face, both palms, scalp taken off the skull". Dr. Predrag Delibašić, Medical Report on Causes of Deceased, Trpinja, 20 December 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 50364.
Notes (continued)

280/ All information, including a list of those killed and an autopsy report of one of the victims is taken from UNCIVPOL, Mass Grave - Vladislavci - Ćepin, 6 November 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 50357-50364.

281/ A more detailed discussion of camps in Pakrac county can be found in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3143-3164.

282/ A separate report, without making mention of detention facilities, alleged that the Croatian Army massacred approximately 150 civilians in Pakracka Poljana in November of 1991. No other details regarding the killing were provided. Corell, Report Rapporteurs under the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism to Croatia, 9/30/92 - 10/5/92, 7 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 276V-276W.

283/ Unless otherwise noted, the following background information is taken from Serbian Council Information Centre, Death Camps and Mass Graves in Western Slavonia: Marino Selo and Pakracka Poljana, 19 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 46326.

284/ The camp at Marino Selo was situated in a hotel. Prisoners were kept in the cellar.

285/ The report places the date of the killings at December 1991.


288/ This man, who provided a deposition to the Serb Council Information Centre, is not identified in this report. Unless otherwise noted, all information in this section is taken from a transcript of the man’s deposition. Serbian Council Information Centre, Deposition Transcript of [Witness], Death Camps and Mass Graves in Western Slavonia: Marino Selo and Pakracka Poljana, 15 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 46329.

289/ The prisoners were identified in the statement, but their names have been redacted here.

290/ The men were identified in the transcript, but their names have been redacted here.
Notes (continued)

291/ It appears from the report that more than the four prisoners who were taken out on 19 November were killed. One had died on 18 November after a heavy beating and a forced cold shower. Another was beaten to death on 20 November 1991.

292/ It should be noted that the witness alleged earlier in his statement that after the one prisoner died on 18 November, his body was "driven off somewhere" by a guard.

293/ The witness also mentioned that the body of another prisoner was buried downstream. It appears from the report that he was buried alone. The statement makes no mention of how the man died, but does state that both of his ears were cut off.

294/ The two witnesses were detained at the Ribarska Koliba camp. Each provided a statement to the Serbian Council Information Centre. Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from both deposition transcripts. Serbian Council Information Centre, Deposition Transcript of Witnesses, 18 December 1991. Death Camps and Mass Graves in Western Slavonia: Marino Selo and Pakracka Poliana, IHRLI Doc. No. 46330.


296/ As discussed earlier, the camp at Marino Selo was housed in a hotel. It is unclear whether the garbage pit referred to here is located behind the hotel where the Serbian prisoners were detained.


298/ One of the witnesses gave a written statement to UNCIVPOL which is similar in substance to that given to the Serbian Council Information Centre.

299/ This sketch does not illustrate the pit alleged to be situated at the hotel garbage dump. UNCIVPOL, Draft Drawing of the Location of Some Graves of Ethnic Serbs Murdered by the Fish Pond in Marino Selo (Detail 1), IHRLI Doc. No. 53184.

300/ UNCIVPOL, Memo from Sgt. Jone Blika, UNCIVPOL Daruvar, to Mr. Cherniavsky, Civil Affairs Sector West, 26 October 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 50368.


302/ Binz' report also noted that the names of most of the victims buried at the mass graves in Marino Selo are known, but did not indicate who is in possession of the information.
Notes (continued)


304/ Until otherwise noted, information in this section is taken from D.W. Nicholson, Complaint of Missing Person & Mass Grave - Between Poljana Pakracka and Gai, 18 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 12891-12892.

305/ A person who is "in a powerful position in the Croatian government" was said to be responsible for the roundup, killing and subsequent burial of the civilians.


308/ Fenrick, On-Site Report, at 7/16, IHRLI Doc. No. 62429.


311/ Id.

312/ Id.

313/ ID.

315/ For a detailed sketch of the layout of Site C, the positioning of the 23 trenches, and the other excavations done on-site, see Holland & Olson, Interim Report of WCIT, IHRLI Doc. No. 62462.

316/ The two bodies appeared to be in military uniform.
Notes (continued)

317/ The WCIT did not speculate in its report as to the reason that feature 10 was chosen as a burial site amongst 23 military trenches.

318/ The only identifying characteristic left on the skeletal remains was a pair of cowboy boots.

319/ WCIT also did a thorough investigation of the surrounding areas, including a forested area near the railway tracks, the area of the soccer field and railway station, and an area near the airfield. These were all reported to be possible gravesites, but no evidence of burial sites were found. Id.

320/ Holland & Olson, *Interim Report of WCIT*, at 12/15, IHRLI Doc. No. 62456. Numerous pieces of physical evidence were also retrieved from the gravesites. All but one of these items (an Italian coin) was preserved, recorded and marked for chain of custody purposes.

321/ All information in this paragraph taken from Fenrick, *On-Site Report*, IHRLI Doc. No. 62423-62438.

322/ Fenrick also noted that the allegation of 1,700 bodies, contained in a report by the Serbian Council Information Centre in August 1993, may have originated with Nicholson's calculation from his first on-site inspection, and did not constitute an independent allegation. Fenrick, *On-Site Report*, at 8/16, IHRLI Doc. No. 62430.

323/ Interestingly, this period also corresponds with the time that Serbs were allegedly imprisoned and killed while detained at Marino Selo and Stara Ciglana.


325/ See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3165-3170, for a discussion of identified detention facilities in Petrinja, and Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 634-638, for an overview of paramilitary activity in the county.


327/ The location of what appear to be the villages of Župić and Nebojan was not clarified. The location of the Gavrilović vineyards is also unspecified.

328/ The witness identified four victims, one of whom was a civilian. The witness also reported that all Serbs were in camouflage uniforms. *Serbian War Crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Cleansing of Croats from Northern Bosnia (Posavina) and North-Western Bosnia (Krajina)*, Submission of the Government of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations (14 September 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 42915.
Notes (continued)

329/ The witness did not clarify how many survivors there were, nor did he state whether there were any persons alive who could not walk.

330/ Inconsistencies in the witness' report appear when the Serbs noticed that he and another Croat, identified as "I.C.", were still alive (the witness also recalls another wounded person, "M.A.", who told the witness that he could not help the witness stand). Apparently paying little attention to them, the Serbs moved on to the cottage, at which point the witness "saw that there was nobody but me" and proceeded to move along the hill. The fates of "M.A." and "I.C." are not known. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 42915.

331/ All of the information in this section is taken from Declassified Document No. 94-81, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56579-56581.

332/ The report identifies the following reported Serb perpetrators at the Petrinja camp: Ćedo Vukmirović (Chief "jailer"), Fnu Zorić, Željko Ostojić, Sergeant Vodnik, Djuro Krnjačić, and another JNA Lieutenant who was allegedly a former civilian police inspector in Kutina.

333/ For burials at Vasil Gaćeša, see below.

334/ The witness stated that the bodies were in a state of "advanced decomposition" which made it difficult to ascertain the causes or place of death.

335/ There is, however, a disparity in the number of victims mentioned in the two reports. The first account suggests that 21 individuals were killed (24 total victims, less three identified survivors). The second account places the number of victims at 18.

336/ The specific location of the Vasil Gaćeša casern is unspecified; however, the report indicates that it formerly served as JNA army barracks in Petrinja. The date of the burial is also unclear, but it may be that the interments took place during or after September 1991, after the Serb offensive began.


338/ A discussion of paramilitary activity in this county can be found in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 639-642.

339/ All information in this section taken from The Humanitarian Law Fund, Report on War Crimes and Violations of Human Rights as indicated in Politika, Borba and Vjesnik (1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 49755.

340/ At least 11 civilians were killed in Voćin on 14 December 1991, when Serb paramilitary formations poured gasoline on them and set them on fire. It is unclear from the report whether the bodies of these victims are inside the church.
Notes (continued)


342/ The following background information is taken from George Rodrigue, Serbs Systematic in Ridding Region of Muslims, Many Say: Bosnia Corridor Considered Crucial to 'Republic,' Dallas Morning News, 27 December 1992, at 1A.


344/ For a detailed discussion of the July killing at Keraterm, see the section on the Omarska mining complex.


346/ Id.


349/ See infra for further discussion of the burials of prisoners from Keraterm camp.

350/ Also spelled "Bajr".


352/ Information was given to this source by a Serb guard at Keraterm.

353/ All of the soldiers were from Prijedor, Banja Luka, and Sanski Most units. They wore camouflage, red berets, and the Serbian flag on their sleeves.

354/ The witness did not note whether the burials were supervised by the Serb infantry, or if the villagers buried the victims on their own.


357/ Id.
Notes (continued)


359/ This background information was taken from Declassified Document No. 94-8, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346.

360/ Trnjani is a small village between Omarska and Trnopolje. An alleged camp was set up on the school grounds there, and reportedly many men from Kozarac were imprisoned.

361/ This information is taken from Declassified Document No. 94-8, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56346.

362/ It appears from other witness statements that the gravediggers were not referring solely to the rape victims who had been killed. Id.


366/ It is also possible that a group of over 100 prisoners from Keraterm might be buried near the fish hatchery. One report noted that the bodies, which were all killed during one night, may have been taken to Lake Ribkjak for dumping. Defence Debriefing Team Material, Summary 24 of Atrocity Information, Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, 30 September 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43281.


371/ It did not appear from the report that the witness actually dug the graves at this site. It is also unclear whether the mill is located in Trnopolje proper, for the witness mentioned gravesites in several nearby villages. Helsinki Watch, Field Notes of Dinah PóKempner, 5 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32319.

The witness did not specify if the individuals he buried were prisoners of the camp.

This burial was on or after 26 June 1992, when witness received his first burial assignment. Helsinki Watch, Field Notes of Dinah PoKempner, 5 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32319.

A 21 year-old prisoner stated he and another detainee had to bury nine bodies in a nearby field. Submission of Information by Austria, Submission of the Government of Austria to the United Nations (5 March 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 18426.


One report stated, "in Trnopolje, there are mass graves next to each house with 5, 10, 20 bodies". Former Yugoslavia: Grave Breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Supplemental (2nd) Submission of the United States Government to the United Nations (22 October 1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 119.

There is a discrepancy in the spelling of the name of the house's resident. One spells it Redžić, another Redžić. From other facts, it is clearly the same house. One spelling may be phonetic.


Names of the victims were provided in the report, but are redacted here.

The remaining men, along with 17 male prisoners, were taken to Esad Redžić's house and killed. Declassified Document No. 94-28, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56411.


Spelled "Šivac" in one report.


Witness did not say whether the 50 killed on 26-27 June were those buried on this road, or furthermore, if they were prisoners of Trnopolje Camp. The gravedigger said Talić was buried in Šivci, near the Meitaf. There is a knife still stuck in his neck. Helsinki Watch, Field Notes of Dinah PoKempner, 5 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 32319.
Notes (continued)

387/ The names of the prisoners were provided in the report, but have been redacted here.

388/ Id.

389/ Another witness said Omarska had only one mass grave, an open mine pit. Forty to 50 bodies per day, for 25 days, were taken to this site for burial. It is possible that the witness was referring to the mining complex generally. Declassified Document No. 94-95, IHRLI Doc. No. 56622.


391/ It is unclear whether the mine at Tomašica is part of the Omarska complex or an independent site. Information on the Tomašica mine is discussed.


394/ Witness noted, however, that he believed this killing was a unilateral action by some of the camp guards and not officially ordered. Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 43035.


396/ Estimates of those killed ranged from 99 to 400. Three of the accounts, however, place the number as between 150 and 250.

397/ Estimates of those wounded were fairly consistent, being between 40-50 inmates.

398/ Again, the accounts diverge as to the number of prisoners loading bodies. Anywhere from two to 20 prisoners were put on burial detail.

399/ Most of the accounts simply say that the bodies were dumped in the mine. However, one account alleges that the bodies were doused with liquid and burned. Declassified Document No. 94-172, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56872.

400/ Some of the reports listed multiple locations as possible burial sites.
Notes (continued)


402/ The witness personally observed 100 corpses loaded onto a 11 metre truck, but did not specify if the trucks went to the swamp. Declassified Document No. 94-270, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57208.


407/ One report alleges that as many as 5,000 prisoners were "burned" at the Tomašica mine. Republic of BiH Parliament, Commission for Protection of Human Freedoms and Rights, Excerpts from Aggression Against the Republic of BH - Facts of the Effects, 6 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29894.


409/ One of the victims was Mustafa Čerić, the owner of the residence.


413/ Id.

414/ Id.

415/ One account refers to the site only as the Ljubija strip mine. The other account specifies the Iskupine pit. Because of the similarity of facts relating to the incident, the accounts are discussed together here.
Notes (continued)

416/ One account by a known witness specifically mentioned the pit. Declassified Document No. 94-292, IHRLI Doc. No. 62633. The other account, of a man who escaped, does not mention burial at all. It could be that he escaped before being able to witness a burial. Declassified Document No. 94-146, IHRLI Doc. No. 56804.


418/ The first attack on Brišev was 27 May 1992. For a discussion of events in Brišev.


424/ While the numbers do not correspond, these bodies may have been those of the seven men killed at Miska Glava, or the 10 who disappeared from the cafe.


426/ Id.


428/ Raljas may be the name of a creek near Ljubija.


Notes (continued)

433/ The identities of the victims have been redacted.

434/ The source also believed that the victims were killed not because of their ethnicity, but because they were wealthy residents of the community. Declassified Document No. 94-13, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56358.

435/ Victims were identified in the source documentation, but their names are redacted here.

436/ Id.


438/ All the witness' personal data is available at the Department for Collecting Documentation and Processing Data on the Liberation War. Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 30 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 14590.

439/ Most of them were killed by fire arms, but some of them were tortured before death. Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 30 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 14592.


441/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23449.

442/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23449.

443/ Serbian Army major, Veljko Brajić, reportedly led the Brisevo operation and was later promoted to either lieutenant-colonel or colonel. Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 30 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 14593.

444/ Names of other perpetrators have been redacted from this report, but are available in the original documentation.

445/ A list of victims buried in eight individual graves in the Brisevo area can be found in the original documentation.

446/ The above details about the grave markings and burial methods are at the Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 30 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 14597.

447/ Unless otherwise noted, information in the following sections was taken from Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 30 January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 14590-14601.


450/ Id.

451/ According to the witness, this body had been tortured and was found in a corn field. He was found with his eyes missing, his ears cut off, the muscles on his arms severed, and his skull cracked with a lath or club.

452/ Approximately 150 metres north-west of this site, on the east side of the paved road from Dimaci to Buzuci, is the grave of an unidentified woman. Id.

453/ Id.

454/ The witness considers these two sites to be one location because they are close in proximity.

455/ Id.

456/ One of the women buried at this site was raped until she died. S.B. and I.Z. buried her 15 days after her death. There were visible signs of bites on her breasts and parts of her body were missing. It appeared that parts of her breasts had been bitten off. She was found naked in the field.

457/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23451.

458/ There are many human corpses and bones in the part of the Kurevo forest between Radulović's house on the one side and Babić's house on the other side (called Rivica Strana). The Muslims who attempted to escape from the area around Hambarine to Stari Majdan or Japra were killed at this spot. Their villages were destroyed and when they tried to flee, they were shot by Serbs stationed at the Lisina hill. There are many dead women, children, and men in this part of the Kurevo forest. The witness found six or seven piles of bodies, 10 or 12 bodies per pile. Some of the bodies were already so decomposed that the witness could see the bones.

459/ Detention facilities in Rogatica are discussed in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2276-2328. Information on paramilitary groups operating in the county is provided in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 498-503.

460/ It is not clear that this mass grave is located in Rogatica county; however, since the witness is from Višegrad and the convoy did not seem to have traveled far before the killing took place, it is discussed here as being in Rogatica. All information in this section taken from Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Interior, Security Department, Statement of [Witness], 3 July 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 34721.

461/ Slap appears to be on the border line between Višegrad and Rogatica counties.

462/ The local civilian had a list of 85 buried victims and the personal property had also been accounted. Therefore, it appears that the civilian, perhaps with the assistance of the man who buried the personal property, buried the victims in the graves once they resurfaced in the Drina. Memorandum from UNMO Sarajevo to UNMO HQ Zagreb Re: Mass Grave, October 1993.
Notes (continued)

IHRLI Doc. No. 43931.

463/ Identified detention facilities in Sanski Most are discussed in Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2336-2377.


466/ The report notes that the witness provided a detailed description of the site, but the description was not contained in the report and is not currently in the possession of IHRLI. Supplemental (7th) Submission of the Government of the United States of America to the United Nations (12 April 1993), IHRLI Doc. No. 11943-11944.


468/ The escapee's name was provided in the report but has been redacted here. Id.

469/ It should be noted that other villages in Sanski Most, such as Donji Kamengrad and Demišević, were also completely destroyed and their populations have either been killed or remain missing. However, no reports of mass graves have surfaced from these other villages. Declassified Document No. 94-189, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56923-56926.

470/ The name of the village was spelled "Oteš" in the document. For the purposes of this report, it is presumed to refer to the village of Otiš in Sanski Most county.


472/ All information in this section taken from Croatian Information Centre, Written Statement of G.S., 20 January 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 63973-63983 (with accompanying maps illustrating places of execution).

473/ See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2378-2521, for identified detention facilities in and around Sarajevo. A discussion of paramilitary groups operating in the county can be found in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 506-525.

474/ The memo stated that information about the site was received from Muslim prisoners.

475/ All information in this section is taken from Memorandum from U.N. Commission of Experts to U.N. Centre for Human Rights Regarding Mass Grave Allegation, 22 October 1993 (with accompanying illustration), IHRLI Doc. No. 46344-46347.
Notes (continued)


478/ This is believed to be a phonetic spelling of Ahatovići, a village in Sarajevo. Most of the soldier's testimony concerns events in and around Sarajevo.

479/ According to the soldier, 120 living prisoners were on one of the trucks when it arrived in Ahatovići. Court TV, Edited Transcript of Testimony of [Witness], IHRLI Doc. No. 16876-16879.

480/ The soldier related that he could hear the wounded prisoners screaming and moaning.

481/ In this edited version of the soldier's testimony, a precise description of the location of the grave was not provided. Court TV, Edited Transcript of Testimony of [Witness], IHRLI Doc. No. 16883-16885.

482/ It is unclear whether the soldier was referring to Bihać county or some other location. Ilijaš appears to be the phonetic spelling for the Ilijaš district. It seems impractical for bodies to have been transported from Bihać to Ilijaš, which is in Sarajevo. The transcript of this interrogation is edited and difficult to follow, with the translator using phonetic spellings on much of the location and name information. IHRLI Videotape No. 18, Transcript of [Witness], IHRLI Doc. No. 32186.


484/ The report consisted of an edited transcript of the soldier's interrogation. Many of the spellings are phonetic and the material is extremely difficult to follow. CNN News, Transcript of Interrogation of [Witness], in Serbs Using Rape as a Weapon, IHRLI Videotape 18, IHRLI Doc. No. 32239-32241.


486/ The report noted that the Serbs were afraid that they were not welcome in Croatian-dominated villages, and that there was no accessible route to the nearest refugee camp.


488/ This man was reportedly the bodyguard of a supposed Serb commander.
Notes (continued)

489/ All information in this section was taken from State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Testimony of N.N., Bulletin No. 3, March 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29866-29867.

490/ For a discussion of the activities of Arkan's men in Srebrenica, see Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 526-528.

491/ All information in this section was taken from Declassified Document No. 94-55, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56500-56501.

492/ The gravesite is on the left of the school, when entering Debelo Brdo from the direction of Bihać.

493/ All information in this section was taken from The Humanitarian Law Fund, Report on War Crimes and Violations of Human Rights as indicated in Politika, Borba and Vjesnik (1992), IHRLI Doc. No. 49755.

494/ The report does not specify in which army Pašalić serves.

495/ It is presumed, for the purposes of this report, that "Raštani" is the phonetic spelling for Raščani, a village in the centre of Tomislavgrad county.


497/ Activity of paramilitary groups in Travnik is discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 534-536.

498/ An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 40147-40149.

499/ Id.


502/ One report alleges that the bodies of as many as 3,000 "convoy victims" may be at this site. Society for Threatened Peoples, Genocide in Bosnia (T. Zulch ed.), IHRLI Doc. No. 4041-4042.

503/ A great deal of information for this section of the report was obtained from US State Department debriefings of two of the survivors of the mass killing. In all, seven or eight persons survived.

504/ Some reports place the date of incident in late July or early August. However, most of the survivors of the mass killing on Vlašić mountain note the date as 21 August 1992.

Notes (continued)

506/ Id.


509/ Id.

510/ Id.

511/ Id.


513/ The reports allege the convoy travelled anywhere from an additional 200 metres to two kilometres.


515/ Declassified Document No. 94-179, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56889-56891. Another report noted that the commander of this operation was Dragan Mrdja, nicknamed "Drdo". Declassified Document No. 94-196, US Department of State, IHRLI Bates No. 56945-47.

516/ Id.

517/ Id.

518/ Id.


521/ Presumably, one of the witnesses interviewed by the State Department was among the three men taken to the back of the bus.


524/ Id.
Notes (continued)

525/  Id.

526/  Id.


528/  B.J. appears to be the only witness who has estimated the number of those killed at Vlašić on 21 August as less than 200.  Id.


532/  Id.


536/  All information in this section was taken from UNICIVPOL, UNICIVPOL Memo Re: Possible Mass Graves in Sector East, IHRLI Doc. No. 3984.

537/  The bracket character was used to spell the name of the railroad station in the report.

538/  V. Sladić, On General Strategy and Methods of Serbian Aggression on Croatia in 1991 (selection of topics from the project papers), IHRLI Doc. No. 54624.

539/  See Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2745-2807, for a discussion of identified detention facilities in Vlasenica.


541/  According to a witness, the ethnic distribution of the village of Vlasenica was 64 per cent Muslim and 36 per cent Serbian.  Id.
It is interesting to note that from April 1992, villagers who were spouses in mixed marriages were forced to change, according to one witness. Where a husband was Muslim and the wife was Serbian, the husband was reportedly killed and the wife and children forced to adopt the wife's Serb maiden name. Muslim wives of Serb husbands had to adopt a Serb first name, as did any children with non-Serb first names. Defense Debriefing Team, Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, 19 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43262.

The camp was reportedly in operation from May to October 1992, but was never officially recognized. Defense Debriefing Team, Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, 19 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43258. The campsite consisted of two warehouses and one small building surrounded by barbed wire. All of the prisoners were kept in one warehouse. The structure was said to be seven metres wide and 15 metres long. At full capacity, it could have held up to 560 prisoners. Declassified Document No. 94-49, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56478.

Many of the prisoners of Sušica Camp were transferred to the camp at Batković in June of 1992. Defence Debriefing Team, Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, 19 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43258.

One report alleges that over 1000 prisoners have been executed at the camp. International Society for Human Rights, Report 3: Populations at Risk, August 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 11497.

One former prisoner of the Susica Camp noted that when she escaped from the camp in September of 1992, there were still 180 prisoners at the camp, whom she believes have since been killed. Defense Debriefing Team, Summary No. 19 of Atrocity Information, Submission of the Government of the United Kingdom, 19 October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 43258.

The Serb guards were identified in the report, but their names are redacted here.

According to the refugee interviewed by the State Department, the two men who assisted with the burial were still in detention as of February 1993. Declassified Document No. 94-49, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56480.

For a discussion of detention facilities in Vukovar, see Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 3272-3361. Activity of paramilitary groups operating in the region is discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 653-679.


Notes (continued)


555/ Croatian Red Cross, Testimony by Gravediggers, 13 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.

556/ These two sources submitted nearly identical lists of mass graves. It could be that one relayed the information to the other, but both submitted the report independently.

557/ Presumably the cemetery was situated amidst heavy attacks by the Serbs, making it unsafe to transport bodies there. DIMH, Chapter 10: Vukovar, IHRLI Doc. No. 26487-26488.

558/ Croatian Red Cross, Testimony by Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.

559/ Chapter 10: Vukovar, IHRLI Doc. No. 26487-26488. The "Vukovar gravedigger" noted that 378 bodies were buried at the cemetery without identification. It is not clear whether Bosanac and the gravedigger are referring to the same group of individuals. It is not likely, since the Office of Burials for Vukovar attempted to register all dead persons until the last possible moment. Testimony by Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.


561/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 23425.


565/ Testimony By Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.
566/ One former Velepromet prisoner said the regular army treated the prisoners correctly. Croatian Information Centre, Statement of [Witness], 22 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36175-36180.


569/ Id.

570/ For example, one gravedigger said bodies of people killed at night at Velepromet were taken to Negoslavci to be buried. Testimony of Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.


572/ Testimony by Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.

573/ The Croatian Government alleged that 300 persons were buried at the railway station. While the brickyard sites are near the railway station, it is unclear if the report meant to refer to the brickyard. Supplement 8, Criminal Offenses, IHRLI Doc. No. 2875.

574/ All information in this section taken from T. Opsahl, Opsahl Report on Mission to Zagreb 11-14 August 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 35335.

575/ Supplement 8 - Criminal Offenses, see also Croatian Red Cross, Report on Mass Graves in Sector East, IHRLI Doc. No. 3993-3994.

576/ It is possible that the site was bulldozed over to hide evidence of a mass killing; however, no other report notes the existence of this grave. Society of Croatian Professional Women, Testimony of [Witness], Testimonies Regarding Allegations of War Crimes and Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 10 March 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 6348-6352.


578/ Z. Šeparović, Documenta Croatica, IHRLI Doc. No. 14934.

579/ Testimony by Gravediggers, IHRLI Doc. No. 19590-19610.

580/ Supplement 8, Criminal Offenses, IHRLI Doc. No. 2876.

581/ Testimony VU-VP-692, IHRLI Doc. No. 36732.
Witness stated that two men gave him his burial orders. They also had lists of where people were buried and sometimes these corpses were dug up. This would comport with other accounts of JNA personnel exhuming bodies for proper identification and autopsy. Id.


Unless otherwise noted, the following information can be found in William J. Fenrick, Report Concerning On-Site Investigations in Croatia - October-November 1993, February 1994, IHRLI Doc. No. 62423-62438.


A camp was set up at the cooperative in the centre of the village, where people were detained and beaten.

S.P. was the person responsible for identification of the bodies, while B.F., J.R., J.B., P.P. and D.R. loaded the bodies.

The witness identified five individuals who were put into body bags and buried in the canal. Others were covered with blankets or tablecloths. Testimony Lov-628, IHRLI Doc. No. 36735.


Croatian Red Cross, Report on Mass Graves in UN Sector East, IHRLI Doc. No. 3993-3994.

UNCIVPOL, UNCIVPOL Memo Re: Possible Mass Graves in Sector East, IHRLI Doc. No. 3983-3985.
Notes (continued)


595/ Id.


597/ It is possible that "Kakobovac" is a misspelling, and the report actually refers to Jakobovac, discussed above. Declassified Document No. 94-96, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 55624-56628.

598/ All information in this section taken from DIMH, Testimony BEK-189, 24 June 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 4938.


600/ Names of victims have been redacted from this document. Report on Mass Graves In UN Sector East, Croatian Submission, IHRLI Doc. No. 4935.


602/ The fourth grave may be located behind houses in Tovarnik in the direction of Sid. On General Strategies and Methods of Aggression on Croatia in 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 54617.

603/ The names of some of the victims were provided in the report, but have been redacted here.

604/ Five other individuals were also buried in this grave. Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin No. 14, 14 November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 47018.

605/ This account suggests that the 24 persons buried in one day were placed in the grave at the cemetery. Croatian Information Centre, Crimes Committed by Military and Paramilitary Formations Against Croatian Population of Tovarnik Between 20 September and the End of December 1991, IHRLI Doc. No. 11691.


607/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40145.

608/ Id. The exact number of Croats killed varies from account to account. For example, ECMM reported 30-40 Croats killed. ECMM, ECMM Humanitarian Activity Report No. 35, 29 August - 4 September 1993, at 3-4 (hereinafter ECMM Report No. 35), IHRLI Doc. No. 38406-38407.
Notes (continued)

609/ UN Central Bosnia Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 40146.

610/ Id.

611/ The reports are unclear as to whether the village of Maljina is located in Zenica or the neighboring county of Travnik.

612/ UN Central Bosnia Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 40145.

613/ Id.

614/ Id.

615/ Id. ECMM reported that the Deputy Commander admitted that there were three mass graves containing a total of 30 bodies, all of which were HVO soldiers killed in battle. ECMM Report No. 35, IHRLI Doc. No. 38406-38407.

616/ UN Central Bosnia Report, IHRLI Doc. No. 40146.

617/ Id. The priest argued that the existence of a third grave supported information regarding six Croats from Maljina who were still missing. Id.

618/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40147-40148.

619/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40146.

620/ Id.

621/ Id.

622/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40148-40149.

623/ Id., IHRLI Doc. No. 40149.

624/ Id.


626/ Id.


628/ Id.

629/ A detailed discussion of identified detention facilities in Zvornik can be found at Annex VIII, Prison Camps, paragraphs 2947-2952. Paramilitary groups operating in the county are discussed in Annex III.A, Special Forces, paragraphs 566-595.
630/ A Bosnian refugee who was interviewed by the US State Department estimated the percentage of Muslims as 70 per cent, with a 27 per cent Serb population. Declassified Document No. 94-380, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 62859-62863.


632/ "Arkan" is the alias for Željko Ražnatović, leader of the "Tigers", and Vojislav Šešelj is the leader of the "Beli Orlovi" or "White Eagles". Both the Tigers and White Eagles are Serbian paramilitary forces.


635/ Karakaj is the industrial section of Zvornik.


637/ One official report alleged that a total of 10 mass graves had been identified in the Zvornik county by the end of 1992, but provided no specific locations. An official source, IHRLI Doc. No. 18994.

638/ Many Muslims killed in the siege of Zvornik were later found floating in the Drina River. Some of the bodies had their throats cut and black Muslim berets nailed to their heads. Declassified Document No. 94-11, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56352-56356.

639/ The name of the cemetery actually varies from report to report. Variations include Kazambase, Kazan Bašta and Kazambaša.


642/ Id.


644/ A Bosnian refugee, who was a lawyer from Zvornik, also speculated as to the existence of a mass grave at the cemetery, but could not substantiate the allegation. Declassified Document No. 94-214, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57030-57031.
Notes (continued)

645/ Austrian Submission to the UN, 3 February 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 5814-5832. Another villager in Little Zvornik observed bulldozers digging on 22 June 1992, in the spots of the "old Muslim and Jewish cemeteries". Reportedly, the bodies buried in these spots were from Foca. Austrian Submission to the UN, 19 April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 18206.


647/ The boys had been forced to accompany the Chetniks into town, where they removed valuables from Muslim houses and loaded them into vehicles.

648/ It is unclear whether these 600 bodies were the same as those taken from the Čelopek and Divić camps.

649/ The cemetery is bordered on the south-east by a gypsy settlement, on the north-east by the Metereze settlement and on the north-west by a wooded hill. Declassified Document No. 94-60, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 56516-56519.


652/ The term "slaughterhouse" as used here is not pejorative. Karakaj is an industrial complex, and one of the structures in the complex was a slaughterhouse.


654/ It is unclear whether the gravel pits near Čelopek and the quarry at Ravnaje are the same location. Declassified Document No. 94-214, US Department of State, IHRLI Doc. No. 57030-57031.


Notes (continued)


FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX X.A
MASS GRAVES - OVCARA
NEAR VUKOVAR, UNPA SECTOR EAST

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Part One

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As indicated in its first and second interim reports, the Commission had intended for some time to conduct an investigation of the Ovčara gravesite in United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) Sector East. This examination would involve the exhumation of the bodies contained in the mass gravesite, the collection of physical evidence at the gravesite, the transport of the bodies to a morgue facility, and the autopsy examination of the bodies to establish identification and the cause/manner of death. In time, other types of evidence would be collected, including testimonial evidence, so that criminal responsibility for the killings related to the bodies in the grave could be determined.

2. Although the Commission had hoped to conduct the Ovčara investigation expeditiously, it soon became apparent that, although it was possible to obtain the necessary forensic experts from Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and the necessary police and investigative resources from the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) 1/ or elsewhere at reasonably short notice, it would be very difficult to obtain the services of a small military engineering support unit, which was essential for the conduct of an excavation investigation. It would also be very difficult to obtain usable assurances and approvals from the political authorities controlling the area. A reconnaissance trip to the Ovčara area in March 1993 had indicated that United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) did not have the military resources available to provide complete support for the investigation. Another lesson from the reconnaissance trip was that it was essential to have the approval of the relevant political authorities. Unfortunately, it was also clear that it was extremely difficult to determine the identity and location of the relevant political authorities in Belgrade, Knin and Vukovar. In addition, it was apparent that the political situation was in a state of flux; it was difficult to determine who really possessed power and the relative competence of authorities at different levels.

3. After some considerable efforts by the Commission staff and by the first Chairman, Mr. Kalshoven, the Commission was fortunate enough to obtain the services of a small composite Royal Netherlands Army Unit, which met the military support requirement superbly.

4. In an effort to obtain the necessary political assurances, the Commission made visits to Vukovar in March, July, October, and November; to Belgrade in March and April; and, to Knin in May, September, and October. In addition, the Commission exchanged numerous pieces of correspondence with various authorities in these locations. The approach taken by the Commission was that, as a matter of balance, the Commission would attempt to excavate a second mass grave site in UNPA Sector West, which was believed to contain Serb victims at essentially the same time as it conducted the Ovčara excavation. The Commission and the local authorities at various times also discussed issues including the location for post mortem examinations, the presence of observers during the investigation, and the concerns of the “RSK” administration about the use of UNPA Sector West by Croatian authorities as a location for radioactive waste disposal sites.

5. Following a meeting in Knin with Republic of the Serbian Krajina (RSK) administration on 5 September 1993, it was the view of the Commission that it had obtained the necessary approvals to conduct the Ovčara excavation. As a matter of balance, while the bodies at Ovčara were being exhumed and an autopsy examination was being conducted to establish identification and the
cause/manner of death, a preliminary site survey would be conducted at a presumed mass gravesite in the Pakračka Poljana/Marino Selo area in UNPA Sector West and a preliminary radiological survey would also be conducted in UNPA Sector West. On the basis of this understanding, the Commission decided to have PHR, the WCIT, and the Dutch UNPROFOR Support Detachment deployed to Zagreb in early October, and to deploy them to Sectors West and East during the week of 17 October. The various teams were then deployed to Zagreb.

6. On 14 and 15 October, the Commission met in Knin with the RSK administration to obtain additional written authorization to proceed with the Ovčara excavation and to address newly raised RSK concerns about the location of the morgue facility. The RSK administration insisted that post-mortem examinations could not be conducted in Croatia. Although the Commission had intended to have the post-mortem examinations conducted in Zagreb, the Commission agreed to endeavour to locate a place for these examinations which would be acceptable to the RSK administration. On receipt of this assurance, the RSK administration issued several documents authorizing the Commission to proceed with the investigation.

7. The teams from PHR, the WCIT, and the Dutch UNPROFOR Support Detachment deployed from Zagreb to UNPA Sector East on 19 October. On arrival in UNPA Sector East the evening of 19 October, the On-site Rapporteur was informed by UNPROFOR that a meeting with the RSK UNPA Sector East administration, in particular Colonel Milanović, was a condition precedent to commencement of the excavation. The Dutch UNPROFOR Support Detachment established accommodations for itself and the WCIT at Klisa airfield within the perimeter of the UNPROFOR Russian battalion. PHR was accommodated at the UNPA Sector East Headquarters in Erdut.

8. As it was not possible to meet with Colonel Milanović before 22 October, the various teams went to the Ovčara site on 20 and 21 October with the acquiescence of the Sector Commander to conduct a second site survey which would not involve any excavation. The site had been secured by UNPROFOR since it was originally identified in December 1992. During the site survey, the site was checked for unexploded ordinance by UNPROFOR, brush was cleared, the area was surveyed in detail with a range of equipment and a certain amount of physical evidence, including spent cartridge cases and some cloth, was recovered. Reports on this phase of the investigation were prepared by PHR and by the WCIT.

9. In total, the team spent less than 48 hours on-site. During this time, the principle activity was the electronic surveying of the site by experts in the PHR team. In addition, mine-clearing of part of the site was conducted by UNPROFOR troops. It should be noted that 64 items of potential evidentiary significance, shell casings, were seized from the site before this project was suspended. The bulk of these are shell casings. All the items seized by the WCIT were identified, tagged, and secured in accordance with the standing operating procedures.

10. On 22 October, the On-site Rapporteur met with Colonel Milanović in Erdut and was informed that, notwithstanding the various approvals received in Knin on 14 and 15 October, the RSK Parliament had taken a decision on 21 October requiring the Commission to postpone all activity at Ovčara until a political solution was found to the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Following the meeting, the On-site Rapporteur withdrew all personnel from the Ovčara site to their accommodations at Klisa and Erdut. It was his considered opinion that any attempt to continue the project after receipt of this decision would expose the project personnel or UNPROFOR personnel to an excessive degree of risk.
11. Although efforts were made to rehabilitate the Ovčara project in the ensuing weeks, none of these efforts were successful and no one affiliated with the Commission had returned to the site, which remains under UNPROFOR protection since 22 October.

12. Once it became apparent, by mid-day 24 October, that there would be no rapid change of position on the part of local administration, project personnel were shifted over a period of time from UNPA Sector East to UNPA Sector West and elsewhere for their more efficient use. The last person and the last piece of equipment was out of UNPA Sector East by 30 October. Sufficient material and personnel resources were, however, retained in Croatia until about 10 November so that the Ovčara excavation could be conducted if adequate political approval was obtained. After 10 November, the onset of cold weather made the project impracticable before the spring of 1994. Appropriate political approval was not obtained before 10 November.

13. On 17 November 1993, the On-site Rapporteur and the Secretary of the Commission met with Mr. Hadžić, President of the RSK in Erdut. Also at the meeting were Mr. Nikšić, Vice-Chairman of the Regional Council and Colonel Milanović, Deputy Minister of Defence of the RSK. Note number 1-234-93, dated 16 November, was presented to the On-site Rapporteur under the signature of Mr. Hadžić, stating the following decisions:

(a) The RSK administration agree to co-operate in and give their approval for the excavations on the site of Ovčara, in the municipality of Vukovar;

(b) The excavation activities can start in March or April the following year, when the weather conditions have improved;

(c) The RSK administration will appoint one member to observe the activities of the Commission; and

(d) The President of the Republic, Mr. Hadžić, approved the above-stated items and is willing to co-operate fully with the Commission.

14. Elections were held in the RSK in December 1993, but Mr. Hadžić did not run for re-election. It is reasonable to presume that another round of negotiations is necessary before the Ovčara excavation can be conducted.

15. As a result of the above investigations, the following reports were produced:

(a) a PHR report, Report of a Second Site Exploration of a Mass Grave Near Vukovar, Former Yugoslavia, which can be found in Annex X.A.2;

(b) a WCIT report, Report of Investigative Activity to the United Nations Commission of Experts-Ovčara, which follows.

16. The mass grave excavation project at Ovčara required, in Commission terms, substantial resources and was, at best, a qualified success. It is my view that the Ovčara project was successful to some extent because of the fact that the Commission was actually able to overcome considerable obstacles and deploy the necessary personnel and equipment to UNPA Sector East, even though it was unable to dig for political reasons. It is considered, however, that no attempt should be made to conduct the Ovčara excavation unless a very firm agreement is applied by the appropriate authorities.
17. The following lessons were learned from the Ovčara project:

(a) that local authorities can thwart projects which appear to have been authorized at a higher level. It is recommended that in addition to any written consent, it be a matter of UN policy that a representative of the appropriate Governmental authority be present at, though not on (for security and evidentiary reasons) the site, to facilitate relations with the local authorities;

(b) that it would be most efficient, should resources permit to locate mass grave investigative and exhumation resources "in country" for an extended period of time, that is for three to six months. This would permit flexibility in moving to different sites as soon as obtaining political approval and before any changes are made to the original approval; and

(c) that arrangements should be in place before evidence is collected, to allow it to be taken out for independent analysis to an institution in a country not a party to the conflict.

18. The support of UNPROFOR was essential to the success of all on-site investigations. It would be extremely difficult to conduct any on-site investigation without such support. The support of the Royal Netherlands Army (UNPROFOR Support Detachment) was essential in connection with the excavation projects and the radiological survey and extremely helpful in connection with all other projects. It is unlikely that a substantial excavation project could be carried out in future without the assistance of a unit similar in composition, equipment, and quality to the Royal Netherlands Army.

II. WCIT REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY AT OVČARA

19. In December 1992, the United Nations sponsored an on-site investigation of an alleged mass grave at Ovčara near Vukovar, UNPA Sector East, territory of the former Yugoslavia. PHR determined that there appeared to be a mass grave containing up to 200 bodies. The report relating to this activity is attached.

20. In October 1993, a medicolegal team consisting of PHR, WCIT, and the UNPROFOR Dutch military members were dispatched to investigate the site fully.

21. The team arrived on site at 12:35 p.m., on 20 October 1993. The site is located approximately six kilometres from the town of Vukovar, in a rural area. The site has been cordoned off with concertina wire, and was under the guard of RUSBAT UN troops, located in a guardhouse approximately 50 metres from the site. In attendance at the scene were Major Holland (Canadian Forces Legal Officer), Drs. Calabrese, Doretti, Fondebrider, Haglund, Hartley, McClurkan, Schmitt, and Scott and Mr. Stover of PHR. Also in attendance were members of the UNPROFOR Dutch Support Unit, as well as UN Commission of Experts member, Mr. Fenrick, and Lieutenant-Colonel Kempenaars, Dutch Military Lawyer, Assistant to the Commission.

22. Utilising an electronic surveying theodolite equipped with a SDR33 data collector (serial number F253137), Dr. Scott surveyed and mapped the perimeter of the suspected grave. This device allows the computerized recording of the topography, and can be used to map and graph items or artifacts located in the area.

23. Upon completion of the perimeter survey, the wire was removed and the scene entered. It was noted that the enclosed area was knee-high in grass and vegetation, making it difficult to locate surface artifacts. A number of
empty cartridge casings were located and marked by way of a pinflag. Twenty-seven empty casings and two items of cloth/clothing were located, mapped, seized and held as evidence. These items (Evidence items 2000-2027) have been forwarded to the forensic laboratories of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for analysis. Vegetation was removed from the interior of the scene. Photographs and video-tape of the investigation were taken by Dr. Doretti, and are held by the investigators. At the conclusion of each work day, the barbed wire was closed, and the site remained under guard of the RUSBAT troops.

24. On 21 October 1993, evidence items 2028 to 2064, inclusive, were seized from the scene. These items consisted almost exclusively of shell casings, and one live round of unidentified calibre.

25. At 10:12 a.m., 21 October 1993, a Belgian UNPROFOR mine team arrived and commenced checking the area for unexploded ordinance. While this was being done, investigative and forensic work was conducted only in the declared safe area.

26. At 8:50 a.m., on 22 October 1993, the scene was re-opened and work commenced. At 9:18 a.m., the minesweeping team arrived and commenced operations, including topographic mapping of the area and metal detection sweeps of the ground and trees.

27. At 10:15 a.m., on 22 October 1993, the Commission’s Rapporteur for On-site Investigations, Mr. Fenrick, attended the scene and advised that permission to conduct the on-site investigation had been withdrawn by the local Serb administration. Therefore, because work was to cease, the scene was evacuated, and the team departed.

28. The ordnance and other items of real evidence collected at the scene are secured at UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb, at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

Part Two

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

29. In December 1992, a four-member forensic team, assembled by PHR, conducted a preliminary site exploration of a burial site approximately six kilometres south-east of the city of Vukovar, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In its report 2/ to the United Nations Commission of Experts, the team concluded, inter alia, that the grave was "a mass grave, containing perhaps as many as 200 bodies". The team also concluded that the grave appeared to be consistent with witness testimony purporting that the site was "the place of execution and interment of the patients and medical staff of Vukovar Hospital on 20 November 1991". The team recommended that a second, larger forensic team should return to excavate the grave and remove the bodies for medicolegal examination.

30. In October 1993, a second PHR team returned to the former Yugoslavia to undertake the complete excavation of the mass grave. On 20 October, the forensic team travelled to the gravesite, located in an isolated, wooded area south-east of the farming village of Ovčara, near Vukovar (UNPA Sector East). Prior to their arrival at the site, the team had received written permission to conduct the excavation from the Governments of Croatia and the RSK. However, on 22 October, local Serb officials informed the team that the Regional Council of Vukovar had passed a resolution prohibiting further work at the site. The officials said that military forces had been ordered to
enforce the Council’s resolution. That same day, the team left the site. Soon thereafter, the team joined another PHR forensic team working in UNPA Sector West.

31. As the local Serb administration forced the PHR team to leave the Ovčara site, no exhumations could be undertaken. However, the team was able to confirm that 7.62 by 39 millimetre cartridge cases were near the grave. In addition, the surface distribution of the cartridge cases confirmed the earlier finding that a mass execution had taken place at the gravesite.

32. The PHR team had intended to return to the Ovčara site in April 1994 to excavate and remove the bodies for medicolegal examination.

II. INTRODUCTION

33. From 20 to 22 October 1993, a ten-member international forensic team, assembled by PHR, conducted an exploration of a mass grave near the city of Vukovar, in the former Yugoslavia (see Appendix A). The investigation was carried out in collaboration with a Canadian team of lawyers and military policemen. A detachment from the Dutch military provided the PHR team with logistical and technical support.

34. The team had intended to excavate the mass grave, which is located in the farming village of Ovčara, near Vukovar (UNPA Sector East), over a period of weeks. However, on the third day of the investigation, the local Serb administration ordered the team to leave the site under threat of force. The team withdrew from the Sector and later joined another PHR forensic team working in UNPA Sector West.

35. As of December 1992, PHR has conducted medicolegal investigations of apparent war crimes in the territory of the former Yugoslavia on behalf of the Commission under a Cooperation Service Agreement concluded between PHR and the United Nations. The Commission is charged under UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to collect and analyse evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

36. PHR first investigated the Ovčara site in December 1992. During that investigation, two skeletonized individuals, bearing gunshot wounds to the head, were recovered from the surface and nearby the gravesite. A shallow test trench, or "sondage", dug across the gravesite revealed nine more bodies. In addition, a large concentration of spent 7.62 by 39 millimetre cartridge cases were found in the burr bushes, in a pattern west to north-west of the gravesite. Based on the preliminary site exploration, the PHR forensic team concluded:

   (a) a mass execution took place at the gravesite;
   (b) the grave is a mass grave, containing perhaps as many as 200 bodies;
   (c) the remote location of the grave suggests that the executioners sought to bury their victims secretly;
   (d) there is no indication that the grave has been disturbed since the time of execution and interment;
   (e) The grave appears to be consistent with witness testimony that the site is the place of execution and interment of the patients and medical staff.
members, who disappeared during the evacuation of Vukovar Hospital on 20 November 1991. However, before that determination can be made with scientific certainty, the grave will need to be excavated and a number of bodies will need to be identified using forensic methods and procedures; and

(f) the fact that two bodies bore necklaces with Roman Catholic crosses—one bearing a small metal plate with the inscription "BOG I HRVATI" (God and Croatians)—suggests that the grave is likely to contain the remains of Croatians.

37. The following report describes the activities carried out by the PHR forensic team at the Ovčara site from 20 to 23 October 1993.

III. FIELD REPORT
A. Site preparation

38. At the time of the PHR forensic team's arrival, on the afternoon of 20 October 1993, the site was secured with two rows of concertina wire and guarded by a Russian contingent of UNPROFOR. The guard station is approximately 40 metres north-east of the site. The gravesite was indicated by a depression, situated at the head of a ravine. The relatively flat lands immediately adjacent to the site were in agricultural production.

39. The team first walked the perimeter wire to ascertain the condition of the site. The gravesite was observed to be overgrown with rank, weedy vegetation. Thistle and cocklebur were observed, as well as a variety of other tall weeds. Some vegetation extended to a height of 1.5 metres. This is all indicative of the revegetation of previously disturbed land.

40. After ascertaining the site condition, Canadian military police personnel, with the aid of Russian UNPROFOR soldiers, created an access point in the wire perimeter near the north-east corner. All ingress and egress to the site was monitored by military police personnel.

41. After gaining access to the site, three tasks were carried out simultaneously. One was the placement of the mapping datum, the second was initial clearing of the vegetation on and around the gravesite, and the third was photographic documentation of the site and the investigation.

B. Methods

42. Electronic Mapping Procedures. A professionally recognized archaeological mapping procedure was used to map the site, the grave pit, associated artifacts, natural and cultural features, and features of the previous excavation unit. The mapping procedure was enhanced by the use of an electronic data recorder, which allowed a high degree of precision in individual measurement and data logging. Precise location control was accomplished through the use of a total station theodolite and electronic data collector. The instrument was a Leitz SRT5A total station theodolite with an SDR33 electronic data recorder. Each theodolite shot was recorded on the data recorder and given a previously established identification code. The specific artifact number was provided by the SDR33 used in auto-generate point mode. The electronic data recorder is equivalent to a surveyor's fieldbook.

43. A primary datum was established as a mapping control point at a convenient location on the site. This datum, numbered 1, was given the arbitrary coordinates of N100/E100 and an elevation of 120. Datum 2 was
established 3.9 metres west of datum 11 and was used as an orientation and backsite datum for all readings taken from this location.

44. The absolute location and elevation of datum 1 was established by readings taken with a Global Positioning System Unit, utilizing the WGS-84 datum. Datum 1 is located in UTM Zone 34, N5017695, E347778, and the elevation is 120 metres above mean sea level.

45. One subordinate datum was established, numbered 3, north of site to provide another check for accurate orientation of the theodolite.

46. The electronic mapping equipment was utilized to capture raw data, including horizontal angle, vertical angle, slope distance and elevation, for each reading taken. Each reading was automatically converted to coordinate position by the SDR33 data collector.

47. Data collected to generate the electronic map included, but was not limited to, locations of: excavation unit boundaries, artifacts found by metal detecting outside the excavation limits, and relevant cultural and natural features.

48. Each artifact found was piece-plotted as follows. The instrument was set up on datum 1, and distance, azimuth and coordinate point readings for each artifact location were recorded electronically. Distance was read to the nearest one millimetre, as well as the north and east coordinate.

49. At the conclusion of each day’s field investigations the data collector was downloaded to a Dell 325N laptop computer containing the software MAP. The resultant computer file was then transferred to the software AUTOCAD for storage and final site map production.

50. **Photographic Recording Procedures.** Photography was conducted at the Ovcara site using both still and video cameras. Log books were used to record film numbers and to describe the activity being recorded on film. The log books were given to the Canadian military police at the site immediately after each roll of film or video tape was taken from the camera and labelled by the photographer.

51. Still photography at the Ovcara gravesite was begun by taking overview images of the site from various directions prior to the investigating team entering the concertina wire surrounding the site. Both colour transparency and black and white film were used. After an entrance way through the wire was established, photographs were taken of the investigative team clearing the site of vegetation and of those mapping the topographic contour and surface physical evidence. Photographs were taken of the site at the end of each day, after investigation personnel had left the site, and at the beginning of each work day, prior to personnel entering the site. Photographs, both colour transparency and black and white, were taken of selected physical evidence found in situ on the ground surface, and of bullet scars observed in trees at the site. In many cases, photographs of bullet scars and physical evidence were taken using a tripod-mounted camera. Plastic measurement scales (metric) were placed in each of these images.

52. The main purpose of the video documentation was to record the methods and procedures used in the medicolegal investigation of individual and mass graves. At various points during the investigation, experts in charge of specific areas of the work explained in front of the camera the procedures and objectives of each step. The investigators described the archaeological procedure used, how evidence was mapped and collected, and what chain of custody measures were taken.
53. **Surface Inventory and Metal Detecting Procedures.** The surface inventory was designed primarily to locate cartridge cases for use in firearms examination procedures. This effort was enhanced by the use of an electronic metal detector, a Fisher model 1235-X with a 30 centimetre diameter coil. Visual inspection of the surface was carried out concurrently with the metal detector sweeps.

54. The operator of the metal detector transected the site using a sweeping motion to examine the ground. A pin flag was placed at each target site identified visually or by detector signal.

55. The vegetation was cleared by pulling the stalks out of the ground or cutting them off near ground surface. The primary goal was to leave the ground surface intact. As the vegetation removal was occurring, a visual inspection of the site was made. The ground surface was littered with a variety of trash. (This trash was previously noted in the preliminary site exploration in December 1992).

56. The perimeter of the gravesite, which was visible during the December 1992 site exploration, was less visible by 20 October 1993. Natural slumping and vegetation growth had obscured the clearly visible details observed in December 1992. However, a disturbed and severely undulating area demarking the grave was visible, as was the line of the December 1992 test trench cut across the site.

57. After the vegetation clearing began, a Belgian mines clearance team with UNPROFOR arrived and conducted a visual clearing of the area north-west of the gravesite. They also worked to the south of the grave and returned a second day and worked to the south-west of the grave, until halted by orders to leave the site. The demining team pulled or removed some vegetation during their visual clearing operation.

58. All vegetation cleared from the site was removed by team personnel through the access point. It was removed to a pile area approximately 20 metres north to north-east of the site. After clearing the vegetation, team members visually observed the surface and identified cartridge cases and other artifacts found laying on the surface. No subsurface digging was undertaken.

59. Sixty-one cartridge cases (Field Specimen numbers 2000 to 2020, 2023 to 2028, 2030 to 2060, 2062 to 2064, and one live round of 7.62 by 39 millimetre ammunition, which is 2061, were found west to north-west of the gravesite. The location of each was recorded by using the electronic mapping procedures. Each item was collected and bagged by the Canadian military police. Each plastic bag contained one item which was labelled with the same number as generated by the SDR33. The bag was sealed by the MP team, and the artifacts were retained in MP custody at all times. The only other artifacts collected were two pieces of cloth and an unidentified object. These items may be intrusive trash and unrelated to the grave episode. However, their surface context was associated with the cartridge case concentration, so it was deemed appropriate to collect the specimens.

60. The cartridge cases appeared to fall into two clusters. One is from two to 10 metres west to north-west of the grave pit and the other is 12 to 15 metres west to north-west of the grave pit. The clusters may be artificial in that these were just the visible surface artifacts. Due to the team's expulsion from the site on 22 October, the surface investigation was left incomplete and no subsurface investigations were undertaken. Thus, the gap between the artifact clusters may be more apparent than real and only additional work can determine the real situation.
61. Two other activities were carried out at the site prior to the team’s withdrawal. One was the photographic recording of the site and the vegetation clearing operation. Within the context of the photographic recording, several trees believed to bear evidence of bullet scarring were also recorded by utilizing forensic scales. These trees are to the south-west of the grave pit and at the edge or in the ravine that heads the grave pit.

62. The final task that was begun prior to the withdrawal was the initiation of recording topographic elevation points for use in constructing a site contour map. Thirty-six elevation points were recorded on 21 October. Plans were to continue to record elevation points on 22 October, but the team withdrew from the site before the data could be recorded.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

63. Inasmuch as the local Serb administration forced the forensic team to leave the site, no formal exhumations could be undertaken. This investigation confirmed the presence of a large concentration of spent 7.62 by 39 millimetre cartridge cases. In addition, the surface inventory and mapping of the cartridge cases suggests that there is a patterned distribution to the firearms data. Further investigations are needed to explicate fully the relationship between the grave and the cartridge cases. However, the surface distribution of the cartridge cases confirms the earlier findings that a mass execution took place at the gravesite.

64. To complete the medicolegal investigation of the Ovčara site, the following activities will need to be undertaken:

(a) completion of the metal detecting, collecting and recording of firearms-related evidence at the site;

(b) completion of the forensic firearms identification of the cartridge cases and bullets recovered at the site;

(c) completion of the detailed mapping of the grave pit and contents as well as determining the relationship of the firearms evidence with the deposition of the bodies; and

(d) completion of the exhumation and, to the extent possible, the identification and determination of cause of death of the human remains buried at the site.

V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

65. This report is based on a second site exploration of a mass grave at Ovčara near Vukovar (UNPA Sector East), in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, from 20 to 22 October 1993. The report was written by Douglas D. Scott, Ralph Hartely, and Eric Stover. Laura Reiner provided administrative support in Boston, Massachusetts, U.S.A.

66. Members of the forensic team were:

(a) Eric Stover, forensic team leader and executive director of PHR, Boston, Massachusetts, USA;

(b) Mercedes Doretti, forensic archaeologist with the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
(c) Burnie McClurkan, archaeologist and historian with the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA;

(d) Douglas D. Scott, Ph.D., archaeologist with the Midwest Archaeological Center, National Park Service, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA;

(e) Stephan Schmitt, forensic archaeologist with the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Team, Guatemala City, Guatemala;

(f) Melissa Connor, Ph.D., archaeologist with the Midwest Archaeological Center, National Park Service, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA;

(g) Ralph Hartley, Ph.D., archaeologist with the Midwest Archaeological Center, National Park Service, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA;

(h) William D. Haglund, Ph.D., forensic anthropologist with the King County Medical Examiner Division, Seattle, Washington, USA;

(i) Francis A. Calabrese, Ph.D., archaeologist with the Midwest Archaeology Center, National Park Service, Lincoln, Nebraska; and

(j) Luis Fondebrider, forensic archaeologist with the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, Buenos Aires, Argentina;

67.PHR wishes to thank its members and several foundations and companies for their support of the organization’s work in the territory of the former Yugoslavia: Soros Yugoslavia Fund, Rockefeller Foundation, Smith-Richardson Foundation, The New Land Foundation, Joyce Mertz-Gilmore Foundation, John Merck Fund, Lufthansa Airlines, Kamp Air Freight, Miles Dental Products, Henry Schein Company, Baxter Health Care Hospital Supply, Shandon Lipshaw, General Electric Medical Systems, Sokkia Corporation, Polaroid Corporation, AGFA Corporation, AGFA Compu Graphic, United Parcel Service and Vista Travel. PHR also is grateful to the US Government, which contributed equipment and supplies to the Commission for use during the medicolegal investigation.

68.PHR gratefully acknowledges the superb logistical and technical support provided by the UNPROFOR Dutch Support Unit.
Notes

1/ The War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) consisted of military personnel from the Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General as well as military investigators who were seconded from Canada to the Commission of Experts for this specific mission. Similar teams were also seconded by Canada to the Commission for other missions. Such teams were referred to within the Commission and for purposes of its reports as the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team.

FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX X.B
MASS GRAVES - PAKRAČKA POLJANA,
UNPA SECTOR WEST, CROATIA

Prepared by:
William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to

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Members of Netherland's Contributed Personnel
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and

Physicians for Human Rights,
Consultants to the Commission of Experts
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Part One

MASS GRAVE INVESTIGATION AT PAKRAČKA POLJANA, UNPA SECTOR WEST, CROATIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. During a March 1993 reconnaissance mission, the Commission became aware of the need to conduct a second mass grave excavation at a site which would probably contain Serb bodies. This second excavation was necessary in order to balance the Ovčara excavation, which would probably be found to contain Croatian bodies. At the same time the Commission was informed by UNCIVPOL members of a number of probable clandestine gravesites near Pakračka Poljana in UNPA Sector West which were believed to contain a large number of Serb bodies. For reasons related to the security of the sites and of potential witnesses, the Commission avoided visiting the sites at that time.

2. In October 1993, when the Commission was in a position to conduct a mass grave excavation, it decided to have Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conduct a preliminary site survey at Pakračka Poljana to confirm the existence of a mass grave. At the time this decision was taken, it was the opinion of the On-site Rapporteur that the Pakračka Poljana location was the location in the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) most likely to be the site of a mass grave containing Serb victims.

3. Given a UNCIVPOL member's description of the suspected grave sites, the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team members operating in Pakračka Poljana, along with the forensic experts from PHR, concentrated their investigation on the line of 17 trenches along the field, and then on the independent graves alleged to be located along the stream at the end of that field.

4. From 20 October to 9 November 1993, the Commission deployed members of the PHR international forensic team, the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) 1/ and the Dutch UNPROFOR Support Detachment to the area. The numbers of each group's members varied over time, as persons were shifted from the Ovčara site to Pakračka Poljana.

5. The Commission received a particularly high level of support from UNPROFOR during this particular investigation.

6. A lengthy report was prepared by PHR concerning this investigation and two reports were also prepared by the WCIT. The WCIT's Interim Report and the WCIT's Investigation Report follow. The PHR report can be found at Part 2 of this annex.

7. The PHR forensic team reached the following conclusions:

   (a) Nineteen individuals (16 males, three females) were buried in nine separate graves in a field south of Pakračka Poljana. The graves were shallow and appeared to have been dug by hand. Leaves found in the bottom of some graves and the clothing on several individuals, including heavy jackets and sweaters, suggests that burials took place in the autumn or early winter;

   (b) The area around the graves was used as an execution site. Expended .22 calibre, .25 calibre, 9 millimetre calibre, and 7.62 by 39 millimetre calibre cartridge cases were found adjacent to six of the graves. Expended rounds were also found near some of the bodies or were recovered from clothing. Five of the bodies had their hands tied with rope. Other bodies had their hands together, sometimes in extremely awkward positions, but no
rope was found during the excavations. It is possible that the hands had been bound but that the binding was made of a natural fibre that disintegrated. Fifteen of the bodies exhibited gunshot wounds to the head; two had blunt head trauma; one had multiple gunshot wounds to the arm and leg; and one had massive head trauma;

(c) The nine graves are clandestine burials. The isolated location of the graves suggests that the executioners intended to bury their victims secretly. The graves were within a short distance of a road that could be accessed by a truck or other vehicle. The graves were also adjacent to large, woody vegetation that screened the area from at least one direction; and

(d) There was no indication that the graves had been disturbed since the time of internment.

8. There were 143 items of potential evidentiary significance which were identified, tagged and secured at the Pakračka Poljana site by the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team.

9. As indicated at some length in the WCIT Legal Report referred to at paragraph 6, although the Pakračka Poljana site was believed to be the site of mass graves containing up to 1,700 bodies, the site was examined with considerable care and the very firmly based conclusion was reached that this belief was erroneous.

10. On 9 November 1993, the 19 exhumed bodies were placed in body bags, together with preservatives, chemicals, and reburied at a site immediately adjacent to an UNPROFOR observation post. Before this step was taken, some consideration was given to the possibility of conducting an autopsy examination of the bodies to establish identification and the cause/manner of death and to the possibility of gathering some additional ante-mortem information by interviewing selected persons in the area. These activities were not undertaken owing to previously expressed RSK concerns that post mortems not be done in Croatia, the difficulty of obtaining a suitable morgue facility, and that the time factor and personnel resources would not permit the intensive effort required to conduct a criminal investigation and to gather all available ante-mortem information.

11. The Pakračka Poljana project was the most successful project in terms of achieving the goal stated in the plan of action. From 20 to 25 October 1993, there was one lawyer and one military police member assigned to this project. This was augmented by additional military police personnel after the suspension of the Ovčara project.

12. The following lessons were learned from the Pakračka Poljana project:

(a) the persons selected to complete this work must have not only the appropriate background and training, but must also use their own initiative to determine on the spot what action should be taken to achieve long-term goals. For example, Major Pat Olson who acted as the co-ordinator at the Pakračka Poljana site, when it became apparent that there was little likelihood of bodies being in the alleged mass graves, on his own initiative, obtained a backhoe to excavate. He arranged for an international verification team to certify the results of the excavation; and he had a video made of the excavation before the holes were refilled; and

(b) that on-site investigations are absolutely necessary to confirm the validity of allegations. Before this on-site investigation there were allegations up to 1,700 victims were buried at this site. This has been proven untrue. Indeed, some groups have expressed their displeasure at the
investigation establishing that people in those numbers are not buried there. Presumably for propaganda purposes 1,700 is a more useful number than 19. It will be critical from the point of view of prosecution that allegations be proven to have a factual basis. If an allegation like this were to be included in an indictment without the necessary on-site work done to back it up, then the whole credibility of the prosecution could be undermined when the allegation was proven to be untrue. Although 19 is also a shocking number, the discrepancy in numbers is so significant that it could, and probably would, put everything else in doubt. This is the case not only for mass-grave scenarios, but for any prosecution.

13. The support of UNPROFOR was essential to the success of all on-site investigations. It would be extremely difficult to conduct any on-site investigation without such support. The support of the Royal Netherlands Army (UNPROFOR Support Detachment) was essential in connection with the excavation projects and the radiological survey and extremely helpful in connection with all other projects. It is unlikely that a substantial excavation project could be carried out in future without the assistance of a unit similar in composition, equipment and quality to the Royal Netherlands Army.

II. INTERIM REPORT OF THE WCIT

14. To assist the Commission of Experts, established pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), in the execution of its mandate, a War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) was provided by Canada. Two of the members of this team, Major P.J. Olson, a legal officer, and Sergeant J.L. Lamothe, a military police special investigator, were assigned to UNPA Sector West to investigate the allegation of a mass grave at the town of Pakračka Poljana. This sub-team was later supplemented by the addition of Warrant Officer S. Murray-Ford, also a military police special investigator. Major J. Holland, a legal officer, headed the sub-team after the departure of Major Olson.

15. The original mandate of the sub-team in UNPA Sector West was to participate in an on-site investigation. They were to ensure that the collection of any evidence relating to mass graves was performed in such a manner as to ensure, to the extent possible, that such evidence would be acceptable to an International Criminal Tribunal established to try individuals accused of having committed war crimes.

16. This report concerns the activities of the sub-team assigned to Pakračka Poljana. As a technical report will be submitted by PHR, which was also assigned to Pakračka Poljana, the purpose of the present report is to give an overview of the investigation. Where an observation of a scientific nature in this report conflicts with any part of the PHR report, the latter report should be given preference. In addition, a report has been completed by the military police special investigators present that will include details as to the precise evidence collected and its manner of collection, recording, and preservation.

A. Background

17. In December 1992, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police attached to the United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) received an informant's report that there was rumoured to exist a mass grave in the area of Pakračka Poljana. This grave was alleged to contain the remains of approximately 200 Serbs and to be located between Pakračka Poljana and Gaj, in the forest, near the railway tracks.
18. After collecting further information, the UNICIVPOL member concluded that he had located three grave sites in the area. He visited these sites on 9 February 1993. In his report, the UNICIVPOL member described site "A" as the smallest of the three sites. There he observed skeletal remains of at least three bodies and various clothing and debris on top of the ground. He described site "B" as containing two graves, each measuring about five feet by six feet. No human remains were observed at this site.

19. Site "C" was described as the largest site and was observed on 9 February 1993 to contain "two large filled in trenches, each approximately 20 metres by four metres". The UNICIVPOL member reported that each of these trenches was alleged to contain at least 100 bodies. He reported that in the vicinity of these trenches, there were also approximately eight other independent graves, although the number of bodies they were alleged to contain was unknown. The location of these independent graves was described as being at the end of the field in which the trenches were located, along the upper bank of a stream.

20. Subsequent to his 9 February 1993 inspection of sites "A", "B", and "C", the UNICIVPOL member reported that the graves at sites "A" and "B" had been cleared out by unknown parties. He also reported that his inspection of site "C" on 4 May 1993 now indicated that there were not two, but 17 features that appeared to be graves along the length of the field in which the first two trenches were previously observed. His report of 12 May 1993, submitted to UNICIVPOL, speculated that if each of these trenches were graves, and that if each grave contained 100 bodies, then site "C" would contain as many as 1700 bodies.

21. It is noteworthy that a document entitled Death Camps and Mass Graves in Western Slavonia: Marino Selo and Pakračka Poljana, distributed by the Serbian Council Information Centre in August 1993, states that "In Pakračka Poljana, some 1,700 ethnic Serbs were murdered and buried there in 17 large (approximately 20 metres by five metres) and several tenths (approximately two by three metres) graves...". That document suggests that the existence of the graves is known to UN officials and that maps of them "were produced as a result of a long-term investigation headed [by the UNICIVPOL member] and his associates." It appears that the allegation, which began as a report of a grave containing 200 bodies, became significantly enhanced following the initial investigation by the UNICIVPOL member. The estimate of 1,700 bodies seems to have originated with the UNICIVPOL member's calculation, referred to at paragraph 7 above.

22. Given the UNICIVPOL member's description of the suspected grave sites, the War Crimes Investigation Team members operating in Pakračka Poljana, along with the forensic experts from PHR concentrated their investigation on the line of 17 trenches along the field, and then on the independent graves alleged to be located along the stream at the end of that field.

B. The investigation by WCIT and PHR at site "C"

1. The allegation of a mass grave of 1700

23. The WCIT, consisting of Major Olson and Sergeant Lamothe, arrived with five members of PHR at site "C" on 20 October 1993. As a precautionary measure, the area around the first two trenches at the north end of the field was cleared by mine detectors provided by the Jordanian Army Unit located at UN Checkpoint 14. That Jordanian Unit had also been providing security of the site before the arrival of the WCIT and PHR and continued to provide site security for the duration of the investigation.
24. For the remainder of this report, the disconformities in the landscape, initially suspected of being graves, will be referred to as "features". The features identified by the UNCIVPOL member as 17 trenches appeared, on closer inspection, to comprise 23 features, running in a north-south direction along the field, parallel to the road. These features will be referred to as features 1 to 23, with feature 1 situated at the north end of the field.

25. After the area around features 1 and 2 were cleared for mines, Sergeant Lamothe demarcated both features with yellow police tape to indicate that the area was a crime scene and that access was restricted to those involved in the investigation.

26. Once the area was demarcated, Sergeant Lamothe recorded the appearance of features 1 and 2 through still photographs and video recordings. Following this procedure, the team from PHR commenced preparation of a test trench at feature 1. This test trench, measuring approximately one metre wide, by two metres long, by one metre deep, was dug by hand with a shovel. Once this process was underway, a second test trench, at feature 2 was commenced.

27. On 22 October, while the test trenches at features 1 and 2 were in progress, Major Olson led a survey party, consisting of himself, Sergeant Lamothe, and Lieutenant H. Jongen, a veteran member of the War Graves Service (Royal Netherlands Army), on an investigation of the remainder of the features along the field, south of features 1 and 2. The purpose of the survey was to record the approximate dimensions of the features, as well as the distances between the features, and to determine the extent to which these features should be investigated.

28. As the survey party progressed, Lieutenant Jongen prodded the ground to determine where the earth had been disturbed and whether there were indications of objects buried below the surface. At feature 10, the three members of the survey team noted that the disconformity on the surface was more pronounced than that observed at features 3 to 9. That is, the feature was characterized as a mound of earth protruding above the normal level of the surrounding ground and the vegetation covering it was dissimilar to that covering features 3 to 9. Feature 10 was similar in appearance to features 1 and 2, but was approximately four metres long by two metres wide, considerably smaller than features 1 and 2.

29. Lieutenant Jongen prodded the earth with a "pricker", a thin iron rod about a metre long, and made contact with a hard substance below the surface. Upon withdrawal of the pricker, he stated that he smelled the odour of human remains on that device. As a result, a number of forensic experts from the PHR team, including Dr. Clyde Snow, were requested to attend at feature 10.

30. The appearance of feature 10 was recorded by still photographs and by video recordings by Sergeant Lamothe, and the area was explored by metal detector. Within two minutes of digging by shovel, evidence of human remains was uncovered. As a result, Sergeant Lamothe demarcated the area as a crime scene and the Jordanian Army provided site security for this location. By 27 October, the excavation of this feature had been completed revealing two bodies apparently clad in military uniform. The progress of the excavation was recorded by Sergeant Lamothe, using both still photographs and video recordings. In addition, evidence such as cigarette filters removed from the grave and soil samples were placed in evidence bags by Sergeant Lamothe, sealed with tape used for such purposes in police investigations, and marked as evidence. Sergeant Lamothe logged each such piece of evidence in an evidence register and secured the evidence in a locked container. (On 27 October, the two bodies were removed to the temporary morgue facility established at site "C".)
31. While excavation of feature 10 progressed, it became apparent through the test trenches at features 1 and 2 that it was unlikely that those features contained human remains. A conversation between Dr. Marko Šimunović of the PHR and a local boy, and a conversation between Major Olson and the farmer who had farmed that field for the past three years, appeared to confirm Major Olson's view that the series of disconformities running in a north-south direction along the west side of the field may have been a line of defensive trenches dug by the Croatian forces. These trenches were apparently dug between September and November 1991. This supposition is supported by the configuration of the line of trenches, particularly in the apparent regular spacing between the trenches, and the manner in which features 11 and 12 are angles at the edge of a lightly forested area.

32. Further, the suggestion that features 1 to 23 may have comprised a series of defensive military trenches is consistent with the archaeological evidence from the test trenches at features 1 and 2. From the test trenches, outlines of the original trenches could be observed, and it was clear that the dimensions of those trenches were much smaller than the disconformity on the surface of the ground. That the disconformity in the ground is larger than the original trench may be explained by the fact that, in the digging of the original trenches, earth would be thrown in each direction, thereby expanding the area of ground that would later appear to have been disturbed.

33. Inasmuch as there were 23 such features, Major Olson considered it necessary to excavate each one to ascertain whether any or some contained human remains. Without such excavation, it was considered that the allegation of a grave containing as many as 1,700 people could not be effectively determined. The approach adopted was that although these may have been military trenches, they may nevertheless have been used later as graves, particularly in light of the discovery at feature 10.

34. Since the resources for digging by PHR were limited, Major Olson visited Lieutenant-Colonel Cantin, the officer in charge of the Canadian contingent at Camp Polom on 22 October and arranged for the use of a backhoe to excavate the remaining features along the side of the field. Excavation of these features by backhoe commenced on 23 October.

35. As feature 11, located to the south-east of feature 10 was similar to feature 10 in appearance, although somewhat longer, a preliminary examination of that feature was made by shovelling by hand. When no evidence of human remains was encountered, the backhoe continued the excavation of that feature. Following the excavation of that feature, feature 12 was excavated by backhoe. Following the completion of the test trenches at features 1 and 2, the backhoe was employed to excavate each of the remaining features, from feature 1 to feature 23.

36. The procedure followed for the backhoe excavation of these features was as follows:
   
   (a) A member of the Dutch War Graves Service (either Lieutenant Jongen, Warrant Officer Bolle or Sergeant-Major Swerissen) would prod the ground with a pricker to determine the location of the original trench and would indicate to the backhoe operator where to dig;
(b) Depending on the dimensions of the feature, between two and five trenches were dug by the backhoe in each feature in a manner which intersected the original trench;

(c) Each backhoe trench was about two-thirds of a metre in width, about two to three metres in length, and about one metre in depth;

(d) Upon the completion of each backhoe trench, the member of the Dutch War Graves Service present would enter the trench and prod the bottom with a prickler to determine whether the backhoe had dug deep enough to reach the bottom of the original trench (this would be apparent from the density of the earth underneath);

(e) Any irregularities in the surface of the ground in the vicinity of these features were also excavated in this manner; and

(f) The digging of each trench was observed by Major Olson.

37. In total, 78 trenches were dug by the backhoe along the line of features referred to as features 1 to 23. With the exception of feature 10, which was dug by hand, absolutely no evidence of human remains were discovered in any of those trenches.

38. On 26 October, an ad hoc Verification Team was formed to inspect each of the 78 trenches dug by backhoe, as well as the two hand-dug test trenches. As none of the monitors designated by the "RSK" had visited the site, the team was assembled so as to include a level of technical expertise and as wide as possible an international representation. The members of the Verification Team were:

(a) Lieutenant-Colonel T. Kempenaars (Assistant to the Commission, Dutch Army);

(b) Major P. De Jonge (Dutch Army);

(c) Lieutenant H. Jongen (Dutch Army, War Graves Service);

(d) Major Bashir M. Abdel-Rahman (Jordanian Army);

(e) Major P. Olson (Canadian Forces); and

(f) Dr. W. Hagland (American forensic anthropologist with PHR).

39. At the conclusion of the inspection, the members were asked by Major Olson if they were satisfied that the trenches, with the exception of feature 10 and feature 1A (to be discussed in paragraphs 28 to 30), showed no signs of human remains. Each responded that he was satisfied. Each member was also asked whether he felt more excavation was necessary in order to be absolutely certain that there was no mass grave in features 1 to 23. Each responded that no further excavation was considered necessary.

40. On 28 October, Ms. Mercedes Doretti, a member of the Argentinian Forensic Anthropology Team (with PHR) recorded each of the exploratory trenches dug in features 1 to 23 by videotape while Major Olson narrated the process of the excavation for the record. (It should also be noted for the purpose of any future verification of the results of the excavation of features 1 to 23, that the backhoe operators, Mr. Lauri Liimatta and Mr. Erkki Mannisto, were both Finns from the Finnish Defence Construction Service at Camp Polom.)
2. Skeletal remains at feature 1A

41. On 23 October, while the excavation by hand at feature 10 and the excavation by backhoe at the remaining features were progressing, Lieutenant Jongen and Warrant Officer Bolle investigated, by means of the pricker described earlier, the west side of the line of features 1 to 23, closer to the tree-lined road. Less than two metres west of feature 1, they located with the pricker what they believed to be human remains.

42. Members of PHR were called to this feature, referred to as feature 1A due to its proximity to feature 1. It should be noted however, that feature 1A did not appear to be connected in any manner to the disconformity on the surface known as feature 1. In fact, apart from the softness of the earth detected by the members of the Dutch War Graves Service, there were no visible indications that feature 1A had been the subject of previous digging.

43. As excavation progressed at this feature by hand, fully skeletonized human remains were uncovered. The only clothing remaining was a pair of well-preserved "cowboy boots". A preliminary examination of the skull revealed a circular defect which appeared to be a bullet hole. A small item, appearing to be a bullet, was located near the head when the skeleton was exhumed on 27 October. This bullet was seized as evidence by Sergeant Lamothe and packaged and recorded in the same manner referred to in paragraph 17 above.

3. The bank of the stream

44. On 26 October, under the direction of Mr. Eric Stover of PHR, exploration began in the area referred to in the UNCIVPOL member's report as the end of the field, along the upper bank of the stream.

45. By this time, eight additional members of the PHR, including Mr. Stover, had arrived from UNPA Sector East to assist in the growing number of excavations. Also, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford, a member of the WCIT previously operating in UNPA Sector East, arrived at UNPA Sector West. His arrival was extremely timely, as at this point, there were three separate excavations in progress in different areas of site "C" and the demands for access control and evidence collection were increasing rapidly.

46. Examination of the area known as CS 1 (C for site "C" and S for stream) was made by means of pricker, by both the members of PHR and by the members of the Dutch War Graves Service. This examination revealed a grave located close to the stream, although there was little in the topography or vegetation to suggest that this area contained a grave.

47. The excavation of this area, under the supervision of Mr. Stover, revealed two relatively well-preserved human remains. One was laying on the top of the other. The body in the bottom of the grave was laying on its back with arms folded on its front, in what may be described as a common position for burial. However, the body on top appeared to have been placed in the grave in a more haphazard manner. Both bodies were clad in civilian clothing and appeared to be male.

48. Evidence was seized from this grave by Sergeant Lamothe and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford in the manner previously described. The progress of the excavation was recorded by video and still photography.

49. Exploration, in the same manner described in paragraph 33, was conducted in an area along the stream and a few metres to the east of CS 1, on the other side of a small bend in the stream. (The location of this area has been
referred to as CS 2 to CS 7.) This exploration suggested the presence of human remains along the bank of the stream. However, due to the size of the area concerned, the first layer of earth, to a depth of about 15 centimetres, was removed by backhoe.

50. Further excavation of this area by hand revealed what appeared to be five independent yet adjacent graves. In the grave at the east end of the area, known as CS 4 (the graves are numbered in accordance with the order in which they were discovered, rather than in order of their relative positions), four bodies, piled on top of each other, were discovered. Immediately to the west of this was CS 3, containing two bodies, then CS 5 containing two more, CS 2 which also contained two bodies, CS 6 which also contained two bodies, and CS 7 on the west end of the area, which also contained two bodies. In total, 14 bodies were located in CS 2 to CS 7.

51. The terrain around these graves were scanned by metal detectors, which uncovered a number of spent casings, as well as some live rounds, two coins and a wedding ring. The locations of items were plotted, by use of the Computer Assisted Drawing equipment by PHR members, and then secured as evidence, by Sergeant Lamothe and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford in the manner described earlier.

52. As with the remains in CS 1, the human remains discovered in CS 2 to CS 7 were clad in civilian clothing. In one instance, it appeared from the clothing that one of the bodies was that of a woman. Preliminary examinations of the skulls of a number of the remains indicated circular defects that were consistent with bullet wounds.

53. It should also be noted that the manner of placement of the bodies in these graves appeared to be inconsistent. That is, while some appeared to have been haphazardly placed, others appeared to have been in what may be described as a foetal position with their arms covering their heads, as if for protection.

54. As the RSK administration would deny permission to conduct full autopsies on the 19 bodies in the pre-arranged Zagreb facilities, the PHR conducted gross external examinations of each of the bodies between 1 and 3 November 1993. On 9 November, all 19 bodies were reburied on the site in individual body bags. A formaldehyde solution was used inside the body bags in order to inhibit further decomposition of the corpses. The reburial trench was dug and filled-in by the backhoe operated by Mr. Liimatta. The site was marked, recorded and filmed.

C. Summary of investigative procedures

55. As indicated above, before excavation began at a feature, the appearance of the feature was recorded by means of video and still photography. Each area was demarcated by police tape, and access to each area was controlled by Sergeant Lamothe and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford. Areas were also scanned by metal detectors to assist in the location of evidence. Any evidence located in the vicinity, or in a grave, was photographed before removal and then seized, packaged, marked, registered and secured by Sergeant Lamothe and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford in a manner consistent with accepted police procedures in Canada.

56. Each stage in the investigative progress was recorded by both still and video photography and notable events were logged in a daily occurrence book kept by Sergeant Lamothe and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford. These investigators also kept an access log indicating who was present at the scene of the
57. At the close of work each day, the excavations in progress were covered by tarpaulins and each site was secured on a 24-hour-a-day basis by Jordanian soldiers.

58. It should be noted that despite the above precautions, one piece of evidence, an Italian 50 lira coin, dated 1974, disappeared between the time it was marked for plotting by computer and the time it was to be collected as evidence. Whether the removal was accidental or intentional could not be determined.

59. The evidence collected by the WCIT military police special investigators was stored by them at UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb in a secured facility and is at the disposal of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

D. Additional investigation of surrounding areas

60. As no mass grave of the proportions originally reported to the UNCIVPOL member to exist was located, it was felt necessary to explore other areas in the vicinity. As the members of PHR were occupied with the excavation of the discovered graves, and as the military police investigators were occupied with access control and collection of evidence in connection with these excavations, the further exploration was conducted by Major Olson and Lieutenant Jongen.

61. Inasmuch as the original description of the area containing the graves of 200 Serbs included a reference to a forested area, near the railway tracks, between Pakračka Poljana and Gaj, Major Olson and Lieutenant Jongen concentrated their investigation in the limited areas that matched this description.

62. Major Olson and Lieutenant Jongen explored the area along the stream, parallel to the railway tracks, east of CS 1 by foot. Lieutenant Jongen frequently employed the device referred to as a pricker to determine whether the soil beneath the surface had been disturbed. They drove along the road between Pakračka Poljana and Gaj and walked along a section of the railway tracks between those two towns looking for any area which may have contained graves. Although a number of features were examined, no indication of a mass grave was found. These explorations were conducted on 28, 29, and 30 October.

63. In addition to this exploration, on 30 October, Major Olson and Dr. Hagland searched the area around the soccer field and the railway station in the town of Pakračka Poljana for evidence of any of the smaller gravesites that were referred to by the UNCIVPOL member's informants.

64. On 6 November, Lieutenant Jongen examined a small lane running south from the road between Pakračka Poljana and Gaj located south of the airfield. His examination disclosed that the ground on and around the lane was rocky, hard and undisturbed. It was concluded that this area was unlikely to contain a burial site.

65. Lieutenant Jongen attempted to examine Site "A" and found it to be inaccessible due to poor and mud-blocked roads. Major Holland and Lieutenant Jongen made a second attempt to reach the site, but for the same reasons were unsuccessful.

66. On 9 November, Lieutenant Jongen, accompanied by the On-site Rapporteur
and Major Holland examined Site "B". Extensive probing and examination failed to reveal any evidence of buried bodies.

67. On several occasions, members of the PHR and WCIT further examined the soccer field area referred to earlier. Although a small excavation was made of an apparent disconformity, no evidence of buried bodies was discovered.

68. No examination of the Marino Selo area was conducted due to lack of time and resources.

E. Logistics and support

69. The Dutch Support Unit, under the supervision of Lieutenant Jongen, and under the command of Major De Jonge, provided all necessary transportation and facilities, including decontamination facilities in the field. On short notice, this unit was able to erect a substantial portable morgue near the site of CS 1 for the examination of the exhumed remains from features 10 and 1A, and from features CS 1 to CS 7.

70. The Jordanian Army Unit located at UNPA Sector West provided a number of valuable services. These included mine detection, site security, washroom facilities and, on occasion, translation services. In addition, Major Bashir M. Abdel-Rahman, the commander of this Unit, consented to participate in the ad hoc Verification Team referred to in paragraph 25. Without the cooperation and support of Major Abdel-Rahman and Captain Suleiman Nawafleh of this Unit, the work at site "C" would certainly not have progressed in the manner that it did.

71. Support was also provided by the commander of the Canadian Unit at Camp Polom, Lieutenant-Colonel Cantin. With no prior notice, he arranged, within 24 hours of the request, for the delivery of a backhoe to site "C". As it later became apparent, the Canadian backhoe was out of service due to maintenance problems, but the Canadian Unit arranged for the loan of a backhoe and operator from the Finnish Defence Construction Service Unit. The backhoe and driver were available for as long as was required.

F. Conclusions

72. There was no mass grave containing 1,700 or even 200 bodies, as reported, in the area of Pakračka Poljana investigated by the WCIT and PHR. No such grave was evident within the immediate vicinity of that area, although terrain matching the description given in the informant's account was inspected.

73. The allegation that there may have been as many as 1,700 bodies appears to have roots in the calculation made by the member of UNCIVPOL in May 1993, based on his observation of a series of 17 disconformities in the landscape at site "C".

74. Based on conversations with local residents, archaeological observations, and the configuration of the series of disconformities referred to as features 1 to 23, it appears likely that these disconformities are the result of a line of military trenches dug along the west side of the field, probably between September and November 1991.

75. There were, as the UNCIVPOL member's report suggested, other independent graves in the area, including the graves located at the north end of the field along the stream.
76. Two bodies were located in a single grave on the west side of the field in a feature referred to as feature 10. They appear to have been dressed in military uniform.

77. One corpse, a fully-skeletonized, was located in a single grave on the west side of the field in a feature referred to as feature 1A. Although there were extremely slight traces of clothing evident in remaining single threads of synthetic material, the only identifiable clothing remaining was a pair of reddish-brown cowboy boots.

78. Two bodies were located in a single grave at the north end of the field, along the stream in a feature referred to as CS 1. They appeared to have been dressed in civilian clothing.

79. Fourteen bodies were located in a series of six adjoining graves at the north end of the field, along the stream in a series of features referred to as CS 2 to CS 7. They appeared to have been dressed in civilian clothing.

80. The preliminary examination of a number of the skulls found indicated circular defects consistent with a bullet wound. At CS 2 to CS 7, a number of spent casings and live rounds were found just slightly beneath the surface of the ground within the few metres directly south of this series of graves. Ballistic testing of these items remains to be performed.

1. Recommendations

81. Two factors contributed to an investigation at site "C" of a slightly different nature than that originally mandated. First, because the grave site at site "C" was not of the proportions originally alleged, it was necessary to investigate areas surrounding the site to ascertain whether a larger mass grave was present in the vicinity. Second, with the suspension of the investigation at UNPA Sector East, more members of the PHR became available to work on the investigation in UNPA Sector West. This permitted the graves that did exist at site "C" to be not only located and examined, but also excavated and the bodies exhumed for post-mortem examination. The recommendations that follow arise mainly because the nature of the investigation changed while in progress.

2. Equipment

82. The equipment brought by the military police investigators was both appropriate and in adequate supply. However, there appears to have been some confusion as to the equipment provided for PHR, particularly with respect to excavating instruments such as shovels and trowels. It appears that the PHR were lead to believe that those instruments would be available on site; however they were not immediately present in adequate supply.

83. Therefore, it is recommended that in the future, liaison between the WCIT, PHR, and the support unit will need to establish with certainty and in advance what equipment will be available on site.

84. Major Olson found it necessary on a number of occasions, as indicated above, to perform duties away from the main excavation area in which protection was provided by Jordanian guards. As the guards were not in sufficient number to provide personal protection during those occasions, Major Olson would often be outside the main area, in uniform, in UN vehicles, completely unarmed. As this situation is very likely to recur in any future operation, it is recommended that the members of WCIT be provided with small
arms for personal protection.

3. **Personnel**

85. There was no shortage of expertise among the PHR with respect to this operation. However, when the additional task of locating further possible graves arose, the PHR were understandably preoccupied with the numerous bodies already located, particularly as these bodies were now to be exhumed. Fortunately, there were present at the site three members of the Royal Netherlands War Graves Service, lead by Lieutenant Jongen, who may certainly be considered experts in the task of locating graves. With a great deal of experience and a minimum of equipment, these individuals were of invaluable assistance in the investigation of possible additional gravesites. Their role in the discovery of the graves at site 10 and 1A had already been outlined.

86. It is therefore recommended that in any future such operations, where there exists any uncertainty as to the location of graves, experts such as Lieutenant Jongen of the War Graves Service, Royal Netherlands Army, be included in the WCIT.

87. The PHR forensic team comprised experts in a number of fields, including archaeology and forensic anthropology. The skills of these members ranged from the physical aspects of excavation, to computer mapping and post-mortem examinations. No change in the composition of this team is recommended.

88. The military police investigators were well-equipped to deal with the demands of access control and evidence collection. It is recommended that any future operations include the presence of at least one such investigator at each excavation site.

89. The original mandate of the legal officer present was to advise on the legal aspects of evidence collection. However, it also became necessary for him to take on the additional role of liaison between the local civilian authorities and local UN authorities in order to facilitate the execution of the mission. It is recommended that, as this dual role is foreseeable in future operations, a legal officer be present as a member of WCIT in such future operations.

4. **Location of gravesites**

90. There are experts available to assist in the location of graves. There are, however, additional technological means to determine the possible location of mass graves before deploying to the field.

91. Aerial photographs of a region taken before a conflict may be compared with aerial photographs of the same region taken after mass graves were suspected to have been created. These photographs are often available through intelligence services. PHR has suggested that, in future circumstances, it may be possible to obtain this type of assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Such photographs may also be available from the Information Branches of military units operating in the region under UN auspices.
92. It is therefore recommended that, prior to future operations, efforts be made to obtain and compare aerial photographs of a region suspected to contain mass graves.

5. Methodology

93. When the number of PHR forensic experts involved in the excavation of site "C" rose from five to 13, it became evident that there are a number of methods to excavate a grave. While the scientific validity of each one of these methods is not questioned, the differing practices followed by certain members of that group caused some initial concern as to the manner in which evidence should be collected. Although these concerns were overcome through Major Olson's consultation with Mr. Stover of the PHR, it would be preferable in future operations to have standing operating procedures agreed to in advance by PHR and WCIT members.

94. It is therefore recommended that, prior to any subsequent operations, written standing operating procedures be established to indicate a single method of excavation and evidence collection to be followed. As the techniques of excavation differ among scientists, such operating procedures will need to be specific to the scientists involved and therefore may not be effectively completed prior to the selection of the team's members.

6. Support

95. As outlined above, the support provided to PHR and WCIT by a number of authorities was exceptional.

III. INVESTIGATION REPORT OF THE WCIT

96. In March 1993, the United Nations Commission of Experts was made aware of a file containing information regarding the location of a mass grave in the area of Pakračka Poljana, UNPA Sector West. The file contained reports, dated from 16 December 1992 to 27 May 1993, submitted by a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), who had been posted with UNCIIVPOL in the area concerned.

97. The UNCIIVPOL member initiated the above-mentioned file upon receiving a complaint from Mrs. "V" on 2 December 1992. Mrs. "V" reported that her husband, "B", born 25 August 1952, was arrested in her presence, by two Croatian soldiers in uniform, outside the Kutina bus station on 21 September 1991. Her husband was subsequently taken to the village of Pakračka Poljana, after which she never saw him again. Mrs. "V" provided the UNCIIVPOL member with the names of seven additional persons, all of Serbian background, from the area of Pakračka Poljana who were also arrested about the same time as her husband. One of the seven was later released; the others were never seen again. The UNCIIVPOL member was also informed by the complainant of a rumour that about 200 people, male and female, all of Serbian descent, were arrested around the same area and time. They were taken to the village of Pakračka Poljana and killed. All of them were apparently buried in a mass grave somewhere between Pakračka Poljana and Gaj.

98. Subsequent investigation allowed the UNCIIVPOL member to locate three suspected mass graves which he described as follows:
(a) Site "A": located at Grid Reference (GR) 521375 (on a map of Novska, series M709, sheet 2585 IV, scale 1:50,000). This grave allegedly contained five bodies poorly buried under earth and brush. The corpses were believed to have been transported from a previous burial site because of heavy plastic material found at the scene. This site was apparently cleared on 15 March 1993, and the bodies were moved to an unknown location;

(b) Site "B": located at GR 536371, consisted of two graves located approximately 65 feet (19.5 metres) from a hunting cabin in Pakračka Poljana and approximately 15 feet (4.5 metres) apart. Each grave was approximately five by six feet (1.5 metre by 1.8 metre) in dimensions. The depth and number of bodies contained in each was unknown. This site was also cleaned out between 8 and 15 May 1993 and, in place of the site, trees were planted as an obvious ruse for the fresh digging; and

(c) Site "C": located at GR 552362, consisted of two large graves of soft, spongy earth in an open field, and approximately eight solitary independent gravesites, which follow along the bank of a stream and were part of the same field as the large trenches. The large trenches allegedly contained one hundred plus bodies each and measure approximately 100 feet by 20 feet (30 metres by 6 metres). This site was by far the largest and most secure as an UNPROFOR check point, manned by CANBAT ONE at the time, was approximately .1 kilometre from the entrance of the field. Upon a later examination of the field, the UNCIVPOL member noted that what was first thought to be only two large graves, were in fact 17 large graves similar in length, width and soil texture throughout the field. These observations brought him to believe that if the additional 15 trenches were actual graves, and the estimate of 100 persons plus per grave remained the same, the total of bodies would be 1,700 instead of 200.

99. On 15 October 1993, the Canadian team, along with members of PHR, were tasked to conduct a preliminary medicological investigation of a series of clandestine graves near Pakračka Poljana, particularly site "C" as referred to in the UNCIVPOL member's file report. This investigation was described by PHR as Phase I and initially only involved a preliminary site survey in order to confirm the presence of a mass grave.

100. At 12:19 p.m. 20 October 1993, accompanied by Dr. Snow, Dr. Caceres, Dr. Šimunović, Dr. Connor, and Dr. Reveco from PHR, Lieutenant Jongen, Chief Warrant Officer Bolle, and Chief Warrant Officer Heesakkers from the UNPROFOR Dutch Army Support Unit, the Canadian team arrived at the JORDBAT UN check point number 14 (hereinafter referred to as CP 14). At that time, the following was noted:

(a) CP 14 is located on a small paved road two kilometres south of Pakračka Poljana's church;

(b) CP 14 is at GR 551363;

(c) This road, if travelled in a southerly direction a distance of 1.5 kilometres from CP 14, would lead to the village of Janja Lipa;

(d) Located on the East side of this road is a field, used for pasture, which was pointed out in the UNCIVPOL member's report as site "C";

(e) The field is bordered to the north by a stream and to the south by the village of Janja Lipa;

(f) Approximately 70 metres south of CP 14, a tractor trail enters the north end of the field. Upon entering the field from that trail, one can
notice, approximately five metres to the right (south), a ground deformity in
the field which looks like an overfilled trench covered with overgrown
vegetation. This trench (hereinafter referred to as feature C1) is
approximately 30 metres long and six metres wide;

(g) South of feature C1 and approximately 10 metres apart is another
similar trench (hereinafter referred to as feature C2). These two features
are the two suspected mass graves reported in the UNCIVPOL member's report as
containing 100 bodies each; and

(h) Both features are elongated north to south, parallel and
approximately two metres east to a line of trees separating the field from the
paved road.

101. Between 12:28 p.m. and 3:20 p.m. on 20 October 1993, the surrounding
area of both features was swept by a team of Jordanians from UNPROFOR equipped
with mine detectors. During that time, the Canadian team proceeded to video
record and take pictures of the site. Upon the site being declared safe, the
PHR team proceeded to conduct a trench survey of feature C1 in the following
manner:

(a) Video tapes and still pictures of the site were made and recorded
in a photo/video log;

(b) A stake called "Wood Bench" was placed in the ground on the south
West end of feature C1. This stake was then used as reference point (Ground
Zero) in the taking of all required measurements;

(c) A one metre by seven metre trench was delineated across feature C1
in a west to east direction, with the western end of it being outside feature
C1;

(d) This trench was subsequently dug from the outside end (West) and
going into feature C1. Upon removing the first layer of top soil on
vegetation, it was possible to notice a line demarcation from feature C1 with
the appearance of disturbed and undisturbed soil; and

(e) Once the demarcation of feature C1 became easily noticeable, the
PHR team proceeded to dig the outside of the survey trench to one metre depth
and subsequently excavated towards feature C1 in order to uncover possible
human remains.

102. At 5:13 p.m. on 20 October 1993, the trench was covered with a plastic
sheet and canvas to prevent accumulation of water during the night. At 5:20
p.m., the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) left the site, at
which time, and for the entire duration of this operation, it was left under
constant armed guard surveillance of UNPROFOR Jordanian troops.

103. At 9:54 a.m. on 21 October 1993, the WCIT returned to the site and
resumed operations on feature C1. At 10:18 a.m., a second survey trench,
similar to the trench being dug across feature C1, was started across feature
C2.

104. At 1:45 p.m. on 21 October 1993, excavation of the survey trench across
feature C1 was completed to a depth of approximately one metre, at which time
the following was noted:

(a) A demarcation of iron deposits could be observed on both walls
(north and south) of the survey trench, indicating the contours of feature C1,
which had been a previously dug and refilled trench;
(b) A deposit of vegetable substance found at the bottom of the trench was collected by PHR for later analysis, in order to attempt estimation of approximate time of year the trench was refilled; and

c) There was no corpse or traces suggesting that any human remains had once been buried at that location. Later completion of the survey trench across feature C2 revealed the same findings.

105. On 22 October 1993, accompanied by Major Olson, Lieutenant Jongen and the WCIT proceeded to make a survey of the field south feature C1 and C2. Seven other features, similar in size and distribution across the field, were noted at a distance of approximately 245 metres in line from north to south. These features were numbered C3 to C9.

106. At 2:45 p.m., on 22 October 1993, a tenth feature was located approximately 245 metres south of feature C2 and 437.8 metres south and slightly to the east of CP 14. At that time the following was noted:

(a) This feature was located at the south end corner of a wooded area and very close to the tree line;

(b) It was different from features C1 to C9 as it measured only 3.7 metres long by 2.3 metres wide;

(c) It was protruding 30 centimetres from ground level and the vegetation covering it was overgrown and different from the vegetation in surrounding area; and

(d) Upon probing it with a metal rod, Lieutenant Jongen felt a hard object approximately 30 centimetres deep and noted that the end of his probe smelled of decaying flesh, confirming suspicions that a grave had been discovered. This feature was hereinafter referred to as site C10.

107. The PHR team was subsequently informed of the findings and attended site C10. Between 3:03 p.m. and 3:25 p.m., on 22 October 1993, a check of the site was conducted with a metal detector while the WCIT video taped and took pictures of the site.

108. At 3:25 p.m., on 22 October 1993, PHR team proceeded to dig a probe hole on top of site C10, at which time clothing material was found at an approximate depth of 30 centimetres. At 3:36 p.m., Dr. Snow cut open the clothing and uncovered what was suspected to be human flesh. Upon cutting through the flesh, Dr. Snow found what he identified as a human hip bone.

109. At 4:06 p.m., on 23 October 1993, site C10 was cordoned off and placed under armed surveillance.

110. At 9:25 a.m., on 23 October 1993, an Access Control Point (ACP) was set up at the entrance of site C10. Only involved personnel had access to the site and a record of their arrival and departure was kept in an "Access Control Book".

111. During the course of this operation, numerous items which were determined as possible physical evidence were collected in the following manner:

(a) Each item was photographed and/or video taped prior to being removed from its original position;

(b) An Electronic Surveying Theodolite c/w #SDR33 data collector,
serial #F253137, was used to map most items. This computerized equipment allows a three dimensional recreation of the exact position where the item was found and can be later reproduced on a map draft computer print;

(c) Each item was assigned an evidence number and placed in a sealed evidence bag, which was kept in the writer's custody; and

(d) All evidence numbers were recorded in an evidence log which contains information such as the date and time the evidence is seized, who seized it, a description of the item, and the location where it was found. All evidence logs have been submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

112. After completion of the field survey, Major Olson concluded that the field contained a total of 22 features similar to feature C1 and C2 (not including site C10). These features could have been mistaken to be mass graves, however, their configuration and position in the field suggested that they could have been old defensive trench positions which had been refilled for unknown reasons. It is very likely that the 17 features that were believed to be mass graves by the UNICIVPOL member were part of these 22 features. In order to ascertain that these 22 features were not mass graves, Major Olson made arrangements to obtain a backhoe which would be used to cut segments across each one of the features.

113. At 11:18 a.m., on 23 October 1993, Mr. Larry Liimatta, UNPROFOR backhoe operator, began cutting trench segments across the features. All suspected mass grave features were subsequently dug by trench segments and it was determined that none of them contained human remains. Trench segments dug by the backhoe from feature C1 to feature C23 (not including feature C10) covered a distance of approximately 730 metres across the field in a north to south direction.

114. At 3:15 p.m., on 23 October 1993, the WCIT was advised that Lieutenant Jongen and Chief Warrant Officer Bolle had located a second gravesite on the north-west side of the field. The WCIT subsequently proceeded to that location and video taped and took photographs of the site, during which the following was noted:

(a) The gravesite (hereinafter referred to as site C1A) was adjacent and west of feature C1, approximately one metre east of the tree line bordering the paved road and 10 metres south of the field entrance trail. Distance from CP 14 to C1A is 75.5 metres;

(b) Some human ribs had been partially uncovered by Lieutenant Jongen and Chief Warrant Officer Bolle at a position which appeared to be the centre of the grave; and

(c) It was later learned that this grave contained only one human corpse which was hereinafter referred to as body C1A-1.

This site was subsequently cordoned off and an ACP was established.

115. On 24 October 1993, Mr. Stover, Dr. Haglund, Dr. Scott, Dr. Calabrese, Dr. Hartley, Dr. Doretti, Dr. Fondebrider and Dr. Schmitt, all from PHR, arrived on site "C" and joined the operation with the other members of the team.
116. Based on their professional experience, Dr. Doretti and Dr. Hartley were respectively assigned the task of video taping and taking photographs of all activities during this operation. It may be noted that approximately seven hours of video tape and 3,000 photographs were recorded during this investigation and have been submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

117. At 11:31 a.m., on 24 October 1993, WCIT was informed that a second body had been found in site C10. After later excavation of site C10, the following was noted:

(a) The first corpse (hereinafter referred to as body C10-A) appeared to be an adult male, laying on his left side, semi-flexed, with his head to the north, and was wearing what appeared to be a JNA military uniform;

(b) The second corpse (hereinafter referred to as body C10-B) also appeared to be an adult male, laying on his back in an extended position, with his head to the south, and also wearing some sort of military uniform; and

(c) Both corpses appeared to have gun shot wounds to their head.

118. It may be noted that during each grave excavation, PHR compiled an excavation report which provides the following information:

(a) Surface conditions prior to excavation;
(b) Description of soils in grave pit and surrounding matrix;
(c) Description of bodies and skeletons in each excavation;
(d) The position of body(ies);
(e) Artifacts and other associations with the body;
(f) Co-mingling, if any;
(g) Soil and other samples taken and reasons (insects pupae, soil control samples, soil from boots, nut hulls, leaves, etc.);
(h) Description of clothing and shoes, if any;
(i) Description of the condition of the body(ies); and
(j) A note of any potential wounds, trauma, or anomalies.

A rough Forensic Burial Summary report was provided on-site by PHR after each excavation.

119. At 8:22 a.m., on 25 October 1993, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford arrived at the site and assisted in the collection of evidence and as on-site controller as two different sites had to be monitored. Also in attendance were two other members of the UNPROFOR Dutch Support Unit, Warrant Officer Swerissen and Sergeant Jansen.

120. At 1:45 p.m., on 25 October 1993, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford attended the site of a suspected third grave. The location of this grave (hereinafter referred to as site CS1) is described as follows:

(a) If one follows the tractor trail which enters the north-west corner of the field in an easterly direction for approximately 80 metres, it
is branched into a "Y" by a line of trees. The northern (left) branch of the trail then becomes bordered to the south by the tree line and to the north by a small clearing and the stream (see para. 101e. above);

(b) If followed for another 50 metres, the trail enters a small field, which is bordered to the north by the stream curving in a northerly direction. Approximately five metres to the left (north) of the trail where the stream curved to the north (GR 555363) is site CS1; and

(c) Site CS1 is at a distance of 148.5 metres from CP 14.

Upon arrival at the site, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford was informed by Mr. Stover that Lieutenant Jongen had probed the area, detected odours of human remains and had an indication of metal about 60 centimetres below the surface. Lieutenant Jongen stated that there was a possibility that there were two or more bodies at that location. It was later learned that this gravesite contained two bodies laying on top of each other. The body on top was referred to as CS1-A, and the body at the bottom was referred to as CS1-B. At 2:25 p.m., 25 October 1993, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford cordoned off the site and assumed ACP duties.

121. Between 8:30 a.m. and 9:50 a.m., on 26 October 1993, Dr. Haglund and Lieutenant Jongen probed the area south of the stream, where the trail is bordered to the south by the tree line and to the north by a small clearing and the stream (see para. 120a. above). Dr. Haglund stated that there was indication of five to eight bodies buried at that location, and he wished to excavate the site. This site was hereinafter referred to as site CS2 and was subsequently excavated with a backhoe to a depth of approximately 15 centimetres. During this operation, a human skull and a black-pattern female shoe were uncovered.

122. At 2:36 p.m., on 26 October 1993, Dr. Haglund reported the discovery of another grave covered by a garbage pit, which was subsequently removed with the backhoe. This grave was located approximately five metres West of site CS2.

123. At 2:38 p.m., on 26 October 1993, some empty ammunition shell casings were found in the area of the last discovered gravesite. At that time, the operation of the backhoe ceased, the entire area surrounding these gravesites was cordoned off and ACP was set up.

124. At 9:07 a.m., on 27 October 1993, Lieutenant Jongen, Warrant Officer Swerissen, and Dr. Scott proceeded to sweep the entire area surrounding the gravesites with a metal detector. During this operation, numerous metal artifacts such as empty shell casings, live rounds, a ring, and coins were located and plotted with pinflags.

125. Between 10:09 a.m. and 11:37 a.m., on 27 October 1993, body C10-A and body C10-B were removed from gravesite C10, placed in bodybags, and transported to a tent used as a temporary morgue and located in the small field east of site CS1.

126. At 11:00 a.m., on 27 October 1993, PHR proceeded to remove the only corpse found in gravesite C1A. At that time the following was noted:

   (a) The corpse, hereinafter referred to as C1A-1, was almost totally skeletonized, and lay semi-flexed on his left side and head to the south;
(b) Apart from some clothing tags, the only remaining piece of clothing left on was a pair of well-preserved cowboy boots;

(c) What appeared to be an entrance and exit bullet hole was found in his skull;

(d) A nine millimetre bullet was found embedded in sterile earth, directly under the skull. This bullet was found with the help of a metal detector after the removal of the body; and

(e) CIA-1 was placed in a bodybag at 11:40 a.m., and arrived at the morgue at 11:47 a.m., on 27 October 1993.

127. At 1:42 p.m., on 27 October 1993, PHR proceeded to remove body CS1-A from CS1. The body was placed in a bodybag at 2:45 p.m., and transported to the morgue.

128. At 2:50 p.m., on 27 October 1993, Mr. Stover reported the discovery of several human skulls a few inches below the surface of sites surrounding site CS2. It was later determined that this area contained six different gravesites, the locations of which and assigned numbers are described as follows:

(a) All gravesites were located on the south bank of the stream which curved south-east at that location, GR 553363;

(b) Distance from CP 14 to the centre area of these sites is 107 metres;

(c) Gravesites were assigned an identification number in the order they were excavated. Position of the gravesites from north-west to south-east is CS7, CS6, CS2, CS5, CS3 and CS4; and

(d) Each grave contained two bodies with the exception of site CS4, which contained four bodies.

129. At 10:00 a.m., on 28 October 1993, prior to mapping all metal artifacts that had been marked with a pinflag on 27 October 1993, Warrant Officer Murray-Ford and this writer discovered that an Italian lira coin was missing from under its flag. A subsequent metal detector sweep of the area proved negative in its recovery. It was learned from Dr. Reveco that she had picked it up, cleaned it, and replaced it on 27 October 1993. Warrant Officer Murray-Ford recalled seeing the item prior to closing off the site at 3:29 p.m., on 27 October 1993 and noted that it appeared brighter than before. A close examination of the last known location of the coin revealed a circular imprint in the ground, suggesting that it had been picked up instead of being accidentally dislodged. Dr. Hartley, Chief Warrant Officer Heesakkers, and Sergeant Jansen all recalled having observed the coin upon leaving the site on 27 October 1993.

130. At 10:37 a.m., on 28 October 1993, still photographs and video of the last location of the Italian coin and a boot heel imprint found close to it were taken. Warrant Officer Murray-Ford requested Major Olson to raise the question with Major Bashir as to whether he could canvas his troops with a view of determining if they recalled seeing it, or if it was accidentally moved by any of them during their tour of guard duty. Subsequent inquiries with Major Bashir proved negative. At 10:45 a.m., on 28 October 1993, the missing coin was mapped as item 3023.
131. A total of 41 empty shell casings of mostly nine millimetre and 7.62 calibre, a 7.62 calibre live round, and an unknown caliber live round were later mapped and collected. The concentration of these items was located south and between site CS7 and CS6. Three .22 calibre empty shell casings were found and mapped on the tractor trail south of sites CS3 and CS4. Also mapped as items found on-site was a gold ring and a Croatian coin.

132. At 12:30 p.m., on 28 October 1993, PHR proceeded to remove body CS1-B from site CS1. During removal, a gold ring was found on its left hand 4th finger. CS1-B was placed in a bodybag and arrived at the morgue at 1:26 p.m., on 28 October 1993.

133. At 11:05 a.m., on 29 October 1993, Major Olson and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford attended the Pakrac Police Station and met with the local Chief of Police, Nikola Ivanec, who provided them with a list of names and dates of birth for 142 reported missing persons in the area. A copy of this list has been forwarded to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.

134. At 12:06 p.m., on 1 November 1993, a brown briefcase was removed from site CS6. The briefcase contained miscellaneous items and the following items:

(a) A "INA" plastic folder containing a document titled "KUPON ZA PRIJEVOZ", mat# 39101008161, dated 17 December 1989, with the name ILIĆ Dušan, 41320 Kutina; and

(b) A blue plastic folder containing personal papers, an unidentified map and a customer card (Clanska Karta) titled, "AUTO-MOTO SAVEZ JUGOSLAVIJE" with the inscriptions "ILIĆ Dušan, Kutina 41320, I.G., Kovačića bb 910, Kutina, 18 November 1978".

135. It may be noted that most items found in the briefcase had the inscription "INA-NAFTAPLIN", which is a gas company in Croatia. All items in the briefcase are listed in an evidence log under number 1378. A 1990 and a 1991 car calendar book was also found underneath the damaged briefcase, suggesting that it was buried later than 1990 and prior to 1992.

136. At 11:43 a.m. and 11:45 a.m., on 2 November 1993, body CS2-A and body CS2-B were removed from site CS2 and transported to the morgue. It was noted that body CS2-A had been in the grave in a sitting position with a blanket around the shoulders and underneath the body, suggesting that the blanket had been used to place the body in the grave. Both CS2-A and CS2-B appeared to have gun shot wounds to the head.

137. At 11:57 a.m. and 12:10 p.m., on 2 November 1993, body CS3-A and CS3-B were removed from site CS3 and transported to the morgue. Both appeared to have gun shot wounds to the head.

138. Between 3:28 p.m. on 2 November 1993 and 11:12 a.m. on 3 November 1993, all four corpses were removed from site CS4 and transported to the morgue. During the time the following was noted:

(a) CS4-C was first removed, identified as an adult male and was found laying on his back on top of CS4-D's legs;

(b) CS4-D was removed, identified as an adult male laying on his back, with his head resting on CS4-B's legs. His trousers were pulled down to his ankles;
(c) CS4-B was removed, identified as an adult female laying on her back, and a shoe was found over the left side of her face;

(d) CS4-A was last to be removed, suspected to be an adult female laying on her back, with her head resting on CS4-B's right shoulder. Her skull had been damaged by the backhoe; and

(e) All corpses were wearing civilian clothing, had their hands tied behind their backs with a similar rope, and had gun shot wounds to their heads.

139. At 11:19 a.m. and 11:29 a.m., on 3 November 1993, CS5-A and CS5-B were removed from site CS5 and transported to the morgue. Both corpses were adult males, found laying on their sides in a foetal position, touching each other at shoulder level, and had guns shot wounds to their head.

140. At 11:42 a.m. and 1:11 p.m., on 3 November 1993, body CS7-A and CS7-B were respectively removed from their graves and transported to the morgue. CS7-A was found laying on his back on top of CS7-B, who was also laying on his back. It was later learned during field autopsies that both bodies were males and that they had received numerous bullet wounds all over their upper bodies. This could explain why most of the empty shell casings found at the site were in front and slightly to the right of site CS7.

141. At 11:55 a.m. and 2:36 p.m., on 3 November 1993, body CS6-A and CS6-B were respectively removed from site CS6 and transported to the morgue. CS6-A was found face down on top of CS6-B, with his sweater pulled over his head. CS6-B was laying on his back. Both appeared to have gun shot wounds to their heads. An unknown calibre live round was found at the bottom of site CS6 with the help of a metal detector. This item was registered under number 1501.

142. At 1:36 p.m., on 3 November 1993, Dr. Connor reported having found a black leather wallet with identification card in the bottom of site CS4. Examination of the wallet revealed that it contained the following items:

(a) Identification card with photo;
(b) Driver's licence;
(c) Car registration;
(d) Urine test document from Pakračka Poljana Hospital; and

Items were entered in an evidence log under number 1500.

143. Between 1:35 p.m. on 2 November 1993 and 10:47 a.m. on 7 November 1993, Dr. Kirschner conducted field autopsies on all exhumed corpses. All notes during these autopsies were recorded by Dr. Kirschner. Canadian Military Police provided ACP during autopsies and recorded arrival and departure of all persons present in the autopsy room. MCpl McComb, who had arrived on-site, assisted in the operation of the ACP and collection of evidence.

144. All evidence found on corpses during the course of autopsies was collected, and photographs were turned over to the Canadian Military Police for custody. All evidence items were assigned a number and registered in an evidence log. Some jewelry and identification papers collected could provide a greater chance of identifying some of the bodies they were found on. The following is a list of some of these items by evidence log number:
(a) #1481: black leather wallet with the taped inscription "MILETIC", found in clothing of C10-A;

(b) #1502: identification card with photo, driver's licence, and registration papers, found in clothing of CS4-C;

(c) #1509: earring, found on left side of skull of CS4-B;

(d) #1510: earring, found on left side of skull of CS4-B;

(e) #1511: gold colour ring, taken from left ring finger of CS4-B;

(f) #1512: chain with letter "S", taken from neck of CS4-B;

(g) #1517: black "Darvil" Swiss watch, Ser 7050, found on right wrist of CS2-B;

(h) #1523: silver "Month" watch, found in right lower suit jacket pocket of CS2-B;

(i) #1528: pair of eye glasses with brown frame. The frame has tape on both sides and is tied at each end by a red elastic, found in upper left jacket pocket of CS3-B;

(j) #1530: gold chain with gold miniature soccer ball attached to it, found around neck of CS3-B;

(k) #1531: brown leather wallet containing identification card with photo and driver's licence, both under the name of Bozo Velebet, found stuck on right rear buttock of CS3-B;

(l) #1536: gold ring, found of left 4th finger of CS6-A; and

(m) #1539: black leather wallet with photo identification card found in right rear trouser pocket of CS7-A.

145. It may be noted that two .22 calibre empty casings were also found during the autopsy of CS2-A. One was stuck to the front of his trousers, near the right pocket and one was found in the blanket he was buried with. A partial fingerprint of the right middle, right ring and right little finger of CS6-A was also lifted by Dr. Haglund.

146. At 9:18 a.m., on 5 November 1993, accompanied by Major Holland, Dr. Kirschner, Dr. Snow, Dr. Calabrese, Chief Warrant Officer Heesakkers and Warrant Officer Murray-Ford attended the Soccer field and Soccer Club House located north-west of CP 14. This Club House was reported in the UNICIVPOL member's report as having been used to torture people. No evidence was found inside the Club House. A hole containing JNA military clothing, track shorts and some women clothing was found in the field adjacent to the Club House. However, there was no sign of human corpses. Various items of garbage were also located in the pit. Several empty cans of "Lockwoods" beer, with an expiry date of August 1992, were discovered. It is believed that all the garbage may have been found in the Club House and subsequently buried by CANBAT personnel as the Club House had been used in the past by CANBAT troops at the time they were manning CP 14. Measurements, photographs, and a sketch of the Club House were later made. A sample of a sticky substance found on a counter of the Club House was also collected and has been forwarded to RCMP Lab for Benzine testing.

147. On 5 November 1993, attempts were again made by Major Holland and
Lieutenant Jongen to locate other mass graves in the area of site "B" and the lane of Pakračka Poljana and Gaj road. These attempts met with negative results.

148. Between 9:52 a.m. and 3:01 p.m. on 9 November 1993, all bodies were buried at a new gravesite. A video record, photographs, and a sketch marking the exact location of the new grave were made. Bodies were buried in a trench and were placed side by side, starting from the north end of the trench.

149. This investigation had revealed the following:

(a) During the fall of 1991, several persons of Serbian background were arrested around the area of Pakračka Poljana and never seen again;

(b) A report of the existence of 17 mass graves, located in a field near Pakračka Poljana and suspected to contain over 100 bodies each, was made to the UN Commission of Experts;

(c) Between 20 October 1993 and 9 November 1993, an investigation was conducted on-site by the Commission. The investigation revealed that the trenches, reported as being mass graves containing over 100 bodies each, were in fact empty. These trenches are suspected to have been used sometime in the past as defensive positions and were later refilled with earth;

(d) Nine smaller gravesites were uncovered during this investigation and contained a total of 19 bodies;

(e) Evidence at the sites suggested that some of the victims had been shot in or nearby their graves;

(f) A few identification papers and jewelry, which could help in the identification of some of the bodies, were found on the bodies themselves or in the respective graves;

(g) Three of the bodies recovered with ID were reported by witnesses as having been arrested during the fall of 1991 and taken to Pakračka Poljana; and

(h) A confidential report forwarded to the Commission of Experts contains the names of some witnesses and suspects.

150. It is recommended that other measures to be undertaken in respect of this investigation should include the collection of ante-mortem data, complete autopsies, as well as interview of victims, witnesses, and suspects.

Part Two

REPORT OF A PRELIMINARY MEDICOLEGAL INVESTIGATION OF A SERIES OF CLANDESTINE GRAVES NEAR PAKRAČKA POLJANA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

151. From 20 October to 9 November 1993, an international forensic team, assembled by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), conducted a preliminary medicolegal investigation of a series of clandestine graves near the village of Pakračka Poljana, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The work was carried out on behalf of the United Nations Commission of Experts under a Cooperation Service Agreement concluded between PHR and the United Nations,
with logistical and technical support provided by a detachment from the Dutch armed forces, UNPROFOR.

152. Based on the preliminary medicolegal investigation, the forensic team concludes:

(a) Nineteen individuals (16 males, three females) were buried in nine separate graves in a field south of Pakračka Poljana. The graves were shallow and appeared to have been dug by hand. Leaves found in the bottom of some graves and the clothing on several individuals, including heavy jackets and sweaters, suggests that burials took place in the autumn or early winter.

(b) The area around the graves was used as an execution site. Expended .22 calibre, .25 calibre, 9 millimetre calibre, and 7.62 by 39 millimetre calibre cartridge cases were found adjacent to six of the graves. Expended rounds were also found near some of the bodies or recovered from clothing. Five of the bodies had their hands tied with rope. Other bodies had their hands together, sometimes in extremely awkward positions, but no rope was found during the excavations. It is possible that the hands had been bound but that the binding was made of a natural fibre that disintegrated. Fifteen of the bodies exhibited gunshot wounds to the head; two had blunt head trauma; one had multiple gunshot wounds to the arm and leg; and one had massive head trauma.

(c) The nine graves are clandestine burials. The isolated location of the graves suggests that the executioners intended to bury their victims secretly. The graves were within a short distance of a road that could be accessed by a truck or other vehicle. The graves were also adjacent to large, woody vegetation that screened the area from at least one direction.

(d) There was no indication that the graves had been disturbed since the time of interment.

153. The PHR forensic team is prepared to begin the second phase of the medicolegal investigation of the remains recovered near Pakračka Poljana. This phase will require removal of the bodies from the trench burial, where they were re-interred after exhumation, a preliminary post-mortem examination in a field morgue, and transporting them to an appropriate morgue facility for autopsy. The forensic team intended to return to the site in April 1994 to continue the investigation.

154. To complete the investigation, the forensic team will require the following support:

(a) Ante-mortem Information: PHR is confident that most, if not all, of the bodies recovered near Pakračka Poljana can be positively identified. However, this will require the collection of ante-mortem records of persons believed to have disappeared in the area of UNPA Sector West from 1991 to 1992. Members of the forensic team will also need to interview family members of the disappeared. PHR is prepared to work with the United Nations and all other interested parties to obtain ante-mortem information.

(b) Transportation of the Bodies: To maintain security and chain-of-custody of the bodies and other evidence, UNPROFOR should be in charge of transporting them from the trench burial to a morgue facility in the former Yugoslavia or another country.

(c) Medicolegal Examination Autopsy: The medicolegal examination of the bodies and artifacts will be conducted by a PHR team of forensic specialists in pathology, radiology, physical anthropology, and odontology.
The team will need a facility that has hot and cold running water, adequate space and lighting, ventilation and heating, X-ray capabilities, basic autopsy tables, and refrigeration units for storage of the bodies.

(d) Other Investigations: Witness statements suggest that a link may exist between the graves and a soccer clubhouse, located a short distance from the site. The clubhouse is located next to the soccer field in Pakračka Poljana. It is alleged to have been used as a secret detention centre by the Croatian military and police from August 1991 to March 1992. This period corresponds with the likely time of burial of most, if not all, of the 19 bodies. Moreover, survivors of this centre allege that male and female detainees were executed at or near the centre. An appropriate UN agency should conduct an in-depth investigation of the activities at the Pakračka Poljana soccer clubhouse from 1991 to 1992. To the extent possible, UN investigators should interview local residents and former detainees, who should be asked to provide the names and gender of fellow detainees, their approximate ages, dates of detention, and other relevant information. Such information may help to identify the 19 bodies and return them to their families, and to determine who was responsible for these "murders".

II. INTRODUCTION

155. From 20 October to 9 November 1993, an international forensic team, assembled by PHR, conducted a preliminary medicolegal investigation of a series of clandestine graves near the village of Pakračka Poljana, in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The investigation was carried out in collaboration with graves registration personnel from the Dutch armed forces and a Canadian team of lawyers and military policemen. A detachment from the Dutch military provided the PHR team with logistical and technical support.

156. Since December 1992, PHR has conducted medicolegal investigations of alleged war crimes in the former Yugoslavia under the auspices of the United Nations Commission of Experts ("Commission"). The Commission is charged under UN Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) to collect and analyse evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

157. PHR first learned in March 1993 that several clandestine graves might be located near Pakračka Poljana. At that time, the members of the forensic team and a Commission member travelled to Daruvar, in the UN Protected Area of Sector West, to meet with UNPROFOR Civilian Police (CIVPOL). During the meetings, CIVPOL monitors produced reports and photographs from their investigations of several individual and mass graves in the area of Pakračka Poljana and Marino Selo. Most of the information was based on interviews with local informants, including relatives or friends of persons who had reportedly disappeared after being detained by Croatian military or police personnel from August 1991 to March 1992.

158. According to information collected by CIVPOL monitors, members of the Croatian military and police had allegedly abducted hundreds of ethnic Serbs (and some ethnic Croats) and held them in detention centres, where they were interrogated under torture. Some detainees were eventually released in prisoner exchanges and later testified about their treatment in detention. Most of the detainees, however, were allegedly executed by their captors and buried in unmarked graves.

159. Local informants provided CIVPOL monitors with the names of the alleged perpetrators of these crimes. Informants also described the location of several detention centres. One such centre was a building that had served as
a changing room or clubhouse for soccer players in Pakračka Poljana. Survivors of this centre have described the building's interior, noting that door handles had been removed from certain rooms to keep detainees locked in.

160. CIVPOL monitors had information on three possible mass gravesites in the area of Pakračka Poljana. All three sites were within three to five kilometres of one another. In their reports, the monitors referred to these sites as "A", "B", and "C". Site A was reported to be a small, almost completely exposed grave, containing the remains of five bodies. Site B allegedly consisted of two graves approximately five feet by six feet each, containing an unknown number of bodies. Site C was said to be located in a large, open field. It consisted of two trench burials, allegedly containing 200 bodies, as well as several small graves that followed along the bank of a stream in the same field.

161. By May 1993, CIVPOL monitors reported that Site C was all that remained of the three independent sites. In mid-March, Croatian officials had apparently removed the remains from site A and taken them to an unknown location. Site B was similarly tampered with in early May. When CIVPOL monitors visited site B, they discovered trees had been planted over the former graves "as an obvious ruse to mask the fresh digging".

162. On 4 May 1993, CIVPOL monitors visited site C and walked the length of the field. In their daily report, they noted that there appeared to be "not two but 17 elongated mass graves". They speculated that the total number of bodies at the site could be as high as 1,700. The monitors noted, however, that until the trenches were opened, there was no way of verifying if, indeed, they were mass graves.

163. The following report describes the medicolegal investigation conducted by the PHR forensic team and the Dutch graves registration personnel from 20 October to 9 November 1993. Section III on the Archaeological Field Report was written by Melissa Connor, Ph.D.; Douglas D. Scott, Ph.D.; Ivan Caceres-Roque; Luis Fondevrider; and Ralph Hartley, Ph.D. Section IV, Preliminary Post-mortem Examination of Remains, was written by Robert H. Kirschner, M.D.; Eric Stover and William H. Haglund, Ph.D., edited the report.

III. ARCHAEOLOGICAL FIELD REPORT

A. Site Description

164. On 20 October 1993, a five-member PHR team, led by Clyde C. Snow, Ph.D., arrived at site C. Four days later, on 24 October, they were joined by a second PHR forensic team that had been deployed to UNPA Sector East. For several months prior to the team's arrival, site C had been secured and guarded by a Jordanian contingent of UNPROFOR.

165. Site C is located south of the village of Pakračka Poljana. The site is on the south side of the creek named Pakra, directly east of the road leaving town to the south. The area can be accessed by a dirt-field road running east from the paved road. During the excavations, a United Nations checkpoint was positioned on the west side of the road, about 65 metres north of the dirt road.

166. The site area lies about 116 metres above mean sea level (data from a Global Positioning System [GPS] reading of 381 feet). It lies at a latitude of 45 27 72 N and a longitude of 016 59 14 E (this is the position of Datum 2, taken from a GPS reading using the WGS-84 datum). The site area is a very
flat alluvial flood plain, contributing to the Pakra and Bjela drainages. To the south, the houses of Janja Lipa can be seen across the floodplain.

167. Pakračka Poljana is a village surrounded by farmland and pasture. The area north of the dirt field road appears to be used solely for pasture. The area from the field road south to the canal appears predominately used for crops, although cows were also grazing in this area during the investigation. Along the road and the creek bank is a more weedy and woody vegetation, containing tall grasses, bushes, and trees.

168. The PHR team found 23 disturbed areas south of the field road on which the site was entered. These disturbed areas, later designated Feature C1 through Feature C23, matched the trenches described in the CIVPOL reports. During the course of the investigation, the PHR and Dutch and Canadian teams ran test trenches across all of the disturbed areas and found no evidence of human remains. According to a local resident, the trenches had been used as bunkers, during fighting in the area in 1991 and were later covered with earth.

169. However, the forensic team did find nine separate graves at site C, containing a total of 19 bodies. Eight of the graves were along the dirt field road at the north end of the site. The exception, C10, was approximately 386 metres to the south from the field road. South of this grave was a gap in the trees that appeared to be an unused field road. C10 was about 25 metres east of the paved road, separated by a tree-filled depression. The grave was east of the depression, dug into the berm that bordered it. Of the eight graves along the main dirt field road, seven bordered Pakra Creek. The eighth (C1A) was to the south-east of the junction of the paved road and the dirt road, directly adjacent to the trees bordering the ditch along the road. These nine burials corresponded with the graves described in the CIVPOL reports.

170. A soil column, taken from the west wall of the excavation unit around CS1, was sent to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Soils Laboratory for analysis. The soil is a silt loam to silt clay loam. It is relatively acid near the surface (pH=5.31 at 10 centimetres) and becomes more basic with depth (pH=7.18 at 80 centimetres). The water table was encountered at about one metre below surface in the area of Feature C1 and C2. The combination of changes in the soil pH and moisture with depth may be reflected in differences in the decomposition of the bodies discussed in this report.

B. Methods

1. Electronic mapping procedures

171. The site, associated artifact finds, natural and cultural features, excavation units, grave pits, and human remains were recorded utilizing standard, professionally-recognized archaeological mapping procedures. The mapping procedure was enhanced by the use of an electronic data recorder, which allowed a greater degree of precision in individual measures and data logging. The instrument was a Lietz SET5A total station theodolite with an SDR33 electronic data recorder. Each theodolite shot was recorded on the data recorder and given a previously established identification code. The specific artifact number was provided by the SDR33 used in auto-generate point mode. The electronic data recorder is equivalent to a surveyor's fieldbook.

172. A primary datum was established near Features C1 and C1A. This datum (Datum 1) was given the arbitrary coordinates of N2000/E2000 and an elevation of 100. Datum 2 was established 35 metres south of Datum 1 and was used as an
orientation and backsite datum for all readings taken from this location. Six subordinate datums numbered 3 through 8, were estimated on other site areas to provide clear and unobstructed readings with the theodolite and to minimize distances between the operator and the rodman.

173. The electronic mapping equipment captured raw data, including horizontal angle, vertical angle, slope distance, and elevation, for each reading taken. Each reading was automatically converted to coordinate position by the SDR33 data collector. Data collected to generate the electronic map included, but was not limited to, locations of: excavation unit boundaries, grave pit outlines, body outlines, physical evidence found with the bodies, physical evidence outside the excavation limits (bullets and cartridges found by metal detecting), and relevant cultural and natural features.

174. Each artifact found in situ was piece-plotted as follows. The instrument was set up on one of the datum points. Distance, azimuth, and coordinate point readings for each location were recorded electronically. Distance was read to the nearest one millimetre and the north and east coordinates were calculated using the tolerance. Grave pit outlines, individual body outlines, and other relevant cultural and natural features were recorded in the same manner.

175. At the conclusion of each day's field investigations, the data collector was downloaded to a Dell 325N laptop computer containing the software MAP. The resultant computer file was then transferred to the software AUTOCAD for storage and final site map production.

2. Photographic recording procedures

176. Photography was conducted at site C using both still and video cameras. Log books were used to record film numbers and to describe the activity being recorded on film. The information recorded on the forms for each roll included the name of the photographer, the location, site, film type, the assigned roll number, ASA of the film, and the number of exposures available. Information about each exposure taken included the date, the exposure number, the compass direction of the lens and a brief description of the image being photographed. The log books and film were released to the Canadian military police at the site immediately after each roll of film or video tape was taken from the camera and labelled by the photographer.

177. The main purpose of the video documentation was to record the forensic methods and procedures used in the medicolegal investigation of individual and mass graves. At various points during the investigations, experts in charge of specific areas of the work explained in front of the camera the procedures and objectives of each step. The investigators described the archaeological procedure in use, how evidence was being mapped and collected, and what chain of custody measures had been taken.

178. The Canadian military police began still photography at site "C" prior to the arrival of the PHR photographer on 24 October, when he then took over the responsibility for still photography. At that time, two excavations, C1A and C1O, were in progress. Photography during grave exhumation was oriented to five general subjects: (1) the gravesites and their immediate surroundings; (2) the procedures and progress of excavation of soil from above, and around, the bodies; (3) artifacts found during the excavation process, photographed in situ; (4) the completed excavation prior; and (5) process and progress of the removal of the bodies from the grave to body bags.
179. All photographs included a label identifying the grave designation, the date, and the photographer. In each photograph, plastic measurement scales, in metric units, were positioned as a reference. A physical marker orienting the cardinal direction of north was also placed in each image photographed.

3. Surface inventory and metal detecting

180. The surface inventory operations were designed primarily to locate cartridge cases and other physical evidence associated with the deposition of the bodies. This effort was enhanced by the use of an electronic metal detector, a Fisher Model 1235-X with a 30 centimetre diameter coil. A Dutch metal detector used for de-mining was also utilized in conjunction with the Fisher 1235-X. The surface was visually examined concurrently with the metal detector sweeps.

181. During the investigation, the detector operator walked transects across the area being investigated, swinging the detector back and forth over the ground surface. When material was located, either visually or through the detector, a pin flag was placed at the target site. Around the grave sites C1A and C10, a circular area 10 metres in diameter was investigated. In the CS area, the investigations were conducted as east and west linear transects from the treeline, along the stream, and south to the tree line bordering the farm access road.

182. Items determined to be evidence or of questionable association were recorded using the electronic mapping procedures. Each item deemed evidence was collected and bagged by the Canadian military police. Each plastic bag contained one item, which was labelled with the number generated by the SDR33 and sealed by the military police. The physical evidence was retained in their custody at all times.

4. Locating remains by probing

183. Dutch and PHR investigators used wooden-handled, metal probes, .6 centimetres in diameter and approximately one metre long, to probe areas of interest for human remains. Investigators inserted the probes into the ground of suspect areas in an effort to encounter subsurface resistances that could indicate the presence of human remains. Upon withdrawal, the tip of the probe was sniffed to detect malodour that would indicate the presence of decomposing flesh. Positive findings were flagged as potential graves.

5. Excavation of remains

184. Standard archaeological methods and procedures were used to excavate the graves. Once a potential grave was located by probing, the surface was passed over with metal detectors and surface discoveries mapped and collected. A three metres by 20 metres swath of sod, approximately 10 centimetres deep, was removed from the surface areas over sites CS2-7. The sod was cleared to define the extent of disturbed soil that indicated the grave outline. For excavation purposes, the clearing was extended to include a generous area surrounding the actual grave outline. The disturbed area surrounding the remains was totally excavated and bodies numbered, as encountered. Using small hand tools, the forensic investigators further exposed the remains. A pedestal of earth was left in place to support the body. A supportive matrix of earth was left about the head and neck area to ensure intact removal in a single unit. All surface artifacts not directly on the body were electronically mapped, catalogued, and collected.
6. Removal of remains

185. Once the remains were exposed, mapped, and photographed, they were freed from their supporting pedestals and placed on a metal sheet. The metal sheet was then lifted to ground level, where the remains were slid into body bags.

186. Exceptions to this procedure occurred when skeletonized, disarticulated elements of hands and wrists were present. These were removed separately and bagged to be included with the body. A preliminary inventory of observable clothing was undertaken during the excavation and removal process. However, detailed description of trauma, clothing, and artifacts directly associated with the body were deferred until the time of the post-mortem examination of the remains.

187. It should be noted that in the few cases where identification documents were found on or near a body, they were removed, photographed, and preserved. Pending confirmation of a positive identification based on a complete autopsy, names will remain confidential. After removing the bodies, a metal detector was passed over the grave floor to detect possible metal artifacts, and the soil was probed and screened to detect possible further bodies.

C. Findings

1. Features other than graves investigated

188. As mentioned earlier, the CIVPOL reports identified a number of large trenches along the edge of the field, near the paved road. A series of possible features were identified and investigated. While the PHR team completed excavations at Features C1 and C2, members of the Canadian and Dutch teams examined the site area for the remainder of the disturbed areas described by the CIVPOL monitors. They numbered the areas investigated sequentially, Feature C1 to Feature C23, and then used a backhoe to probe all of them. The Canadian and Dutch teams also probed the creek bank and other areas, including the soccer field north of the UNPROFOR Jordanian checkpoint, to ascertain if human remains were present. These probes were all negative.

189. No human remains were uncovered in Features C1 through C23. Moreover, there was no evidence of any activity related to the mass execution or mass burial of human remains in any of the features. Archaeological test probes on C1 and C2, as well as the extensive backhoe trenching on C3 through C23, found no evidence of any activity related to the mass execution or mass burial of human remains. The temporal relationship of these features to the graves is unknown, but it is likely that they represent a totally different event. Local residents have said that these features were bunkers used during fighting in the area in 1991.

2. Excavation of graves at site C

190. On 22 October, human remains were located in Feature C10, at which time it became known as Grave C10. On 23 October, human remains were found west of Feature C1. This site was then designated Grave C1A. While the excavations were ongoing at Graves C1A and C10, probing for further human remains was completed along the stream bank to the north of the field road. Human remains were located along the stream in a series of seven separate graves. The graves were numbered sequentially as they were uncovered, starting with one. To avoid confusion with the other sequence of numbers, these were given a "CS" designation. The "C", as before, was a reference to site C, and the "S" referred to the location by the stream bank. The bodies, and their relative
depths, are summarized in Table 2.

(a) Grave C1A

191. The grave was located, on 23 October, adjacent to the tree line bordering the road, and west of Feature C1. Slight undulations in the ground surface here had led to the use of a probe. The probe located probable bone and a quick hole with a trowel uncovered two ribs and a human vertebra. The remains were removed from the grave on 27 October.

192. The grave contained the remains of one mostly skeletonized corpse. During removal of the corpse, it was found that tissue remained near the spinal column and chest cavity on the underside of the body. Some tissue and hair also remained underneath the cranium.

193. The skeleton lay on its left side, in a semi-flexed position. The feet were pointed toward the north, the shoulders toward the south. The head was positioned as if looking toward the feet. Some hair was found along the mandible, suggesting the individual may have had a beard. The left arm was positioned with the humerus over the skull, and flexed at the elbow, with the hand under the body. Of the right arm, only the elbow was visible during excavation, with the remainder of the arm underneath the body. During removal, it was found that both hands were together, although there was no evidence that they were tied.

194. Artifacts found with the remains included a wire nail, a tack, a buckle, a nut husk, and a bullet. All were electronically mapped and catalogued as evidence. The wire nail, buckle, and nut husk were found in the pit fill, above the body. These were on the east side of the body, near the right femur. The tack was also in this general area, but at a slightly lower depth. The bullet was located several centimetres below the skull and was only found through the use of the metal detector after excavation.

195. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until the time of post-mortem examination.

(b) Grave C10

196. The grave was located on 23 October and the bodies removed on 27 October. The grave was situated on the western end of site C, in an area dominated by trees and thickets. There is a path 30 metres to the west of C10. A small trench was clearly discernable at the locale prior to exhumation. The grave contained two bodies, C10-A and C10-B, lettered sequentially in order of discovery. The remains appear to have been buried at the same time, C10-B first, followed by C10-A. The grave was elliptical and approximately two metres long, one metre wide, and its maximum depth is 73 centimetres from the present ground surface.

197. The grave soil was yellow and relatively homogeneous, though degrading a bit in coloration. Roots were the only organic material present. There was organic material, different in colour, composition, structure, and consistency, in the above-mentioned soil in the bottom of the grave. It was dark grey, dry, and hard. The grave fill was examined for inclusions, and the soil in contact with the bodies was screened with negative results.

198. The body designated C10-A was on its left side, with its right leg flexed. Its left leg crossed over both legs of C10-B. The head pointed toward the west, with the face looking in the same direction. The right arm
was extended to one side and the left arm was flexed with its hand covering the face. The body of C10-A was in an advanced stage of decomposition. The body identified as C10-A was in direct contact with body C10-B. The leaves in the grave suggest that it was dug in the autumn or early winter.

199. During the investigation, the following artifacts were found to be associated with the bodies:

(a) A rusted screw found at a depth of 53 centimetres, 95 centimetres from the western wall and 40 centimetres from the southern wall;

(b) Several tree leaves, found 54 centimetres deep, 80 centimetres from the western wall and 200 centimetres from the southern wall;

(c) A rusted nail, found deep, 87 centimetres from the western wall and 200 centimetres from the southern wall; and

(d) A cigarette filter, found 52 centimetres deep, 47 centimetres from the western wall and 100 centimetres from the southern wall.

Soil samples were taken from one boot and a control sample from near the boot. Hair and scalp samples were also collected.

200. C10-B was lying face down, with the right leg slightly flexed. The arms were flexed toward the head. C10-B was directly adjacent to C10-A, suggesting burial at the same time. Soil samples were collected from one boot and a control soil sample from near the boot. C10-B was in an advanced state of decomposition.

201. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until time of autopsy examination.

(c) Grave CS1

202. The grave was located on 26 October, and the bodies were removed on 27 October. CS1 was located on the east side of a small stream, within the bend of a large loop made by the stream. It contained two bodies designated CS1-A and CS1-B.

203. Body CS1-A was lying on top of body CS1-B. Both were lying in supine positions with the head to the south and the feet to the north. CS1-A was slightly to the north of CS1-B, so that the feet of CS1-A were roughly above the knees of CS1-B. Conversely, the head of CS1-B was below the upper torso of CS1-A. Both bodies had adipocere present, and the clothing appeared well-preserved.

204. A jacket was located north of the feet of both bodies and at the level of CS1-A. Roots growing through the jacket had maximum diameters of .6 to .8 centimetres. Inside the bottom left pocket of the jacket were what appeared to be two nut husks, similar to the husk in Grave 1A. A cigarette filter and a seed were also found in the pocket. A whiteware ceramic shard was found below the body. It appears to be intrusive, and was probably a fortuitous inclusion in the grave fill. The entire area along the stream bank had been utilized as a trash disposal site for an undetermined period.

205. CS1-B was directly under CS1-A and a little to the north. The individual was buried in a supine position with the same orientation as CS1-A. The hands were together on the front of the body. There was a gold band on the fourth finger of the left hand. The head was turned to the right, or
east. CS1-B was wearing smooth-soled sneakers. The cloth had rotted and the eyelets were removed separately during excavation. Facial hair included a goatee and moustache.

206. To the south of CS1-B, at the bottom of the pit, was a large piece of charred wood. This was present in the pit before it was filled in and lay beneath the jacket. Leaves were also found in the bottom of the pit and appeared similar to the leaves from the trees adjacent to the pit by the stream bank.

207. When CS1-B was removed, a large root was found underneath. This, as well as the soil characteristics, suggested that the pit ended directly under CS1-B.

208. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until time of autopsy examination.

(d) Grave CS2

209. Excavation commenced on 27 October and concluded on 2 November with removal of the bodies. The grave contained two bodies, CS2-A and CS2-B, lettered in order of their discovery in the grave. Backhoe activity had uncovered part of the remains. A balk of soil, 15 centimetres thick, separated the two bodies.

210. The shape of the grave pit was clearly discernable. The measurements of the semi-elliptical grave were 227 centimetres east to west, 103 centimetres at the maximum width, and a minimum width of 94 centimetres. The grave measured 93 centimetres deep from its opening. The soil of the grave walls was yellow and relatively homogeneous, degrading in coloration and with a few roots. The floor of the grave was similar to that described for grave C10.

211. CS2-A was in a semi-seated position on its back with its left leg flexed and the foot underneath the right knee. The right leg was extended with the foot (clad in a boot) pointed to the south. The hands were together and resting on the pelvis. No evidence of binding was evident. The body sat facing south, with the face looking downward and to the south-east. The back was almost perpendicular to the legs. The body rested on a green blanket, which covered part of the left leg. It appears that the body was placed in the grave, perhaps by using the blanket as a carrying device. It also appears the grave was not large enough to lay the body down, so it was placed in a semi-sitting posture and oriented perpendicular to CS2-B.

212. CS2-A showed moderately advanced skeletalization. Post-mortem fractures caused by the backhoe were observed on the skull. The facial area was almost completely missing and it appeared, from fracture lines present, that perimortem trauma destroyed the face and jaw. The body was almost totally covered by clothing, so no other observations are possible.

213. Body CS2-B was west of body CS2-A. The body was found prone in a semi-flexed position. The hands were together, underneath the body, with arms flexed so that the hands were close to the face. No evidence of binding of the hands was evident. The body lay with the head to the west and facing south. CS2-B showed extensive adipocere, and with the exception of the skull, no exposed bones could be seen. Adjacent to the main excavation trench, and in an area previously undisturbed, several cartridge cases were discovered.

214. Clothing and trauma will be further described at the time of autopsy examination.
(e) Grave CS3

215. Excavation commenced on 27 October and concluded 2 November with removal of the bodies. The grave's dimensions were 2.03 metres long and 50 centimetres wide. The soil of the grave pit bottom was composed of a relatively homogeneous material. Some roots were also present. The soil of the walls was a bit darker and less homogeneous.

216. The grave contained two bodies, CS3-A and CS3-B. CS3-A was lying on top of CS3-B with no soil intervening.

217. CS3-A was found in a prone position, with both arms stretched out above the head and the hands together. The body was oriented east-west with the head to the west. The left leg was stretched over the right. The head was face down, and the left side of the face was resting on the left side of CS3-B. The hands covered the head of CS3-B.

218. CS3-B was in a prone position, with the head toward the west and face down. The right arm was flexed toward the head. The left arm was extended overhead. CS3-B was almost entirely covered by CS3-A.

219. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until time of autopsy examination.

(f) Grave CS4

220. The grave is located along the south side of the stream bank to the west of the loop containing CS1. Excavation on CS4 began on 28 October, and the bodies were removed on 3 November 1993. Backhoe activity uncovered the cranial, resulting in some damage. The grave pit was irregular in shape, and its maximum dimensions were 1.8 metres by 1.7 metres.

221. The grave contained four bodies (CS4-A, CS4-B, CS4-C, CS4-D), which were intermingled. The order of deposition was not evident until the bodies were removed.

222. CS4-A was the first body laid in the grave pit. The legs were pinned under both CS4-C and CS4-D. The left shoulder was pinned under CS4-B. This individual was sitting in a V-shaped position. The hips were lower than the head and the feet higher than the hips. The legs were spread apart and pointing to the east. The arms were tied behind by a length of rope around the wrists.

223. A piece of printed cloth was found under the skull and may have been the remains of a scarf. The individual appeared to have shoulder-length or longer hair and was wearing ankle-high shoes and support knee-high stockings. A skirt went at least to mid-thigh but was probably longer.

224. CS4-B was the second individual placed in the grave pit. The legs were pinned under CS4-D. CS4-B was in a supine position, with the head pointed towards the south and the feet to the north. The legs were slightly canted to the individual's left (west) with the feet higher than the head. The legs were more or less parallel. The hands were tied behind the back with a length of rope, to be further described by the pathologist. Both feet were clad in shoes.

225. CS4-D was the third individual placed in the grave. The head was on top of CS4-A. The body was supine, extended with the cranium to the west, face looking up. The upper body was slightly flexed to its right (north). The
legs were together, with the feet pointing to the east. The hands were tied together beneath the body, right hand to the outside. The individual's trousers were pulled down to the ankles and the feet were bound in the trousers. Under the trousers, the individual was wearing long underwear, which was still in place on the legs. The belt was still in the trousers and was buckled directly above his ankles. The skull had been hit with the backhoe during removal.

226. CS4-C was the last body laid in the grave. The individual was on the easternmost side of the pit; head to the south and feet to the north. The head was bent down, facing the feet. The body was canted toward the side, left side down and right side up. The right leg was straight and the left flexed, meeting at the ankles. Both hands were tied together behind the back.

227. Following removal of the remains from grave CS4, metal detection indicated a shoe north of body CS4-A. In this area was another piece of patterned cloth that may have been part of a scarf. Under this was a cap with a small bill. Under the cap was a wallet.

228. Further use of the metal detector located a rivet under the hip of CS4-C, near the south edge of the grave. The rivet was attached to several seams, but the clothing was decayed. The rivet was decorated with three, five-pointed stars along one portion of the edge and an ivy branch along the remaining portion of the edge.

229. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until time of autopsy examination.

(g) Grave CS5

230. Excavation commenced on 29 October and concluded on 3 November with removal of the bodies. Probing identified a probable burial site. Two bodies were found side by side, CS5-A and CS5-B. Both bodies were oriented east to west. The grave pit was not clearly discernable until the excavations reached the remains. There, it appeared as an elliptical grave pit, two metres long and 60 centimetres wide, oriented east to west, had been dug. The pit was too short to bury the bodies in extended positions, and both bodies were flexed.

231. Above the bodies and near the north wall of the excavation unit an empty wallet (FS3780) was recovered.

232. CS5-A was found on the left side, in a semi-flexed position. The head was to the east and faced north. The arms were in front of the body, with the hand in front of the stomach, left hand crossed over the right. The legs were flexed at the knees and crossed left over right. The feet, clad in boots, were pointed north and spread apart.

233. CS5-B was lying on its right side, in the foetal position, with the head to the west and looking north. The left hand rested on the right just below the head. The right upper arm was raised slightly above the body, with the lower arm angled down at the elbow to join with the left hand. The legs were flexed at acute angles with the knees to the north. The feet were crossed at the ankles. The head and arms were touching CS5-B's head.

234. In both cases, the hands were found together in an awkward position, but no binding was apparent.

235. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until the time of post-mortem examination.
(h) Grave CS6

236. Excavation began on 29 October and ended on 3 November with removal of the bodies. The site was located using the probe. There was no surface evidence of remains in this location. In fact, the outline of CS6 (2.8 metres long and 80 centimetres wide) was not clearly discernable until the bodies had been nearly uncovered. The grave contained two bodies, CS6-A and CS6-B. This grave pit is the only pit besides CS1 that was longer than necessary for burial of the human remains. A briefcase and several other items were found in the extension at the east end.

237. The shape of the original grave was determined by examining the break in the soil where the grave had been dug. An elliptical shape was seen in the soil. The grave bottom was 55 centimetres from the surface. CS6-B was buried first and immediately covered with dirt. A layer of dirt 10 centimetres deep separated the two bodies.

238. CS6-A was prone with the legs extended and with both arms bent, so that the hands were immediately above the head. The body was oriented with the head to the east. The head was shrouded by cloth that appeared to be a shirt and jacket pulled up over the head. CS6-A was in an advanced state of decomposition. The head and portions of the trunk were partially skeletalized.

239. CS6-B lay in a supine position, with the head leaning to the east and the face looking upward. The right arm was on the chest and the left arm lay by the side. The body was at a slight angle to CS6-A. The head was oriented to the north-east and lay under the mid-section of CS6-A. The feet, clad in boots, were to the south-west and the toes were pointed outward in opposite directions. The hands were tied together.

240. After the bodies were removed, a metal detector indicated a cartridge (FS 1501) under body CS6-B, near the pelvis.

241. A detailed itemization of clothing and trauma is deferred until time of a postmortem examination.

(i) Grave CS7

242. Excavation began on 30 October and ended on 3 November with removal of the bodies. The grave, located underneath a recent trash pile, was discovered through probing. Much of the trash was fresh and was in the early stages of decay. Older trash was scattered along the creek bank and down the bank into the water. Grave CS7 contained two bodies, CS7-A and CS7-B, lying one on top of the other, oriented north to south.

243. CS7-A was in a supine position, with the head to the north and facing up. The left arm was flexed at the elbow and laid on the chest. The right arm was extended down the right side of the body. Both legs were extended.

244. CS7-B was in a supine position, with the head to the north and face up. The left arm was flexed at the elbow over the mouth, and the right arm was flexed over the right thorax. The right hand was underneath CS7-A.

3. Surface artifacts

245. Using the metal detector, team members found and retrieved 41 cartridge cases (Field Specimen numbers 3027-3048, 3049-3051, 3052, 3057-3071) in the
area adjacent to graves CS2 through CS7. Two unexpended rounds were also recovered (FS 3026 and 1503). The calibres represented are .22 calibre rimfire, .25 calibre pistol (including one unfired round), 9 by 18 millimetre pistol, 7.62 by 39 millimetre, one unidentified rimmed unfired round, and one unidentified rimless case dated 1940. The latter cartridge case may be unassociated with the graves, as it was deeper than the other cases, which were usually less than three centimetres deep. Also, it was more oxidized than the other cases.

246. The cartridge cases recovered appeared to fall into two clusters. The larger and more concentrated occurs between CS6 and CS7. Pistol- and shoulder-fired weapons cases were located in this area. The cases and unexpended rounds were found about two metres south of the field road and continued to the edge of the backhoe cut. The soil removal in the cut was done prior to metal detecting, and some patterned data may have been lost. The other cluster is much smaller in size. It consists of three cases, all .22 calibre, found in the road and south of CS4. Other cases were found scattered between the concentrations. All cases were found in, or north of, the field road.

247. Apart from the ammunition components, the metal detector located a wedding band (FS3024) and two coins (FS3023 and 3025) in the same area. One coin disappeared prior to recording. These items may be intrusive trash and unrelated to the graves. However, their locations were associated with the cartridge case concentration, so it was deemed appropriate to collect the specimens. The entire CS area was littered with recent trash. Bits of foil, nails, machine bolts and other debris were evident on the ground surface, as well as located by metal detector. These items were not recorded and were discarded after consultation with the Canadian military police.

248. In addition to the metal detecting around the grave sites, a metal detector search was initiated on the north side of the creek in an attempt to locate bullets that might be associated with the expended cartridge cases found near the graves. The ground was detected for five metres to the north, along the bank opposite the graves, and at selected locations up to 20 metres north of the creek. Trees that lined the creek bank were also swept for metal debris; no bullets were found. A tin of shoe polish and a pair of recently discarded trousers were located. The only evidence of gunfire was a single rotted tree branch. This branch, located due north of CS2 and on the creek's north bank, had a small hole through it that is consistent with a bullet hole. No metallic debris was detected, however.

4. Additional investigations

249. Approximately 200 metres east of CS1, a roughly rectangular hole was located along the south side of the field road and at the tree line. The hole was about 1.4 metres long, east to west, 90 centimetres wide, north to south, and about 90 centimetres deep. The bottom of the hold contained a variety of trash, including a dark green glass bottle. The trash, which appeared to be recent, could not be dated due to the lack of clearly diagnostic temporal features. The hole was probed, but no evidence of human remains were noted. It is unclear if the hole is associated with the graves at site C.

250. On 6 and 7 November, the PHR team undertook a limited investigation of the nearby soccer clubhouse or changing rooms and adjacent field. At the time of the investigation, the building was not in use. The clubhouse had allegedly served as a detention centre at about the time the nearby clandestine graves were dug and the bodies buried. One detainee is reported to have observed a hole being dug to the west of the clubhouse near the soccer
field. This location was identified and briefly investigated.

251. The clubhouse is a brick and mortar structure. The team mapped the building in the same manner as site C. It was noted that door handles were missing from some of the interior doors. Both general and detailed photographs were taken of the interior of the structure. Some time in 1993, the clubhouse had been used by UNPROFOR Canadian troops as a checkpoint. For this purpose, the building had been cleaned and the interior repainted.

252. The depression near the soccer field is approximately 15 metres north-west of the clubhouse. It is a roughly circular depression, about one metre in diameter and about 90 centimetres deep. The fill was removed with a shovel, and at a depth of about 40 centimetres, a concentration of trash was encountered.

253. The trash consisted of used foil jam packets, a yellow plastic detergent bottle, two aluminium beer cans with a "use before August 92" date on the bottom, and clothing. The clothes included underwear (briefs), women's stretch pants, and portions of a man's JNA uniform blouse or coat. Most thread holding the garment together had rotted, leaving only individual pieces. Several small JNA uniform buttons were noted on several pieces. The clothing and beer cans, as well as the depression, were photographed.

254. The depression contained trash, but the specific date of deposition could not be determined. The beer cans indicate that the deposit was created within the last two or three years. There is no definitive evidence to associate the contents with the use of the building as a detention locale, nor is there anything in the pit that indicates the deposition came later. No human remains were found in the depression.

IV. PRELIMINARY POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION OF REMAINS

255. By 4 November, the last of the 19 bodies had been removed from the graves and transported by stretcher to a field morgue within 100 metres of the gravesites. The Dutch government had provided the temporary facility, which consisted of a series of interlinking tents. Equipment for the field morgue was provided by PHR and the Dutch and U.S. governments. On account of the limited facilities, it was decided to conduct a preliminary post-mortem examination of the bodies and re-inter them on-site, until a complete autopsy could be performed in a proper facility.

256. From 3 to 6 November, Dr. Robert H. Kirschner, a forensic pathologist and a member of PHR's board of directors, supervised the preliminary post-mortem examination of the 19 bodies. Dr. Kirschner was assisted by members of the PHR team and personnel from the Dutch graves registration team (UNPROFOR). Chain-of-custody of evidence was maintained with the Canadian military police. For the duration of the post-mortem examination, UNPROFOR Jordanian troops guarded the field morgue on a 24-hour basis.

257. During the preliminary post-mortem examinations of the bodies, the team photographer kept log books, in the same manner described in Section III of this report. The photographer oriented his photographs to four general subjects: (1) the overall body on the examination table prior to physical examination; (2) the overall body after removal of clothing; (3) individual garments, personal adornments, and objects taken from clothing; and (4) features or in situ details of the body that reflect ante-mortem injury or physical restraints. All post-mortem examination photographs included a label identifying the assigned grave and body designation. In some cases, photograph labels included the date and the name of the photographer.
Plastic, metric scales were placed in each image photographed.

258. Pending a confirmation of a positive identification based on complete autopsy, names found on identification documents will remain confidential.

V. FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

259. Based on the preliminary medicolegal investigation, the PHR forensic team concludes:

(a) Nineteen individuals (16 males, three females) were buried in nine separate graves in a field south of Pakračka Poljana. The graves were shallow and appeared to have been dug by hand. Leaves found in the bottom of some graves and the clothing on several individuals, including heavy jackets and sweaters, suggests that burials took place in the autumn or early winter;

(b) The area around the graves was used as an execution site. Expended .22 calibre, .25 calibre, 9 millimetre calibre and 7.62 by 39 millimetre calibre cartridge cases were found adjacent to six of the graves. Expended rounds were also found near some of the bodies or recovered from clothing. Five of the bodies had their hands tied with rope, all in graves CS4 and CS6-B. Other bodies had their hands together, sometimes in extremely awkward positions, but no rope was found during the excavations. It is possible that the hands had been bound but that the binding was made of a natural fibre that disintegrated. Fifteen of the bodies exhibited gunshot wounds to the head; two had blunt head trauma; one had multiple gunshot wounds to the arm and leg; and one had massive head trauma;

(c) The nine graves are clandestine burials. The isolated location of the graves suggests that the executioners intended to bury their victims secretly. The graves were within a short distance of a road that could be accessed by a truck or other vehicle. The graves were also adjacent to large, woody vegetation that screened the area from at least one direction; and

(d) There was no indication that the graves had been disturbed since the time of interment.

260. The PHR forensic team is prepared to begin the second phase of the medicolegal investigation of the remains recovered near Pakračka Poljana. This phase will require removing the bodies from the burial trench, where they were re-interred after exhumation and a preliminary post-mortem examination in a field morgue, and transporting them to an appropriate morgue facility for autopsy. The forensic team intended to return to the site in April 1994 to continue the investigation.

261. To complete the investigation, the forensic team will require the following support:

(a) Ante-mortem information: PHR is confident that most, if not all, of the bodies recovered near Pakračka Poljana can be positively identified. However, this will require the collection of ante-mortem records of persons believed to have disappeared in the area of UNPA Sector West from 1991 to 1992. Members of the forensic team will also need to interview family members of the disappeared. PHR is prepared to work with the United Nations and all other interested parties to obtain ante-mortem information;

(b) Transportation of the bodies: To maintain security and chain-of-custody of the bodies and other evidence, UNPROFOR should be in charge of transporting them from the trench burial to a morgue facility in the former
Yugoslavia or another country;

(c) Medicolegal examination - autopsy: The medicolegal examination of the bodies and artifacts will be conducted by a PHR team of forensic specialists in pathology, radiology, physical anthropology, and odontology. The team will need a facility that has hot and cold running water, adequate space and lighting, ventilation, heating, X-ray capabilities, basic autopsy tables and refrigeration units for storage of the bodies; and

(d) Other investigations: Witness statements suggest that a link may exist between the graves and a soccer clubhouse, located a short distance from the site. The clubhouse is located next to the soccer field in Pakračka Poljana. It is alleged to have been used as a secret detention centre by the Croatian military and police from August 1991 to March 1992. This period corresponds with the likely time of burial of most, if not all, of the 19 bodies. Moreover, survivors of this centre allege that male and female detainees were executed at, or near, the centre. An appropriate UN agency should conduct an in-depth investigation of the activities at the Pakračka Poljana soccer clubhouse from 1991 to 1992. To the extent possible, UN investigators should interview local residents and former detainees, who should be asked to provide the names and gender of fellow detainees, their approximate ages, dates of detention, and other relevant information. Such information may help to identify the 19 bodies and to determine who was responsible for these murders.

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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263. Members of the forensic team were:

(a) Eric Stover, executive director of Physicians for Human Rights, Boston, Massachusetts, USA;

(b) Clyde Collins Snow, Ph.D., forensic anthropologist and senior forensic consultant to Physicians for Human Rights, Norman, Oklahoma, USA;

(c) Robert H. Kirschner, M.D., forensic pathologist, board member of Physicians for Human Rights, and Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, Cook County, Illinois, USA;

(d) Ivan Caceres-Roque, forensic archaeologist with the Chilean Forensic Anthropology Team, Santiago, Chile;

(e) Isabel M. Reveco, forensic anthropologist with the Chilean Forensic Anthropology Team, Santiago, Chile;

(f) Mercedes Doretti, forensic archaeologist with the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, Buenos Aires, Argentina;

(e) Burney McClurkan, archaeologist and historian with the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA;

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(k) Francis A. Calabrese, Ph.D., archaeologist with the Midwest Archaeology Centre, National Park Service, Lincoln, Nebraska, USA;

(l) Luis Fondebrider, forensic archaeologist with the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, Buenos Aires, Argentina; and

(m) Marko Simunovic, M.D., M.P.H., physician and consultant to Physicians for Human Rights, Toronto, Canada.

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265. PHR gratefully acknowledges the superb logistical, security, and technical support provided by the UNPROFOR contingents of the Dutch and Jordanian armed forces.
Notes

1/ The War Crimes Investigation Team (WCIT) consisted of military personnel from the Canadian Office of the Judge Advocate General, as well as military investigators who were seconded from Canada to the Commission of Experts for this specific mission. Similar teams were also seconded by Canada to the Commission for other missions. Such teams were referred to within the Commission and for the purposes of its reports as the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team.

2/ The Belgrade-based Serbian Council Information Centre has also reported the figure of 1,700 bodies buried at this site. In its report, the Centre refers to the investigations of mass graves conducted by CIVPOL monitors. See Serbian Council Information Centre, Death Camps and Mass Graves in Western Slavonia: Marino Selo and Pakračka Poljana, August 1993, p. 3.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX XI
DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY REPORT

Prepared by:

M. Kéba M'Baye
Member of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 780 (1992)
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Sources of Information

1. In determining the extent of the destruction of cultural property in the former Yugoslavia, the Commission proceeded under its overall plan of work and made use more particularly of its database and on-the-spot inquiries or reports by international organizations, including UNESCO and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

2. The information from the database and the on-the-spot inquiries is itemized in the documents annexed to the Commission's final report (see Annex VI, Study of the Battle and Seige of Sarajevo).

3. With reference to UNESCO and the Council of Europe, the documents include:

   (a) "Report on the state of the cultural heritage in the Old Town of Dubrovnik following the shelling in October, November and December 1991" (Report of the UNESCO mission to Dubrovnik, 27 October to 22 December 1991);

   (b) "Information report on the destruction by war of the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", Doc. 6756 of 25 February 1993, with annexes A, B and C;

   (c) "Second information report on the destruction by war of the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", Doc. 6869 of 17 June 1993;

   (d) "Third information report on the destruction by war of the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", Doc. 6904 of 20 September 1993;

   (e) "Fourth information report on the destruction by war of the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", Doc. 6999 of 19 January 1994;

   (f) "Report on the situation in the former Yugoslavia at the cultural level", doc. 6989 of 14 January 1994;

   (g) "Application of international legal systems of cultural property, protection against destruction of monuments in the war in Croatia" (report prepared by Professor Miroslav Gašparović).

4. Again, to underpin its information about the extent of the destruction of cultural property in the former Yugoslavia, the Commission also heard, for a period of 33 minutes, one of two officials sent to Dubrovnik by UNESCO in November and December 1991, who was there on 6 December (during the shelling of Dubrovnik). The video cassette of this hearing forms part of the information gathered by the Commission and is deposited with the Secretariat. Similarly, at its headquarters in Geneva, the Commission met a delegation of two persons sent by UNESCO's Division of Physical Heritage, consisting of a jurist, Mr. Etienne Clément, and an art expert, Ms. Giselle Hyvert (the summary of the meeting of 15 February 1994, entitled "Cultural Property in the Former Yugoslavia", is attached to this annex). Lastly, it sent three missions to UNESCO headquarters in Paris to collect information from UNESCO departments.

5. In addition to the above sources, many complaints have been received from national authorities, governmental or non-governmental agencies,
international organizations, NGOs and individuals.

B. Applicable law

6. It should be remembered that part of the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia is non-international in character. Admittedly, the essential applicable instruments prohibit the destruction of cultural property in non-international armed conflicts (1954 Hague Convention, art. 19; Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, art. 16), but do not establish any penalties in such an instance.

7. For this reason, in regard to destruction of cultural property the Commission has confined itself to property destroyed after the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Croatia (subject to the comments to be made in connection with the Yugoslav Declaration of 20 November 1954).

8. The applicable law includes:

   (a) The 1899 Convention on the Laws of War, the 1907 Convention on the same subject, and the 1923 Hague Regulations relative to Aerial Warfare (rules that were not ratified), which may be invoked as only part of customary law or general principles;

   (b) The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, of 14 May 1954 (ratified by Yugoslavia on 29 December 1955);

   (c) The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, of 16 November 1972 (ratified by Yugoslavia on 31 October 1974);

   (d) The Yugoslav Declaration in connection with the protection of cultural property in cases of armed conflict, of 20 November 1954 (Official Gazette of the SFRY, Contrats internationaux No. 1/1955), a unilateral commitment but creating a legal obligation on the former Yugoslavia (see Mavrommatis Case, PCIJ, merits, series A/B, No. 14, p. 37, and judgment of 1 October 1946 of the Nürnberg International Military Tribunal in the "Prosecution of Major War Criminals", pp. 11, 15, 23 and 26 of the official French text);

   (e) The 1949 Geneva Conventions;

   (f) The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, particularly Protocol I, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (both the Protocols and the Conventions were ratified by Yugoslavia).

9. All of the applicable law concerns the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the two latter States having declared that they accept it. It therefore applies to the conflicts between those countries.

C. Cases cited as examples

10. The Commission has not deemed it advisable, particularly because not all of its programme could be carried out (its mission ended on 30 April 1994), to cite all the grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and of international humanitarian law, especially as far as cultural property is concerned. It has preferred to take two examples typical of such breaches, to underscore them
and possibly enable the International Criminal Tribunal to use them for other situations. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Tribunal, established under Security Council resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 for war crimes "committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991," is able to take cognizance of offences committed in connection with all cultural property, as provided for in the applicable instruments and, more particularly, in those mentioned above.

11. The two examples chosen by the Commission are:
   (a) The Battle of Dubrovnik; and
   (b) The destruction of the Mostar Bridge.

12. However, all the cases of destruction of cultural property brought to the Commission's notice are, none the less, listed in the database at IHRLI, Chicago.

II. BATTLE OF DUBROVNIK

A. The facts

13. In the autumn of 1991, the region of Dubrovnik was surrounded and besieged by the Yugoslav national army. After a few weeks, Dubrovnik itself was cut off by land and sea by the forces of the former Yugoslavia. This situation continued up to the autumn of 1992, when the District of Dubrovnik was recognized as forming part of the Republic of Croatia.

14. The military occupation of Dubrovnik captured international attention because of the cultural and historical significance of the region and the town. In 1979, the Old Town had been included in UNESCO's list of the world's cultural heritage. Dubrovnik is now known as an old town which has suffered great damage as a result of the Serbian attacks.

15. In May 1993, the Commission sent a team of four people to Dubrovnik to take a closer look at the effects of the battle of Dubrovnik, more particularly the effects on cultural property. The team, consisting of experts in the law on armed conflicts and an art historian, was in Dubrovnik from 19 October to 4 November 1993.

16. Dubrovnik is said to have been founded in the year 667, with the name of Ragusium. Later, the town was given the Croatian name of Dubrovnik, which apparently means "oak grove". The Old Town is not very large and is in the present State of Croatia. Croatia, which was made a province of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, declared itself independent on 26 June 1991, following a referendum held in May 1991.

17. The attacks on Dubrovnik started with the Serbian paramilitary forces, supported by Yugoslavia's regular army, in June and August 1992. On 1 October the Yugoslav Army invaded the District of Dubrovnik and laid siege to the town. It may be affirmed that there was virtually no defence of Dubrovnik and the surrounding area against the Yugoslav forces. This means that the destruction could on no account be justified as a military necessity. There is still less justification for the looting of some monuments, such as the Franciscan Monastery of St. Jerome in Slano or the destruction of the old Arboretum of Tresteno.

18. The siege of Dubrovnik lasted from October to December. The first shelling began on 1 October and continued sporadically until 24 October 1991.
After a short lull, the shelling started again on 30 October and continued into December.

19. The shelling of the Old Town has been described not only by the Institute for the Protection of the Cultural Monuments and Cultural Environment of Dubrovnik, but also by UNESCO observers (paragraph 4 above). The Commission heard one of these observers at length and he gave the Commission written documents, video cassettes and slides. The evidence collected by the experts and the findings from their inquiries, as well as the account of the facts given by the UNESCO expert present at the time of the shelling on 6 December 1991, all concur that 82-milimeter rockets were used. The Commission's list of the monuments hit by the shelling, to give an idea of the extent of the damage, includes the Sponza Palace, the Jesuit Church, the Franciscan Bell Tower, the Clock Tower, and the St. Clair Convent.

20. According to the UNESCO observers, the shelling was certainly from the south-east. Negotiations were subsequently held between the parties (negotiations which produced no effect). Accordingly, although a specific agreement on Dubrovnik was signed on 5 December 1991, intensive shelling of Dubrovnik started the next day and has become known as the "St. Nicholas Day Shelling of 6 December 1991". According to witnesses, it began at precisely 5:48 a.m. To begin with, 82 milimeter rockets were fired at the Old Town. In this connection, there are marks of 48 hits. The firing then continued with 82 milimeter mortar shells, which left 232 hits, and 120 milimeter shells, which left 364 hits. According to the UNESCO observers, the shelling lasted until 11:30 a.m. Larger-calibre shells also seem to have been used, since one hit, in the Cathedral at least, has been found to backup such an assertion.

21. It is apparent from the inquiries conducted by the experts, dispatched by the Commission, that the UNESCO observers' assumption is indeed true, namely that the shelling was from the south-east. In the light of the photographs of the damage to the rooftops and the trajectory of the shells, this conclusion is inevitable. The projectiles came from the direction of Bosanka, Prgit or Uskopje and Žarkovica. Most of them hit the north-western part of the Old Town. Ships also fired from the harbour.

22. The experts' conclusion on the part of the experts is suggested by the fact that there are red traces on the surfaces where the shells exploded. Moreover, the shelling was concentrated on the area affected by the 1979 earthquake. This does not appear to be mere coincidence. In all likelihood, those doing the firing were aiming at this part of the town, where any shell damage would be greater because the ground is unstable.

23. In any event, according to the experts, the shelling was selective and deliberately aimed at the buildings in the Old Town. According to the report by Professor Miroslav Gašparovič, there is no doubt that the destruction of cultural property was intentional. The Commission has also acquired this conviction. However, the people doing the firing hit not only the Old Town, but also the New Town. It is difficult for the Yugoslav army to deny responsibility for this shelling.

24. On 7 December, a delegation of the Yugoslav army visited the Old Town in order to assess the damage. An investigation was conducted by UNCOE in Zagreb with the Belgrade authorities.

25. There are several documents which describe and evaluate the destruction inflicted upon Dubrovnik and in particular the Old Town. The documents are from several sources, including the Institute for the Protection of the Cultural Monuments and Cultural Environment of Dubrovnik, and UNESCO. The Institute possesses a document, in seven volumes entitled "Preliminary report
on the destruction to the Old Town of Dubrovnik" (October-November-December 1991), completed on 6 January 1992. These documents, which are particularly informative, contain maps and photographs together with individual records for each monument and house. UNESCO, for its part, drew up a report on the basis of documents transmitted to the Director-General before and after the shelling on 6, 7 and 8 December 1992. Entitled "Report on the state of the cultural heritage in the town of Dubrovnik following the shelling in October, November and December 1991," it is very helpful in establishing the reality of any charges against the perpetrators of these shellings.

26. UNESCO observers have in their possession hundreds of slides on the damage inflicted in October and December 1991. They also have photographs, remains of mortar shells and rockets.

27. The Institute completed its work with eight volumes concerning the New Town. Worth noting among the documents used by the Commission is the "Information report on the destruction by war of the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina", dated 2 February 1992. This document was submitted to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and, in particular, to the Committee on Culture and Education. It includes a section containing an inventory of the destruction which took place in Dubrovnik. While the purpose of the document was purely informative, it has the advantage of having been compiled not long before the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Konavle in October 1992. A comparison of the overall damage to the Old Town of Dubrovnik reveals that the damage inflicted in October and November 1991 was considerably less than the damage from the shelling on 6 December 1991.

28. Indeed, the shelling on 6 December was far more serious in terms of hits and the force of impact, the fires caused and the overall duration of the shelling. According to the Institute, 55.9 per cent of the buildings were affected, either by fires or by damage to the structures and special elements or to the façades and roofs. The roofs of several palaces were either destroyed or burned, including the Festival Palace, whose archives were completely destroyed, and a the roofs of a number of monuments caved in.

29. Other examples are St. Blaise's Church, the Franciscan Cathedral and Convent, the Dominican Convent, St. Clair's Convent and the Fountain of Onofrio; and, of course, there is the destruction of the roofs of the Old Town. In this respect, the Institute lists 336 direct hits and 254 cases of partial destruction of roofs by shell fragments.

30. From the Institute's assessment, together with that of UNESCO, the total damaged roof areas can be estimated at 56,747 meters. To this visible damage, the experts on the Commission have added damage resulting from vibrations which may appear later, as well as the damage which simply could not be detected at the time the experts were carrying out their work.

B. Characterization of the battle of Dubrovnik

31. There is some question as to the nature of the battle of Dubrovnik. The Commission has taken the view that it was an international armed conflict, and the justification for this position is discussed in paragraph 8 and 9 of this report. The Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague Convention, and the 1945 Regulations of the International Military Tribunal are applicable in this respect, as well as Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

32. Thus, with respect to the Statute of the International Tribunal, the offences in Dubrovnik can be said to concern extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military necessity and seizure, and
destruction of and damage to religious institutions dedicated to charity education, the arts and sciences, as well as historic monuments and artistic and scientific works.

33. The concept of military objective should also be considered in this connection in order to shed light on the crimes committed. Indeed, it appears quite clearly that this destruction of cultural property did not in any way contribute to the military action and could in no way be considered necessary in terms of the military objectives pursued. Nor is there any way that the perpetrators of these crimes can claim to have been utilizing the monuments for military purposes.

34. In the Commission’s view, other concepts in addition to military objectives should be applied: the concept of undefended place or object, of proportionality and of neutrality.

C. Imputability

35. While it is difficult to determine with any precision who was actually responsible for the crimes committed during the Battle of Dubrovnik, it would seem that sufficient charges can be made against some persons. This applies, for example, to an identified person in connection with the destruction of the Old Town and the New Town of Dubrovnik, which was ordered or permitted by him on 6 December 1991.

36. However, in the Commission's view this attribution of responsibility should not overshadow the responsibility of an identified officer whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. Similarly, responsibility must be attributed to supervising and commanding officers whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

37. Moreover, the Commission has more complete information on the command structure of the Yugoslav army on the occasion of the battle of Dubrovnik.

D. Recommendations

38. By way of recommendation, the Commission can only reiterate the viewpoint expressed by the committee of experts it sent to Dubrovnik, according to which:

"With respect to the wanton destruction inflicted upon the Old and New Towns of Dubrovnik, immediate attention should be given to the further development of cases against certain known officers whose names are not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. The cases against all of these JNA officers are close to completion, and they have already been the subject of considerable attention by the Croatian authorities. Of the essential elements of these cases, the identities, the command structure and the damage to both moveable and immovable cultural property, both religious and historic, are close to being provable, and they should be followed up.

"As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, wanton destruction of cultural property was not limited to the Old and New Towns of Dubrovnik. The District of Dubrovnik suffered greatly, and as it was occupied for a considerable period, it experienced plunder as well as wanton destruction. The entire District of Dubrovnik should be the subject of further investigation. Starting points in the Primorje region should be the village of Slano and the old Arboretum of Trsteno which suffered"
both wanton destruction and plunder. It also appears that the village cemetery of Osojnık was subject to desecration. In the Konavle region, the village of Čilipi and the Franciscan Convent of Pridvorje would be good starting points. These matters should also be the subject of early attention by any future UNCOE investigative teams."

III. MOSTAR BRIDGE

A. The facts

39. On 9 November 1993 at 10:16 a.m., Mostar Bridge was destroyed. In this connection, the Institute for the Protection of the Historic and Natural Cultural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina has accused the Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army (see letter dated 10 November 1993 sent to UNESCO).

40. This letter and other documents attached to this report describe the history of the bridge, which was built between 1557 and 1566, according to the plans of the Turkish architect Aerudin. It is a monument which, unfortunately, did not appear in the UNESCO list.

41. However, this bridge was well known to all of the population in the region, whether Serbian, Croatian or Muslim. Moreover, it was a symbol in two respects. First, it was a symbol of Bosnia and Herzegovina: spanning the gap between the Muslim and Croat communities, it embodied the links which united these peoples in spite of their religious differences and the circumstances of the present war. Second, there can be no doubt that it was of greater value to the Muslims. An article in a French newspaper reports claims by some people that the bridge was of greater value to them than their own parents or ancestors.

42. Admittedly, before it was destroyed the bridge had already suffered a certain amount of damage. Indeed, damage had already been done to its northern parapets. But all things considered, the damage had been minor. The initial objective, it would seem, had been to discourage people from using it. Thus, prior to November 1993, the primary target had been the parapet, forcing anyone who might be tempted to cross the bridge to refrain from doing so. However, the shelling on 8 November 1993 clearly aimed to destroy the bridge.

43. This destruction was carried out by tanks belonging, it seems, to the Croatian forces. On 9 November the shelling continued and it was then that the supporting arch of the southern end of the bridge was hit and collapsed. It would seem that this incident was filmed by Folio Productions (a British production company).

B. Characterization of the destruction of Mostar Bridge

44. The same criminal characterization which applies to the Battle of Dubrovnik also applies to the destruction of Mostar Bridge, which was also devoid of any military significance.
C. Imputability

45. It would seem that the Croats were at the origin of the destruction of Mostar Bridge. A Mostar District military tribunal reportedly interrogated three HVO soldiers who allegedly acted, according to a statement by the tribunal, "on their own initiative, without orders from their superiors" (see Communiqué dated 22 September 1993 from the Zagreb Foreign Press Bureau). The Commission considers that the Croatian Army bears some responsibility in this matter.

D. Recommendations

46. The same recommendations made with respect to the battle of Dubrovnik apply here as well.

IV. CONCLUSION

47. The findings of the Commission's investigation reveal that war crimes (serious infringements of the relevant instruments) were committed either by subordinates or by commanders.

48. Indeed, attacks took place that were deliberately directed against cultural property. In addition, movable property of a cultural character was transferred under false pretenses and without justification. Although in many cases imputability has not been established, in other cases it can be proved beyond doubt.
RECORD: CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Meeting of 15 February 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

49. On 15 February 1994, a meeting was held at Geneva with two representatives of the Division of Physical Heritage of UNESCO, within the framework of the destruction of the cultural heritage in the armed conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

50. The working meeting was chaired by Mr. Kéba M'Baye, and the Secretariat was represented by Ms. Molina-Abram, with the assistance of Veronique Ivanovsky, Administrative Secretary.

II. PARTICIPANTS

51. Statements were heard from Mr. Etienne Clément, Jurist in the International Norms Section of the Division of Physical Heritage, headed by Ms. Prott, and from Ms. Giselle Hyvert, Expert Consultant for technical and operational questions relating to the town of Dubrovnik and for collection of information on destruction of cultural property.

52. After recalling briefly the activities and objectives of the Commission of Experts and points of convergence with the activities of UNESCO, Mr. Kéba M'baye invited representatives to give an account of the legal and operational aspects of their mission.

III. JURIDICAL FRAMEWORK

53. Mr. Etienne Clément referred to the basic legal instruments for UNESCO measures vis-à-vis States in a situation of armed conflict:

(a) The Hague Convention of 1954 was ratified by the former Yugoslavia, and subsequently accepted by Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Article 4 of this Convention constitutes the basis for UNESCO's work for the protection of cultural property. Paragraph 1 states: "The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property." These provisions are clearly binding on the two parties. On the other hand, under article 4, paragraph 2, "The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present article may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver."

The scope of this Convention relates both to international conflicts and non-international conflicts.
(b) The 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, which stipulates that no State Party shall take any deliberate measures against the property protected under this Convention, is applicable to the towns of Dubrovnik and Split. Moreover, this Convention (arts. 16-26) establishes the conditions and modalities of international assistance for property forming part of the cultural heritage.

(c) The Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit any acts of hostility directed against the cultural heritage or the use thereof for military purposes.

54. Special reference was made to article 53 of Protocol I and to article 16 of Protocol II.

55. Furthermore, article 85, paragraph 4, of Protocol I, which refers to "making the clearly recognized historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples and to which special protection has been given...the object of attack," was evoked. With regard to Protocol II, article 16 was cited.

56. Mr. Clément emphasized, firstly, that part of the protected property must be special and, secondly, that they must be recognizable. States bear the responsibility for indicating this cultural property by affixing to it the appropriate distinctive blue and white sign.

57. Mr. Clément also emphasized that the 1972 International Convention (arts. 19 and 23) enabled UNESCO to offer its services to States without, however, being able to impose the prerogatives of protection of the heritage according to international norms.

IV. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

58. Ms. Giselle Hyvert presented a synthesis of the findings made in Croatia and the documents received by the Division of Physical Heritage. These examples illustrated the difficulties and the need to develop the legal provisions on the subject.

59. a.) Dubrovnik - The attacks sustained by this town, especially on insignia and flags, indicate intentional systematic destruction. Moreover, two orthodox churches in Dubrovnik were damaged.

60. b.) Vukovar - Considerable cultural property was transferred to Belgrade. More than 35,000 objets d'art were inventoried.

61. c.) Mostar - The bridge was not adequately protected.

62. In Bosnia, UNESCO is constantly receiving appeals regarding the destruction of historic sites. An impressive list on the subject has been published by the Council of Europe. The destruction of the Pocitelj mosque should also be noted.

63. Lastly, Ms. Hyvert referred to the UNESCO General Conference, in the course of which an analogy had been drawn with regard to the conflict between Kuwait and Iraq, in connection with the subject of the looting of cultural property.
FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992)

ANNEX XI.A
THE BATTLE OF DUBROVNIK AND
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Under the Direction of:

William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur on On-Site Investigations,
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to

Prepared by:

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Mandate

1. In the fall of 1991, the region surrounding the town of Dubrovnik on the southern Dalmatian coast was subject to siege and occupation by what was then known as the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA). Within a matter of weeks, the City of Dubrovnik itself was surrounded on both land and sea by besieging forces of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This occupation continued well into the fall of 1992, when the JNA withdrew from the hinterland or District of Dubrovnik in what had come to be recognized as the Republic of Croatia. This military action received wide international attention because of the historical and cultural significance of an area in the City of Dubrovnik known as the Old Town which sustained considerable damage during these attacks.

2. The importance in terms of cultural heritage of the Old Town of Dubrovnik has been recognized by UNESCO through its inclusion on the World Heritage List in 1979. For this reason, the Battle of Dubrovnik is significant for law of armed conflict since the military actions of the JNA, especially in the early stages of the battle, appear to have caused inordinately extensive damages not only to civilian but also to the cultural, historical and religious property in proportion to what would reasonably have been expected given the number, location and nature of valid military objectives within the District of Dubrovnik.

3. It was with these circumstances in mind that the Rapporteur for On-site Investigations, Mr. William Fenrick, visited Dubrovnik in May 1993. As a result of his recommendation, the Commission sent a team to Dubrovnik to study the Battle of Dubrovnik. Accordingly, the Commission approved the study and a plan of action was provided by the Commission. The plan of action called for the deployment, on behalf of the Commission, of a small team of law of armed conflict experts (Lieutenant Colonel Dominic McAlea, Major Terje Lundt and Major Oyvend Hoel) and an art historian (Mr. Colin Kaiser) to the area of Dubrovnik from 10 October to 4 November 1993 in order to:

   (a) review and collect copies of relevant documents and reports in situ;

   (b) meet with United Nations, European Community Monitoring Mission, Croatian and Serbian officials;

   (c) visit and analyse relevant sites in and around Dubrovnik;

   (d) videotape and photograph appropriate sites, and

   (e) interview witnesses.

4. The ultimate objective of the team was to prepare this analytical survey focusing upon injury to civilians and to civilian objects (particularly cultural objects) with a view to:

   (a) determine whether and when indiscriminate attacks or deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian objects have occurred;

   (b) quantify the loss of civilian life, injury to civilian persons, and damage to civilian property, including cultural property, and

   (c) attribute responsibility for apparent violations of the law of armed conflict.
B. Methodology

5. The methodology contemplated in the original plan of action was deviated from, to a certain extent, as some circumstances differed from what had been anticipated. Therefore, the survey became less ambitious in some aspects. For example, the documentary evidence available on some matters was so voluminous that rather than seeking to collect substantive evidence with respect to all potential violations of the law of armed conflict during the Battle of Dubrovnik, the Commission assessed the main sources available in terms of type, quality, category, comprehensiveness and probative value with a view to providing substantial assistance to a future prosecution team. This does not mean that the Commission failed to gather substantive evidence with respect to some particular, potential violations of the law of armed conflict. Certain promising cases were examined as well as the subject of specific recommendations in this report (see chapter XII) for further prosecutorial investigations.

6. In addition to the problem caused by the volume of the available documentary evidence, it became apparent soon after the commencement of its survey that the Commission would be unable, given the time constraints, to conduct comprehensive, or even effectively representative interviews of witnesses or visits to sites. The number of potential witnesses of violations of the law of armed conflict was so great, and they were so widely dispersed, that a team twice as large as the present would be required to carry out this task, as well as several months on-site to complete the investigation thoroughly. Many suspected violations took place in the occupied areas of the District of Dubrovnik in addition to what was suspected to have occurred in the City of Dubrovnik. The part of the District of Dubrovnik, which was the subject of the Commission's survey, included hundreds of towns and villages spread along a seventy-five kilometre band in which approximately three to five thousand residents remained throughout its occupation by the JNA (which was for more than a year in some places).

7. Although the Commission was provided with a plethora of information from different sources, other crucial sources of information proved to be inaccessible. Information held by the Croatian Ministry of Defence with respect to the constitution, location, and movement of military forces in and around the District of Dubrovnik from September 1991 until October 1992 was the most notable gap. This is only one example of how access to important sources of information was effectively denied, even though the Commission had previously visited all the key local government officials and secured their promise of positive support for the Commission's investigative efforts. In a related vein, the need to acquire some information from other than Croatian sources also proved to be problematic because of the short time frame available to the Commission to complete the report, and because of the Commission's limited ability to cross political boundaries.

C. Sources and analysis of information

8. The evidence assessed by the Commission came in many forms:

(a) oral narrative from first hand witnesses;
(b) written witness statements or memoranda prepared at the time of, or shortly after, the event in question;
(c) hearsay;
(d) photographic and videotape evidence;
(e) physical evidence such as unexploded ordnance;
(f) documentary evidence including the reports of previous investigations by national bodies, such as the civilian police, or international bodies, such as UNESCO, and
(g) a local district criminal court judgement.

9. The actual sources of information were also quite varied:
(a) former JNA Captain Zeljko Soldo and many other first hand witnesses;
(b) the Dubrovnik civilian police war crimes investigation files;
(c) the report and files of the Dubrovnik Civil Defence agency;
(d) the ECMM HQ files in Zagreb relevant to the period;
(e) the UNESCO report on the damage to the Old Town of Dubrovnik;
(f) the Council of Europe report on the damage to the small towns and villages of the District of Dubrovnik;
(g) the reports of the Institute for the Protection and Conservation of Historic Monuments on the damage to the Old Town of Dubrovnik;
(h) damage repair estimates from the Restoration Institute of Dubrovnik;
(i) the original judgement of the District Court of Dubrovnik in the case of former JNA Captain F. Soldo as well as F. Soldo's appeal;
(j) guided, as well as self-directed, site visits to various locations within the Old and New Towns in the City of Dubrovnik and District of Dubrovnik;
(k) the report of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences on the damage to the old Arboretum of Trsteno;
(l) casualty reports from the Dubrovnik Red Cross;
(m) casualty reports from the databank Dr. Ivan Kostovic (Vice-President of the Republic of Croatia) in Zagreb;
(n) videotapes made by private citizens of various military activities of the JNA during the relevant period, and by team members, of the current state of damage to the Old Town, and
(o) the files of the office of the Dubrovnik District Prosecutor's Office.

10. The Commission always assessed this evidence, with a view to identifying what would be relevant and useful for the purposes of future war crimes prosecutions before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY). Therefore, evidence with respect to essential elements of potential war crimes was sought, and when found, it was analysed in terms of type, quality, category, comprehensiveness and probative value. In collecting evidence or identifying and analysing sources of evidence, the Commission's team first sought evidence which was independent and directly probative.
Evidence of lesser quality was sought in default of this or as corroboration. It also attempted to build redundancy into the bases for potential future prosecutions by always seeking out secondary, non-connected, sources of evidence as supplementary proof of the essential elements of suspected violations of law of armed conflict.

II. CULTURAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF DUBROVNIK

A. Background

11. In 1991, the City of Dubrovnik was capital of a district or community that covered some 979 square kilometres and stretched about 200 kilometres from the peninsula of Prevlaka on the Boka Kortorska in the south-east to the end of the Peljjesac peninsula in the north-west. The mainland area itself is narrow, ranging from 500 metres to 15 kilometres in width.

12. According to the census of 1991, the population of the City of Dubrovnik and the surrounding district was 71,419 of whom 49,728 lived in the city itself. Of this population, 82.4 per cent were Croatian, 6.8 per cent were Serbs, and 4 per cent were Muslims. The rest were comprised of 20 other ethnic groups, not including a small group of "others".

13. The city and the rest of the district contain symbols of cultural heritage of outstanding value. The Old Town of Dubrovnik, for example, was "consecrated" by the World Heritage Committee by inscription on the World Heritage List in 1979. The region contains: small towns whose urban structure is of high historic interest (e.g. Mali Ston); numerous monastic establishments, especially Franciscan; and the summer residences of the old Dubrovnik aristocracy. The villages in the south-eastern region, Konavle, and particularly in the poorer north-western region, Primorje, present an extremely high degree of architectural authenticity, the latter forming a remarkable landscape of limestone houses in hilly and frequently arid settings, amidst the remnants of a traditional Mediterranean forest of oaks.

14. The settlement of Dubrovnik was first mentioned in written records by an anonymous cosmographer of Ravenna in 667. Known in Latin as Ragusium, it was long known by its Italian name, Ragusa, before its Croatian name Dubrovnik (from Dubravka, "forest of oaks") acquired general acceptance.

15. In the political vacuum left by the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, Dubrovnik found itself faced by numerous dangers from the Slavic peoples on the mainland and from invasion by sea. Geography forced it to turn towards the sea and to seek protection, or at least the benevolent indifference, of greater powers. This exigency would greatly influence its history up to the end of its independence which occurred de jure in 1808 with its attachment to the Illyrian provinces governed by France.

16. Sequentially, Dubrovnik experienced the suzerainty of Byzantium, the Normans, and Venice, which was to remain its great rival for the Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean trade. Venice ruled Dubrovnik directly from 1000 to 1018, from 1171 to 1172, and intermittently after 1232 until finally losing control in 1358. From this year until the disastrous battle of Mohac in 1526, Dubrovnik recognized as its sovereign the Croatian-Hungarian kings. Until the fall of the republic of Dubrovnik in 1808, Dubrovnik's sovereign was the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. During this period, Dubrovnik paid tribute, but at the same time enjoyed considerable trading privileges throughout the Empire. In 1699, Dubrovnik recognized the good offices of Vienna in settling its territorial disputes with Venice, and for a century added the protection of the Habsburgs to that of Constantinople. It is important to realize,
however, that these dominations were nominal only and that Dubrovnik has effectively been an independent republic throughout most of its history.

17. Militarily weak, Dubrovnik deployed treasures of diplomacy and amassed treasures from the sea and the land routes that wound through Bosnia. It concluded numerous treaties with Italian city states and negotiated advantageous arrangements with its powerful protectors. Toward the end of its golden age, in the last decades of the 16th century, it had a merchant fleet of 200 vessels. Devastated by the earthquake of 1667, which decapitated the town of its merchant aristocrats, it arose from its ruins thanks to its fleet and enjoyed a notable economic recovery in the 18th century.

18. In 1814, Dubrovnik became a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918. Throughout the 19th century it continued to prosper, but its economic significance dwindled. The building of the Imperial Hotel in 1898, was a harbinger of the economic function that would predominate after the Second World War and expand enormously in the 1970s – tourism.

19. The wealth of its trading aristocracy, combined with the loyalty to its own identity, played a vital role in the establishment of the Old Town that was honoured by the international community in 1979.

B. The Old Town of Dubrovnik

20. The Old Town is contained in a small area. The distance from Fort Minceta to St. Peter's on the sea is 450 metres, while the distance from Fort Bokar in the west to Fort St. John in the east, parallel to the axis of the Stradun, is 550 metres. This dense urban space is confined by fortifications whose present aspect is derived mainly from the building campaigns of the 15th and 16th centuries. These fortifications are 6 metres thick on the land side, and 1.5 metres on the sea side, but individual bastions (Fort St. John and Fort Minceta) are thicker. The imperatives of organizing life within this defensive structure explain to a large degree the astringency of subsequent urban legislation.

21. The settlement on the promontory that overlooks the sea, supposedly the home of the refugees who fled Epidaurus (present day Cavtat), was joined to the burg on the slopes of Mount Srdj by filling in an arm of the sea during the tenth and eleventh centuries. The municipal regulation of 1272 dictated building standards and forms that were long to be respected. Such regulation also softened the impact of changing architectural styles in the Mediterranean world and prevented the rebuilding that followed the catastrophic earthquake of 1667 from radically changing the scale and design of the new structures. Dubrovnik engaged Italian architects, whose creations (even those of the Baroque period such as St. Blaise, the Cathedral and, to a lesser extent, the Jesuit church) would not clash excessively with the surrounding architecture. All buildings were of hard limestone with the same pale yellow and light red roofing tiles. Aristocratic residences and most public buildings were sober in decoration, and important buildings attained monumental status through perspective and not size. The slow, regulated accretions of the ages created a remarkable architectural ensemble of great coherence. The architectural safety valve of expansion into neighbouring districts outside of the Old Town walls (Ploce, Pile) and the economic decline of the Old Town conserved its authenticity.

22. The Old Town is not only an architectural and urbanistic ensemble of high quality; it also contains museums and libraries of interest (e.g. the collection of Ragusan masters in the Dominican Monastery, the Museum of the
History of Dubrovnik, the Icon Museum, the libraries of the Franciscan and Dominican Monasteries). Above all, it houses the archives of Ragusa. Kept continuously since the last quarter of the 13th century, they are "the most important source for Mediterranean history" according to the French historian, Fernand Braudel.

III. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

23. Until its dissolution in 1991, the Peoples' Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a federal state composed of six republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), with two autonomous provinces attached to Serbia that were abolished in 1989. The federal state which was created at the end of the World War II was an attempt to escape the centralizing tendencies of the Serbian monarchy of the first state of Yugoslavia (1918-1941). Under the leadership of Marshal Tito nationalist tensions were kept under control, but after his death in 1980, these aspirations became stronger and were exacerbated by the economic crisis within the country.

24. Tensions increased markedly after 1985 - with the nationalist revival in Serbia, riots in Kosovo (one of the autonomous provinces) in 1989, and the end of the dominant role of the single party - the Communist League - in Slovenia the same year. In 1990, there were free elections throughout the Federal Republic which brought to power nationalist parties, such as the HDZ of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. Slovenia declared that it was a "sovereign state" within the Federal Republic in July, and Croatia modified its own constitution in July and December. At the same time, a Serbian autonomous movement emerged in the Krajina region of Croatia, which had a large Serbian population, giving rise to a declaration of separation from Croatia in February 1991.

25. The federal presidency proved incapable of bringing about either effective economic reforms or satisfactory constitutional changes, and the dissolution of the Federal Republic accelerated. The first violent incidents occurred in the Krajina at Plitvice (31 March 1991), and they were followed by others (killing of Croatian policemen in Borovo Selo on 6 May 1991). In Croatia, a referendum on independence was carried out in May 1991, and it was followed by simultaneous declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia on 26 June 1991. The JNA (Yugoslav National Army) intervened in Slovenia the following day, but mediation by the European Community led to agreement to withdraw JNA forces and a three-month moratorium on the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.

26. In July and August of 1991, the situation in Croatia worsened due to numerous attacks staged by Serbian para-military forces who were supported by the JNA. A coalition government was formed in Croatia under the presidency of Tudjman on 1 August 1991, and two weeks later, the JNA intervened massively in Eastern Slavonia with the attack on the town of Vukovar beginning on 26 August. JNA garrisons were blockaded by Croatian forces, and further operations were carried out by the JNA in the Krajina and the Dalmatian coast, where Croatian towns were blockaded from the sea. On 25 September the United Nations introduced an arms embargo on all the republics of the former Yugoslavia. On 1 October 1991, the JNA invaded the District of Dubrovnik on multiple axes; the District was blockaded by sea and was subjected to bombardments by land, sea and air.
IV. THE MILITARY SITUATION

A. Sources

27. As mentioned in Chapter I, the Commission's ability to obtain primary source information with respect to the Order of Battle and activities of the JNA and Croatian Army was effectively foreclosed for reasons which remain speculative. Other sources, less comprehensive or authoritative, provided a useful perspective. Those sources are:

(a) interview with former JNA Captain Zeljko Soldo on 26 October 1993;
(b) Civilian Police files;
(c) ECMM reports concerning the period in question;
(d) first hand witnesses, such as the members of the Dubrovnik negotiating team (crisis committee) which met regularly with representatives of the JNA forces, and
(e) UN reports.

B. The Croatian Army order of battle

28. The Croatian military forces, present in the District of Dubrovnik in September 1991, were virtually non-existent. A platoon-minus sized body with light weapons manned the Imperial Fort on Mount Srdj (built during the Napoleonic period). It was stationed about one kilometre up Mount Srdj above the Old Town of Dubrovnik. No other regular army units were present in the district, except for a national territorial defence force or "homeguard", which could be considered operational from a military perspective. A Yugoslavian Naval installation, controlled by Belgrade, was present in the Prevlaka area at the extreme southerly tip of the District of Dubrovnik.

29. The immediate reason for the absence of any significant Croatian military presence could not be attributed to the fact that the Croatian authorities' assessment of the threat to this district was insignificant. Certainly, the proportion of the Serbian population in this area was relatively low (6.8 per cent). Further, the military authorities in Belgrade had affirmed that it was not their intention to attack Dubrovnik. In addition, the District of Dubrovnik (apart from Prevlaka) had long before been largely demilitarized. The last regular army unit of any significance located in the District of Dubrovnik was moved in 1968, and the territorial defence armament was transferred in 1972 to Duči and Grab, also in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

30. Another important factor to this equation is the General Order issued in May-June 1989, in Belgrade, at the JNA Headquarters, by which it would appear that the territorial defence forces of Croatia and Slovenia were disarmed. This element is essential for understanding the Croatian military situation, as its knowledge can be imputed to the senior JNA authorities. This may fundamentally effect the validity of their direction to subordinate JNA authorities with respect to the presence and nature of military objectives in the District of Dubrovnik.

31. The presence of the Croatian Army in the District of Dubrovnik has increased significantly since January 1992, nevertheless, the information available to the Commission was scant and limited at this stage.
C. The "Yugoslavian" order of battle

32. Even though the JNA and Yugoslav Navy and Air Force were involved in the bombardment and occupation of the District of Dubrovnik, only limited information regarding their conclusion and activities were made available to the Commission.

33. The JNA unit which occupied the hills closest to, and immediately above, the City of Dubrovnik was the III Motor Vehicle Battalion of the Trebinje Brigade detached for the purposes of that operation to the Military Naval Sector with headquarters in Herceg Novi, Montenegro. It was comprised of three sharpshooter (rifle) companies, one anti-tank company, one mixed-mortar company and one tank detachment under the command of a named officer not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. It had a strength of approximately 800 to 1000 personnel; 50 per cent professional JNA soldiers, and 50 per cent were reservists from Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

34. As previously stated, elements of this unit were positioned all around the hills, directly overlooking the City of Dubrovnik (Zarkovia and Bosanka in particular), and they participated extensively in the bombardment of both the Old and New Towns of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. They appear to have possessed a wide assortment of former Warsaw-Pact type weapons, as well as Yugoslavian variants of the same. These included: 60 millimeter, 82 millimeter and 120 millimeter mortars; 82 millimeter rockets; 20 millimeter anti-aircraft guns; 85-105 millimeter tank guns; 62 millimeter recoilless rifles, and 7.62 millimeter assault rifles and general purpose machine guns. With the approval of the sector commander, this unit also had access to the employment of 130 millimeter artillery.

35. The sector commander was a JNA officer of Vice-Admiral rank. A number of other officers involved in this operation both on sea and on land are known but not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

36. In regard to the strength of the JNA forces which occupied the District of Dubrovnik, estimates range from 7,500 to 20,000 men. A more precise estimation of the number of JNA personnel involved in this operation and a determination of the place of origin of most of them remains to be discovered. Little else is known about the constitution of the JNA forces apart from the names of several individual officers who came into contact with local Dubrovnik authorities.

V. THE OCCUPATION OF THE DISTRICT OF DUBROVNIK

A. Sources

37. As mentioned in Chapter IV, the lack of information from Croatian and Serbian military sources precludes, at present, any detailed or authoritative description of the military actions which resulted in the occupation of the District of Dubrovnik by JNA forces in the fall of 1991, or on the events which occurred during that occupation. This gap in information prevents the Commission from determining many facts which could be crucial for the attribution of criminal responsibility. For example, it was often possible for the Commission to determine when and where a civilian was killed or wounded. The attribution of criminal responsibility, however, requires clear answers to the following questions:

(a) Did the person die as a result of military action or accident?
(b) Prior to his/her death, was this "civilian" acting consistently with his/her status as a non-combatant?

(c) If the person died as a result of military action, was he/she specifically targeted or was he/she a collateral victim of an attack upon a valid military objective or was he/she the collateral victim of an attack upon an unlawful target?

(d) Who committed the act which resulted in the civilian's death?

(e) Was the person, who caused the death of the civilian, acting on his/her own initiative or pursuant to orders? If such orders were given, who gave them or passed them on?

(f) If the person who committed the act was acting on his/her own initiative, what guidance had he/she been given by his/her superiors regarding appropriate conduct? Who are his/her superiors?

(g) Did the superiors of the person who committed the act monitor his/her conduct and the conduct of all their subordinates? Who are their superiors?

38. These particular questions focus upon the death of a civilian or non-combatant, but they represent the type of questions which must be answered with respect to all types of violations of the law of armed conflict, whether they refer to lawful combatants, civilian property, religious or historical property.

39. Without information on the marginal activities to the ad hoc military units formed in Croatia to resist the JNA advance, the determination of what constituted a valid military objective for JNA attention is very difficult. Similarly, without information about the names and locations of commanders and command structure of JNA units and formations, finding the answers to the questions posed in paragraph 37 becomes a matter of an enormous expenditure of investigative energy and luck. Therefore, this basic information should be obtained before any future prosecutorial teams begin assembling cases with respect to specific law of armed conflict violations.

40. Although the Commission's team was able to obtain a limited amount of information which exists on the subject, the Commission has managed to construct a general outline of how most of the District of Dubrovnik came to be occupied by JNA forces and some of the events which occurred during this period which suggest a violation of the law of armed conflict. This has been done with information obtained from first-hand witnesses and reports from the Dubrovnik Civilian Defence, the Dubrovnik Civil Defence authorities, the Dubrovnik Red Cross, the United Nations Military Observers Detachment Dubrovnik and the former ECMM Detachment Dubrovnik.

41. Independent information on the constitution and actions of the respective military forces is expected to be provided in the near future through the Commission of Experts. This additional information should contribute to a better understanding of the events in question.

B. Konavle - the south

42. The political tensions described in Chapter III manifested themselves militarily at the end of September 1991 in Konavle, located in the south-east of Dubrovnik. At that time the Yugoslavian Navy established a blockade along the southern coast of Dubrovnik, and the JNA deployed its forces along the
border with Croatia. On 23 September 1991, the southern village of Vitaljina was bombarded. Many villages throughout Konavle were subjected to artillery bombardments, including the village Brgat, located five kilometres from the city of Dubrovnik.

43. On 1 October 1991, the JNA entered Konavle by several routes and began to move steadily north-west through Konavle toward the city of Dubrovnik (this action was co-ordinated with a similar, multiple-axis advance toward the city of Dubrovnik through Primorje and the area known as the Rijeka Dubrovacka areas to the north-west of the City of Dubrovnik). As far the Commission's team has been able to determine, the resistance to the JNA's advance took the form of small, poorly armed, and hastily formed, bodies of "homeguard", composed of men from the Croatian police and former members of Croatian descent who had deserted the JNA. Information regarding their numbers, weaponry and activity is limited. It can be said, however, that the nature of this resistance was such that there was no "front line" distinction between the JNA and Croatian military forces - only the edge of the area up to which the JNA had advanced.

44. By the middle of October 1991, the JNA forces had advanced to an area approximately fifteen kilometres south-east of the City of Dubrovnik, near the village of Mocici. This advance caused thousands of residents of Konavle to seek refuge in the City of Dubrovnik, thereby severely straining the city's already diminished resources (see Chapter VI). Thousands of people remained in their residences throughout the occupation, and they represent an enormous potential source of information on alleged violations of the law of armed conflict. At that time, the ECMM arranged for representatives of the JNA forces and the City of Dubrovnik to meet in order to negotiate on matters such as cease-fires, public utilities and prisoner exchanges. These negotiations and cease-fire arrangements had no real effect upon the advance of the JNA toward the City of Dubrovnik. During the next two weeks, the JNA forces advanced north-westward through Cavtat, Plat, and Zupa Dubrovacka until they occupied, on 26 October 1991, the promontory of Zarkovica, which commands a direct view of practically all of the City of Dubrovnik.

45. The occupation of the Zarkovica promontory represented the end of the JNA's north-westward advance and the beginning of what was to be a year long occupation of the entire area of Konavle by the JNA forces. By this time, many civilians in Konavle had been killed or wounded as a result of the military action incidental to occupation of Konavle by JNA forces. As the entire details of the circumstances surrounding these deaths and wounding were not available to the Commission's team, this report cannot present, at this stage, a complete and balanced account of the events. Nevertheless, due to the nature of the resistance mounted against the JNA during its advance through Konavle and the district paucity of any valid military objectives, it is suggested that many of these deaths and wounding were not militarily necessary. Subject to the concerns set out in paragraphs 31 and 32, the extensive destruction of civilian property and cultural property by JNA forces during their advance or during the occupation, such as the damage to the Franciscan Monastery in Pridvorje or the Ethnographic Museum in Cilipi, would appear to fall into the same category. For these reasons, the conduct of the JNA forces during the advance north-westward will be the subject of a recommendation in Chapter XII.

46. Numerous allegations have been made with respect to the abuse of civilians who remained in Konavle during its occupation by JNA forces. Also, many allegations have been made with respect to the destruction and pillage of civilian and religious or historical property by JNA forces during their occupation of Konavle. The Commission's team has identified some victims of, and witnesses to, these alleged violations, as well as reports prepared by
local authorities. These allegations and this information will also be the subject of a recommendation in Chapter XII.

C. Primorje - the north

47. The co-ordinated, multiple-axis advance of JNA forces through Primorje, in the north-west, toward the City of Dubrovnik experienced the same negligible resistance as the JNA forces which advanced from the south-east. However, they did not follow a similar timetable. The JNA forces from the north-west entered Croatia at the beginning of October 1991, as did those from the south-east, but they did not occupy their final position surrounding the City of Dubrovnik until approximately 24 November 1991, almost one month after the JNA forces from the south-east halted their advance on the City of Dubrovnik. There may have been several reasons for this.

48. First, the control by the JNA forces of the strategically located Pigeon Rock on the border of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from the beginning of October 1991 effectively hemmed in the City of Dubrovnik to the north-west by land. By sea, the City of Dubrovnik was blockaded by the Yugoslavian Navy, and there was no infiltration without its permission. In combination, these factors would not have required the JNA forces to "hurry" down the coast from the north-west.

49. The JNA forces may also have approached this area more slowly because it was more internationally significant at that time. It may be recalled that the Kouchner Plan of 19 November 1991, called for the JNA forces advancing from the north-west to stop at Mokosica and for this halt to be monitored by ECMM monitors. This plan was followed closely by the Geneva Agreement of 23 November 1991 which also called for no further troop advancement. On the other hand, both of these agreements were violated as soon as they had become effective. However, with the information currently available, it is not possible to determine why the JNA forces advanced toward their final static position the way that they did.

50. The evidence available does clearly suggest that, (even more so than in Konavle), the nature of the resistance to the south-eastward advance of the JNA forces and the paucity of any valid military objectives in Primorje were such that many of the deaths and wounding of civilians, (significantly higher in Primorje than in Konavle), and much of the destruction of civilian property during this advance was not militarily necessary.

51. The concerns expressed in paragraph 46 above regarding the destruction and pillage of civilian property and religious or historical property during the occupation by JNA forces, (which lasted until the end of May 1992), are equally applicable to Primorje. Subject to the concerns set out in paragraphs 37 and 39 above, it is hard to imagine how the looting and desecration of the Franciscan Monastery of St. Jerome in Slano or the destruction of parts of the old Arboretum of Trsteno can be anything but two glaring examples of destructive acts which were not militarily necessary. As in Konavle, the occupation of Primorje caused many people to seek refuge in the City of Dubrovnik. Of course, many residents of Primorje remained in their homes during the occupation by JNA forces, and the information which they can provide with respect to the violations of the law of armed conflict during the occupation of Primorje should not be overlooked. Therefore, the conduct of JNA forces in the advancement through, and occupation of, Primorje will also be the subject of a recommendation in Chapter XII.
VI. THE "SIEGE" OF DUBROVNIK: OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1991

A. Sources

52. In addition to the sources noted in Chapters IV and V, information regarding the siege of Dubrovnik was derived from the reports of the UNESCO observers and the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments and the Natural Environment Institute. UNICEF was also present in Dubrovnik throughout November and December 1991, and possesses potentially useful information. Extensive videotape records made by ITN, local amateurs, the Dubrovnik Civilian Police and the Dubrovnik Civil Defence agencies during their investigations, and from Montenegrain television are also available.

B. Situation of the city area

53. The invasion of the District of Dubrovnik by the JNA led to masses of its residents seeking refuge in the City of Dubrovnik. These refugees numbered approximately 15,000, and most of them took shelter in the numerous hotels in the New Town (west of the Old Town); some stayed with relatives or friends. Approximately 7,000 others were evacuated by sea in October 1991. These evacuations became more difficult as the siege progressed, but negotiations with the JNA carried out by international organizations, such as the ICRC and UNICEF, with the assistance of Croatian humanitarian organizations and the local crisis committee, ensured that a further 9,000 persons, (mainly pregnant mothers, mothers with small children, the elderly and the sick), were able to leave by sea.

54. On 1 October 1991, the electricity and water to the city were lost as a result of aerial bombardment by JNA forces of the district's electrical grid. Except for those few people who had generators, the people of the City of Dubrovnik lived without electricity until the end of December 1991, and they were dependent on ships for their supply of fresh water.

C. Bombardments during October and November - military positions and weapons

55. It is difficult at this time for the Commission's team to present a precise chronology of the bombardments of, or firing on, the city area. With the exception of the discussion of the bombardments on the Old Town, the following comments will require revision as more information becomes available.

56. The Imperial Fort on Mount Srdj above the city and the telecommunications tower next to it, the hill of Zarkovica and the Ploce district (south-east area of city) were bombarded on 1 October 1991 and again the following day. On 3 October, the Hotel Belvedere, (in which there was a Croatian military post), was shelled, and JNA aircraft dropped bombs in the sea near the Hotel Argentina. There was further shelling of Ploce on 5 October 1991 and an airstrike on the Imperial Fort on 6 October 1991.

57. The city was relatively quiet thereafter until 18 October 1991, when airstrikes fell on Ploce again. Two days later, there was another airstrike on the Imperial Fort and further shelling of Ploce. On 22 October 1991, the hotels inhabited by displaced persons in Lapad (north-west area of city) were subjected to naval bombardment.

58. On 23 October 1991, the Old Town was bombarded for the first time. In particular, 120 millimeter mortar fire hit the Old Granary (Rupe), and 82
milimeter rockets struck a house on the Ulica Boskoviceva. It was also
reported by the local radio station that the Sponza Palace had been hit. This
bombardment probably originated from JNA positions consolidating on the
hills above the city.

On 24 October 1991, there was a naval bombardment of the Hotel Belvedere
and uninhabited Lokrum Island. The next day, the JNA representatives
presented an "ultimatum" to the Dubrovnik crisis committee and the ECMM
representatives. This "ultimatum" demanded the disarmament of the city and
the immediate departure of all Croatian military forces and "foreign
mercenaries", as well as the removal of the public officials who had been
elected during the previous free elections. On 26 October 1991, the
Yugoslavian flag was hoisted at Zarkovica, a point on a promontory 2.3
kilometres south-east and up from the Old Town. Zarkovica looks directly down
onto virtually all of the City of Dubrovnik, and it is a textbook example of a
point from which military actions can be directed against a location like the
City of Dubrovnik.

According to an ECMM report, the City of Dubrovnik was shelled again on
30 October 1991, and 6 civilians were wounded. This shelling was also
responsible for the deaths of a mother and her children on the following day.
This same source details the shelling on the Gruj and Lapad (western city
zone) on 1 November 1991. A complex of hotels in Babin Kuk, (also in the
western city zone), was bombed on 2 November, and several refugees were
wounded as a result. According to the ECMM report, shrapnel from JNA mortar
and artillery fire struck the Hotel Argentina the next day.

Automatic weapons were fired on the Old Town from the lines of the III
Motor Vehicle Battalion on 3 November 1991, wounding one person on the
Stradun, (the main east-west thoroughfare in the Old Town). On 4 and 5
November 1991, similar fire was directed toward the Hotel Argentina, and on
the following day, the Imperial Fort was bombarded again.

On 7 November 1991, an ultimatum was announced on the local radio,
demanding that all Croatian forces surrender by noon. On 8 November 1991,
Vice-Admiral Jokic announced that discussions with the Croats had not
succeeded and that he would spare only the Old Town. Bombardments continued
from 9 to 12 November, some of which were recorded on videotape by ITN. On 9
November, the Imperial Fort, Gruj and Lapad were bombarded. The following
day, the Imperial Fort was hit again, as well as the Hotel Belvedere, the
Excelsior Hotel, the Hotel Argentina and the Old Town. Naval vessels
participated in this bombardment. The Imperial Hotel, just west of the Old
Town, the Hotel Argentina, the Tirena Hotel on Babin Kuk, the new (St. Blaise)
Hospital, and the Old Town were hit the following day. On 12 November, the
Ploce district, the Imperial Hotel and the Old Town were bombarded again. On
13 November, only the Imperial Fort was attacked.

Apart from the targets mentioned, there is little precise information
available on targeting except with respect to the Old Town. Bombardment
damage to the Old Town was recorded by the Institute and for the most part
verified by UNESCO observers. Up until this point, mainly 82 millimeter
rockets had been fired at the Old Town. The front of the Small Port in the
south-east of the Old Town and the houses along the Stradun had been hit by
these projectiles, as were the St. John Fort and St. Peter's Bastion, which
were being used as shelters. Among notable monuments hit were the Sponza
Palace (roof and south-east facade), the Jesuit Church (roof and corniche
damaged by a 120 millimeter mortar), the Franciscan Bell Tower, and the Town
Clock Tower. The home for the elderly south of the St. Claire Monastery and
the city wall behind it were also hit. The location of these impacts were
such that the UNESCO observers concluded that the bombardment had come almost
entirely from the south-east. Pleasure craft in the Small Port were also hit with wire-guided rockets.

D. A month of negotiations

64. Throughout the rest of November 1991, there was a lull in JNA activity during which intensive negotiations between the JNA representatives and the Dubrovnik crisis committee took place. Such meetings had been brokered throughout October by the ECMM, but they were withdrawn in mid-November after an incident in which the ECMM claimed to have been deliberately targeted by the JNA. At this time, Bernard Kouchner, the French Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, and Stephan Di Mistura, Chief of the UNICEF Mission, took an active role in attempt to broker a cease-fire.

65. As a result of these efforts, a General Protocol Agreement was signed by both sides on 19 November 1991, which provided for mutual withdrawal of armed forces behind a neutral zone and, "under neutral control", the delivery of weapons and withdrawal of military elements for Dubrovnik. Another agreement, signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991, among other things called for a cease-fire and withdrawal of JNA forces from the District of Dubrovnik. Yet another agreement, specific to Dubrovnik, was negotiated on 5 December 1991, punctuated by the 6 December 1991 bombardment and then signed on 7 December 1991. None of these agreements had any real effect upon the JNA activity in the district.

66. On 2 December 1991, automatic weapons fire was directed on the Old Town. Witnessed by one of the UNESCO observers, it wounded one civilian. The following day, automatic weapons fire wounded several civilians at Ploce. On 4 December, the Imperial Fort was subjected to mortar fire.

E. The St. Nicholas day bombardment - 6 December 1991

67. At 5:48 hours, on 6 December 1991, the single heaviest bombardment that the Old Town was to experience began. In its opening stages, 82 millimeter rockets struck the Old Town, (48 impacts according to the Institute). The bombardment continued with the utilization of 82 millimeter mortars (232 impacts) and 120 millimeter mortars (364 impacts). The intensive shelling lasted until about 11:30 hours. Wire-guided rockets (22) were used on yachts in the Small Port, and others were fired on the Old Town itself. For example, videotape records show one of these hitting the drum of the Cathedral.

68. It is possible that heavier calibre weapons were used. This could be the case since two impacts on the interior parapets of the Old Town caused more damage than would normally be expected from 120 millimeter mortars. Local records indicate that, in addition to those already mentioned, about 300 other projectiles landed in the Old Town, but did not explode. This information has yet to be verified. Photographic evidence and rough crater analysis suggest that, as with previous bombardments, most of the firing originated from the south-east. Combining these findings with the known range of projectiles involved, the source can reasonably be established as coming from a particular unit whose name and emplacement are not mentioned for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

69. On 6 December 1991, the targeting was different than earlier bombardments. The south-eastern front of the Old Town, except for the Dominican Convent, was relatively unscathed. This means that the monumental zone at the end of the Old Town, including the Sponza Palace, the Rector's Palace, St. Blaise Church and the Cathedral, maintained its integrity.
Similarly, the southern part of the Old Town on the promontory over the sea did not receive many impacts either.

70. While there were many impacts north-east of the Stradun and on the Stradun itself, the preponderance of the heavy mortars fell upon the north-western part of the Old Town. The Franciscan Convent, the buildings near the Stradun and the buildings in the zone south-west of the Stradun were most seriously hit. This is also the area in which most of the burning damage occurred. According to the Institute report, a large proportion of the 120 millimeter mortars fell there. Some of those mortar rounds probably contained white phosphorus. This conclusion is suggested because of the distinctive red stains which were evident on the surfaces where these mortars exploded.

71. It might be more than coincidental that the zone which received the worst bombardment damage was also the area which had been most seriously damaged by the earthquake of 1979. However, this concordance might just as easily have been a coincidence. In a similarly cognitive vein, some evidence suggests the mortars fired upon the Old Town on that day were systematically firing upon pre-established grid co-ordinates, while other evidence suggests that the targets were selected opportunistically as those witnessing the effects of the bombardment from the observation post at Zarkovica monitored the activity of the JNA forces.

72. This bombardment not only struck the Old Town, but the Inter-University Centre west of the Old Town burned down as well, along with its library of 20,000 volumes. In addition, the worst civilian casualties (see Chapter VII) were incurred on this date, at the Hotel Libertas which is in the New Town and clearly visible from Zarkovica. Unfortunately, the information on the bombardment outside of the Old Town has not yet been organized in a way which would permit its proper analysis. It is buried in the reports of the Institute, the Civilian Police agencies, the Dubrovnik Red Cross, and probably the files of the Ministry of Defence.

F. The inquiry of the JNA

73. The international media, the Director-General of UNESCO (Federic Mayor), and Cyrus Vance, (the UN negotiator for the Yugoslavian crisis), protested strongly about the bombardment of 6 December 1991. The ECMM in Zagreb also lodged a strong protest the same day. In response, the JNA promised "a full investigation of the incident" and asked Croatia to do the same. Later that day, a statement of regret and apparent intention to discipline those responsible was received from the JNA. The team was unable to determine if this promised investigation was actually carried out. We know that on 7 December 1991, a delegation from the JNA visited the Old Town to investigate the damage, but we do not know if any other follow up occurred. A request has been made by the representatives of the Commission of Experts stationed in Zagreb to the Belgrade authorities, on the status of the promised investigation and disciplinary action taken on this matter, but at the time of writing, no response had been received.

74. After 6 December 1991, the JNA forces surrounding the City of Dubrovnik were relatively inactive until April-May 1992. In the meantime, the Croatian Army's capability in the city was increased dramatically. This resulted in a proliferation of valid military objectives in the City of Dubrovnik (but not in the Old Town). This increase in number and distribution of valid military objectives, combined with the Commission's lack of information on the constitution, location, and movements of these Croatian military forces, makes any realistic assessment of violations of the law of armed conflict after this
build up impossible. Therefore, at present, this survey will be largely limited to the period up to 7 December 1991.

75. From the perspective of the law of armed conflict, it is clear that there were valid military objectives in and around the City of Dubrovnik. Above the city was the Imperial Fort on Mount Srdj which was besieged continuously, but never overtaken by the JNA Forces. In addition to this, the team is aware that there were Croatian military forces located in Sustjepan and the Container Port on the Rijeka Dubrovačka; these locations were the only spots in the area which remotely resembled a "front line". Finally, evidence suggests that there may have been some Croatian military forces in Babin Kuk and Petka, however, this is uncertain at this point in time.

76. One point that remains clear is that the closest that any of these valid military objectives were to the Old Town was within one kilometre of the Imperial Fort, and most of them were between three to four kilometres away from the Old Town. They also appear to have been insignificant in terms of the numbers of military personnel and the calibre of their weaponry. In addition, knowledge of the special historical status of the Old Town which was recognized by UNESCO in 1979 upon the sponsorship of Yugoslavia can be imputed to the JNA. In addition to these aforementioned points, there is evidence that the Dubrovnik authorities, (aided by UNESCO observers), appear to have been scrupulous about keeping weapons out of the Old Town, that the besieging forces could see virtually everything that was going on in the Old Town, and that the Old Town was clearly subject to indiscriminate, and possibly even deliberate, targeting. Therefore, this conclusion will also be the subject of a recommendation for further investigation with a view to prosecution in Chapter XII.

VII. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

A. Sources of information

77. Sources of information with respect to those killed and wounded during the Battle of Dubrovnik are numerous and varied, and the Commission's team studied as many cases as were made available to them. In particular, the Commission's team studied the data available from the Dubrovnik Red Cross, the databank from Dr. Ivica Kostovic (Vice President of the Republic of Croatia), the Civilian Police and the data available along with the report of the Dubrovnik Civil Defence agency.

78. While using so many different sources may seem to represent unnecessary redundancy, such an approach was not wasteful since each source reflected a different approach to the data and contained unique information. For example, the Dubrovnik Red Cross data dealt with everyone from the District of Dubrovnik who had been killed as a result of hostilities. In addition, it made a distinction between civilians, the military, and police, and it provided the age of the victim as well as the date and place of his or her death. This data was presented by listing the victims alphabetically by name.

79. Dr. Kostovic's data listed all dead and wounded from the district. However, it made no distinction between civilians, the military, or police. Further, it provided the date of birth of the victims and the date of wounding with respect to those who had been killed, as well as those who had been wounded. This data was provided by listing the victims name in alphabetical order. The approach of the Dubrovnik Civil Defence agency was different again. It only listed, in chronological order, civilians from the district, as well as their age, the place they were injured, the date they were wounded and their degree of gravity, (from lightly to mortally wounded). Contrary to
other lists, information continued to be provided beyond, and it extended until March 1993.

80. The data provided by the Civilian Police arrived too late and it could not be analysed by the Commission.

B. Analysis

81. Although evidence with respect to the dead and wounded was plentiful and well presented, real problems subside. The data differs, not just in perspective, but also in substance. For example, the names of some people who have been killed appear on all three lists, in other cases their names appear only on two lists and, in other cases, only on one. In addition, the lists often contradict each other with respect to crucial information such as the date or place of injury.

82. These shortcomings do not indicate that the data is un-useful. For prosecutorial purposes, it will have to be independently verified and properly cross-referenced in terms of names, dates, places and nature of injury.

C. The dead and wounded

83. With respect to civilians who died as a result of hostilities, at least 82, (and possibly as many as 88), from the District of Dubrovnik were killed as a result of the JNA advance and occupation of the area from September 1991 until the end of December 1992.

84. It is also clear that most (about 50) of these civilians died as a result of JNA action prior to the St. Nicholas Day bombardment on 6 December 1991. Thirteen civilians died as a result of the bombardment on that date, and this represented the greatest number of civilian deaths that had, or would, be sustained on a single day during the Battle of Dubrovnik. About 20 more civilians were killed over the next twelve month period as a result of the hostilities.

85. Fewer conclusions can be made with respect to the available data on civilians wounded during this period. However, once the work contemplated in paragraph 82 above is completed, a more accurate account will be available regarding wounded civilians. In the meantime, it is clear that hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded, and while these figures may not seem high in absolute terms, when put into perspective, they become shocking.

86. To create this perspective, one must consider that civilians are non-combatants, (assuming that they do not do anything to jeopardize that status), and they may not legally be the object of attack by opposing forces. The law of armed conflict does contemplate the death or wounding of civilians as being legally possible, but this may only occur incidentally or collateral to attacks upon valid military objectives. When one considers: the overwhelming military superiority of the JNA forces throughout the period during which most of the civilians were killed or wounded (1 October 1991 to 6 December 1991); the negligible size, offensive impotence and isolated location of the pockets of resistance to the JNA occupation and siege of the District, and City, of Dubrovnik; the weapons used by the JNA (thousands of rounds or mortar and artillery fire of various calibers), and the ability to identify and neutralize specific Croatian military objectives which JNA forces had because of the weapons systems made available to them. Due to the ideal observation capacity that the JNA enjoyed through its command of the high ground, the air, and the sea, it seems clear that (at best) the JNA was indifferent to the
civilian casualties it caused or (at worst) it deliberately and systematically targeted civilians and civilian objects throughout this period.

87. As stated above, discrepancies and incompleteness of data with respect to civilian casualties and lack of information with respect to their nature are more comprehensive or precise than the location of activity as the respective military forces preclude. Therefore, the state and cohesiveness of the data with respect to the civilian casualties caused by the Battle of Dubrovnik will also be the subject of a recommendation for further investigation in Chapter XII.

VIII. DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN PROPERTY

A. Sources

88. The Institute for the Restoration of Dubrovnik is responsible for evaluating the war damage to private and public property in the District of Dubrovnik, with the exception of the cultural heritage, which is the responsibility of the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments and the Natural Environment.

89. So far, the former institute has completed its survey only for the housing of the district of Dubrovnik. Categorization of damage and the financial estimates for public buildings such as hotels, factories, shops, forests, etc. should be ready in the spring of 1994.

B. Categorization of damage

90. The statistics made available by the Institute cover the housing of the district, which includes thousands of buildings in the villages that are vernacular cultural heritage. The categorization used comprises six levels of damage:

(a) 1-3 represent minor damage to surfaces to slight damage to the building structure;

(b) 4 is heavy damage to the building structure;

(c) 5 is partial destruction of the building, and

(d) 6 is total destruction of the building.

91. Unfortunately, this system of categorization gives no indication of the actual means of destruction. Therefore, much of it is of insignificant use for purposes of attributing criminal responsibility. In the District of Dubrovnik, for example, burning was the cause of most damage except for the damage caused by shelling which is apparent in the "fighting" zones near to towns. In the New Town of Dubrovnik, shelling is the main cause of damage.

92. The following table represents the categories of damage for three zones, including the Old Town, but it must be kept in mind that the figures for the World Heritage Site do not include damage to sacral structures and many public buildings and monuments:
Total Number of damaged buildings: 11,425

93. These statistics reveal that the occupied areas of the district suffered the worst damage to housing, 93.9 per cent for category 4, 98.5 per cent for category 5, and 99.5 per cent for category 6. This explains why Chapter XII will include a recommendation that further investigations into war crimes include intensive investigation of damages to small towns and villages of the District of Dubrovnik.

C. Financial evaluation

94. Specifically concerning only the question of housing, the Institute has calculated that the cost of reconstructing the buildings comes to DM 69,000,000, and the cost of complete reinstallation of the families (reconstruction, appliances, furniture, etc.) is DM 480,000,000 (prices on 31 December 1990). The methodology used was elaborated by the Building Institute of Zagreb, and modified for local conditions.

IX. DAMAGE TO CULTURAL PROPERTY

A. Sources - Old Town and New Town

95. There have been numerous descriptions and evaluations of damage to the cultural heritage of the Old Town and, to a lesser extent, to the New Town of Dubrovnik. These have been prepared by the local Croatian cultural authorities, the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments and the Natural Environment of Dubrovnik as well as by UNESCO. There has been a great deal of co-operation between the Institute and UNESCO in the preparation of this information since the arrival of the UNESCO observer mission of November-December 1991, in culmination with the preparation of the Action Plan for the Old Town of Dubrovnik, published in February 1993. With the exception of the first report of the Institute, which was prepared in English, all the other local reports exist only in Croatian.

96. The first report of the Institute, dated 24 November 1991, contained maps and photographs and was prepared without outside assistance. It was entitled, "The Report on the War Destruction in Dubrovnik", and it covers damage in the Old Town which occurred during the bombardments of October and November 1991. The UNESCO observer mission checked most of the entries contained in this report and provided an evaluation of the damages for the Director-General of UNESCO.

97. The observer mission elaborated on a methodology which was adopted by the Institute. This methodology was simplified and did not have the same exactitude as the methodology elaborated on by the National Institute for Monuments in Zagreb, which was only prepared in the latter part of 1992.
Using the UNESCO observers' methodology, the Institute drew up a preliminary Report, contained in 7 volumes, on the Destruction in the Old Town Of Dubrovnik for the months of October, November, December 1991, which was completed on 6 January 1992. This document contains maps and photographs in addition to individual fiches on monuments and houses. It also covers the sections on the contact zones of the Old Town, and on Gruž and Lapad as well as second hand information about the occupied zones.

98. While in Dubrovnik, from 27 November to 20 December 1991, the UNESCO observers prepared reports that were transmitted to the Director-General. The first was on 3 December 1991, and two others followed the bombardment of 6, 7 and 8 December 1991. The second two reports included maps of impacts. Their final report ("Rapport sur l'état du patrimoine culturel dans la ville de Dubrovnik à la suite des bombardements d'octobre, de novembre et de décembre 1991"), submitted in January 1992, included first-hand information as well as summarized data already included in the January report of the Institute. The observers also took approximately 1,000 colour slides of the damage caused by the JNA bombardments of October-December 1991.

99. The Institute extended its work to include the New Town, using the same methodology, but working only on monuments and parks. This "Preliminary Report on War Destruction - October, November, December 1991", consists of 8 volumes and was completed in February 1992. This document contains many photographs and maps in addition to individual fiches.

100. The present mission did not closely examine the bombardments of May-July 1992, because of a lack of crucial information on the contested nature of the District of Dubrovnik during that period. Mention should be made of the "Preliminary Report on War Destruction in the Old Town in June-July 1992", which was completed on 27 August 1992, using the same methodology.

101. It should be pointed out that reports on damage to specific architectural elements were also prepared, but these grouped all the damage done in the bombardments of 1991 and 1992 ("Reports on Destruction of Architectural Elements and Stone on Monuments of the Old Town of Dubrovnik, August 1992, Project Programme for Renewal of Roofs destroyed in the 1991-92 War, August 1992).")

102. The UNESCO Action Plan contains cost estimates for restoration of the most important buildings, roofs, street surfaces, fixtures and the walls. However, it does not extend to other areas regarding damage.

B. Sources - the district of Dubrovnik

103. Analyses of damage to cultural heritage in the district are few and far between. The Island of Lokrum has been the subject of one report of the Institute (December 1991). Mali Ston was also the subject of a report (summer of 1992). The Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb had prepared a report on the damage to the Old Arboretum of Trsteno. Also, the Institute is slowly collecting information on moveable heritage, the monuments, and the vernacular architecture of the villages, but, at the present stage, it cannot present any overall appreciation of damage in the district.

104. The information report on "The Destruction by War of the Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina", dated 2 February 1992 and submitted to the Committee on Culture and Education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, contains a long section on damage in the district. This report was based on statistics presented by the Institute for the Restoration of Dubrovnik and on first hand observations carried out by its
consultant experts. No exhaustive approach was used for its preparation. As a result, a number of villages which did not suffer extensive damages were not visited. The utility of this report is close in proximity to the time of withdrawal of the JNA from Konavle in late October 1992. The Commission is in possession of about 300 colour slides and prints taken during the mission, with captions on this subject.

C. Damage to the Old Town of Dubrovnik during the bombardments of October-December 1991

105. The damage suffered by the Old Town during the bombardments of October and November 1991 was slight, relative to the damage sustained in December 1991. Caused primarily by 82 millimeter rocket fire, this damage was confined mainly to the stone surfaces of the Small Port, Fort St. John, St. Peter's Bastion, and the pavement of the Stradun. A number of houses were also hit, mainly in the roofs and the upper stories. In several instances, 120 millimeter mortars were shot, which caused extensive damage to roof structures. There were no fires caused by the bombardment during the October-November period, although the internal structures and contents of some buildings sustained some heat damage.

106. The damage done by the bombardment of 6 December was far more serious, however, due to the type of projectiles used (notably 120 millimeter mortars); the number fired, and the duration of continuous bombardment prevented the fire department and citizens from extinguishing fires before getting out of control.

107. In the report of January 1992, the Institute estimated that 55.9 per cent of the buildings had been damaged:

(a) 1 per cent had burned;
(b) 11.1 per cent had suffered serious structural damage;
(c) 26.4 per cent less severe damage to structural elements; and
(d) 17.4 per cent only minor damage to facades and roofs.

108. The worst devastation was caused by the burning of the roof and interior structures of seven places from the Baroque period. Among them was the Festival Palace, where the archives from the Summer Festival of Dubrovnik were kept and later destroyed by the fire. In several of these buildings, all floors and internal walls collapsed; in others, they collapsed only partially. Two other houses, of lesser cultural value, also burned down.

109. Individual monuments of importance sustained damage to stone and architectural decorative elements:

(a) St. Blaise Church (balustrade, medallion, statues, stained glass);
(b) the Cathedral (drum, statues);
(c) the Franciscan Convent (cloister: balustrade, columns, facade: library);
(d) the Dominican Convent (south door mouldings and the rose window of the church, cloister facades);
(e) the St. Claire Convent (facades, well); and
(f) the Onofrio Fountain (covering, stonework).

All of these monuments suffered damage of varying degrees to their roofs as well. The beautiful veined limestone of the Stradun was also disfigured by 43 mortar impacts.

110. Another type of serious damage, one which will permanently mark the town, was the destruction to the roofs of Dubrovnik. The Institute counted 336 direct impacts on roofs by which 254 roof sections were damaged by shell fragments. In the "Plan préliminaire de financement des travaux d'urgence de reconstruction, de réparation et de restauration pour la vieille ville de Dubrovnik à la suite des bombardements de novembre et de décembre 1991" the UNESCO observers and the Institute estimated that 56,747 square metres of roofs had been damaged. Therefore, thousands of traditional tiles were destroyed and probably will be replaced by modern imitations, since the manufacture of the old type of tiles was discontinued in the middle of the 19th century.

111. The surveys by the UNESCO observers and by the Institute carried out immediately after the 6 December bombardment under extremely difficult conditions, may suffer from a tendency to exaggerate the gravity of some impacts on facades and the stability of the greater buildings. However, with the exception of a few cases, little analysis was performed on the effects of vibrations from the detonations on buildings that had been shaken by the earthquake of 1979. In some instances, the amount of damage to some roofs was determined to be worse than originally estimated since surface tiles were often lifted by nearby detonations, falling back on the tiles underneath, and, in consequence, breaking them. This damage, as well as the weakening of the roof structures, was not readily visible, and only became visible at a later stage. To summarize, the hidden damage to the town was worse than the immediately assessed, and the obvious and visible damage was somewhat less in significance.

X. APPLICABLE LAW

A. The conflict

112. The geographical area, which once was the state of Yugoslavia, has been the stage for the use of varying degrees of force during the last two years, and these conflicts have involved parties with differing international status. Although the international status of Croatia during 1991 may reasonably be the subject of academic debate, the discussion to follow will be based upon the premise that the Battle of Dubrovnik was an international armed conflict.

B. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

113. In proposing the statute for an International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993) of 3 May 1993 (S/25704), required that only rules of international humanitarian law which were "beyond any doubt" part of customary international law were to be applied by the ICTFY. The report referred to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in justifying this position. Among other international instruments, the report cited the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague IV Convention Regulations, and the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal as being included in this group.
114. The additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions (AP 1) is conspicuous by its absence from this group, even though the former state of Yugoslavia ratified the AP 1 on 11 June 1979, and its successor states, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro are also bound at present by this international obligation in spite of the fact that large portions refer to customary international law. This restrictive approach was adopted to avoid the substantive and procedural problems which might be caused by non-universal adherence to AP 1.

115. In regard to the Battle of Dubrovnik, the non-inclusion of AP 1 does not represent a problem since the offences and principles of law set out in the statute of the ICTFY adopted 29 May 1993 satisfactorily cover all the violations identified by the Commission.

C. Offences

116. Although the statute of the ICTFY lists many possible offences on which the ICTFY could stand its jurisdiction, only those set out in Article 2(a), 2(d), 2(g) and Article 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and 3(e) have been determined relevant to the Battle of Dubrovnik, such as:

(a) wilful killing;

(b) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

(c) unlawful confinement of a civilian;

(d) wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(e) attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;

(f) seizure of, destruction, or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments, and works of art and science, and

(g) plunder of public or private property

D. Personal and command responsibility

117. The offences listed in paragraph 5 of the Statute provide perspective by including principles such as personal responsibility and command responsibility. Article 7 of the Statute sets out these principles and briefly states that one can incur criminal liability for the aforementioned offences: committing the offence oneself, ordering, planning or instigating the commission of an offence, or by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or deter the commission of an offence by subordinates if one knew, or ought to have known, that subordinates had committed or were about to commit an offence.

118. This statement may seem convoluted and unworkable, but it represents nothing more than a restatement of principles common to most domestic criminal law systems and those declared by many war crimes tribunals which sat in the years following the Second World War.
E. Protection of victims and witnesses

119. In accordance with Article 15 of the Statute, the need to protect victims and witnesses has also been recognized. This first took the form of Guidelines to the Commission's team for the Conduct of Inquiries and Interviews. Later, this took the form of an interview protocol which was developed by the Dubrovnik team as a way of ensuring absolutely that personal interviews do not violate the principle set out in Article 15 of the Statute.

F. Military objectives and other customary international law principles

120. The Statute of the ICTFY cannot hope to make all public international law applicable to armed conflict or even to the prosecution of individuals for grave breaches of this law. The Statute must be seen as an essential mechanism which functions as part of the great body of international humanitarian law for its enforcement through the suppression of grave breaches of the same. For this reason, we must remember that in addition to the Statute of the ICTFY and the international instruments specifically named, the great body of customary international law is also applicable to armed conflict.

121. A good way to illustrate this point is to consider a well known rule found in a notable international instrument. An example of this is found in the 1907 Hague IV Regulations which states that the right of opposing parties "to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited". Considered in isolation, this broad prohibition, by way of a double-negative, may seem to be too vague and abstract to be practically useful. However, this broad principle could be useful and could be made applicable to real armed conflicts with the application of concepts such as "military objective" which have become, over the last one-hundred years, part of customary international law.

122. As quoted in the Commission's team Report of the Battle of Sarajevo, "military objectives are those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use:

(a) make an effective contribution to military action, and

(b) whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage ..."

123. A "military objective" is a lawful target, and the knowledge of this criteria allows combatants and non-combatants alike to determine which kind of opposing forces are likely to attempt to destroy or neutralize. This concept also allows the competent authorities to assess the legality of the conduct of opposing forces and react accordingly. Without this concept, the above quoted rule would just be a legal abstraction. Concepts such as "undefended places or things" or "proportionality" or "neutrality" or "collateral damage" are other examples of concepts which make concrete rules of international humanitarian law.

124. These kind of principles complement the Statute of the ICTFY; thus they are part of the law applicable to the Battle of Dubrovnik as well as to the prosecutions initiated as a result of it.
XI. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

125. At this stage, based upon the collection and assessment of the evidence on the Battle of Dubrovnik, the Commission is not in a good position to suggest indictments for any individual. This is not because a prima facie case cannot be produced, but further evidence is needed. A prima facie case, however, can be made against certain officers with respect to the incident of 6 December 1991. Names are not included for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons.

126. The problem with the prima facie case against a known officer, whose name is not mentioned for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons, is that according to the Commission team's knowledge, several of the essential elements in the case were only provided by former JNA Captain Soldo - someone who has a lot to gain if he can pass on responsibility from himself to his superior. It may very well be that Soldo's evidence is reliable, but when one considers the enormous amount of raw data relevant to this case which has yet to be evaluated by an independent body such as the Commission's team, and the fact that the evidence on all of the essential elements is not as consistent as one would like, it seems reasonable to take the time to consider all the readily available evidence before preparing the indictment.

127. It is also possible that these officers could be linked to other offences in the occupied areas such as the unlawful confinement of civilians and plunder of private property. Clearly, more evidence is necessary to even consider issuing indictments for these additional offences. Cases against the commanding officers and other senior officers can be made and are subject to the same comments as those made above in paragraphs 125 and 126.

128. On the last day set aside for the drafting of this report, the team started to receive more information on the JNA command structure during the Battle of Dubrovnik. This enabled the Commission's team to have a more complete picture of the military hierarchy, but the Commission did not have enough time to go back to the records available to try to establish a link with any specific offences. This task must be reserved for the future.

129. In order to conduct effective prosecutions to punish violators of international humanitarian law and deter others from the same actions, indictments must be prepared dispassionately after all of the available evidence has been reviewed. The prosecutor will need to know:

(a) what offences occurred;
(b) where the offences occurred;
(c) when the offences occurred;
(d) how the offences occurred (by artillery? by mortars? by small arms? by beating? by burning? etc), and
(e) how the victim was conducting himself or how the building or town/village was being used at the relevant time.

130. The prosecutor will then need to correlate that information with reliable information regarding the names of units and unit commanders, as well as details of their activities at the relevant time. Armed with this kind of evidence, the prosecutor will be able to conduct successful prosecutions.

131. It should be noted that the local Croatian authorities have been working on their own cases for approximately two years. According to the Dubrovnik
Civilian Police, they completed investigations on 127 JNA members and forwarded them to the District Prosecutor's office with recommendations for charges. Out of these 127 cases, 36 are related to offences committed against the Old Town. The Dubrovnik Civilian Police have another 80 JNA members under investigation.

132. The local authorities also have a former JNA member, First Lieutenant Ahmet Alasani, in custody pending charges. The local authorities did not specify the charges except that they refer to crimes against Croatia. The Commission team's assessment concludes that local authorities operate under much less stringent rules of proof and evidence than those established by the ICTFY. For example, they include provisions for trials in absentia. Therefore, it is suggested that the statistics regarding these potential prosecutions should not be treated as anything other than interesting facts for assessing the feasibility and prospects of future investigations by the Commission’s team.

XII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION

A. Criteria

133. As mentioned in previous chapters, there are many avenues along which the initial work of the Commission's team should be followed either by further investigations of events or by reviewing the existing data. Specific incidents should receive priority of attention for any future investigative missions.

134. The Commission chose two basic criterion for the selection of specific incidents. The first criterium was determining how close the existing evidence was to establishing a prima facie case of a violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the Statute of the ICTFY against a specific individual or group of individuals. Therefore, cases which are most likely to bear fruit, from a prosecutorial point of view, should be given priority.

135. The second criterion for selecting incidents should involve those cases for which, though a strong prosecutorial case did not exist, are considered to be serious in terms of loss of life or health or loss of property. In other words, the most serious breaches of international humanitarian law should be properly investigated even though evidence with respect to them is scant or vague.

B. Crimes against persons

1. Wilful killing

136. During the Battle of Dubrovnik, 82 to 88 civilian persons were killed. The circumstances surrounding these deaths appear to be particularly disturbing. The deaths of firemen at the Libertas Hotel in the New Town of Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991 while they were fighting a fire appear to have been the result of a specific target by JNA forces. In that connection, a recording of the JNA radio transmission which gave the order to direct mortar fire on the firemen is in the possession of the Dubrovnik Civil Defence Agency. This case should receive investigative priority.

137. Another case of civilian deaths which should receive investigative priority is the apparently deliberate targeting by JNA forces of the hotels in the New Town of Dubrovnik during the fall of 1991. These hotels were filled with thousands of refugees. The JNA forces either had or ought to have had
knowledge of their presence.

2. **Unlawful confinement or abuse of civilians**

138. Approximately 5,000 civilians remained in the District of Dubrovnik during its occupation by JNA forces. The Dubrovnik Red Cross and the ICRC have collected information with respect to beatings and other maltreatment of civilians in these occupied areas, and these incidents should be followed up.

139. In addition, it appears that several employees of the hydro-electric plant at Plat were unlawfully confined during the occupation of that area.

3. **Arrest of protected persons**

140. Two Red Cross volunteers of a five-member Red Cross team were sent to Cajkovici to collect bodies. They were detained on 26 November 1991 by JNA forces. These volunteers, Muslims from Kosovo, were wearing Red Cross armbands at the time of their arrest. They were arrested by a known JNA officer, whose name is not disclosed for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. They have not been seen again, in spite of the efforts made by the Croatian Red Cross. This matter should also be followed up.

C. **Crimes against civilian property**

141. The incidents of wanton destruction and plunder of private property were so numerous and widespread that it is difficult to choose a starting point for further investigation. They must all be dealt with, and the Dubrovnik Civilian Police have already been working for at least one year investigating and documenting these violations by JNA forces. They must all be followed up. No specific recommendation is made, at this stage, with respect to a particular case.

D. **Crimes against religious, historical and cultural property**

142. With respect to the wanton destruction inflicted upon the Old and New Towns of Dubrovnik, immediate attention should be given to the development of cases against certain JNA officers, who are not named for confidentiality and prosecutorial reasons. The cases against all of these JNA officers are close to completion, and have already been the subject of considerable attention by the Croatian authorities. As to essential elements of these cases, such as the identities of the officers, the command structure and the damage to both moveable and immoveable cultural property - both religious and historic - are practically ready for prosecution, and they should be followed up.

143. As discussed in Chapters VIII and IX, the wanton destruction of cultural property was not limited to the Old and New Towns of Dubrovnik. The District of Dubrovnik suffered greatly, and was occupied for a considerable period of time. It experienced plunder as well as wanton destruction. The entire District of Dubrovnik should be the subject of further investigation. Starting points in the Primorje region should be the village of Slano and the old Arboretum of Trsteno which suffered both wanton destruction and plunder. It also appears that the village cemetery of Osojnik was subjected to desecration. In the Konavle region, the village of Cilipi and the Franciscan Convent of Pridvorje would be good starting points. These matters should also be the subject of early attention by any future Commission's investigative
144. In making these recommendations for further investigative efforts, it is understood that conducting these investigations will involve significant financial and personal resources and that the Commission of Expert's resources are limited. The Commission's team has no solution to this dilemma other than to emphasize how serious the violations of international humanitarian law were during the Battle of Dubrovnik and to state that evidence must be found and promptly secured if the Commission envisages prosecutions. With the passage of time, the physical evidence is most likely to get lost or mislaid. In addition, it is most possible that human memories and the international indignation will fade away.

XIII. LESSONS LEARNED

145. In all endeavours of this nature, lessons are to be learned. So that future Commission's team investigations may benefit from the experience, and mistakes of the Dubrovnik team, a brief outline recommending a methodology for making future investigations more efficient and effective is provided herewith. It is hoped that these recommendations will become a part of the Commission of Expert's corporate memory.

A. Interpreters

146. Independent and professional interpreters are essential to the effective operations of investigations of this kind. Two of the three interpreters used by the Commission's team were provided by the government of Croatia. Although they were charming and well motivated people, the Commission's team often had to discipline them so that they would only interpret and not carry on conversations which effectively excluded the Commission's team members from a conversation. This is a matter of professionalism, and it can normally be dealt with by the team members on the ground.

147. This problem was underscored when the team used the interpreter provided by the UNMO Detachment Dubrovnik. This interpreter was conscientious, disciplined and accurate. She also permitted the team to maintain an appearance of impartiality when this was very important (during the interview of former JNA Captain Soldo, for example). Having said this, there were clearly times when having an interpreter who was "connected" to the regime facilitated our investigation. The lesson learned is that independent interpreters are to be sought, but if they are not available, an interpreter who is less than perfectly independent is acceptable, (and advantageous in certain circumstances), as long as the interpreter is professional and disciplined.

B. Pre-deployment preparation

148. Much valuable investigatory time was lost once the team was deployed to Dubrovnik because the team had to spend time attempting to secure the co-operation of many local authorities who were prepared to be very bureaucratic in dealing with the team. The amount of time referred to was well beyond that would be dictated by courtesy and protocol, and in the end, the team was still not able to get access to a great deal of crucial, locally held data.

149. This could have been avoided if all of the important authorities had been formally contacted in advance so that they could grant the necessary permission and notify their subordinates to expect, and co-operate with, the
investigative team. Ideally, this could be accomplished by holding a pre-deployment conference at a convenient location. All of the necessary requests for co-operation could be prepared in draft during such a conference and then forwarded to the Commission of Experts in Geneva or Zagreb for official contact with the relevant authority. This would also be an appropriate occasion for the team members to identify issues and crucial areas and to prepare a very detailed plan of action and to identify and review relevant documentation so that the team would be more efficient and effective once it actually got on the ground.

C. On-site secretarial support

150. Although the team members were able to use the personal computer provided by the Commission of Experts and another provided by the Norwegian government in the processing of data and the preparation of this report, the team would clearly have been more efficient if it had some type of dedicated on site secretarial support. It is recommended that this type of support be made available to future investigative teams. If this type of support is not feasible, then each member of the team must have access to a personal computer to avoid the non-productive time which occurred when team members waited for a personal computer to become available.

D. Co-ordination with UNPROFOR and ECMM

151. Although the Commission’s team received significant support from the UNPROFOR and ECMM personnel individually and from the UNMOs as a group, the team did not receive as much formal support from UNPROFOR and ECMM as it might have. The team would most certainly have been more effective with such support. Therefore, it is recommended that co-ordination be requested at whatever level is necessary to secure the support of these organizations for future investigations.

E. Team members in uniform

152. It was readily apparent that being in a military uniform was helpful in some circumstances but a hinderance in others. During this mission three of the four team members would have been entitled to wear a uniform, but only one (the team leader) actually brought one to wear. It is recommended that those future team members who are entitled to wear military uniforms be given the option of doing so according to the circumstances as long as the team leader (if military) is always in uniform.

F. Team composition

153. The sheer volume of information available with respect to the Battle of Dubrovnik dictated very early in the deployment that the team would concentrate on an overall assessment of the evidence available with which to prosecute war crimes rather than on the assembling of specific war crimes cases. Therefore, the team was well constituted, with three lawyers and one art historian, to do this. In the future, however, if the mandate of a particular team is to assemble specific war crimes cases and conduct the personal interviews and other associated foot work, the team will have to be more heavily composed of trained investigators such as civilian or military police (at least four). Investigators might be drawn from the civilian or military police of UNPROFOR to conduct these investigations.
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ANNEX XII
RADIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION (UNPA SECTOR WEST, CROATIA)
OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1993

Under the Direction of:

William J. Fenrick
Member and Rapporteur for On-Site Investigations,

Prepared by:

Royal Netherlands Army
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical School, Members of Netherland's Contributed Personnel to the Commission of Experts
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I. GENERAL

1. On request of the United Nations Commission of Experts, two Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) specialists were temporarily attached to the Royal Netherlands Army UNPROFOR Support Detachment, in order to conduct a preliminary radiological survey in United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) Sector West. The team deployed to Croatia on 18 October 1993 and to the Sector on 20 October. The team conducted its investigation in the Sector until 3 November, redeployed to Zagreb on 3 November, and returned to The Netherlands on 4 November. An initial debriefing was held on 3 November at UNPROFOR Hqgs. Zagreb.

II. PERSONNEL

2. The NBC team was formed by two instructors of the NBC School of the Royal Netherlands Army, Captain J. J.H.M. Limbourg and Sergeant-Major C.C.L. Daelman.

III. EQUIPMENT

A. Radiological equipment

3. For the radiological survey, the team used the KL PDR 7000 radiological monitor, fitted with both an internal and external sensor. This radiation monitor proved to be an excellent tool for the mission, as it was capable of measuring the normal background radiation in Gamma mode, in Beta/Gamma mode, and to indicate the nuclear activity in water and soil samples. This meter is the standard radiological survey meter in the Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA), as well as the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF). In addition, a civilian gamma monitor was used.

4. For personal protection, the team was equipped with several personal dosimeters, named a "filmbadge" and two electronic dosimeters. The maximum dose allowed was 5 cGy for the NBC team and 0.5 cGy for any other personnel involved.

B. Additional equipment

5. Vehicular: UN Jeep Cherokee, fitted with VHF radio.

6. Communications: A satellite communication system with built-in Global Positioning System was provided. For back-up communication with the NBC School in The Netherlands, telephone communications were used from UNPROFOR Communications Centre in the Sector.

IV. EXECUTION

A. General

7. The locations of alleged dumping were given to the examining team only after their arrival in Zagreb. However, the information provided was hardly sufficient to conduct a thorough examination of the areas stated, as each of the mentioned areas covered at least 120 square kilometres. The team, as ordered by the Ministry of Defence in The Hague, only covered UNPA Sector West. Before deployment, the team conducted a very detailed map study. This, combined with information obtained from UN Civilian Police, UNPROFOR, and the
local population enabled the team to operate in the Sector.

B. Locations

8. The main area of the survey was UNPA Sector West, with Sector Hqs. at Daruvar. Within UNPA Sector West, two areas were indicated in the information given to the team. These two areas, PSUNJ mountains and PAPUK mountains, were of main interest. In addition, other areas in the Sector were covered, with special attention towards abandoned mine shafts, rockeries, and domestic waste dumps en route. Furthermore, the radiological situation at the gravesite in UNPA Sector West (Pakracka Poljana) was closely monitored as well, in order to eliminate rumours of possible dumping of radiological waste near the alleged mass graves.

9. Due to the increasing activities and the large movements of troops of the warring factions in the area of the Cease Fire Zone, combined with the increasing threat of snipers, the team was not able to examine the PSUNJ area. This was decided in conjunction with the Sector Commander and his staff in Daruvar.

C. Mode

10. The survey was held by mobile patrol, with both internal and external sensors. In the immediate area of measuring points, patrols by foot were conducted; i.e., one member of the team leaving the vehicle, vehicle moved away at least 50 metres, then reading the monitor. This, combined with the reading of the vehicle monitors, gave the most accurate results.

11. On five locations, soil samples were taken, to be investigated by the TSD laboratories in The Netherlands. Two of the samples were taken at the mass gravesite in UNPA Sector West (#1 and #5). The examination report is set out at page 4 of this report.

12. In total, 1,800 kilometres of roads were covered in the Sector, of which approx 1,100 kilometres non-metalled (gravel and sandpaths). Many minefields, possible locations and mine warning signs were seen and reported to UNPA Sector West Headquarters.

V. RESULTS

13. The normal, natural radiation ("background radiation") in the mission area proved to be approximately 0,25 uGy/h. This was an average, monitored throughout the team’s stay in the mission area. In UNPA Sector West, the level of nuclear activity proved to be between 0,05 uGy/h (location rockery 33TXL773533) and 0,45 uGy/h (location 33TXL 86685281, soil sample #2). All other readings were within this range.

14. Further investigation of possible dumpsites, such as rockeries, waste dumpsites and abandoned villages showed no physical presence of nuclear waste.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

15. The nuclear activity, measured at UNPA Sector West, proved NOT to be any higher than the normal background radiation. In addition, examination of the five soil samples proved that the quantity of radioactive materials in the samples can be considered as normal. These radioactive materials contribute
to the level of background radiation.

16. There were no signs of any nuclear waste in the areas searched.

17. The mission proved to be too short to conduct an investigation in the other areas. However, the team is willing to return, to examine the other areas.

Vught, 14 December 1993,

OIC NBC
Royal Netherlands Army
UNPROFOR Support Detachment
### Analysis Results of Soil Samples by TSD

**Captain RNLA**

**J. J.H.M LIMBOURG**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sample Nuclide</th>
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<th>#3</th>
<th>#4</th>
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<td>647</td>
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Units used in this table: Bq/kg (Becquerel per kilogramme)

**Conclusion:** There was no radioactivity found in the samples which was considered to be higher than that of the constant available "natural occurring radioactivity".

The first four nuclides mentioned are daughters of the parent nuclide Uranium, the last four of the parent nuclide Thorium. K-40 (potassium) is another naturally occurring nuclide, while the very small amounts of Cs-137 will be present anywhere in Europe because of the Chernobil accident.

The results are presented graphically in Appendix II.

(Dated 13 December 1993) (Signed Eng. A. Klerk)

*The method used caused a negative result.*